FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN OHIO PRIOR TO 1850
By LEO ALILUNAS
Background of the Fugitive Slave
Question
Before the subject of fugitive slave
cases in Ohio prior to
the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 can be developed,
it is necessary to consider a few
aspects of the antislavery move-
ment in Ohio. A number of questions
arise. What was the
antislavery sentiment of the people of
Ohio before 1850? What
was the legislative policy of the State
legislature on fugitive
slaves? What was the nature of the
Underground Railroad move-
ment in Ohio, an agency for assisting
fugitives to escape from
the slave system of the South? All these
questions must receive
some response before analysis can be
made of fugitive slave
litigation in Ohio resultant of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,
and of Ohio's fugitive slave legislation
before 1850.
The composition of Ohio's population
reflected its attitude
on slavery. In the Western Reserve were
settlers from the various
New England states, New York, and
northern Pennsylvania. In
east central Ohio settlers were from
middle and western Penn-
sylvania, including Moravians and
"Pennsylvania Dutch." In
Marietta and in the Muskingum Valley the
settlers came from
Massachusetts. In southern Ohio settlers
came from the states
where slavery had existed at the time
Ohio became a state, in-
cluding such states as Virginia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland
and North Carolina.1
No doubt some antislavery sentiment
developed in Ohio
before 1830, but its popular expression
certainly was not aboli-
tionism. In her research, Alice Dana Adams cited that only
four antislavery societies existed in
1827 in the State. Lundy
had formed a society at St. Clairsville
in 1815. Another was
1 William Fox Cochran, "Western
Reserve and Fugitive Slave Law," Western
Reserve Historical Society, Publications
(Cleveland, O.), no. 101 (1920), 54.
(160)
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 161
noted by her at Ripley. Dyer Burgess had
organized a society
at West Union in 1819. Another had been
organized at Zanes-
ville in 1826.2 Only a few of the early antislavery
societies in
the United States dared to stand for
immediate emancipation.
Others were timid about demanding
emancipation of any kind.
Their activities were confined to
holding meetings, giving ad-
dresses, collecting general facts about
slavery, presenting memo-
rials, and petitions to state and
national officials, defending fugitive
slaves in courts, and trying to promote
the education of the
Negro.3 That there was an
active antislavery feeling in Ohio
before 1830, however, was sensed even by
William Henry Har-
rison, who believed it political capital
to exaggerate his antislavery
views in a campaign speech in the Ohio
Congressional election
of 1822.4
In 1830, many people in Ohio were
antislavery in their
thoughts. Few, however, were so radical
at this time as to accept
a doctrine of immediate emancipation,
which was then regarded
with the same popular stigma as
Communism is today. Even in
the early '40's such feeling prevailed.
Abolitionism was made a synonym, in the
popular mind, for slave in-
surrection and negro equality, equally
fearful and abhorrent. It was al-
leged by public men--and doubtless many
believed it--that abolitionism
would lead to a dissolution of the
Union. So that as every antislavery man
was charged with being an abolitionist,
and as every abolitionist was repre-
sented to be a willful promoter of negro
insurrection, negro equality and dis-
union, the Liberty party received but
scant consideration among the voters
of the State.5
Between 1831 and 1840 a series of
events in the country
afforded a temporary impetus to the
antislavery movement. The
movement, centering around moral
suasion, saw the rise and fall
of the American Anti-Slavery Society
during the decade. Organ-
ized in 1833, the American Anti-Slavery
Society succumbed to
a factionalism which reached its height
in 1840 when Garrison's
2 Alice Dana Adams, The Neglected
Period of Anti-Slavery in America, 1808-1831,
Radcliffe College Monographs (Boston
and London), XIV (1908), 118-9.
3 Ibid., 122.
4 Jacob P. Dunn, Indiana, A Redemption
from Slavery (Boston, 1888), 311.
5 Jacob William Schuckers, The Life
and Public Services of Salmon Portland
Chase (New York, 1874), 68.
162
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
opponents withdrew to form the American
and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society.6
The Virginia debate on slavery in 1831,
the abolition of
slavery in Mexico in 1829, and in the
West Indies by Great
Britain, in 1833, the vituperations of
William Lloyd Garrison in
his Liberator, the rise of the
American Anti-Slavery Society, in
1833, all produced a reaction toward
antislavery throughout the
country, bringing a threat to civil
liberties not only in the South,
but in the North, as well. Southern
states adopted resolutions
calling on northern states to pass laws
suppressing antislavery
societies, and, in 1835 and 1836
northern governors respectfully
received them. Even before the time of
these requests the legis-
lature of Rhode Island had considered a
bill to suppress abolition-
ist societies.7
In Ohio there were also reflections of
this wave of reaction
to the antislavery movement. The
trustees of Lane Seminary,
situated near Cincinnati, prohibited
students from organizing or
becoming members of antislavery
societies or even discussing the
subject. The consequence was that
students left in a mass with
some of the professors to establish
Oberlin College, which became
famous as an antislavery institution.8
In April, 1836, James G.
Birney, a former southern slaveholder,
and later the presidential
candidate of the Liberty Party, began
publication of the Philan-
thropist in Cincinnati. Soon he aroused considerable public re-
action. Warnings to cease publication of
the Philanthropist were
not heeded. On midnight of July 29, 1836, a mob
entered Birney's
office, threw his press into the Ohio
River, and tried to find
Birney, who happened to be out of the
city. Unable to find him,
the mob ransacked homes of Negroes, and
considered itself
satiated only when the mayor of the city
told them to go home,
declaring that demonstration had been
made that public opinion
could not be denied.9
The antislavery movement received a
favorable national focus
6 Jesse Macy, The Anti-Slavery
Crusade, in Chronicles of America Series (New
Haven), XXVIII (1919), 56-7.
7 Macy, Anti-Slavery Crusade, 57-72.
8 Ibid., 74-8.
9 Schuckers,
Life of Chase, 39-41.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN OHIO 163
after 1836 when it was tied up with the
issue of civil liberties as
the result of the passage of the
"gag resolution" in the House of
Representatives. This was not repealed
until 1844. Abolitionists
profited by the pleas for the right of
petition which were made
by John Quincy Adams in the House of
Representatives.10 The
association of antislavery with the
defense of civil rights aided in
promoting the growth of the antislavery
societies in Ohio. In
1837, there were nearly 15,000 individuals in
the Ohio River
towns, and in the eastern and northern
counties, who joined to
make Ohio second only to New York in
antislavery society mem-
berships. Yet, the movement, not only in
Ohio, but in the other
northern states, lapsed within a few
years. By 1839 there had
come to be a decentralization in
organization, as the result of
the panic of 1837; the doctrine of
immediatism had collapsed, and
among abolitionist ranks an antagonism
had developed to Gar-
rison. Another phase of the antislavery
movement was at an
end.11
With the formation of the Liberty Party,
the antislavery
movement in the Nation and in Ohio
became a political expres-
sion.12 Not discouraged by
the few votes which Birney received
in the presidential election in 1840,
more than 200 individuals,
led by Salmon P. Chase, who had become
convinced that political
organization against slavery was a
necessity, met in a state con-
vention at Columbus on December 29,
1841.13 In 1845, at Cin-
cinnati, a gathering of about 2,000 delegates from
Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New
York, Rhode Island, Vir-
ginia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and the
territories of Iowa and
Wisconsin met in what was hailed as the
most significant meet-
ing of antislavery forces.14
It was not, however, until the
legislature of Ohio met in
1848 that the antislavery movement in
the State began to show
real political dividends. In this
legislature, the antislavery ele-
10 Macy, Anti-Slavery Crusade, 78-84.
11 Gilbert Hobbs Barnes, The Antislavery Impulse, 1830-1844 (New
York, 1933),
134-5.
12 Rufus King, Ohio, First
Fruits of the Ordinance of 1787 (Boston and New
York), 364-5.
13 Schuckers, Life of Chase, 45-51.
14 Ibid., 90-4.
164
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
ment held the balance of power between
the Democrats and the
Whigs. Led by Col. John F. Morse and Dr.
Norton S. Town-
shend, the "Free-Soilers"
offered political deals to both the Demo-
crats and the Whigs. The Whigs shunned a
deal which would
have involved their backing Joshua R.
Giddings for election as
United States Senator. The Democrats
promised to repeal the
"Black Laws" of Ohio and elect
Chase to the United States Sen-
ate in return for assistance for their
political measures. The deal
went through. Chase became Senator and
the "Black Laws"
were repealed, although accomplished in
a clandestine manner.15
In dealing with the legislative policy
of Ohio on fugitive
slaves, it is well to recognize the fact
that for more than a quarter
of a century after Ohio had become a
state the politics of the
State were run by the Democratic Party.
Shaping the party's
policies were men who had come from the
border slave states.
They had a personal dislike for the
Negro, and desired the pres-
ence of neither free Negro nor slave.
However, they did not
wish to evade the antislavery provisions
of the Ordinance of
1787 or of the Constitution of Ohio.16
The Act of January 5,
1804, compelled a Negro to give positive
proof of his freedom
before he might reside in Ohio.17 The
Act of January 25, 1807, re-
enacted in 1811, 1816, 1824, and 1831,
required a Negro not
only to prove his freedom but to post
bond that he or she would
not become a public charge. In addition,
the law prohibited a
Negro from testifying in a court case
which involved whites.18
Ohio officially accepted the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, for
between 1804 and 1831 the legislature
had the act reprinted in at
least five volumes of the Ohio law.19
The Act of January 5, 1804, gave the
claimant of a slave
the right to secure a warrant for the
delivery of the slave, and
15 Schuckers, Life of Chase, 90-4.
For Chase's interest in the repeal of the
"Black Laws," see Salmon P.
Chase, Diary and Correspondence; ed. by S. M.
Dodson, American Historical Association,
Annual Report...1902 (Washington, D. C.,
1903), II, 153, 164.
16 Cochran, "Western Reserve and
Fugitive Slave Law," 55.
17 Ibid.; John
Codman Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States
(Boston, 1862), I, 117.
18 Cochran,
"Western Reserve and Fugitive Slave Law," 56. These measures,
however, did not prove to be impediments to the flow of
Negroes into Ohio, for by
1850 there were 25,279 free Negroes in
the State. United States Bureau of Census,
Negro Population 1790-1915 (Washington, D. C., 1918), 57.
19 Ibid., 72.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 165
provided a fine of not more than $50
against any one harboring
or hiding a slave, or hindering an owner
from securing his slave.
Section VII of the act was as follows:
That any person or persons who shall
attempt to remove, or shall re-
move from this state, or who shall aid
and assist in removing, contrary to
the provisions of this act, any black or
mulatto person or persons, without
first proving, as herein before directed,
that he, she or they is, or are legally
entitled to do, shall on conviction
thereof, before any court having cogni-
zance of the same, forfeit and pay the
sum of one thousand dollars; one half
to the use of the informer, and the
other half to the use of the state; to be
recovered by action or debt, quitam, or
indictment; and shall moreover be
liable to the action of the party
injured.20
The Act of January 25, 1807,
re-enacted in 1811, 1816, 1824,
and 1831, raised the fine on those
unlawfully employing, harboring
or concealing a Negro to not more than
$100.21 Complaints aris-
ing out of attempts of slave catchers
from Kentucky to kidnap
Negroes out of Ohio led to the Act of
January 25, 1819, re-
enacted in 1824, and 1831.22 Some of the
provisions of the Act
of February 15, 1831, with respect to
kidnapping were as follows:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the general
assembly of the State of Ohio,
That no person or persons, under any
pretence whatever, shall, by violence,
fraud or deception, seize upon any free
black or mulatto person in any kind
of restraint or confinement, with intent
to transport such black or mulatto
person out of the state.
Section II. That no person or persons
shall in any manner attempt to
carry out of this state, or knowingly be
aiding in carrying out of this state,
any black or mulatto person, without
first taking such black or mulatto
person before some judge or justice of
the peace, in the county where such
black or mulatto person was taken, and
there, agreeably to the laws of the
United States, establish by proof, his,
or their property, in such black or
mulatto person.
Section III. That any person or persons
offending against the pro-
visions of this act, shall, on
conviction thereof, by indictment in the court
of common pleas in any county in this
state, be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and shall be confined in the
penitentiary, at hard labor, for any
space of time, not less than three nor
more than seven years, at the discre-
tion of the court.23
Complaints against kidnappers of Negroes
in Ohio were not
altogether satisfied by the Act of 1831,
for on March 9, 1838, the
Ohio legislature passed a resolution
asking that a free Negro
20 J. R. Swan, ed., Statutes of the
State of Ohio of a General Nature, in Force
December 7, 1840; Also, The Statutes of a General Nature
Passed by the General
Assembly at Their Thirty-ninth
Session, Commencing December 7, 1840 (Columbus,
O., 1841), 593.
21 Hurd, Law of
Freedom and Bondage, 117-8.
22 Ibid., 118-9.
23 Swan, Ohio Statutes, 600.
166
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
woman, Eliza Jane Johnson, who had been
abducted into Mason
County, Kentucky, and held in the county
jail, although the pre-
sumed owner had disclaimed title, be
released.24
Kentucky had its own grievances against
Ohio. In a resolu-
tion in 1817, the Kentucky legislature
charged that the states
north of the Ohio River were not passing
or enforcing laws to
reclaim fugitive slaves. A copy of the
resolution was sent to the
governor of Ohio, Thomas Worthington,
but he replied that de-
spite the general prejudice against
slavery in Ohio the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 was being enforced.25
In 1839, again in a
resolution, the Kentucky legislature
admitted its lack of juris-
dictional power involving escaped slaves
from Kentucky into
Ohio. The legislature appointed two
commissioners to negotiate
with Ohio officials with regard to
providing more effective means
of preventing Kentucky slaves from
escaping through Ohio.26
Admitting its previous laws had been
inadequate, Ohio re-
sponded by enacting a more stringent
fugitive slave law, which
became operative May 1, 1839.27 Section I provided for an affi-
davit for a warrant against a fugitive
slave, to be issued upon an
oath or affirmation of the claimant, or
his or her agent, or at-
torney. The warrant included the name of
the fugitive. It es-
tablished the procedure for his or her
arrest, and for bringing
him or her before a judge of a court of
record in Ohio. Section
II required the claimant, his or her
agent or attorney to give proof
of ownership of the fugitive before the
judge, whereupon the
judge was to issue a certificate of
authority permitting removal
of the fugitive to the state from which he fled. Section III
provided a penalty for hindering an
officer from arresting a
fugitive, or for willfully hindering a
claimant or his or her agent
or attorney having a certificate of
removal; or for rescuing the
fugitive from public officials,
claimant, agent or attorney, or for
intent to obstruct, hinder or interrupt
in the removal of a fugitive
to another state from which he fled. The
penalty was to consist
24 Cochran, "Western Reserve and
Fugitive Slave Law," 74-5.
25 Ibid., 72-4.
26 Charles B. Galbreath, "Ohio's
Fugitive Slave Law, 1889," Ohio Archaeological
and Historical Quarterly (Columbus, O.), XXXIV (1925), 216-7.
27 Ibid., 217.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN OHIO 167
of a fine not in excess of $500, or
imprisonment in the county
jail for no more than 60 days. Also,
offending persons were to
be liable in a suit of the individual
claiming a fugitive from labor
or service. Section VI provided a
penalty of a sum not in excess
of $500, or imprisonment in the county
jail for no more than 60
days, and liability to suit by the party
injured for enticing a slave,
or aiding him to escape by means of
money, transportation or any
other facility, if there was knowledge
that the Negro was a fugi-
tive from labor or service. Section VII
provided a similar pen-
alty for those who gave false
certificates of emancipation, or who
harbored or concealed fugitive slaves.
Section XI, pertaining to
kidnapping, was as follows:
If any person or persons shall in any
manner attempt to carry out of
this state, or knowingly be aiding in
carrying out of this state, any per-
son, without first obtaining sufficient
legal authority for so doing, accord-
ing to the laws of this state, or of the
United States, every person so of-
fending shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary,
and kept at hard labor, not less
than three, nor more than seven years.28
This statute, as well as similar laws of
other states, became
void by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the
Prigg vs. Pennsylvania case, when Justice Joseph Story
declared
that the Federal Act of 1793 must be
executed only by federal
authorities, and that state officials
could not be forced to act
because the state legislatures had no
right to interfere.29
This decision was hailed as a welcome
relief, on the part of the Ohio
Legislature, Courts, and Executive, from
all responsibility for the return
of fugitive slaves, and, thenceforth, no
effort was put forth by either to
assist claimants in recovering their
alleged "property." What was done in
that line, from 1843 to 1850, was done
through the United States Courts and
officials. The acts respecting
kidnapping remained in force.30
Terminating action on its state fugitive
slave legislation prior
to 1850, the Ohio legislature repealed
the "Black Laws" on Feb-
ruary
10, 1849. The political
background of this repeal has
already been mentioned. Repealed was the
act of 1807, which
had been re-enacted in 1811, 1816, 1824, and 1831.31
28 Swan, Ohio Statutes, 595-9.
29 Marion Gleason McDougall, Fugitive
Slaves, 1619-1865, Fay House Monographs,
no. 3 (Boston, 1891), 27-8. See also 16
Peters, 957.
30 Cochran, "Western Reserve and Fugitive Slave
Law," 77.
31 Ibid., 56-7.
168 OHIO
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
The Underground Railroad movement
without doubt was
significant in its relation to the slave
question. Wilbur H. Siebert
has called it one of the greatest forces
which brought on the Civil
War, and thus destroyed slavery.32 In his correspondence with
Chase in 1842, Birney expressed his
belief that few things con-
tributed more to keep the abolitionist
spirit alive than did rescuing
slaves.33 E. Delorous Preston
has stated that the Underground
Railroad was a source of constant
agitation in Ohio affecting
citizens to the point where they were
brought face to face with
slavery, irrespective of their wishes.34
Regardless of whatever
the evaluation of the Underground
Railroad movement may be,
certainly it is recognized that out of
such activities fugitive slave
cases developed and reflected public
sentiment. Hence, a brief
review of the Underground Railroad
movement in Ohio seems
appropriate to present.
Ohio was an important scene of
Underground Railroad ac-
tivity.
Because of "its geographical location between the slave
states and Canada, and the character of
the early settlers from
New England and from the Quaker
settlements of North Caro-
lina and Pennsylvania then, the number
of slaves escaping through
Ohio was larger than that in case of
other States."35 The total
number of underground operators in Ohio
was more than 2,000.
It has been estimated that between
40,000 and 50,000 slaves
escaped through Ohio, thereby causing a
loss of thirty million
dollars in property by Southern slave
owners.36 Although there
were twenty or more stations in Ohio
along the Ohio River, opera-
tions were by no means confined to the
river, for there developed
an extensive system of stations leading
into the interior of the
State to such points as Cleveland,
Sandusky and Toledo.37
There is evidence of an Underground
Railroad case in cen-
tral Ohio as early as 1812,38
but the origin of the Underground
32 Wilbur H. Siebert, The Underground
Railroad from Slavery to Freedom
(New York, 1898), 358.
33 Chase, Diary and Correspondence, 460.
34 E. Delorous Preston, "The
Underground Railroad in Northwest Ohio," Journal
of Negro History (Washington, D. C.), XVII (1932), 412.
35 Ibid., 412, Statement of C. B. Galbreath.
36 Preston, "Underground
Railroad," 412.
37 Ibid., 412.
38 Siebert, Underground Railroad, 38.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 169
Railroad movement in the State dates
about 1815-1817.39 By
1818, an appreciable number of slaves
were escaping across the
Ohio River.40 In 1817, the
Kentucky legislature had made official
complaint to Ohio that fugitive slaves
were crossing into Ohio
and were not being reclaimed by Ohio
officials.41 By the early
1820's a number of communities extending
as far north as San-
dusky reported the beginnings of secret
assistance to the runaway
slave.42 By 1830 the business
of helping fugitive slaves to escape
had become more systematized in the
receiving, hiding, protecting
and dispatching process.43 The
period of greatest activity in
assisting slaves to escape, however, did
not occur until the time
of 1840-1860.44 Illegal
assistance in aiding slaves to escape was
much more motivated by the passage of
the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850. The Addison White and
the Oberlin Wellington cases
were symbolic of the rebellious attitude
often found in Ohio during
the decade preceding the Civil War.45
Analysis of the Fugitive Slave Cases
in Ohio
In view of the antislavery sentiment in
Ohio, the laws of Ohio
on fugitive slaves and against the
kidnapping of Negroes, the
proximity of Ohio to the border slave
states, and the nature of
the Underground Railroad movement in
Ohio, it is not strange
that litigation arose involving fugitive
slaves. As the antislavery
feeling became more pronounced, and as
the operations of the
Underground Railroad became more
developed, there was in-
creased resistance in Ohio to the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 for
the rendition of slaves. Such
resistance, together with the efforts
of southern slave owners and slave
catchers to take Negroes out
of Ohio, led to numerous cases of
fugitive slave litigation. Fugi-
tive slave cases prior to 1840 in Ohio,
as well as throughout the
North, were fewer in number than after
this date.46 After 1840
39 Preston, "Underground
Railroad," 409.
40 E. Delorous Preston, "The
Genesis of the Underground Railroad," Journal of
Negro History, XVIII (1933), 161.
41 Cochran, "Western Reserve and
Fugitive Slave Law," 72-4.
42 Siebert, Underground Railroad, 38-40.
43 Preston, "Genesis of the Underground Railroad," 169.
44 Siebert, Underground Railroad, 39-40,
316.
45 Ibid., 315, 318.
46 Ibid., 302, 308-9; Adams, Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery, 16.
Cochran,
"Western Reserve and Fugitive Slave
Law," 47.
170
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
open interference and rescue became more
common, and it was not
unusual for prominent men, such as
Salmon P. Chase, often called
the "attorney-general for fugitive
slaves," and others to offer their
legal services in behalf of slaves
seeking refuge in Ohio.47
This presentation of fugitive slave
cases in Ohio before 1850
is not presumed to be exhaustive, for
the analysis of a number of
the cases is based on the investigation
of the reports of the Ohio
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts
in Ohio, and of the
United States Supreme Court. These
sources would not provide
information about cases settled in the
lower courts of Ohio order-
ing the return of fugitive slaves.
Further, these sources would not
reveal instances in which fugitive
slaves escaped while on trial
before justices of peace in various Ohio
communities. There is
the case of a Kentuckian who had seized
his slave at Perrysburg,
and brought him before Squire
Huntington. The lawyer for the
fugitive, desiring to stall, found a
flaw in the information of the
papers, so new papers had to be drawn.
Meanwhile, Under-
ground Railroad operators had brought a
fast horse around to
the front of the squire's office. The
slave quickly mounted it and
away he tore to freedom, settling that
case.48 A similar situation
took place in 1841 in Oberlin. Three
slave hunters seized a Negro
and his wife, and carried them to an inn
for the night. The people
of the town decided the Negroes must
have a trial, and employed
a lawyer. He discovered the writ for
capture was illegal, and
secured a hearing. Meanwhile, the
Negroes were put in jail.
With assistance, they managed to slip
out of the prison windows
and escaped to Canada before the day set
for trial.49
The first Ohio case was that involving a
Virginia Negro
woman named Jane, in 1810. The case was
significant because it
revealed the early public attitude of
citizens of Marietta on slavery,
and the stand of the governor of Ohio,
who, in a reply to the re-
quest for the extradition of Jane by the
governor of Virginia,
stated that the Fugitive Slave Law of
1793 did not authorize the
executive of a state to interfere with
the apprehension of a slave.
47 Schuckers, Life of Chase, 52.
48 Preston, "Underground Railroad,"
433-4.
49 McDougall, Fugitive Slaves, 41.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 171
The trial of Jane, a slave of Joseph
Tomlinson, Jr., began
on October 22, 1808, in the town of
Charlestown (later Wells-
burg), Brooke County, Virginia. Jane was
charged with stealing
merchandise valued at $4. James
Griffith, the judge, found Jane
guilty of a felony. The law of 1876 in
Virginia made felony by
a slave punishable by death, with the
state compensating the owner
for his loss of property. In 1801,
however, an act was passed
authorizing the governor to contract
with any person for the sale
of a slave under the sentence of death,
but the purchaser was
required to put up a bond and transport
the condemned out of
the United States. In other words, the
sale amounted to a re-
prieve. If the condemned slave should be
returned to Virginia,
the original sentence would be carried
out. Jane was sentenced
to be hanged on December 10, 1808, but
on November 4 the gov-
ernor asked for a reprieve effective
until November 1, 1809, so
that she might be sold and taken out of
Virginia. The court
clerk, John Connell, was appointed agent
to arrange for her sale
and to see to it that the terms of the
act of 1801 were enforced.
Before the governor's action could be
known at Charlestown,
the door of the jail was left open
deliberately, and Jane was
allowed to walk out on November 9. With
the public officials
aware of her presence, she spent two
days in Charlestown, and
then crossed the Ohio River to Marietta.
There she secured
employment with Abner Lord. When the
sheriff allowed Jane
to leave jail, he had acted in
accordance with public opinion in
Charlestown, for the attitude was that
the laws of 1786 and 1801
were too stringent.
For some time after her
"escape" no one attempted to have
Jane arrested, even though the sheriff
was aware that Jane was
residing in Marietta. Jane married a
free Negro, had a child by
him, and lived in peace for more than a
year. Then, Jacob Bee-
son, a Virginian, appeared in Marietta,
and attempted by force
to carry off Jane and her child, without
furnishing evidence that
he was representing the agent appointed
by the governor of Vir-
ginia to sell and transport Jane out of
the State. Beeson applied
to Governor John Tyler advising him to
demand of the governor
172
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
of Ohio the return of Jane to Virginia,
and that he, Beeson, be
employed as the agent of the State to
return her.
On February 5, 1810, Tyler corresponded
with Gov. Samuel
Huntington asking that Jane be delivered
to Beeson, the of-
ficial agent of Virginia. Beeson was
unable to get Jane, for in
his letter of February 24 to Huntington
he complained that when
he applied before the justice of peace
in Marietta for the delivery
of Jane, the people of the town had
hidden her. He asked that
Jane be delivered to him. On February
24, however, a number
of citizens in Marietta, including such
promiment men as Samuel
P. Hildreth, Dudley and William
Woodbridge, Abner Lord, and
others, had sent a petition to
Huntington asking him not to sur-
render Jane, contending that she was
entitled to her liberty.
Huntington ignored Beeson's letter, but
on March 22 he
replied to Tyler, refusing to comply
with the governor's demand
on the ground that the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793 did not au-
thorize the executive of a state to
interfere with the apprehension
of a slave. Then, Tyler, in a letter to
Huntington, on April 26,
1810, enclosed formal papers regarding
Jane, and asked for her
return as a fugitive from justice,
requesting that she be delivered
to Beeson. Huntington became resigned
and ordered that a war-
rant be issued in Marietta on May 21 for
Jane's arrest. Beeson
returned Jane to Virginia. She was given
an absolute pardon by
Tyler, who ordered Beeson to sell her
and pay the proceeds into
the state treasury.50
Another early case, occurring in 1812 in
central Ohio, was
of interest because it demonstrated that
a judge's personal feel-
ings often influenced the status of a
Negro seeking refuge in a
state where slavery did not exist. An
alleged runaway was seized
at Delaware, taken away from the custody
of his captor by a
crowd and brought before Col. James
Kilbourne, the justice of
peace. Kilbourne, known for his
antislavery convictions, ordered
the Negro released. He was then sent
north on one of the gov-
ernment wagons carrying military
supplies to Sandusky.51
50 William Henry Smith, "The First
Fugitive Slave Case of Record in Ohio,"
American Historical Association, Annual Report...1893 (1894),
91-100.
51 Siebert, Underground Railroad, 38.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES
IN OHIO 173
Litigation in the Ohio courts also
involved free Negroes who
sought refuge across the Ohio River when
their status became
endangered in Kentucky. Such was the
case of Tom, a Negro
boy, against Daily and Desha, decided by
the Ohio Supreme
Court in 1829 in Cincinnati.
A bill had been filed on January 17, 1829 in behalf of
Tom
by his friend Orange Witt charging that
Tom's mother, Kate
Daily, a sister of the defendant, Thomas
Daily, was formerly a
slave of Miss Baker, who had lived in
Mason County, Kentucky.
Miss Baker had married Alexander
Edwards. When Edwards
died, a sale was held in 1823 at which
Kate was purchased by
her brother. Daily had announced that
his sole purpose in buying
Kate was to free her. He was allowed to
buy her without com-
petition, and on January 12, 1824, he freed her.
Kate then went
to live on a plantation of James
Dummitt, and it was there that
her son, Tom, was born.
In April, 1828, Daily purchased a slave
of Joseph Desha and
in order to secure part of the purchase
money, he gave Desha a
bill of sale on Tom. Tom was not
delivered to Desha; Desha
threatened to enslave Tom, but Kate,
learning of his threat, hastily
sent Tom to Orange Witt in Cincinnati
for protection. Desha
then complained to the mayor of
Cincinnati, and Tom was taken
into custody for trial.
The argument was presented in court that
Desha knew that
Kate was free before the birth of Tom,
even though no deed of
emancipation had been made. In court,
Desha declared that he
did not know of Daily's intentions to
free Kate, and that Daily
had informed him that he never intended
to free Kate. Daily
neither denied nor admitted the freedom
of Tom, but agreed to
pay Desha $120. He said,
however, that an arrangement had been
made between Desha and himself not to
inform Kate of the bill
of sale on Tom and that Desha had asked
Dummitt, at whose
plantation Kate was living, to keep the
matter a secret from Kate.
The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
was that as Kate
was free at the time of the birth of
Tom, Tom was free, and that
174 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
he was not property. Neither Daily nor
Desha had any right
against him.52
The Matilda case in 1837 aroused
public attention. It was
one of the various cases in which Salmon
P. Chase appeared as
counsel for a fugitive slave. A result
of the case was the prosecu-
tion of James G. Birney, who employed
Matilda, for harboring
a slave in violation of the Ohio statute
of 1807, which had been
re-enacted.
Matilda was alleged to be a fugitive.
She had been a slave
in Virginia, but her master had moved to
Missouri, taking her
with his slaves. Traveling by steamboat,
he arrived at Cincinnati,
and went ashore. While the boat was
docked, Matilda also went
ashore, and was concealed by some
Negroes. Later, she found
employment with James G. Birney, who had
presumed that she
was free. Meanwhile, the owner had gone
on to Missouri, but
had left agents to be on the lookout for
her. She was discovered
one day at Birney's home and was seized.
Birney and his family
believed that Matilda was free inasmuch
as Matilda had landed
in Ohio with the consent of her master.
Chase was engaged to defend her. He
argued that when a
slave owner voluntarily brought a slave
into a free state the slave
automatically became free and could not
be reclaimed as a fugitive
slave under the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793. The argument did
not seem to impress the judge for he
ordered her to be delivered
to her owner.
Pro-slavery individuals in Cincinnati
then brought proceed-
ings against Birney for harboring a
fugitive slave. The case was
heard before the same judge, with Chase
appearing as Birney's
counsel. Birney was found guilty and
fined. Chase appealed
the case before the Ohio Supreme Court,
and argued that as
Matilda was not a slave, Birney could
not possibly have har-
bored a slave. The Court, however,
upheld the lower court's
decision. Of interest was the fact that
the Supreme Court re-
quested that Chase's arguments be
published, although at the
52 Cases
Decided in the Supreme Court of Ohio upon the Circuit and
at the
Special Sessions in
Columbus (Cincinnati, 1872-1873), IV, 336-40. Hereafter, this
source will be referred to as Ohio
Reports.
ALILUNAS; FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 175
time the court had a rule prohibiting
publication of arguments of
the counsel except at the court's
discretion. This indicated that
the court was interested in giving
publicity to the legality of the
issue.53
Sometimes a Negro would come to reside
in a community
in Ohio, and endear himself to the
citizens with his talents to
such an extent that when "slave
catchers" from out of the State
arrived to seize him, the citizens would
take the law into their
own hands and hie him off to liberty.
Such is what happened
to "Black Bill" in 1839 in
Marion. "Black Bill," alias Mitchell,
alias Anderson, came to Marion County in
the fall of 1838. He
worked as a butcher, barber, and common
laborer. Possessing
talent with the fiddle and banjo, he
made himself quite popular
at dances in Marion. About the middle of
July, 1839, eight
representatives of the Kanawha Court
House in Virginia arrived
to claim "Black Bill" as the
runaway slave of Adnah Van Bib-
ber. He was arrested as a fugitive from
service in accordance
with the Ohio law of 1839, and jailed.
"Black Bill" had many
sympathizers. Being a Negro, he was not
allowed to testify at
his trial. On August 27, the judge freed
"Black Bill," for the
testimony had showed that he had
formerly been owned by John
Lewis, a cousin of Van Bibber. Ownership
had not been proved
by Van Bibber, whom the Virginians
represented.
As soon as the decision was given, the
Virginians, armed
with pistols and bowie knives, seized
"Black Bill" and ordered
the crowd to stand back. But the crowd, maddened, threw
stones at the Virginians, who, however,
managed to get "Black
Bill" into the office of a justice
of peace, where they meant to
guard him until a new trial was held.
With the crowd outside
demanding the release of "Black
Bill," the Negro somehow
managed to escape. He spent his first
night in a swamp near
Marion. Later, taking refuge at a Quaker
settlement near
Fredericktown, then, at another
settlement at Greenwich, he
safely reached Oberlin, and from there
went to Canada. Mean-
while, the Virginians had been arrested
for contempt of court.54
53 Schuckers, Life of Chase,
41-4; Ohio Reports, VIII, 230-9.
54 Nevin
Otto Winter, A History of Northwest Ohio (Chicago and New
York,
1917), II, 276.
176 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
The Greathouse vs. Dunlap case,
decided in December, 1843,
in the United States Circuit Court for
the Seventh Circuit, con-
cerned litigation resulting from the
alleged assistance of an
Ohioan, John B. Mahan, in the escape of
a slave from Ken-
tucky on June 19, 1838. But the
significance of the case was
the question of the validity of a bond
which was put up for
Mahan rather than the rendition of
assistance to a slave escaping
into Ohio from Kentucky.
Mahan was indicted on August 22, 1838,
for aiding a slave,
named John, and owned by William
Greathouse, a Kentuckian,
to escape into Ohio on June 19, 1838.
Greathouse undertook
legal proceedings against him with the
result that he was ex-
tradited, and committed to the Mason
County jail in Kentucky.
Then, Greathouse began a civil suit
against him to secure dam-
ages. On November 22, 1838, Mahan was
released from jail
when William Dunlap, a resident of Brown
County, Ohio, put
up a bond for him. The terms of the bond
called for a promise
on the part of Dunlap to pay Greathouse,
in the event Great-
house secured damages in his civil suit
against Mahan. Great-
house was awarded damages of $1600
against Mahan, and Dun-
lap became liable for payment.
Dunlap believed that he had been
duped. His counsel
claimed that Dunlap had signed the bond
only to release Mahan
from an unjust imprisonment, that Mahan
was not guilty of as-
sisting the slave of Greathouse to
escape, that Greathouse had
made misrepresentations in order to have
Mahan imprisoned so
that Mahan would have to get friends to
be responsible for any
damages which might be incurred by
him. The court dis-
missed the plea of Dunlap's attorney,
ruling that the bond had
been voluntarily given by Dunlap, and,
therefore, the bond could
not be held void.55
It has been mentioned previously that in
the Prigg decision
in 1842 the United States Supreme Court
nullified state legisla-
55 John McLean, Reports of Cases
Argued and Decided in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Seventh Circuit (Cincinnati, 1850-1856), III, 303-16. Here-
after, this source is referred to as McLean's Reports. Helen
Tunnicliff Catterall,
Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery and the
Negro (Washington, D.C., 1926-
1937), V, 9.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 177
tion on fugitive slaves, and that as a
consequence Ohio, in 1843,
repealed its law of 1839 with respect to
fugitives in escape from
service in other states, retaining,
however, a kidnapping law
against Negroes in Ohio. In view of this
situation, which
placed the burden of executing the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
on federal authorities, the tendency
after 1843 was for jurisdic-
tion involving escaped slaves in Ohio to
be the concern of the
federal courts. The most known cases
from 1843 until 1850
affecting the fugitive slave question in
Ohio were the cases which
were federal and in which there was
prolonged litigation. They
were significant in providing public
focus on the legal aspects of
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. The Van
Zandt and Parrish
cases, particularly, supplied an
elaboration of the legal argument
against the act.
Included in this presentation of cases
between 1840 and
1850 are two cases which did not arise
or terminate in the
federal courts, but were decided in the
Ohio Supreme Court,
namely, the State vs. Hoppess case
of 1845, and the Richardson
vs. Beebee case, decided in 1846.
The State vs. Hoppess case,
arising out of a writ of habeas
corpus issued by a judge of the Ohio Supreme Court, gave
Chase, who was assisted by Birney, an
opportunity to display
the versatility of his legal attacks on
the Fugitive Slave Law
of 1793. Hoppess had arrived on January 21, 1845, at Cin-
cinnati on the steamer, Ohio Belle, having
in his charge a Negro,
Samuel Watson. Soon after the boat had
docked, Watson was
missing, but was found on the landing in
the evening by Hop-
pess. Hoppess took Watson on January 22 before a
magistrate
so that he might secure a certificate
for his removal as a fugitive
under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.
On a writ of habeas corpus, issued
by a judge of the Ohio
Supreme Court, Hoppess was asked to
justify his holding Wat-
son. Hoppess replied that Watson had
been a slave in Virginia,
and that he had been taken to Arkansas.
Then, the master had
returned to Virginia, sold Watson to a
man named Floyd, and
died soon after the sale. Hoppess stated
that, as Floyd's agent,
178
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
he had gone to Arkansas to get
possession of Watson, and that
he was returning him to Virginia when
the boat reached Cin-
cinnati and Watson escaped. Evidence was
introduced that the
boat was on the Ohio shore when
fastened, and that when Wat-
son was seized by Hoppess he was making
an effort to escape.
In Watson's behalf, Chase argued that
there was no escape,
that the escape, even if there was one,
was from one place to
another in Ohio, that the boat, at the
time of the alleged escape
was within Ohio, that holding
individuals as slaves in Arkansas
was repugnant to a treaty of the United
States with France,
which provided for the people of the
territory the immunities
of United States citizens, and that such
holding was repugnant
to the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution with respect to
deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. Proceeding
further in his elaborated argument,
Chase declared that the Act
of 1793 relative to fugitives was
unconstitutional, that Congress
had no constitutional power to legislate
on fugitive slavery, that
the Ordinance of 1787 limited the right
of reclamation of escap-
ing slaves to the states of the
Northwest Territory, excepting
cases of escape from the original
states, and that Watson, not
having escaped from any of the original
states, could not be
legally reclaimed.
The judge, N. C. Read, who had been the
legal opponent
of Chase in the Matilda case, and
in the prosecution against
Birney for harboring a slave,
specifically answered each point
Chase had raised. He declared that
slavery might exist in Ar-
kansas, that the treaty with France did
not change the relations
of persons or rights of property. A
slave escaping to Ohio from
a new state was just as subject to
capture as though the escape
were made from one of the original
states. He called the Act of
1793 constitutional, and, with regard to
what seemed the leading
issue in the case, jurisdiction on the
Ohio River, Read held that
a master navigating the Ohio River while
on the river was within
the jurisdiction of Virginia or Kentucky
for the purpose of
retaining his slave.56
56 Schuckers, Life of Chase, 74-8; Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in
the Ohio Courts of Record as
Published in the Western Law Journal
(Norwalk. O.,
1896), 105-118.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN OHIO 179
A curiosity about Read's decision was
his admission that
he had changed his mind about the nature
of slavery in a free
state.
He stated:
At one time I was of the opinion that he
had the right of passage
through a free State with his slave.
This would probably harmonize with
the spirit of compromise upon this
subject. But upon more careful exam-
ination, I am satisfied the master must
lose his slave if he brings him into
a free State, unless the slave
voluntarily returns to a state of slavery;
because the master loses all power over
him, and there is no other law
authorizing the master to remove him.
The Constitution of the United
States only recognizes the right of
recapture of a fugitive held in one
State escaping into another. The person
owing service must escape from
the State where such service is owed
into another State. The act of Con-
gress carrying into effect the
constitutional provision, authorizes a recaption
only where there has been an escape into
another State. If there has been
no such escape, the master has no right
of recaption, and the slave may go
where he pleases; the master has lost
all control over him.57
In his reply to Chase apropos slavery
and its violation of
natural rights, Read said:
Slavery is wrong inflicted by force, and
supported alone by the munic-
ipal power of the state or territory
wherein it exists. It is opposed to the
principles of natural justice and
rights, and is the mere creature of posi-
tive law. Hence, it being my duty to
declare the law, not to make it, the
question is not, what conforms to the
great principles of natural right and
universal freedom but what do the
positive laws and institutions under
which we live, are bound to recognize
and obey, command and direct.58
Read digressed in his decision to
advocate colonization. He
stated:
It is to be furthermore observed that
ours is a government of white
men. Our liberties were achieved, and
our government formed by white
men and for white men. The negro was not
included or represented--
the hope there was as it now is--that
the whole race of negroes should
at some future time be removed to a
country of their own, to be subject
to their own government and laws.59
The Richardson vs. Beebee case
in 1846 was significant be-
cause in its decision the Ohio Supreme
Court declared the Ohio
law against kidnapping, revived in 1843,
unconstitutional if it
applied to persons carrying escaped
slaves out of the State ac-
cording to the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793, without the aid of
state authorities.
William R. Richardson had been arrested
by Huron Beebee,
57 Schuckers, Life of Chase,
77.
58 Reports of Cases in Ohio Courts of
Record, III.
59 Ibid., 112.
180
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
sheriff of Cuyahoga County, for taking
Alfred Berry, a Negro,
out of the county without first taking
him before a judge to
establish his property right. Richardson
was prosecuted in viola-
tion of Ohio's kidnapping law since he
had not established proof
of ownership. In the trial the counsel
for Richardson cited the
Prigg vs. Pennsylvania case in which the United States
Supreme
Court had decided that an owner of a
slave, either by himself
or his agent, might return a fugitive
slave without the assistance
of any state authority; further, that
all state legislation which
interfered with such arrest was
unconstitutional, and, finally, that
all legislation on the subject belonged
exclusively to Congress.
Judge Matthew Birchard of the Ohio
Supreme Court stated in
his decision that the ruling of the
United States Supreme Court
in the Prigg case nullified the Ohio
kidnapping law, if it applied
to persons carrying away their escaped
slaves. He declared
Richardson was not guilty of kidnapping,
because he was re-
moving a slave from the State, and,
hence, he was being illegally
detained.60
The Jones vs. Van Zandt case,
which began in 1842 and
was not settled until 1847, was a case
which reached the United
States Supreme Court. It afforded
considerable publicity on the
question of the legality of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793. Of
interest was the prominence of the
lawyers who appeared in the
case. Defending Van Zandt when his
appeal was made before
the Supreme Court were Salmon P. Chase
and Gov. William
Henry Seward. Appearing for Jones, the
plaintiff, was the
United States Senator from Kentucky,
James T. Morehead. In-
volved was the question of interpreting
the nature of notice
under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.
John Van Zandt was an aged abolitionist,
a Kentuckian who
had migrated into Ohio, and was active
in aiding slaves to
escape. On Friday night, April 22, 1842, nine
slaves escaped
from Kentucky into Ohio. On Saturday,
while Van Zandt was
returning to his farm near Cincinnati he
found the nine slaves,
including among them a husband, wife and
three children, on
60 Ibid., 197-8; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage,
II, 122.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 181
the road, and picked them up. Hargraves
and Hefferman, as-
sisted by other pursuers, stopped Van
Zandt about fifteen miles
north of Cincinnati, and caught all but
two of the slaves. With-
out any legal action, the captives were
taken to Covington, Ken-
tucky, and jailed. The grand jury of
Warren County, Ohio,
then proceeded to indict Hargraves,
Hefferman and the others
for kidnapping, but they were acquitted
in the trial.
Meanwhile, the owner of the slaves,
Wharton Jones, sued
Van Zandt for damages for harboring and
concealing fugitive
slaves, taking advantage of the double
penalty provisions of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. Chase,
assisted by Thomas Morris,
defended Van Zandt in the trial before
Justice John McLean of
the United States Circuit Court at
Cincinnati in July, 1842.
The argument for Van Zandt was that no
case of unlawful
harboring or concealment had been
established and that it was
not shown that Van Zandt had been
notified that the fugitives
had escaped from Kentucky. The case
resolved itself into a
debate about the nature of notice. Chase
maintained that there
must be actual notice to the person
charged, and that the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 provided a liability
of penalty only after
notice. The verdict went against Van
Zandt, and he was
ordered to pay Jones damages of $1200. Jones also sued for
the forfeit of $500 as provided by the
Act of 1793, and again
the verdict was in his favor.
Appeal was made in behalf of Van Zandt
before the United
States Supreme Court, and the case was
argued at the December
term in 1846. James T. Morehead, United
States Senator from
Kentucky, represented Jones, while Chase
and Seward appeared
for Van Zandt. In his argument, Chase
asked what was meant
by nature of notice under the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, and
by harboring and concealing a slave.
Then, he went further and
asked whether the Act of 1793 was
consistent with the Ordinance
of 1787, or with the Constitution.
Despite his arguments that
the Act of 1793 was not consistent with
the Ordinance, and that
the Constitution had nothing to do
directly with slavery, the de-
cision was against Van Zandt.61
61 Schuckers, Life of Chase, 53-65;
McLean's Reports, II, 611-32.
182
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Among the points emphasized in the
decision of the Supreme
Court were the following: First, under
Section 4 of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, with reference to the
charge of harboring
and concealing fugitives from service,
the notice need not be in
writing by the claimant or his agent
stating that a person is a
fugitive from labor, under Section 3 of
the act, and served on
the person harboring or concealing such
fugitive to make him
liable to the penalty of $500 under the
act. Second, such notice,
if not in writing, may be given verbally
by the claimant or his
agent to the person who harbors or
conceals a fugitive. To
charge him under the statute, a general
notice to the public in a
newspaper is not necessary. Third, a
clear proof of the knowl-
edge of the defendant, by his own
confession, or otherwise, that
he knew the slave was a fugitive from
labor, although he may
have secured the knowledge from the
slave, or in other ways, is
sufficient to charge him with notice.
Fourth, rescuing the fugi-
tive from labor at 3 o'clock in the
morning in Ohio when the
slave was escaping from Kentucky, and
transporting him in a
covered wagon 12 or 14 miles so
that a Negro boy escaped, is
harboring or concealing the fugitive.62
The Driskill vs. Parrish case,
which was finally settled in
1847, was based on litigation on the
definition of what con-
stituted hindering, obstructing the
arrest and delivery of a fugi-
tive slave to his master or agent, as
well as concealing and har-
boring a slave, under the provisions of
the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793.
In February, 1845, Col. Mitchell and
Driskill, son of Peter
Driskill, called at the home of Francis
Parrish in Sandusky,
Ohio, to ask whether a Negro woman, Jane
Garretson, was at
his home. Parrish replied that she was.
They asked to see her,
and indicated that she was an escaped
slave of Peter Driskill, a
Kentuckian. When Jane and her boy
appeared, Col. Mitchell
then claimed the right of arrest to take
them before a judge to
show right of property. Parrish demanded
to know by what
authority he was acting. Col. Mitchell
replied that he was acting
62 Benjamin C. Howard, Reports of
Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme
Court of the United States (New York, 1883-1890), V, 281-2.
ALILUNAS: FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN
OHIO 183
by virtue of his power as Peter
Driskill's attorney. Parrish said
he would accept nothing less than a
judge's authority, and told
Jane and her boy to go within his house.
Suit was brought against Parrish in
violation of the Fugi-
tive Slave Act of 1793. He was charged
with hindering, ob-
structing the arrest of Jane and her
son, as fugitives from
service, and with harboring and concealing them.
Parrish's
counsel denied that he was guilty of the
charges, arguing that
Parrish was not attempting to elude the
claims of the owner of
the slaves, but that his intention was
to secure a fair legal hear-
ing, and that this was not a violation
of the federal law. After
some deliberation, the jury could not
agree on a decision and
the judge discharged it.63
A second trial was held. The jury
returned a verdict for
Driskill on the count of hindering and
obstructing arrest, and
assessed damages of $500 against
Parrish. On the count of
concealing and harboring, the verdict
was in favor of Parrish.64
It is interesting to note that in his
instructions to the jury Judge
Humphrey Howe Lesvitt specifically
cautioned the members not
to let the pronounced antislavery
convictions of the public influ-
ence them in their interpretations of
the federal law. He said:
I have now only to suggest, that
although this action has originated
in the existence of slavery in an
adjoining state, the views of the jury, in
relation to that subject in the
abstract, should exert no influence in their
conclusions as to the merits of this
controversy. Like every other case
tried in a court of justice, it should
be decided according to the law and
evidence. If the plaintiff has suffered
a wrong, for which the law gives
him redress, it is the plain duty of the
court and jury to aid him in obtain-
ing that redress. It cannot be
disguised, that the subject of slavery is at
this time a fruitful source of public
agitation. Unfortunately, it has be-
come a chief element of excitement in
our country. . . . In Ohio, popular
sentiment is no doubt strongly against
that institution; and there are few,
if any, of her citizens who do not
rejoice, that its admission into the State
is precluded by a barrier, that may well
be deemed insurmountable. Still,
it may be taken for granted, that with
very few exceptions, the citizens
of that State are disposed in duty to
accord to citizens of the States in
which slavery is tolerated by law, the
rights solemnly guaranteed to them
by the Constitution of the Union, and
the law passed in pursuance thereof.65
63 McLean's Reports, III, 631-44.
64 Ibid., V, 76.
65 Ibid., V, 75.
184 OHIO
ARCHAEOLOGICAL
AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Evaluation of Fugitive Slave
Litigation in Ohio
In a review of this study, these facts
may be presented as
being significant. Fugitive slave
litigation in Ohio previous to
1850 was an outcome of a combination of
factors. This study
has taken cognizance of the antislavery
sentiment in Ohio, the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, the laws of
Ohio pertaining to fugi-
tive slaves and the kidnapping of
colored persons from the State,
the proximity of Ohio to the border
slave states, the nature of
the Underground Railroad movement in
Ohio, the efforts of
southern slave owners to recapture their
slaves in Ohio, and the
activities of slave catchers in the
State. Fugitive slave cases
before 1840 in Ohio were fewer in number
than after this time.
After 1840, there was a greater
sensitivity to the question of
slavery and a disposition for more open
intervention in behalf of
fugitive slaves. It became not unusual
for men of prominence,
such as Salmon P. Chase, and others, to
offer their legal services
without charge in behalf of Negroes
seeking refuge in Ohio.
Fugitive slave litigation before 1843
was not confined to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in
Ohio. There was jurisdic-
tion in the interpretation of not only
the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793, but also of the Ohio statutes on
fugitive slaves and the
kidnapping of the colored people. The
decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Prigg vs.
Pennsylvania case in
1842 nullified state legislation on
fugitive slaves and placed the
responsibility for the execution of the
Fugitive Slave Act of
1793 solely upon federal authorities. As
a consequence, Ohio
disclaimed its responsibility by
repealing its Fugitive Slave Law
of 1839, but retained its law against
the kidnapping of colored
persons. The tendency after 1843 and
until 1850 was for juris-
diction involving escaped slaves in Ohio
to become the concern
of federal courts. Federal jurisdiction
brought with it prolonged
litigation, as may be noted by the Van
Zandt and Parrish cases,
and gave more public emphasis upon the
question of fugitive
slaves. Finally, the cases after 1843
were characterized by a
more elaborate attack upon the legality
of the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1793.
FUGITIVE SLAVE CASES IN OHIO PRIOR TO 1850
By LEO ALILUNAS
Background of the Fugitive Slave
Question
Before the subject of fugitive slave
cases in Ohio prior to
the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 can be developed,
it is necessary to consider a few
aspects of the antislavery move-
ment in Ohio. A number of questions
arise. What was the
antislavery sentiment of the people of
Ohio before 1850? What
was the legislative policy of the State
legislature on fugitive
slaves? What was the nature of the
Underground Railroad move-
ment in Ohio, an agency for assisting
fugitives to escape from
the slave system of the South? All these
questions must receive
some response before analysis can be
made of fugitive slave
litigation in Ohio resultant of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,
and of Ohio's fugitive slave legislation
before 1850.
The composition of Ohio's population
reflected its attitude
on slavery. In the Western Reserve were
settlers from the various
New England states, New York, and
northern Pennsylvania. In
east central Ohio settlers were from
middle and western Penn-
sylvania, including Moravians and
"Pennsylvania Dutch." In
Marietta and in the Muskingum Valley the
settlers came from
Massachusetts. In southern Ohio settlers
came from the states
where slavery had existed at the time
Ohio became a state, in-
cluding such states as Virginia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland
and North Carolina.1
No doubt some antislavery sentiment
developed in Ohio
before 1830, but its popular expression
certainly was not aboli-
tionism. In her research, Alice Dana Adams cited that only
four antislavery societies existed in
1827 in the State. Lundy
had formed a society at St. Clairsville
in 1815. Another was
1 William Fox Cochran, "Western
Reserve and Fugitive Slave Law," Western
Reserve Historical Society, Publications
(Cleveland, O.), no. 101 (1920), 54.
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