The Toledo Chevrolet Strike of
1935
By SIDNEY FINE*
IN THE SPRING OF 1935, at a time
when the fortunes of the auto-
mobile workers organized into American
Federation of Labor fed-
eral locals were at a low ebb, a strike
at the Toledo plant of the
Chevrolet Motor Company brought
Chevrolet production all over
the United States to a standstill,
caused the great General Motors
Corporation to retreat from its policy
of refusing to negotiate with
strikers, and resulted in an agreement
which a future president of
the United Automobile Workers described
at the time as "our
greatest single step forward."1 The
strike was in many ways the
most important staged in the automobile
manufacturing industry
during the period the national
industrial recovery act was in effect
(June 16, 1933-May 27, 1935).
The Toledo Chevrolet strike originated,
in the last analysis, in
the struggles of the A.F. of L. after
June 1933 to establish itself in
the automobile industry. Failing to
secure a satisfactory relationship
with the automobile manufacturers,
several of the federal locals
that the A. F. of L. had chartered in
the industry following the
adoption of the N.I.R.A. threatened in
March 1934 to employ the
strike weapon in order to secure their
objectives. Alarmed at this
potential danger to the recovery
program, President Roosevelt per-
sonally intervened in the dispute and on
March 25 announced a
settlement that called for the
establishment of an Automobile Labor
Board "to pass on all questions of
representation, discharge and
discrimination." Most important of
all, the settlement applied the
* Sidney Fine is associate professor of
history at the University of Michigan.
The preparation of this article was
facilitated by grants to the author from the
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial
Foundation and the Horace H. Rackham School
of Graduate Studies of the University of
Michigan.
1 Homer Martin to Francis Dillon, May
16, 1935, quoted in Dillon to William
Green, June 11, 1935. A. F. of L. Strike
File, Local 18384, A. F. of L.-C.I.O.
Archives, A. F. of L.-C.I.O. Building,
Washington, D.C.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 327
principle of proportional
representation to the choice of representa-
tives for collective bargaining in the
industry rather than the prin-
ciple of majority rule, which the A. F.
of L. favored.2
The A.F. of L. soon became
disillusioned with the A.L.B. and
sought in September 1934 to withdraw
from the March 25 settle-
ment. It was dissuaded temporarily from
taking this action, but on
January 24, 1935, President
William Green publicly announced
that the A.F. of L. would have
"nothing more to do" with the
board.3 The A.L.B. had in the meantime,
on December 7, 1934,
announced an election plan designed to
provide each of the auto-
mobile plants under its jurisdiction
with a bargaining agency whose
membership would be determined on the
basis of proportional repre-
sentation. Angered because of its
objections to proportional repre-
sentation and to the particular
features of the A.L.B.'s plan, the
A.F. of L. advised its members not to
participate in the elections.4
The A.F. of L.'s boycott of the A.L.B.
elections and its efforts to
withdraw from the March 25 settlement
did not, however, cause
the administration to lose confidence
in the board or the settlement.
Indeed, when the automobile code was
extended on January 31,
1935, it included an amendment that
specifically confirmed and con-
tinued the settlement, which had not
previously been mentioned in
the code.5 This caused the A.F. of L.,
for a time, to talk as though
it would strike the automobile industry
so as to gain by its economic
power what it had failed to achieve as
a result of its political weak-
ness. Strike talk did not, however,
result in strike action until April
23, 1935, when Toledo's United
Automobile Workers' Federal
Labor Union No. 18384 closed down the
Toledo Chevrolet plant.
The Toledo local, which served the
city's numerous auto plants,
2 New
York Times, March 26, 1934.
3 Green to Roosevelt, September 11, 12, 1934,
Official File, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York; Detroit
News, January 25, 1935.
4 Automobile Labor Board Memorandum,
December 7, 1934, Records of Special
Labor Boards, Automobile Labor Board,
Record Group 9, Records of the National
Recovery Administration, National
Archives (hereafter, Automobile Labor Board
records will be cited as Automobile
Labor Board; other N.R.A. records will be
cited as Records of the National
Recovery Administration); Green to Dillon,
December 8, 1934, Green Letterbooks,
A.F. of L.-C.I.O. Archives; Dillon to Leo
Wolman, January 11, 1935, Automobile
Labor Board.
5 National Recovery Administration, Codes
of Fair Competition, XXI (Washing-
ton, 1935), 204.
328
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
was one of the most powerful in the
automobile industry. It had
gained national prominence in the
spring of 1934, when it engaged
in a successful and bloody strike
against the Electric Auto-Lite
Company.6 The local had
successfully organized Toledo's parts
plants, and it held signed contracts
with many of them, but until
the end of March 1935 it had failed to
organize the Chevrolet plant.
The latter was an exceedingly important
link in the G.M. chain of
plants, since it was the only one
making Chevrolet and Pontiac
transmissions. A successful strike at
the Toledo plant was bound to
have serious repercussions for G.M. as
a whole.
When the A.L.B. announced late in March
1935 that it would
hold a nominating election in the
Chevrolet plant on April 9, the
leadership of the Toledo local realized
that the time had come to
make a determined effort to organize
the plant. There were only a
handful of Chevrolet workers in the
local when the campaign be-
gan, but the employees were evidently
ripe for organization, since
they flocked to the A.F. of L.'s
banners. Indeed, the paid-up mem-
bership of the local increased from two
thousand in March to four
thousand in April, and at least half of
this increase was accounted
for by the Chevrolet plant.7
The A.F. of L. leadership, consistent
with the organization's
policy, advised the Chevrolet workers
to boycott the A.L.B. election,
but this counsel was ignored. In the
April 9 primary, 1,327 of the
2,140 employees who voted designated
Fred Schwake, the local's
business agent, as their candidate, and
he emerged victorious in all
of the plant's eight districts.
According to the A.L.B.'s election
6 The Ohio National Guard was sent into
Toledo during the course of the
strike and engaged in hand-to-hand
fighting with the strikers and pickets, which
resulted in the death of two strikers.
The Bingham Stamping and Tool Co. and the
Logan Gear Co. were also involved in the
strike.
7 The men complained that wages were too low, that employees doing
similar
work received different rates of pay,
and that shop conditions were unsatisfactory.
W. Ellison Chalmers, "Collective
Bargaining in the Automobile Industry" (incom-
plete manuscript [19351
in the Littauer Industrial Relations Library, Harvard
University; microfilm copy in the
General Library, University of Michigan), XII,
3-4; Toledo Blade, April 26,
1935. The average wage of Toledo Chevrolet employees
in April 1935 was 69.6 cents per hour as
compared with a national average for
the industry of 72.8 cents. Toledo
Blade, April 19, 1935; George Myrick, "An
Economic Survey of the Automobile
Industry" (1936), III, 52, Records of the
National Recovery Administration. For
membership in the local and in the Chevrolet
plant, see George Addes to Green, August
6, 1935, C.I.O. Historical File, A.F. of L.-
C.I.O. Archives.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 329
rules, Schwake, in the final election
scheduled for April 24, was to
face the candidate with the next
highest number of votes in each
of the eight districts. Had Schwake won
in each of the districts in
the final election, as seemed likely,
the A.L.B. would have added
to the plant bargaining agency a
sufficient number of representa-
tives from among the defeated
candidates to afford the voters who
had indicated no affiliation for their
candidate representation in
proportion to their total strength as
evidenced in the nominating
election.8 The union,
however, did not wait for this contingency to
develop. It quickly drafted a tentative
agreement, modeled on the
contracts it already had signed with
the Toledo parts plants, mailed
it to the company on April 16, and its
executive shop committee
discussed the document with the
management on April 18. When
the committee reported to a union
meeting of April 20 that it had
failed to reach an understanding with
the company on fundamental
issues, it was given the authority to
call a strike if this seemed
necessary.9
Negotiations between the union and the
company were resumed
on April 22. The union was represented
by Schwake and its execu-
tive shop committee, and the company
negotiators included not only
the local management but also William
S. Knudsen, executive vice
president of G.M., Marvin E. Coyle, the
president of Chevrolet,
C. E. Wetherald, the vice president of
Chevrolet, and Hugh Dean,
the manufacturing manager of the
Chevrolet division.10 The pres-
ence of Knudsen, Coyle, Wetherald, and
Dean indicates the import-
ance that G.M. attached to the
threatening Toledo situation.
8 A. J. Muste, The Automobile
Industry and Organized Labor (Baltimore, 1936),
40-41; W. Ellison Chalmers' analysis of
the Toledo strike, April 24, 1935, Joe
Brown Collection, Wayne State University
Library); Chalmers, "Collective Bargain-
ing," XII, 3; Final Report of the
Automobile Labor Board (August 1935), Appen-
dices A, B, Automobile Labor Board; Toledo
Blade, April 10, 1935. In A. L. B.
elections a voter could vote only for an
individual, and not for an organization,
to represent his district, although he
could write in the affiliation of his candidate.
Voters who expressed no affiliation for
their candidate were placed in a single
unaffiliated group. In the nominating
election, 508 voters expressed no affiliation
for their candidate, and 101 voters
designated their candidate as affiliated with
the company union. The company union did
not receive enough votes in the
primary, according to A. L. B. rules, to
entitle it to representation on the bargaining
agency.
9 Toledo Blade, April 16, 19, 20,
1935; Chalmers, "Collective Bargaining,"
XII, 6; Chalmers' analysis, May 16,
1935, Brown Collection.
10 Toledo News-Bee, April 22, 1935.
330
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Although the company in the
counterproposals that it presented to
the union on April 22 met several of
the union's terms, the differ-
ences between the two groups were
substantial. The company con-
ceded the union request that it agree
to meet with the duly ac-
credited employee representatives on
all questions arising between
them; but what the union was really
pressing for was the right to
represent all of the Toledo Chevrolet
employees, and this the
management, finding defense in the
March 25 settlement's promise
of proportional representation and in
the rules of the A.L.B., re-
fused to grant. The company conceded
the right of the union to
have an executive shop committee of
nine members and, pointing to
its obligations under Section 7(a) of
the N.I.R.A., also conceded
that there would be no discrimination
against employees for serving
on this committee. The company
furthermore agreed in principle to
pay members of the shop committee for
time spent on grievance
work inside the plant.
The union requested that employees who
had been discharged or
suspended should not be removed from
the payroll until their case
had been heard by the union and the
management and that
employees who were found guiltless
should be reinstated with back
pay, but the company stated that the
union committee had no
jurisdiction in this matter. The
company noted that the seven-and-
one-half-hour day that the union
requested was standard practice
when three shifts were employed but
that the nine-hour day would
continue in effect when only two shifts
were worked. The union
asked that employees who reported to
their jobs as requested and
were then not given work should receive
pay for at least two hours,
but the company offered compensation
for only one hour. The
union asked for time-and-one-half for
work in excess of regular
shift hours and double time for Sunday
work and work on seven
legal holidays, but the company
promised to pay time-and-a-half
only for hours in excess of forty-eight
per week, as the auto code
required,11 and time-and-a-half for six
legal holidays.
11 The automobile code permitted only
employees engaged in the preparation,
care, and maintenance of plant machinery and of facilities
of and for production to
work in excess of forty-eight hours per
week, provided they did not exceed forty-two
hours per week averaged on an annual
basis.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 331
To the union request that the older
employees in point of service
should be rehired first when the
working force was increased and
that efficiency and practicability
should be determined by the execu-
tive shop committee, the company
replied that older employees
with dependents would be rehired first,
as A.L.B. seniority rules
required, and that the company alone
would determine efficiency.
The company refused to furnish the
executive shop committee with
a seniority list of all employees on
the payroll.
The union and the management were also
far apart on the issue
of wage rates. The union requested a
minimum wage of seventy
cents per hour and a minimum increase
of five cents per hour for
each employee. The company, pointing
out that the minimum wage
requested by the union represented a
forty percent increase, offered
a blanket five percent increase. It
also promised that hourly rated
employees whom it was necessary to
place on lower paying jobs
would suffer a maximum reduction in pay
of ten percent, whereas
the union demanded that no employee
receive a reduction in his
hourly rate. Similarly, to the union
request that all employees re-
ceive the same compensation as the
highest-paid employee doing
the same kind of work, unless the shop
committee approved a de-
parture from this rule, the management
replied that it would try to
reclassify out-of-balance rates to
within ten percent of the higher
brackets before applying the promised
blanket increase. The man-
agement countered the committee's
request for a voice in the retim-
ing of all jobs with an offer to
furnish information on times to the
proper department on request. Finally,
the company made it per-
fectly clear that it would not give the
union a signed contract.12
The union committee was particularly
disturbed by the company's
refusal to grant a signed contract and
exclusive bargaining rights.
It was also antagonized by other
factors that were not directly re-
lated to the negotiations for a
contract. It felt that the conferences
which the company was holding with
small groups of employees
12 The union's demands and the company's
counterproposals are given in full
in Automotive Industries, LXXII (1935), 613-614.
See also General Motors Corpora-
tion, "Labor Relations Diary,"
Section I (1946), 55-56, and Chalmers, "Collective
Bargaining," XII, 7-8. The union
had announced on April 9 that it would seek
exclusive bargaining rights regardless
of the outcome of the A.L.B. election.
Toledo Blade, April 9, 1935.
332 THE OHIO HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
were designed to discourage support for
the union, although the
company insisted it was simply trying
to explain A.L.B. election
procedures, a task normally assumed by
the board itself. The union
found additional reason for concern in
the fact that although the
primary elections at the Toledo
Chevrolet plant and the Toledo
Willys-Overland plant had been held on
the same date, the final
election at Chevrolet was scheduled for
a week later than the final
election at Willys. Was not the purpose
of this delay to give the
Chevrolet management more time to
defeat the union? The union
also thought that the company was
itself preparing for a strike,
since it was hiring extra guards and
having wire netting placed
over the windows of the plant.l3
The management presumed at the close of
the conference on
April 22, which had continued
throughout the day, that negotia-
tions were to be resumed at a later
time, but the union's executive
shop committee decided that night to
strike the plant the next
morning. Union committeemen appeared in
the plant at 6:00 A.M.,
when the morning shift began, and went
from department to depart-
ment announcing the strike.
Approximately six hundred employees
promptly walked out, and a few minutes
later the management sent
out the remaining five hundred workers.
The second shift, of ap-
proximately twelve hundred employees,
did not report for work,
and the plant was thus completely shut
down.14
Just what part the A.F. of L.
leadership played in the calling of
the strike is a matter of some
uncertainty. The Toledo local did not
request permission to strike, and
officially the strike was un-
authorized. It is possible though, as
W. Ellison Chalmers has
maintained, that Francis Dillon, the
A.F. of L.'s national repre-
sentative in the automobile industry,
whom Chalmers was at the
time assisting, actually welcomed the
strike, since he feared that
the A.L.B. bargaining agencies were
about "to eliminate the Fed-
eration as an independent bargaining
agency." Dillon, according to
13 Toledo News-Bee, April 22, 29, 1935; Toledo Blade, April 22,
1935; Toledo
Union Leader, April 26, 1935; Chalmers' analysis, April 24, 1935,
Brown Collec-
tion; Chalmers, "Collective
Bargaining," XII, 5; G.M., "Labor Relations Diary,"
Section I, 55.
14 Toledo Blade, April 23, 1935; Toledo
News-Bee, April 23, 1935; Chalmers,
"Collective Bargaining," XII,
8-9; G.M., "Labor Relations Diary," Section I, 56.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 333
Chalmers, did not wish to authorize the
strike officially, because he
did not want to accept responsibility
for its possible failure, but he
did suggest to T. N. Taylor, an A.F. of
L. organizer in Ohio, that
he hint to the leaders of the Toledo
local that it might be a good
idea to force the issue with the
company. At all events, Green
promptly announced on April 23 that the
facilities of the A.F. of L.
would be extended to the strikers, and
he told Dillon the next day,
"We should support these people in
Toledo."15
From the beginning of the strike to its
end, the union main-
tained a completely effective,
round-the-clock picket line at the
Chevrolet plant. The union admitted into
the plant only those whom
it pleased--principally high company
executives and a telephone
operator and a maintenance man for each
shift. It permitted six
clerical workers to enter the plant on
April 24 to prepare the pay-
roll so that the employees could be paid
on April 26, but it saw to
it that the strikers did not have to
enter the plant or step on com-
pany property to receive their wages.l6
In contrast to the situation that
prevailed during the Electric
Auto-Lite strike, the union excluded
from its picket line Communists
and Musteites17 and members
of their satellite organizations of the
unemployed. "This strike,"
Schwake declared, "is our own affair,
and we'll keep it cean or know the
reason why." Not only was dis-
cipline maintained on the picket line,
but, in marked contrast to the
Auto-Lite strike, the Chevrolet strike
was free of violence. The
company deserves a great deal of credit
for this happy occurrence,
since, remembering the trouble that had
developed at the Auto-Lite
15 Chalmers' analysis, April 24, May 16,
1935, Brown Collection; Dillon to
Green, June 11, 1935, A.F. of L. Strike
File, Local 18384; Toledo News-Bee,
April 23, 1935.
16 Toledo Blade, April 23, 24, 26, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, April
24, 26, 1935;
Strike Truth (Toledo), April 26, 1935. The pickets worked in
six-hour shifts, with
550 men assigned to each shift.
17 A. J. Muste was the key figure in the
Conference for Progressive Labor Action,
established in 1929 "to rally the
elements in the American labor movement that
could accept neither the leadership of
the A.F. of L. nor that of the Communists."
Muste later founded the American Workers
party, which then merged with the
Trotskyite Communist League of America
to form the Workers Party of the
United States. The Lucas County
Unemployed League, a Musteite organization,
played a key role in the Electric
Auto-Lite strike. Lewis L. Lorwin, The American
Federation of Labor (Washington, 1933), 265; Bernard Karsh and Phillips L.
Garman, "The Impact of the
Political Left," in Milton Derber and Edwin Young,
eds., Labor and the New Deal (Madison,
1957), 92, 93, 98.
334
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
plant, it decided not to operate the
Chevrolet plant for the duration
of the strike.18
The company, to be sure, did not rely
entirely on its economic
power in this contest with the union.
It is possible that two of the
union officials were employees of
Pinkerton's National Detective
Agency, which was performing labor
espionage services for G.M.,
and some of the strikers manning the
picket line were actually
Pinkerton agents. The La Follette
committee later found that G.M.
had "flooded" Toledo with
labor spies as a result of the strike, and
Merle C. Hale, who had been G.M.'s
director of industrial relations,
admitted to the committee, "I
tried to keep track of the union ac-
tivities very definitely." Both
Dillon and Taylor were put under
surveillance, and Pinkerton agents also
had instructions to shadow
the chairman of the strike committee.
When Edward F. McGrady,
assistant secretary of labor, was sent
in to mediate the strike,
Pinkerton men took a hotel room next to
his in a vain attempt to
listen in on his conversations.
Preparing for the worst, the Chevrolet
division bought $6,874.80 worth of gas
equipment during the strike,
including 288 long-range projectiles
and 288 grenades.19
Although management presented a united
front to the employees,
there was division in the camp of the
strikers between the A.F. of L.
leadership and the nine-man strike
committee,20 headed by James
Roland. Dillon, who gave the strike his
personal attention, pursued
a cautious policy and was prepared to
settle for less than a complete
victory. Dubious about the objectives
of at least some members of
the strike committee, he was determined
to keep control of the
strike largely in his own hands and
was, on the whole, successful
in doing so.21 The strike committee, as
Dillon knew, was tinged
18 Toledo Blade, April 23, 24, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, April 23,
26, 1935;
Strike Truth, April 26, 1935.
19 Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights
of Labor; Hearings . . . Pursuant to
S. Res. 266, 75 cong., 1 sess., Part 5
(Wash-
ington, 1937), 1511-1514, 1518-1522;
Part 6 (Washington, 1937), 1914-1915,
1970-1973, 2073-2075; ibid., 75
cong., 2 sess., Senate Report No. 46, Part 3 (Wash-
ington, 1937), 71-73; ibid., 76
cong., 1 sess., Senate Report No. 6, Part 3 (Wash-
ington, 1939), 73.
20 The executive shop committee was
transformed into a strike committee once
the strike was under way.
21 Taylor was more favorably disposed toward the strike committee and its
aims
than Dillon was. He publicly praised
Roland on one occasion, and he approved
the idea of a joint strike committee
representing the locals on strike, which Dillon
opposed. Toledo Blade, April 27,
30, May 1, 1935.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 335
with radicalism. Roland and one or two
others were under the
influence of A. J. Muste and his
Workers party, and the committee
also included Robert C. Travis, later
prominent in the U.A.W. and
described by Max M. Kampelman as
"a man with a long pedigree
of Communist activity." Both the
Musteites and the Communists
attacked the A.F. of L. leadership in
the strike and urged the strike
committee to run the strike itself
without regard to the wishes of
Dillon and the A.F. of L.22
Occupying a middle position between
Dillon and the strike com-
mittee was the executive committee of
the union, and particularly
the union's president, Ellsworth
Kramer, and its financial secretary,
George Addes. Fred Schwake was also a
member of this middle
group. The executive committee and
Schwake, like the strike com-
mittee, had their differences with the
A.F. of L. and were equally
committed to local control of the
strike,23 but, at the same time,
they were not under the influence of
Muste or the Communists, and
they supported Dillon, as we shall see,
on several crucial occasions.
One of the fundamental issues raised
between Dillon and the
strike committee was the question of
spreading the strike to other
G.M. locals and thus presumably putting
additional pressure on the
company. The strike committee pictured
the strike as not simply "a
fight against the local management. . .
but against the entire anti-
labor policy of General Motors."
Consistent with the advice of the
Musteites and the Communists, but not
necessarily for this reason,
the strike committee, and the executive
committee to some degree
as well, were anxious to have other
G.M. locals join Toledo on
strike and to have them all pursue a
common strike policy regard-
less of the wishes of the A.F. of L. In
support of this position, a
union mass meeting of April 29 resolved
that all G.M. locals
should go out on strike and should
remain out until all of them
22 Detroit News, May 12, 1935; J.
A. Wilson to Green, May 13, 1935, A.F. of L.
Strike File, Local 18384; Chalmers'
analysis, May 16, 1935, Brown Collection; Max
M. Kampelman, The Communist Party vs.
the C.I.O. (New York, 1957), 64; New
Militant (New York), May 4, 11, 1935; Daily Worker (New
York), April 25, 29,
May 4, 11, 1935; Communist and Workers
party handbills in the Brown Collection.
Publication of the strike committee's
organ, Strike Truth, was halted after the first
issue because some strike committee
members thought it "too communistic," but
the union voted to resume its
publication, and a second issue appeared. Toledo
Blade, May 1,
1935.
23 Toledo Blade, May 2, 1935; Alfred Hirsch, "Why They Lost in
Toledo,"
New Masses, XV
(May 28, 1935), 13.
336
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
had won signed contracts. Roland stated
bluntly that the locals
should not wait for the permission of
the A.F. of L. to strike, be-
cause such permission would not be
forthcoming.24
In conformity with its view of the
situation, the strike committee
on April 18 dispatched six carloads of
workers to Detroit to picket
the G.M. building and thus to point the
finger at what it regarded
as the real source of the workers'
troubles. The strike committee
and the union executive committee also
sent emissaries to Flint,
Norwood, Ohio, Cleveland, and elsewhere
to contact G.M. locals,
and delegations from various G.M.
locals were received in Toledo.
The policy of spreading the strike met
with only limited success,
however. The Norwood Fisher and
Chevrolet leadership, after con-
ferring with the Toledo group, drew up
strike demands that were
almost identical with Toledo's, and the
local then staged a walkout
on April 30.25 Following a conference
in Toledo on April 28, of-
ficers of the Cleveland Fisher Body
local decided to strike and
gained the membership's consent for
this action the next day; but
before the walkout occurred the company
on April 30 closed the
plant, allegedly because of lack of
transmissions. The union then
converted the shutdown into a strike.26
A similar situation occurred
in Atlanta, where the Fisher Body and
Chevrolet local voted a
strike on May 3, following a shutdown
of the plant on May 1.
Other Chevrolet plants and Fisher Body
plants making Chevrolet
bodies were forced to shut down simply
because of lack of trans-
missions. Altogether, some thirty-two
thousand workers were idled
as the result of the Toledo strike.27
The Toledo local failed, however, to
persuade G.M. workers
24 Strike Truth, April 26, 1935; Toledo
Blade, April 26, 29, 30, 1935; New
York Times, April 30, 1935. For the Workers party and Communist
line on this issue,
see the New Militant, May 4, 11,
1935; Daily Worker, May 4, 11, 1935; and
handbills of both organizations in the
Brown Collection. The Workers party picketed
the G.M. building in New York on May 6. New
Militant, May 11, 1935.
25 Toledo News-Bee, April 29, 30, 1935; Toledo Blade, April 30, May
1, 2, 1935;
Daily Worker, May 3, 1935; Toledo Union Leader, May 3, 1935.
There is a copy
of the Norwood demands in the Labadie
Collection, University of Michigan.
26 The
Cleveland Fisher Body local saw eye-to-eye with the Toledo strike com-
mittee on strike policy. Representatives
of the local threatened to "close the whole
city of Cleveland" if necessary and
promised a Toledo union meeting of April 30
to remain on strike as long as the
Toledo local did. Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 1,
1935; Toledo Blade, May 1, 1935; United
Auto Worker (Cleveland), May 1935.
27 C. H. Gilman to Green, May 1,
1935, A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18488;
Detroit Free Press, May 15, 1935.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 337
other than those at Norwood, Cleveland,
and Atlanta either to
strike or to convert plant shutdowns
into strikes. It was unable, as
we shall see, to induce the key Buick
plant in Flint to walk out, and
it failed also to prevent G.M. from
reopening its Muncie Products
Division plant on May 7 to manufacture
Chevrolet transmissions.
The Muncie plant, which was producing a
small quantity of trans-
missions by the time the strike ended,
had too limited a capacity,
however, to offset the loss to
Chevrolet of the transmissions norm-
ally produced in Toledo.28
Dillon had little sympathy for the
strike committee's policy of
spreading the strike. To be sure, in
order to increase the A.F. of L.'s
bargaining power, he hinted on occasion
that all the G.M. locals
might be called out on strike if G.M.
proved adamant; but,
privately, he did not believe that most
of the G.M. locals had the
strength to challenge the company, and
so he sought to localize
the strike. Similarly, Dillon opposed
the establishment of a general
strike committee, embracing the various
G.M. plants, to conduct
strike negotiations. Thus, when the
Toledo strike committee on
May 10 issued invitations for a
conference of G.M. locals to be
held in Toledo on May 12, ostensibly to
coordinate strike demands
but perhaps also to set up a joint
strike committee which would
settle the strike as it saw fit, Dillon
persuaded the executive com-
mittee of the union to repudiate the
call and influenced most of the
locals concerned not to send delegates,
with the result that the con-
ference was not held.29
The crucial test of strength between
Dillon and the strike com-
mittee as regards the spread of the
strike, a test that Dillon won,
involved the great Buick plant in
Flint. If this plant, which made
parts not only for the Buick but also
for the Oldsmobile and the
Cadillac, could have been shut down
successfully, G.M.'s position
would have been considerably weakened.
Dillon, however, did not
think the Buick local was strong enough
to win a strike and so was
determined to prevent the walkout the
strike committee desired.
Trouble arose at Buick when the local
learned that Pontiac trans-
28 Detroit Free Press, May 7,
1935; Chalmers, "Collective Bargaining," XII, 12.
29 Toledo News-Bee, May 1, 1935; Toledo Blade, May 11, 1935; Detroit
News,
May 9, 11, 12, 1935; Daily Worker, May
9, 11, 13, 1935; Chalmers' analysis, May
16, 1935, Brown Collection.
338 THE OHIO HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
missions, previously made in Toledo,
were henceforth to be pro-
duced in the Buick plant. The local's
executive board informed the
management on April 28 that this
situation had created "a deep-
seated feeling of resentment and
hatred" among the employees and
requested a conference not later than
April 30.
A conference was held with the Buick
management on April 30
at which Harlow Curtice, then president
of Buick, conceded that
the manufacture of Pontiac
transmissions was being moved to Flint
but insisted that G.M. had decided on
this step prior to the strike
and had simply accelerated the shift
because of the Toledo shut-
down. The union at first protested that
this was scab work that
would limit the effectiveness of the
Toledo strike, but the next day,
after the company indicated that the
Toledo strike might be settled
by May 6, a modus vivendi was
worked out between the union's
executive board and the management,
which was subsequently ap-
proved by the union. It was agreed that
there should be no work
on any transmissions after Friday, May
3, no substantial increase in
Pontiac transmissions for the remainder
of the week, and no work
at all on Chevrolet transmissions. The
union for its part agreed that
there would be no cessation of work
prior to Monday. In accepting
this agreement, the union voted to
strike on May 6 if the Toledo
strike was not settled by then but gave
its executive board discretion
to defer the strike "if it seemed
advisable."30
The threat of a Buick strike on May 6
brought Dillon to Flint
on the fifth to plead at a union
meeting that the strike be delayed
pending the outcome of negotiations in
Toledo. Although there was
some heckling from the audience, the
union's executive board
agreed to support Dillon, and a strike
was averted. When the
Toledo strike did not quickly yield to
settlement, however, the
executive board decided on May 11 to
strike on May 14 regardless
of developments in Toledo. "It is
a question of survival of the union
here," declared the president of
the local in expressing the opinion
30 Flint Weekly Review, May 3, 1935; Memorandum of Meeting of the
Executive
Board of Buick Federal Labor Union No. 18512
with Management of Buick Motor
Car Co., April 30, 1935, Brown
Collection; typewritten memorandum, May 1, 1935,
ibid.; Toledo Blade, April 29, May 1, 2, 1935; Detroit Free Press, May 2, 1935;
Chalmers, "Collective Bargaining," XII,
14-15.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 339
of the executive board, "and
further delay would be fatal."31 But
there was to be no strike at the Buick
plant. On May 11 and 12 an
agreement to end the Toledo strike was
negotiated, and Dillon in-
formed Louis Hart, the A.F. of L.
organizer in Flint, that he would
recommend its acceptance to a meeting
of the strikers on May 13
and that he did not favor a walkout at
Buick. Bowing to Dillon's
wishes, the Buick executive board
agreed to defer a Buick strike at
a wild meeting of the local on the
night of May 13. About thirty
to thirty-five Toledo strikers were
present, and when it was an-
nounced that there would be no strike
the next day, they demanded
the floor. The president of the local
thereupon adjourned the meet-
ing. Before order could be restored, it
proved necessary to turn out
the lights and to hustle the Toledo
strikers from the room.32
On the first day of the Toledo strike,
the company, in full-page
ads in the Toledo afternoon papers and
in an almost identical state-
ment issued directly to its employees,
noted that it had negotiated
all day on April 22 with the union's
executive shop committee, that
it had understood that its proposals
would be submitted to the men
and that negotiations would continue,
but that the union had struck
without warning, thus throwing 2,340
men out of work and depriv-
ing Toledo of $15,000 in wages daily.
It demanded that the com-
pany's proposals be submitted to the
employees and a vote taken
on them. It listed as its proposals a
five percent increase in wages,
a readjustment of out-of-balance rates
to within ten percent of the
higher brackets, enforcement of the
A.L.B.'s seniority rules, will-
ingness to make service and seniority
records available to an
employee on his request, agreement to
meet with duly accredited
employee representatives on issues in
contention, guarantee of no
discrimination against workers on
account of service on the execu-
tive shop committee, and agreement in
principle to pay members of
the executive shop committee for time
spent in settling grievances
within the plant.
31 Flint Weekly Review, May 10, 1935; Dillon to Green, June 11, 1935, A.F. of
L.
Strike File, Local 18384; Detroit
News, May 12, 1935.
32 Toledo News-Bee, May 14, 1935; Detroit Free Press, May 14, 1935. The
Flint Weekly Review of May 17, 1935, said the meeting was packed with
"reds"
from Toledo, Detroit, and Flint.
340
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
In the statement it handed its
employees, the company insisted
that the union was seeking the closed
shop, which the company
refused to grant; and Hugh Dean
described the walkout as "a
direct closed shop strike, led by a few
extremists." This opinion
was echoed in New York by Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., G.M.'s
president,
who said that the vital issue was
whether G.M. would agree to the
closed shop by granting exclusive
bargaining rights to the union.33
Throughout the strike, G.M. talked as
though exclusive bargaining
rights and the closed shop were one and
the same thing.
The strike committee, for its part,
issued a statement blaming the
walkout entirely on the
"uncompromising attitude of the manage-
ment. . . toward genuine collective
bargaining," criticizing the com-
pany for refusal to sign a contract
with the union, which Schwake
described as the "real bone of
contention," and insisting that the
company had met the union's demands on
only "two minor points."
Foolishly, the strike committee stated
that it would ignore manage-
ment demands for a union vote on its
proposals. The next day the
union executive committee challenged
the adequacy of the com-
pany's proposals and insisted that the
company had been so
emphatic about not signing any contract
with the union that further
negotiations had seemed pointless. The
strike committee made it
clear that it was not striking for the
closed shop, as G.M. alleged,
and that it was guided not by
"extremists" but by the wishes of the
workers.34
The same day, April 24, Francis Dillon
made it apparent that
policy in the strike was not to be
determined by the local union and
its strike committee alone. Fearing
that the strike leaders had
antagonized public opinion by their
refusal to submit the company's
proposals to the union members, he
announced from Washington,
where he had gone after a brief
stopover in Toledo late on April
23, that the strikers would vote on the
company proposals at a meet-
ing on April 26. Dillon on the
twenty-fourth also conferred with
Secretary of Labor Perkins and
Assistant Secretary McGrady and
warned them of the possible spread of
the strike. The department
33 Toledo News-Bee, April 23, 1935; Toledo Blade, April 23,
1935; Toledo Morn-
ing Times, April 24, 1935.
34 Toledo News-Bee, April 23, 1935; Toledo Blade, April 24, 1935.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 341
of labor responded by assigning veteran
conciliator Thomas J.
Williams to the dispute. Realizing that
this decision effectively by-
passed the A.L.B., Dillon triumphantly
proclaimed with regard to
the board: "It's all washed up. We
will have nothing more to do
with it." The A.L.B., for its
part, canceled on April 24 the final
election scheduled for the Chevrolet
plant on that day.35
Dillon was the chief speaker at the
union meeting of April 26,
which was attended by approximately
sixteen hundred persons. The
company proposals were unanimously
rejected by the assembled
throng, and then a resolution to resume
negotiations was unanim-
ously adopted. Although this reasonable
behavior by the union
placed the company on the spot, G.M.
made it clear on the twenty-
seventh that it would not "resume
negotiations with the strikers
while they remain on strike."
Knudsen, in charge of negotiations
for the company, stated publicly that
the strike was "an arbitrary
and lawless act." G.M., he
declared, would not and could not
abridge the right of any group of its
employees to bargain with the
management concerning terms and
conditions of employment. The
union in seeking exclusive bargaining
rights was striking not only
against the company but also against
President Roosevelt's settle-
ment and the A.L.B. and was, in effect,
seeking the closed shop.36
The strike committee replied that
"no more provocative or in-
flammatory statement could have been
made at this time, nor one
better calculated to produce a bitter
conflict." It insisted that the
walkout of all the employees proved its
right to negotiate for the
workers as a whole. It agreed with
Knudsen that it had repudiated
the A.L.B., but declared that this was
because the board was partial
to the employers. It could not accept
Knudsen's condition of a
return to work prior to the resumption
of negotiations, because this
meant the acceptance, in effect, of the
company's terms.37
Thomas Williams, who had spoken with
G.M. executives in
35 Toledo Blade, April 24, 26, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, April 25,
1935; New
York Times, April 25, 1935; Chalmers' analysis, April 29, 1935,
Brown Collection.
It is difficult to accept Chalmers' statement
that Dillon advised against department
of labor intervention in the strike.
36 Address by Dillon . . ., April 26,
1935, A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384;
Toledo News-Bee, April 27, 29, 1935.
37 Toledo Blade, April 29, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, April 29,
1935.
342
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Detroit on the twenty-fifth, with
Schwake, Dillon, and Taylor in
Toledo the next day, and with Knudsen
again on the twenty-
seventh, was convinced that Knudsen was
in earnest when he stated
that he would not confer with the
strikers. Williams so informed
the strike committee and advised a
return to work on the basis of
G.M.'s offer of April 22 and with the
understanding that negotia-
tions would then be resumed. The strike
committee, however, re-
jected this suggestion.38
Efforts to break the impasse that had
developed were not resumed
until May 2, by which date the Toledo
shutdown had already idled
21,500 workers. The participants in the
prolonged negotiations of
that day, which were held in Detroit,
were McGrady, who had
stepped into the dispute on April 30,
Williams, Knudsen, Dillon,
and Chalmers. Although Knudsen would
not confer with the
strikers, he was apparently not
unwilling to speak, at least in-
formally, with Dillon. The purpose of
the meeting was to work
out some basis on which negotiations
between the company and the
strike committee could be resumed; and
a formula acceptable to the
conferees, but subject to the union's
approval, was finally devised.
The management agreed to negotiate with
the union on the basis
of its April 22 proposals, and both
sides promised to bargain to a
conclusion. On the strength of this
understanding, work was to be
resumed at once. Knudsen, in addition,
agreed to accompany Dillon
to the various G.M. plants to settle
allegations of discrimination.
Knudsen also pledged his word that he
would deal only with the
A.F. of L. bargaining committee on
wages and hours, but this part
of the formula, McGrady informed Green,
was "to be treated in
strict confidence." McGrady,
Williams, and Dillon carried these
proposals to Toledo late the next day,
but the strike committee and
the union executive committee found
them unacceptable.39 The
union leaders, it is clear, would not
permit a return to work until
an agreement had been concluded.
38 Toledo Blade, April 26, 27, 29, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, April
25, 27, 1935;
Chalmers' analysis, April 29, 1935,
Brown Collection.
39 Memorandum to Mr. Green from Mr.
McGrady from Detroit, May 3, 1935,
A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384; Toledo
Morning Times, May 4, 1935; Toledo
Blade, May 2, 4, 1935. Knudsen at the May 2 conference refused
to accept the
union committee as the "responsible
bargaining agency." G.M., "Labor Relations
Diary," Section I, 59.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 343
Negotiations to break the deadlock were
resumed in Detroit on
May 4. The conferees were reinforced by
the presence of the
A.F. of L.'s counsel, Charlton Ogburn,
who attended at Dillon's
request and who believed that a
settlement of the strike should
provide for a new labor board in the
automobile industry to replace
the A.L.B. Ogburn reported to Green on
the basis of the day's
discussion that Knudsen was
"absolutely unyielding." Knudsen's
position, as Ogburn described it, was
that the company unilaterally
determined the terms of employment and
then communicated its
decision to the employees, whose
participation in the definition of
working conditions was limited to the
presentation of grievances.
Thus, Ogburn maintained, not altogether
accurately, that in its
April 22 proposals, the company
conceded only what was already
company practice. To resolve the
dispute, he proposed that the
company post on its bulletin board as
the "Laws of the Chevrolet
Motor Co." its concessions to the
union's demands but with the
statement that the terms listed
represented the result of negotiations
between the company and the union. If
the company accepted this
proposal, Ogburn stated, he would try
to secure union acceptance in
time to permit the resumption of work
on Monday, May 6. Knud-
sen, however, was unwilling to concede
that the company's pro-
posals of April 22 had been arrived at
through negotiation with
the union.40 Even if Knudsen
had yielded on this point, however,
there is no reason to think that Ogburn
could have gained union
acceptance for his plan.
Knudsen no doubt found it easy to
reject Ogburn's proposals
late in the evening of May 4 because of
the development by that
time of what appeared to be a majority
movement among Toledo's
Chevrolet employees in favor of a
return to work. The back-to-work
movement was initiated on April 29,
when ten Toledo employees
conferred in Detroit with Richard Byrd,
the labor member of the
A.L.B., and informed him that
seventy-five percent of the employees
were opposed to the strike. They
requested the A.L.B. to poll the
40 Ogburn
to Green, May 5, 8, 1935, A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384; Toledo
Blade, May 4, 1935; New York Times, May 4, 1935. Green,
like Ogburn, favored
a new board, but he did not believe that President
Roosevelt could be "clubbed
into appointing a Board through strike
action." Green was apparently peeved at
Ogburn's intervention in the dispute. This information
is based on a highly reliable
but confidential source, which I have not been
permitted to identify.
344 THE OHIO HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
workers by mail ballot to ascertain
whether they were willing to
return to work. Four days later an
Independent Workers Associa-
tion was formed and began circulating
petitions calling for a return
to work on the company's terms or,
failing that, for a vote of the
employees by secret ballot on the
company's proposals. The next
night, May 4, the organization held a
meeting in the chamber of
commerce auditorium which was attended by sixteen
hundred per-
sons, all alleged to be Chevrolet
employees. The meeting was ad-
dressed by Bert Conway, who had
resigned as general manager of
the Toledo Chevrolet plant on April 18,
and by officials of the new
organization, all of whom praised the
company for its fairness in
dealing with its employees. At least
fourteen hundred of those
present endorsed by a rising vote the
twin proposals supported by
the petitions. The next day the I.W.A.
presented its petitions,
allegedly bearing fourteen hundred
signatures, to Chevrolet's presi-
dent, Marvin Coyle, and to the A.L.B.41
It is difficult to ascertain how bona
fide this back-to-work move-
ment was. The strike committee charged
that the new organization
was "company owned, controlled and
managed" and that it was a
"strikebreaking agency"
designed to destroy the power of organized
labor in Toledo and in the automobile
industry in general. It
claimed that the company had itself
recruited the members, that it
had signed up persons who had not
worked for the company for
years, and that it had threatened to
blacklist union members who
refused to approve the company's
proposals. The committee in-
sisted that the May 4 meeting was a
farce, contending that the
officers of the union and the members
of the strike committee had
not been permitted to enter the hall
and that the signing of the
petition was a condition of admission.42
Whatever the merit of the
union charges, one thing was made clear
by later developments:
the back-to-work petitions grossly
exaggerated the number of
Chevrolet employees who were willing to
return to work at that
time on the basis of the company's
proposals.
41 A.L.B., In Re: Chevrolet Motor Co.,
April 29, 1935, Michigan Historical
Collections, University of Michigan; Toledo
Blade, May 1, 4, 6, 1935; Toledo News-
Bee, May 1, 6, 1935; New York Times, May 5, 6, 1935; Detroit
Free Press, May 6,
1935.
42 Toledo Blade, May
4, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, May 7, 1935; Strike Truth,
May 7, 1935.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 345
Whether the back-to-work movement was
genuine or not, Dillon
realized that the action taken by an
apparent majority of the Chev-
rolet employees placed the union very
much on the defensive and
that it would have to take some
affirmative action if it were to
enjoy any public support for its
position. He therefore proposed
to the strike committee on May 5 that
it agree to permit the depart-
ment of labor, rather than the hated
A.L.B., to conduct a poll
among the employees to ascertain
whether they favored the com-
pany's proposals. The strike committee
was far from enthusiastic
about this suggestion, but Dillon
finally won the committee's con-
sent. McGrady and Williams then carried
the idea to Detroit and
secured G.M.'s approval.43 As
it turned out, Dillon's proposal
proved to be the key factor in the
settlement of the strike.
Opposition to Dillon's plan was
immediately and strongly
expressed by Charlton Ogburn. It was up
to the union itself, with
the aid of the A.F. of L., he advised
Dillon, to determine if it
wished to continue the strike. It would
be an "extremely bad pre-
cedent" to permit a strike called
by a union to be settled by all the
employees whether they were union
members or not. With seventeen
G.M. plants already closed, the Toledo
local was in a position "to
force important concessions," but
the poll Dillon was proposing
would "end the strike and the
union will be humiliated with nothing
but defeat to point to." If the
attendance at the I.W.A. meeting
of May 4 had been accurately reported,
Dillon would be leading
the Toledo officers "to the
slaughter," and the A.F. of L. "might
as well fold up in the automobile
industry." Dillon, however,
thought the poll "indispensable to
a proper solution" of the Toledo
question and stated that he would go
ahead with the idea unless
Green directed him otherwise. Ogburn
then carried his objections to
the A.F. of L.'s president, and Green
did express to Dillon his
"apprehension" concerning the
poll, but no change in plans was
made.44
43 Dillon to the Officers and Members
United Automobile Workers' Federal Labor
Unions, May 17, 1935, Dillon File, A.F. of L.-C.I.O.
Archives; Dillon to Green,
June 11, 1935, A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384;
Chalmers, "Collective Bargain-
ing," XII, 18-19, 40; Chalmers' analysis, May 16,
1935, Brown Collection; Toledo
Blade, May 6, 1935.
44 Ogburn to Dillon, May 5, 7, 9, 1935,
Dillon to Ogburn, May 7, 1935, Green
to Ogburn, May 9, 1935. A. F. of L.
Strike File, Local 18384.
346
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
While the I.W.A. on May 6 and 7 urged
its adherents to accept
the company's proposals and the union
advised the strikers to vote
"No," Knudsen stated that
G.M. was not committed to further
negotiations even if the company's
proposals were rejected. He
insisted furthermore that the A.L.B.'s
position was not at all affected
by the fact that the department of
labor was conducting the poll,
since no choice of representatives for
collective-bargaining purposes
was involved. Knudsen, as events were
to prove, was simply
whistling in the dark.45
The balloting, which was confined to
the production workers,
was held on May 8 on the ground floor
of Toledo's federal building.
The voters were simply asked to
indicate on their ballots whether
they approved or disapproved of the
company's proposals as listed
in the Toledo newspapers on April 23.
In a joint statement,
McGrady and Williams, who were in
charge of the poll, announced
that it was their understanding that if
a majority of the voters
favored the company's proposals, there
would be an immediate
return to work. If the proposals were
rejected, they would seek to
have negotiations resumed at once.46
The result of the voting was a clear
victory for the union. Despite
the fact that the company's proposals
promised some improvement
of existing working conditions, 1,251
employees rejected the com-
pany's offer, whereas only 605
indicated their approval. Even
if all the 369 eligible employees who
did not vote were I.W.A.
adherents, there was nothing in the
balloting to indicate that the
I.W.A. had the support among the
workers that it claimed. Dillon,
his judgment vindicated, immediately
announced that the poll
proved that G.M.'s labor policy was
"unsatisfactory to the great
majority" of its employees and
that the company would now have
to negotiate directly with the
accredited representatives of the
A.F. of L. "We today occupy an
enviable position," Dillon, with
some reason, informed Green. Not only
had the union proved its
right to speak for the majority of the
strikers, but it was easy to
45 Toledo News-Bee, May 7, 1935; New York Times, May 7,
1935; Toledo
Morning Times, May
8, 1935; Address by Dillon . . ., May 7, 1935, A.F. of L.
Strike File, Local 18384.
46 Toledo News-Bee, May 7, 1935.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 347
interpret the poll as a repudiation of
the A.L.B. and a victory, at
least in an oblique sense, for the
concept of majority rule.47
Knudsen realized that the poll made it
difficult for G.M. to con-
tinue to insist that it would not
negotiate with the strikers, and so
after conferring with Williams and
McGrady in Detroit on May 9,
he stated that "we will negotiate
directly with the committee." A
conference was accordingly scheduled
for May 11 in Toledo.48
Representing the company at the May 11
conference were Knud-
sen, Coyle, Wetherald, Alfred G.
Gulliver, the Toledo plant gen-
eral manager, and J. T. Smith, a G.M.
attorney. The union was
represented by the strike committee,49
Schwake, Dillon, and James
A. Wilson, whom Green sent in as his
personal representative.
McGrady and Williams were also present.
The conference began at
9:00 A.M. and did not break up until 3:00 A.M. the next
morning,
by which time the weary negotiators had
finally arrived at an agree-
ment. The terms agreed upon did not, on
paper, differ greatly from
the company's proposals of April 22,
but the union did register
some additional gains. As before, the
company refused to sign a
contract and agreed simply to post the
settlement on its bulletin
boards and to file a copy with the
department of labor. But now the
settlement was entitled
"Memorandum of negotiations between
Chevrolet. . . and Employees
represented by a Committee in behalf
of . . . Federal Labor Union No.
18384," which indicated that the
union had had something to do with
working out the terms. The
company did not grant the union
exclusive bargaining rights and
simply agreed, as before, to meet with
duly accredited employee
representatives upon all questions at
issue. There seems, however,
to have been an "informal
understanding" that no final A.L.B.
election was to be held at the plant
and that the company would
not seek to convert the I.W.A. into a
company union. This left the
union, de facto, as Knudsen
privately conceded, the sole bargaining
47 Ibid., May 9,
1935; Dillon to Green, May 9, 1935, A.F. of L. Strike File,
Local 18384; Dillon to U.A.W., May 17,
1935, Dillon File. Dillon regarded the
poll as "unique in industrial
relations" in the United States. Dillon to U.A.W., May
17, 1935, Dillon File.
48 Toledo News-Bee, May 10, 1935;
Toledo Morning Times, May 10, 1935.
49 During the negotiations Roland
frequently consulted with Muste, who occupied
a room on the same floor of the hotel in
which the negotiations were being con-
ducted. Detroit News, May 13,
1935.
348
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
agent in the plant.50 Knudsen
also promised to confer with Dillon
and the local shop committees at other
G.M. plants. This was of
some importance to Dillon, since to
counter the strike committee's
plea for a common strike policy he had
assured the G.M. locals
that he would insist on the application
of the Toledo terms to G.M.
employees generally.51
As regards seniority, the May 12
agreement stated that the com-
pany was operating under seniority rules
established by authority
of President Roosevelt but that the
executive shop committee and
the company would try to reconcile
their viewpoints concerning the
application of these rules. This at
least presented the possibility
that the union could alter the
application of the rules in its favor.
The company also improved its wage
offer. Whereas it had pre-
viously proposed a five percent
increase, it now promised an in-
crease of not less than four cents per
hour to all employees, which
represented an eight percent increase
for those receiving the
minimum fifty cents per hour. Finally,
the company now agreed
that the executive shop committee would
have the right to confer
with the company on the timing of any
jobs the committee believed
incorrectly timed, whereas previously
the company had simply
agreed to furnish information on times,
on request, to the proper
department.52
Although Dillon realized that the union
had failed to gain many
of its principal demands, he indicated
in his aforementioned mess-
age to Hart that he intended to
recommend the acceptance of the
agreement to the strikers. Dillon
reached this decision because
Knudsen had made it clear to him that
this was the company's final
offer and that the Toledo plant would
be dismantled if the terms
were rejected. More could have been
gained only if additional G.M.
locals, like the Buick union, had been
called out and G.M. was, as
a consequence, forced into submission,
but this also involved the
risk of losing everything, and the
cautious Dillon did not believe
50 Chalmers, "Collective
Bargaining," XII, 23-25; Chalmers' analysis, May 16,
1935, Brown Collection; G.M.,
"Labor Relations Diary: Appendix Documents to
Accompany Section I," Document 49.
51 Toledo Morning Times, May 11, 1935; New York Times, May 13, 1935.
52 There is a copy of the final
agreement in Automotive Industries, LXXII (1935),
656.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 349
that other G.M. locals were strong
enough for such a contest,
which was probably true. Dillon also
felt that for the union to
settle on the basis of the May 12
agreement would have a good
effect on public opinion and would help
to convince G.M. that the
A.F. of L. was a reasonable and
responsible organization.
Wilson also took the position, as he
reported to Green, that "this
was the best that could be done at this
time." It was not what the
men wanted, but "still it is
progress and lays the ground work for a
future relation that would be
good." The strike leaders did not,
however, share this view and were
particularly angered that the
settlement did not include a signed
contract. After all, the local
had not called off the Auto-Lite strike
without winning a signed
contract, and G.M. too could be brought
to terms if only the Buick
workers were called out. The strike
leaders refused consequently to
give the agreement their blessing.53
The settlement still required the
approval of the strikers, who
were to meet on the evening of May 13
in Toledo's civic audi-
torium. In advance of the meeting, the
strikers were advised by the
Musteites and Communists to reject the
settlement, since it fell far
short of their original demands. This
prompted Dillon to deliver a
public attack on "those who
presume, without authority, to speak
in the interest of workers in the
language of a Soviet dictator-
ship."54
The May 13 meeting of the strikers, as
the Toledo News-Bee re-
ported, was "marked by dramatic
highlights such as seldom have
been equalled in all the colorful
history of the labor movement in
Toledo."55 Approximately
fifteen hundred workers, some of whom
had been rehearsed for the occasion by
the strike leaders who op-
53 Chalmers, "Collective
Bargaining," XII, 26-28; Chalmers' analysis, May 16, 18,
1935, Brown Collection; Wilson to Green,
May 13, 1935, A. F. of L. Strike File,
Local 18384. The Toledo Blade reported
in a front-page editorial on May 11, 1935,
that it understood the plant would be
closed permanently if an amicable settlement
could not be arranged.
54 New York Times, May 13, 1935; Toledo News-Bee, May 14, 1935.
Donald
Richberg, executive director of the
National Emergency Council, conferred with
Sloan about the strike in New York on
May 12. New York Times, May 13, 1935.
55 My account of the May 13 meeting is
based on the following: Toledo News-Bee,
May 14, 1935; Toledo Blade, May
14, 1935; Detroit Labor News, May 17, 1935;
Muste, Automobile Industry and Organized Labor, 47;
Chalmers' analysis, May 18,
1935, Brown Collection; Chalmers,
"Collective Bargaining," XII, 29-33; Dillon to
U.A.W., May 17, 1935, Dillon File.
350
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
posed the settlement, were gathered
inside the auditorium, while
outside the inner doors Communist and
Workers party literature
was being passed out advising the
strikers to hold out for all their
demands and attacking Dillon. When
Dillon arrived, he was
warned by a guard posted at the
entrance, "I'm afraid you won't
get a very good reception," and
when he entered the auditorium
itself, he was greeted with boos and
jeers. A resolution was offered
from the floor and carried which
permitted only members of the
strike committee to address the crowd
and which, contrary to
A.F. of L. regulations, specifically
excluded Dillon. Dillon angrily
countered this move by declaring that
the union was no longer part
of the A.F. of L. "They're out,
they're out," he told reporters as he
stalked from the auditorium and
returned to his hotel.
Dillon's action caught the strike
leaders by surprise, and the
executive committee, which had no
desire to see the union expelled
from the A.F. of L., assumed the
initiative in securing the with-
drawal of the resolution that had
barred Dillon from speaking.
Addes thereupon phoned Dillon and asked
him to return. While
Dillon was absent, all of the strike
committee members but Roland
had spoken, and only one of them had
specifically urged acceptance
of the agreement.56 Dillon,
on his return, spoke for thirty minutes
and pleaded for a favorable vote on the
settlement. Some gains had
been registered, he said, and it was
simply impossible at the moment
to win anything further. G.M. would
not, unhappily, sign a con-
tract. Yes, he had advised the Buick
local not to strike, but this
was because he did not wish to see the
"slaughter of innocent
people." Dillon even had to deny
that he owned G.M. stock. When
Dillon finished speaking, Roland took
the floor and urged that the
agreement be rejected. Dillon thereupon
told Roland that he was
"out" if the settlement was
turned down, but he did not, as was
later charged, threaten to expel the
union as a whole if the terms
were rejected.
While the ballots were being
distributed, Schwake went over the
agreement point by point and indicated
the gains that had been
56 Five of the committee members urged
rejection of the settlement. Two mem-
bers indicated the settlement had some good points, but
they did not urge its approval.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 351
made, although he did not specifically
urge acceptance. This action
may have turned the tide in favor of
the agreement because of the
confidence reposed in Schwake by the
rank and file. When the vote
was announced--732 to 385 in favor of
acceptance--Roland
exploded. "Are you a lot of yellow
mice, or are you men?" he
asked of the crowd. Roland demanded
another vote, but the crowd
was beginning to thin by that time. The
bitter-end foes of the agree-
ment thereupon gathered on the stage
and decided to continue the
strike. The next morning a small
handful of strikers set up picket
lines about the plant, but Dillon
ordered them to disperse "forth-
with" on pain of losing their
membership in the A.F. of L. At the
same time, he lifted the suspension of
the union that he had pro-
claimed the previous night.57
On the morning of May 15 the Toledo
Chevrolet workers re-
turned to their jobs without incident,
and with their return the
strike movement in the G.M. plants came
to an end. The strikes
in Norwood and Atlanta were called off,
with Dillon giving assur-
ances that the "basic
principles" of the Toledo settlement would be
applied to the affected plants.
Cleveland's Fisher Body workers
voted on May 14 to return to work, and
the Buick local also voted
to accept the Toledo terms insofar as
they were applicable.58
The Toledo News-Bee felt that
Toledo had "escaped a calamity"
largely because of Dillon and McGrady,
and Dillon was praised for
his "responsible and courageous
labor leadership." McGrady in-
formed Green that he had "never
seen exceeded in my thirty five
years of experience in handling labor
disputes" the "intelligence,
patience and courage" displayed by
Dillon. Dillon, for his part,
praised Knudsen's
"statesmanship" and declared that "his logic
represents the dawn of a new day in
America's most important
industry."59
57 Toledo News-Bee, May 14, 1935; Detroit Free Press, May 15, 1935.
58 Toledo Blade, May 15, 1935; New York Times, May 16, 1935; Flint
Weekly
Review, May 17, 1935; Detroit News, May 21, 1935.
59 Toledo News-Bee, May 14, 1935; McGrady to Green, May 17, 1935, Dillon
File. President Roosevelt, at Frances
Perkins' suggestion, praised McGrady for his
"very tactful and diplomatic"
handling of the Toledo situation. Perkins to McIntyre,
May 16, 1935, Roosevelt to McGrady, May
20, 1935, President's Personal File,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
352 THE OHIO HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
The view of the A.F. of L. and its
friends was that the best terms
possible had been gained and that a
foundation had been laid upon
which a solid future could be built.
The American Federationist
proudly stated that "for the first
time in history one of the major
automobile manufacturing concerns . . .
has agreed to recognize and
meet with a spokesman for its
employees."60 There was some
exaggeration in this statement, but
when one considers how little
the A.F. of L. had accomplished in the
auto industry up to that
time, it is easy to understand its
jubilation. As it turned out, how-
ever, the A.F. of L. proved itself
unable to build on this partial
victory.
In contrast to the A.F. of L. view, the
"progressives" in the
union and left-wing groups felt that
the A.F. of L. had capitulated
when it would have been possible to tie
up G.M. as a whole and to
win the original union demands. Thus
Walter C. Guntrup, the
editor of the Toledo Union Leader and
a sympathizer with the point
of view of the strike committee, found
the settlement "pathetically
weak," referred to the
"heart-breaking, soul-crushing pressure" that
the A.F. of L. had brought to bear on
the strike leaders, and com-
pared Dillon to Mussolini and Hitler.
He advised the union's
militants to remain in the fold and to
seek to remove the Dillon-
Taylor-Wilson influence. The Daily
Worker also advised the "pro-
gressives" to remove "the
reactionary Dillon supporters."61
The auto manufacturers, for their part,
pointed to the fact that
the union had failed to win its
principal demands--a signed con-
tract and exclusive bargaining
rights--that management had suc-
cessfully resisted inroads on its
prerogatives originally sought by the
union, and that the A.L.B.'s seniority
rules had not been altered.62
However management explained it,
though, the union had won a
status in the plant and a position of
power that it had not pre-
viously enjoyed. The business press
recognized that the A.F. of L.
had staged a comeback in the auto
industry when it seemed to be
60 American Federationist, XLII (1935), 588;
Dillon to Green, May 17, 1935,
A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384.
61 Toledo Union Leader, May 17,
1935; Daily Worker, May 14, 15, 16, 1935.
62 Alfred Reeves to Donald Richberg, May 16, 1935, Records of the National
Recovery Administration; Automobile
Manufacturers Association, General Bulletin No.
G-1750, May 14, 1935, Ford Archives,
Dearborn, Michigan.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 353
on the ropes and had demonstrated that
it was a "power to be
reckoned with."63
The Toledo strike dealt a smashing blow
to the prestige of the
A.L.B. Not only were the board and its
policies partly responsible
for the strike, but the A.L.B. had been
excluded from the strike
picture from the beginning to the end,
and it had been forced to
cancel the final election scheduled for
the plant. It is doubtful
whether the A.L.B. could have long
survived the Toledo strike
even if the N.I.R.A. had not soon been
declared unconstitutional,
since even the employers now had some
doubts as to its effective-
ness.64
In tangible terms the Toledo strike
resulted directly or indirectly
in the closing of eighteen plants in
ten cities and the idling of ap-
proximately thirty-two thousand
workers. The Detroit Free Press
estimated on May 16 that the strike had
cost workers $2,500,000
in wages and that it had deprived G.M.
of the production of forty
thousand vehicles.65
The Toledo settlement was followed by
further negotiations in
May and June between Dillon and G.M.
executives in Cleveland,
Norwood,66 Atlanta,
Janesville, Wisconsin, and Kansas City. Agree-
ments were concluded as the result of
these meetings which were
roughly similar to the Toledo
settlement and in which the company
recognized the A.F. of L. shop
committees as the spokesmen for the
union's members. Dillon was exceedingly
optimistic about the re-
sults of these conferences. After he
had conferred with Knudsen,
Coyle, and E. Fisher at Norwood and
Atlanta, he informed Green
that these G.M. officials had
"acknowledged the fundamental fallacy
of the company union" and had
recognized the A.F. of L. shop
committees as "a legitimate
bargaining agency." He had been
assured that the future policy of G.M.
as regards the A.F. of L.
would be determined by "the
ability and competency of these com-
63 Business Week, May 18, 1935, p. 9; Iron Age, CXXXV (May 23, 1935),
41.
64 Chalmers' analysis, May 16, 1935,
Brown Collection; Automotive Industries,
LXXII (1935), 721; American
Federationist, XLII (1935), 591; G.M., "Labor
Relations Diary: Appendix Documents to Accompany
Section I," Document 49.
65 Detroit Free Press, May 15, 16, 1935.
66 A second strike had broken out at the Norwood Chevrolet plant when
foremen
refused admission to the plant to workers wearing union
buttons. This problem was
disposed of in the Dillon-G. M. talks. Detroit
News, May 27, 1935.
354
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
mittees to function" and to see
that negotiated agreements were
carried out. "I am
confident," Dillon declared, "that the United
Automobile Workers are upon the way to
the achievement of great
things."67
Dillon, as later events were to show,
was too optimistic about
G.M.'s good will with regard to
automobile unionism. His words
were to turn particularly sour in
Toledo, for the company in the fall
of 1935 removed about fifty percent of
the machinery from the
Toledo plant to Saginaw and Muncie,
thus displacing approxi-
mately nine hundred Toledo workers.
From the union point of
view this appeared to be entirely an
act of revenge, but the company
was also made aware by the Toledo
strike that it was unwise for
it to concentrate the production of a
key part in a single plant,
particularly if the union was strong in
that plant.68
The Toledo strike had important
consequences for the future of
the auto workers organized into A.F. of
L. federal locals. For one
thing, it helped to persuade Green that
the time had come to call a
constitutional convention to establish
an international union of auto
workers. In accord with a resolution
approved at the 1934 A.F. of L.
convention, the A.F. of L. executive
council at its session of January
29-February 14, 1935, had instructed
the organization's president
and secretary to charter an auto
international, but the executive
officers had subsequently been
authorized to take this action when
in their judgment it was
"appropriate and convenient." As organiza-
tion lagged, Green hesitated to
implement the executive council's
decision, but the Toledo strike and the
settlements which followed
it helped to convince him that the
appropriate time had arrived.
Following a conference with Green on
June 17, 1935, Dillon was
able to announce that preparations
would be made for a convention
beginning August 26 to launch an
international union.69 The
67 Dillon to Green, May 17, 31, June 10,
1935. Dillon File.
68 Toledo Blade, November 18, 25, December 16, 1935; H. S. Grant,
"General
Motors Strikes Back," Nation, CXLI
(1935), 743-744; Senate Committee on Education
and Labor, Violations of Free Speech
and Rights of Labor; Hearings . . . Pursuant to
S. Res. 266, 75 cong., 1 sess., Part 7 (Washington, 1937), 2316;
G.M., "Labor Rela-
tions Diary; Appendix Documents to
Accompany Section I," Document 49.
69 Dillon to Green, May 14, 1935, A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384;
Executive
Council Minutes, January 29-February 14,
1935, April 30-May 7, 1935, Auto
Workers File, 1935-1937, A.F. of
L.-C.I.O. Archives; Dillon press release, June 18,
1935, Dillon File.
THE TOLEDO CHEVROLET STRIKE 355
Toledo local was, incidentally, to
contribute important leadership
elements to the auto international.
George Addes of the local's
executive committee was later to become
the U.A.W.'s secretary-
treasurer, and Robert Travis of the
strike committee was to play a
key role in the organization of G.M.
workers in Flint and in the
great sit-down strikes that followed.
The Toledo strike, although it
contributed to the formation of
an auto international, nevertheless
helped at the same time to
weaken the A.F. of L.'s control over
the organized auto workers.
The A.F. of L. triumphed over the local
strike committee in the
running of the Toledo strike, but in so
doing it helped to widen
the cleavage that had been developing
between the A.F. of L.
leadership in the auto industry and the
more militant elements of
the rank and file. This was clearly
apparent in Toledo in particular,
but it also had implications for the
organized auto workers as a
whole. Less than two weeks after the
Toledo settlement had been
approved, the Toledo local adopted a
resolution introduced by
Roland attacking Dillon's conduct of
the strike and petitioning the
A.F. of L. to deprive him of his
credentials as an organizer and to
repudiate his conduct. Green rejected
the charges against Dillon as
"false and without
foundation," as they largely were, and declared
that they were inspired by "real
enemies" of the A.F. of L., which,
in a sense, was also true.70
The so-called progressives in the A.F.
of L. thought otherwise,
however, and the opposition to Dillon
at the constitutional conven-
tion of the international largely
centered on his handling of the
Toledo strike. Green appointed Dillon
the president of the new
organization in the face of the
expressed opposition of a majority
of the delegates, who believed that the
delegates themselves should
select the organization's president.
Significantly, George Addes of
the Toledo local was one of the seven
delegates elected to protest
70 Chalmers' analysis, May 16, 1935,
Brown Collection; Edward A. Wieck, "The
Automobile Workers Under the NRA"
(manuscript [August 1935] in the possession
of Mrs. Wieck), 231; A. J. Muste,
"Toledo Thriller," Nation, CXL (1935), 632;
William K. Siefke to Green, May 24,
1935, Dillon to Green, June 11, 1935, Green
to Siefke, June 19, 1935, A. F. of L.
Strike File, Local 18384. Dillon reported to Green
that Addes had told him that not more
than sixty people were present at the meeting
at which the resolution noted above was passed. Dillon
to Green, June 11, 1935,
A. F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384.
356
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
this action and the limited
jurisdiction of the new international to
the A.F. of L. executive council and
the A.F. of L. convention.71
The Toledo Chevrolet strike, coming
only a year after the Auto-
Lite strike and soon to be followed by
a strike of power-house
employees, helped to convince many
Toledoans that it was necessary
for the city to provide some kind of
machinery for the peaceful
settlement of industrial disputes. The
result was the inauguration
on July 15, 1935, of the so-called
Toledo plan, devised largely by
McGrady, which has functioned with
modifications to the present
day.72 Thus, the Toledo
Chevrolet strike had important reper-
cussions not only for the organized
automobile workers and for the
General Motors Corporation but also for
the cause of industrial
peace in Ohio's fourth largest city.
71 Detroit News, August
26-September 1, 1935; Edward Levinson, Labor on the
March (New
York, 1956), 88-93.
72 Memorandum Left with Mr. Green by
Edward F. McGrady (date not legible),
A.F. of L. Strike File, Local 18384; Toledo Blade, July
17, 1935; Edward F. Mc-
Grady, "How Peace Came to
Toledo," Atlantic Monthly, CLXII (1938), 13-21.
The Toledo Chevrolet Strike of
1935
By SIDNEY FINE*
IN THE SPRING OF 1935, at a time
when the fortunes of the auto-
mobile workers organized into American
Federation of Labor fed-
eral locals were at a low ebb, a strike
at the Toledo plant of the
Chevrolet Motor Company brought
Chevrolet production all over
the United States to a standstill,
caused the great General Motors
Corporation to retreat from its policy
of refusing to negotiate with
strikers, and resulted in an agreement
which a future president of
the United Automobile Workers described
at the time as "our
greatest single step forward."1 The
strike was in many ways the
most important staged in the automobile
manufacturing industry
during the period the national
industrial recovery act was in effect
(June 16, 1933-May 27, 1935).
The Toledo Chevrolet strike originated,
in the last analysis, in
the struggles of the A.F. of L. after
June 1933 to establish itself in
the automobile industry. Failing to
secure a satisfactory relationship
with the automobile manufacturers,
several of the federal locals
that the A. F. of L. had chartered in
the industry following the
adoption of the N.I.R.A. threatened in
March 1934 to employ the
strike weapon in order to secure their
objectives. Alarmed at this
potential danger to the recovery
program, President Roosevelt per-
sonally intervened in the dispute and on
March 25 announced a
settlement that called for the
establishment of an Automobile Labor
Board "to pass on all questions of
representation, discharge and
discrimination." Most important of
all, the settlement applied the
* Sidney Fine is associate professor of
history at the University of Michigan.
The preparation of this article was
facilitated by grants to the author from the
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial
Foundation and the Horace H. Rackham School
of Graduate Studies of the University of
Michigan.
1 Homer Martin to Francis Dillon, May
16, 1935, quoted in Dillon to William
Green, June 11, 1935. A. F. of L. Strike
File, Local 18384, A. F. of L.-C.I.O.
Archives, A. F. of L.-C.I.O. Building,
Washington, D.C.