Ohio History Journal

by WILLIAM R. BARLOW By the spring of 1812 the little delegation of three that represented Ohio in the national congress could easily have agreed with ex-President John Adams that a "black Cloud of War, with England hangs over us."1 Senator Thomas Worthington had thought war probable for some time, and after the twelfth congress was called into early session in November 1811 to deal with "weighty" foreign problems, he was convinced that hostilities were almost inevitable.2 Yet when the fateful decision was taken on June 17, 1812, Worthington voted no, as surely would have his colleague, Alex- ander Campbell, had he been present.3 Representative Jeremiah Morrow cast Ohio's sole vote for war, probably out of loyalty to the administration. NOTES ARE ON PAGES 257-259

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176                                                 OHIO HISTORY It was not that the senators felt the grounds for war inadequate.4 Their opposition to war lay in an entirely different direction. They knew that war with England would mean an Indian war, already threatening, on Ohio's borders and that adequate defenses had not yet been made to cope with that threat. Nearly six months before war was declared, Worthington had warned Governor Return J. Meigs: "Unless measures are taken to prevent it . . . in the spring we may expect an Indian War, and especially in event of war with England which is now almost certain."5 During the months immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the delegation worked diligently to alert the national government to the Indian menace. After news of Tippecanoe reached Washington, the dele- gation visited the president, and in Worthington's words "stated the exposed situation of our frontier and recommended in the strongest terms" defensive measures.6 With the aid of the administration Worthington and Morrow were able to obtain congressional approval of legislation which authorized the government to loan arms to the state of Ohio and provided for the organization of companies of rangers to defend the frontier. In addition, Madison was persuaded to appoint Worthington and Morrow as commis- sioners to negotiate a treaty of neutrality with the Indians at a conference to be held at Piqua.7

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OHIO'S CONGRESSMEN                                              177

 

Ohio's congressmen also wanted the nation at large adequately prepared.

Although Campbell was frequently absent and Morrow abstained from

voting on an increase in the navy and opposed the appointment of addi-

tional army officers, the delegation was united in supporting the strongest

versions of bills designed to fill the ranks of the existing military establish-

ment, increase the size of the regular army, form a volunteer corps, and

authorize the president to accept militia detachments.8

As the members of the delegation worked for preparedness, however,

they also were in favor of restraint. Morrow and Worthington helped

convert an executive request for a sixty-day embargo, which was considered

a precursor to war, into a negotiating measure of ninety days. In the

senate Worthington headed a movement for adjournment because he "be-

lieved much greater injury would result from sitting here than from a

recess." All efforts along this line failed when the house refused to

concur.9

The war message came June 1. While congress debated the issue, Worth-

ington again expressed his fears about an Indian war in case of war with

Britain in another meeting with Madison. He "candidly stated" to him, he

wrote in his diary, "that we are unprepared." "I knew the whole western

frontier was exposed," he recalled later, "and knowing as I did the influence

which the British had over the savages, I was convinced it would be used

for the worst of purposes."10

"The war will be a favorite one, and honor awaits those who may

distinguish themselves," John C. Calhoun had predicted in March.11 The

prospect of military glory and perhaps its bearing on future political

careers was not overlooked in Ohio. Moreover, a significant increase in

political opportunities coincided with the coming of the war. As a result

of its population growth Ohio would for the first time elect six congressmen

in October.¹² Under these conditions, a host of candidates, most of whom

combined campaigning for office with campaigning against the enemy,

entered the field.

By far the most glittering military record possessed by a candidate for

congress was that of Colonel Duncan McArthur. Probably because of that

advantage he was unopposed in the third congressional district.13 Colonel

John S. Edwards marched his regiment to Cleveland after Hull's surrender,

aroused his fellow citizens to the "threatening dangers," and defeated

General Reasin Beall on the political battlefield in the sixth district.¹⁴

Others had less pretentious claims to military fame. John Alexander of

Xenia, in the second district, was only a private in the militia but was

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promoted to congress by his constituents.15 Captain James Caldwell of St. Clairsville and Colonel James Kilbourne of Worthington, although repre- senting the rival Tammany and anti-Tammany wings of Ohio Republican- ism, were both firm supporters of Madison and the war and were elected from the fourth and fifth districts, respectively.16 Proving that a military title was not necessarily a prerequisite for election, however, John McLean of Lebanon was selected by the voters of the first district despite the fact that his chief opponent, Ethan Stone, was serving as a volunteer with Gen- eral William Henry Harrison.17 When the Madisonian electoral ticket won the presidential race a month later, the Republican party could boast of a clean sweep of all elections for national office. During the remaining years of the war a number of changes took place

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in the make up of the Ohio congressional delegation. Before the thirteenth

congress convened, two of the newly elected representatives had to be re-

placed at special elections. Congressman-elect Edwards died during the

winter of 1813, and General Reasin Beall, who had seen active service in

the early months of the war, was elected to replace him.l⁸ Duncan McArthur

resigned his seat after being appointed a brigadier general in the regular

army in 1813, and a veteran of Ohio politics, Colonel William Creighton,

won the right to represent the third district.19 Upon the expiration of his

term Senator Campbell did not seek reelection, and the legislature elevated

Representative Morrow to that post in February 1813.20 In the third session

of the thirteenth congress two new faces were added to the delegation.

David Clendenin, who had served as a lieutenant and paymaster in the

Ohio militia and the United States army during the first two years of the

war, ran successfully for the seat left vacant by General Beall, who resigned

in 1814.21 Finally, Joseph Kerr was selected to fill the unexpired term of

Senator Worthington, who resigned after being elected governor in 1814.

The new senator had held various political posts in Ohio, including adjutant

general, and had been appointed a brigadier general in the militia in 1812.22

Since most of the Ohio congressmen had a first-hand knowledge of the

military phase of the war, they easily grasped the strategic significance of

attacking Canada. Like other western congressmen, they looked upon such

a maneuver as a method of waging war, not as a means to the conquest of

new land. "We cannot reach personally the authors of our injuries," de-

clared McLean in 1814. "We resorted to war for the purpose of obtaining

redress for injuries. The infliction of the greatest possible injury on our

enemy within the usages of nations, is promoting the object of the war.

Take the Canadas, and we act in accordance with this policy."²³ In 1815,

Duncan McArthur, a firm supporter of war in 1812, hotly denied in a

speech to a group of Indians that American territorial ambitions had led

to war: "It never was the intention of the United States to take the Canadies

from the British, for the country is not worth having. The cause was that

the British refused to let our ships, or great canoes sail on the Great Water

which was intended by the Great Spirit to be free for all."²⁴ Although Ohio

was far from the "Great Water" and had little direct interest in the freedom

of the "great canoes" to sail upon it, British infringements on American

maritime rights stirred the patriotic ardor of its congressmen and led them

to support a war to vindicate the national honor. A strike at Upper Canada

seemed not only a wise strategic move but indeed the only method by which

American rights and honor could be defended.

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Because of their acute awareness of the necessity for quick and decisive

land victories, Ohio's congressmen advocated strong army legislation. Still

it was possible for disagreement to occur in providing what Kilbourne

called "an overwhelming force for an army . . . and the most rapid move-

ments to every point required."²⁵ Representative Morrow's record on such

matters during the early months of war was somewhat better than that of

Worthington and Campbell. He backed an administration measure raising

army pay, exempting soldiers from arrest for debt, and lowering the enlist-

ment age to eighteen years. Despite the disapproval of the secretary of

war, Ohio's senators joined a majority in the upper house in striking out

the enlistment of minors. On a second army bill Campbell helped to

eliminate authorization for additional officers, and he and Worthington re-

fused to grant the administration increased bounties, which had been de-

signed to aid enlistment.²⁶  Worthington, however, united with Morrow in

January 1813 in strongly supporting a third army measure which incorpo-

rated executive demands. Campbell aided a temporary majority in re-

moving a provision authorizing a short enlistment period of one year and

suggested that "eighteen months" be substituted, but the senate in the end

failed to agree and eventually returned to the twelve-month figure.²⁷ That

Worthington and Campbell at times quibbled over the administration's

methods should not obscure the fact that the Ohio delegation firmly sup-

ported the aims of these proposals, which were designed to strengthen the

available military force.

By January 1814 the military situation was grave. American armies had

been repulsed from eastern Upper Canada, and the Niagara Frontier

had been invaded. Under these sobering circumstances the delegation lent

its efforts to the task of filling the army's depleted ranks and to this end

voted for boosting enlistment bounties.²⁸ McLean, speaking vigorously for

an extension of enlistment periods, claimed that the Ohio militia was ready

to "vindicate with bayonets the cause of their country, against enemies of

any nature or character," and Alexander, urging formation of additional

rifle regiments, declared that the nation "should unite in repelling . . . this

unfeeling and cold hearted tyrant." "On the principle of equal rights and

equal duties," Beall denounced an exemption of government clerks from

militia duty.²⁹

As chairman of the senate military committee, Worthington worked tire-

lessly for military efficiency. He introduced and successfully supported

in the senate bills permitting the president to accept self-organized fighting

units, creating a comptroller for the war and navy departments, and aug-

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menting the staff of the army paymaster. He failed to gain approval of legislation "to produce exact uniformity in the Army" and to organize a second military academy.30 Although not enthusiastic about a big navy, the Ohio delegation gener- ally supported naval legislation requested by the administration. As a house member Morrow lacked a spotless record in this area, but as a senator he served on the naval committee, which devised plans creating a naval board of commissioners and establishing a naval academy, only the former of which was realized during the war.31 To entice men into naval service, Kilbourne in January 1814 urged more lucrative pay, but the house was unmoved.32

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Ohio's congressmen were vitally concerned with the welfare of their constituents during the war and were fortunate in having Caldwell, Alex- ander, and Beall as members of various claims and pensions committees. Especially active in attempting to right the wrongs suffered by Ohioans was Beall, who gave his attention to such measures as memorials requesting payment of bills drawn by the army and compensation for supplies and equipment furnished the militia.33 Other members were equally solicitous for the "folks back home." Kilbourne urged the payment of compensation to militia and mounted volunteers in the northwest army who had lost

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OHIO'S CONGRESSMEN                                              183

 

their horses, and McLean advocated relief for families of militia or volun-

teers who had died in service. In such cases, insisted McLean, the "only

question ought to be--was he, when he fell, fighting under the eagles of

his nation against the enemies of his country."³⁴ More successful were the

efforts of McLean and Worthington to gain for Ohio citizens reimbursement

for wagons and teams lost at the surrender of Detroit. To overcome oppo-

sition to that measure, McLean harshly criticized General Hull and an-

nounced that "but one opinion exists, and that is, that the surrender of

Detroit was unnecessary." Ohioans got their compensation.35

By September 1814 the military situation had worsened. Part of the New

England coast had fallen, New Orleans was threatened, and Washington had

been invaded. "I feel for our country," lamented David Clendenin.³⁶ Some

Ohio congressmen were obviously frightened, and Alexander, Creighton, and

Caldwell went on record in October 1814 for a removal of the national

government to a "place of greater safety and less inconvenience than the

City of Washington."³⁷ McLean was opposed, and Kilbourne would have

voted no had he been present. Detained en route, he wrote that an evacua-

tion "would have given it to the enemy to say, and the world to believe, that

the government of the United States was in fact driven from its chosen

capital."³⁸ Yet Ohio congressmen sanctioned an investigation of the humili-

ating capture, and Worthington urged an inquiry into means for the future

protection of the city.39

Demanding immediate defense measures, the administration proposed

raising volunteers for local use and filling the regular army ranks by

subjecting the militia to a draft.⁴⁰ The possibility of compulsory service

at first shocked the Ohio delegation, and McLean asserted that it would "try

the patriotism of the people." Worthington thought conscription unconsti-

tutional.⁴¹ Such sentiment was strong in congress, and refusing even to

discuss a draft, the house turned to another volunteer bill. The entire Ohio

delegation was prominent among a minority insisting on militia exemption

for the volunteers, and after a week of bitter controversy over that issue, the

bill was tabled.⁴²

Senators Morrow and Worthington then took up the battle and helped to

pass a bill to fill the regular army ranks through lowering enlistment age to

eighteen, doubling the land bounty, and exempting from militia service any

person furnishing a recruit for the regular army.⁴³ Although a conscription

plan introduced by Worthington as chairman of the militia committee was

postponed, he voted for other draft legislation despite his constitutional

scruples. Morrow also championed compulsory service, and declared that

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184                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

he believed "we have the power & must resort to some other mode of filling

the ranks than that of volunteer enlistment if we pretend to save the country."

Over bitter Federalist opposition, the senate finally accepted conscription.⁴⁴

House debate on the regular army bill was brief but bitter. Only McLean

voted to weaken the section dealing with the enlistment of minors.⁴⁵ Evidenc-

ing considerably more disunity on the draft bill, the delegation was badly

divided on the length of service, but an amendment specifying one year,

which McLean upheld, was adopted. All, however, supported authorizing

the president to requisition troops directly from militia officers in case

state governors hedged.⁴⁶ The senate, refusing to accept either of the

changes, proposed a compromise which Morrow considered "presumptive

evidence that it is worth little." When the house refused to concur, the

senate postponed the draft bill over the objections of Morrow, who insisted

that it was better than "no provision for defence."⁴⁷ After this failure, a

volunteer bill was hastily written and agreed to by congress without roll

call and with little debate.⁴⁸

During debate on these measures in late 1814, Kilbourne was especially

vocal. Conceiving the "militia service already sufficiently injured, if not

dishonored, by the construction of the Constitution which had limited its

utility," he successfully urged expunction of a section from the draft bill

limiting service of draftees to their own and adjacent states. Repeatedly

he advocated the pensioning of families of those slain in battle.⁴⁹ To increase

the number of men under arms, Kilbourne hit upon the enlistment of

Negroes. To effect this, he wrote two resolutions: one suggested the

employment of "free able bodied men of Colour," who would receive equal

pay and bounties with other soldiers; the other, the recruitment of slaves

with their owners' consent. The slaves would be given their freedom upon

honorable discharge, while the owners would be awarded the pay and

bounties.50

Even more novel as a defense measure was the fifth district representa-

tive's attempt to secure free land for settlers in the Old Northwest. Urging

residents to add their weight to his proposal through petitions, he badgered

congress for enactment.51 Free land also made a good political platform,

and a loyal follower wrote him, "None before has taken such a laborious

taste [sic] for the Benefit of our Great and fruitful country." Actually,

Kilbourne's scheme provided for the "more effectual and economic protec-

tion" of the frontier "against incursions of savages and other enemies, by

granting donations of land to actual settlers." Although it was a "home-

stead" suggestion, it was designed to meet the exigencies of wartime, and

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a Michigan resident believed that it would be the "most Effectual & Speedy method to get the western Lands Setled [sic] and our frontiers Secured."52 If war helped to soften the heart of a congressman toward the indebted and embattled small farmer of the Old Northwest, it also dramatized the need for improved transportation. Forced to hack a road to Detroit, General Hull and his men had lost valuable time at the opening of the war. The Ohio delegation proposed and supported measures to open roads which not only would serve a military purpose in wartime but would also be of inestimable value to Ohio once peace was restored.53

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186                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

Even before war was declared, a Federalist thought that the "war party

must fail for want of two much essential Ingredients, (viz) Men & Money.^"54

Indeed, Ohio congressmen soon discovered that one was as difficult to procure

as the other. When congress failed to levy taxes in the early months of war,

Representative Morrow supported increased tariffs in order to raise a

revenue and even voted for repeal of the nonimportation act.55 Failing in

this painless way to obtain money, the entire delegation voted for loans and

treasury notes in 1813.56

So difficult were financial affairs by May 1813 that congress was called

into special session to consider a "well-digested system of internal revenue."

The delegation raised no serious objections during debate, and with only

minor reverberations over a tax on whiskey, members supported the neces-

sary legislation as well as a loan authorization in the summer of 1813.57

Ohio votes had helped provide additional wartime revenue, but, as the

war progressed, the financial picture darkened. In February 1814 congress

was asked to authorize another loan and more treasury notes. With hardly

a murmur the latter was passed, but debate on the loan was utilized by

Federalists for a damning denouncement of the "ruinous war." Proving

that they considered the object of the war "the restoration of violated

liberty," in the words of Alexander, the entire delegation voted for passage.⁵⁸

The new loan and note measures proved disappointing, and by October

1814 the treasury was almost bankrupt.⁵⁹ Members looked desperately for

new sources of revenue, and some even advocated taxes on salaries. Among

the latter was Kilbourne, who asked that taxes be laid on capital invested in

public stock or private loans in any way "yielding profits to owners" and

on large professional incomes. Nothing came of the suggestion, for a com-

mittee had already denounced such a tax as inexpedient. A system of

government paper money introduced into the house by Creighton's ways and

means committee was more appealing to rural Ohio. It was the "best plan,"

wrote future Senator Kerr.⁶⁰ When Secretary of the Treasury Alexander J.

Dallas demanded increased taxes and a bank instead, Kerr was unmoved by

the suggestions of that "Philadelphia lawyer, acquainted with fine language,

but not with either the situation of the country" or the "almost boundless

demands that are to be met."⁶¹ "I have at all times," Kerr said, "viewed the

incorporated bodies of our country as so many steps towards the ultimate

destruction of our free government." Even Morrow regretted "the necessity

of its establishment" but could not "suppress . . . fears of a total failure of

public credit on a failure to pass the Bank bill." It is "indispensably

necessary to establish a circulating medium, and aid in restoring public

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OHIO'S CONGRESSMEN                                             187

 

credit," wrote Creighton, and "no expedient, it is believed, is so well calcu-

lated as a national bank."⁶²

The Ohio delegation understood that the bank proposed by Dallas was

designed solely to meet the financial crisis. Capitalized at $50,000,000

with $6,000,000 in specie and $44,000,000 in government war stock, it

was obligated to loan the treasury $30,000,000.63 There was great dis-

agreement over certain sections of the bill, and spearheaded by Calhoun,

a majority in the house, including some Ohio congressmen, transformed

drastically the administration measure. Fearing that bank stock might be

monopolized by capitalists, all Ohioans voted to substitute paper money

for war stock. A second amendment, which eliminated loans to the govern-

ment and government participation in the bank's management, drew the

votes of Creighton and Caldwell. Kilbourne, however, argued that such a

change would establish a "colossal moneyed institution" which would "fall

entirely under the direction of enemies of the government." His suggestion

that if the bank exceeded its power congress could declare its charter void

was partially accepted.⁶⁴

Federalists, who had helped alter the Dallas bill, now spoke out against

any bank, and as debate continued, hope of enacting the administration

measure diminished. Finally, the bill was referred to a committee, so that

"the views of all parties might be obtained in favor of one plan." "The

fate of the bank, in its present form," thought Creighton, "is doubtful."⁶⁵

After Secretary Dallas condemned the Calhoun version of the bank as

unacceptable, loyal executive followers joined with Federalists in rejecting

it; only the Calhoun group, including the Ohio delegation, voted for passage.

The bill defeated, Kilbourne was immediately on his feet, explaining that

"he had ever considered it to be the interest of the United States that a

National Bank should be established, for the convenient management of its

finances." He "held in his hand a resolution embracing a sketch of a plan

which, if approved, might be put into the shape of a bill." Ruled out of

order by the speaker, who considered the proposal "in substance" the same

as the one rejected, Kilbourne withdrew his motion.⁶⁶

Realizing that the defeat of the Calhoun bank was an administration

victory and that they had been on the losing side, Ohio's congressmen

attempted to redeem themselves by meekly following an executive request

for a doubling of existing taxes and the inclusion of new items ranging from

snuff to law suits.⁶⁷ Ohioans were not enthusiastic over the increased direct

tax. It was detrimental to Ohio, where most land was "in a state of nature

and unproductive to the owners," claimed McLean. Yet it had his "hearty

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188                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

concurrence," and its proposed increase met equally with his assent.68

The whiskey tax was a different matter. As reported, the bill was a combi-

nation of an increased license tax based on still capacity and a tax on each

gallon distilled. It seemed that Ohioans would accept one or the other but

not both, and they presented a united front in attempting to eliminate the

capacity tax. Declaring that the existing tax had already "suppressed or

stopped perhaps one-half of the distillers" in his district, Kilbourne argued

that the "increase now proposed of four hundred per cent on the present

duty would . . . rather reduce than increase the revenue." More pointed

was McLean, who insisted that the "tax upon the capacity of the still . . .

depresses the smaller establishments to the advantage of the larger ones."

A slight concession was made permitting the sale of certain quantities without

a license, which, said a westerner, would help the smaller producer.⁶⁹ Ohio

did not like the whiskey tax, even with the concession, but McLean assured

congress that the people of Ohio would accept it. "They are sensible," he

announced, "that the present crisis is eventful to their country; they believe

sacrifices from the people necessary; they are prepared to make them."⁷⁰

The heavy taxes would provide additional revenue but not a stable circu-

lating medium. A bank remained the only hope. When it appeared that

the house stalemate was unbreakable, the senate, with Morrow helping to

defeat emasculating Federalist amendments, passed a bill framed along

administration lines.71 As the house began debate on it in December 1814,

McLean feared that it would remain adamant. Sensing the seriousness of

the issue, the Ohio delegation reversed itself and opposed all crippling

changes sponsored by the Calhoun-Federalist coalition.⁷² On final passage

McLean reported that the "representation from Ohio have been firm--they

have been united." But the bill was agreed to by only one vote, and the

Ohio triumph was short-lived. Denouncing the bill as unable to "afford

ways and means to support the government," the speaker voted no. The tie

vote defeated the bill.73

Chaos resulted. Representative Alexander, the "Buffalo of the West,"

"a giant between six and seven feet high, large, stout, muscular, threatened

the Speaker with bodily harm."⁷⁴ After prolonged debate the bill was

reconsidered and then recommitted to a select committee, but the reported

bill provided for the Calhoun bank. After administration spokesmen urged

acceptance as a "last resort," the Ohio delegation voted for passage.⁷⁵

Forwarded to the senate, the bill now took on characteristics of the Dallas

bank. Over objections of Ohio congressmen, however, the house stood fast,

and the senate was forced to capitulate. The measure which was sent to

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the president was essentially the Calhoun bank. Ohio congressmen were dissatisfied. "It will by no means relieve us from our present embar- rassments," wrote McLean, because "it has been modified to meet the views of the opposition."76 Morrow had even voted for permanent postponement rather than accept it; Kerr also wanted postponement, but because he was opposed to any bank. "I have no idea," he stated, "of fixing on the country a certain evil without a certainty of at least a temporary good," and imply- ing that the president would reject the Calhoun bank, he concluded that when "I have James Madison and A. J. Dallas at my back I may not be thought greatly wrong."77 Madison vetoed the bill as not to "be relied on during the war."78 Not only bankruptcy but a possible collapse of the government and the prosecu- tion of the war seemed imminent. A caucus, in which McLean participated, whipped Republicans into line, and the Dallas bank bill was on the verge of passage when the news of peace arrived in February. Many now felt the necessity of a bank removed, but indefinite postponement was passed by

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190                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

only one vote. McLean, Clendenin, Kilbourne, and Creighton voted for

further consideration. If Alexander and Caldwell had joined their four

colleagues instead of abstaining, perhaps the second National Bank would

have been established in 1815 rather than in 1816.79 On the question of the

bank, the Ohio delegation, as well as congress as a whole, had shown an

inability to face squarely the serious wartime financial crisis.

To read some works on the War of 1812, one would expect to find that

Ohioans talked only of Indians and Canada and were uninterested in foreign

problems. Far from it. The Ohio congressmen were firm in their support

of administration foreign policy. They believed that war in 1812 had

turned on the question of the British orders in council and impressment of

American seamen. Before war began, Kilbourne declared in a July 4 toast:

"May the more than 7,000,000 of people, which compose the American

republic determine, with one accord, to compel the release of the thousands

of their free-born brethren, now held in the most ignominious slavery under

the chains and scourges of British tyrants, or sacrifice the last resource of

the nation in the attempt." The war was being fought for "free-trade and

sailor's rights, and the freedom of the ocean," proclaimed an Ohio news-

paper.⁸⁰ Even after repeal of the British orders in council, the Ohio dele-

gation continued to consider impressment a chief cause of war. Supporting

a manifesto in 1812 which declared that America's honor could be vindicated

only by continuing the war until British impressment ceased, the Ohio

congressmen voted for a bill prohibiting the employment of foreign nationals

on American ships after the end of hostilities. Although they regarded the

prohibition as a peace overture, the enemy did not, and impressment per-

sisted as an emotional issue throughout the war congresses.81

Denying that maritime rights had caused the war, Federalists charged

that a secret alliance existed between Madison and Napoleon. To prove

the accusation, Representative Daniel Webster introduced in 1813 five

resolutions calling for exact information concerning the repeal of the French

decrees limiting our foreign commerce. Federalists alleged that since April

1811 the executive had known of the repeal but had suppressed all knowl-

edge of the fact to bring on war with England. Because it would imply that

the president had something to hide, it was difficult for Republicans to

vote no, and Beall supported all five of the resolutions, Alexander, McLean,

and Creighton four, and Kilbourne three; only Caldwell, obviously an

uncompromising Francophile, refused to call for any information. The

president's reply completely refuted the accusations, but the Federalist

search for a secret French treaty went on.⁸²

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OHIO'S CONGRESSMEN                                              191

 

Again in 1814 a Federalist charged that the president had concealed a

letter written by the French minister in 1809 which supposedly contained

proof of a Franco-American alliance. The Ohio delegation joined a huge

majority in defeating the demand for a congressional investigation. Then,

urging adoption of a simple request that the president forward the letter

if existent, McLean, a member of the foreign relations committee, expressed

what everyone knew. Not only did the Federalist have a copy in his posses-

sion, but the letter had even appeared in the Baltimore and Washington

press in August. McLean had read the letter and judged it a "harmless

paper, and one to which no one could ever have supposed any considerable

consequence would be given." There appeared shortly a state department

pronouncement that the French minister had been forced to withdraw the

unimportant letter because of certain objectionable sentences.⁸³

If some congressmen were interested in uncovering a nonexistent French

treaty, others were more concerned with the possibility of peace negotia-

tions. On the basis of a Russian offer of mediation, three peace envoys

had been dispatched to Europe by the summer of 1813. Although Morrow

was one of six voting against the nomination of the anti-war Federalist

James A. Bayard, both he and Worthington voted to confirm the appoint-

ment of John Quincy Adams. The two Ohio senators were also vocal and

energetic supporters of the confirmation of Albert Gallatin, whose appoint-

ment was criticized because he had failed to resign as secretary of the

treasury. Knowing that there were ample Federalist precedents for dual

officeholding, Worthington and Morrow disregarded such charges, but Gal-

latin was denied confirmation.84

For months there was no significant news from Europe, but in January

1814 the Ohio congressmen learned that England, though declining the

Russian mediation, had consented to direct negotiations.85 The inclusion of

Speaker of the House Henry Clay on the peace commission was hailed by

Ohioans. "We are about to lose our old friend and speaker Mr. Clay,"

wrote Creighton. "On the 14th the President nominated Messrs. Adams,

Bayard, Clay and Russel [sic] commissioners to treat with the British . . . at

Gottenburg. Their nominations . . . will be confirmed to-morrow."⁸⁶ Indi-

cating that much was expected from the peace proposal, the senate added

Gallatin's name as an envoy, and Morrow, in a spirit of unanimity, declined

contesting the appointment of Bayard.⁸⁷

An end to hostilities, however, was unlikely, and the Federalists, seiz-

ing upon the British offer, renewed their attack on the war by reopening

well-worn issues of foreign policy. "All this mighty suffering," ranted one,

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is "to establish the most wild and chimerical of all pretensions--that neutral

flags make neutral men and neutral goods." Since the cause of war had

ceased with repeal of the British orders and since impressment had been

concocted as an issue, cried another, there were no grounds for further

hostilities.⁸⁸ Members of the Ohio contingent retorted in kind. "Suppose

the Orders in Council are repealed," asked McLean, "does that act heal

the bleeding wounds of our country? Are the thousands of American seamen

now held in British servitude--taken by force--retained by force--and

compelled to fight the battles of our enemy, are these to be neglected and

forgotten?" The war was being fought, Alexander contended, for "the

preservation of the remaining rights of freemen."⁸⁹

In the other body, Senator Worthington, in a long speech in which he

observed that he had never publicly expressed his "sentiments as to the

cause of war," made it clear that he believed the war justified. He declared:

"I never did consider these ORDERS as the principal cause of war; nor would

I have voted for war on their account alone. The impressment of AMERICAN

SEAMEN was with me, the greater cause of war. The orders in council were

a flagrant infringement of our commercial rights; the impressment of

American seamen on board British ships of war, aimed a blow at the liberties

and independence of this nation." Hinting at his own impressment as a

youth, he denounced impressment as "a systematic invasion of our dearest

rights."90

As negotiations dragged on during the summer of 1814, the prospect of

peace looked dim. McLean judged that "peace will not soon be concluded.

It will require all the energies of our govt to give success to the war."⁹¹ Not

only did Napoleon's defeat assure increased British military strength in

America, but the opening of the continent to British trade weakened the

effectiveness of the administration's coercive system. In March 1814, there-

fore, the president recommended repeal of the embargo of 1813 and the

venerable nonimportation act. Alexander, Caldwell, and McLean voted

against repeal. They stood with a minority of thirty-seven, which a repre-

sentative called "the remnant of the large administration majority once

taught to rely on national self-denial and passive suffering" as preferable

to war. There may have been another explanation of the three Ohio votes,

for former Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky, suggesting that nonimporta-

tion provided tariff protection, asked: "What is to become of our new

manufactories and young merinos?"⁹²

Even more ominous than Napoleon's downfall, was news in October of the

harsh peace terms offered by Britain. The establishment of an Indian buffer

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state, comprising much of Ohio, and the incorporation of the Great Lakes into Canada "would reduce us to the lowest state of degradation," declared McLean. "Inadmissible & insulting terms," exclaimed Creighton.93 Just as alarming was the approaching convention at Hartford. "God only knows the result," McLean wrote; while Worthington commented, "I fear they will take steps which they cannot retrace."94 Further disappointing dispatches from Europe in December led Morrow to write privately: "I have now less hopes." As peace rumors circulated at the end of January, the senator was unexcited: "They are received by our party as a stratagem of the enemy to put us off our guard." The Ohio delega- tion had little hope of a successful conclusion of the war. News of the peace treaty in February 1815, therefore, was astounding. All was "hurly burly, congratulation and joy" in congress, observed a representative.95

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Ohio congressmen had played an important role in the United States' first

wartime congress. They had accurately predicted in June 1812 that the

nation was not prepared for war. Although most members of the delegation

lacked the seniority and experience required for important positions of

leadership, once the nation took up arms they were more willing than

congress as a whole to support legislation necessary to wage war more

vigorously and to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. While the final

terms of peace--in light of the objectives of the war--were somewhat less

than satisfactory, McLean could still proclaim: "The day of the ratification

of the treaty was a proud day for America, equal may I not say to the day

our Independence was signed." The young Ohio congressman had undoubt-

edly made an exaggerated claim. Yet the War of 1812 did mark the begin-

ning of a new era of peace with Europe, and Jeremiah Morrow, senior

member of the Ohio congressional delegation, correctly prophesied: "We

shall have peace in all our borders [;] each citizen may then sit under his

own vine & fig tree & none to make him afraid.^"96

 

 

THE AUTHOR: William R. Barlow is an

assistant professor of history at Hope College.

The subject of his doctoral dissertation at Ohio

State University was "Congress During the

War of 1812."

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