OHIO
IN NATIONAL POLITICS, 1865-1896
By CLIFFORD
H. MOORE, PH. D.,
Professor of History in Ripon College,
Ripon, Wisconsin.
CHAPTER I
SOME DETERMINING FACTORS
The sectional conflict, which ended in
1865, contrib-
uted a number of conflicting elements
to the new era of
national life. Prominent was the
suspicion engendered
by four years of struggle; and it
persisted throughout
the period of the next generation as a
barrier to a true
sense of national unity. Men easily
visualized the war's
destruction of life and property. Its
cruelty had left an
indelible imprint upon their memories,
and the dangers
of the "post war mind," which
selfish interests stood
ready to capitalize to their own ends,
tended to sweep
aside better standards of judgment in
matters of justice.
Through an inability to dissemble the
passions of
struggle, national problems became more
perplexing,
and they would have been intricate
under even more
favorable circumstances.
While the passions of war clouded the
future and
reduced unity to terms of military
supremacy or at best
to a legal theory, another great
sectional rivalry had
been temporarily eclipsed. The issue of
"one nation or
(220)
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 221
two" had united the north-east and
north-west in com-
mon purpose. A temporary alliance had
been formed:
it was the first of importance between
these sections
since states west of the Alleghanies
had begun entering
the Union. Its genius was the spirit of
Republicanism;
and every state in the north-west, from
Ohio to the Pa-
cific coast, expressed its allegiance
in terms of that par-
ty's ideals. In only five states, Ohio,
Indiana, Missouri,
Oregon and California, was the
Democratic party a
factor to be immediately reckoned with.
These states
consequently assumed primary importance
in party ma-
neuvers concerned with the issues of
reconstruction and
the new era of national life: at
critical times they shared
the balance of power and formed
vulnerable points in
the Republican ideal of unity.
Circumstances other than that just
mentioned mark
Ohio's claim to significance during the
era of national
reconstruction. Special importance is to be attached
to geographical location, the character
and extent of
population and economic interests. A
survey of the
period indicates that the state was in
one way or another
concerned with practically all those
developments which
featured national life as a whole:
whether viewed from
the standpoint of interests which were
purely local or in
the light of a broader relationship,
the history of the
state appears as a cross-section of the
new national de-
velopment.
In 1870, the largest population of any
state west of
the Alleghanies was located in Ohio.
The total reached
somewhat more than two and one-half
millions and
was surpassed by only two eastern
states, New York
and Pennsylvania; at a rough estimate
one-tenth of the
222 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications
national voting strength was accounted
for in this con-
stituency. The process of adjusting
varied social and
political interests incident to the
differing antecedents
of a population drawn from older
sections of the Union,
as well as a due proportion of the
European influx, fa-
vored an aggressive attitude toward
national as well
as state affairs. As the first product
of the Northwest
Territory a habit of leadership had
been assumed. His-
tory and tradition united in
attributing a peculiar
genius or merit to Ohio's native
stock--a sort of local
patriotism to be capitalized in
advancing her sons to
places of national honor. And the first
generation of
native born did represent a typical
product of the ante-
cedents and influences which
characterized national life
as a whole. The National Road was Mason
and Dixon's
line in miniature; "People from
the Southward" con-
tended with those of New England
antecedents for con-
trol of state and national affairs;
frontier experiences
had left their imprint and the state
had long since be-
come eloquent in advancing the western
cause in the
form of national issues.
Geographically, Ohio was the junction
point of
the types of civilization developed in
the older and in
process in the newer sections of the
nation. The Ohio
River, which skirts the entire southern
border of the
state, connects with the Mississippi
Valley and Gulf of
Mexico. Lake Erie on the north forms
the connecting
link with the Atlantic seaboard and the
north-west.
These waterways in the days of
primitive methods of
travel made possible the early
settlement of the state by
a heterogeneous population and provided
a national
highway for the exchange of products.
The generous
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 223
contributions of Ohio to the population
of north-west-
ern states, the degree to which the
state provided the
industrial centers of the seaboard with
agricultural
products and the importance of early
Ohio river com-
merce, attest the significance of this
fact.1 The census
of 1860 indicated that the state was
the center of na-
tional population. Industrial interests
centered to the
east and agricultural just to the west
of the state's
boundaries. Thus, historically and
geographically, the
state boxed the national compass and
was a social and
economic pivot of national interests.
Preceding the war, Ohio was primarily
identified
with
agricultural interests. Until
1880, less than
twenty-five per cent dwelt in cities of
4,000 or greater
population. In 1870, only one city
registered more than
100,000. Prosperity centered
extensively in the great
excess of farm products supplied to the
manufacturing
interests to the east and the
plantations to the south.
By 1860, however, the agricultural
frontier of the state
had passed. Progress in this line
related primarily to
the introduction of greater diversity
of crops and more
intensive methods of cultivation. The
advent of the
industrial frontier with its factory
and city life condi-
tioned a social and economic
readjustment by all odds
the most significant in the history of
the state. Urban
districts, although in a minority in
point of population
throughout the remainder of the
century, became the
1 A suggestive discussion of the social
and commercial relationship of
Ohio to the Southern states is found in
David Carl Shilling's Relation of
Southern Ohio to the South during the
Decade preceding the Civil War,
in the Quarterly Publication of the
Historical and Philosophical Society of
Ohio, Vol. XIII, 1913, No. 1. Cf. also Atlantic
Monthly, August, 1867,
(Vol. XX), pp. 229 ff.; and Vol. LXXXIV,
pp. 679 ff.
224 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
dominant and decisive factor in
determining the atti-
tude of the state toward national
issues. With a dis-
proportionate command of the state's
wealth, the power
of the press, and the intellectual and
political talent of
the state, these cities finally left to
the rural elements
scarcely more than a choice between
essentially indus-
trial programs.
In 1870, Cleveland and Toledo vied with
each other
as distributing and collecting agencies
for the districts
reached by the Great Lakes. The Civil
War had
checked the importance of Mississippi
River navigation
and stimulated the railway and lake
traffic east and
west. The great opportunity of these
cities came with
the increased demand of the northwest
for Ohio and
Pennsylvania coal and the bulky
articles of manufac-
ture, and the opening of the iron and
copper mines of
the upper lake region. Constantly
increasing commerce
and ship building brought subordinate
industries in
their trail. When railway traffic
became sufficiently de-
veloped Cleveland was brought into
direct contact with
the coal fields and iron producing
centers of the nation
and was assured a well balanced and
diversified indus-
try. The city's interests became
ultimately identified
with the financial and industrial
interests of the east.
Toledo, less fortunate in location in
so far as these re-
sources were concerned, was soon
outdistanced by
Cleveland, but became conspicuous in
the state's politics
as a center of "isms" and
third party movements.
The expansion of Cleveland enabled that
city to
2 Toledo was in 1878 a center of the greenback movement.
It early
inclined toward socialistic programs.
Sam Jones, better known as "Golden
Rule" Jones, later became mayor of
the city and an inspirer of many
liberals.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 225
share the pre-eminent political
leadership held by Cin-
cinnati since the days of early
statehood. Primarily
connected with the agricultural
interests of the north-
west and the border states, the latter
city had the ad-
vantage of being a sort of political
center of gravity--
an "Old Hunkers' Paradise" in
the words of an eminent
historian.3 As the center of
population and industry
shifted westward, Chicago, Kansas City
and St. Louis
drew an increasing share of the type of
traffic that con-
ditioned Cincinnati's earlier
development. The old sec-
tional ties and a multiplicity of
voting interests, how-
ever, enabled the city to continue as a
strategical point
in political conflicts.
While political contests centered
primarily in the
two major cities in opposite corners of
the state, lesser
centers occasionally figured
prominently. This fact
was, however, in its final analysis,
merely one of various
devices by which party discipline was
preserved. The
choice of candidates and the dictation
of platforms were
frequently delegated to the lesser
cities and towns as
political expediency dictated. In this
way solidarity was
promoted and rank and file became
conversant with
theories that were ultimately accepted
as their own.
The chief medium by which the dominance
of indus-
trial influence was maintained in
unifying party action
and rendering it consonant with the
national program
was the newspaper. Party machinery as
developed in
the mid-century era functioned
extensively through this
particular channel; the influence of a
celebrated group
3 Cf. Shilling, loc. cit., pp.
12-18; Atlantic Monthly, August, 1867, Vol.
XX, pp. 229 ff.
Vol. XXXVII-15.
226
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
of editors was a powerful factor in
articulating popular
opinion and translating it into
political results. A list
of Ohio editors included men of
national reputation and
influence. Foremost, perhaps, may be
placed the name
of Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial.
He
was not so steadfast in his
Republicanism but that he
gained influence in more or less
independent projects
even beyond the boundaries of the
state. In circulation
and consequent numbers reached, the
Cincinnati En-
quirer distanced all rivals. Its name was a household
term in great areas of the mid-west.
The weekly edi-
tion probably approached 100,000. In
1873, its editor
boasted that the circulation was
greater in Ohio, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois and
West Virginia,
than that of any paper published within
those states.4
Under the editorship of Washington
McLean until the
early seventies and later under his
son, John R., the
paper frequently assumed a dictatorship
of the Demo-
cratic party. Its ambition was to
articulate a great sec-
tional interest, and, in pursuance of
it, its editor did not
hesitate to declare Cincinnati the
logical site for the
national capitol. No paper surpassed it
in capitalizing
popular impulses in furtherance of
political designs.
Another Cincinnati paper of extensive
influence
(aside from the German press) was the Gazette,
under
the bitterly partisan editorship of
Richard ("Dick")
Smith. With the Commercial and
the Dayton Journal
under W. D. Bickham, the Gazette shared
the press
leadership of the Republican party in
south-western
Ohio.
Two newspapers in Cleveland, as in
Cincinnati, as-
4 Cincinnati Enquirer, January 1, 1873.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 227
serted political influence in
comparatively equal degree.
The Plain Dealer and Leader, Democratic
and Repub-
lican organs respectively, contested
their relative impor-
tance and respectability as well as the
issues of the day.
Edwin Cowles made the Leader the
vehicle of his recog-
nition as the "Horace Greeley of
the West." The
Plain Dealer, at one time boasting Charles F. Browne
(Artemus Ward) as a member of its
staff, was, after
1865, under the control of William D.
Armstrong, the
undisputed organ of its party in
Northern Ohio.
In Toledo the Blade was
important primarily be-
cause of its retention of one of the
best known news-
paper wits of the day--"Petroleum
V. Nasby."5 His
letters from "Confedrit X
Roads," purporting to be
those of an illiterate observer on the
issues of the day,
were considered sufficiently effective
thrusts at Demo-
cratic stupidity to be copied
extensively by the Repub-
lican press.6 The Blade's nearest
competitor was the
Commercial, organized by Clark and Ralph Waggoner,
formerly editors of the Blade, in
1866, as a Johnson
organ.
5 David R. Locke.
6 The following is a typical extract
from the writings of a satirist
whom one must know in order to sense a
significant current in national life.
It appeared during the height of the
financial agitation: "G. W." orders a
barrel of whiskey and pays in the
"follerin dokeyment: Confedrit X Roads,
Sept. 1, 1875. I promise to pay G. W.
Bascom sixteen hundred and eighty
dollars, Jehial Perkins. 'Wats this?'
askt the astonished Bascom with an
expreshun uv intense disgust usurpin the
place of the smile. 'Pay for that
likker,' replied Perkins calm es a Joon
mornin'. 'But this aint pay--its
your promise to pay, and you aint got
time nor place fixed for payment--
you aint got no interest exprest, nor
nothin. Wen do you perpose to pay
it? 'Never, G. W., never. Under the noo
dispensashen, promises to pay is
money. All you want is faith. So long as
you beleeve that that paper is
money, what do you want of money? With
faith enuff that paper is money
. . . . . .'" Cleveland Leader, September
18, 1875.
228
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The location of the official party
organs was natu-
rally Columbus. The Ohio State
Journal edited by Gen-
eral Comly met the needs of the
Republicans, while at
different times the Statesman, the
Democrat and the
Times gave aspiring Democrats good services.
Several news sheets other than those
mentioned de-
serve recognition as educative
agencies. The Crisis of
Columbus, commonly regarded as the
"Copperhead"
organ during and immediately after the
war, the Co-
lumbus Dispatch, "a skim
milk independent," the
Springfield Republican, the
Cleveland Herald and the
Dayton Democrat, appear among
the better known
prints.
With slight exceptions, no change in
the physical
make-up of Ohio newspapers was apparent
between
1860 and 1880. They usually consisted
of four pages
of news, essays on freaks and freakish
events, editorials
and catechisms on political issues. In
October, 1880, the
Cleveland Leader first advanced
the campaign issues by
a page of crude cartoons. From that
period, owing to
the development of advertising, dated
also the tendency
to multiply pages and to feature a
wider range of infor-
mation.
As magazines advanced in significance
and news-
paper editing became a complex
function, the impor-
tance of a dominating personality
vanished. Through
the period of transition, however, a
great readjustment
in American life was taking place. With
it came the
necessity for the realignment of
parties in keeping with
the new era. From the issues of the war
to those of a
new age, an intensive educational
campaign was neces-
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 229
sary. In this capacity newspapers and
their editors
wielded an extensive influence.
Important as newspapers were as
political agencies,
they may be regarded as first only in a
series of factors
incident to elaborate political
machinery made possible
by industrial agencies. Closely
connected with the daily
press and tending to overshadow it
during the later
years of the century, was the
development of party ma-
chinery designed to reinforce regularity
wherever weak-
ness manifested itself or critical
interests demanded.
Owing to close contests between the two
dominant par-
ties, the modern political machine
became a conspicuous
factor in the state's politics at a
comparatively early
period. In fact, various modern
practices and devices
may be said to have developed
extensively within Ohio
as the result of a series of critical
contests.
One must not gather, however, that
parties were
without their ideals. In fact, a great
measure of solidar-
ity rested upon the assumption that
certain broad princi-
ples and ideals continuously permeated
the party struc-
ture. Certain antecedent practices and
creeds formed
party ties as binding as those of
national patriotism. At
all times political leaders used the
appeal of loyalty as the
surest device for promoting solidarity.
The persistence
with which men commonly followed the
party of their
choice is reflected in the similarity
of election returns
from one canvass to another. A brief
survey of the sit-
uation as it stood in 1865 will
illustrate the extent to
which party alignment had been
crystallized and the
degree to which sectional influences
persisted.
The Connecticut Reserve, consisting of
the counties
in the north-eastern part of the state
and settled almost
230
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
entirely by New Englanders, was
Unionist and Repub-
lican by an overwhelming majority. The
Ohio Com-
pany's purchase, consisting
approximately of Washing-
ton, Athens, Meigs and Gallia Counties,
was also settled
primarily by New Englanders and next to
the Reserve
was noted as a Unionist and Republican
stronghold. In
the south-western part of the state,
from Delaware
County on the north to Montgomery and
Warren
Counties on the south, extended another
tier of consist-
ently Republican counties--a monument
to the Whig
dictatorship of Thomas Corwin. With few
exceptions,
the rest of the state, owing to an
admixture of Scotch-
Irish, Germans and those of Southern antecedents,
was
debatable territory. The counties of
Monroe, Fairfield,
Holmes, Auglaize and Mercer were
inclined to be as
staunchly Democratic as the Reserve was
Republican.7
The issues of the war had fixed this
alignment quite
definitely. It persisted with
comparative regularity sev-
eral years after the original issues
had lost their signifi-
cance. In no other northern state had
party strife been
more bitter during the Civil War
period. The contest
for governor in 1863 had made party
ties practically the
acid test between loyalty and treason.
The Democratic
party had become, in the judgment of
many, synonymous
with "rebel" and
"Copperhead." Others viewed the Re-
publican party as a revival of French
Jacobinism seek-
ing to eradicate the last vestiges of
respectable society
as established by the Constitution.
This comparative
7 For the sources of Ohio's population
see Chaddock, Ohio before 1850;
Columbia University Studies in History,
Economics and Public Law, Vol.
XXXI; also Porter, Ohio Politics
During the Civil War Period, in the
same series of Studies, Vol. XL.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 231
rigidity of party lines was a basic
factor in determining
processes by which political ends were
achieved.
The same factors conditioning the
alignment of vot-
ers produced political leaders of a
similar type. Fully
conscious of the prestige implied by
commanding this
aggressive constituency, men of varying
types maneuv-
ered for success in politics. Within
their ranks were
those who had in youth experienced the
hardships of the
crude agricultural life of the frontier. Shirt-sleeves
and "galluses" had been the
common badge of self-
reliance and democracy. A vision of
success in business
or law led them to broader fields of
enterprise. An age
characterized by its legalistic faith
looked primarily to
the law to develop men well qualified
to draw up rules
for the safe-keeping of society.
Political eminence was
therefore the best tested criterion of
a successful career
and offered its appeal accordingly.
The importance of the various factors
enumerated
varied from one period to another. In
general, how-
ever, each of those indicated suggests
the basis of Ohio's
conspicuous position in national life
and politics for a
number of years following the war. The
period was
one in which politics and business were
of primary con-
cern. The State, through a close
identity with the chief
current of national life, gained
political distinction as
an offensive outpost of an expanding
industrialism and
a defensive stronghold of a
capitulating agrarianism.
232 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications
CHAPTER II
POLITICS AND THE WAR ISSUES
The three years following immediately
upon the
close of the war were characterized
politically by issues
directly connected with
Reconstruction Events so
shaped themselves that negro suffrage
was ultimately
faced as a direct issue and practically
eliminated from
the political realm. Problems connected
with the status
of seceded states projected beyond this
period and ap-
peared under various guises in connection
with issues
only remotely connected with the war
and primarily re-
lated to the newer era. Each party,
therefore, passed
through a critical stage of
readaptation to the new situ-
ation.
The campaign for governor in 1865 and
the congres-
sional campaign of the year following
may be character-
ized as preliminary sparring matches
with each party
maneuvering for advantage. The issue
upon which the
Union party had rested was eliminated
by the collapse
of the Confederate cause. Since the
opening of hostili-
ties between North and South in 1861,
the preservation
of the Union was the single bond that
held together for-
mer Whigs, Abolitionists,
Know-nothings, Free Soilers,
and Anti-Slavery Democrats. When that
issue was
closed, former prejudices threatened to
assert them-
selves with disruption of the party as
an imminent con-
sequence; and many politicians were
thoroughly aware
that the end of the war carried threats
of ending like-
wise their political careers.
The fortunes of the Peace Democracy, on
the other
hand, were conditioned by factors
scarcely less promis-
ing. In time of war the peace idea is
popular and that
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 233
alone gave the Democratic party an
advantage. Its
factions ranged from avowed nullifiers
and secessionists
to those who, though professing loyalty
to Union prin-
ciples, held that the war was not a
necessary program
for perpetuating the Union. Its dilemma
was similar
to that of the Unionists. From a
practical standpoint
it faced the problem of keeping its
factions as nearly
intact as possible while constructing a
program which
should win over factions, especially
those of Democratic
antecedents, attached to the opposite
camp. Owing to
the embarrassment of the Unionists on
the immediate
issues of reconstruction, Democratic
attempts met with
partial success. The moral and social
tone of the nation
was such, however, that a general
demoralization of the
party long persisted as a heritage of
its war record . its
success at best could be only partial
or as a result of a
temporary protest against certain
phases of the Unionist
policy.
Developments of the summer of 1865
appeared alto-
gether favorable to the plans of the
party which had
been more than four years in opposition
and without
office. The threatening break between
President John-
son and the Radicals regarding the
program of recon-
struction threatened to shatter
completely the fragile
bond by which the party had maintained
its unity. In
many communities, especially those
regarded as debat-
able political territory, party
differences were slight; a
radical attitude toward restoration of
the South or in
the direction of negro suffrage carried
the possibilities
of a disastrous defection. In the
Reserve an equally
disastrous defection awaited any
program that suggested
other than a radical or vindictive
attitude.
234 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The dilemma of the Unionists is
illustrated by the
difficulties encountered by two of the
party's exponents
--Senator Wade and General J. D. Cox.
The former
had risen on the high tide of the
anti-slavery issue, and
as a leader of the Radical group became
apprehensive
of the development in Washington which
threatened to
consign "the great Union or
Republican party bound
hand and foot to the tender mercies of
the rebels * * *
and their Copperhead allies of the
North." The course
which he later pursued in hurling
campaign invective
upon the Democracy as not only
"dead but damned
through the sin of treason"
contributed to the destruc-
tion of whatever availability he had
formerly possessed.2
His political martyrdom came through an
erroneous
faith in Ohio's love for the negro.3
General Cox, on the other hand,
narrowly escaped
sacrificing his political future on the
opposite horn of
the dilemma. Unlike Wade, he was not
temperamentally
vindictive in attitude and was
consequently strongly in-
clined to debate the possible tyranny
of majorities as
1 Porter, op. cit., p. 209.
2 Referring
to a speech delivered by Wade at Marietta, Thomas
Ewing, Sr., wrote: "He spoke it in
eight or ten of the southern counties.
In Gallia, he brought down the
Republican majority 1017 -- in Washington
about 700 and it had a like effect in
Scioto, Lawrence, Meigs and Athens.
If he had stumped the state, the Democratic
ticket would have prevailed
by 30,000." Ewing MSS., October
16, 1867.
3 The Cincinnati Commercial, November
6, 1867, reported the follow-
ing interview: "I had no idea that
there were so many Republicans in
Ohio who were willing to see negro
suffrage in the South, but wouldn't let
the few niggers of Ohio vote. That's
what got me. They all seemed to
be in favor of it as a measure of
reconstruction just as much as I was.
I didn't dream they'd be mean enough to
vote against it here."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 235
against the rights of minorities.4
The Unionists in an-
ticipation of the Election of 1865 had
nominated him as
their candidate for governor. His
availability centered
in his war record and Oberlin
training--a tacit guaran-
tee to the Reserve that their ideals
were respected.5 The
party platform endorsed the policy of
the President as
looking to the "restoration of
peace and civil order in
the so-called seceded states". An
endorsement of the
Declaration of Independence (often a
device for meet-
ing a political impasse) was
procured as a compromise
on the problem of the negro. The
Unionists as a whole
for the sake of solidarity evaded the
endorsement of
more tangible principles.
On July 24th, however, General Cox
threw his party
into confusion. In response to an
inquiry from a com-
mittee of colored students at Oberlin,
he was compelled
to declare his program regarding negro
suffrage. He
explained at some length his conviction
that a com-
munity of blacks and whites in the
South was an absolute
impossibility. He further elaborated a
scheme for or-
ganizing the freedmen into communities
in the South
under the territories. The response to
this incident was
immediate. "Politics run wild in
Ohio," wrote a corre-
spondent to Chase. "Cox, your old
friend, seems to have
fallen into the arms of the
Conservatives and to have
ignored the former teachings of
Oberlin."6 The Dem-
4 Cox, subsequently, in his inaugural,
warned against a "hard peace":
"A victorious majority, flushed
with its triumph, finds it easy to forget the
rights of minorities, and it remains for
us to prove whether in our day the
old cry of 'Woe to the conquered' may be
silenced by a truly republican
determination to administer the
government for the real advantage of all--
of the defeated rebels as well as of the
loyal victors."
5 Cox's
wife was a daughter of President Finney, of Oberlin.
6 Porter, op.
cit., p. 218, footnote.
236
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ocratic and Radical press united in
declaring the letter
an apostasy of Unionist principles.
"It is a painful con-
fession," declared the Crisis, "drawn
from a devotee
that the faith which he preferred, the
ideas he imbibed,
and the principles he has cherished
from his youth have
proved when put to the final test
chimeras, falsehoods,
failures, frauds, and humbugs."7
The Democrats thus
had cause for optimism when their convention
met at
Columbus on August 24.
In the hope of a radical defection and
with the pur-
pose of making effective overtures to
the Conservatives,
the Democratic Convention declared for
the doctrine of
States' Rights as announced in the
Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions.8 The
so-called seceded states were
declared to be still in the Union and
therefore entitled
to all the reserved rights of the
states. The program
for negro suffrage was held as "an
insidious attempt to
overthrow popular institutions by
bringing the right
to vote into disgrace." The
Convention further resolved
to stand by President Johnson in all
Constitutional ef-
forts to restore immediately to the
states the exercise
of their rights and powers under the
Constitution. The
military record of General George W.
Morgan com-
mended him as the candidate for
governor.
Despite a defection of 65,000 Unionist
votes, Gen-
eral Cox carried the election by a
majority of 30,000.
The Unionist candidate's program was
side-stepped in
Radical areas during the campaign as
merely the pecu-
liar ideas of an individual--an
opportunity which Gen-
7 Crisis, August 9, 1865.
8 Cf. Porter, op. cit., p. 214.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 237
eral Cox had safeguarded in his Oberlin
letter.9 The
Unionists maintained control of the
state and an ex-
tension of time in which to square
public opinion and a
program.
For another year Unionist leaders were
forced to
maneuver in an atmosphere of indefinite
popular opin-
ion. Successive attempts were made to
endorse the pro-
gram of the President or Congress.
While certain Con-
servatives turned to the Democrats,
others hesitated in
doubt as to the direction in which the
path of political
wisdom lay. In the Congressional
campaign and that
for state officers in 1866, party unity
was in large
measure preserved by pleading that no
real difference
existed between Congressional and
Presidential pro-
grams. The only real difference, it was
maintained,
was in the manner of imposing terms.
Meanwhile, the Democrats capitalized
the Unionist
dilemma by encouraging the cooperation
of the Johnson
sympathizers. Their convention of 1866
was primarily
designed for this purpose. In the
National Union Club
Convention, held at Philadelphia in
August of the same
year, the party shared its
representation with Johnson
sympathizers, although it first assured
itself that it had
not for its object "the disbanding
of the Democratic
party and merging it into a new
organization." The
fiasco of the campaign during the
following October,
coupled with a fear on the part of
regular party leaders
that the policy of cooperation implied
a certain danger
9 He had declared: "If other views
than mine prevail, I shall hold it
my duty to act cheerfully and promptly
with the body of loyal men, believ-
ing that the best solution which they
can give will be the best obtainable
and that to divide from them will be to
deliver the government into the
hands of its enemies." Crisis, August
9, 1867.
238
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
to their individual interests, brought
a change of tactics.
The election impending for the
following year loomed
as especially significant to the
interest of both parties
and their leaders. Besides the
governorship, a legisla-
ture which should choose Senator Wade's
successor was
at stake. The campaign would naturally
bear a signifi-
cant relation to the Presidential
campaign impending a
year later. With a view to reaping the
full benefit of
the apparently hopeless situation
between the Presi-
dent and Congress, three leaders
consistently identified
with the Democratic party proceeded to
take the situa-
tion in hand.
Prominent above all others was Clement
L. Vallan-
digham. His name had become synonymous
with "Cop-
perhead" Democracy as a result of
his banishment from
the state and subsequent candidacy for
the governorship
in 1863. Gifted with a commanding
personality and the
power to appeal to the masses, he had
intrenched him-
self as an undoubted hero in the
estimate of thousands
of his constituents. His convictions
led him into an
aggressive attitude dictated in great
measure by an hon-
est and fearless nature. He was thus an
asset and a
liability to the Democracy as it
attempted to extricate
itself from the dilemma of the Civil
War period. The
Unionists made him the victim of their
propaganda; he
was himself an issue--"a millstone
on the necks of the
Democracy"; many of his party
associates stood ready
to read him from the party councils.
Owing to his
tenacity he remained a factor to be
reckoned with until
his untimely death in 1871.10
10 For highly favorable estimates of
Vallandigham see Ohio Archaeo-
logical and Historical Publications, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 266 ff., and Cox
Three Decades of Federal Legislation,
pp. 80-85.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 239 In the person of George H. Pendleton, the party pos- sessed a leader gifted in the subtle devices of political methods. Personally correct and cultured, he was pop- ularly identified as "Gentleman George," later when championing the "Ohio Idea" as "Young Greenbacks." |
|
With a record of four terms in Congress from a Cincin- nati district and as the Vice-Presidential candidate in 1864, he was yet hopeful of procuring the nation's great- est political reward. "Allen G. Thurman, "the noble Roman" or "Old |
240 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Bandanna," as he was popularly
called, the third of the
group, was of Virginia birth, a
thorough party man
with convictions as to the political
justice of his party's
ideals. He was a constitutional lawyer
of recognized
ability. His peculiar manner enlisted
confidence though
it seldom aroused enthusiasm. He was,
nevertheless, a
striking figure, and later was to voice
a powerful protest
against measures of questionable constitutionality
that
were forced rough-shod through the
national legisla-
ture. "Ernest, outspoken, and free
in his criticisms of
men and manners, he would wave his red
bandanna
handkerchief like a guidon, give his
nose a trumpet
blast, take a fresh pinch of snuff, and
dash into a debate,
dealing rough blows and scattering the
carefully pre-
pared arguments of his adversaries like
chaff."11 On
the stump he was effective, though,
like Senator
Sherman, he failed to attract men by
personal magnet-
ism. Much of the popular strength of
both men cen-
tered in that type of venerability
which tends to crystal-
lize about those long in public life.
January 8, 1867, St. Jackson's or St.
Hickory's Day
in the calendar of loyal Democrats, was
a logical time
to restore the party to its original
principles. The Dem-
ocratic triumvirate made an advanced
division of the
party spoils. Thurman was to be the
candidate for gov-
ernor; Vallandigham, in case of a
Democratic legisla-
ture, was to succeed Wade in the
Senate; Pendleton
should receive the party endorsement
for the Presiden-
11 Poor's characterization continues:
"When he sat down, he would
signal to a Republican friend and they
would leave the Senate chamber by
different doors and meet in a committee
room, where there was a supply
of old Bourbon whiskey." Poor, Reminiscences,
Vol. II.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 241 tial nomination in 1868.12 The platform was launched against the "unconstitutional, revolutionary, and des- potic" reconstruction measures, then before Congress, and the threatening "thralldom of niggerism." |
|
The Unionists by common consent passed over Gov- ernor Cox and nominated General Rutherford B. 12 Porter, op. cit., pp. 239. Vol. XXXVII--16. |
242
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Hayes. The Oberlin letter and the fact
that General
Cox had eulogized President Johnson in
1866, combined
to make him unavailable. As a
Representative in Con-
gress, General Hayes had followed the
Radicals but had
evinced no great enthusiasm for the
cause. The plat-
form endorsed the proposed amendment ot
the Constitu-
tion enfranchising the negro, and the
reconstruction
measures of Congress.
The campaign centered primarily in the
issue of
negro enfranchisement. The Unionists
had successfully
side-stepped that issue in 1865 and
although the "Visible
Admixture" law, and the last of
the Ohio "Black Code"
had been repealed, the Radicals had
succeeded in bring-
ing the issue before the voters in a
proposed amendment
which provided that "white"
be stricken from that
clause in the Constitution which
described the qualifica-
tions for suffrage.
The contest was second in intensity and
national in-
terest only to that of 1865. The State
Legislature had
in a blundering manner given an added
issue. In fram-
ing the negro suffrage amendment the
preceding Febru-
ary, Conservatives in the House had
sought to gain for
it an added popularity by
disfranchising as many Peace
Democrats as possible. An amendment to
the Senate
bill disfranchised those who had
"borne arms in support
of any insurrection or rebellion
against the Government
of the United States, or have fled from
their places of
residence to avoid being drafted into
the military serv-
ices thereof, or have deserted the
military service of
said government in time of war and have
not subse-
quently been honorably discharged from
the same."
When it was discovered that about
one-fourth of the
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 243
total deserters credited to Ohio had
left the army after
Lee's surrender in order to escape
services on the Mex-
ican border or on the Indian frontier,
attempts were
made to secure from the Federal
Government honorable
discharges for all who had left after
April 15, 1865.
Not until July, through the services of
J. M. Ashley, a
representative from the Toledo
district, did a bill pass
Congress which removed the ban of desertion.
The campaign threw the Unionists on the
defensive,
although they countered by resurrecting
the war records
of their opponents. General Hayes
pleaded the cause
of the negro and attempted to convince
his audiences that
slavery and rebellion were convertible
and union and
liberty inseparable terms. Thurman
pleaded the consti-
tutional case of the Democracy and
declared that for
six years the Unionists had
unnecessarily prolonged the
war by shamelessly and needlessly
trampling the Con-
stitution under foot. Intellect and
passion were ap-
pealed to in opposition to the proposed
enfranchisement
of the negro-the proposition to confer
the vote upon
"7,000 or 8,000 negroes while
taking it away from two
or three times as many white
soldiers." Wagons filled
with girls dressed in white and bearing
banners in-
scribed "Fathers, save us from
negro equality" featured
Democratic processions. Inscriptions of
Republican
banners read: "Honest Black men
are preferable to
white traitors"; "Democrats
murdered our President";
"If any man pull down the American
flag, give him a
Post Office--A. Johnson."13
The campaign result was a virtual
victory for the
Democracy. The total vote indicated an
increase of
13 Toledo Blade, September 23, 1867.
244
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
67,000 over the election of 1865 with a
bare majority
of less than 3,000 for General Hayes.
Twelve thousand
fewer votes were cast on the Amendment
than for the
governor, with a direct majority of
38,000 against it.14
The Democrats procured control of both
houses of the
Legislature and the assurance of naming
the successor
to Wade in the United States Senate.
The result of the war issues apparently
placed the
Democracy on a competitive basis with
the Unionists.
Their voting strength had been steadily
recruited since
the disastrous election of 1863 when
they had been de-
feated by a majority of 100,000. The
impending Presi-
dential campaign extended a reasonable
hope of success
to the minority party providing its
program was di-
rected with reasonable tact and
foresight. A new turn
in popular interests extended an
apparent opportunity
for Democratic leaders to identify
their party with a
program that would at least partially
relieve it from the
popular prejudice revealed by the
recent campaigns.
The issue born of this new popular
interest became sig-
nificant in the Presidential campaign
of 1868.
*
* * * *
A natural consequence of the issues of
the Civil War
was a distraction of popular attention
from economic
and social interests which were not
directly con-
nected with that event. The North-west in general
passed through a stage of expansion and
prosperity
while serving as an important agency in
procuring the
subjection of the South. The demands of
the war for
food and men eliminated all
possibilities of "hard
14 The term "white" remained
in the Ohio Constitution until the adop-
tion of a new instrument in 1912.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 245
times" connected with
over-production and unemploy-
ment. Ohio had profited greatly from
this favorable
situation. During the war and for a period of two
years following, prosperity was the
common topic of
newspapers and official reports. The
state debt de-
creased rapidly and reports visioned
its entire efface-
ment within a very short period. In
1865, the per capita
indebtedness was somewhat less than
one-half that of
1844.15 Thanks in part to cheap money,
the mortgage
debt was estimated to have been reduced
by somewhat
less than $17,000,000, or about
one-third the total, be-
tween 1859 and 1863; state bank
deposits more than
doubled between 1860 and 1863.16 But great as
the
general satisfaction was with this
situation, many
pointed to the even greater
possibilities of the future.
The report of the State Auditor in 1865
was typical of
the prevailing optimism: "With a
rigid adherence to
economy, the proper amendments of the
tax laws, and
the steady and intelligent enforcement
of a just and
equal taxation, the public debt will
disappear in seven
years, and the state levy sink down to
one mill on the
dollar. Then, with the rate of interest
properly ad-
justed, capital will flow into the
State, manufactories
will spring up and population and
wealth augment in a
ratio hitherto scarcely dreamed
of."17
Definite programs by which industrial
interests
should be advanced took various forms.
The general
idea was that greater freedom was to be
advanced to
those interests directly concerned,
especially in so far as
15 Annual Cyc., 1865, pp. 683 ff.
16 Annual Cyc., 1863, pp. 731-732.
17 Annual Cyc., 1865, p. 684.
246
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
it related to finances. That industrial
interests were
awakening to the new issues, was
indicated in the gen-
eral demand for the removal of barriers
that had been
erected primarily for agricultural
interests. Business
interests of Toledo and Cincinnati
petitioned the Legis-
lature either for the removal of the
six per cent interest
maximum or its increase to from seven
to ten per
cent "to keep money from New York
and the far
West."18 The Toledo Blade early in 1867 declared that
"traffic in money should be as
free as that in corn."19 In
December of the same year the National
Convention of
Manufacturers met in Cleveland to
declare a construct-
ive program for the advancement of
their own interest
and to identify it with the large realm
of national in-
terest. It placed itself upon record as
opposed to any
scheme for the rapid reduction of the
National debt as
"fraught with danger." A
memorial addressed to the
Senate and House of Representatives
read in part as
follows:
"Labor increased our wealth from
$7,135,780.228
in 1850 to $16,159,616,068 in 1860. The
same ratio,
making an allowance of $4,520,732,313
for the wastes
of war, will increase the national
wealth to $32,000,-
000,000 in 1870. In comparison with
this, our national
debt which by the Secretary's last
report was $2,511,-
800,013.33, will be neither an
embarrassment nor a
terror.
"Wise legislation that will
protect well our industrial
interests and give permanency and
stability to all gov-
ernmental affairs, will greatly
increase the power of
18 Toledo Blade, November 20,
1867.
19 Ibid., February 26, 1867.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 247
labor in our midst, which, when
relieved of excessive
taxation, will soon make us the most
prosperous and in-
dependent nation on earth."20
Ohio newspapers echoed
the advantages of industrial interests
over agricultural
as a medium of advancing national
welfare. The Blade
called attention to the returns of
English industrial cap-
ital at 120 per cent as compared with a
return of only 13
per cent on capital invested in
agriculture.21 It was in-
deed a radical program from the
standpoint of Jeffer-
sonian or Jacksonian economy toward
which the indus-
trialists were driving and being
driven.
Before the election of 1867 had closed,
popular at-
tention was being centered more and
more in the direc-
tion of the national debt and financial
measures in re-
lation to the advancement of material
interests. Bond
issues and the National Bank had been
designed pri-
marily as devices by which financial
support had been
procured for prosecuting the war. These
instruments
of finance had in turn largely relieved
property interests
from direct taxation and provided the
basis of inflation
which had too frequently augmented
private credit in
spite of a wealth-consuming war. Finances,
then,
formed the chief issue about which the
problems of the
new industrial age revolved. A brief survey of the
factors concerned will make clear the
character of the
struggle as it unfolded itself.
The function of money and credit ever
tended to be-
come more complicated and important as
the industrial
age advanced. In the various forms of
its relationship
to economic life it was open to
numerous and puzzling
20 Ohio State Journal, January 3, 1868.
21 Toledo Blade, January 3, 1867.
248
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
intellectual slants. In this and
subsequent crises
through which the struggle passed, many
phases and
combinations of phases of the subject
were emphasized.
A popular conception, for example, held
it to be a lubri-
cant for industrial machinery--an
accelerator which by
expansion could speed up a period of
economic depres-
sion. On one point only was practical
unanimity evi-
dent. This was in the general acceptance
of the idea
that financial expansion or credit must
keep pace with
the increase of wealth and population.
It was in the
program by which this fact was to be
accomplished that
differences existed. Industrial and banking interests
characterized their program as the
"sound money doc-
trine" and realized profit and
security in the concessions
of the National Bank Act--security
especially from
Congress, which in determining the
needs of industry
might "mistake its own pulse for
that of the nation."
"Sound money doctrine"
advocated sound money in so
far as it discountenanced the issuance
of credit certifi-
cates in any form on the part of the
government. By
the quantity theory of value, banking
credits stood in
the way of being depreciated by any
such action.
The "greenback movement,"
actuated as it was by
debtor classes who viewed any increase
in the denom-
inator of values as a source of relief
from their obliga-
tions, nevertheless carried within
itself an opposing
theory of justice. By its opponents the
program was
caricatured as a "soft money
craze"--any scheme of
government credit circulation other
than that of
coin worth its intrinsic value was open
to the criti-
cism
"soft money."22 Programs
for securing such
22 Government indebtedness in the form
of bonds which secured bank-
ing circulation was on the other hand
consistent with the banking program.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 249
credits varied among proponents of the
general
scheme. Some held that the mere fiat of
the govern-
ment was sufficient security,
especially since the gov-
ernment had sovereign authority through
its taxing
power over all national wealth.23 "Print"
was held to
be etymologically the same as
coin--hence the scheme
was constitutional. Others advocated
securing govern-
ment credit by making issues of
certificates interchange-
able with bonds, the value regulated by
an interest rate
payable in coin--a system "free
from the manipulations
of both banks and Congress and in the
hands of the
people where it belongs." Another
commonly advanced
view held that a coin reserve was
necessary to stabilize
such government credit. All these
schemes, however,
possessed a common unity in their
declared warfare
against the perpetuation of the
national debt, and bank-
ing associations which "drew
interest on their indebted-
ness and practiced extortion upon the
people": "The
right to coin and issue money is a
function of the gov-
ernment and can no more with safety be
delegated to
private individuals than we could
afford to delegate to
private individuals the power to make
penal statutes or
levy taxes." In its broader
aspects the "needs of indus-
try and commerce" were to be the
standard of finance
rather than metallic value or the
criterion of banking
interests, and whether
"sound" or not the program was
a phase of that popular struggle which
had as its object
the control of economic agencies which
were soon to
demonstrate a power and magnitude that
completely
overshadowed that of the government
itself.
23 The number embracing this scheme was comparatively small.
250 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Various interests of the past
designated Ohio as an
area in which the issue possessed
paramount interest.
With Kentucky, the state had attacked
the Second bank
of the United States when it forced
their banks to pay
their debts. A latent suspicion of
Eastern methods of
finance was an abiding legacy from the
days when An-
drew Jackson counted Ohio a dependable
supporter in
his war upon the "monster."24
Success appeared cer-
tain, therefore, when the Cincinnati Enquirer
and Pen-
dleton advanced a scheme of finance
which possessed an
apparently double virtue--first, relief
from embarrass-
ing taxes occasioned by the war debt
and, second, the
necessary expansion of credit to meet
agricultural needs
and industrial development.
The program was to be realized by
demanding the
payment of bonds in certificates issued
upon the credit
of the United States in all cases in
which gold was not
specified. The issuance of
non-interest-bearing certifi-
cates in payment of bonds made
possible, according to
the advocates of the scheme, a short
cut to the payment
of the debt and a consequent lowering
of taxation. By
making the certificates legal tender in
the payment of
taxes and debts, it was claimed that a
quick return to
specie payments was automatically
assured and an ex-
pansion of credit created to meet the
advancement of
economic interests. On the theory that
"there should be
24 Ohio Democratic leaders persisted in
identifying their party with
their sectional interests. A
"toast" at a Jackson Day banquet in 1867 is
illustrative: "The North-west--not
hewers of wood or drawers of water
for New England monopolists ought the
North-west to be. Woe to her
representatives who aid the cormorants
to devour her substance and im-
poverish her people by high tariff,
unequal taxation and the creation of
unnecessary debt." Cincinnati Enquirer,
January 9, 1867.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 251
no divided sovereignty in providing the
people with
their currency," the scheme looked
to the elimination of
the national banking system as well as
the payment of
the national debt. "Eliminate the
National Bank notes
and there will be no undue inflation of
the currency"
was the answer to the indictment of
opponents.
After the issue had been drawn and had
become a
more or less Democratic dogma, the
"sound money" ad-
vocates ridiculed that party for having
turned a com-
plete somersault since 1863 when they
had so radically
opposed the issue of fiat money. For
example, no one
had been more radical in opposition to
fiat money during
the war than Pendleton. He was likewise
represented
as an apostate from the Jacksonian
Democratic tradi-
tion of specie as against credit money.
Accepting the
program of credit circulation, however,
as an estab-
lished fact, Pendleton could claim
consistency in advo-
cating a national currency as against
the national bank
currency. Good legal opinion declared
that no contract
was violated since bondholders should
receive as good
currency as they had given in exchange
for the bonds.25
The general program for a national currency
as out-
lined gained wide circulation during
the latter months
of 1867 and became familiar as the
"Ohio Idea." The
immediate popularity of the scheme in
the face of a
slackening "war prosperity"
was evident. The En-
quirer congratulated itself repeatedly as the pioneer of
the movement. Party lines threatened to
dissolve in
behalf of the new issue. Newspaper editors of both
25 A manuscript in the Thomas Ewing
papers written by Ewing shortly
before his death is one of the ablest
defenses of the Pendleton program
available.
252
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
parties attached no political
importance to the program
and only quibbled as to differences.
The Blade, for ex-
ample, in its remonstrance against
McCulloch's contrac-
tion of the greenbacks, declared that
its own program of
inflation demanded only a sprinkle
whereas the Enquirer
was demanding a flood.
Congress immediately reflected the
effect of the new
popular pressure and political
expediency demanded im-
mediate action. Sherman was especially
active in evol-
ving a program which would square his
party with the
rising tide. The editor of the
Cleveland Leader ad-
vised him repeatedly of the necessity
for immediate ac-
tion. Under date of February 20, 1868,
he wrote:
"The reason why I advocate an
early resumption is to
prevent the Copperheads from
carrying the next Presi-
dential election. I will say confidentially that in the cry
now being raised by the Copperhead
Demagogues of
'Gold for the Bondholders and
Greenbacks for the la-
borers' I see the defeat of the Union
party next fall
which even the military prestige of
Grant cannot pre-
vent." "No doubt you should
do something with the
National Banks," urged another
prominent adviser.
"They are simply grand swindling
shops under the Na-
tional Flag."26
Sherman launched his program and
frankly de-
fended it out of deference to popular
demands. Febru-
ary 4, 1868, an act passed the
President's veto which
forbade any further reduction of the
currency and au-
thorized the replacement of
"mutilated notes." By this
act the minimum limit of legal-tender
notes was fixed
at $356,000,000--the volume then afloat
after McCul-
26 T. J. McLain to Sherman, December 18,
1867. Sherman MSS.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 253
loch's policy had done its work.
Senator Sherman, in
advocating the measure, declared that
it was entirely
preliminary to other legislation
"which must include
the banking system, the time and manner
of resuming
specie payment, the payment of the debt
and the kind
of money in which it can be paid, and
the reduction of
expenditures and taxation."27
His program was professed in the
interests of public
justice and with due deference to the
government's obli-
gations to national interests. His
conclusions in regard
to the subject had been reached against
the earnest ar-
guments of personal and political
friends, and against
his own "personal and pecuniary
interests."28 This
speech, in view of the fundamental
change in attitude
which party allegiance was to encompass
on the part
of Sherman and many of his associates,
is particularly
significant. Few men of opposing
political attachments
formulated the social and economic
issue in broader
terms. The political exigency first
received emphasis:
"I might show you by the
resolutions of political parties,
both Republican and Democratic, that we
cannot avoid
or evade this issue. We must meet it. I
have here the
resolutions of both political parties
in the state of In-
diana, both declaring that these bonds
ought to be paid
in greenbacks and differing only as to
the limit of green-
backs. I have also resolutions adopted
in different parts
of the country. The tendency of the
Democratic party is
to drift into a political declaration
that these bonds shall
be paid in greenbacks; and great masses
of patriotic
men all over the country of the
political faith to which
27 Congressional Globe, January 9, 1868, p. 408.
28 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., part V, Appendix, p. 188.
254
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
the majority of the Senate belong have
come to the same
conclusion. We are, therefore,
compelled to consider
the question. It will be made the basis
of every election
next fall in nearly all the
north-western States. No
man can be elected to Congress unless
he commits him-
self for or against this
proposition."29 By all means
the government was bound to express its
good faith by
backing the notes with as good credit
as that which
stood behind the bonds: "I say
that equity and justice
are amply satisfied if we redeem these
bonds at the end
of five years in the same kind of
money, of the same in-
trinsic value it bore at the time they
were issued. Gen-
tlemen may reason about this matter
over and over
again, and they cannot come to any
other conclusion; at
least, that has been my conclusion
after the most careful
consideration. Senators are sometimes
in the habit, in
order to defeat the argument of an
antagonist, of say-
ing that this is repudiation. Why, sir,
every citizen of
the United States has conformed his
business to the
legal-tender clause. He has collected
and paid his debts
accordingly. Every state in the Union,
without excep-
tion, has made its contracts since the
legal-tender clause
in currency and paid them in
currency."30 * * *
"There is a wide discrimination
made between the bond-
holder and the noteholder, which gives
rise to popular
clamor and is the cause of a great deal
of just complaint.
In 1863, we were compelled for wise
purposes to take
away the right of the holder of the
greenback to fund
it, because we wished then to force our
loans upon the
market; and while that right was
outstanding we could
29 Ibid., p. 181 ff.
30 Ibid., p. 184.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 255
not do it. Now that the war is over,
that the whole
process of funding is intended to be
voluntary at the
discretion of the noteholder, we ought
promptly to re-
store this right to allow the note to
be converted at any
time into some kind of bond; and we
propose also to
allow the bond to be converted into
notes keeping within
the limit of notes fixed by law. Then
there is no dis-
crimination; the bondholder and the
noteholder are
both public creditors; both depend upon
public faith.
The noteholder may go to the Treasury
of the United
States and demand his bond; the
bondholder may go
also and demand his note. They are put
on a basis of
equality. This destroys all speculation
in government
securities. Both will then stand on the
same footing,
and both will be of equal value. The
noteholder may at
his option draw interest in gold by
converting it into
bonds, and the popular cry of demagogues
that we have
provided gold for the bondholder and
notes for the peo-
ple will be silent."31 * * * The peroration identified
the policy with an ideal of social
justice that has ever
animated men of altruistic mold since
property holding
became a recognized privilege.
"Senators often tell us that we
must not be influ-
enced by public discontent or clamor. I
agree with this
when the discontent is not founded upon
substantial
equity, but when it is founded upon
equity it will make
itself felt through you or over you.
And Senators must
remember that this is a government of
the people, for
the people and by the people. It is not
like the Govern-
ment of Great Britain, a despotic
oligarchy, where the
rights of property override the rights
of persons; where
31 Ibid., pp. 187-188.
256 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
the laws are made to add to the
accumulations of the
rich, though hundreds of thousands may
thereby be
pinched with poverty. That is the land
of entails, where
the offices of the church are bought
and sold as property,
and where all that is good in
life--office, honor, prop-
erty--is confined to less than
one-tenth of the popula-
tion--where the laws are studiously
formed to exclude
the poor from all political rights. We
borrow from
these people of kindred blood many of
the best guards
of liberty, but we must take care not
to engraft on our
republican system the leading feature
of their present
government, the supremacy of property
over labor.
* * * To encourage, maintain, and
reward labor
must be the principal object of our
legislation. Capital
can take care of itself. It has many
advantages in com-
petition with labor. It may be
idle--labor cannot be.
* * * No privilege should be granted to
the bond-
holder that is not granted to the
noteholder. Both are
public securities, and both, and
equally, can appeal to
the public faith. No privilege should
be granted to the
bondholder unless it is compensated for
by some advan-
tage reserved by the Government, and
the whole public
debt should be made to assume such form
that it may
be a part of the circulating capital of
the country bear-
ing as low a rate of interest as
practicable, and with
only such exemptions as will maintain
it at par with
gold."32
Here indeed, was an issue, irrespective
of the rela-
32 Ibid., pp. 188-189. Under date of March 9, 1868, Joseph Medill
of
the Chicago Tribune wrote to
Sherman as follows: ". . . You have demon-
strated unanswerably to my mind that
while we must not water the c'y,
yet the bondholders cannot require any
better money than greenbacks for
the principal of their debt. . . ." Sherman MSS.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 257
tive merits of the conflicting
financial ideas, worthy of
the best mettle of statesmanship.33
The national fiscal
policy thenceforth became the important
pivot of the
new era. It carried important social as
well as eco-
nomic implications and threatened the
unity of the new
nation much as it had that of the
British Empire in
1776. Was the West ready to join the
bankrupt South
in overthrowing the program of
industrial finance, as it
had joined the East in overthrowing the
agricultural
system of the South? Apparently Ohio
was all but a
unit in influence to that end. During
the time that the
issue was under debate, H. D. Cooke
declared Garfield
"the only member of the entire
Ohio delegation who
would vote aye on a square proposition
that the bonds
should be paid in gold and he says that
it will defeat him
for reelection."34 At
all events the popularity of the
"Ohio Idea" possessed an
immediate political signifi-
cance; while threatening the unity of
the Republican
party, it promised to advance George H.
Pendleton to
the Presidency.35
Before the Democratic National
Convention met in
33 Sherman shortly afterward attempted
to cast this record into ob-
livion. Cf. Recollections, II, p.
624 ff.
34 Oberholzer, Jay Cooke, II, pp.
40-41.
35 The
State Journal became especially apprehensive. In a long edi-
torial of February 27, 1868, it made the
following plea: "Whatever may
have been done elsewhere, whatever
weakness and fear may have given up,
whatever short-sighted and timid policy
may have yielded in other quarters,
here in Ohio, where so many Statesmen
and Generals and Soldiers have
made us a name and a praise in the whole
earth, whose sons have fallen
on so many fields for the government and
Union, whose own faith has been
kept with its creditors in spotless
purity, here, in the stronghold of patriotic
devotion and scrupulous integrity, let
there be no symptoms of weakness or
wavering."
Vol. XXXVII--17.
258
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
New York, however, various political
developments mili-
tated against the success of the
Pendleton program.
The New York and Indiana delegations
were headed by
factions openly and determinedly
hostile to the Ohio
group. A strong sentiment was yet
evident that the
campaign should center in the issue of
the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Ohio the State
Legislature, encour-
aged by the 50,000 majority against
amending the state
constitution in behalf of negro
suffrage, passed a reso-
lution retracting the act of
ratification by the previous
Legislature. The so-called
"Visible Admixture" law,
designed to disfranchise at least 2,000
voters, was
passed. By it any person challenged at
the polls must
swear and procure the oath of two
witnesses that his
freedom from an admixture of African
blood was prac-
tically absolute. Although this law was
soon declared
unconstitutional, it served to keep the
issue of negro suf-
frage before the public. Another phase
of the legisla-
tive program prompted Republican
leaders to arouse
suspicion as to the sincerity of
Democratic proposals.
Legislation designed to disfranchise
college students
and the inmates of the Soldiers' Home
enabled the Re-
publicans to act on the offensive when
the National Con-
vention met in New York on July fourth.
A source of friction overshadowing all
others had
resulted in the redivision of party
spoils made necessary
by the partial success in the election
of 1867. A legis-
lature had been secured upon terms
which represented
a revolutionary reaction to the
vindictive attitude threat-
ened by such men as Wade. A popular
reaction to the
crusading spirit had been uncovered,
and astute party
managers were not slow to see that it
stood in the way
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 259
of crystallizing about the person of
their most radical
party leader--the man who had been most
uncompro-
mising at the moment when it was
apparently political
suicide to do so; Pendleton's
personality and financial
program did not stand in distinct
relief to Vallandig-
ham's enthusiastic and idolizing
audiences.36 More pli-
ant politicians whose control rested
upon influences
which must frequently defeat popular
tendencies, could
not therefore look with equanimity upon
so complete a
vindication as that connected with
Vallandigham's elec-
tion. Without regard to the agreement
of the year
before, Pendleton and the Enquirer turned
to squaring
the Legislature to the election of
Thurman--a choice
that squared better with promoting
Pendleton's presi-
dential chances. Vallandigham was
bitterly disappointed
by his defeat. His vindication had been
near at hand. It
36 A leading correspondent of the
Cincinnati Commercial at various
times insisted that in case the election
were left in the hands of the masses,
Vallandigham would undoubtedly be
elected. Under date of October 25,
1867, he wrote: "I shall not
attempt to account for Mr. Vallandigham's
popularity among the Democratic masses;
least of all shall I attribute it
to the same cause to which I attribute
his unpopularity among the Demo-
cratic politicians. I have attended two 'jollification' meetings
recently,
and have seen at each such
demonstrations in the direction of hero-worship
as are seldom exhibited in this country.
. . . .
The speech occupied a little over an
hour in its delivery, and I thought
that at its conclusion the assembled
Democrats would quietly disperse to
their respective homes. But not so. The
ovation, instead of having ended,
had just commenced, and for about an
hour there was such a scene of wild
confusion, produced by attempts to
congratulate the speaker, as is seldom
witnessed by any one, and I hope will
never again be witnessed by me
except from a respectful distance.
They crowded around his carriage,
they choked every avenue of travel
around him, and conducted them-
selves in a general way like so many
lunatics." Cited in Vallandigham,
Life of Vallandigham, p. 421. Accounts in the same tenor are given in
the Commercial, November 24 and
25, 1867.
260
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
was beyond the nature of things to
expect him to be-
come aggressive in behalf of the man
who had failed to
stand by him. He was shortly to reveal
his hand in
another enterprise.
The day before the Convention,
Pendleton with his
"body-guard" of three hundred
men clad in linen dust-
ers and caps, paraded the streets
bearing a banner in-
scribed, "The people demand
payment of the bonds in
greenbacks and equal taxation. One
currency for all.
Pendleton the people's nominee."
Despite the selection
of New York over St. Louis as the place
for holding the
Convention, commonly regarded as a blow
at Pendle-
ton's chances, the delegation was
determined upon a
conspicuous part in the Convention
proceedings. A few
days previously, five members of the
delegation were in-
duced to withdraw in favor of
Vallandigham, Pugh,
Jewett, Thurman, and Morgan--the five
most influen-
tial Democrats of the state, with the
exception of the
candidate for the Presidential
nomination. The contest
as developed in the Convention resolved
itself into a
duel between New York and Ohio. The
platform as
adopted on the third day embraced the
Pendleton pro-
gram and went on record against the
Reconstruction
Acts as "usurpations,
unconstitutional, revolutionary,
and void." The "Ohio
Idea" was safely launched, but as
the result of maneuvers designed to
break the deadlock
between candidates, the Ohio delegation
became the
victim of one of the most peculiar
ironies in political
history. As a result of Vallandingham's
cooperation in
an attempt to secure the nomination of
Chase, an Ohio
delegate led a stampede of the
Convention to the New
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 261
York nominee, Horatio Seymour, a
recognized oppo-
nent of the Pendleton program.37
During the impeachment trial of
President John-
son, it became evident that the
Republicans must nomi-
nate General Grant. The program was
backed by the
Ohio press from the beginning--as soon
as it became
known that Grant would not be the
Democratic candi-
date. His election was represented as a
patriotic duty,
and the campaign resolved itself into
an incrimination
of Seymour, the "Mephistopheles of
the riots," and the
"guiltiest of the murderers of
that bloody mob."38 The
Pendleton program was represented as
merely a step in
the direction of a general program of
repudiation--if
not actually in itself repudiation. The
Democratic cam-
paign in the state, owing to the fiasco
in New York,
never assumed significance. The Enquirer
expressed
its determination to stand back of its
candidate in 1872.
The success of the Republican party in
electing Gen-
eral Grant by an overwhelming electoral
vote and by a
popular majority of 300,000 left the
Democratic party
in practically the same position it had
occupied in 1865,
with the exception that it had involved
itself with an
additional discredited program. The
Republican party,
which had emerged from its previous
Unionist factions,
stood practically unchallenged as the
embodiment of na-
tional patriotism. While there was no
real unity among
Republicans on the financial issue, the
success of 1868
contributed toward incorporating the
ideal of bank
37 The plan was that Seymour should
refuse the nomination and trans-
fer his support to Chase. Cf. Ann. Rep't. of the Am. Hist. Assoc., 1902,
Vol. II, pp. 520-521.
38 In reference to the draft riots in New
York in 1863.
262
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
credit and "sound money" as a
party tradition. Grant's
majority in Ohio reached 40,000--20,000
less than that
of Lincoln in 1864.
By clever maneuvering, the Democrats
were in po-
sition to cause the Republicans
considerable anxiety. By
combining with a "Reform"
movement in Hamilton
County in 1869, they succeeded in
maintaining a nomi-
nal majority in the state Legislature.
On party issues,
however, that combination acted with
the Republicans.
As candidate for governor the same
year, the Demo-
crats, under Pendleton's direction, had
nominated Gen-
eral Rosecrans. The latter, much to the
satisfaction of
many Democrats, declined the nomination
in a letter
in which he scored the party for its
erratic course. Pen-
dleton, to save the situation, was
forced to accept the
state committee's nomination and suffer
defeat by a
margin of 7,500 votes.
Before the next Presidential election a
series of
events and factors in state and nation
combined to
awaken new hope on the part of
disappointed Democrats
and stranded Conservatives. In the
light of these de-
velopments it will be seen how remote
from certain pop-
ular interests was the canvass of 1868
with its election
of a national hero and ambiguous appeal
to national
honor on an "honest money"
platform.39
39 The Committee on Resolutions
of the Republican Convention is re-
ported to have struggled
four hours before securing a resolution that
was
sufficiently ambiguous regarding
"honest money."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 263
CHAPTER III
THE NEW DEPARTURE
The election of General Grant in 1868
was secured
without reference to the fundamental
problems of the
newer era; the keynote, "Let us
have peace," the plat-
form and the candidates merely asked
the voter's ap-
proval of what had been achieved in
reconstruction.
This program proved expedient in
carrying the election,
but involved serious difficulties the
moment the adminis-
tration assumed responsibility for concrete
action. The
execution of the enforcement acts
committed the ad-
ministration to a radical policy
against which a very
powerful element of the Republican
party was in a posi-
tion of vehement protest. The disregard
of the Presi-
dent for the conventions of his office,
connected with his
inability to judge men for their
political capacity, had
led to evils which gave rise to severe
criticism and pro-
test throughout the nation. The many
sources of op-
position, both social and economic,
attested a national in-
terest in the practical problems of the
future, while in-
dicating a flagging interest in the
issues of the war.
An immediate effect of the Grant regime
was to
create a situation altogether favorable
to the establish-
ment of political alliances on issues
more real than those
of the shadow conflict of 1868.1 As
early as 1867, Ham-
ilton County had furnished a
conspicuous example of
the possible success of such movements.
Samuel F.
Cary, who had been passed over by his
party convention
1 The break between Sumner and Grant had
early in 1871 aroused
apprehensions of a serious break in the
Republican party. Cf. Ohio State
Journal, March 22, 1871.
264 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
for the Second Congressional District
nomination,
opened an independent campaign against
the regular
nominee as a "Working-man's
Candidate" and with the
aid of his "Tin Bucket
Brigade," gained recognition of
the Democrats by his aggressive
campaign.2 His suc-
cess was not lost sight of in the years
immediately fol-
lowing. The partial Democratic success
of 1867 had
convinced many that the future of the
party rested in
acting "with such moderation and
sound discretion that
it may permanently convert them (the
Conservatives)
to the Democratic organization."3
It was in pursuance
of this policy that party leaders had
elected Thurman
to the Senate over Vallandigham in
January, 1868.
Vallandigham's retort was in the form
of one of the
most far-reaching political alliances
consummated be-
fore 1871--that between himself and
Chase before the
National Convention which had nominated
Seymour.
It demonstrated at all events the
degree to which politi-
cal lines might be crossed during that
era. The Pen-
dleton men had saved themselves from
Vallandigham's
promotion of the Chase movement in the
New York
delegation only by uniting in advance
upon Seymour.
2 October 4, 1867, when Cary's election
became a practical certainty,
the Enquirer openly supported
him. October 8, his name was inserted in
the Democratic ballot.
3 The Cincinnati Enquirer (October
14, 1867) asserted: "We could
have given the Conservative Republicans
one-half of the County offices,
and made a clean sweep of the
negro-worshiping, bank aristocracy and
tax exempting bondholders of Hamilton
County. Let us in the future fight
the Devil with fire on a larger scale
than we did in this County at the
late election." The same paper,
October 15, clipped the following from
William D. Morgan's Newark Advocate: "Let
it be the care of the Demo-
cratic party not to drive these men away
from their new association; but
let it act with such wisdom, moderation
and sound discretion. that it may
Permanently convert them to the
Democratic organization."
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 265 An attempt at a "New Departure" in the Democratic party had been side-stepped in a manner that encour- aged renewed attempts. |
|
In the state elections of 1869 and 1870, combination tickets were an altogether frequent experiment and ex- tended to the nomination of General Rosecrans for gov- |
266 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ernor.4 Representatives
James M. Ashley and Robert
Schenck, of the Toledo and Dayton
districts respect-
ively, lost their seats in the
elections of 1868 and 1870
by effective party and factional
combinations. Such
proofs of political instability were
disconcerting to the
established party leadership, but a
source of encourage-
ment to those who had ambitions or had
experienced
recent disappointments.
State and national elections from 1871
to 1873 were
conditioned by the same attitude which
had character-
ized the elections immediately
preceding them. From
the camps of both parties issued
factional expeditions
which held forth the hope of being
offered favorable
terms of leadership in the opposing
camp, or of being
met half way in the formation of an
entirely new or-
ganization. Also an actual step was to
be taken in the
direction of shifting political issues
from their former
channels.
Cincinnati was fertile soil from which
new political
ventures were in the habit of
springing. The instability
of its voting elements was ever the
hope and despair of
aspiring politicians. The city's
immediate touch with
sectional interests, on the other hand,
commended its at-
mosphere as peculiarly favorable for
maturing political
schemes which were in the grafting
process. It was
the vantage point from which Salmon P.
Chase had
aided in articulating the Republican
party when he had
first hoped to become President of the
United States.
4 In remonstrating against the
"miscellaneous" tickets in the election
of 1869, the Ohio State Journal scored
the "Republican Soreheads" in the
following terms: "They are simply
playing into the hands of our political
enemies and damning themselves
politically forever." Ohio State Journal,
September 14, 1869.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 267
March 10, 1871, the city was again the
scene of an
event which promised at least future
influence for the
men who promoted it. Quickened by the
success of the
Liberal movement in Missouri and the
cause of "re-
union and reform" which Carl
Schurz was at the time
promoting among the border states, a
dozen disaffected
Republicans took council with each
other.5 Prominent
among them was J. D. Cox, who had
recently broken
with Grant and resigned from the
Cabinet. With him
were associated George Hoadly and
Stanley Matthews,
prominent attorneys, Fred Hassaurek,
editor of the
city's most important German paper, and
J. W. Hart-
well, Vice-President of the Dayton and
Hamilton Rail-
way.5a They declared as
their program the common pur-
pose of cleansing the Republican party,
or starting a
new one. The report of principles,
embracing amnesty,
civil service reform, specie payments
and a revenue re-
form was signed by one hundred
prominent citizens.
The "Reunion and Reform
Association," which grew
out of the movement, although
originally intended as a
Republican affair, enlisted the
interest of Democrats--
especially those who felt their
political discouragement
most bitterly.6 The Enquirer
was sympathetic. Some
Republicans were hopeful and others
were cynical.7
Sherman's sympathizers knew that the
immediate ob-
jective was to secure their leader's
seat in the United
5 Cox was at that time in
intimate correspondence with Schurz. See
especially Schurz's letter of April 4 in
Schurz's Speeches, Correspondence
and Political Papers, II, pp. 254-255.
5a Cincinnati Enquirer, March 28,
1871.
6 Cf. Schurz's op. cit., II, p.
255.
7 See especially Cincinnati Enquirer,
March 23, 1871.
268 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
States Senate.8 The New York
Tribune, whose editor
was to figure prominently in the
movement a year later,
expressed the suspicion of regular
party men when it
scored the promoters "for oiling
their favorites pre-
paratory to getting them comfortably
swallowed by the
Sham Democracy as candidates for the
Presidency."9
As the campaign of 1871 approached, the
Democrats
laid their plans with the growing
Republican defection
clearly in mind. With the exception of
Pendleton, all
proposed candidates for gubernatorial
honors were at
one time or another of Unionist or
Republican ante-
cedents. Naturally "the
thoroughgoing Copperheads"
must be kept in abeyance while the gap
between the lib-
eral elements of the two parties was
closed.
Since 1868, Vallandigham had nursed his
resent-
ment in comparative silence.10 Pendleton
was appar-
ently in complete control of his party
as he surveyed
the possibilities of succeeding Sherman
in the Senate.
On May 19, however, Vallandigham's
silence was
broken by newspaper accounts of a
Democratic county
convention held in Dayton the preceding
day. Under
his leadership an elaborate program,
characterized as a
"New Departure" of the
Democratic party, had been
8 L. H. Bond wrote to Sherman October
16, 1874: "Three years ago I
ran for the legislature and lacked only
150 votes of an election in a poll
of thirty-nine thousand votes, and I
carried the weight of Hassaurek's op-
position and the enmity of all your
rivals in Hamilton County, such as Cox,
Hassaurek, Matthews and several others.
These men have since assured
me that personally they would have
rejoiced in my success, but they knew
I would support you, and therefore were
not enthusiastic." Sherman MSS.
9 Cited in the Cincinnati Enquirer, April
13, 1871.
The Cincinnati Enquirer, May 20,
1871, contains a collection of news-
paper editorial reactions.
10 Cf. Vallandigham, op. cit., pp.
422-423.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 269
adopted and submitted as a model for
the State Conven-
tion called for June 1. The event was a
clear challenge
to the McLean-Pendleton dictatorship,
as well as an
overture to schismatic Republicans. The
essential fea-
tures of the program attacked the
Radical party of 1871
as one different from the Republican
organization pre-
ceding the war and as an
"Administration or Grant
party" dating from March 4, 1869.
The term "New
Departure" was drawn from the set
of resolutions which
dismissed the issues of the war, the
Constitutional
amendments, slavery, inequality, and
"all that is of the
dead past." "The Resolutions
of '68, States' Rights,
Negro suffrage, greenbacks for public
debts, our South-
ern brethren, justice to the South and
everything else
which Democracy had held destructive as
opposed to
Black Republicanism, was turned into
the hopper to be
seen no more in the original,"
commented the Dayton
Journal.11 On its positive side the platform declared for
universal amnesty, a strictly revenue
tariff, elimination
of extravagance, woman suffrage, and
"reform of the
extortionate system of banking"--a more compre-
hensive program than that offered by
the Cincinnati
movement.12
The essential features of the program
were adopted
by the State Convention, although the
resolution con-
cerning the Constitutional Amendments
was strongly
opposed by a minority group led by
Frank Hurd of To-
11 Dayton Journal, May 19, 1871.
12 George Houk explained the philosophy
of the movement by the fol-
lowing simile: "A great earthquake
occurs. A mountain sinks and a lake
appears in its stead. We must accept the
lake for we cannot restore the
mountain." Dayton Journal, May
19, 1871. Vallandigham declared it "not
a New Departure but a return."
Cleveland Leader, May 19, 1871.
270 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ledo.13 A resolution to the effect that
greenbacks be
made convertible into 3 per cent bonds
redeemable in
greenbacks on demand, was conceded to
the Pendleton
group. The nomination of George W.
McCook of the
famous family of fighting McCooks was
an additional
bid for conservative support.
The Vallandigham coup attracted
favorable and un-
favorable comment throughout the
nation. A congrat-
ulation from Chase for the great
"service to your coun-
try and the party," was
immediately forthcoming.14 The
New York Sun, the New York Herald,
the Philadelphia
Evening Herald and the Louisville Courier-Journal
were among the more conspicuous
newspapers endors-
ing the program--the first named
declaring that it
placed "Mr. Vallandigham among the
most conspicuous
political leaders of the day."15
The Enquirer was at
first non-committal, inviting
"criticism and improve-
ment if not opposition to the main
idea."16 The Repub-
lican press naturally spared no effort
in attempting to
13 Hurd's minority resolution that
"the 14th and 15th Amendments,
having been made parts of the
Constitution by violence and fraud, are
revolutionary and void," was voted
down 169-296. Cleveland Leader, June
2, 1871.
14 Vallandigham, op. cit., p.
446.
15 Ibid., pp. 446
ff.
Cincinnati Enquirer, May 19,
1871.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer (quoted
in Vallandigham, op. cit., p. 448)
offered the following explanation:
"While it makes no apology for the
position the Democratic party has held
in the past, it recognizes the situa-
tion, accepts facts that are
accomplished, refuses to play heads and tails
on the grave of issues that were live
ones only in '62, '63, '64, and '65;
it refuses to allow the Republican party
to put a ring-fence around us and
keep us dancing to the same old tunes
and rattling the same old bones."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 271
discredit Vallandigham as a perpetrator
of fraud and
promoter of treasonable hypocrisy.l7
The program was accordingly not without
its em-
barrassments. An advance movement of
the sort natu-
rally stood in danger of rear-guard
defection. Thur-
man had just advanced to leadership of
the Democratic
minority in the Senate through his
aggressive opposi-
tion to the Amendments, the Civil
Rights and the Force
Bills. The success of the movement
inferred a loss of
his leadership.18
The slight hold of the
"Departure" upon the party
was
soon demonstrated. Shortly after the tragic
death of Vallandigham, which occurred
before the con-
test had fairly begun, the campaign
languished in inter-
est.19 Party leaders were
soon convinced of the imprac-
ticability of shifting the issues too
radically. Further-
more, the Republicans nominated General
E. F. Noyes,
17 An observation of the Ohio State
Journal is typical: "The whole
game is plainly a ruse to catch the
votes of colored men and those conser-
vative Democrats who were driven into
the Republican party by the treason
of the Democracy during the war. . . .
The New Departure, Bah !"
Cleveland Leader, May 22, 1871.
The Ohio State Journal under the same
date declared: "It would be out of
the course of nature for the Republican
party not to feel some gratification
that the great archtraitor of the peace
Democracy has been brought by any means
to get down on his belly and
humbly eat the many dirty words which
have defiled his mouth in the utter-
ance during the past ten years. If his
repentance were sincere, and his
desire to atone for his miserable past
by some good in the future could be
accepted as reliable, the very angels in
Heaven would rejoice over the
salvation of this meanest of
sinners." June 12, 1871, Hayes made the
following entry in his diary: "I
say with the Albany Journal, 'The voice
is the voice of Jacob but the hand is
the hand of Esau'."
18 "I regard this new move as one
to foist you -- your friend Thurman
--Pendleton and others and place you as
impracticable fogies . . ." James
Fergerson of Center Point, Indiana, to
Allen June 19, 1871. Alien MSS.
19 Vallandigham was accidentally shot
while demonstrating the use of
a pistol before a jury.
272 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications
who had suffered the loss of a limb in
the recent war,
and who, as a young Republican was
capable of show-
ing how "thoroughly alive and
vigorous are the prin-
ciples that slew slavery and made the
Union the guar-
antee of liberty."20 The
Republicans carried the elec-
tion by 20,000 majority--three times
that of 1869.
The Republican majority in the
Legislature elected
at the same time was not proof,
however, that the first
objective of the program--that of
defeating Sherman
for the Senate--was not to be
realized. Shortly after
the election, rumors gained currency
that the Senator
was to be sacrificed to the new
political order. James
Ashley attempted the part of chief
ritualist. He had
been a Representative from the Toledo
district during
and at the close of the war, and had
been among the
first to advocate impeachment
proceedings against Pres-
ident Johnson. During the party tangle
he had lost his
seat in Congress.21 His
scheme during the latter part
of 1871 was to secure a defeat of a
caucus nomination
by the Republicans preceding the actual
election by the
legislature.22 By throwing
the election directly into the
latter body and securing the nomination
of three or four
Republicans, he contemplated the
ultimate support of
the Democrats for some candidate who
had been deter-
mined upon as agreeable to both groups.
Governor
Hayes, Robert Schenck and J. D. Cox
were prominent
20 Harper's Weekly, July 8, 1871.
21 An account of Ashley is found in
Winter's History of North-western
Ohio, pp. 294 ff. Grant had later given him a "lame
duck" appointment as
Governor of the Territory of Montana,
and shortly afterward dismissed
him from that position.
22 J. R. Wing to Sherman, December 31,
1871. Under date December 4,
1871, Rush R. Sloane wrote: "Ashley
will do his best against you and yet I
think him only dangerous on account of
his dishonesty." Sherman MSS.. ..
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 273
among those considered for the
position. The plan failed
primarily because of the prompt action
of Lieutenant-
Governor Jacob Mueller. At the close of
the first ballot,
and before the result was announced, a
Democrat
changed his vote from General Morgan
(the recipient
of the complimentary vote of the
Democrats) to Cox.
The presiding officer refused to
recognize others who
attempted similar changes and declared
Sherman duly
elected.23
The reelection of Sherman marked the
failure of
the first phase of the "New
Departure," but did not
check the plan to name Grant's
successor as President.
The call for the Liberal Convention at
Cincinnati in
1872 marked Ohio as the storm center of
what was now
regarded as a national movement. The
fiasco connected
with the attempt is familiar history.
The original pro-
moters lost control of the convention
proceedings amid
political manipulations which
paralleled, if they did not
surpass, those of the older parties.
Only the advance-
ment of Greeley to the nomination was
needed to dem-
onstrate the lack of a serious or
consistent purpose on
the part of the delegates. As a result
Ohio Democrats
and Liberals faced a common impasse.
George Hoadly
and Stanley Matthews, the two
Republicans of the state
most conspicuously identified with the
Convention,
shortly declared that they would not
support the "Whi-
23 According to the Plain Dealer he
was declared "elected President
frum te state off Ohio in te Conkgress
of te United States fur six years
frum de furst of March eighteen huntred
and seventy-two."
Vol. XXXVII-18.
274 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
tey-Brown" ticket.24 The
Democracy on the other hand
came to the support of Greeley, if one
may call it sup-
port, only after hesitation and clear
evidence that such
action formed the expedient program.
Following the
lead of the party at Baltimore, the
Democratic State
Convention at Cleveland, June 27,
"pronounced for the
heartiest endorsement of the Cincinnati
movement and
its candidates, without abating one jot
or tittle of the
Democratic organization."25 Thurman
accepted the in-
evitable by a letter published July 15.
He declared the
election of Greeley preferable to that
of Grant. "Indi-
vidually," he wrote, "I
preferred fighting under the
Democratic banner, with a straight
Democratic ticket;
but I could not shut my eyes to the
fact that a great many
good Democrats were of a different
opinion. And to
me it seemed clear that any course that
did not emanate
from the masses of the party, would
surely fail. Acting
on this principle I have not answered a
single one of the
many letters that I have received upon
the subject.
*
* *"26 Throughout the campaign the Democratic
organization remained intact--an
excellent safety de-
vice in the face of the impending
fiasco.
The defeat of the Liberal Republican
ticket con-
vinced many that the cooperative scheme
was imprac-
ticable--"would not wash,"
according to the political
parlance of the day. A final attempt,
however, was yet
to be made, which, preceding the
election of the follow-
24 The latter, who had denounced the
Grant administration as con-
sumed by the "slow poison of
corruption," explained his defection on the
basis of the principle of reform being
in Adams but not in Greeley. Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, August 6,
1872.
25 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June
28, 1872.
26 Ibid., July 15, 1872.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 275
ing year, and although not assuming the
importance of
1872, presented the occasion for a
noteworthy coup--
a reversal of the political strategy
underlying the devel-
opments of the preceding year. The
"Allen County
Movement," as the "New
Departure" of 1873 was
called, was an echo of the preceding
year. The occasion
was the recurring Senatorial election:
the Legislature
elected that year would name Thurman's
successor to
the Senate. Administration influence
had already man-
ifested itself in behalf of Columbus
Delano, successor
to J. D. Cox as Secretary of the
Interior in Grant's
cabinet in 1870. The Credit Mobilier
scandal and
"Salary Grab" had succeeded
other issues in nursing
popular opposition to the Grant administration.
Symp-
toms of a period of economic depression
were becoming
evident. A new impetus of unrest
manifested itself
among farmers and laborers; conventions
voicing a
spirit of opposition gained in
frequency. One of these,
a Workingmen's and Farmers' Convention,
met at
Mansfield, where Senator Sherman
maintained his resi-
dence, early in June to register
opposition to the "cor-
rupt rings" of both parties.27
A few weeks later a more
important convention was held in Allen
County. The
leaders, T. E. Cunningham, Shelby
Taylor and others,
whom the press identified as
"Johnsonizers," drew up
an indictment against "moneyed
corporations" and their
influence in Congress and connected it
with a demand
for governmental efficiency, revenue
tariff and a repeal
of laws "favorable to the
capitalist to the prejudice of
labor."28 Every one
soon knew that the "Allen County"
27 Cincinnati Commercial, June 9
and 10, 1873.
28 Nation, August 14, 1873, p. 105.
276 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
movement was nothing less than an
attempt to resurrect
the Cincinnati movement of the
preceding year. The
Cincinnati Commercial published
a list of one hundred
and twenty Hamilton County Democrats,
which it char-
acterized as "the brains and
wealth and energy of the
Democracy in this quarter of the
state," who stood
ready to support the proposed program.29
The State
Convention was called to meet at
Columbus, July 31--
one week before the Democrats were
scheduled to meet
at the same place.
Before either convention met, however,
Thurman's
hand began to be felt. He let it be
known that he had
no sympathy for any movement which
proposed to elim-
inate him as unfit for further service
in the Senate.
Until his hand was felt the Enquirer
lent its support to
the program with undivided enthusiasm.30 Within a
week, however, the editors could find
no invective too
bitter to be heaped upon the
"obstinate Allenites and
pig-headed Liberal Republicans."31 Aside from the
Enquirer the movement met with slight encourage-
ment from Democratic organs. The Plain
Dealer gave
expression to its attitude and at the
same time undoubt-
edly represented the convictions of
numerous other dis-
appointed Democrats:
"The result of the Greeley Deal in
Ohio last fall is
not calculated to make the old straight
haired moss-
29 Cincinnati Commercial, July
18, 1873.
30 Cf. especially Cincinnati Enquirer,
June 24, 1873. The Commercial
afterward frequently called attention to
the Enquirer's readiness to scrap
the Democratic party. Cf. Cincinnati Commercial,
January 3, 1876.
31"There will be men there like the
mule that could not be kept in a
pasture unless put in a meadow alongside
and allowed to jump out." Cin-
cinnati Enquirer, July 29, 1873.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 277
covered Democrats enthusiastic about
'fusing all the ele-
ments.' The Democracy then did the
principal voting--
the Liberals the principal boasting;
and if those Repub-
licans who do not like the Credit
Mobilier business, the
back-sway swag, and the general
demoralization of
their own party, cannot form an
alliance with us to free
the Government from the depredations
and blunders so
apparent to all, without they break up the
old Demo-
cratic organization, make it lay aside
forever its historic
and noble old name, then how can we
admit there is any
more honesty about them than about
anybody else?"32
July 31, when the State Convention met
at Colum-
bus, the program had become a distinct
third party
movement, backed primarily by the Commercial,
and
resolved that "neither of the old
parties are to be courted
or affiliated with."33
Thurman, from his headquarters
at the Neil House, kept watch over the
actions of the
Democratic element.34 Before
final action was taken, a
committee was sent to make formal
inquiry as to the
Senator's attitude. In quite definite
and emphatic terms
he declared the room too small to serve
as a burial-place
for the Democratic party. By an eloquent
plea he pre-
vailed upon certain Democratic leaders
to discounte-
32 Clipped in Cincinnati Enquirer, July
3, 1873. The Enquirer (July
2, 1873) declared: "The Democrats
are perfectly willing to cooperate with
Republican reformers. They will even, as
they did in 1872, put them in
the lead, backing them up with all their
strength, but further than that
they will not go and it is idle to talk
about it."
33 Cincinnati Commercial, July
30, 1873.
34 July 7, 1873, Thurman declared the
Allen County movement "hasty,
ill-advised and not calculated to meet
the approbation of the Democratic
party at large." Cincinnati Commercial,
July 7, 1873.
278 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
nance the Liberal and await the
Democratic Conven-
tion.35
A faction of the Convention, however,
nominated
a state ticket, placing Isaac C.
Collins, a Cincinnati
Democrat, at the head of it as the
candidate for gov-
ernor.36 The Commercial became eloquent in commen-
dation of the "People's
Party" and in defiance of Thur-
man and the "battered, dilapidated
and spoiled" Democ-
racy:37 "He (Thurman) has said
continually that the
thing to do was to 'blow the trumpet
and rally the boys.'
Let us see him do it now. He preaches a
great Demo-
cratic revival. Very well. Produce it.
Show us the
mighty magic, the consummate chemistry,
that will yield
the result from the conditions of the
country. * * *"38
August 6, when the "old Democratic
wheelhorses"
met at Columbus, the program was
practically fixed.
Thurman had secured the assurances of
his uncle, Wil-
liam Allen, popularly known as
"Roaring Bill Allen,"
that he would accept the nomination for
governor.39
The latter, one of the most striking
characters in Ohio
politics, like his nephew, was of
southern birth and a
rigid disciple of the Democratic faith
in the days of
35 The Cincinnati Enquirer, July
31, 1873, declared that the program
was designed to supersede Thurman by
Hassaurek or Brinkerhoff. "Too
much Brinkerhoff," was a common
opposition criticism of the movement.
36 Collins was formerly Matthews' law
partner. Ford and Ford, His-
tory of Cincinnati, p. 416.
37 The Commercial was frank in
announcing the objective of the move-
ment: "The present fight in Ohio is
on the ground whether Mr. Thurman
shall be Senator, or somebody
else." July 19, 1873.
38 Cincinnati Commercial, July
31, 1873.
39 "A sobriquet gained by speaking
successfully in a freight depot
against the shrieking whistles of two
locomotives." Cincinnati Enquirer,
August 12, 1873. "The Ohio
Gong" and "Fog Horn" were also sometimes
applied.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 279
Andrew Jackson. Tall, aggressive and
commanding, he
bore many points of resemblance to his
earlier contem-
porary.40 Although he had
now been twenty-five years
in retirement and was almost seventy
years of age, his
name bore the magic of twelve years'
association as the
"peer of Clay, Webster and other
intellectual giants."41
"One blast from this old Jackson
Democrat would be
worth ten thousand men," declared
the Enquirer in ad-
vocacy of the nomination.42
The platform declared against the
revival of dead
issues and resolved to stand by its
[Democratic] princi-
ples as "suited to all times and
circumstances."43 From
the beginning, the Democratic campaign
was aggressive.
General Noyes, the Republican candidate
for re-elec-
tion, had met with embarrassments
during his adminis-
tration. The candidacy of Collins never
passed a de-
sultory stage--was in fact practically
lost sight of in the
heated campaign conducted by Allen and
Thurman.
The Republican attempt to ridicule the
candidacy of Al-
len served only to advance the latter's
cause. The
slighting remarks of O. P. Morton, who
came from In-
diana to assist in the campaign, struck
at state pride
and aroused the resentment even of
Republicans.44 As
the campaign progressed it became
increasingly evident
that the man of Virginia was gaining
the ascendency
40 He was, traditionally at least, the
originator of "fifty-four forty or
fight."
41 Cleveland Plain Dealer, August
7, 1873.
42 Cincinnati Enquirer, August 1,
1873.
43 Annual Cyc., 1873, p. 610.
44 In a speech at Athens, Morton said:
"As well attempt to restore
the customs and manners of ancient Egypt
by presenting for our admiration
and pattern well preserved mummies from
her Pyramids." Cincinnati
Commercial, August 25, 1873.
280
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
over the former native of New
Hampshire. The Demo-
cratic party was triumphant. The
failure of Jay Cooke
and Company in September, and financial
reverses fol-
lowing, contributed to the political
reaction; it lent an
element of reality to the bitter attack
levied by the Dem-
ocratic candidates upon the National
Banking System
and "bondholders who practised
extortion through per-
petuating the national debt." Allen's majority was
somewhat less than 1000 votes; a
Democratic Legisla-
ture assured Thurman a continuance in
the Senate.
The "New Departure" and
Liberal Republican
movements were more than "spasms
of political enthusi-
asm of a negative character." They
did not pass away
as quickly as they came, as one writer
has declared. It
is true that Sherman, Grant and Thurman
in turn
weathered opposition in the retention
of their offices.
Each of the old parties likewise
retained its name and
continued to insist, whenever
circumstances demanded
it, upon former traditions. Much that
was prominent
was staged by self-seeking politicians,
and the impor-
tance of the movement might easily be
over emphasized.
For after all, the program, even as
originally advanced,
advocated little that was not at the
time continuously
professed by one or other of the
existing organizations.
Civil service reform--a self-denying
ordinance for the
party leaders in control of
office--capitalized the popu-
lar opposition to jobbery in the
administration, and en-
listed the lip-services of all grades
of office seekers as
well as the support of the
conscientious. At no time did
the promoters of the movements profess
a program that
was not in accord with the tendencies
that dominated
in one way or another each of the older
parties. The
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 281
real significance must be sought in the
subsequent for-
tunes of the chief promoters.
Thenceforth the "Stal-
wart" supporters of the
administration were forced to
call a halt upon certain of their more
excessive prac-
tises. A party cleavage had been
created which estab-
lished a counterpoise to fast and loose
methods.
Staunch partisans might sneer in public
at the Inde-
pendent or "mugwump" for his
"better than thou" atti-
tude and party perfidy, but
nevertheless they weighed
his influence in party deliberations.
In the next Presi-
dential election they were forced to
countenance as their
candidate one whom they could only hope
would prove
amenable to their practices. With
chagrin they saw the
most prominent leader of the Liberal
movement ap-
pointed to a cabinet position and
exercise great influence
upon the administration. In Ohio as
elsewhere, Liberal
leaders became available candidates for
office in both
parties. J. D. Cox was returned to
Congress in 1876.
Matthews was promoted for a brief
period to the Sen-
ate and later awarded a seat on the
Federal Bench
Democratic ranks were at the same time
liberally re-
cruited. Thomas Ewing, Jr., son of the
great Whig
leader, became influential in promoting
the greenback
cause among Democrats and was finally a
candidate for
governor. George Hoadly became a
Democratic gov-
ernor and entertained an ambition to
become a Presi-
dential candidate. In brief, after the
days of Governor
Allen, the selection of Democratic
candidates who had
formerly been Republicans was all but a
universal fea-
ture of the party's strategy. The
process also was in-
dicative of the fact that the party was
becoming a con-
venient alternative to Republicanism.
282
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The complexity of party membership and
the weight
of tradition prevented a shifting of
the political stage.
The party stereotype was too firmly
fixed and was in no
way of becoming easily shattered. And
yet the political
center of gravity had been disturbed;
it will be seen that
the relationship of party tradition to
the newer issues
was thenceforth a matter of greater
emphasis.
CHAPTER IV
DEPRESSION AND THE FINANCES
The Democratic coup of 1873
served to check some-
what the political maneuvering designed
to promote
third party movements. Through at least
two decades
following, party solidarity was to form
the chief source
of unity in the face of disruptive
tendencies occasioned
by the growing multiplicity of social
and economic in-
terests. Somewhere between the extremes
of unity on
the one hand and the atomizing
tendencies of democ-
racy on the other must be established a
new order--
one whose fundamental features were to
be determined
largely by the newer economic and
social influences.
The role of each party was to represent
itself as more
thoroughly identified with a higher
ideal of unity than
its rival and at the same time more
thoroughly respon-
sible in the task of reconciling
individual and group
interests with its attainment. This
role of party or-
ganizations was naturally involved with
a great de-
gree of obscurantism. Programs designed
to meet new
issues were read into party traditions
by empirical
processes. The popular mind, obsessed
by an ap-
proved legalism, constituted a high
expression of na-
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 283
tional optimism: from its texture
politicians, in much
the manner of mediaeval scholastics,
spun new rules for
the safekeeping of society, and
received public office as
their reward. Accordingly the
catholicity of an ac-
cepted doctrine was declared: by some
sort of anamor-
phosis the new issue was squared with
it and the voter
left no choice other than following the
line of patriotic
duty in voting the ticket. The outward
party tradition
was preserved; voters in the mass were
willing if not
eager to be convinced of the
transcendent wisdom of
their party. A national election became
for many, in
consequence, the occasion for
reconsecration to a chosen
faith. While in outward manifestations,
such as cam-
paign speeches and legislation,
government conformed
to the popular image of democracy,
social, economic and
political readaptations were all but
invisibly cloaked.
The medium of political methods as just
outlined
provided, at any rate, a practical
basis of unity.
Through a hierarchy of symbols, the
party secured har-
mony, and in no other way, perhaps,
could an organi-
zation have served the demands of its
age. When Ed-
ward McPherson, in 1888, wrote that the
Republican
party is "both in the purity of
its doctrine, the beneficent
sweep of its measures, in its courage,
its steadfastness,
its fidelity, in its achievements and
in its example, the
most resplendent political organization
the world has
ever seen," he lent expression to
a more or less articu-
late and powerful mass sentiment. Many
inclined to
discontent and open to convictions of
injustice were en-
abled to bury their differences on the
basis of a patriotic
duty.
In Ohio, as might well be expected in a
pivotal state,
284 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
voters were particularly subjected to
those influences
which molded the paramount convictions
of their time.
The observations of Brand Whitlock from
the stand-
point of experiences in a Republican
stronghold were
drawn with literary effect:
"In such an atmosphere as that in
Ohio of those
days it was natural to be a Republican;
it was more than
that, it was inevitable that one should
be a Republican;
it was not a matter of intellectual
choice, it was a
process of biological selection. The
Republican party
was not a faction, not a wing, it was
an institution like
those Emerson speaks of in his essay on
"Politics," root-
ed like oak-trees in the center around
which men grouped
themselves as best they can. It was a
fundamental and
self-evident thing like life, and
liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness, or like the flag, or the
federal judiciary.
It was elemental like gravity, the sun,
the stars, the
ocean.
It was merely the synonym for
patriotism,
another name for the nation. One became
in Urbana
and in Ohio for many years a Republican
just as the
Eskimo dons fur clothes. It was
inconceivable that
any self-respecting person should be a
Democrat: there
were, perhaps Democrats in Lighttown;
but then there
were rebels in Alabama, and in the
Ku-Klux-Klan,
about which we read in the evening, in
the Cincinnati
Gazette. * * * The Republican party had saved
the Union, won liberty for all men, and
there was noth-
ing left for the patriotic to do but to
extol that party,
and to see to it that its members held
office under the gov-
ernment."1
1 Whitlock, Forty Years of It, pp.
27-28.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 285
Supplementary to party organization as
an agency
of unity, was a generally accepted
economic and social
philosophy hitherto common to an
expanding frontier;
and neither party was inclined to
depart radically from
its tenets. The laissez-faire ideal,
which had found
classic expression upon the advent of
European expan-
sion, met ready acceptance with the
pioneers of Ohio
industry.2 In the days when
the state passed through
an agricultural stage of development,
the idea that the
chief function of government was to act
as a supple-
ment to individual effort with a
minimum of restriction,
had met with no serious difficulties.
This idea, applied
to an industrial community in its
extreme form, counte-
nanced an exploitation of human
agencies on the same
level with inanimate resources.
Although producing
commendable results, it frankly
professed a callousness
to all other theories of abstract
justice.
The era was productive, as other eras
are pro-
ductive, of programs in opposition to
dominant tenden-
cies. Labor groups were experimenting
with unions,
and farmers began to visualize benefits
in uniting with
neighbors in the formation of granges.
These associa-
tions professed a recognition of common
interest and
registered a protest against
consequences which were
held to be in need of popular control.
The dominant press on the other hand
was con-
strained by the forces of opposition to
lend concrete ex-
pression to the tenets of accepted
philosophy. The
Cleveland Leader was especially
frank in its tendencies
to dogmatize the relative rights of
employers and em-
2 For
a discussion of laissez-faire ideals in national life, see Merriam,
American Political Ideas, 1865-1917, chapter XI.
286
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ployees. Accordingly it insisted that
before the laws
of business all were equals and
"laboring men have no
more rights than others."3 Higher
wages might well
work an injury through higher prices
and fewer sales
abroad: "If we aspire to be a
manufacturing nation
and to compete with the world in our
sewing-machines,
our agricultural implements, our edge
tools and our
pianofortes, the scale of wages must
approximate (all
things being equal) to that prevailing
abroad."4 Labor,
indeed, had the right to combine and
strike, and no em-
ployer or company "can in this
country legally compel
the humblest working-man to labor one
hour for wages
lower than the latter is disposed to
accept. It follows
conversely--and here is the point of
the whole matter--
that no working-man or working-men can
legally or
with any prospect of public support,
endeavor to coerce
the employer to pay more wages than he
feels disposed
to pay. This is a free country; labor,
like flour and coal,
is worth what it will sell for in the
market, not more.
The working-man is entitled to the best
wages he can
get; the employer--even though it be a
corporation--
has the fullest right to buy labor as
cheaply as pos-
sible." It was against an all but universal acceptance
of this principle of industrialism that
labor was remon-
strating; something of a reversal of
the process was
being sought through legislation and
unionism.
The advent of an industrial hierarchy
implied social
readaptations which stood in striking
contrast to the
3 Cleveland
Leader, May 29, 1874. This was the answer to the argu-
ment for an eight-hour day.
4 Cleveland Leader, January 25, 1868.
5 Cleveland Leader, July 23,
1877.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 287
simple order of pioneer days. Even
before the war
period, various groups had ambitions to
parallel the bet-
ter social standards of eastern or
southern society.
Cincinnati had long been a favored
resort with the
southern aristocracy; and eastern
visitors never failed
to pay tribute to its exclusive
residential district among
the hills above the river. At the same
time Euclid Ave-
nue in Cleveland set Fifth Avenue in
New York as its
model, and one might observe here the
same standards
that held forth in Boston or
Philadelphia. The day had
all but passed when the state could not
"boast a hundred
silk hats."6 The
problem was to secure a serving class
which was likewise subservient in its
attitude. The ar-
rogance of household servants,
"servant-galism" ac-
cording to the Toledo Blade, might
even command edi-
torial attention.7 The
strike of 1877 inspired John Hay,
at the time resident in Cleveland, to
write a novel which
undertook to analyze the problem and
indicate its solu-
tion.8 By its implications
the American social tradition
was in need of being fundamentally
recast. The pseudo-
romantic style strongly suggested Sir
Walter Scott in
its appeal to mediaeval tradition in
support of social
cleavage. Neither Hammond nor Calhoun,
when they
had been compelled to defend their
system most stub-
bornly, had been more convincing. The
European
model, which Sherman had so
spectacularly criticised
in 1868, was after all the very ideal
which commanded
the admiration of the industrial
parvenu.
The process by which the new order was
being
6 Cf. Atlantic Monthly, Vol.
LXXXIV, p. 684.
7 Toledo Blade, February 26, 1867.
8 The Breadwinners first appeared anonymously in 1883-84.
288
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
achieved was by no means uniform nor
without protest.
The period brought to the surface many
and varied pro-
grams in conflict with it and each
other. The State Con-
vention called in 1873 to organize a
new fundamental
law, illustrates to a degree the extent
of diversified in-
terests, when the situation, detached
somewhat from
the element of party interests, was
actually tested.
Various provisions which were understood
to threaten
or be inconsistent with the demands of
political rings,
religious sects, temperance elements,
liquor interests
and others, were listed among the
leading causes for the
overwhelming defeat accorded that
instrument. Very
few approved of it entirely. One critic
enumerated
twelve issues which had alienated
support. The prob-
lem of securing government responsible
for increasingly
intricate responsibilities connected
with the new age
was further complicated by the
continuous struggle for
political advantage. The domination of
national issues
in a pivotal state even in "off
years" frequently sub-
ordinated local issues and converted
the contest into a
preliminary of a national election. The
task of recon-
ciling these interests and at the same
time subordinating
them to political advancement was
worthy of the best
efforts of any politician.
Prominent among local problems which at
various
times became issues were those
especially which per-
tained to the control of liquor
interests, taxation, main-
tenance of secular education, city
government and elec-
tions, factory, mine and transportation
regulation and
the care of dependents and delinquents.
Each of these
at various times became prominent;
occasionally certain
features conditioned national
campaigns. The natural
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 289
tendency, however, was to clear the
path to solidarity of
the national program by subverting
these issues as
stumbling-blocks in the path of the
opposition.
The most threatening issue of a local
nature to party
solidarity was that growing out of
recurring threats of
a liquor revolt: the Western Reserve,
which had been
staunch in abolitionism, was especially
open to moral
convictions on the subject. Owing to a
lack of restric-
tion under which intoxicants were sold,
practices had
arisen which shocked an ordinary sense
of decency.
Due to a popular conviction that all
citizens would be-
come thereby party to the traffic, the
state constitution
forbade the licensing of saloons.
Without restraint
street peddlers with push-carts or
drays and "alley rum-
holes" dispensed the "vilest
liquids ever poured into a
human stomach."9 The Cincinnati Commercial
de-
clared it a shame "to see,
wherever there is a shop em-
ploying a score of men, a great hulking
fellow, squatted
with his beer keg, snatching for the
nickels that were
much better spent for bread." The
wave of protest of
1873 and 1874 in the form of a
temperance prayer cru-
sade which swept the state was the
culmination of a
movement which thenceforth became a
relatively fixed
issue. Under the leadership of Dr. Dio
Lewis, a lec-
turer, women's bands were formed, first
in Hillsboro
and Washington Court House, whose
program con-
sisted in visiting places where liquor
was sold, to sing
and pray and to plead with the
proprietors to close. If
the doors were closed against them, the
crusaders knelt
9 Cleveland Leader, January 27,
1871.
Vol. XXXVII--19.
290
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
in the snow and prayed. The movement
spread through-
out the state and gained attention
through occasional
scenes which approached riots.10 From
the "Washing-
ton Court House Movement" was
finally evolved the
National Women's Christian Temperance
Union--a
permanent institution of the
anti-liquor forces.
Second only to the liquor issue for a
brief period in
the seventies, figured the problem of
sectarianism and
the public schools. The decade
characterized by threat-
ening labor revolts, witnessed
extensive legislation rela-
tive to the establishment of compulsory
state education.
The advent of this feature of the new
age naturally in-
volved difficulties with sects,
especially the Roman Cath-
olic, whose ideals and traditions were
infringed upon by
this expansion of secular
activity. The issue as to
whether the Bible should be read in the
public schools
and whether public funds should be
divided between
secular and parochial schools, at
various times threat-
ened solidarity. A defeat of the
Democratic party, how-
ever, at a time when the Republicans
declared it most
inclined toward serving the Catholic
cause, went far in
eliminating the controversy.
The relationship of the party
organization to state
issues was, from the nature of things,
a haphazard one.
It was from the standpoint of a broader
relationship
that the party claimed its special
significance. It not
only articulated the political
activities of a state with
those of the federal government, but it
represented in
large measure the bond which held
together the greater
and conflicting sectional interests. It
was primarily in
10 Cleveland Leader, March 20,
1874, contains a characteristic ac-
count of one.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 291
this capacity that a party disciplined
voters, sought office
for its candidates and attempted to
intrench itself in
power. The period from 1873 to 1879 was
one which
tested the efficacy of party government
to the utmost.
Although a partisan warfare was
threatened, it was a
spirit of party loyalty which became
effective in restor-
ing a degree of intersectional and
group comity.
* * * * *
The difficulties of the nation after
1873 rested upon
a series of complicating factors.
Farmers, for the most
part unorganized, industrial, railway,
banking interests
and rising labor groups were inclined
to view the new
problems from highly divergent
standpoints. The first
named was concerned with meeting
financial obligations
in the face of uncertain seasons,
markets and conditions
of transportation; railway magnates had
frequently
built on a faith in the future or with
an eye to financial
manipulation rather than with reference
to legitimate
public service; industrial interests
were linked with
banking institutions in demanding the
liquidation of in-
vestments and credits in terms of
"sound" finance; labor
groups, comparatively silent during the
war, were aris-
ing to protest once more against
conditions which lay
beyond their control as individuals.
Supply and de-
mand, the theoretical tyrants of a laissez-faire
ideal,
failed to keep credit, wealth and wages
in a state of
harmonious relationship. It was,
consequently, against
centrifugal forces no less than
national in scope that
party machinery operated; success in
this field only con-
stituted a worthy criterion of
political effort.
The period of economic depression, the
beginning of
292 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
which was signalized by the Wall Street
panic in Sep-
tember, 1873, accentuated the primary
issue about which
party dogma tended to crystallize. The
"dismal tale of
declining markets, exhaustion of
capital, a lowering in
value of all kinds of property,
including real estate, con-
stant bankruptcies, close economy in
business and grind-
ing frugality in living, idle mills,
furnaces and factories,
former profit-earning ironmills reduced
to the value of
a scrap heap, laborers out of
employment, reductions in
wages, strikes and lockouts, the
general railroad riots of
1877, suffering of the unemployed,
depression and de-
spair,"11 were, according to Mr.
Rhodes, indicative of
how seriously the elements of economic
life were dis-
jointed. Between laborers and employers
developed a
degree of suspicion and cynicism
hitherto scarcely par-
alleled in the hundred years of
national life. Spokesmen
for discouraged farmers and laborers
with destitute
families quoted the pulpit, the press
and industrial mag-
nates as proof that the latter were not
only unsympa-
thetic with the poverty and suffering
of the unemployed,
but were designing a dictatorship in
order to protect
their fabulous fortunes. The behavior
of the parvenu
in riotous squandering was to a
discontented workman
a sufficient answer to the argument
that no greater com-
pensation was possible for him and his
associates.12
Industrial depression, the real cause
and nature of
which has consistently baffled the
American business
mind, dealt severely with the economic
interests of Ohio.
11 Rhodes, History of the United
States, Vol. VII, pp. 52-53.
12 Brice, Financial Catechism, pp.
195-199, contains a collection of
such statements. The Annual Cyc. for
1877 under "Labor Strikes" con-
tains a statement of the labor point of
view.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 293
Over half of its iron furnaces went out
of business be-
tween 1873 and 1878. Wages were reduced
on an aver-
age of 33 per cent.; forty-six miners
in the Mahoning
Valley receiving from $2.50 to $3.00 in
1873 received
scarcely $1.50 in 1878.13 The scrip
system was resur-
rected. The laboring man was thus
directly confronted
with evidence that some agency stood
between him and
the liberty to exact a legitimate
compensation for his ef-
forts.14 The argument that
Wall Street controlled busi-
ness with a direct interest in its own
profits only, became
more than an empty theory.
When Congress assembled in 1873, the
state and
nation at large turned to that body in
hopes of some
solution to the difficulty. No less
than sixty financial
schemes were proposed--an evidence of a
multiplicity
of ideas if not of true financial
wisdom.15 After four
months of discussion relating primarily
to the question
as to how much the greenback
circulation should be in-
creased, a bill passed both houses
which set $400,000,000
as the maximum total. The President's
veto of the bill
stimulated popular discussion and
subjected party lines
13 Ohio Labor Statistics, 1878, p. 59.
14 Ibid., pp. 43-49, contains an estimate of the situation.
15 When financial discussion was at its
height in 1868, Joseph Medill
visited Washington and later wrote
Sherman the result of his observa-
tions: "The trouble is that not one
M. C. in ten has any clear ideas of
the financial problem. I came away from
Washington very much dis-
gusted at the stolid ignorance and
sneering indifference I found among
many members who boasted to me that they
did not understand finances
and did not want to." Sherman
MSS. March 9, 1868.
294 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
inside Congress and out to further
confusion.16 Sher-
man, turning to a
"redistribution" bill, which was de-
signed to increase the circulation of
money in the west,
and other legislation designed to
promote banking in
the same section, finally secured a law
designed to har-
monize all interests and eliminate the
issue as a source
of embarrassment to his party.17 This
was the Specie
Payments Law of 1875. It promised through
securing
a gold reserve by the sale of bonds to
secure for treas-
ury certificates a circulating value
equivalent to that of
gold by January 1, 1879. Excepting the
votes of a
score of "hard money"
Republicans who attacked the
bill as perpetuating an unwarranted
inflation, it was
passed as a party measure.
16 Thurman, upon the passage of the
bill, bade farewell to honest
money and crooked his finger at the
Republican party: "I doubt very
much, Mr. President, whether the history
of this or any other country in
which free institutions have existed
ever presented such a spectacle as
was beheld here this afternoon. . . .
The great Republican Party of
the Senate of the United States has
agreed to take the measure of a
Democrat and place it upon the
statute-books of the country, in defiance
of the recommendations of its Secretary
of the Treasury, and in utter
scorn and contempt of the recommendation
of its Committee on
Finance. . . . Sir, I can take no credit
for this triumph that my
Democratic friend from North Carolina
(Mr. Merrimon) has achieved.
The Senator from Indiana, (Mr. Morton),
the Senator from Illinois,
(Mr. Logan), the Senator from Michigan,
(Mr. Ferry), were looked upon
as that paper-money trinity which was to
be exalted above all other
gods in the country; but all their
glories have gone and faded, and it was
reserved for the pine woods of North
Carolina to shape the financial
destiny of the country. Disband your
party. . . ." Cong. Rec., April
6, 1874, p. 2833.
17 A number of such bills were
introduced at various times as reme-
dies for the lack of circulating media
in the west. They in general pro-
posed to remedy the agricultural
difficulty by extending the advantages
of the banking system to that region.
They may be considered the pre-
cursors of many "rural credit"
schemes that have since been advanced.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 295
The popular response to the financial
issue was im-
mediate. The election of 1874 returned
thirteen Demo-
crats and only seven Republicans from
Ohio to the Na-
tional Legislature--a significant
contribution to the
Democratic majority in that body. Such
an overturn,
however, was not due to any measure of
solidarity
among Democrats on the leading issue.
Two party or-
gans no less conspicuous than the Enquirer
and States-
man proceeded to quarrel over Thurman's opposition to
the inflation bill of 1874. The former
leveled its attack
upon Thurman as an agent of Wall
Street; the latter
declared the Democracy to have been a
hard money
party always, and supported Thurman in
his vote. The
Democratic State Convention, August 26,
was presided
over by Thomas Ewing, Jr., a recruit by
way of the New
Departure, and was dominated by a
majority favorable
to the payment of bonds, interest and
one-half the reve-
nue duties in greenbacks. This action
presaged the
serious breach in the Democratic ranks
during the cam-
paign of the year following.
June 17, 1875, brought the issue, so
far as the De-
mocracy was concerned, to a crisis.
Pendleton, Morgan
and Ewing headed the "rag
baby" faction in the Demo-
cratic Convention; the renomination of
Allen was se-
cured on a platform which declared for
the retirement
of all national bank currency and its
replacement by
legal-tenders--the circulating value of
the latter to be
brought to a parity with gold by
"promoting the indus-
tries of the people, and not by
destroying them."18 An
18 Although the platform declared
against sumptuary legislation, as
to the liquor question, Samuel F. Cary,
noted as an anti-liquor crusader,
was nominated for second place.
296
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
influential group of Republicans had
broken from their
party in order to secure this
unreserved commitment."19
Thurman was especially embarrassed by
the radical
turn of events. He refused to deliver a ratification
speech at Columbus at the time of the
Convention. On
July 31, at Mansfield, he opened the
campaign by a
speech which illustrates how slightly a
difference of
opinion need stand in the way of party
unity:
"* * * Understand me," he
declared, "I am not de-
fending the platform, for in some
particulars I do not
like it, and I leave to those who
approve it the task of
its advocacy. Nor am I criticizing it,
for I have no dis-
position to be critical and I leave
that role to our com-
mon adversaries. But I think it but
justice to say that
the platform has been construed to mean
more than is
expressed in it, and more than was
meant, as I believe,
by those who framed it. In saying this
I do not lose
sight of the interpretation placed upon
it by some of its
friends. I know that some of its
warmest advocates
regard it as a declaration against gold
and silver and for
an irredeemable greenback currency now
and forever,
coupled with great and permanent inflation;
but for
reasons that I have partly stated and
others that I have
no time to state, I believe that these
men are compara-
tively few in number. * * * The
question is not strictly
a party question. Honest men of all
parties may be
found on its opposite sides, and so it
has ever been after
every great panic by which the country
has been af-
flicted. * * *" At this point he switched to other is-
19 In the words of the Cleveland Herald,
hard money Democrats
were asked to swallow a platform made by
men "who have not been
Democrats long enough to let the dirt
accumulate under their nails."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 297
sues and explained his continued
adherence to the Dem-
ocratic Party because of its
fundamentally sound prin-
ciples.20
Despite the serious lack of solidarity
within the
party, the Democrats inaugurated a
campaign which
compared in aggressiveness with those
of 1863 and
1867. Newspapers and stump speakers
made finances
a household topic. A correspondent
described popular
interest graphically: "They think
about it before they
get up in the morning, discuss it at
the table, turn it over
on the street, talk upon it over the
bar when solacing
themselves with spiritual refreshment,
and expound
their favorite theory wherever and
whenever they can
find an audience.
"Some of their theories are wilder
than the figments
of a diseased brain but in most cases
they seem to be
honestly entertained, however crazy and
impractical
they may be."21
The passage of the Resumption Act
secured for the
Republicans a comparative element of
unity. At least
it was the basis of an effort to assure
the farmer and
laborer that shortly the bondholder
would have no bet-
20 In
August, Republican papers drummed up campaign material
from statements attributed to Thurman in
a conversation with one
Theodore Cook, at Put-in-Bay. The
following and other quotations
were featured: "The d--d priests
have overdone this thing by sticking
their noses into our politics."
"Cary is an out and out communist." The
Dayton Journal subsequently
supplied Allen with the following "elegy":
"Now I miss my lovely nephew, Who
so often spoke me fair; He didn't
keep his promise true, He has climbed
the golden stair, Gone to Cali-
fornia." August 17, 1875.
21 Cleveland Leader, September
24, 1875.
Governor Allen in the course of the
campaign coined an epithet
which became popularly attached to the
Republican program; this was
his reference to the Resumption Act as
"a d--d barren ideality."
298
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ter money than their own. And yet the
party faced em-
barrassments. "The prospects of an
election seem to
me to be not good," Hayes wrote in
his diary: "The
third term talk, civil rights bill, the
partisan appoint-
ments of the baser sort, in other words
the Butlerism
of the Administration, are all bad, and
weights on us."22
The Republican Convention had
apparently no other
choice than to confer the nomination on
the candidate
who had twice before led his party
through a crisis.
Judge Alphonso Taft of Cincinnati was
the only candi-
date other than Hayes to receive
serious consideration.
His recent attitude, however, relative
to the rights of
the Cincinnati Board of Education to
require the read-
ing of the Bible in the public schools,
stood in the way
of compelling the Democrats to stumble
over that issue.
Hayes was disinclined to jeopardize
party harmony
through committing himself to a contest
with the gen-
erally accepted candidate. Charles
Foster, the Congres-
sional Representative from Hayes'
district, however,
encompassed Taft's defeat before the
convention; the
latter was led into a trap on the
school issue which de-
stroyed him with the "rural
districts": "You need not
feel any delicacy about the Taft
matter," wrote an ad-
viser to Hayes afterward, "for
in no possible event,
would or could Judge Taft have been
nominated. The
"Rural Districts" did not want him and were deter-
mined not to have him in spite of Dick
Smith or any-
body else."23
Following the nomination of Hayes, the
redemption
of Ohio became a problem of national
necessity to
22 Hayes' Diary, April 18, 1875.
23 R. P. Kennedy to Hayes, Hayes MSS., June 3,
1875.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 299
the Republican Party. Prominent leaders
from other
states joined their influence in the
common cause. Carl
Schurz was prevailed upon to return
from Switzerland
in order to win over Cincinnati Germans
and help smash
"Old Bill Allen." Charles
Francis Adams pictured the
situation in terms of despair:
"Allen's election will be
our destruction; his renomination on
the rag money
issue was a defiance and insult to us,
and his success
would render us contemptible.24 If we don't
kill him he
will kill us." An old Jacksonian
"wheelhorse" was
promising to duplicate the work of his
earlier contem-
porary in smashing a credit system
that, since the days
of Alexander Hamilton, had been a
recurring source of
controversy. Fortunately for Republican
success, a de-
fence of the banking system did not
enter seriously into
the contest. The extreme views of Cary
that a stamped
paper currency made a legal tender in
all cases, "formed
a currency as nearly perfect as
possible," enabled the
Republicans to take the offensive in
behalf of "hard
money." Hayes made above fifty
speeches and effectively
attacked any governmental scheme of
inflation not con-
vertible into coin as "a violation
of the national faith
and a destruction of national credit."
Sherman was
effective, on the other hand, in
turning the inflation side
of his Resumption measure to his
audiences. After one
of the most memorable campaigns in
national politics
the Republicans claimed the state by a
margin of 5500
votes.
The narrow margin of defeat, coupled
with certain
other untoward features of the
campaign, afforded the
Democracy excellent reasons for feeling
that their
24 Schurz' Speeches, Correspondence,
etc., III, p. 156.
300
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
financial policy had continued
political possibilities. The
Republicans had forced an issue in
accusing the Demo-
crats of designing to divide public
funds between public
and parochial schools. Cowles of the
Cleveland Leader
especially urged that issue against the
liberal financial
tendencies of the Reserve. A Republican
organ frankly
attributed the heavy vote of its party
in the Reserve to
the Catholic issue: "The currency
issue appealed to the
heads of citizens; the school question
went straight to
their hearts."25 Shortly after the election General
George W. Morgan, formerly a Democratic
Congress-
man and candidate for Governor, wrote
Allen: "Out-
side of the financial issues we did not
make a vote, and
all we lost, and they were not a few,
were on the Church
Question."26
While Ohio Republicans thanked the
school issue
and the "solid South" for the
margin of their victory
and sought to escape the financial
issue in another cam-
paign, the national currency Democrats
planned to force
their candidate and platform upon the
national conven-
tion. As early as January, 1876, the Enquirer
advocated
holding the state before the national
convention, adopt-
ing the platform of the previous year,
demanding a
western candidate, "and then see
whether the Tildenites
will dare go back on us."27 As
in 1868, the Ohio Democ-
racy was determined to lead a popular
cause in effecting
the overthrow of the Republican
machine: J. J. Faran,
an editor of the Enquirer, and
Governor Allen's closest
adviser, was convinced that the
"Ohio idea" was the
25 Cleveland Herald, October 13,
1875.
26 Allen MSS. October
16, 1875.
27 Quoted in the Cincinnati Commercial, January 29,
1876.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 301
only fit instrument with which to
counter the Republican
"Confederate Brigadier" and
secure the Presidency.28
The circumstances under which the Allen
endorse-
ment was ultimately secured, however,
did not promise
well for his candidacy in the National
Convention.
Thurman continued to entertain hopes of
support in
spite of his defeat in the State
Convention. The nomi-
nation of Tilden had already become a
foregone conclu-
sion, and, as in 1868, the New York
wing of the De-
mocracy was able to override the
schismatic Ohio
Democracy to its own ends. "Tilden
was nominated
before the Convention and it was not in
the power of
man to beat him," wrote General
Morgan to Allen after-
28 His representations in a letter to
Allen, who, in spite of recent
defeat, was courting the hope of
becoming the Presidential nominee,
infer all that is necessary in the way
of commentary: "The Democratic
party seems to be in a pretty 'torn'
condition, and the prospect is that
it will not be much improved by the time
the Convention meets, in June,
or July next. It does not seem possible
for there to be a common agree-
ment on the currency question. It is even
doubtful whether the Demo-
cratic House can be brought to vote in
favor of repealing the resumption
law. The movements of the business men
of Cleveland and Toledo in
favor of the repeal of that law show how
the general public is coming
to regard the matter. And the most of
these very men voted against
you last fall.
It must be evident to every candid and
thinking Democrat, that
nothing but our Ohio currency
views can secure to the Democratic party
success in the Presidential race.
"It is too soon yet, to entrust the Demo-
cratic party with its rebel element,
with the control of the General Gov-
ernment" is the sentiment of the
Republican leaders, which presses are now
inculcating and it will be their main
reliance in the campaign. And I know
its power among the people. We can
present nothing that can down it
like our currency plan, which takes with
the people the more it is known
and understood -- it is so right, and
just and Democratic in itself." Allen
MSS. February 3, 1876.
302 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ward.29 The third national
campaign since the close of
the war thus found the Ohio Democracy
in the same
plight as in each of the preceding
campaigns: Tilden
was "crow pie" just as
Seymour and Greeley had been.
For the first time since 1860, the
Republican nominee
for the presidency was not a foregone
conclusion. The
party approached the contest with
serious misgivings.
When the National Convention met at
Cincinnati, Conk-
ling, Blaine, Bristow, Morton,
Hartranft, Jewell and
Hayes were backed by leaders who
attributed peculiar
availability to their respective
candidates. Subsequent
events, however, justified an estimate
of one of Hayes'
followers as essentially sound:
"The people are disgusted and mad
with the abound-
ing corruption at Washington and
elsewhere, and feel
more keenly on that subject just now
than any other.
Hence the cry for Bristow--and in the
other party for
Tilden. But Bristow will not have the
hearty support
of the friends of Grant, Conkling, or
Morton. Blaine
in losing Massachusetts will suffer
severely, besides not
being acceptable to the Independents
and his residence
is at the extreme East and sectional,
and he is no-
toriously too active and self-seeking.
At the Conven-
tion some man identified with the great
Mississippi Val-
ley and the West, of sterling character
and ability, with
administrative reputation and
experience, a good war
29 The letter continues: "The South
did the decisive work, and I
believe her representatives as a rule
acted from honest but mistaken mo-
tives. . . . In consequence of trouble
of my throat, I was not able
to announce your name. I had intended
doing so with an aggressive at-
tack on the money power, but the result
would not have been changed.
. . . . . A considerable portion of the press was subsidized to Tilden's
interest and the discipline of his
friends was like that of an army."
Allen MSS. August 1, 1876.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 303
record--and in sympathy with the
people, whose senti-
ments on the subject of good money,
free schools, po-
litical morality and civil reform, are
not merely ex-
pressed, but acted upon and are known
to everybody,
who has not been mixed with the
corruptions and jeal-
ousies festering in Washington, will be
selected and all
Republicans will be satisfied and will
join in electing
him."30 By making no
mention of Sherman's Resump-
tion Law, the Cincinnati Convention
contributed still
further to Hayes' availability. His
candidacy was a
guarantee to the East against the
aggressions of the "rag
baby."31 The party was
accordingly free to take the
offensive in Ohio and Indiana against
the "Confederate
Brigadier."
The political situation in Ohio and the
West gener-
ally forced a truce on the money issue.
Despite the
Democratic nomination of a "hard
money minion of
Wall Street", a
"'cold-blooded Vampire of Western
Railroads," Republican hegemony
was threatened. A
common bankruptcy threatened again to
restore the
southern-north-western alliance which
had been effective
in 1828 and 1844. Ex-Governor Morton
estimated that
$100,000 would be required to hold
Indiana within the
Republican ranks.32 Blaine,
Sherman and Morton es-
sayed to check the tide by waving the
"bloody shirt."33
30 H. S. Noyes to Hayes. Hayes MSS. May 12, 1876.
31 Hayes to Schurz, June 27, 1876, in Schurz'
Speeches, Corres-
pondence, etc., III, p. 254.
32 Hayes' Diary, August 13, 1876.
33 Sherman and Hayes had, of course,
long before the canvass of
1876, made use of the great expedient of
capitalizing war enmity and
suspicion as implied by the "bloody
shirt" and "Confederate Brigadier."
In 1871, Hayes, in reference to one of
Sherman's speeches on the Ku-Klux
outrages, wrote in congratulatory terms:
"You have hit the nail on the
304 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Hayes was convinced of the expediency
of that device.
He counseled Blaine, just as the latter
started on his
tour of Indiana and Ohio: "Our
strong ground is the
dread of a solid South, rebel rule,
etc., etc. I hope you
will make these topics prominent in
your speeches. It
leads people away from 'hard times'
which is our dead-
liest foe."34 A margin of
only 7,500 votes in the can-
didate's native state indicated how
necessary had been
the need of capitalizing the emotional
heritage of the
war. Although the voters were given no
real oppor-
tunity to register their attitude on
the financial issue, it
was altogether clear that a popular
protest was weaken-
ing the hegemony of the Republican
party. In fact, it
was necessary to consult the interests
of the "Confed-
erate Brigadiers" themselves
before it became entirely
clear that the Democratic candidate was
to be counted
out.
The circumstances under which the Hayes
adminis-
tration subsequently entered office
were in every way
discouraging. The Democratic candidate
had secured a
popular majority of 250,000. Hayes'
claim to office
rested upon a margin of one vote in the
electoral college,
head. Nothing unites and harmonizes the
Republican party like the con-
viction that Democratic victories
strengthen the reactionary and brutal
tendencies of the late rebel states. It
is altogether the most effective
thing that has lately been done." Sherman
MSS. April 1, 1871.
34 Under
date of August 9, 1876, Hayes wrote Schurz as follows:
"A vast majority of the 'plain
people' think of this as the main interest
in the canvass. A Democratic victory
will bring the Rebellion into power.
They point to a host of facts and are
greatly moved by them." Schurz'
Speeches, Correspondence, etc., III, pp. 284-285.
Again under date of September 15, 1876:
"The canvass daily brings to
the front more and more as the leading
topics, the danger of a 'United
South' victory, and Tilden's record as a
reformer." Schurz, op. cit. III,
p. 338.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 305
and that secured only after
negotiations which involved
threats of open revolt. Democratic newspapers dis-
cussed "fraud" and the
"Presidential steal" in terms
which carried conviction with an
electorate which faced
continuously falling prices and
stagnant business. It
was incumbent upon the President to be
as much of a
Democrat as his opponent would have
been, if not more
so, in order to restore a degree of
equilibrium. But a
Democratic majority in the House was
more inclined to
embarrass an administration program
than to assume
the responsibility for one of its own.
The narrow Re-
publican plurality in the Senate
contained only three men
willing to accept the President's
leadership.35 At the
the end of six weeks, Cabinet
appointments and a south-
ern policy which circumstances had
forced upon the
President, precipitated a party schism
against which no
element of unity seemed possible.
Before the summer
following the inauguration had passed,
the party had
lost its identity in factions.
Hayes' southern policy broadened the
schism in the
Republican party, and it was further
complicated by an
attack upon Sherman's plans for
resumption under the
leadership of politicians of both
parties. A beginning
was made in a House bill revoking all
power of bond
issues for resumption purposes. This
was followed
shortly by another bill to open the
mints to the free coin-
age of silver. Bills of a similar
nature had been intro-
duced during the preceding summer; the
increased pro-
duction of silver furnished the key to
a type of credit
35 Hoar, Autobiography, Vol. I,
p. 429 and Vol. II, Chap. II. For a
"Stalwart" excoriation of
Hayes, see Platt, Autobiography, pp. 84-97.
Vol. XXXVII--20.
306
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
inflation as an antidote to business
depression which to
all appearances eliminated the
embarrassing features of
the greenback movement. The author of
the bill of
1876 declared for the program of
"free and unlimited
coinage of silver" or a resort to
"issuing paper money
enough to stuff down the bondholders
until they sicken."
The measure, moreover, side-stepped the
argument of
"rag babyism," which had
embarrassed the greenback
program. Silver as "coin"
fulfilled the specifications of
bonds. One of Allen's correspondents
stated the possi-
bility squarely when he inquired:
"Does it (the Bland
Bill) not enable us--of the East at all
events--to throw
the "rag baby" off on the
radicals, by assuming to cham-
pion the word of the bond--coin?"
The passage of the Bland Bill in the
House in No-
vember, 1877, was secured with the aid
of sixty-seven
Republican votes--this out of the total
affirmative vote
of one hundred sixty-four. Influence
favorable to silver
coinage rested without reference to
party lines in the
delegations of states west and south of
Pennsylvania.
The bill repealing the power of the
Secretary of the
Treasury to sell bonds for the purpose
of securing coin
for resumption was defeated in the
Senate. Also the
silver coinage act was ultimately
modified into a com-
promise requiring the government to
purchase and coin
only two or four millions' worth of
silver monthly. In
this form the law passed over the
President's veto.
Throughout the period of financial
manipulation, the
Ohio delegation played a conspicuous
part. Thomas
Ewing, only recently converted to the
Democratic ranks,
led the fight for the repeal of the
Resumption Law. Stan-
ley Matthews, who had failed to follow
the Liberal Re-
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 307
publican movement after the nomination
of Greeley,
championed the movement "to do
something for
silver" in the Senate. He had been
selected to com-
plete Sherman's unexpired term when the
latter en-
tered the President's cabinet. In December, 1877,
shortly after the Bland bill passed the
House, he in-
troduced a resolution explicitly
declaring that in the
opinion of Congress, all the bonds of
the United States
issued or authorized to be issued were
payable in
the silver dollars of the proposed
Bland Law. His
eloquence in behalf of the necessity of
relieving a
condition of national bankruptcy was a
feature of
the Congressional session. Sherman had
not been more
eloquent in 1868 in reference to the
justice of paying
the bonds in greenbacks: "* * * It
can be demonstrated
by an impregnable array of facts, that
silver can today
buy more of every other known product
of human labor
than it could in July, 1870, gold alone
excepted: lands,
houses, stocks of merchandise,
machinery, labor, every-
thing but gold; here and elsewhere. In
Asia, in Europe,
throughout this whole continent,
nowhere, measured by
the average price of the general
commodities of the
world, has silver depreciated the breadth
of a hair.
* * *"36 And Sherman
had evinced no greater defer-
ence to popular demands: "*
* * What else means all
this cry of discontent? What else means
all this half-
suppressed murmur of dissatisfaction?
Do gentlemen
suppose that people are crying out when
they suffer no
pain? Do they suppose that the voice of
lamentation
comes up from the homes of the people
merely that they
may hear themselves speak and cry? Or
is it the truth
36 Cong. Rec., 45 Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 7. pt. 1, p. 91.
308
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
and is it the fact that the distress of
the country is be-
yond all historical comparison in our
country, and that
to-day it will require but a few more
turns of the wheel
to submerge the majority of the body of
the people into
hopeless bankruptcy?
"So then, Mr. President, on any
ground and in any
view that I am able to take, if we
restore the silver dol-
lar to its former and accustomed place
in our legislation,
in our coinage, and in our currency, we
are still paying
the public debts according to a large
and a full and over-
flowing measure of value."37 When
interrupted by a
question as to the rights of foreign
subscribers to
American bonds, the speaker retorted,
"What have we
got to do with abroad?" Thus
Sherman's resumption
scheme was threatened by the same sort
of party op-
position as the Secretary had himself
led ten years
before against McCulloch.
Nor was the position of Secretary
Sherman a happy
one. Caught between "two clouds,
one East and the
other West," the latter giving
"wrathful token" against
treasury schemes "for making
dearer the money in
which these enormously usurious bonds
are to be paid,"
he grasped for some program for
placating both ele-
ments.38 During the campaign
of 1876 he had aroused
the "bullionists" as if he
were an "inflationist of the
worst type."39 His
scheme, as advocated at that time.
declared for the payment of greenbacks
in silver. This
policy he declared a safe middle ground
between the
extremes of opinion in the East and
West. In subse-
37 Cong. Rec., 45th Cong.,
2nd Sess., Vol. 7, pt. 1, p. 91.
38 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 18,
1877.
39 Toledo Blade, July 21, 1876.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 309
quent interviews he reiterated this,
his so-called Mari-
etta doctrine.40 He
undoubtedly experienced the full
impact of the silver movement. One of
his most trusted
Ohio advisers warned him that the
urgency to coin and is-
sue silver was so great that unless
complied with it would
result in the issue of more greenbacks
"in spite of fate
* * *"41 Sherman at any rate advised the
President
against a veto of the Silver Bill.42
At the same time he
sought a supplement to the Resumption
Law in the form
of authority to issue bonds for
currency. In this he fell
squarely back upon his financial
program of 1868--
namely, that of restoring specie
payment through the
issuance of bonds. He held that the
process of selling
bonds need not go far before the mere
fact that the
legal-tenders were receivable for bonds
"would bring
them up to par, and that is specie
payment".43 And yet
this program was opposed through fear
of over contrac-
tion.
Sherman had thoroughly aroused all
factions of na-
tional credit advocates through his
Resumption Law
without having satisfied those opposed
to every form
of government credit. Under the caption
"Manhood
and honor should have hard
hearts," Harper's Week-
ly ridiculed the Secretary's temporizing attitude. His
interview with a correspondent of the
Cincinnati Com-
mercial was quoted as illustrative of his attitude against
the coinage of silver. Accordingly, he
had declared the
funding operations checked, "if
not all broken up, and
40 Cleveland Herald, June 12, 1877.
41 C. W. Moulton to Sherman, August 14,
1877. Sherman MSS.
42 Sherman,
Recoil., II, p. 623.
43 Ann. Cyc. 1877, p. 239.
310
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
we shall have to wait for the sober
second thought from
the people themselves, who will set
this thing right."
Before the Finance Committee he stated
the effects of
the silver bill as having been adverse
in stopping refund-
ing operations. "On the other
hand," he added, "I will
give the favorable effects: In the
first place, the Silver
Bill satisfied a strong public demand
for bimetallic
money, and the demand is, no doubt,
largely sectional.
No doubt there is a difference of
opinion between the
West and South and the East on this
subject, but the
desire for the remonetization of silver
was almost uni-
versal. In a government like ours it is
always good to
obey the popular current, and that has
been done, I
think, by the passage of the Silver
Bill. Resumption
can be maintained more easily upon a
double standard
than upon a single standard." * *
*44
Throughout the entire period of the
controversy,
members of the Ohio delegation were
subjected to
strong pressure by their constituents.
In January, 1878,
the State Legislature resolved upon
"the common hon-
esty, true financial wisdom and justice
to the taxpayers
of this country" connected with
the "immediate restora-
tion of the silver dollar to its former
rank as a legal-
tender for all debts, public and
private." President
Hayes and Secretary Sherman, in their
opposition,
were declared as not representative of
the "views nor
wishes of the people of the State of
Ohio on this vital
issue, as is shown by the passage of a
resolution by
the Sixty-second General Assembly of
Ohio, in its regu-
lar session of 1877, asking Congress to
restore the said
44 Harper's Weekly, April 13, 1878.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 311
silver dollar, with only three negative
votes in the House
of Representatives and but one in the
Senate, and by the
passage of a bill by the House of
Representatives of
Ohio at the same session, making silver
coin a legal-ten-
der for all debts and demands
throughout the State of
Ohio in conformity to the universal
voice of the people
of Ohio, irrespective of party."
Thurman presented at
the same time another petition for the
repeal of the Re-
sumption Law, which he declared to have
been signed by
prominent men irrespective of party.45
The anti-silver
advocates were alarmed by the sweep of
silver sentiment
which became manifest in the state
during the campaign
of 1877, and were cynical toward
Republican leaders
who made haste to make political
capital of the indus-
trial panacea. On one occasion, Senator
Matthews, hop-
ing to be reelected to a full term in
the United States
Senate, in the course of a stump
speech, held a silver
dollar to the crowd and declared
himself "in favor of
coining as many of them as might be
necessary" with
gold and greenbacks, "to oil the
machinery which shall
keep the great business of the world in
free and har-
monious action, so that every man shall
be busy in keep-
ing up with the wheels of
industry."46
And there was need for haste if
Republicans were
to shelter themselves in the apparent
neutrality of the
silver zone. The Democrats were already
claiming pre-
emption rights to the issue. The
Cincinnati Enquirer
boasted itself the high-priest of the
new order, the first
paper to call attention to the fact
that "if the dollar of
antiquity should be respected, the
silver dollar shone far
45 Cong. Rec., 45th Cong., 2nd Sess. Vol. 7, pt. ??; p. 953.
46 Nation, August 9, 1877, p. 81.
312
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
above all other dollars; that if the
ancient halo were of
consequence, the white gold was the
most venerable."
The editor declared his attitude
consistent with his pre-
vious record: "The greenback
heresy of 1867-68 is
identical with the silver heresy of
1876-77. The Ohio
Democrats are not unwilling to be
regarded as the lead-
ers in these movements. We called
attention to these
facts a year and a quarter ago,
substantially as we have
now stated them."47
The financial issue represented but one
phase of the
political tangle from which Ohio
Republicans sought to
extricate themselves. The President's
southern policy,
his insistence upon placating the
Liberal elements
through greater efficiency of the civil
service, each
threatened serious defection. By yeoman
service the
State Convention in 1877 was brought to
pay lip serv-
ice to the administration. "If an
attempt had been
made to endorse Hayes' southern policy,
two-thirds of
the Convention would have been against
him," a prom-
inent Cleveland attorney wrote Sherman.
"It was a
personal acquaintance of most of the
delegates with the
man and a desire to help him in the
delicate position in
which he found himself placed that gave him the en-
dorsement of the Convention. Had he
been elected as
a resident of any other state, the
Convention would have
done just what the Iowa Convention did.
* * * The last
order of the President 'decitizenizing'
Federal office-
holders * * * takes an army of workers
out of the con-
test."48 In seeking a parallel to
the President's difficul-
ties as he attempted to serve honest
convictions, one may
47 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 4,
1877.
48 W. C. McFarland to Sherman, August 4,
1877. Sherman MSS.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 313
recall the days of President Johnson
just a decade be-
fore. But it would be more difficult to
determine just
which party was more willing to lead
the assault.
Out of respect for the "Murphy
movement," as the
labor crisis of 1877 was called, the
Republican Conven-
tion of that year overreached itself in
respect to both
the candidate and platform. The party
viewed "with
alarm the present disturbed condition
of the country"
and as an earnest of desire to find a remedy
recom-
mended first, that Congress establish a
National Bureau
of Industry. Second, that Congress
exert its authority
over all national highways of trade by
prescribing and
enforcing such reasonable regulations
as will tend to
promote safety of travel, secure fair
returns for capital
invested and fair wages to the
employes, preventing mis-
management, improper discriminations,
and the aggran-
dizement of officers at the expense of
stockholders, ship-
pers, and employes. Third, that
provision be made for
statutory arbitrations between
employers and employes,
to adjust controversies, reconcile
interests and establish
justice and equality between them.49 Business men
openly avowed that they would not support
the ticket.50
Laboring classes had only contempt for
the statutory
arbitration provision. One, listening
to Matthews' elab-
oration of the platform, was satisfied
that "Tom Scott
can buy them off again."51 If
business men were alarmed
by the platform and a candidate who
declared his adher-
ence to it, the laboring classes were
unwilling to accept
the party's overtures in good faith.
Without placating
49 Annual Cyc., 1877,
p. 620.
50 T. Ewing Miller to Sherman, August
20, 1877. Sherman MSS.
51 Nation, October 11, 1877.
314
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
either set of interests, Ohio
Republicanism reached the
lowest ebb of its fortunes since it had
secured national
control.
The Democracy was, in consequence of
Republican
schism and defection, for a second time
since the war,
able to elevate its candidate to the
governorship. Wil-
liam M. Bishop, a wholesale groceryman
of Cincin-
nati, untried in politics, but reputed
to be a millionaire,
was nominated on an anti-resumption,
free silver and
greenback platform dictated by the Enquirer.
Disaf-
fected Republican business men and
politicians were
apathetic in the face of his election.
The Democratic
State Legislature elected Pendleton as
Thurman's col-
league in the Senate. In control of the
State Governor-
ship and Legislature, its members
commanding two-
thirds of the state's apportionment of
seats in the House
and both Senatorships, the party
planned optimistically
to take charge of the Presidency in 1880.
CHAPTER V
A POLITICAL TRUCE
Both parties encountered difficulties
in squaring
their ranks for a Presidential campaign
which at best
promised neither more than a narrow
margin of victory.
Industrial depression had produced a
labor movement
by far the most pretentious that the
state had thus far
experienced; and it had clouded
political reckoning on
either side. After the Republican
socialistic dip of
1877, the party faced apparent
difficulties in extricating
itself from a serious dilemma. It had
betrayed those
very principles which made it an
acceptable association
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 315
among those who gave it influential
support. Defeat
offered a welcomed opportunity for
repentance. The
Democratic victory, on the other hand,
had been won
under any but fortuitous circumstances.
To face the
situation or to ignore it was equally
hazardous. The
party turned to a positive program. A
solution to the
prevailing industrial and social
anarchy was sought
through the enactment of such broad
socialistic meas-
ures that the Republicans were able to
take the offensive.
The decade ending in 1875, under the
shadow of war
issues, had been free from any great
difficulties arising
from concerted labor movements. Ohio,
like other
states possessing industrial pockets,
had been threat-
ened by independent labor movements,
but none had
reached significant proportions. Major
parties had been
proof against a schism of that sort
producing any great
rift in the political structure.
Campaign speeches and
newspaper editorials had preached the party
gospel with
conviction.1
Nor did Ohio farmers threaten seriously
to oppose
accepted practices. Their support of the Granger
movement did not reach the proportions
accorded it by
their fellow-workers to the South and
West.2 Agricul-
tural conditions had in the first place
become compara-
tively stabilized. Farmers who could
not secure ample
1 "Republicanism, strongly and
faithfully supported, is the best and
only agent through which true reformers
of labor laws, intemperance and
other evils, can attain their end."
This was a declaration of the Cleve-
land Leader and was repeated in
various forms. It was of course a
form of ballast with which a party was
inclined to face any threatening
circumstance, as indicated in the first
part of Chapter IV.
2 In 1876 the
number reached 305 organizations to each 100,000 en-
gaged in agriculture. Buck, The
Agrarian Movement, pp. 68-69.
316
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
returns from the sale of crops found
some satisfaction
in the increment of land values. At the
same time
urban development furnished an
expanding market for
the products of diversified farming,
and the flood of
migration westward tended to drain off
the unfavor-
ably situated.3
The years 1876 to 1878, however, formed
an epochal
stage in the attempt of labor leaders
to establish an
independent party movement on a
national scale. In
1877, the success of such a program
appeared immi-
nent. Two conventions, one at
Cincinnati and the
other later at Columbus, placed
candidates in the field.
Their platforms differed primarily in
respect to the
financial issue. The latter among other
provisions de-
clared for the remonetization of
silver, the payment of
the bonds at or before maturity, repeal
of the resump-
tion law, and "a wholesome control
over corporate bodies
and the fostering of resources in order
to fully and
profitably employ labor." An
income tax and provision
against "store script" for
labor was also advocated.
The combined votes of the tickets was
somewhat less
than 30,000, almost ten times the vote
Peter Cooper,
the Greenback Presidential candidate,
had polled the
year before. In 1878, the two factions
succeeded in
combining their tickets, and Ohio again
promised to
become the stage of an important
national movement.
February 22, 1878, Working-men,
Greenback and
Labor Reform organizations met at
Toledo and
launched the National party. July 23,
various factions
of the state pooled their interests at
Columbus and
3 Buck, op. cit., pp. 4 and 5.
Industry, besides absorbing many im-
migrants, made exactions from the
agricultural population.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 317
placed Anarew Roy, a Jackson County
coal-miner, at
the head of their ticket. The new
organization clearly
threatened to command more votes than
ordinarily de-
termined the balance of power between
the other
parties.
The Democrats especially faced a
dilemma as the
new party threatened its hegemony. It
was without a
clear record on the financial issue
except its opposition
to the resumption act which both
"hard" and "soft"
money men could oppose or advocate for
opposite rea-
sons. Thus while Thurman was being
attacked as hav-
ing not "a single idea in his head
which was not pumped
into it by August Belmont,. . .
." Ewing was
leading the attack against the
Resumption Law as a de-
flation measure.4
Before the election of 1878, however,
an apparent
agreement had been reached: Thurman and
Ewing at
any rate came to a closer
understanding.5 Whatever
opposition existed to the former's
financial views was
designed to be eliminated by a key-note
speech deliv-
ered at Hamilton, August 11. He
declared squarely for
the party platform (a national currency
instrument) and
astounded "hard money"
Democrats by declaring his
stand consistent with his former
record: "Inasmuch
as, in certain quarters, I am denounced
as a man who
has surrendered his conviction to
appease a popular
clamor, it may be pardonable in me to
occupy a few
4 Ohio Statesman, July 25, 1878.
Since 1875, when Thurman broke with his
venerable uncle regard-
ing the financial issue, and especially
since 1876, when the two had been
rivals for the Presidential nomination,
the Enquirer has been opposed to
Thurman's political interests.
5 Ohio Statesman, July 11, 1878.
318
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
moments in replying to the
charge." Accordingly he
had steadily opposed contraction,
spoken and voted
against resumption and for its repeal,
and worked hard
to restore silver to the place it held
before its demoneti-
zation. He had proposed that greenbacks
be received
for custom duties and had been against
an increase of
the bonded debt. After the manner of
his day he at-
tacked the National Bank which drew interest
on its
indebtedness, perpetuated the national
debt and "tended
to combine, concentrate and intensify
the money
power."6
The Dayton Journal thenceforth
declared the En-
quirer appeased.7 The Cleveland Leader stated
that
Thurman had knowingly embraced the
false God, just
when the tinsel and glitter was being
torn away.8
A Democratic reversal in the election,
however, was
a set-back to Thurman's ambition. The
National party
reached its high water mark in casting
38,000 votes for
its leading candidate. A new Democratic
organ, es-
tablished in Columbus, thenceforth
attempted to re-
kindle enthusiasm for an enfeebled
candidacy. The next
year Thurman refused to risk his
political dignity as a
candidate for governor. His influence
was thrown to
Americus Rice, a crippled soldier who
was "not ob-
noxious to hard money men." The
strength of the
Bishop delegation, however, compelled
him to accept
the nomination of Ewing, who was still
fighting that
"hellish measure," the
Resumption Act.
6 Ohio Statesman, August
13, 1878. Many other papers published
the speech.
7 Dayton Journal, August 16,
1878.
8 Cleveland Leader, October 16,
1878. Thurman's program did not,
however, differ essentially from that of
Sherman's.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 319
The Republicans, as had the Democrats,
hoped for
some element of unity as the critical
campaign of 1879
approached. The air had been cloudy
indeed in 1877
and in 1878 when Republicans had been
so determined
to read Hayes and his program out of
the party. In
the convention of 1878 the demand of
the Stalwarts be-
came emphatic. General John Beatty, out
of regard for
his former abolitionist proclivities,
essayed to direct the
insurrection from the floor. He was unsparing
in his
invective against a President who had
turned disgrace
upon Republicans of the South,
"who went through
hell-fire to put Rutherford B. Hayes in
the executive
chair." His civil service was
declared a sham and the
veto of the silver bill an effort to
destroy "the only meas-
ure that made resumption
possible."9 But the ranks
were not converted to drastic action.
Shrewd leaders
were hoping for the success of
resumption and a re-
turn of economic stability as a
"pillar of fire" to fellow
partisans who had lost their bearings
in troublous
times. The party resolved to oppose
further agitation
of the financial question as
"injurious to business," and
to satirize the Democratic legislation
-- "O'Connor
legislation"10 -- relative
to providing public works for
the employment of labor. The nominee
for governor
in 1879 promised an efficiency in
campaign methods
hitherto unapproached in Ohio politics.
The Republican who essayed to retrieve
the gov-
ernorship and establish state hegemony
in national
affairs was Charles Foster. His
advancement on the
9 Ohio Statesman, June 13,
1878.
10 So called from the name of a reputed
bounty jumper who had
become a member of the legislature.
320
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ticket came as the result of a type of
political effort that
was thenceforth a more pronounced
feature of the
state's politics. His political record
before nomination
was an exposition on "efficiency
and organization" in
the attainment of political results.
Foster was born in Seneca County in the
north-
western part of the state. With his
father he became
a great promoter in the material
development of that
section. Fostoria had been founded by
and named in
honor of the father. The son became the
controlling
agent of the town's merchandizing and
banking inter-
ests. His influence encouraged
factories and led rail-
roads to build lines through the city
for which he en-
tertained great ambitions. A
generous nature and
affable manner made him a popular idol.
He carried
successful business methods into
politics and became a
recognized power in the state. By a
thorough canvass
in 1870, he had transferred a
Democratic stronghold
into a Republican district and gone to
Congress. In
1872, he had been able to override a
Liberal-Democratic
combination in his district, as he also
had the Demo-
cratic landslide of 1874. In 1876, he
secured reelec-
tion by running ahead of his ticket 271
votes. The
Democrats gerrymandered his district by
an insur-
mountable margin in 1878. In all but
the last of these
campaigns success was attained by most
thorough or-
ganization. Paid workers dispensed liberal sums.
Critical districts were located by
pre-election polls and
prompt attention given to making them
safe.
Foster's influence was demonstrated in
other ways
than those connected with his
individual fortunes. His
instinct as to the expediency of
political measures se-
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 321 cured him an influence in the House: he was as inti- mate with Democrats as with fellow partisans. In the disputed election of 1876, he and Matthews were lead- ing influences in the decision of "long-headed men" of |
|
the South that the Hayes candidacy offered them the better terms of political security. He was aided by Matthews also in 1877 in flanking an attempt of Taft to become a candidate for governor -- a program that Vol. XXXVII--21. |
322 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
would have blocked Matthews' ambition
to return to
the Senate.11 The strategy
of 1877 was applied with
exceptional efficiency in 1879: Taft
was again out-
flanked even in his own stronghold,
(Cincinnati) and
Foster himself claimed the nomination.12
The election of 1879 became memorable.
Foster
was liberal in the use of his purse in
promoting the
campaign. A special train was employed
in order that
every critical district might be
canvassed. The Demo-
crats attempted to hold up the
Republican candidate to
ridicule in reference to his
merchandising business and
jeeringly attached the epithet
"Calico Charlie." Women
of Republican sympathies replied by
donning calico
dresses. As frequently happens in such
cases the popu-
larity of the candidate was promoted.
Efficiency at any
rate prevailed. Foster carried the
state and humiliated
the most popular if not the ablest
national credit advo-
cate of the opposition -- a task that
Sherman had held
below his political dignity. By this
blow, Foster as-
sured himself a place of influence in
national party
councils. And there was evident need of
capitalizing
just such energy and resourcefulness in
staving off
disaster in the impending Presidential
campaign.
After four troublous years, consumed
primarily in
wrangling over the financial issue and
characterized by
11 Political expediency demanded that
the gubernatorial and sena-
torial candidates be not taken from the
same sections of the state. Taft
and Matthews were both from Cincinnati.
This canon of expediency
was observed with comparative regularity
in Ohio politics. Taft was
also considered as "committed to a
contest with Matthews for the Senate
through an election as governor."
W. C. McFarland to Sherman, Sherman
MSS., August 4, 1877. Also press reports.
12 Myers, Bosses and Boodle, pp. 143-153, describes
shameful manipu-
lations connected with the Convention.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 323 temporizing that did not promise well for the political future of many of the participants, the leadership of both parties evinced greater anxiety to declare the issue closed. Contests in Congress connected with the fraud |
|
issue, the cipher dispatches, the army bill and the elec- tive franchise in the South afforded a much safer basis on which to muster forces for the impending battle. Each party turned to squaring the political mind to its |
324
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
own ends; Democrats courted sympathy
for a great
injury in 1876; Republicans found, in
the trumped up
issues, color for their cause of
"national supremacy in
national affairs." The growth of
the Greenback party
in the face of financial agitation
threatened insecurity
to the traditional appeal of both
parties.
From visible evidence the political
redemption of
Ohio was to become an asset in
advancing Sherman's
candidacy for the Presidency. The
abundant agricul-
tural harvests of 1878 and 1879, which
a distressed
Europe was eager to command, enabled
the farmer
again to enter the market for the
products of industry.
Unemployment was relieved, and the
laborer became
less willing to listen to
"addle-brained lunatics who were
endeavoring to ruin the credit of the
nation." Sherman
had exhibited the dexterity of a shrewd
business man
in securing a favorable sale of bonds
and a coin re-
serve with which to secure the greenback
circulation.13
The triumph of resumption at the moment
that business
activity became manifest formed
conclusive evidence to
Sherman's mind of "patient courage
and unswerving
conviction" of the Republican
party.l4 He felt there-
fore that his financial wisdom had been
justified and
his claim upon his party for its
highest reward fully
vindicated.
With the fixed purpose of promoting his
candidacy,
Sherman lost no opportunity to
encourage every favor-
able prospect. "What I would
aspire to," he declared
in a letter which soon reached print
and excited criti-
13 Sherman deserves credit for being
able to dictate for the first
time since 1860 the terms of the
government's credit.
14 Sherman's Memoirs, II, 743.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 325
cism, "in case public opinion
should decide to make me
a candidate for President, would be to
unite in co-
operation with the Republican party all
the national
elements of the country that
contributed to or aided in
any way in the successful vindication
of national au-
thority during the war. I would do
this, not for the
purpose of irritating the South or
oppressing them in
any way, but to assert and maintain the
supremacy of
national authority to the full extent
of all the powers
conferred by the constitution. This, as
I understand
it, is the Jacksonian as well as the
Republican view of
national powers. . . ."15 These terms of ambigu-
ity may be better understood in
relation to the type of
political career that had elevated
Sherman to political
eminence. Moreover, it forms an
illuminating com-
mentary on a career that was molded by
the forces that
dominated a sort of political "No
man's land."
When the slavery issue was disrupting
party lines
in the decade of the 'fifties,
Sherman's candidacy, in
view of no particular identity with the
great problem
that threatened to disrupt the union,
had united dis-
affected factions in advancing him to
Congress.
Thenceforth he trailed rather than
advanced with his
party to the extreme stand it
ultimately occupied in
defiance of the South. When the impeachment of
President Johnson demoralized political
lines, Sherman
as Senator drifted without reference to
consistency in
attitude toward the Tenure of Office
act.16 He embraced
the greenback issue in 1868 to the
extent of declaring
for the payment of bonds in
certificates then afloat.
15 Sherman op. cit., II, 730.
16 Oberholtzer, Hist. of U. S., II,
129-130.
326
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Following the election of 1868, his
convictions did not
stand in the way of retrieving his
political position
somewhat through introducing an act to
strengthen the
public credit, pledging the United
States to payment
"in coin or its equivalent,"
of notes and interest-bear-
ing obligations, "except in cases
where the law author-
izing the issue of any such obligations
has expressly
provided that the same may be paid in
lawful money or
other currency than gold and
silver." The removal of
the discrepancy between the circulating
value of coin
and greenbacks formed Sherman's real
hope of escap-
ing the dilemma. During the great
controversy of 1877,
he was willing to compromise by
removing all discrimi-
nation in favor of the bondholder,
preventing him any
longer from being a "privileged
person" by a treasury
sale of bonds for "currency at par
with gold."17 His
declaration that the existence of the
national banks was
a question of "policy" and
not of "principle," the right
conferred upon them to issue
circulation "not for their
profit but for the public
convenience," indicated how
readily he could quibble over the issue
when expediency
demanded it. As to silver, he declared
the difference
among Republicans would be settled
"by the use of the
silver dollar to the extent that it can
be kept in circula-
tion at par with greenbacks," and
as a "pure question
of detail."18
Sherman believed in the rule of
political parties.
The period offered its challenge to
robust statesmanship;
but temperamentally, Sherman was not
explosive nor
was he gifted with that rare quality of
firing men's
17 Sherman's Recoll., I, 594.
18 Ibid., p. 594.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 327
imaginations with phrases which they
could not forget.
In later life he declared himself in
essential accord with
the ideal of governmental control of
credit and adverse
to the banking system.19 His
services, in compromising
the issue, were similar to those of
Clay when slavery
threatened the union.
As Sherman approached the political
crisis of his
career in 1880, he was without
particular political
preferment at the hands of either of
the sets of con-
flicting interests he had striven for
fifteen years to
compromise. He was well aware of the
necessity of
being acceptable to "monied
men" of Wall Street; he
appreciated likewise the importance of
a recognition of
his personality and adaptability to the
popular cause.
Interests peculiar to party promoters
he knew must be
met, and reasonably satisfied in case
they committed
the fortunes of party in making him
President. In
all respects, however, Sherman found
himself facing
a dilemma. He was without that personal
magnetism
which made Clay, Blaine and Roosevelt
practically in-
evitable candidates of their day: there
was nothing
stimulating or romantic in his career
that transcended
his record in office.20
The more Sherman called attention to
his past rec-
ord as an endorsement of his
qualifications for the
Presidency, the more skeptical all
interests became. His
text was the Resumption Act and the
return of pros-
perity. A great banker had assured him
that the suc-
19 Cf. Sherman's Recoil., II, pp.
755 ff.
20 Cf. Hoar, op. cit., I, p. 394:
"There was nothing stimulating or ro-
mantic in the plain wisdom of John
Sherman. It was like reading a pas-
sage from 'Poor Richard's Almanac' after
one of the lofty chapters of the
Psalms of David."
328 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
cess of that measure would do more "to
strengthen and
retain the ascendancy of the
Republican party than any
and all other reasons."21 Sherman's speeches in 1879
assured those men who thought that the
control of
American finances should center at
Washington in-
stead of Wall Street that they had
secured all they had
been asking." "We have
crowned them (the treasury
certificates) with honor. They are no
longer depre-
ciated, but they travel the circuit of
the world equal
to the best coin ever issued from the
mint."
But the very elements which Sherman
most as-
siduously attempted to placate resented
his overtures
most. The height of the greenback
movement in 1878
had identified the Treasury Secretary's
name with the
program of the "money
sharks." In Toledo, the center
of the Independent party movement, he
had been all
but driven from the stage when
attempting to defend
the policy which had "given gold
to the bondholder and
burned up the poor man's money."
Eastern interests
were provoked to the point of
ridiculing the Secretary
for suggesting for a moment that the
certificates were
to be kept in circulation.22 New
York banking interests
21 Jay Gould to Sherman, Sherman
MSS., October 17, 1878.
22 Regarding Sherman's Portland (Maine) speech of July,
1879,
the New York Evening Post declared:
"These may serve to catch the
votes of the Greenbackers but they are
not the words we ought to hear
from the chief financial officer of the
government. Mr. Sherman knows
or should know, that there is absolutely no safety so long as a single
greenback remains in existence. He knows
or should know, that so far
as the relations of the government to
its promissory notes are concerned,
redemption means payment, cancellation,
destruction. It does not mean
the exchange of gold for the greenback,
the payment of the promissory
note, and its immediate reissue as a new
promissory note. Does Mr.
Sherman believe that the Treasury should
be a bank of issue for all
time to come? If he does, he is yet far
from sound on the financial
|
(329) |
330 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
were apathetic.23 Nor was his
candidacy prom-
ising from the standpoint of powerful
party in-
terests. Hayes' civil service program
had led to a
stroke at political jobbery in the New
York Custom
House. Chester A. Arthur, one of
Conkling's place
men, had been dismissed, and Sherman, as
Secretary of
the Treasury, shared with Hayes the
wrath of the New
York Senator. And yet Sherman came to
the assistance
of Arthur in the election of 1879,
despite his later as-
sertion that the latter had been
dismissed solely be-
cause he was unfit for the position.
Independents, con-
cerned with civil service reform, were
reticent. They
were convinced that Sherman's
administration of the
Treasury did not promise well for their
program.
Schurz and others of the group debated
the candidacy
only in terms of its expediency in
defeating the nomina-
tion of Grant.24
The atmosphere even in Sherman's native
state was
question. If he does not believe so, the
words are disingenuous. As to
silver, while Mr. Sherman shows
distinctly why there should not be
free coinage now, at eighty-five cents
to the dollar, he trifles with the
question and seems to hold out a promise
that we may have it presently.
The Secretary of the Treasury sees
clearly the folly and danger of free
coinage, but the politician throws
something very like a silver tub to
the whale." New York Evening
Post, July 24, 1879.
23 W. L. Strong sent a check for $1,000
to Sherman, "to use as he
sees fit," and apologized for the
apathy of banking interests: "I regret
that we cannot get up more interest
among the bankers and moneyed
men of N. Y., but while they all seem to
be friendly to you they do not
feel like putting up money until after
the nomination. Then they will
all come in." Sherman MSS., May
4, 1880.
April 16, 1880, Sherman wrote to John P.
Kumler of Toledo: "I
wish above all things to carry Lucas
County. You need spare no
efforts or expense. Talk to Locke and
tell him to aid and he will never
regret it." Sherman MSS., April
16, 1880.
24 Schurz, Reminiscences, III, p.
394.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 331
clouded with uncertainty as Republicans
professed their
program for the future. In April, 1880,
however, Sher-
man was duly endorsed as his party's
favorite son.
Charles Foster, who had been
inaugurated as Governor
in January, and Garfield, who had at
the same time been
elected to succeed Thurman in the
Senate, were two of
the delegates whom Sherman selected to
promote his
cause as delegates at large. Long
before the National
Convention had met, newspapers had
become free in
their gossip relative to the latter's
predilections for
Grant or Blaine.25 By a
stroke designed as political
strategy, Sherman named Garfield as the
spokesman
for his candidacy before the Convention.
The Republican National Convention met
in Chi-
cago, June 2. Conkling and Cameron were
confident
of securing Grant's nomination and were
anxious to
secure a safeguard against a
"bolt" in consequence.26
25 E. g. the Cincinnati Commercial, March
31, 1880, or Cleveland
Leader, February 7, 1880.
26 The
following letter illustrates the
attitude of a prominent
political adviser toward the nomination
of Grant: "I cannot think Grant
will be nominated, and yet, money,
money, any amount of money.
"I am prepared for the worst. Grant
would be beaten in nearly
every state. The triumvirate has made
the people frantic. Should they
now switch from Grant and nominate
Edmunds, the Democrats would
still have an immense advantage. Fully
one-half the Republicans of
this state are in open revolt. Edmunds
against such a man as Jewett
would be beaten 50,000 and no help for
it. Anything hence but the
machine in any form. Sherman would walk
over the course in New
York. Blaine would, I am quite sure,
carry the state. Tilden would
beat Grant 50,000. Jewett would lead him
150,000. Any machine man,
or anybody nominated by the machine is
gone. . . . Should you, in
event some dark horse nominated by
machine votes, conclude to give
support to the candidate, most of the
independents of this state could be
brought in. Blaine and yourself would,
however, completely command
the situation in New York, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, New Jersey, etc., and
could turn the 'horse' black or white at
will.
332 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Against him were the "allies"
-- the Blaine, Sherman
and Edmunds forces, bound by the common
purpose of
"anything to beat Grant."27
Sherman's hopes of secur-
ing the nomination rested upon a
favorable break in
the impending deadlock.28 He
had less than one hun-
dred pledged delegates, and they were
recruited pri-
marily from southern states that could
not have deliv-
ered an electoral vote for any nominee.
They formed
a "Swiss Guard," which
political managers knew could
never be remobilized once their line
was broken.
Organization maneuvers resulted in
Conkling's
first serious defeat. The unit rule was
broken, and in
consequence sixty delegates were
released from the
"immortal 306." At the same
time a serious lack of
solidarity in the Ohio delegation was
disclosed. Pre-
liminary arrangements had not gone far,
before it be-
came noticeable that Garfield was
attracting a marked
"I have conferred fully with
Governor Fenton. We shall no longer
train under Conkling, Cornell, Cameron
and Logan personally or by
proxy. Any candidate who carries their
flag, will be buried out of
sight. I know what I am writing about,
and you can depend on what I
say. We shall not act rashly but
deliberately, desperately, if need be."
A. N. Cole (writing from Belmont,
Allegany Co., New York) to Sher-
man, June 3, 1880. Sherman MSS.
27 The Cincinnati Commercial, May
31, 1880, covered its first page
with the names of men who would not vote
for Grant in case he were
nominated.
28 In hopes of securing the ultimate
support of the Grant and
Blaine forces, Sherman naturally evaded
the point of arousing antagon-
ism on either side. April 19, 1880, he
wrote William Henry Smith:
". . . . Your conversation with
Logan was a very interesting one,
but the best thing to say to him is
that, while I have the warmest per-
sonal feeling for Gen. Grant, I still
think his nomination would be fatal
to us in the election, and therefore, I
ought not to take any position as
between him and Blaine." Sherman MSS.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 333
attention from the galleries and
delegates.29 The Con-
vention had not long been in session
before Sherman
was being advised repeatedly that a
design other than
that connected with securing his
nomination was on
foot: if Blaine should be nominated
Foster was hopeful
for second place; if Garfield should be
nominated Fos-
ter could still hope to succeed him in
the Senate.30
Sherman in Washington received
contradictory reports
as to subsequent transactions.31 Delegates
of their own
initiative warned him of untoward
developments. Many
declared both Foster and Garfield
guilty of "treachery,"
"sickly support" and
"selfish ambitions":32 Garfield in
29 A despatch to the New York Herald declared
Garfield's name a
possible choice in case it became
necessary for Sherman to withdraw:
"Mr. Garfield will present the name
of Mr. Sherman, and his speech
and manner, it is thought, will make a
very favorable impression on
the convention. The applause which greeted the name today
when it
was announced that he had been selected
by the Ohio delegation to serve
in the Committee on Rules was a marked
compliment to him, which has
not been forgotten to-night in the calculations
of the thoughtful men."
McCabe, The Life of James A.
Garfield, p. 422-423.
Beyond a reasonable doubt Sherman was
aware of the instability
of the Ohio delegation many weeks in
advance of the Convention. May
1, 1880, W. D. Bickham advised:
". . . . You will see everything
goes right now but your friends may do
much to make Ohio solid for
you by personal attention to the five or
six who are sentimentally against
you in the delegation."
On the second day of the Convention, B.
D. Fearing wrote: "Gar-
field and Foster are the only weak
points in our line. Our friends say
if they are true, you will win. If they
are not, I promise you the young
Republicans will revenge their
treachery." Sherman MSS.
31 A mass of telegrams among the Sherman
papers furnish many
interesting commentaries on the
convention procedure. The opposition
to Sherman was furthered by a check,
purported to have been written
by Sherman, in the hands of a negro
delegate by the name of Smith. A
telegram informed Sherman that Smith
professed that he had had his
pockets picked, "which I seriously
doubt." Sherman MSS. June 2, 1880.
32 A telegram marked private and dated June 6, was forwarded by
W. P. Nixon: "My information is
that Foster is conspiring with others
334 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
to bring Garfield out as a candidate and
transfer your forces to him. I
think Garfield has full knowledge of the
fact. This is only for your
information and does not require
answer. This is sent without the
knowledge of others and is my act
only."
A political convention, especially if
the contest of candidates is long
drawn out, becomes a scene of nervous
tension interspersed with occasional
outbursts of excitement. Suspicions
are rife and charges of bad faith are
often recklessly made. The looming up
of a "dark horse" in the early
stages of his advance, however it is
regarded by the world outside, is an
occasion for disappointment and
resentment of delegates where the chances
of their favorites begin to wane. All
this was exemplified in the Repub-
lican National Convention of 1880.
As ballot after ballot was announced
without a choice and intimations
became more frequent that Garfield
was the candidate upon whom the op-
position to Grant would ultimately
unite, it was but natural that the dele-
gates from Sherman's state, who had
labored long and arduously for him,
should raise questions in regard to the
loyalty of Garfield and Foster. If
the former should be nominated it was
pointed out that Foster could still
hope to succeed him in the Senate.
Sherman, in Washington, received con-
tradictory reports in regard to the
attitude of the Ohio delegation. He was
warned that he was the victim of the
"selfish ambitions" of men who had
been chosen to support him faithfully
to the last. Garfield and Foster were
the chief objects of suspicion.
Governor William Dennison, however, ad-
vised Sherman that Garfield's conduct
from the beginning had been "frank
and manly," and years afterward
when the passions incident to the contest
had subsided, Senator George F. Hoar,
in his Autobiography paid high
tribute to the attitude of Garfield.
In his Autobiography, I, pp. 397 and 400, Senator George F. Hoar,
after quoting from the proceedings of
the Convention, left the following
record with reference to the
remonstrance of Garfield:
"This verbatim report is
absolutely correct, except that where there is
a period at the end of Mr. Garfield's
last sentence there should be a dash,
indicating that the sentence was not
finished. I recollect the incident per-
fectly. I interrupted him in the
middle of his sentence. I was terribly
afraid that he would say something
that would make his nomination im-
possible, or his acceptance
impossible, if it were made. I do not believe
it ever happened before that anybody
who attempted to decline the Presi-
dency of the United States was to be
prevented by a point of order, or that
such a thing will ever happen
again."
In tribute to the sterling qualities
of Garfield, Senator Hoar added:
"He stood like a rock when Ohio
and the whole West seemed going
against him, and when the
statesmanship even of John Sherman was of the
willow and not of the oak. * * * Next to the assassination of Lincoln
his death was the greatest national
misfortune ever caused to this country
by the loss of a single
life."--EDITOR.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 335
his nominating speech "must have
intended not to help
you nor hurt himself. He cherishes the
hope that he
may be the coming man and your
nomination would
close him out now and hereafter."
Another declared:
"If defeated thank the ambition of
Garfield, the defec-
tion of Foster, the cowardice of
Bateman and the imbe-
cility of the Ohio delegation." A
few were inclined to
exonerate Garfield. William Dennison
advised that
Garfield's conduct from the beginning
had been "frank
and manly."
The first ballot of the Convention
registered nine
Ohio delegates for Blaine. They
"not only disregarded
the request of the State Convention but
opposed Sher-
man in the interest of Blaine."33
This action subse-
quently precluded all hope of
marshalling Sherman's
Ohio forces behind Blaine: since the
nine would not go
to the thirty-five it was hardly to be
expected that the
thirty-five would go to the nine. On
the thirty-fifth bal-
lot the landslide to Garfield began.34
After the bitterness and struggle of a
national con-
vention, the conduct or attitude of
defeated factions is
always of extreme importance. Sherman
was not, of
course, inclined to embarrass party
fortunes by serious
33 C. S. Dyer to Wm. Dennison, June 6,
1880. Sherman MSS.
34 At this
point in the proceedings Garfield rose to a point of order and
remonstrated as follows:
"I challenge the correctness of
the announcement. The announcement
contains votes for me. No man has a
right, without the consent of the per-
son voted for, to announce that
person's name, and vote for him in this
convention. Such consent I have not
given."
The president of the convention
declared that Garfield had not stated
a question of order and the balloting
proceeded. On the thirty-sixth ballot
Garfield secured a total of 399
votes, and was declared the nominee.--
EDITOR.
336 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
threats of defection.35 Quite
the reverse, he was among
the very first to congratulate the
nominee who had
35 The
observations of Warner M. Bateman, Sherman's financial
manager at the Convention, form an
interesting commentary on the
convention procedure: .... "At last it was apparent that the
Blaine forces were the ones we could
draw from only. They would not
yield to us. We spent--Dennison,
Garfield, Butterworth and I--Mon-
day night until 3 o'clock trying to
prevail upon Hamlin, Frye and Hale
to come over to you, but it ended where
it began in the conclusion of
both to go on in the morning.
.....I want to say here that after
much reflection and a close watch of
Garfield from the beginning I am satisfied he was not a
party to it.
. . . . During the progress of the last
ballot, in much apparent emo-
tion, he came to me to enquire what it
meant. He protested in the ut-
most earnestness that he had nothing to
do with the movement, and
asked me whether I thought he had. He
said he would rather be shot
to death by the inch than than to have
furnished any just ground for such
suspicion, and desired if I could that I
should vindicate him against any
charge of unfaithfulness to you. I told
him, as I have told you, that
I did not believe him guilty and told
him that I should say so to you.
You can tell him I have said so, if you
find suitable opportunity. But
of Foster I cannot speak so favorably. I
do not think he gave you an
hour of honest service the whole time he
was in Chicago. This is strong
but what everybody believed. At the
outset he sought companionship
with Hale and Frye and gave an
encouraging ear to the talk of his
being a candidate for Vice-Presidency
with Blaine. I did not get a
five-minute interview with him during
the whole two weeks we were
together. He treated me with the most
constant evasion as he did also
Gov. Dennison. Upon a failure of an
arrangement to transfer your
trength to Blaine, which he advised on
Monday night, the vision of
the Vice-Presidency disappeared. He and
Nichol I think, then agreed
upon an experiment in favor of Garfield,
beginning with the Wisconsin
delegation, which was very unsettled, and
among whom Nichol had a
great deal of influence. This was
followed by Harrison. This scheme
opened to Foster the vision of the
Senate. I believe him a cold-blooded
and thoroughly selfish man, rich and
entirely prodigal of the use of
his money for his own ends. I trust if
Garfield is successful that you
will disappoint him as to succeeding G.
in the Senate. . . . As to
Arthur's nomination I agree with you
that it was ill-advised. So for
as the Ohio delegation was concerned,
their vote was the result of Den-
nison's haste in pledging Conkling that
Ohio would follow him on the
Vice-Presidency. Our Massachusetts
friends remonstrated and at first D.
could not get many votes in our
delegation to support him. but the anti-
|
ALLEN G. THURMAN WILLIAM ALLEN GEORGE H. PENDLETON Vol. XXXVII--22. (337) |
338 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Conkling men in New York yielding, most
of our men gave way. It
was a mistake. . . .
Enclosed I send you two drafts drawn by
the Merchants' Loan and
Trust Co., Chicago, upon the National
Bank of Commerce of New
York dated the 10th inst., one for
$800.00 payable to my order which I
endorse payable to you and the other for
$1,700.00 payable to your order
making a total of $2,500.00.
As soon as the nomination was made, I
notified Nichol that Gar-
field's friends must assume your
obligations. It was already agreed upon
by Foster and Everett to do so to amount
of $1,500. They at once paid
the cost of our headquarters which
amount to about $1,200. There
were about $1,600 of liabilities for the
expense of delegations, etc., etc.
They assumed most of this. I had paid
$800 of this which they refunded
to me and it is included in the $800
draft which I enclose. I was com-
pelled to hand over management of money
affairs to Nichol. He handed
back what he had not expended, and I am
able in these two drafts to
refund the $2,500 draft No. 2 you sent
me at Chicago. I did not use
any of the $10,000 privilege you gave me
on Tuesday. I have still a
balance of the first $2,500, a small
one--which I will ascertain as soon
as I can and forward to you.
[These two communications are the
impressions of the active support-
ers of Sherman immediately following
the convention, when the feelings
aroused by the contest had not wholly
subsided. The sums of money which
Senator Sherman's manager was
authorized to expend in his behalf look
very small compared with the amounts
used in the interest of presidential
aspirants in succeeding years. The
"reforms," including the popular pri-
mary do not seem to have diminished
the "legitimate" expenditure in the
interests of presidential
candidates.--EDITOR.]
Now as to your friends. You had some as
true as ever. . . .
Cassidy, Hill, Buck Warner, Butterworth,
Smith of Florida, DeMortie
and Norton of Virginia, Harris and Gary,
Sanderson of Milwaukee,
Amos Smith, Holland, Mulloy, Daggett,
Dumont, etc., etc. Woltz dis-
gracefully betrayed you. He is a
treacherous dog. After he had sold
out to Grant for a consideration, he
went to Nichol and by lying to him
got $250. Under pretext of supporting
your delegates in his charge
he voted them all against you. Brady
worked actively against you for
Grant; Russell and Bowdin most of their
time for you. Darnell left
you at last for Grant just in time to
turn pale at the nomination of
Garfield...." Sherman MSS., June
12, 1880.
Benjamin Butterworth contributed his
"confidential" version on
June 11: One great need was a competent
major-general; the delegates
worked at cross-purposes. "Belcher
of Virginia sold out and delivered
his men to Grant." South Carolina
did the same. Dennison didn't know
each minute what was going on.
"Blaine could have sent a telegram
that would have electrified the
convention." Sherman MSS.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 339
"saved the Republican party and
the country from a
great peril and assured the continued
success of Re-
publican principles."36 He
wrote numerous letters de-
claring that he would support Garfield
and that he re-
lieved him from all "suspicion of
perfidy." To a promi-
nent newspaper editor he declared that
he was glad
that Garfield "did not commit any
act or do anything
that could imply bad faith on his
part."37 As to Gov-
ernor Foster, however, the charge had
given him more
"real pain than all others
combined." His chief er-
rors had been those of generosity.38
He regretted that
he had "assisted Cameron in being
made Chairman of
the National Committee." Also he
"should not have
designated either Foster or Garfield as
delegates at
large." "The errors," he
added, "contributed to my
defeat."39 On June 30,
however, Sherman wrote Fos-
ter an extended letter in which, after
reciting many of
the latter's misdeeds, he agreed to
treat him "as of old,
with hearty good-will and
respect," with assurances
that he would give no further credence
to the stories
he heard.40
36 June 8, 1880. McCabe, Garfield, p. 487.
37 Sherman
to Richard Smith, June 14, 1880. Sherman MSS.
38 Sherman to W. D. Bickham, June 17,
1880. Sherman MSS.
39 Sherman
to Smith, June 14, 1880. Sherman MSS.
40 Sherman, Memoirs, II, pp.
776-778.
Sherman's reaction to Arthur's
nomination was expressed in a
letter to James M. Hoyt: "As for
Arthur, I suppose he is connected
with the ticket and we must vote for
him, although it is rather a
scandalous proceeding. The only reason
for his nomination was that
he was discharged from an office that he
was unfit to fill." Sherman
MSS., June 12, 1880.
340 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
Garfield had points of weakness as well
as strength
as a "dark horse" candidate.
He had served in Con-
gress continuously for sixteen years as
a Representative
of a Connecticut Reserve constituency.
During that
time he had not kept his name clear of
those questionable
practices by which men in public life
had too commonly
pursued their personal interests. His
explanation of a
connection with the Credit Mobilier, Salary
Grab and
De Golyer scandals had never been such
as to inspire
confidence.41 Continuous contact with
political life
served him much as it had Sherman. His
attitude to-
41 Cf. Oberholzer, History of the U. S., II, pp.
605-607.
Hayes' Diary (February 21, 1883)
contains the following estimate:
"I have just read President
Hinsdale's account of Garfield as a student and
teacher. Here was his strength. In both
capacities he was a model. He
had large faculties, memory, analysis,
fluency, the debating faculty. He was
the best popular debater of his time. He
was not executive in his talents,
not original, not firm--not a moral
force. He leaned on others--could not
face a frowning world; his habits
suffered from Washington life. His
course at various times, when trouble
came, betrayed weakness. The Credit
Mobilier affair, the De Golyer business, his letter of
acceptance, and many
times his vacillation when leading the
House, place him in another list from
Lincoln, Clay, Sumner and the other
heroes of our civil history."
For a more tolerant estimate of Garfield
see Hoar, Autobiography, I,
pp. 399-404.
In charging Garfield with corrupt
intent in his contact with the Credit
Mobilier his political enemies
over-reached themselves. They had made, as
the chief basis of their attack, the
charge that he had accepted a bribe of
$329.00. Somewhat early in the
campaign, after Garfield's nomination, by
preconcerted arrangement, "$329.00"
was written in chalk on the pavements
of many of the cities of Ohio, on the
doorsteps and buildings of prominent
Republicans, and tallow was used to
mark the same figures on the windows
of many business concerns. This
aroused the ire of many of his suporters,
who up to that time had taken but
indifferent interest in the campaign.
They began the organization of
Republican clubs with 329 members, carried
banners inscribed with these figures
and made frequent allusions to the
charge in their public speeches. One
popular campaigner advised the Demo-
crats "to abandon the rooster as
a party emblem, to substitute an old hen
and set her on 329 eggs just to see
her spread herself."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 341
ward the financial issue of 1876 was
indicative of this
tendency. He inquired of Hayes as to
the "drift of senti-
ment among our friends in Ohio,"
and while declaring
his opinion "that an appeal to
what is true and honest
is always safest," insisted that
"still we want to put the
issue in the best shape."42 Once
a policy was fixed
upon, few men of the day could advocate
it more ef-
fectively.
While partisan advocates were soon to
find that Gar-
field's record was to demand defensive
tactics as well
as representations that turned him
"black or white" as
expediency demanded, there were, on the
other hand,
positive points of availability. On the
whole, he had
been perhaps the most consistent
opponent of govern-
ment inflation, of the Ohio
Congressional delegation;
he alone, of the representatives of his
state, had voted
in opposition to certain features of
legislation designed
to expand the government's credit issue.
During the
period of party disruption of the later
seventies he had
maintained an acceptable relationship
with all factions.
He was one of Blaine's closest
companions; in 1879 he
had paraded himself before the Ohio
convention as a
converted liberal, as good a Stalwart
"as could be
The rank and file of his party seemed
to swing into hearty agreement
with his own statement in his
published defense: "If there be a citizen of
the United States who is willing to
believe that for $329. I have bartered
away my good name, and to falsehood
have added perjury, these pages are
not addressed to him."
They could not believe that, for such
a sum of money, he had sold
himself to an ignoble cause.--EDITOR.
42 Williams, Hayes, I. p. 428.
Taussig, History of the Tariff, p. 178,
gives another example of Garfield's
tendency toward expediency; in sup-
port of the tariff of 1867 he appealed
to his party to vote so as to make
up the two-thirds majority necessary for
its consideration, declaring that
later they might make up their record by
voting against it.
342 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
found anywhere."43 And he had
become Sherman's
spokesman in 1880. Immediately
preceding the Na-
tional Convention no one had vindicated
a more accept-
able attitude from the standpoint of
financial interests.
From January to April during the
campaign year, rep-
resentatives of the National party
labored incessantly
and against the intentions of dominant
groups of both
major parties to bring their resolutions
bearing upon
their favored issue before the House.
On April 5,
Weaver of Iowa was successful. His
resolutions de-
clared for the issuance and control of
the volume of
all currency, whether metallic or
paper, "by the gov-
ernment and not by or through the bank
corporations
of the country * * *" and against
the refunding of
"that portion of the
interest-bearing debt of the
United States which shall become
redeemable in the
year 1881, or prior thereto * * *
beyond the power
of the government to call in said
obligations and pay
them at any time, but should be paid as
rapidly as pos-
sible and according to
contract."44 Garfield led the
assault for the opposition: "*
* * never was there a
measure offered to Congress of so vast
and far-reach-
ing centralism. It would convert the
Treasury of the
United States into a manufactory of
paper money. It
makes the House of Representatives and
the Senate,
or the caucus of the party which
happens to be in the
majority, the abosolute dictator of the
financial and
business affairs of this country. This
scheme sur-
43 Nation, June 5,
1879.
44 To enable the government to meet
these obligations, the mints of
the United States should be
"operated to their full capacity in the coinage
of standard silver dollars, and such
other coinage as the business interests
of the country may require."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 343
passes all the centralism and all the
Caesarism that
were ever charged upon the Republican
party in the
wildest days of the war or in the
events growing out
of the war * * *."
"* * * The government
should prescribe general
laws in reference to the quality and
character of our
paper money, but should never become
the direct manu-
facturer and issuer of it."45 Nothing in
Sherman's rec-
ord had ever approached these
assurances.
Garfield's nomination was nevertheless
a source of
inspiration to the Ohio Democracy. The
Republican
candidate's popular strength had never
been tested be-
fore the people of the state for any
office. There was a
general impression that his nomination
had been secured
through treason to party instruction
and false betrayal
of his state. Thurman regarded his own
candidacy as
the logical one by which to swing Ohio
to the Demo-
cratic column. In 1879, the
"National Side Show" had
been largely absorbed through holding
the two state
conventions at the same time, selecting
a candidate ac-
ceptable to the "Wicked
Seven" and adopting an anti-
resumption platform.46 Thomas
Ewing had exacted for
the party the second highest popular
vote in the history
of the state but was unable to match
the efficient meth-
ods of Foster. His defeat advanced the
influence of old
party leaders, insistent upon fighting
it out "along old
lines." Thurman was unanimously
endorsed by his
state convention in 1880 as the first
choice of his party
45 Cong. Rec., 46th
Congress, 2nd Sess., p. 2140.
46 The Greenback leaders; Sherwood of the Toledo Commercial, Cary,
Sturgeon, Odell, Linton, Johnson and
Throckmorton. Cleveland Leader
August 30, 1879.
344
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
for the presidency. By previous
agreement, no plat-
form declarations were made--a
safeguard against a
"double-decked platform like that
of 1876."47
But at the very instant that the Ohio
Democracy was
professing its purpose of promoting
Thurman to the
presidency, methods, just as patent as
those which had
prevented the nomination of Sherman,
were all but open-
ly employed. The uncertainty of the
Tilden candidacy
gave rise to two lines of political
maneuvering. One
was designed to test the availability
of the New York
candidate as a result of the
"Fraud of 1876" and the
Matthews' investigations. The other
centered upon the
selection of a candidate capable of
honoring Tilden's
mantle in case it became evident that
he should not re-
tain it. Even before the launching of Thurman's
"favorite son" candidacy,
certain Ohio Democrats were
bargaining in advance as to the terms
which New York
managers might be willing to consider.
As the pledge
was being secured to promote Thurman's
candidacy "by
all honorable means," party
workers were busily repre-
senting a popular demand for two other
aspirants.
These men were Hugh J. Jewett, until
1874 a resident
of Columbus, and Henry B. Payne of
Cleveland.
Of the two candidacies, that of Jewett
was by far
the weaker. He was a corporation lawyer
and had
gained renown in connection with
railroad bankruptcy
cases. A few years earlier he had
removed to New
York City in order to accept the
receivership of the Erie
47 "Who does not remember the ludicrous spectacle of
about 10,000
Democrats with linen dusters on their
persons, the pockets filled with
Enquirers, invading New York, and demanding the nomination of
George
H. Pendleton on the issue that bonds
should be paid in greenbacks only."
Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 16,
1880.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 345 Railroad. He had been the defeated candidate for gov- ernor in 1861 and had since that time been inconspicu- ous in politics. But in 1880 the Plain Dealer conducted a publicity campaign in his behalf, while David R. |
|
Paige, later to gain unenviable notoriety, undertook to lay the wires. The candidate's connection with railroad affairs did not comport well with popular inter- ests. He was "too cold, like John Sherman." More- over it was the Payne "boom" that was more seriously |
346
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
at work. It bore a direct connection
with the manipula-
tion of the New York machine and was
directly convert-
ing Thurman's endorsement into a
mockery.
Payne was a Democrat of New York and
Connecti-
cut antecedents. He had come to
Cleveland in 1833,
and had established himself in the
practice of law. He
inclined toward business and became
identified with real
estate, industry and railroads. He
married a daughter
of one of the wealthiest men of the city.
He acquired
wealth also through his own efforts.
Within a few
years he was prominent in politics, and
in 1851 was de-
feated by Wade for the United States
Senate by one
vote. Chase defeated him for the
governorship in 1857
by 1500 votes. He was a delegate to the
National Con-
ventions of 1856, 1860 and 1872. In the famous
Charleston Convention he had led the
fight for Doug-
lass, who was his relative and with
whom he had studied
law. In 1874, he had carried the
Cleveland district as
a candidate for Congress. In that body
he had been in-
strumental as a member of the Committee
on Banking
and Currency, preventing
"hard" and "soft" money men
from disrupting the party.
It was of course pure historical irony
which placed
Payne in the same political party with
men of the ante-
cedents of Thurman, Allen and
Pendleton. It was a
matter of gossip that Payne had failed
to defeat Chase
in the critical election of 1857
because of the failure of
Thurman and other "People from the
Southward" to
render cordial support.48 The
impending contest for the
presidential nomination was
significant, however, from
an angle other than that of the rivalry
between two men
48 Cf. Powell, The Democratic Party
of the State of Ohio, I, p. 187.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 347
of conflicting antecedents. Payne's two
sons, Oliver
and Nathan, lived in Cleveland. The
first-named held a
high position with the Standard Oil
Company. William
C. Whitney of New York, who had married
Payne's
daughter, headed his state's delegation
to the National
Convention. While the two sons were
obliterating the
Thurman "boom" by every
knowable intrigue, they
were hoping to cooperate with their
brother-in-law in
adjusting political accounts.
Thurman was fully aware of all that was
transpir-
ing and made desperate efforts to
counter the results of
a lost battle. He called upon the
delegation to meet him
at Columbus on June 18. Less than half
of the mem-
bers responded and adjourned shortly to
meet in Cincin-
nati. Before the National Convention
had become or-
ganized the delegation was so
thoroughly under the con-
trol of the anti-Thurman group that one
of their own
number was selected chairman of the
delegation. The
Democratic "favorite son"
candidacy was thus rendered
far more hopeless than ever that of
Sherman had been.
The first ballot in the Convention
indicated General
Hancock as the leading candidate. The
New York and
Pennsylvania delegations were torn by
dissensions equal
to those of Ohio, but an attempt was
made to kill off
Hancock by mustering the Tilden forces
to Randall.
During the roll call, the Ohio
delegation retired for con-
sultation and returned only in time to
cast its vote for
Hancock, whose nomination was already
assured. On
the vote for Vice-President, the
behavior of the delega-
tion was equally ludicrous. Ex-Governor
Bishop had
been presented for nomination. The Ohio
delegation
withdrew again, however, and resolved
to support Dur-
348
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
bin Ward, a loyal Thurman supporter.
While they were
out, an Ohio delegate cast the state's
vote for William
English, and his nomination had been
secured before
the Ohio delegation had returned.
The presidential campaign of 1880 was
directly con-
ditioned by the same type of political
attitude that had
pervaded the pre-convention
manipulations. Neither
party dared to risk the hazards
connected with the finan-
cial question. It was entirely clear that
a reopening of
that issue would have diverted greater
prominence to the
National party which was at the very
moment holding
votes enough to turn the balance of
power in the House.
Prosperity was entirely too concrete an
argument to
make an attack upon Resumption an
expedient proce-
dure on the part of the Democrats. The
agitations of
the greenback advocates were all but
smothered in a
bitter campaign of personalities. In
order to veneer
the real character of the campaign each
of the major
parties resorted to every possible
device in order to rep-
resent an issue at stake. Personal
charges against the
candidates were supplemented by
representations of the
dire consequences connected with the
possible success of
the opposition. The assumed hysteria of
the Cleveland
Leader was typical: The Democrats entertained schemes
to "divide Texas into five states,
to admit Romish Ari-
zona and New Mexico, and a repudiation
of the Amend-
ments by twelve more judges to be added
by a Demo-
cratic President * * *" Toward the
close of the can-
vass Republican conjurors were certain
that the Demo-
cratic platform declaration for a
tariff for revenue fur-
nished the basis for a fight against
"free trade."
Beneath all the artifices of a national
campaign,
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 349
however, a fundamental feature stood
out significantly:
Republicans found their treasured
appeal to sectional
prejudices a less valid instrument for
the promotion of
party solidarity; and the Democracy
advanced no com-
mon program in opposition to the new
industrial struc-
ture which had advanced as if by magic
under Repub-
lican auspices. A conflict to win over
stragglers from
an opposing camp forbade even great
emphasis of tra-
ditional differences. The campaign,
primarily a dynastic
struggle for office, signified little
beyond the power of
tradition in political combat.
CHAPTER VI
THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW DECADE
The inaugural at Washington, March 4,
1881, wit-
nessed five native Ohioans prominently
identified with
the ceremony. The retiring President,
the President-
elect, the Chief Justice administering
the oath, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army, and the
Secretary of the
Treasury stood upon the platform of the
east portico of
the Capitol. The spectacle was a source
of congratula-
tion to Ohioans; their traditions
respecting the ability
of the Ohio man appeared fully
vindicated. One writer
declared it a positive demonstration of
ethnographic in-
fluences.1 Each was there,
however, through a multi-
plicity of circumstances.
The conditions which confronted the new
President
were in every way as complex as those
which had ele-
vated him to the office. Every faction
had been await-
ing the day which should reveal the
status of its political
1 Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio, II, p. 127.
350 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
fortunes for the next four years. The
qualities of a
"dark horse" candidate
remained even on inaugural day
somewhat concealed. Conkling, thwarted
by the last
administration, was sparing no threat
nor device in
prosecuting efforts to recoup his
damaged machine in
New York. Independents, upon vague
convictions of
Garfield's adaptability to reform of
the civil service, had
supported his candidacy. Their faith
had at various
times been shaken by evidences that did
not reflect de-
cided immunity from machinist
influences.2
Before the inaugural year had closed,
the assassina-
tion of the President sobered the
national mind and led
to momentary reflection upon the consequences
of zeal-
ous demand for office. The political
readjustments
which the President had attempted had
led to all but
inextricable tangles. Among other
things he had faced
the necessity of securing harmony in
his own state. The
selection of Blaine as Secretary of
State made Sher-
man's continuance in the Treasury
impossible. Conk-
ling's selection of Morton for that
position was passed
over for various reasons. His
appointment would have
been a direct repudiation of the
Hayes-Sherman admin-
2 Garfield's message of acceptance
aroused the criticism and apprehen-
sion of various prominent members of the
party. Both Sherman and
Hayes criticised his stand relative to
civil service. Carl Schurz did not
hesitate to warn against the consequences
of compromise: "No skill in
nice balancing will save you from the
necessity of choosing between two
roads, one running in the reactionary
tendencies and machine politics, and
the other in the direction of
intelligent, progressive and reformatory poli-
tics. Following the latter you will be
supported by the best intelligence
and moral sense not only of the party
but of the country. Following the
former, you will have the political
machinists around you and will be
their slave." Schurz, Speeches,
Correspondence, etc., IV, pp. 1-5. For
Platt's account of his
"bargain" with Garfield, see Platt's Autobiography,
chapter VI.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 351 istration and a shock to western interests as well.3 Sher- man's continuance would have been a final blow at Conkling's demands. The solution was to award Sher- |
|
man the President's vacated seat in the Senate and ap- 3 Morton was unqualified because of his business interests. Windom's anti-monopoly record supplemented Garfield's "sound money" record. |
352
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
point Foster to a Cabinet position. The
latter part of
the program became deranged through the
war with
Conkling, and Foster was compelled to
surrender and
seek re-election to the governorship.4
Even with this arrangement, the party
situation was
not altogether satisfactory. The
apportionment of ex-
penses for the Chicago convention
continued to threaten
the party truce for some time after the
election. Again
Sherman's willingness to compromise served
good pur-
poses. Nichol, the dispenser of
finances at Chicago,
performed successfully the duties of an
intermediary.
In December, Sherman agreed to pay any
part of the
debt that Foster demanded with the
understanding that
the latter should be renominated for
governor.5 This
meant also that Foster could look with
encouragement
to succeeding Pendleton in the Senate
two years later.
Matthews, whose ambition to return to
the Senate had
been thwarted by the Democratic
reaction in 1877, oc-
cupied himself in overcoming opposition
to his con-
firmation to the Supreme Bench.6 His
record as a cor-
poration lawyer was held up as an
argument against his
confirmation. This opposition was
ultimately allayed,
but only, however, after Sherman had
counseled Foster
that "either Matthews himself or
someone for him
should be here to help the
matter."7
The State Convention, in June, 1881,
witnessed the
consummation of the recast political
program. Threats
4 Cf.
The Nation, December 23, 1880. Hayes Diary, December 14,
1880.
5 Sherman to Bateman, Foster and Grosvenor, December 6,
7, and 8,
1880, respectively. Sherman MSS.
6 His nomination by Hayes had been
defeated a few months earlier.
7 Sherman MSS., March 19, 1881.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 353
of a revolt had been made in case
Foster should be re-
nominated. Sherman, as agreed upon,
came to the
rescue. He presided at the Convention,
plead support
for Garfield's administration and gave
Foster his full
endorsement. His speech was identical
in spirit with
the platform. The latter in brief form,
one of the brief-
est on record, endorsed the Republican
party on the
basis of its past performance.8 Sherman recalled it
afterward as an exceptionally good set
of resolutions.9
Foster was nominated according to
schedule, and the
party again moved to overcome its
adversary.
The Democrats were at the same time
seeking a
working program with which to match
that of the Re-
publicans. The schism of 1880 had riven
the party into
two factions between which there
appeared to be no
hope of future cooperation. One group,
that which had
been identified with the Payne
interests, had become
popularly designated as the
"kid" element. Colonel
Oliver H. Payne of Cleveland and John
R. McLean of
the Cincinnati Enquirer were its
most prominent lead-
ers. The other faction, designated as
the "mossback,"
still looked to Thurman and Pendleton
for leadership.
The immediate need was to declare a
truce and select a
candidate acceptable to both factions
-- so much of a
"dark horse" that it would
take "two weeks to find out
who he is." The honor was finally
settled upon John
W. Bookwalter of Springfield, a wealthy
manufacturer
8 Ohio State Journal, June 9,
1881.
Annual Cyc., 1881, p. 699.
9 Sherman, Recoil., II, p. 820.
Vol. XXXVII--23.
354
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
of steam engines.10 He had
formerly been identified
with the Republican party, but was
reputed to have
carried a torch in a recent Democratic
procession. The
"mossbacks" failed to become
enthusiastic for their
candidate. The circumstances of the
President's as-
sassination cast a gloom over the
campaign. Foster was
re-elected by 24,000 less votes than he
had polled in
1879. Bookwalter received 30,000 less
than Ewing had
received. The truce of party leaders
became a voters'
truce as well.
Of more significance to the immediate
future than
the vote of either major party was that
cast by the Pro-
hibitionists. Their candidate for
Governor received
above 16,000 of the 23,000 cast for
minor party can-
didates -- 6,000 more than the highest
record of the
crusade of 1873. Foster succeeded only
in bringing
disaster upon his party when
legislation was secured
against the interests of the liquor
traffic. Two separ-
ate laws were passed providing for
regulation through
taxation. Each was in turn declared
unconstitutional.
The Democracy therefore held a distinct
advantage in
1883 with its opportunity of nominating
a candidate on
an "anti-sumptuary" platform.
But the factional war was resumed. The
candidacy
of Durbin Ward was promoted by the
"mossback" fac-
tion. No name in the political annals
of the state com-
manded higher respect from the
standpoint of charac-
ter and popular esteem. He was not
pliant in politics.
During the war he had won a
Brigadier-General's com-
mission, and in the midst of the great
struggle had given
10 Bookwalter bore the reputation of
never having had a strike among
his employees.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 355
expression to the famous phrase,
"I am a Democrat."
After the hardships of farm life in
Kentucky and In-
diana he had, like many of his
compatriots, taught
school and studied law. Later he
entered into a partner-
ship with the celebrated Thomas Corwin
at Lebanon.
He had never won signal success in
politics, but many
of his friends were hopeful when the
Democratic Con-
vention met in 1883.
Ward's opponent for the nomination was
George
Hoadly of Cincinnati, a Puritan of the
Puritans. He
was born in New Haven, Connecticut, and
was a lineal
descendant of Jonathan Edwards and
Timothy Dwight.
He had grown up in Ohio, and after
graduating from the
Harvard Law School, had entered the law
office of
Salmon P. Chase in Cincinnati. Hoadly
had originally
been a Democrat. During the war he had
been a Re-
publican. He was one of the most
prominent Liberal
Republican leaders in 1872, and in
1876, just in time to
argue before the electoral commission
that a Tilden
elector from Oregon was entitled to a
vote, he again
became a Democrat. As a recent
Democratic "re-
cruit," his candidacy had
advantages of an overture to
disaffected Republicans -- especially
those alarmed by
recent prohibitive tendencies of their party.11
The renewal of the factional fight of
1880 with all
its questionable manipulations was
signalized by the
rivalry between Ward and Hoadly for the
guber-
natorial nomination. Pendleton was
interested in se-
curing his re-election to the Senate.
He had quarreled
11 Hoadly was the leading attorney for
the liquor interests in a suit to
test the constitutionality of the Scott
law, which provided for the taxation
of saloons.
356 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
with the McLeans, and their paper, the Enquirer,
opened its columns to a warfare of
invective. Pendle-
ton and Hoadly secured the support of a
rival paper,
and the Enquirer turned to the
support of Durbin
Ward.12 The result of the
convention fight, probably
the "noisiest, the most disorderly
and altogether the
most remarkable political
gathering" that Columbus had
ever seen, and characterized by "a
few instances that
led to accusations of
crookedness," was the nomination
of Hoadly.13 At the close of
the proceedings the de-
feated candidate for the nomination was
called upon
for a speech. He declared that he would
be a candidate
for the United States Senate, but that
he would not use
one dollar to secure his election.
The hopes of both Pendleton and Ward
were framed
without sufficient reference to the
strength of a com-
bination that was set on foot
immediately after the
election. Hoadly was elected Governor,
and Pendleton
was certain that a majority of the
Democratic caucus
would secure his nomination. Between
the election and
the meeting of the caucus, however, his
pledges began
to be seized by an enthusiasm for
Payne. The latter's
name had not been mentioned during the
legislative can-
vass in connection with the Senatorial
honor. On Janu-
ary 8, 1884 -- an appropriate date for
awarding Demo-
cratic offices -- the Payne agents had
squared a major-
ity of Democratic legislators with
their program.14
12 The News-Journal.
13 Cincinnati
Enquirer, June 22, 1883.
Myers, op. cit., pp. 214-220,
describes the Convention in detail
14 For testimony as to their methods see Senate
Miscellaneous Docu-
ments, 49th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. V, No. 106, and Cong.
Record, 49th
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7308-7361.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 357
Payne was a man of vast wealth.
"Hereafter, if we
elect him senator, there will be plenty
of money to con-
duct the campaigns in the state of
Ohio."15 Pendleton
was "penurious," and General
Ward was poor. Pen-
dleton had also sponsored the
disreputable Civil Service
Law; Payne "believed in delivering
the spoils around
among the victors."16 The
real explanation was that
men connected with one of the greatest
industrial con-
cerns of the age had united their
forces with those of
a powerful newspaper editor17 and
completely eclipsed
the agencies of feudal warfare employed
by the "moss-
backs."18
The election of Payne was a natural
culmination of
a movement set up in the Democratic
party to counter
the Foster machine. The magnitude of
its manipula-
tions cannot, of course, be accurately
estimated. In
15 Senate Misc. Docs., 49th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 106, p. 122.
16 Ibid., p. 122.
17 John R. McLean of the Cincinnati Enquirer.
In August the so
called Highland House Convention had
been held in Cincinnati in order to
control the nomination of legislative
members and secure Pendleton's de-
feat. Its high-handed methods became
traditional in the annals of cor-
rupt politics. For various accounts of
its proceedings see the Cincinnati
News Journal, of August 19, 1883; Commercial-Gazette, July 4,
1884, and
September 7, 1889; Myers, op. cit., chap.
IX.
18 During the procedure, Thurman issued
a statement which was aimed
as a bomb against the Payne
manipulators. Relative to the attack upon
Pendleton in re his Civil Service
Reform bill, Thurman replied: "I hear
Payne men say: 'We can not support
Pendleton because we disapprove of
his civil service reform bill',
forgetting that convention after convention
of the Democratic party, both State and
National, had resolved in favor of
civil service reform, and also
forgetting that the Republicans now in office
are just as liable to be turned out as
if the Pendleton bill had never been
passed . . . . But if these gentlemen
cannot support Pendleton, why can
not they support Ward? He is not
responsible for the civil service re-
form bill. Indeed, I have always
understood that he disapproves of it.
. . . . Why then prefer Payne to him?
The answer, I fear, is per-
358 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
January, 1886, one Colonel S. K.
Donavin published an
open letter in the Cincinnati Commercial
specifically nam-
ing a number of men who had received
from $1,200 to
$5,000 for their votes. The State
Legislature instituted
an investigation. About fifty witnesses
were examined
by a special committee. A wealth of
damaging evidence
was secured and forwarded to the
Senate. The major-
ity report of the Committee on Privileges
and Elections
held that there was no evidence that
Payne himself was
charged with irregularities. It was the
business of Ohio
to prosecute its own corruptionists.
Senators Frye and
Hoar of that committee made a minority
report which
declared that sufficient evidence had
been produced to
warrant an investigation. The former
declared the
issue was "whether or not the
great Standard Oil Com-
pany, the greatest monopoly of to-day
in the United
States of America, a power which makes
itself felt in
every inch of territory in this whole
republic, a power
which controls business, railroads, men
and things, shall
also control here; whether or not that
great power has
put its hand upon a legislative body
and undertaken to
control, has controlled and has elected
a member of the
fectly plain. There never has been any
machine politics in the Demo-
cratic party of Ohio. We have, as a
party, been freer from bossism than
any party that has ever existed. But
some men seem to think that we
ought to have a machine amply supplied
with money to work it, and
under absolute control of a boss or
bosses, to dictate who shall and who
shall not receive the honors and rewards
within the gift of the party. To
set up such a machine it is necessary,
in the first place, to kill the men
who have heretofore enjoyed the
confidence of the party--the men whose
ability, hard labor, and principles did
so much to keep the party together
in the terrible ordeal through which it
has passed . . . . I want to see
all true Democrats have a fair chance,
according to their merits, and do
not want to see a political cut-throat
bossism inaugurated for the benefit
of a close party corporation or
syndicate."
Ohio in National
Politics, 1865-1896 359
United States
Senate. . . ." The body
could not
afford to sit silent
and not let its voice be heard as to the
truth of the
allegations.19 During the entire procedure
Payne made no move
to vindicate himself by urging an
investigation. The
Senate accepted the majority report
and refused to
investigate.20
19 Cong.
Rec., 49th Cong., 1st Sess., pp.
7322-7323.
20 The evidence
gathered by the investigating committee of the State
Legislature is in Senate
Miscellaneous Documents, 49th Congress, 1st sess.,
No. 106. The Senate
debate introduced a measure of additional evidence
Cf. Cong. Rec., 49th
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7203-7210, 7251-7272, 7308-7329,
7350-7362. A series
of newspaper editorial declarations, chiefly Democra-
tic, is given on page
7327.
John Hay, in a letter
dated January 18, 1886, summarized for Sherman
his views relative to
the investigation: "I hasten to reply to your letter
of the 16th. I
entirely agree with you in your repugnance to go into the
matter. I should
certainly advise you to keep out of it if possible--for two
reasons. First it is
so disagreeable in itself. Second I believe it will be
impossible to prove
Donavin's charge.
Of course everybody
believes money was used. Col. Payne has a
passionate devotion
to his family (he cares little for politics per se) and
would as freely give
a hundred thousand as a cent for his father's or
Whitney's success.
But from the nature of the case these things are un-
provable. Col.
Thompson, we will say, paid the money. A member re-
ceives it. They are solus
cum solo. Nobody else can swear they saw it.
Both sides will of
course deny it. A man who will take a bribe will not
stick at perjury.
Even those who have blabbed about it will deny and say
they were joking.
If the investigation
is ordered and nothing is proved, where is the
gain? And in the last
resort, I am sure the matter was never mentioned
between Mr. Payne and
the Colonel. . . . Sherman MSS.
Newspapers of both
parties, immediately after the election and for
several years
afterward, denounced the corruptionists in bitter terms.
January 9, 1884,
immediately after the caucus, the Columbus Times (Demo-
cratic) declared:
"The Democratic clock is put back four years, and cor-
ruption is given a
new leasehold in our land. Syndicates purchase the
people's agents, and
honest men stand aghast."
The Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette,
September 9-14 inc., 1889, con-
tains a detailed
"History of the Payne Purchase" by General H. V. Boyn-
ton.
360 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The Payne election shattered every hope
of the party
of exercising any influences whatever
upon the National
Convention of 1884. The tariff bill of
1883 furnished
additional grounds for disunity. Payne
was convinced
that it had been a source of
embarrassment in the elec-
tion of 1883. He spoke his convictions
frankly in a
long letter to Doolittle of Wisconsin:
"But for the in-
sanity at Washington, we could have carried
the state
in October by 25,000 or 30,000. . . .
But devils
and fools would have it otherwise.
Carlisle was made
speaker. Hurd, the fanatic free trader,
was, against
the united protest of all our members
and and the known
wishes of the entire party of the
state, placed on the
Ways and Means Committee, and under the
leadership
of Watterson and the Kentucky
statesmen, a crusade
was commenced for "Revenue
only" and against the
"Ohio platform." All that was
wanted to secure suc-
cess on our part was that the tariff
for this Congress
should be let alone."21
In addition labor strikes threat-
ened a defection which would partially
recoup the Re-
21 Payne to Doolittle, April 10, 1884,
in the Ohio Archaeological
and Historical Society Publications, Vol. 22, p. 544.
Additional extracts furnish a commentary
on the character of the
tariff and political struggle: "The
present law had not been tested. No
man could tell wherein it was defective.
Nobody asked for change or
agitation. No amendatory law could be
passed. Evil and only evil could
result from the attempt. But demented,
conceited, desperate schemers
would have it so. They proclaimed
"free trade or defeat"! Hence the
"Morrison Bill," with its
senseless, illogical and ridiculous horizontal strike.
Last October the reduced wool rate gave
us at least 10,000 votes. Both
parties pledged their efforts to restore
the former rate. M's bill, instead of
restoring it, deducts 20 more and the
recent vote of the House shows
an immense majority of Democrats in that
direction. Now how can we
expect that the wool growers can be
induced to vote with us in October or
November? Unless the Democratic members
by some bad step rebuke this
free trade madness, and with the coming
convention pronounce distinctly for
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 361
publican loss of Prohibition and saloon
votes.22 Hoad-
ly's administration, through its
recognition of the
Payne faction and its "coal
oil" legislature was a party
disaster. There was, from the
standpoint of disunity
within the state, even less hope for
the success of an
Ohio candidate than there had been in
1880.
The state delegation was headed by
representatives
of both factions. Thurman and Ward were
associated
with Hoadly and McLean. Thurman's name
was pre-
sented by a Kentucky delegate. T. E.
Powell, a recent
convert, nominated Hoadly. On the first
ballot, Thur-
man received a total of 88 votes
including 23 from his
own state. Hoadly received 3, including
2 from his
own state. The remaining 21 were cast
for Cleveland,
who was nominated on that ballot.
The election of the first Democratic
President since
the Civil War was accomplished with
Ohio remaining
in the Republican column. The
circumstances carried
little significance beyond exhibiting
the demoralized
the Ohio Platform it will, in my
opinion, be utterly useless to enter a can-
vass to carry Ohio in October. . . . Yet
if, on the Morrison Bill, it
appears that a majority of the
Democratic party are free traders, I doubt
much whether the Ohio Platform adopted
at Chicago would recover us
from the shock which this agitation has
given in alarming the business men
of the country." . . . . Without recovery a defeat of at
least 30,000
votes was prophesied.
22 In October ex-President Hayes
estimated the changes in votes as
follows: "On a full vote the
Republican majority I put at 30,000. From
this deduct 10 to 15,000 Prohibition
votes and 10,000 saloon votes. Add
5,000 Irish and Labor votes and we have
left at least 10,000 majority. I
hope for this result." Hayes Diary,
October 14, 1884.
362 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
state of the Democratic party.23 And
developments im-
mediately after the Presidential
inaugural promised no
immediate return to the better. The
election of 1885
was a demonstration of political
corruption in its worst
form. Intimidation at the polls,
stuffing of the ballot-
boxes by gangs of hired repeaters and
the forging of
tally-sheets were combined in the mad
scramble to con-
trol office.24 Since the
election involved Sherman's seat
in the Senate, serious charges were
brought against men
high in Democratic ranks. By clever
manipulation the
Republicans were able to prevent a
majority of Demo-
crats being seated in the Legislature.
Sherman's elec-
tion ultimately rested upon a narrow
majority on a joint
ballot. The Republicans were in
suspense until the last
moment, and their success was a matter
of joy and con-
gratulation. Sherman had, according to William H.
Taft, "overcome one of the most
scoundrelly conspira-
cies ever conceived in the history of
American poli-
tics."25
23 During the canvass Payne in outlining
the prospects to Senator
Doolittle of Wisconsin remarked:
"This scandal affair is unfortunate to
say the least. Some of the tenderest portion of the goody good people
may be frightened away from us." Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Soc. Pub., Vol.
XXII, p. 547.
24 Two wards, one in Cincinnati and the
other in Columbus became
classical examples of tally sheet
forging In the first case 726 was made
to read 926 by affixing a 0 on the 7. In
the latter case 208 was converted
into 508. These manipulations were
committed in behalf of Democratic
candidates. The numbers became stereotypes
of Democratic corruption
in Republican newspapers. They were invariably reproduced in such
a manner as to illustrate the method of
the forgery. Extensive accounts
are in Foraker's Notes, I, pp.
213-223; Cincinnati Commercial, January 10.
1886, September 7, 1889.
25 Taft
to Sherman, January 14, 1886. Sherman MSS. Under date of
January 13, 1886, John Hay congratulated
Sherman and declared: The state
not only secures your inestimable
services for six years to come, but Ohio
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 363
The Democracy had no opportunity of
vindicating
itself as a state organization before
the Presidential
campaign of 1888. Hoadly was defeated
after his re-
nomination for Governor in 1885. T. E.
Powell, an-
other recent recruit to Democratic
ranks, who had en-
gineered the scalping of Thurman in
1884, was ineffec-
tive as a candidate in 1887. Again the
delegation had
no commonly accepted program and was
without influ-
ence in determining the action of the
National Conven-
tion. The renomination of Cleveland was
a foregone
conclusion. His selection of Thurman
for the Vice-
Presidential candidacy was effective in
securing the
latter's nomination.26 At the same time
a considerable
contingent of the Ohio delegation was
busily intent
escapes what would have been an
indelible disgrace, if fraud and envy
had been able to accomplish your
defeat."
Irregularities were not of course
confined to Democratic manipu-
lators. The October election of 1884
was, in Cincinnati, an occasion for
exceptional irregularities. U. S.
Marshal Lot Wright testified that he
had received a shipment of 600 English
bulldog pistols, presumably from
the Republican National Committee, with which
to arm deputy-mar-
shals. The weapons were placed in the
hands of men with slight regard for
their character and with due reference
to their Republicanism. Testimony
relative to the results covers almost
600 pages of a House Report. Cf.
House Reports, 48th Congress, 2nd Sess., No. 2681.
26 A correspondent of the Cincinnati Enquirer
(June 4, 1888) wrote:
"It (the Thurman boom) does not
come from Ohio and the tendency
in that state seems to throw the entire
responsibility for it outside. It
is the product, not to use the term in
an offensive sense, of the machine.
It is an invention of that child of
genius, William L. Scott, stimulated
no doubt by that gentleman in the White
House, who has long been in
friendly relations with the Ohio veteran." The California delegation,
out of respect to Thurman's attitude
toward Chinese exclusion and the
regulation of the Pacific Railway, led
the demonstration.
364
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
upon "kicking him through the
ropes."27 A sea of red
bandanna handkerchiefs, the battle
emblem of the "Old
Roman," completely swept aside the
white hat emblem
of Governor Gray of Indiana. The
nomination of
Thurman and the subsequent defeat of
the Democratic
ticket may, from the standpoint of
subsequent develop-
ments, be regarded as the final scene
in an era of Ohio
Democratic politics. A new generation
of leaders was
no longer hindered in availing itself of
the legacy.
The decade ending in 1888 had indeed
been a bar-
ren and demoralized period of
Democratic politics. It
was for the most part devoid of
meaning, other than
its demonstration of commercialized
politics incidental
to an advancing industrial age.
Republican opponents
derisively referred to the Democracy as
the C. O. D.
party, and suggested that the terms
represented also
the "Collapsed Ohio
Democracy." But the Repub-
licans shared in the experiences of a
"Slough of De-
spond." Sherman remained the
visible leader of his
party and was in 1884 and 1888 hopeful
that it would
pay a just indebtedness by promoting
him to the Presi-
dency. His shadow, like that of
Thurman, lay athwart
the paths of younger men with growing
ambitions. It
was well for his party that he could
accept with appar-
ent stoicism an extraordinary degree of
political disap-
pointment.
After the successful campaign of 1881,
the liquor is-
sue had become an important stumbling
block in the way
27 June 5, 1888, Charles Hedges
telegraphed Sherman from St. Louis:
"Ohio delegation very sore at being
whipped in for Thurman; Indiana
intensely disappointed over Gray's
defeat. Leading members both dele-
gations privately predicting your
nomination and election."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 365
of Foster's election to the Senate.28
The party had at-
tempted in vain to read the issue out
of the campaign
of 1883. A Republican sally on the
"free trade" here-
sies of the Democracy failed to break
the drift. Con-
stitutional amendments relative to the
traffic were sub-
mitted to popular vote, but disaffected
contingents had
turned either to the Democratic or the
Prohibition
party, and Foster saw the coveted honor
captured by
the Payne machine. Joseph B. Foraker, a
young Cin-
cinnati lawyer, had been chosen with
the consent of all
factions to oppose Hoadly for the
Governorship. His
advent secured for the Republicans one
of the cleverest
campaigners of his generation. He
became a past-mas-
ter in turning every opening afforded
by the opposition
to the account of his own party. Later
the acts of a
Democratic President were converted
into an outrage
on a patriotic conscience. The
"rebel flag" order, the
"gone a fishing," the
lowering the flag for "old Jake
Thompson" and the "Gettysburg
snub" affairs became
the material which fired a
"blazing spirit of patriotism
and Republicanism that filled the minds
of the people
who listened and then voted."29 An attempted "Rebel
Invasion," i. e., aid to a
Democratic candidate by a
southern governor, was swept back by a
fife and drum
corps to the tune of "Marching
Through Georgia."
Despite untoward events and
circumstances, Sher-
man entertained hopes of becoming the
available candi-
date of his party in 1884. His hopes
were so ill founded,
however, that he later denied having
had any interest
28 At times Sherman's critics blamed him
for "letting the ship go
down" as a defence against a
Republican colleague in the Senate.
29 Foraker, Notes, I, p. 279.
366 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
whatsoever in securing the honor.30
And yet he was in
continuous touch with political
advisers as to how his
nomination could best be promoted.
Political honors,
like lightning, sometimes play freakish
tricks, and it is
always well to be prepared for the
shock.31 Foraker,
Warner Bateman and C. W. Moulton
advised Sherman
and received directions as to the tack
to be pursued.
The intention was to conduct the
Sherman candidacy in
such a manner that the Blaine men could
turn to Sher-
man as they had not been able to do in
1880.32
The nomination of Blaine was not,
therefore, with-
out its disappointments. The Ohio
delegation did not
measure up to Sherman's expectations, and
he was con-
30 Sherman Recoil., II, pp.
885-886. "I had not expressed the slightest
desire to make such a contest. When
approached by personal friends I
dissuaded them from using my name as a
candidate. I neither asked
nor sought anyone to be a delegate. When
the convention met, the Ohio
delegation was divided between Blaine
and myself, and this necessarily
prevented any considerable support of me
outside of the state. I was
not sorry for it. I regarded the
nomination of Blaine as the natural
result under the circumstances."
31 Foraker reproduces in his Notes extensive
correspondence relative
to promoting Sherman's candidacy.
32 The following excerpts from letters in the Sherman manuscripts
indicate the methods by which this end
was being promoted: On May 4,
Warner Bateman declared the advisability
of avoiding "irritation or
offense to those having Blaine
preferences in Ohio. These matters could
probably be best determined on the
ground. If it is so determined it
could be very safely left with such men
as Robinson, Craighead, Foraker,
Amos Smith, etc. These are valuable and
discreet men. But these for
purposes of counsel should be so
increased as to include every sincere
and discreet friend of yours, in the
delegation, that the jealousies that
impaired the effectiveness of your
support in 1880 might be avoided. It
is also desirable that as much
individual work should be put in as possible
toward abating the ardor of the positive
Blaine support as dull and
feeble in its influence on the
convention and in the best condition for an
early abandonment of him. I am satisfied that the condition could not
be more favorable for this work. West
can be handled by those who
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 367
vinced that it was chargeable to
William McKinley's
timidity and unreliability. This
conviction he expressed
to a friend and adviser: "McKinley
only demonstrated
the characteristics he has always shown
of being timid,
uncertain, changeable and utterly
unreliable. He de-
ceived my friends from the beginning to
the end, and,
without exception, they feel for him
marked ill-will
tinctured with contempt. He certainly
misled me and
was the fatal cause of most of the
dissensions in the
Ohio delegation, which, if he had acted
firmly for me,
would have been two-thirds or
three-fourths in my
favor. His pretended friendship was a
lure and a
snare, and far worse than his open opposition.
I trust
the good people of his District will
not nominate him
know him. He is fearless and aggressive
in a fight but is not stubborn.
He could be employed in many things in
which his enthusiasm as well
as his partisanship could be safely
worked off. He would be good on
resolutions in the judicial work of
contests in delegations. He is a noble
hearted but ambitious man and must be
dealt with accordingly. Mack
and Conger can be used to advantage. If
Colonel Moulton will keep
sufficiently to the rear, his capacity
to learn what is going on and the
access to persons to be reached will be
of great value. . . ."
Another letter after Moulton had arrived
in Chicago preceding
the Convention was of the same tenor: "Upon
arriving here, I find that
the delegates here will not take any
excuse and that I must go with them
this evening.
The story that proposals have been made
to Foraker have just this
foundation. Mr. Scarlett, a Kentucky
delegate, called upon Foraker
with a proposal to make him (F.) the
nominee for the second place
Presumably this came from the law firm
of which Arthur was a member
in New York City as that firm are
attorneys for Mr. Scarlett, who is
manager for Dun's Commercial Agency in
New York. It is stated that
Mr. Butterworth made a similar
proposition to Foraker not long since.
There is no doubt about these
offers--and I give them to you so that
you may know the story. No one believes
that Foraker could consider
the matter other than to reject it. But
it serves to illustrate the diffi-
culties of preserving strict methods in
politics where such trading is
resorted to on all sides."
368 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
for Congress. If they do, they will
certainly have cause
to regret it. . . . All this is in the confidence of
private friendship, although I shall
probably openly
state the substance and have no
objection to stating
without you quoting me the effect of
McKinley's defec-
tion and how I feel about it."33
Subsequent events were
to produce a noteworthy change in the
relationship be-
tween the two men.
On the other hand the Convention had
its compen-
sations. Sherman was notified of the
effective work
of a new-comer in national politics:
Marcus A. Hanna
of Cleveland received an expression of
the candidate's
gratitude and hopes for a more intimate
acquaintance.34
Sherman in 1887, as in 1879, engaged
himself in
the task of formulating a nationalistic
program toward
which men of all sections and interests
could look with
favor. In March he delivered a speech in Nashville,
Tennessee, marked by a conciliatory
attitude toward
the "Confederate gray." He
declared that the war was
over and that the interests of
Tennessee and other
southern states must naturally draw
them into the Re-
publican party. A speech in Cincinnati
proclaimed the
benefits of an impending imperialism as
a solution of
the difficulties between labor and
capital: "Let us stand
by the Republican party, and we will
extend in due time
33 Sherman
to J. S. McClure, June 9, 1884. Sherman MSS.
The letter from Sherman here quoted
was written shortly after the
convention, while the disappointment
over the result was acute. Soon after-
ward he paid generous tribute to
William McKinley, and in a speech
at a ratification meeting of the
nominations made in the Republican Na-
tional Convention of 1892, "he
eulogized McKinley most eloquently and de-
clared him to be one of the best men
in public life." Sherman, Recollections,
Vol. II, p. 1161.--EDITOR.
34 Sherman MSS., June 12, 1884.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 369
our dominion and power into other
regions; not by an-
nexation, not by overriding peaceable
and quiet people,
but by our commercial influence, by
extending our
steamboat lines into South America, by
making all the
Caribbean Sea one vast American ocean;
by planting
our influence among the sister
republics, by aiding them
from time to time, and thus, by
pursuing an American
policy, become the ruler of other
dominions." It was
indeed an extreme nationalism upon
which Sherman
proposed to lead the Republican party
back into power.
The South in its most militant days had
not demanded
a more far-reaching program of
expansion in support
of its system. The effect of this venture
was some-
what broken by a subsequent speech
delivered in
Springfield, Illinois. Here his attack
upon the stupidity
of the Democratic party in dealing with
the tariff and
all national problems degenerated into
a "bloody shirt"
harangue. Sherman realized the
equivocal effect of
his speeches by attempting to reconcile
their temper.35
The Republican party found the real
clue to an at-
tack upon the Democracy in the message
of the Presi-
dent to Congress in December preceding
the campaign
year. A Democratic revision of the
tariff with a view
to the reduction of the surplus as the
President recom-
mended, could mean nothing else from
the standpoint
of the opposition than an effort to
strike down the pros-
pering industries of the country. The
Republican party
was on the offensive; labor and capital
in every section
of the nation was open to
representations of just how
their respective interests were being
threatened.
35 Cf. Sherman Recoil., II, pp.
987-988.
Vol. XXXVII--24.
370
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The promises for a "Republican
year" were fair
when the party met in National
Convention to select
their standard bearer. The
circumstances surrounding
Sherman's candidacy were similar in
many respects to
those of 1880. The Ohio delegation
again embraced
two men who were reputed to be
entertaining ambitions
similar to those of Garfield and Foster
in the former
contest. They were, however, revolving
in opposition
to each other. Foraker had twice
carried the state as
a candidate for Governor, and had a
claim to influence
similar to that of Foster. William
McKinley, on the
other hand, had been playing a role
relative to the tariff
issue similar to that of Garfield to
the financial issue
in 1880.36 It was to him that the
Sherman forces were
willing to turn in the extremity of
their avowed pur-
poses becoming quixotic as it formerly
had.
The division of party forces of the
Ohio delegation,
which led to no end of recrimination,
dated from the
state canvass of the year before. A
dispute had arisen
between Sherman and Foraker regarding
the advisa-
bility of securing a resolution
endorsing the former
for the Presidency by the State
Convention. Sherman
had from all evidences grown suspicious
of the growing
popularity of the young Governor and
his known sym-
pathies for the Blaine candidacy. Many
of Sherman's
correspondents assumed a cynical
attitude as to the
avowed unity of the Ohio delegation,
and memories of
36 Murat Halstead to Sherman, June 12,
1888: "The Ohio delegation
will, I think, be reasonably steady--and
the fact that there is talk of
two of the delegates as dark horses may have a conservative
influence."
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 371
1880 validated their insinuations.37
The State Conven-
tion ultimately passed the desired
resolution but it con-
vinced nobody, least of all perhaps,
Sherman himself.38
The Blaine men became all the more
anxious to secure
delegates who were not
"offensively Sherman."39
In spite of all protestations to the
contrary the Ohio
delegation to the National Convention
was not a source
of strength to the Sherman candidacy.
The readiness
of delegates to "sneak away"
from Sherman became a
commonplace in newspaper gossip.40
The candidate was
37
On July 18, 1887, Sherman declared his impatience in the following
letter: ". . . . Amid the many kind
things said and many friendly
letters received, at the end of them all
was the inquiry "What will Ohio
lo?
Will Ohio be solid?" sometimes with a sneer at the position of
Ohio in the past two conventions. I confess I am always irritated at
the inquiry, and cannot answer it. And
now the signs of the times indicate
Ohio will present a divided delegation,
especially if the present con-
vention should fail to express any
choice. I think it due to my personal
honor not to give my encouragement to
residents of other states to sup-
port me as long as there is any doubt
about the position of Ohio. Nor
will I go into a convention with a
delegation broken up as it was es-
pecially in 1880, unless that fact and
the precise condition of it is known
beforehand to all the people of the
United States. Sherman to John C.
Entrekin, Sherman MSS., July 16,
1887.
38
Cf. Harper's Weekly, August 13, 1887.
39 Foraker op. cit., I, p.
335. A conference, attended by Sherman,
McKinley, Foster and others, was held in
Canton during July, relative
to Sherman's endorsement. Foraker was
overlooked in this "social and
agreeable" visit and afterward
learned of it through Hanna. He had his
reasons for feeling that too many
"moccasin" tracks were being made.
The story is outlined in his Notes, Vol.
I, Chapters XIX and XXI.
40 Walter
Wellman made the following criticism of the delegation:
"Friends of Joseph B. Foraker are
beginning to make known the fact
that Ohio's support of Sherman is formal
and half-hearted. It is a
singular situation. The men who are supposed to be Sherman
repre-
sentatives declare that only seven of
the Ohio delegates are so wedded
to Sherman that they are ready to stick
to him to the last. . . . For-
aker is their choice. They may vote for
Sherman but they are talking
for Foraker. Their desire is to make the
Governor a dark horse. Sher-
man they say is an old man of the sea,
dragging down all the young
men in the state. . . ." Chicago Tribune,
June 15, 1888.
372
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
in reality courting other and more
important sources
of support. His mainstay in the Ohio
delegation was
Mark Hanna, and through him he was
attempting to
secure an effective combination.
Since the convention of 1884, the
relationship be-
tween Sherman and Hanna had grown more
cordial.
The latter had, because of Sherman's
influence, been
appointed a member of the Board of
Directors of the
Union Pacific railroad.41 During
May and June pre-
ceding the date of the convention he
made an exten-
sive trip through the north-west. He
kept in intimate
touch with Sherman and volunteered
suggestions as to
the promotion of the campaign. His
letters suggest
not only the intimacy of the
relationship between the
two men but something of the nature of
their program.
One of May 26 informed Sherman of a
proposed con-
vention procedure: "I have a
letter from Mr. Conger
by which I find there has been a change
in the arrange-
ments of rooms as I proposed, therefore
I may be
obliged to make a change in regard to
the Sherman
Headquarters when I get to Chicago
Monday. Please
have Gen. Raum notify the Chairman of
the Southern
Delegation to report to me on his
arrival and say to
them that I will be prepared to
purchase surplus tickets
of their Delegation for members of the
Sherman
Club. . . ."42 By the time the Convention opened
Sherman had secured a large proportion
of the south-
ern delegates. His chief concern was to
augment these
delegations by a creditable showing of
support from
41 Croly, op. cit., p. 131.
Foraker, Notes, I, p. 313.
42 Hanna at the time of the Convention
bought a large number of
such tickets. Cf. Croly, op. cit., p.
136. Foraker, Notes, I, p. 363.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 373
the mid-West and East, especially from
New York and
Pennsylvania delegations. Platt and
Quay, who prac-
tically controlled these delegations,
were sedulously
solicited to this end.43 Sherman
early in June consulted
with them in New York. Hanna, writing
from Omaha,
felt free to offer suggestions and seek
counsel in refer-
ence to both features of the program.
Under date of
May 30 he wrote: ". . . . I shall
be very anxious
to know the result of the consultation
between Quay
and Platt. If Platt only wants New York
City patron-
age -- let him have it -- provided that
satisfies Morton
and does not interfere with Miller. . .
. I did not
ask you a question while in W -- that I
wanted to, fear-
ing that I might interfere with some of
your agree-
ments with Foster and the others --
that is, may I de-
pend on proper recognition being given
to such men as
I may select in several states,
provided we are success-
ful. You may depend on my selection of
men because
if you are elected I want to see you
surrounded by the
very best class of men in the party. I
do not promise
offices, but I do to such men. Whoever
is for Sherman
in time of need is Sherman's friend and
Sherman
never forgets his friends."44 Quay
from all evidences
became thoroughly converted to the
Sherman cause.45
43 Sherman's Recoil., II, p.
1025.
44 Sherman MSS., May 30, 1888.
45 Sherman's mainstay is not any of his
Ohio supporters, but is
Senator Quay, of Pennsylvania. Ben
Butterworth, ex-Governor Foster,
M. A. Hanna did the pleasing and
ornamental at the Grand Pacific head-
quarters yesterday, while Quay kept
closely to his rooms at the Richelieu
and gave orders about the tack to be
taken. Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1888.
374 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
His services were at any rate
sufficient to exact a
hearty expression of gratitude.46
The first ballot of the Convention was,
nevertheless,
a source of disappointment. Sherman,
indeed, was the
leading candidate from the standpoint
of number of
votes received, but his strength did
not measure up to
the boasted estimate of his promoters.
Platt cast the
major portion of his state's votes for
Depew, but im-
mediately sought terms with other
candidates when he
found that his favorite could command
little support
from the north-west. His lieutenants
had practically
secured an arrangement whereby William
B. Allison of
Iowa was at the point of securing the
honor. Platt
was at last convinced, however, that
Harrison's name
satisfied his requirements, and threw
his forces to the
latter's support.47 Had this attempt
proved abortive,
Sherman might have been the favored
recipient.48
The failure of Sherman to receive votes
from New
York at scheduled periods tended to
break the Ohio
delegation and drive its members to
consider other pro-
grams in case of an emergency. On the
afternoon of
June 23, rumors gained currency that a
Blaine test vote
was forthcoming. Hanna feared that it
would sweep
the Convention and requested Sherman by
telegraph to
permit him to counter it through
McKinley's candi-
46 A
telegram to Hanna during the convention reads: "Say to Quay
--Thanks, a thousand thanks--call for
anything you want. Let Ohio
stand firmly and unitedly until
convention by majority decides and heartily
acquiesce. Hope for success."
Sherman MSS., undated but in files with
other documents pertaining to the
convention.
47 Cf. Platt's posthumous statement in
the Chicago Record Herald,
March 7, 1910, as given by William E.
Curtis; also Charles Edward Rus-
sell, These Shifting Scenes, pp.
126-129.
48 Platt's statement, op. cit.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 375
dacy.49 Sherman counseled
both Hanna and Foraker
to stand firm. Although the Blaine
movement came to
nothing, the Sherman candidacy was
swept aside when
Platt's arrangement to nominate
Harrison began to
materialize. Its success was attained
without regard
for the interests of either faction of
the Ohio delegation.
It was indeed, as Mr. Croly has stated,
a "seething
caldron" of intrigue which took
place behind the rather
tame procedure of the Convention. Sherman
declared
a few years afterward that his defeat
had been due to
the "bargain" between Platt
and Harrison.50 Alger's
supporters had been active in turning
southern dele-
gates to his support.51 William Henry
Smith attributed
a degree of Sherman's weakness to the
influence of
railroad interests:
"One very striking
feature of
the Convention was the extent of the
representation
of railroad corporations -- New York,
Nebraska,
Colorado and California were absolutely
under their
influence. The delegates of this class not only al-
ways voted against you, but always
spoke against
you."52 With Platt's
support, however, Sherman might
have become the nominee instead of
Harrison. Just
before the Convention met, John Hay,
writing from
49 The telegram read: "Blaine move
to be made on next ballot. We
think McKinley the only man who can
defeat him. Who do you advise?
Can Ohio afford to lose the opportunity?
I regret the situation but
fear I am right. Hanna. Foraker says he
will go to Blaine. Sher-
man MSS.
50 It was in response to this assertion
that Platt confided a post-
humous statement to Curtis. According to
its tenor, Sherman was favor-
ably considered as a recipient of
Platt's influence.
51 Charles Foster and E. E. Wood, a
patent attorney of Cincinnati,
each emphasized this charge in letters
to Sherman after the Convention.
Sherman MSS, June 26 and 27, 1888.
52 Sherman MSS., June 25, 1888.
376
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
New York City, with more accuracy
undoubtedly, de-
fined the difficulties that stood in
the way of Sherman
securing the nomination. First was
Platt's hostility
because Sherman had written slightingly
of the former
to someone in New York. Second was the
hostility of
the old Arthur and Conkling element,
and finally "the
bankers and brokers who thought they
had not had
their share of the funding operations."53 The suc-
cessors of the old "Stalwart"
faction were in the saddle
in 1888. They had no particular reasons
for fitting
one into the new scheme of things who
had not served
their interests better in other days.
Neither Sherman's
career nor record squared with the
interests which he
was attempting to command. He neither
weighed po-
litical forces accurately nor held the
confidence of the
"interests" which supported
them.
Harrison's election was for the most
part a political
reaction against a Democratic
administration. By
1884, Cleveland's party had usurped the
ground for-
merly occupied by the liberal elements
of Republican-
ism. It rapidly proved to be an
untenable position from
the standpoint of practical politics.
Cleveland shortly
found himself situated as Hayes had
been eight years
before. It needed but the degree of
courage and in-
sight connected with the tariff message
of 1887 to en-
able the Republicans to capitalize the
forces of opposi-
tion and identify them with a program
that carried
an appeal for industrial support. The
"Stalwart"
forces of Republicanism shared
liberally in the dicta-
tion of methods and rewards. Liberals and Inde-
pendents ignored, if they did not
accept outright, the
53 Sherman MSS., June 14, 1888.
Ohio in National Politics
1865-1896 377
new dispensation in the common cause of
repudiating
Cleveland. It was a campaign of "great importance
to business," and as such received
financial support
beyond former campaigns.
Owing to the factional break in the
Democratic
ranks of Ohio, the state was regarded
as "safe" for
the Republicans. Indiana, New York,
Connecticut and
New Jersey became the battle-ground.
Cleveland's se-
lection of Thurman as a candidate for
the Vice-Presi-
dency accentuated rather than relieved
the factional
breach. The recognition of
"mossback" leadership in
direct opposition to the
"kid" program was little short
of treason; and the Chairman of the
Democratic Cam-
paign Committee had no more reason for
promoting the
success of the party than Zach Chandler
had in secur-
ing Republican success in 1876. The
Republican tri-
umph in Ohio was due therefore to the
negative tenden-
cies of the opposition rather than to
an endorsement of
extreme principles.54 True
enough, the state had its
particular interests which were
hopefully seeking to be
subsidized. But there was no
opportunity of securing
this end without apparently endorsing
the full scheme,
and the party that had won the election
was shortly to
find that a horizontal increase of
tariff rates was al-
most as precarious as a horizontal
reduction. The fu-
ture was shortly to disclose just how
great were the
reservations that had attended the
lease of power to
the Republican party.
54 The writer does not feel that Ohio
had been successfully con-
verted to protectionism in 1888. Perhaps
Mr. Dooley's assertion that
"one does not vote for a candidate
but against his opponent" more
nearly explains the vote of Ohio in this
election.
378
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
CHAPTER VII
OHIO AND THE "FIRST
BATTLE"
Preceding the Republican Convention of
1888, Mark
Hanna declared his convictions to
Sherman in the fol-
lowing terms: "You know our four
delegates at large
are all in each other's way --
and no man can do the
same work in such a cause as this with
any other
thought than the one great object
sought. . . ."1
The failure of Sherman to receive the
nomination sub-
stantiated the validity of this
observation. Connected
with it was Hanna's conclusion, as it
was undoubtedly
that of his fellow-countrymen, that
Sherman had be-
come a Presidential impossibility.
Without effort, Mc-
Kinley had appeared to have greater
availability than
even Sherman, though the latter had had
the benefit
of long and painstaking preparations.
The pursuit of
the nomination, on the other hand, had
afforded Hanna
an opportunity to observe political
methods in two na-
tional conventions. He was destined to
turn his les-
sons to account and achieve even more
significant re-
sults than his former masters had.
The task and its accomplishment are
without a
strict parallel. Few men have been
animated by an
enthusiasm equal to that of Hanna in
securing the end
to which he had set himself. Energetic,
shrewd and
affable, he had extraordinary capacity
for leadership.
His career, coincident with the great
period of indus-
trial expansion, and his method and
outlook were
molded by the atmosphere of his day.
His life had
been identified with practically every
phase of expand-
1 Sherman MSS., May
30, 1888.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 379
ing industry connected with the city of
Cleveland.
After a measure of success in business,
he turned to
politics. Like other men of his day, he
became devoted
to the same methods in politics as had
brought results
in his former activity. A sense of
loyalty, even devo-
tion, to his friends, led him to direct
his energy to the
political interests of others. In this
pursuit, dictated as
it was by a conviction that he was
serving the best in-
terests of good government and
industry, he expressed
his Republicanism and his patriotism.2
The situation which Hanna faced in 1889
was in
striking contrast to that of just eight
years before. The
intervening period had witnessed little
if anything that
might be regarded as practical success
on the part of
Ohio Republicans; and from many angles
the imme-
diate future was scarcely more
promising. The break
between Foraker and the Sherman forces
was a her-
itage of the Convention which had
nominated Harrison.
The charges regarding Foraker's conduct
both before
and after the Convention had been
menacing.3 News-
2 Croly,
Marcus A. Hanna, His Life and Work, is a critical bi-
ography.
3 On May 28, preceding the Convention,
E. E. Wood, a patent at-
torney, informed Sherman that the
"position of the Governor is giving
me some alarm as he has a following
enough to raise a split which must
not be allowed. You will of course
assume to consult him and other
leaders about procedure at Chicago. If
you have not done so, you could
write words of assurance, etc., and
assume that he is satisfied. I don't
want you to show this letter to
Grosvenor, Butterworth or McKinley,
the two latter are not close mouthed and
the latter I believe to be
treacherous. Still you can use your own
judgment even in this matter.
Col. Thompson is a prudent man. Perhaps it would be well for Thomp-
son to write to the Governor. If we can
get our forces from Ohio in
half working shape we will nominate you
this time and the Governor
will be boasting among the loudest. . .
." Sherman MSS.
During the convention preliminaries, one
of Sherman's trusted lieu-
380 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
papers took up the quarrel, and many in
the spirit of
Richard Smith, at the time editor of
the Toledo Com-
mercial, hoped that it spelled the end of Foraker's po-
litical life.4 After a brief
correspondence, the friendly
tenants (Green B. Raum) declared the
most serious trouble to be in
the attitude of Governor Foraker:
"He is prepared to make a speech
against Mahone if the majority report is
resisted by the friends of Ma-
hone--this would result in a division of
the Ohio delegation and would
no doubt be very damaging. The fact
cannot be too highly emphasized
that Gov. Foraker has hindered and not
helped your cause. If you are
defeated, the Governor will have
contributed to the result. When the
delegation was organized, he recognized
a favorite to make the motions
and General Gibson was put on the
committee of credentials instead of
Mr. Butterworth as was arranged. Foster,
McKinley, Butterworth and
Hanna find it necessary to make
concessions to the Governor to prevent
a breach.
Last evening when the Ohio Clubs were in
procession they halted
to hear addresses by Butterworth and
Grosvenor. In the midst of this
the Foraker Club deliberately left the
procession and disbanded. All
these things have entirely shaken the
confidence of Butterworth and others
in the Governor's fidelity. He may vote
for you all the way through, but
I fear that some of his strikers on the
delegation may at a critical point
fail you. . . ." Sherman MSS., June 20, 1888.
Henry C. Hedges, Sherman's closest
neighbor in Mansfield, on the
same day expressed himself in similar
language, and while he feared
the worst was still hopeful, "for
F. is after all a weak man, with all of
his ambition, and some way must be found
to control him, but you must
be prepared for disaster."
Two letters of Foster, one to Sherman
and the other to the accused
man, serve to illustrate how these
charges might be framed in the face
of political circumstances. To Sherman
he wrote: "We were constantly
met by it (i.e. the charge that eight or
ten delegates were ready to leave
Sherman at any time) from our friends; we insisted that it was not
true. Charles Foster to Sherman, June
27, 1888. Sherman MSS. Two weeks
later he addressed a letter of sympathy
to Foraker in which he said: "I have
no doubt of your good purposes; if any
errors were committed they are
not chargeable to a disposition to be
other than faithful to Mr. Sherman's
interests." Foraker, op. cit., I.
p. 376. Foraker states his reply to these
indictments in his Notes, I,
Chapters XXI-XXIII, inc.
4 Foraker, op.
cit., I, p. 379.
He makes it very clear that there was
no foundation for the reports
of his factional opponents above
quoted. John Sherman, himself, writing
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 381
relationship between Foraker and Hanna
was broken.
The former, however, retained a very
real political in-
fluence and by way of vindication was
able to command
for the fourth time the nomination for
the governor-
ship. He dictated the issues upon which
the campaign
was conducted and defied his opponents
by taking the
canvass into his own hands.5
The Democratic candidate for governor
in 1889
was, from the standpoint of the newer
political age, all
that could have been demanded. As late
as 1879, James
E. Campbell of the Dayton district had
been a can-
didate for office on the Republican
ticket. He came
of the charges years afterwards,
disposed of these reports as follows: "I
have no right to complain of anything
done by the members of the dele-
gation during the convention. There
was a natural rivalry between For-
aker and McKinley, as they were both
young, able and eloquent men.
Rumors prevailed at times that the
Ohio delegation could be held solid no
longer, but if there was any ground
for these rumors it did not develop
into a breach, as the delegation,
from beginning to end, cast the entire vote
of Ohio for me on every ballot,
except on the last two or three, only one
of the delegates, * * * voted for
Harrison, placing his action on the
ground that he had served with him in
the Army and felt bound to vote for
him."
Foraker had reached the zenith of his
popularity in 1888. As many
newspapers stated, he was the idol of
the convention. His speeches before
that body were most generously
applauded. Years afterward, in 1896, Hon-
orable Samuel Fessenden and Senator
Elkins, both friends of James
G. Blaine, united in a statement that
they went to Senator Foraker's room
at "2 o'clock" on Monday
morning and "made it very clear to him that if
he would consent to become a
candidate he could be nominated without fail
and without difficulty on the first or
second ballot Monday."
Foraker refused to consent to the use
of his name and voted for Sher-
man on every ballot. In view of these
facts, the suspicions voiced in the
preceding quotations became a portion
of the "chaff" which has probably
been evolved at every national
convention since the first.--EDITOR.
4 Cf. Foraker, op cit., I, p.
379.
5 C. W. Wooley (writing from Old Point
Comfort, Va.) advised
Sherman that Alger financed the
campaign. Sherman MSS., December 29,
1889.
382
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
from a family that had already gained
prominence in
politics and had just vindicated his
ability as a Demo-
cratic politician by overcoming
ordinary Republican ma-
jorities in his Congressional district
and serving three
successive terms in Congress.
The circumstances of the campaign were
altogether
favorable to the young Democratic
candidate. The
struggle early took on an aspect of
personal abuse sel-
dom equaled in political canvasses.
Campbell's record
in the navy during the war was held up
to ridicule. For-
aker had undertaken to advance certain
proposed con-
stitutional amendments as issues. Among
these was
one providing for extensive authority
of the governor
over election boards in cities as a
remedy for extensive
corruptions at the polls. To this
scheme the Democrats
replied by declaring for home rule --
for Ohio as well
as Ireland. The Foraker program as
applied to Cin-
cinnati was bitterly attacked, and in the
course of the
campaign Campbell read a so-called
"Topp letter" which
reflected discredit upon the Cincinnati
administration.
A counter irritant was demanded.6
October 4 it was
forthcoming in a charge so serious that
had it been
true, it would have discredited
Campbell for all time to
come. A document was printed in the
Cincinnati Com-
mercial as irrefutable evidence that the Democratic
candidate's record in Congress in
behalf of a "pure bal-
lot" was nothing less than an
attempt to further a
scheme of forming a monopoly for the
manufacture of
ballot-boxes. A memorandum of the
contract support-
ing the charge was published with three
of Campbell's
6 Halstead to Sherman, Sherman MSS., December
4, 1889.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 383 signatures attached.7 Republican organs seized upon the scandal with all the ardor of a neighborhood gos- |
|
sip. The Cleveland Leader and Herald declared that the transaction proved Campbell "hand in glove with 7 The original document also had the signatures of Sherman, Mc- Kinley and other prominent Republicans. These were of course with- held. According to Foraker no part of the paper was to be published until after the election. Halstead had failed to receive an expected ap- pointment by the Harrison administration to a foreign diplomatic post. He was undoubtedly irritated by Campbell's continuous reference to him in his stump speeches as "the late Minister to Berlin." |
384 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
the unprincipled and disreputable
element of the Demo-
cratic party that stuffed the
ballot-boxes at Cincinnati
and Columbus. . . . in a vain effort to
steal the
Legislature, and that negotiated the
purchase of Henry
B. Payne's seat in the Senate."8
Campbell was defied
to prove his innocence, and a week's
silence was freely
interpreted as a tacit confession of
guilt. But the out-
come was as sensational as the charge
had been. On
October 11, Halstead himself meekly
confessed that he
had blundered. The paper was a forgery.
The Repub-
lican indictment of Democratic
unreliability utterly
collapsed, and an insistence upon the
point merely
stressed the party's confusion.9
Foraker's defeat was a matter of
chagrin and ela-
tion at the same time to many of his
party associates.
Richard Smith, the newspaper editor who
had declared
war upon the candidate shortly after
the convention
in 1888, was furious, in fact
"full of ugliness" and ad-
vised Sherman accordingly. Referring to
the episode
and its relation to the Republican debacle
he declared:
"He (Foraker) did sacrifice it (the party). Fortu-
nately he sacrificed himself
also."10
Foraker's defeat, at all events,
temporarily eclipsed
8 Cleveland Leader and Herald, October 4, 1889.
9 A "saloon keepers'
rebellion" also added to Republican difficulties.
An amendment to the licensing law was
aimed at the practice of keeping
beer gardens open on Sunday. The German
ideal of "personal liberty"
was again challenged. Cf. Foraker, Notes,
I, Chap. XXV.
10 Sherman MSS., December
4, 1889. For Foraker's apology see his
Notes, I, pp. 402-411. A brief account is given in Sherman's Recollections,
II, pp. 1053-1056. The full testimony,
secured by a Congressional investi-
gating committee, is given in House
Reports, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol.
I, p. 3446.
Neither Foraker nor Halstead was guilty
of the forgery. In their
zeal to counter Campbell they fell
victims to the wiles of an office-
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 385
his leadership. It at the same time
afforded Hanna a
much coveted opportunity to advance the
interests of
his faction of the party. But it was an
altogether un-
promising circumstance which the
immediate future
was offering. After the election of
1888 the Repub-
licans were for the first time in many
years in com-
plete control of both departments of
the Federal Gov-
ernment. They were committed to the passage of
legislation looking to the reduction of
the surplus with-
out injuring the protective
system. McKinley, as
chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, be-
came conspicuously identified with and
nominally re-
sponsible for the bill which was to
raise rates all along
the line. The surplus was extensively
reduced by
spending it, or by enlarging
appropriations for pensions
beyond all previous records. A
reduction of the reve-
nue was secured by making many duties
prohibitory
and by the abolition of the duty on raw
sugar. De-
spite the overture to farmers in the
way of a heavy
duty on many agricultural products
which were not
and could not be heavily imported, the
bill embodied
an altogether too radical form of the
industrial pro-
gram. Various classes failed to be convinced
of any
great "prosperity" connected
with increased prices, es-
pecially in case their own purchasing
capacity did not
proportionately advance. The reaction
not only swept
the Republicans from power, but gave
new impetus to
seeker. Their embarrassment consisted in
having countenanced a docu-
ment that brought disrepute upon so many
prominent names, especially
since it had been very awkwardly
executed. Foraker had promised to
recommend one of the chief perpetrators
for a smoke inspectorship in
case he secured such a paper.
Vol. XXXVII--25.
386 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
minor party movements which had, since
the closing
of the financial issue in 1879, assumed
only momentary
or local flashes of prominence.
McKinley, with many
of his Ohio associates, went down in
the Democratic
landslide of 1890. His district was
gerrymandered in
the hope of permanently ending his
political career.
The succession of party reverses was
not, however,
without its compensations. As a matter
of fact, many
obstructions connected with the past
were being swept
aside in such a manner that greater
opportunities for
newer foundations became possible.
Since the fiasco
of Sherman's candidacy in 1888, Hanna
had turned his
political enthusiasm almost entirely to
the interests of
the candidate whom he had at one stage
of the Con-
vention held capable of securing the
nomination. The
schism with Foraker left McKinley
definitely in the
center of Hanna's political plans for
the future. Dele-
gates had been attracted by the
steadfastness with
which McKinley played the political
game at Chicago.11
Hanna had been particularly impressed
and was de-
termined that his favorite should have
a new field of
activity in retrieving the
governorship. Foraker was
extended an opportunity to do party
penance by out-
lining before the Convention the
candidate's qualifica-
tions for office.12
11 The same men who wrote with
disparagement of Foraker's be-
havior usually had a note of
commendation for McKinley. William H.
Smith accorded high praise for "the
firmness with which he withstood
all temptation. If he had been a weak
vessel like Garfield, he might have
been tempted to his destruction . .
."
12 Foraker, in his Notes, Vol. 1,
p. 444, outlines with some detail
the circumstances which made this act
possible. There was no personal
friction between the men, and McKinley
had made the request.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 387 The election of 1891 offered Hanna a real oppor- tunity to vindicate his skill as a political manager. The renomination of Campbell by the Democrats offered one point of vantage to the Republicans in so far as |
|
the latter party was able to assume the offensive. The tariff naturally became the chief topic of campaign oratory, although "free silver" in the hands of Alli- ance advocates threatened to defy the efforts of both |
388 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
parties to stifle its prominence. An
additional source
of difficulty rested in Foraker's
cherished ambition to
secure Sherman's seat in the Senate.
The latter's in-
fluence was essential, and it was
necessary to carry him
along through a continuance in the
Senate and the en-
tertainment of his cherished hope that
he might even
yet become a Presidential candidate.
Every artifice of
campaign management was essential in checking
vari-
ous sources of threatened defection and
in encouraging
the best efforts of party workers.
McKinley, Sher-
man and Foraker carried through a
campaign which
from visible evidences professed party
unity. Sherman
was convinced that the campaign was
important from
the standpoint of the financial issue;
eastern interests
were entirely too apathetic as to its
significance.13 He
was gratified in the end that an
abundant crop ren-
dered Republican farmers immune to the
appeal of
silver as a form of agricultural
credit.
Hanna in the meantime performed a
service as es-
sential as that of party advocates, if
not more so. He
was effectively resourceful in raising
campaign funds
and vigilant in expenditures.14 In
return, McKinley's
13 Sherman Recoil., II, pp.
1125 ff.
At least one banker, however, was
convinced of the importance of
the campaign to the extent of $1,000.
John Jay Knox, President of a
Wall Street bank, wished "every
success in the campaign." Sherman MSS.,
September 19, 1891.
Foster wrote that he had sent Hahn (the
state chairman) $5,000,
"received from a gentleman in
Philadelphia." Sherman MSS., October 3,
1891.
14 Something of the character of his
services may be gathered from
extracts of two letters to Sherman. The
following is taken from one
written September 28, and indicates the
nature of precautions taken against
Foraker: ". . . . It is well I took
the position I did in the start.
For if we had not insisted in having the
Senatorial question in it at
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 389
majority, while not large, represented
a substantial vic-
tory in the face of untoward
circumstances. Foraker
was not disillusioned as to how well
Hanna had done
his work until after the caucus had
met; the former
found that the vote stood in reverse
proportion to his
estimates.15
McKinley's election was practically the
only bright
spot in what was, generally speaking, a
disastrous Re-
publican year. But the situation was
still a difficult one
to deal with. Harrison, according to
political prece-
dent, was entitled to the vindication
of a renomination.
He had, however, incurred the
disaffection of a large
number of influential leaders of the
party -- especially
Platt and Quay. The uncertainty of the
Blaine move-
ment formed sources of hope and
discouragement at
the same time, so far as the plans of
securing McKin-
least seventy-five per cent. of the
delegates would have been pledged to
Foraker. They were thoroughly organized
in every ward and town-
ship and Taylor was playing it "low
down" on us all the time. Oh! he's
a daisy -- second only to his Creator in
his own estimation. But I will
give you the particulars when we meet
--"
The problems of organization are indicated
in the following of
October 7:
"I am in receipt of your favor of
the 5th inst., and reply that I
fully appreciate the necessity of giving
personal attention to the legis-
lative ticket in close counties. I have
been raising considerable money
for the State Committee and have
accepted the chairmanship of the Finance
Committee of this county, so that what I
do here must come from the same
source. However, I will not send any
funds collected in Cleveland to the
State Committee until I find out what
will be the application of it. I had
to pay pretty well to get the workers on
my side for our candidates in
the convention here. You know that
element are not cheap. . . ."
McLean and Brice were probably no whit
less active. T. C. Wil-
liams, of Salesville, Ohio, advised
Sherman on October 10: ". . . Demo-
crats. . . . are flooding the entire
county with money. I can see the
Italian hand of John R. McLean and Cal
Brice wherever I go." Sher-
man MSS.
15 Foraker, op. cit., I, p. 445.
390 Ohio Arch, and Hist. Society Publications
ley's nomination were concerned. Hanna,
at all events,
was resolved upon securing harmony in
his state dele-
gation and taking advantage of whatever
opportuni-
ties he found open. Preceding the
National Conven-
tion in 1892 a conference was called
for the special
purpose of harmonizing the past
differences of the
party. A solid vote of the delegation
should at any
rate advertise the fact that the former
schism was
healed and that thenceforth Ohio
delegates should not
be looked upon by rival delegations as
legitimate prey
to hostile designs. Foraker and Hanna
resumed an in-
timate relationship, and the former was
pledged to vote
for his former rival for the Presidential
nomination.
Hanna elected to attend the Convention
unham-
pered as a delegate and free to
negotiate independently.
He was on the ground at work before the
delegation
arrived.16 His sole hope
rested in defeating the re-
nomination of Harrison on the first
ballot. But the
Harrison forces proved to be altogether
too well or-
ganized. On the second day of the
Convention, Hanna
was practically convinced that his
fears for the nomina-
tion of Harrison were justified.17
Great as was his
16 Sherman was still hoping for the
nomination under certain con-
tingencies. He had however given Hanna
authority to act fully in Mc-
Kinley's interests. Sherman MSS., May
9, 1892.
17 The following telegram, dated the
second day of the convention
(June 8, 1892) and addressed to Sherman,
indicates Hanna's interests in
the developments:
"The bitterness of the contest here
seems to preclude the possibility
of the exercise of good judgment.
Outside of the leaders the sentiment
is strong in favor of a compromise
candidate. The west favors Mc-
Kinley; the east Sherman. Can be
harmonized if a choice is not made
on first ballot; but with present
feeling I believe it will be pushed to a
conclusion on that ballot. The result of
that I am unable to predict. I
consider the situation very unfortunate
for the party." Sherman MSS.,
June 8, 1892.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 391
apparent disappointment, he was not the
man to be
seriously discouraged by the darker
side of his failure.
Certain aspects of the situation
justified a degree of
optimism.18
18 The following letter (the original
an autograph) is clearly in-
dicative of Hanna's reaction:
Cleveland, June 14th, 1892.
Hon. John Sherman,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir:--
I returned yesterday from the
Minneapolis convention and desire
to give you something of an idea of the
course of events as they
transpired there.
On my arrival Saturday morning, June
4th, I found that the leaders
of the Blaine faction had started out
for a very active campaign and
were doing most of the talking. By
Sunday there were a large number
of delegates on hand which seemed to
increase the possibilities for Blaine
so that by Monday their efforts had
materialized into a demonstration
that to an outside observer would make
it appear as if Blaine might be
nominated. The Harrison men pretended to
feel confident and indiffer-
ent, but both Depew (and I understood
Senator Sawyer) with others
expressed themselves on Sunday and
Monday as believing it for the
interests of the party that a third man
be chosen.
This was the opportunity I waited for,
and immediately upon
hearing it I went to Quay and Platt
suggesting that efforts be made to
bring about a conference. Both seemed to
think that the time had not
then arrived, Mr. Platt stating very
positively that any overtures of that
kind must come from the other side. When
I came to make an effort
in that direction I found the Harrison
men taking exactly the same posi-
tion -- that no overtures or compromise
would come from them. In
fact, they pretended to believe that no
third man would be considered.
For the next twenty-four hours things
drifted in that direction,
each side claiming strength and
confidence. Meantime I was busily at
work trying to bring about a condition
of things which would prevent
a choice on the first ballot. In
canvassing the situation with reference
to a choice for a third candidate I
found New York, a portion of
Pennsylvania and a portion of New
England favoring you as that can-
didate, while in the West, particularly
the Silver States and California,
Kansas and Nebraska, the choice was
almost unanimously for McKinley.
In studying the situation for your
interests, I was firm in the belief
that your name should not be put in the
field to make a contest, for to
392 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
be put in that position the drift would
have been to make you as ap-
pearing in opposition to the
re-nomination of Harrison. I told your
friends of the East that in my judgment
your name should not be con-
sidered except in case of a dead-lock,
when it would be ascertained that
neither of the principal candidates
could be chosen; then if it could be
agreed on both sides that you should be
the choice and be made so
unanimously as a compromise candidate it
would be the proper thing
to do. I considered that there could be
no honor to you in making a
contest, but that if coming to you in
the way I had mentioned, it would
be a just tribute and would be a
fortunate deliverance of the situation.
On Tuesday after the arrival of about
all the delegates it became
evident to me that the Blaine faction
had over-rated their strength and by
that time I began to find a disposition
on the part of many of them to
go to McKinley; therefore I renewed my
efforts to prevent a nomination
on the first ballot. It was discovered
that a great many men inside and
outside of the convention were earnestly
and sincerely opposed to Mr.
Harrison's nomination on the grounds of
a second term and from the
fact that his support in that convention
was by this time clearly proven
to be largely from such states as could
not give him an electoral vote
and many more from the so-called
doubtful states. I found also that many
of the delegates who had been instructed
for him and many more who
were under promise and control by
office-holders, North and South, would
vote for McKinley as their second
choice. I had many assurances and
expressions from such men that they
hoped a choice would not be made
upon the first ballot in which case they
considered that (they) would
be released from such promises and would
vote for McKinley. At the
time I wired you to this effect. Had we
been able to have secured a
support of thirty to fifty votes from a
few of the Western States like
Iowa, Kansas and Nebraska, Mr.
McKinley's nomination was assured. I
believe that a word from Allison at the
time to Governor Greer would
have changed the situation and made
Governor McKinley's nomination
not only a possibility but a reality.
By Thursday the Harrison men had gained
so much confidence that
it was utterly impossible to get any
consideration from them in the in-
terests of party harmony or for any
other purpose a single concession.
By Thursday afternoon the Blaine men
were willing to cooperate
in the nomination of McKinley. The test vote made upon the report of
the Committee on Credentials was
purposely forced by the Blaine men
and the result was not discouraging, so
that at a conference Thursday
night after adjournment, it was shown
that there was a possibility and
even a probability of preventing a
nomination upon the first ballot. To
do this of course it became necessary to
secure some Harrison votes for
the Governor. Our New York and
Pennsylvania friends told me that
if I could secure the solid vote of the
Ohio delegation for McKinley it
would certainly prevent a choice upon
the first ballot and his nomination
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 393
on the second. I spent the entire night
in accomplishing this, which
while it did not succeed in resulting as
we could have wished, did result in
great benefit to our party in Ohio
because it laid the foundation for
carrying out the Cleveland agreement
made with Governor Foraker and
his associates to do away with these
factional fights in the State.
I do not consider that Governor McKinley
was placed in any false
position by what was done. I do not
consider that the administration
have any right to criticize his actions
because of his friends -- and I was
at the head of it -- took the
responsibility of doing just what we did do.
Governor McKinley's position to-day as
the result of all that transpired
at Minneapolis is in the best possible
shape for his future. His bearing
and conduct and personal magnetism won
the hearts and respect of
everybody.
So much for the nomination.
And now let me say a word about what is
to follow. I am sorry
to say that the re-nomination of
President Harrison seemed to fall like a
wet blanket upon those in attendance
upon the convention outside of the
ones most interested in his nomination.
I found a good deal of that same
feeling in Chicago where I spent Sunday;
and on my return home I
learn that the feeling here is even more
intense in that direction. There
is an utter indifference manifested
toward his success, and I want to go
on record now by saying that nothing
except a change of his manner
and policy toward the leaders of the
party and the utmost consideration
toward the men who have contributed so
much by their efforts and work
in the ranks of the party will save
President Harrison from defeat in
next November.
I have heard such talk that the attitude
of Ohio in the convention
would be visited by his displeasure
toward our State as to affect the
political prospects of our leaders in
Ohio. Therefore I can only say to
Mr. Harrison and his friends that any of
that sort of feeling or talk
will greatly endanger the prospects of
his carrying even Ohio. I know
that I am as well qualified to speak for
the Northern part of the State
as any other man, and he knows the
loyalty and the support that he has
had from the business and manufacturing
interests of Cuyahoga County
in the past, so that should there be any
manifestation of that kind toward
Ohio he would lose all the material aid
and support that did so much
for him in '88. I do not use this
language as a threat but more as a
warning that it would be a dangerous
experiment for the President's
friends to take any such attitude toward
Ohio. For my part I feel loyal
enough to the party to do all I can to
secure the success of the ticket
next Fall if the proper spirit is shown
by the managers of the campaign,
and I hope and trust that will be
done. Yours truly,
M. A. HANNA.
394 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The action of the Ohio delegation at
the Conven-
tion, notwithstanding the fact that it
became among
Ohio partisans a subject of vindictive
charges and
criticisms, was in accordance with
Hanna's wishes.
Among other things it was charged that
the support
of Foraker's faction was not given in
good faith but
in order to put McKinley in a false
light by advancing
him as a candidate when his defeat was
a matter of
certainty. Even Charles Grosvenor, a
recognized ad-
herent of the Hanna faction, was
skeptical as to its
effects.19 Hanna found
excellent reasons, on the other
hand, for congratulation: The Ohio
delegation had
for the first time in more than a
decade been a practical
unit;20 a working agreement
had been reached with
Foraker; and Ohio Republicans escaped
embarrass-
ments connected with the derelict
Harrison adminis-
tration. Hanna realized the positive advantages of
his position, felicitated Foraker for
his cooperation,
ignored the "foolish talk"
connected with the action of
the delegation and trusted time to
educate "friends on
both sides. . . . to do away with these factional
jealousies."21
The election returns insured the defeat
of Har-
rison and contributed definitely to
McKinley's avail-
19 On June 14, he wrote Sherman as
follows: "The casting of the
vote of Ohio for McKinley at the time it
was given was not in my opinion
good politics. It was simply putting the
Ohio men in an attitude of hostility
to the administration without a
possibility of his nomination. On the whole,
the men who sneered at us at Chicago
four years ago, Clarkson, Payne,
Alger, Platt, Warner Miller, Fessenden
and others got a pretty serious set-
back." Sherman MSS., June
14, 1892.
20 McKinley alone of the Ohio delegation
had cast his vote for
Harrison.
21 Foraker, op. cit., I, pp. 449-450.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1806 395
ability in 1896. Ohio was carried by
the Republicans
but by the narrowest plurality in a
national election
since the Republicans had gained
control of the state.
One Cleveland elector was elected, and
the average
plurality of the Republican ticket did
not exceed 1,000
votes. Ohio was beyond the shadow of a
doubt a
pivotal state whose interests must be
carefully con-
sulted in the future. The period of the
incoming ad-
ministration was one which would
doubtless have
proved disastrous to any party.
Legislation touching
upon any phase of the national fiscal
system was certain
to bring disastrous political results,
and yet the situa-
tion was such that it could not have
been ignored. As
in 1884, Cleveland had inherited "a
condition and not
a theory" in respect to keeping
the nation's finances
balanced. Tariff reform was attempted
in conformity
with the campaign pledge, and an
attempt was made
to secure the gold reserve through
repealing the silver
coinage act. The sale of bonds to
prevent the treasury
reserve from becoming depleted
convinced impatient
debtors that the finances were again
being manipulated
to the interests of Wall Street. More
favorable cir-
cumstances for an opposition party, and
incidentally
the program of Mark Hanna, could
scarcely have been
imagined. It only remained for him and
his co-work-
ers to turn the opportunity to account.
Meanwhile, developments were maturing
in state
and nation which were to make the
political struggle
of 1896 an epochal event -- the first
important Presi-
dential contest since that of 1860.
Preceding the re-
election of Cleveland, the country had
enjoyed above
a decade of practically uninterrupted
prosperity, and
396 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
no popular reaction to dominant
tendencies greater
than could be bridged by the
oscillation of control from
one party to the other had arisen. At
the same time
the great West had been settled as far
as the Rocky
Mountains, and the lands of western
Kansas and Ne-
braska had been capitalized in a spirit
of over-confi-
dence in their productivity; new farms
had extended
the production of agricultural
commodities in excess of
the world's demand. Railway mileage had
been ex-
tended upon an unprecedented scale and
with faith in
the future to secure adequate returns.22
In all these
activities, credits had frequently been
extended in be-
half of expectations that had fallen
short of realization.
Farmers suffered severely -- prices of
commodities fell
so low that they were unable to meet
their obligations,
and many lost their farms. Industrial
depression and
unemployment were augmented by these
circumstances.
The contraction of credit extended
itself to the national
treasury, and it became doubtful
whether the govern-
ment could maintain gold payments --
especially in the
face of a persistent exportation of
that metal. As in
1876 it was only natural that men embarrassed
by these
circumstances should lend a sympathetic
ear to some
scheme of public credit. A
free issuance of silver
money to take the place of a credit
system that had all
but evaporated, again had the
appearances of a logical
solution to the difficulty. As under
former circum-
22 Railways were also constructed with
motives other than their divi-
dend earning capacity. The relationship
between the East and the South
and West was, at the time at least, in
many respects similar to that be-
tween European nations and the outlying
regions of the world which had
been placed under imperialistic control.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 397
stances it side-stepped the
"system of extortion" of the
national banks.
The movement to achieve a program in
conformity
with the objective just outlined was
naturally along
lines of economic interests, rather
than those of for-
merly accepted party lines. The burden
of depression
rested most heavily upon the debtor and
laboring
classes -- the farmer and the
propertyless. The ques-
tion was, would these classes be able
to strike hands
in common opposition to the established
system of fi-
nance and industry? The threat had
gained momen-
tum at the time that the most extreme
form of Re-
publicanism was registering its fiscal
policy of 1890.
The cloud gathered in the west and swept
eastward
with unexpected momentum.
In May, 1891, representatives of the
discontented
classes met in National Convention in
Cincinnati and
sought to give principles advocated in
earlier conven-
tions and held primarily in the West, a
nation-wide
significance. Their problem held all
the complexities
that naturally accompany such circumstances; there
could be no unity as to how far
established ideas were
to be discarded, nor just what lines
the program for
the future should follow.23 The new movement
of
23 One observer was struck by the array
of discordant elements and
described their dilemma with a note of
cynicism: "Perhaps never in the
history of politics were there gathered
together a more incongruous body
than that which yesterday morning began
its sessions at Cincinnati. There
is not one element whose ideas are not
violently antagonized by half a
dozen other elements and no two elements
probably that agree exactly
upon the same thing. Here, for instance,
are the various Farmers' Alli-
ances, representing a vast class of men
who recognize a day's work of
anyone in their employ as beginning as
soon as the dew is off the grass
and lasting as long as one can see in
the evening, meeting with the Knights
of Labor, and hundreds of industrial
unions, whose cardinal idea is the
398 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
discontent was significant, therefore,
even beyond the
immediate circumstances connected with
the threat-
ened revolt: it indicated the practical
value of party
dogma in having secured unity in the
past: it also
revealed a new problem for the future
in case the
older parties lost their validity in
the face of discour-
aging realities.
There was, of course, no way of
determining in
advance just how high the tide of
discontent would rise.
The more threatening it became the more
interest it
was bound to enlist from the leadership
of the old
parties. Each naturally attempted to
stem it in behalf
of its own interests, while in its
incipient stages, through
the hitherto effective device of
ambiguous platform
phrasing and a more intensive use of
other party in-
struments. Leaders identified with
conservative poli-
cies anxiously hoped that they would
prove adequate
for the purpose.
reduction of a day's work to eight
hours. Here are the enthusiastic
Kansas men demanding above all other
things the organization of a new
political party, yet seeking to coalesce
with the cunning Bourbon politi-
cians of the South who have no use for
Farmers' Alliances or anything
of the sort except as they may be used
for putting the old Democratic
party in power.
Here are the laboring men of the North,
East and West, who know
more keenly than they have ever known
before that the very life breath of
American industry is involved in
maintaining the principle of protection,
yet striving to strike hands with cranky
'doctrinaires' on one side and
Jefferson Davis's principles on the
other, whose devotion is as fanatical as
a Mussulman's is for free trade.
There are organizations which look with
undisguised contempt upon
all the machinery of secret rituals,
grips and pass words, yet whose mem-
bers, nevertheless, are met to form a
political alliance with other organiza-
tions into whose meetings they cannot secure
a moment's admittance with-
out first giving the necessary 'sign'. .
. ." Ohio State Journal, May 20,
1891, reproduced in the Ohio Arch.
and Hist. Soc. Pub., Vol. XXV,
pp. 149 ff.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 399
As was the case a score of years
earlier, the tide
struck most menacingly at the
strongholds of the Demo-
cratic party. The region west of the
Mississippi was
most strongly affected by the
inequalities of a fluctuat-
ing credit system; even under normal
circumstances
farm mortgages operated as a sort of
refined absentee-
ism in drawing off scant accumulations;
and indebted-
ness effected a pressure which defied the
laws of "sup-
ply and demand" in stabilizing
markets.24 It was no
chance circumstance that the
"sixteen to one" program
offered an appeal to men who faced such
untoward
realities.
The Ohio canvass following the
Cincinnati Alli-
ance Convention of 1891 brought a sense
of uneasiness
to men prominent in each of the major
parties. Sher-
man knew that his continuance in the
Senate was
threatened and declared that eastern
men were not fully
awake to the recurring danger. He
answered Alliance
advocates by extolling the financial
system as it was
-- a system that made 77 cents worth of
silver the
equal of a dollar in gold.25 He
was, moreover, aggrieved
when Campbell, the Democratic candidate
for gov-
ernor, did not readily shoulder the embarrassments
of
economic heresy.
And there were patent reasons for the
Ohio Dem-
ocracy attempting to remain impervious
to a recru-
descent Jacksonianism. By dismissing
the financial
24 The cause of the farmer during this
period has not as yet been
adequately treated. His heresies have
been fought and grievances acknowl-
edged but their origin and extent have
not been adequately surveyed.
25 Accordingly free coinage would
demonetize gold, which constituted
one-half the coin in circulation, and
drive it from the country. Cf. Sher-
man, Recoil., II, p. 1133.
400 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
issue in 1880, the party had declared a
truce and sig-
nalized itself a convenient alternative
to Republicanism.
The subsequent promotion of the Payne
candidacy had
not only been an attempt to end the
regime of men
identified with a passing tradition but
also a positive
effort to place the party in direct
harmony with the
interests which had consistently
thwarted it. During
the decade of the eighties, Ohio
Republicans might well
be alarmed at seeing their own ground
so rapidly
usurped by Democratic polity. Even
Democratic tar-
iff declarations were so worded that
Republicans could
impute danger for various protected
interests only by
attributing extravagant interpretations.
A partisan of
the type of C. H. Grosvenor had been
apparently more
alarmed at seeing an outright
protectionist like Payne
elected to the Senate in 1884, than he
was concerned
with the questionable methods by which
the election
was secured.26 The action of
a Democratic President
in 1887 in declaring for a general
tariff reduction had
been as great a source of embarrassment
to many Ohio
Democrats as it had been a source of
gratification to
Republicans.
26 Grosvenor testified as follows before
the Ohio investigating com-
mittee in 1886: "I did not hear
that Mr. Payne was a candidate during the
canvass. I had no knowledge of his being
a candidate or that any person
was proposing him. When I first heard
about it, some time, perhaps, in
December -- I met a number of gentlemen
in Cincinnati, Republicans. I
met them one at a time; and then finally
we had a meeting in the evening
of three or four of us. We decided.then
that somebody was making a
serious effort to nominate Mr. Payne,
and we volunteered to endeavor to
defeat Mr. Payne's election because of
the supposed perils that we thought
would result to the Republicans in Ohio
by his election. And I may say
wherein that existed as we understood it.
We had made the campaign
largely on the question of the
protective tariff and free trade. We had lost
the state, nevertheless. We thought--that was the opinion of the
party
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 401 Following the election of 1889, Payne had not, it is true, been returned to the Senate. But his successor |
|
in no wise represented a denial of the method and at- titude that had previously triumphed. Calvin S. Brice, that I consulted with--that the election of Mr. Payne, himself an avowed protectionist, would be an injury to the party in the country, because we believed it would be giving a false position to the Democratic party on that leading issue that we had made in the state. The Cleveland Leader Vol. XXXVII--26. |
402 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
although he had some years before
established himself
in New York City, awarded the honor to
himself: the
election formed a striking climax to a
spectacular
career. Thenceforth the new incumbent
was resolved
to make the fortunes of the Democratic
party his own.
In temperament and attitude Brice
presented points
of contrast to his opponent, Mark
Hanna. Whereas the
latter impressed one as an aggressive
and prosperous
business man, Brice's wiry and slight
stature suggested
the type that secures results by
indirect method. An
abundance of sandy hair and a beard of
similar nature
bespoke his Scottish ancestry. A
prominent nose and
deep set sapphire eyes pronounced him a
man of "gen-
erous disposition" and
"singular mental alertness."
Newspapers sometimes caricatured him as
"the smart-
est man in America." His physical
make-up and career
presented a study in contrasts, and it
was not completely
out of the nature of things that this
son of a Presby-
terian minister, born in the Black
Swamp wilderness
of north-western Ohio, should become a
master manip-
ulator of industrial interests and
politics.27
and Herald, then a separate and independent paper, independent in
the
sense of not being merged at that time,
and the Sunday Voice, edited by
Mr. Hodge, had all begun vociferously to
endorse and further the election of
Mr. Payne. It was decided that I should
go up to Cleveland and see if
I could not pull off that Republican
support from him. . . ." Senate
Misc. Docs., 49th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 106, p. 78.
In 1884 only three Ohio Democrats out of
a total of fifteen in the
House voted for the enacting clause of
the Morrison Bill-a measure that
provided for a horizontal reduction. Cong.
Rec., 49th Cong., 1st Sess., p.
3908.
27 Myers, op. cit., p. 267 ff.,
contains an arraignment of Brice's character
and methods. Mercer and Vallandigham, Representative Men of Ohio,
pp. 28-36, and Winter, History of
Northwestern Ohio, vol. I, p. 287 ff.,
contain brief biographies.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 403
Brice's career in business, as that of
Hanna, fur-
nished an enlightening clue to his
method and attitude
in politics. After graduating from the
Ann Arbor Law
School he had attempted to establish a
legal practice
at Lima. A few years later he became
associated with
Foster, Samuel Thomas and others in
various schemes
of railroad promotion. Among others,
the Ohio Cen-
tral and the Nickel Plate roads were
built, the former
paralleling the Hocking Valley and the
latter the New
York Central. Through manipulation,
each venture
was made to realize munificent profits
for their pro-
moters; the returns on the latter road,
which was sold
to the Vanderbilts, were reputed to
have enabled Brice
to become a fixture on Wall Street.28
Party traditions counted for little in
the politics of
such men as Brice.29 His
ideal, like Hanna's, was po-
litical results. "Reforms" or readaptations to the
newer industrial age that looked to
greater measures
of popular justice were as foreign to
his imagination
as had been the building of railroads
for legitimate
public service. He had been active in
Democratic poli-
tics since 1876, when he had been a
delegate to the
National Convention. In 1888, he
escorted the Ohic
delegation to the St. Louis Convention
on a special train.
He was chosen as the Ohio member of the
National
Democratic Committee and became the
chairman of
28 Brice's interests also extended to
the promotion of a road in the
Gogebic range, the Tennessee and Georgia
Southern System and extensive
enterprises in China.
Cf. Mercer and Vallandigham, op.
cit., p. 31 and Frank G. Carpenter's
interview in Buffalo Illustrated
Express, June 12, 1892.
29 Myers relates that when Brice became
a lawyer he and his partner
flipped a coin in order to determine
their respective party affiliations.
Myers op. cit., p. 269.
404
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
the Campaign Committee. In that
capacity he spon-
sored a scheme of converting western
states, especially
Iowa, Wisconsin and Illinois to the
Democratic ticket.
He and his committee were suspected of
party treason.
Newspapers derisively caricatured him
as the "Rain-
bow Chaser," and charges were made
that he had be-
come annexed to Quay's organization.
After the elec-
tion he imitated Zach. Chandler in 1876
in telegraphing
that his candidates had been elected.
In claiming the Senatorial honor Brice
had "par-
alleled" his competitors just as
effectively as had the
Payne agents six years earlier. Moreover, the can-
didate had been more directly connected
with the
manipulations. His associate in railroad affairs,
Charles Foster, had been hopeful of
obtaining the
honor in case of Republican success.
But the pupil
bested the master, and the latter was
compelled to ac-
cept a "lame duck"
appointment in Harrison's cabinet.30
But Democratic optimism aroused by the
success of
1889 was short lived: Campbell's
candidacy for re-elec-
tion in 1891 was unable to withstand
Hanna's efficiency.
The young Governor's hopes, damaged by
defeat, be-
came evanescent as it became evident
that the Hill
forces of New York were to be
over-ridden by Cleve-
land's renomination. The Ohio state
delegation pro-
fessed no common program beyond an
expectation of
acting "for the best interests of
the party." Brice,
Campbell, Lawrence T. Neal of Ross
County and Rob-
ert Blee of Cuyahoga were chosen to
head the delega-
30 Myers, op. cit., pp. 286-293, outlines the activities of a
bi-partisan
machine in connection with Brice's
election. For an account of Payne's
attitude in the confirmation of Foster,
see Lloyd, Wealth against Common-
wealth, p. 400.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 405
tion. No one professed to know with any
degree of
accuracy just what was to be done. Brice, through his
relationship with Gorman's
"Senatorial Syndicate,"
was interested in any scheme which
promised to defeat
the ex-President's renomination. Newspapers circu-
lated reports of his reputed offer to
bet $1,000 that
Cleveland would be re-nominated and
defeated. Camp-
bell headed a faction of the state delegation
that was
known to be inclined to join Whitney's
procession in
reindorsing the ex-President. Henry
Watterson at the
same time declared that the former Ohio
Governor was
not so strong for Cleveland but that
the Anti-Cleveland
forces would be willing to support him.31
Cleveland's
manager, however, had his organization
of delegations
completed in time to secure a
renomination on the first
ballot. The result indicated that every
prominent can-
didate had made inroads among the Ohio
delegates.
Boies led with sixteen. Cleveland secured thirteen, Hill
six, and Gorman and Carlisle secured
five each. The
delegation was not, therefore,
sufficiently "in" in re-
spect to the nomination to secure great
influence with
the administration after its inauguration.32
Brice's grip upon his party became less
firm with
the progress of events during 1894 and
1895. Various
31 Interview in the Chicago Post, June
16, 1892. Campbell supported
Cleveland.
32 The nearest approach to an outright
sensation afforded by the
Convention was an attempt of Neal, the
Ohio member of the Committee
on Resolutions, to secure a free trade
plank in the platform. On the
strength of his convention performance
he was nominated for governor
in opposition to McKinley the following
year. His overwhelming defeat
was a tribute to McKinley's rising
popularity, and a result in part of the
general reaction which was already
setting in against the Cleveland ad-
ministration.
406
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
forces began to crystallize against him
in spite of a
publicity campaign which he directed in
support of his
interests. As the "free
silver" issue gained momentum
various leaders, who had been compelled
to stand aside
in the past, grew in influence. Among
them was Allen
William Thurman,33 who had been passed
over as a
delegate to the Convention in 1892
because he was too
pronounced in his support of Cleveland.
Another was
General A. J. Warner of Marietta, who
was willing to
lead a crusade for silver irrespective
of party lines. In
the north-western section of the state,
L. E. Holden ex-
pressed his convictions and defied
Brice to declare ex-
plicitly for a single standard. The
Cincinnati Enquirer
endorsed "free silver" with
an enthusiasm equal to that
of 1876. Each joined in the common
cause of attempt-
ing to force a specific declaration
into the state platform
of 1895. But Brice succeeded in
procuring a statement
as ambiguous as the one Sherman had at
the same
time written for the Republican
platform. Thurman,
who headed the opposition to Brice in
the Convention
and had failed, contented himself with
picking phrases
from the "revolving platform"
which gave him com-
fort. Campbell was nominated for a
third time, al-
though he had insisted that he was
"too poor" to make
the contest.
Brice was compelled to ward off
opposition from
still another angle. His activity in
the Senate, con-
nected with his inability to make a
creditable public
address and an insistence that a
citizen of "Yorkohio"
could not speak for Ohio interests,
compelled a counter
publicity. His acts of public charity
and interests in
33 Son
of the ex-Senator.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 407 pension services to old soldiers became subject matter in many stereotyped editorials.34 His remarks before the Democratic State Convention in 1895 were estab- |
|
lished as proof that he could acquit himself creditably in that respect. At that very moment, however, he 34 The following defence was addressed from Washington and ap- peared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and a great number of other papers during the campaign of 1895: "There are over 15,000 (pension) cases on his books in which he is aiding the soldiers to secure pensions. A num- ber of these have been allowed--some original, some renewals and many increases. His labors in this field have been prodigious, and when properly |
408 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
had reached the zenith of his power.35
His platform
had been made the confession of faith
of his party;
and his name was beside the President's
as deserving
commendation in respect to the fight
for tariff reform!36
But the recurrent "Ohio idea"
was rapidly passing be-
yond his control, and the preliminaries
of the Demo-
cratic Convention in 1896 evinced a
more stubborn de-
termination to abandon the ambiguous phrasing
of 1895.
Both Brice and Campbell had hoped that
the silver
"craze" would pass before the
summer of 1896. The
latter desired, as did McKinley, to
make the tariff the
pivot of popular interests during the
campaign. He
had, during the summer of 1895, been
willing to de-
clare for "free and unlimited
coinage of silver," but
insisted that it must be "AT ITS
PROPER RATIO."37
During the summer of 1896, however, a
new and clever
escape from the dilemma opened itself
to conservative
men of both parties. Campbell declared
his willing-
ness to accept it in an open letter to
W. R. Hearst,
dated June 4. His conviction was that
free silver was
inevitable, and that it should receive
international ac-
ceptance at a convention to be called
at Washington.
and thoroughly understood will call
forth high praise rather than censure,
and nobody knows this better than the
many old soldiers whom he has
served.
In January, 1893, he distributed 100
tons of coal and 100 barrels of
flour to the poor of Lima. He received
extensive newspaper publicity for
the act.
35 Mercer and Vallandigham state that
Brice practically financed the
campaign of 1895. Cf. Mercer and
Vallandigham, op. cit., p. 35.
36 Brice, as a member of Gorman's
"Senatorial Syndicate" which de-
feated the intentions of Cleveland's
tariff program in 1894, was un-
doubtedly uppermost in the President's
mind when he wrote his famous
letter to Representative Catchings.
37 Cf.
Toledo Bee, May 14, 1895.
Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896 409 Tariff favors should be extended to those nations agreeing to the bimetallic standard; in case no nation agreed, the United States should declare for it on its |
|
own responsibility and fix a date, "for instance, Janu- ary 1, 1899, for meeting gold and silver on equal terms." He was not a candidate for the Presidency but would accept in case the nomination was tendered. |
410
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
But the State Convention in 1896 fell
completely
under the control of the "sixteen
to one" silver men.
Brice and Campbell were completely
routed. In con-
sequence John R. McLean reached the
height of his
political influence; the state
delegation was committed
to his dictation, and he was recognized
as the "favorite
son" for the Presidency of the
United States. Thur-
man was later vindicated through an
appointment to
the Committee on Resolutions. And the
prospects con-
tinued favorable to an acceptance of
the latest version
of the "Ohio idea" and a
nomination of a candidate who
had unequivocally endorsed it.
The story of the Democratic Convention
in Chicago
is one of the most familiar in national
history.38 The
outcome indicated definitely that the
farmers Sand the
masses who had been subjected to
economic distress
were ready to turn to the Federal
government for a
redress of their grievances. It was
more than a mere
demand for "soft money" for
the sake of "repudiat-
ing" debts. Specific remedies had
their place, but be-
hind these was a general urge that the
masses be given
a greater share in the matter of
governmental policies.
Such ends naturally involved a direct threat
to the
order of things as they were.
While it is not the way of heresies, in
any age, to
be greatly concerned with the
consequences of their
doctrines upon established practices
and creeds, neither
is the heresy spared the distorting
invective and ridicule
at the hand of the intrenched power.
These observa-
tions hold true in respect to the
battle of 1896. The
38 The nomination of William Jennings
Bryan on a free coinage of
silver platform.
|
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412
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
national credit system had assumed the
form of a huge
inverted pyramid, and men could only
speculate as to
the consequences in case silver
inflation was made to
strike at the base of the financial
structure. "Bryan-
ism" was therefore more than a
taint of socialism; in
terms of opposition propaganda, it even
transcended
repudiation: "the campaign from
beginning to end was
marked with such a flood of blasphemy,
of taking God's
name in vain, as this country, at
least, has never known
before. . . . Why, almost every appeal
made by
Bryan, or for him, has been addressed
directly to the
covetousness, the envy, and all the
unhallowed passions
of human nature."39 Prominent
clergymen joined in
denouncing the dishonesty connected
with paying debts
in coin worth only fifty cents to the
dollar. One de-
clared the platform "had been made
in hell" and an-
other characterized Bryan as "a
mouthing, slobbering
demagogue, whose patriotism was all in
his jawbone".40
The candidate's frank appeal to class
interest threat-
ened to defy even the threats of
unemployment that
were thrust before the eyes of wavering
laborers.
Varied emotional and intellectual
appeals were re-
sponsible for a great popular
hesitation to embrace a
program which promised the consequences
of a revo-
lution. Business men acknowledged their
conviction as
to the seriousness of the struggle
through the magnitude
of the campaign budget.
In time of depression,
"prosperity" has an appeal
like "peace" in time of war.
In that fact Hanna found
his opportunity. A publicity campaign
was launched;
39 New York Tribune quoted in
Lingley, Since the Civil War, p. 373.
40 Bryan,
The First Battle, pp. 473-474.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 413
its object was to make Republicanism,
protectionism and
prosperity synonymous with the
candidacy of William
McKinley. The slogan became a living
symbolism
through newspaper editorials and
cartoons; it fixed it-
self upon the popular imagination much
as the colors
of the rainbow fired the enthusiasm of
the ancient He-
brews in time of flood. It was an
altogether fitting
climax to the gospel of Republicanism
which had been
in process since the foundation of the
republic.
Other great labors were yet to be
exacted, however,
in case success were not to prove
elusive. Powerful
leaders must be reconciled to the
proposed order in suffi-
cient numbers to secure a cooperating
organism. Mc-
Kinley's attractive and ingratiating
personality served
good purposes in this respect.41
He was able to attract
friends and admirers when they were
most needed.
Before eastern managers of political
affairs had
bestirred themselves, Hanna and
McKinley with
their co-workers had achieved
substantial results. In
order to devote his entire time to
politics, Hanna with-
drew from active business interests. He
rented a house
in Thomasville, Georgia, as a winter
residence. He
was joined by McKinley as a guest, and the
latter was
given an opportunity of ingratiating
himself with influ-
ential southern leaders. Eastern
managers were beaten
at their own game in seizing these
"rotten boroughs" as
political pawns. According to Platt,
"He [Hanna] had
41 H. H. Kohlsaat relates a story
illustrative of a rare quality in
human nature. McKinley was approached by
an office seeker whose re-
quest could not be granted. Before
dismissing the applicant McKinley
presented him with a flower from the
button hole of his coat as a token
for his wife. The man went away happier
than if the original request had
been granted. Saturday Evening Post, May
13, 1922.
414 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
the South practically solid before some
of us waked
up."42 Various western states were brought to McKin-
ley's support by devious methods.
Pro-McKinley or-
ganizations were established in every
state worthy of
the contest, and no opportunity was
overlooked in rep-
resenting McKinley's nomination as
inevitable.43 All
were encouraged to join the procession
while that action
appeared to be a rational choice rather
than a belated
act of necessity.
The canvass was not without its periods
of discour-
agement. Shortly before McKinley made
his canvass
for the governorship in 1893, a friend,
whose business
was secured by the Governor's
signature, went into
bankruptcy. It was soon discovered that
McKinley's
liabilities were many times greater
than he could hope
to meet. Friends came immediately to
the rescue; criti-
cism was forestalled; the obligations
were more than
met; and McKinley's reputation for
honesty was ef-
fectively enhanced.44 People of limited means ex-
pressed their esteem in contributing
collectively a con-
siderable sum. The Governor's
re-election was subse-
quently secured by the largest majority
accorded any
candidate since the defeat of Vallandigham
in 1863.
Another source of danger became evident
when the
"bosses" of other states
became fully aware of the
progress of the McKinley
"Boom." Various devices
were sprung on all hands in order to
offset a political
42 Platt, Autobiography, p. 331.
43 Croly, op. cit., Chapter XIV,
is an excellent detailed description of
Hanna's and McKinley's efforts.
44 Cf. Kohlsaat's account in the Saturday
Evening Post, May 13,
1922, and Olcott, Life of William
McKinley, Vol. I, pp. 288-292.
|
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416
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
movement which had not been made with
due reference
to the confronted interests.
"Favorite son" candidacies
were encouraged in various sections of
the union in
order to effect an opportunity for an
alliance along more
acceptable lines. Hanna's organization
of the "Solid
South" was endangered, and there
was no way of de-
termining just how far the opposition
was proving ef-
fective.45 McKinley's
popularity continued to gain
strength, however, and opposition
gradually weakened
in the face of it.
But, notwithstanding the growing
popularity of the
candidate and the many circumstances
favoring
Hanna's plans, there were difficulties
yet to be overcome.
The irrepressible Foraker gained
control of the State
Convention in 1895, and, with the aid
of George B. Cox,
who had placed Cincinnati under machine
control, put
through his slate as the state ticket.
All state precedents
were broken when a resolution was
passed endorsing
Foraker as a candidate for the Senate.46
Although For-
aker had succeeded in taking control of
the state organi-
zation, which was to cause Hanna
trouble in the future,
McKinley was duly endorsed for the
Presidential nomi-
nation.
While the silver issue was wrecking the
Cleveland
administration, it carried serious
threats at the same
time for the Republicans. The party
threatened to divide
just as the Democrats had done.
McKinley's record had
been equivocal in the past; he had
voted for the Bland
free-silver bill in 1877 and for the
passage of the Bland-
45 Cf. Croly, op. cit., Chapter
XIV.
46 Foraker had, however, attempted to
secure such a resolution in
1891.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 417
Allison act over the veto of President
Hayes in 1878.
And his recent commitments on the
subject had been
designed to allay the demands for
silver.47 The State
Convention met early in the campaign
year, and the
nation awaited eagerly an announcement
of the pro-
gram. But a resort was made to
ambiguous phrasing
regarding "sound" and
"untarnished" currency, and the
use of both metals to be "kept at
a parity by legislative
restrictions"--phrases which had
become all but thread-
bare by services in platforms of both
parties in the past.
McKinley's unwillingness to depart
radically from his
support of a bi-metallic standard
promoted rather than
retarded his candidacy. The
resurrection of his silver
record, for example, enabled at least
one western state
to instruct its delegates for him and
at the same time
declare for the free and unlimited
coinage of silver.48
Various spokesmen for the party were
able to impute
for their constituencies whatever
doctrines best suited
their purposes. Sherman was generously
quoted by
magazines and newspapers alike in
support of the can-
47 Cf. Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, p.
454. June
25, 1890, McKinley declared: "I do
not want gold at a premium, I do not
want silver at a discount, or vice
versa, but I want both metals, side by
side, equal in purchasing power and in
legal tender quality, equal in
power to perform the functions of money
with which to do the business
and move the commerce of the United
States." He frequently commended
the Sherman Law of 1890 as one which
"purchases all the silver product
of the United States and utilizes it as
a part of the money currency of
the country." Cf. Tippecanoe
banquet speech as reported in the Cleveland
Plain Dealer, April 1, 1891.
48 Croly, op. cit., p. 194.
Vol. XXXVII--27.
418 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
didate's "soundness" on
finances.49 McKinley continued
to hope, even until the time of the
National Convention,
that the currency issue would be
subordinated to that of
protection.50
The duty of reconciling
"gold" to McKinley's can-
didacy, without at the same time
creating too great a
defection among the "silver"
men, devolved upon
Hanna. Although convinced on his own
part, of the
vital relationship between gold as a
standard of values
to banking operations, political
expediency demanded
that he appear to have his hand forced
in regard to the
matter. This was astutely managed in
the Convention;
and various other political managers
were left to dispute
among themselves the credit for the
gold plank in the
party platform.51 Hanna at
any rate gained his great
objective; a spectacular silver
defection was precipitated,
but it was undoubtedly kept within the
lowest possible
proportions under the circumstances.52
But even then
McKinley was not satisfied but that the
financial decla-
49
An editorial extract from the Cincinnati Commercial, (May 1, 1896)
was typical of the method of assuring
anti-silver men that they had noth-
ing to fear from McKinley: "We have
not had the least doubt, at any time,
that he was opposed to the free coinage
of silver. We care not for any
vote he may have given in the past. The
logic of events has taught him
as it has others, that free silver means
ruin to the great interests and
industries of the country."
50 Croly, op. cit., p. 193 ff.
51 Platt, Lodge, Kohlsaat and Foraker,
each, claimed primary credit
for the performance. Cf. Croly, op.
cit., Chapter XV; Foraker, op. cit., I,
Chapter XXVIII; Kohlsaat's article in
the Saturday Evening Post, May
27, 1922, and Platt, Autobiography, p.
313. ff.
52 Disaffected California leaders could,
for example, direct their con-
stituents to the promised hope of an
increased tariff on citrus fruits. Kohl-
saat, op. cit., p. 120.
420
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
ration had been altogether too
explicit.53 The Bryan
movement gathered momentous headway
during August
and September; and men familiar with
the situation be-
lieved that, had the election been held
at that time, the
Nebraskan would have been elected.
Nothing less than
an intensive campaign to rectify the
popular judgment
could change the tide and save the day.
While Bryan traveled thousands of miles
and ap-
pealed directly to the masses with
telling results, McKin-
ley remained at his home in Canton. He
received a con-
stant stream of delegations, and
exercised care that no
untoward incidents should arise to
create embarrass-
ments. At the same time an army of
speakers was or-
ganized; literature, posters and
buttons were distrib-
uted by the car-load. The relative
merits of gold and
silver became matters of discussion
even among school-
boys.
The Republican party drew heavily from the
great banking and business interests to
meet the sudden
demand for financial
"education." Before the close of
the campaign the Democratic tide had
begun to ebb.
Mathematically, the election result was
decisive.
Bryan was defeated by a half million
votes, and he did
not carry one state identified
primarily with industrial-
ism nor any of the large cities where
the great wealth
of the nation was concentrated. But the
defeated can-
didate was inclined to be optimistic
and regarded the
rebuff as merely the results of
"The First Battle". He
found a measure of comfort in
reflecting that the elec-
toral college, a device that had been
devised to check ir-
responsible selections of Presidents,
might have secured
him a favorable majority had 20,000 more
Democratic
53 Croly, op. cit., p.
209.
Ohio in National Politics,
1865-1896 421
votes been cast in critical
districts.54 The cause of "free
silver" had been defeated; but it
was not a definite meas-
ure of discontent that had failed to
embrace "Bryanism"
as a remedy for grievances.
The contest of 1896 may be regarded as
marking a
distinct epoch in national history.
Many thoughtful
men, who did not commit themselves to
the silver pro-
gram, were free in admitting that Bryan
forces had
been recruited because of certain
untoward features in
the economic structure. They were
alarmed by Bryan's
appeal to class and sectional
interests; the respects in
which the economic structure of society
had thrust itself
through the veneer of party
organization were disquiet-
ing. For men had in a groping manner
become con-
scious that certain forces had made
inroads upon
spheres of freedom which they had
formerly held even
above the government's intrusion.55 The
conviction that
politicians had been playing fast and
free with popular
grievances in return for political
favor had a foundation
in fact. After three decades the
shadows of the sec-
tional conflict had lifted, and in a
less hampered atmos-
phere a new humanistic doctrine was in
the way of as-
serting itself. The election had taken
place at the very
time that the agricultural frontier was
no longer afford-
ing an outlet for social pressure. The
party in power
had a manifold obligation in taking an
inventory of re-
sources to be commanded in making valid
for the future
the traditional promises of national
life.
54 Bryan, op. cit., pp. 606-607.
55 For a contemporary estimate of the
social significance of the "Poli-
tical Menace of the Discontented"
see the Atlantic Monthly, Vol.
LXXVIII, pp. 447-451.
422 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications
The great referendum carried likewise a
significant
result in the political life of the
commonwealth whose
"favorite son" had been
elevated to the Presidency. The
tradition of the "Ohio man"
appeared to have been vin-
dicated. But of greater significance
was the transition
which had taken place since the close
of the great sec-
tional conflict. A defensive revolt
against the advance-
ment of the Industrial Revolution
westward had been
overridden; the state was clearly
within the zone which
had formed the stronghold of the
dominant forces.
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OHIO
IN NATIONAL POLITICS, 1865-1896
By CLIFFORD
H. MOORE, PH. D.,
Professor of History in Ripon College,
Ripon, Wisconsin.
CHAPTER I
SOME DETERMINING FACTORS
The sectional conflict, which ended in
1865, contrib-
uted a number of conflicting elements
to the new era of
national life. Prominent was the
suspicion engendered
by four years of struggle; and it
persisted throughout
the period of the next generation as a
barrier to a true
sense of national unity. Men easily
visualized the war's
destruction of life and property. Its
cruelty had left an
indelible imprint upon their memories,
and the dangers
of the "post war mind," which
selfish interests stood
ready to capitalize to their own ends,
tended to sweep
aside better standards of judgment in
matters of justice.
Through an inability to dissemble the
passions of
struggle, national problems became more
perplexing,
and they would have been intricate
under even more
favorable circumstances.
While the passions of war clouded the
future and
reduced unity to terms of military
supremacy or at best
to a legal theory, another great
sectional rivalry had
been temporarily eclipsed. The issue of
"one nation or
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