ROBERT D. ACCINELLI
Was There a "New" Harding?
Warren G. Harding and the
World Court Issue, 1920-1923
In the past ten years a revised, more
flattering image of Warren G. Harding and
his administration has appeared in
historical writing.1 Although many historians
still hold the Harding presidency in low
esteem, a group of revisionists has sought
to upgrade its reputation. These
revisionists do not agree in all respects about
either Harding or his administration,
but they have produced more positive evalu-
ations than previous interpretations.
Their writings indicate that the adminis-
tration, while not without its glaring
defects, had its fair share of accomplish-
ments and originated domestic and
foreign policies which persisted well into the
1920s. Harding himself, once judged a
flat failure and the worst chief executive
in the nation's history, is depicted as
an earnest, hardworking, politically shrewd
President of modest talent and moderate
views-one of the lesser men to occupy
the White House, but not necessarily the
worst.
Refusing to dismiss Harding as an
incompetent, do-nothing President, a num-
ber of writers have contended that he
became increasingly more confident, inde-
pendent, and assertive during his
abbreviated stay in office, and that he signifi-
cantly altered his style of leadership
and his conception of the presidency. They
have argued that upon entering office he
intended to govern in close cooperation
with Congress, his cabinet, and party
leaders, acting as a counselor and concili-
ator rather than as a dynamic chief
executive in the tradition of Theodore Roose-
velt or Woodrow Wilson. His Whiggish
conception of the presidential office and
of executive-congressional relations,
his own personal insecurity and easy-going
nature, and his affinity for harmony
inclined him towards a non-aggressive po-
litical style suited for achieving
consensus and reducing friction. As a result,
however, of a heightened sense of the
responsibilities of his office, greater po-
litical maturity, and the frustration of
coping with a divided and often hostile
Congress, he shifted to a more
forthright posture and came to display greater
initiative and determination in
advancing his domestic and foreign program. By
late 1922 he had become bolder and more
hard-hitting--a "new" Harding had
taken command in the White House.2
1. Louis W. Potts, "Who Was Warren
G. Harding?" The Historian, XXXVI (August 1974), 621-
645, is an excellent survey of
perspectives on Harding since his death. Also helpful for recent apprais-
als is Eric F. Goldman, "A Sort of
Rehabilitation of Warren G. Harding," The New York Times Mag-
azine, March 26, 1972, pp. 42-43, 80-88.
2. Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era:
Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis,
1969), 127-128, 376, 422, 533-534;
Robert K. Murray, The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory
and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge
Era (New York, 1973), 22-23, 41-43,
70-73; 75-78, 86-87, 93,
98-99; Andrew Sinclair, The Available
Man: The Life Behind the Masks of Warren G. Harding (Chi-
cago, 1965), 208-211, 240, 245; Francis
Russell, The Shadow of Blooming Grove: Warren G. Harding
in His Times (New York, 1968), 552-553. In spite of a generally
sensationalistic and sour treatment of
Harding, Russell does concede that the
President tried to break from his past in his last months in
office.
Dr. Accinelli is Professor of History at
the University of Toronto.
World Court 169 |
But to what extent had Harding in fact changed prior to his death? Had the burdens and frustrations of power indeed compelled him to shed old attitudes and habits? On the basis of his handling of the issue of membership in the Per- manent Court of International Justice (or World Court), there is reason to ques- tion how much he had changed. His conduct during the struggle over membership demonstrates that he had neither forsaken his conciliatory style nor enlarged his presidential role to the extent of insisting on his own viewpoint in the face of opposition from within the Senate and his own party.3 The Court issue plagued all the presidents of the interwar period, mainly be- cause of the controversy arising from the Court's connection with the League of Nations. First confronted with the issue during the 1920 campaign, Harding,
3. Among Harding scholars, Murray provides the best balanced account of the Court fight; his de- scription of the President's erratic performance is offset by his belief that by 1923 a "new" Harding had appeared who "had become aware of the need for more aggressive and dynamic diplomatic leadership." Murray, Harding Era, 368-374. The same author ignores the fight in his Politics of Nor- malcy but contends that Harding's leadership had markedly improved by late 1922. Sinclair's account of the fight emphasizes Harding's firmness of purpose and his desire to prove his independence of the Senate. Sinclair, Available Man, 274-277. According to Russell, by the last weeks of Harding's life, the Court had become "his . . . dominant and dominating" issue. "Defining himself as he never had before, moving beyond his party in his determination to become leader of his country, he was willing to stake his reputation on the World Court as Wilson had dared to stake his on the League of Nations." Russell, Shadow of Blooming Grove, 581. It is David H. Jenning's contention that the Court fight demonstrates that Harding had changed his mind about the primacy of party and the prerogatives of the Senate in foreign affairs. "President Harding and International Organization," Ohio History, LXXV (Spring-Summer 1966), 161-165. |
170
OHIO HISTORY
adroitly sidestepped the controversy in
the interest of party harmony and his own
election. Once in the White House he
continued this "hands off" approach until
February 24, 1923, when he submitted to
the Senate a proposal for membership
drafted by Secretary of State Charles
Evans Hughes. In the nearly five months
before Harding died a brouhaha erupted
which divided the Republicans and
threatened to disrupt an important phase
of the administration's foreign policy.
For a time Harding championed the
proposal, refusing to capitulate to its critics
in and out of the Senate. Ultimately,
however, his resistance crumbled under
pressure, and he reverted to a strategy
of conciliation, first by forsaking the origi-
nal proposal for an impractical
compromise plan, then by retreating into a smoke-
cloud of ambiguity.
The campaign of 1920 offered a preview
of Harding's later trouble with the
Court issue and of the conciliatory style
he would bring to the White House. By
1920 the creation of a world court had
become not just well-established Republi-
can doctrine but the method of
international cooperation most widely accepted
by the American people.4 Shortly
after the beginning of the campaign, a specially-
appointed Committee of Jurists (which
included Elihu Root, the Republican party
sage and the best known American
advocate of a court) completed a draft-scheme
for the World Court, thus making it a virtual
certainty that an international ju-
diciary would come into existence under
the auspices of the League. Dubbed the
"Root Court" by the press, the
proposed tribunal was a source of potential em-
barrassment for Harding, who was
determined to waffle on the issue of League
membership so as to keep his party
united and ensure his own election. If he em-
braced the Court he would aggravate
those Republicans who wanted him to steer
clear of the League, but if he
repudiated it he would offend those, including the
influential Root, who were not totally
out of sympathy with the League and were
pleased with the establishment of the
Court. "If a 'Root Branch', so to speak, can
be grafted upon the Wilson League,"
reported The Literary Digest in a survey of
Republican press opinion, "the
fruit of the tree will apparently be more to the
taste of many Republicans who have been
telling us not to touch or taste or han-
dle it."5 As Harding and his
advisers perceived, in order to maintain party unity
it would be necessary to devise a
formula acceptable to all factions with regard to
both the League and the Court. To take a definite
stand one way or another on
the Court without taking into account
different opinions about the League would
be politically self-defeating.6
For a time in late August, the Harding
camp considered making the Court part
of a substitute for the League. Will
Hays, the Republican campaign manager,
cabled Root (then still in Europe) for
his opinion of such a plan, only to be advised
that Harding's wisest course was not to
abandon the Versailles Treaty entirely
but to advocate an "Americanized
League" as opposed to the "Wilson League."7
4. Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World
Order (Nashville, 1969), 280, 340.
5. "A Supreme Court for Quarreling
Nations," The Literary Digest, LXVI (August 14, 1920), 17.
6. Scholars have ignored Harding's deft
management of the Court issue in the campaign. An ex-
ception is Randolph Downes, The Rise
of Warren Gamaliel Harding, 1865-1920 (Columbus, 1970),
ch. 23. My own interpretation differs
somewhat from that of Downes, who fails to appreciate that
Harding's hazy endorsement of the world
court idea was politically useful not only as an alternative
(along with the association of nations
idea) to the "Wilson League" but as a way of avoiding divisive-
ness among Republicans over relations
with the League-sponsored World Court.
7. Will Hays to Elihu Root [no date,
typescript of a telegram], Elihu Root Papers, Library of Con-
gress, hereafter cited as Root Papers;
Root to George Harvey [no date, typescript of a telegram], War-
ren G. Harding Papers, Ohio Historical
Society, hereafter cited as Harding Papers. According to Arthur
Sweetser, an American associated with
the League Secretariat who was in close contact with Root at
this time, Root felt that the Court
could not replace the League because it was limited to legal dis-
putes; he preferred to take the League
as it was, with whatever reservations were necessary, and then
improve it from within, rather than risk
chaos by destroying it. Arthur Sweetser to Eric Drummond,
August 31, 1920, Arthur Sweetser Papers,
Library of Congress.
World Court
171
By vetoing the plan outlined in the Hays
cable, Root obliged Harding to come up
with a somewhat different proposal for
international cooperation. In a speech on
August 28 the Republican nominee offered
as an alternative to the "Wilson
League," an "international
association for conference and a world court whose
verdicts upon justiciable questions this
country in common with all nations would
be willing and able to uphold."
After broadly and vaguely sketching his proposal,
Harding pledged that he would, after his
election, call a conference of the best
men in the country to formulate a plan;
until then he could not be more specific.8
For the remainder of the campaign he
played a series of variations on the themes
introduced in this address. He ignored
the "Root Court," taking no public posi-
tion on possible American membership.
Instead, he embraced the idea of a world
court and often contrasted the coercive,
politically-oriented features of the Cove-
nant with the legalist approach to
international cooperation which was the main-
stay of conservative internationalists
such as Root. Although die-hard Republican
anti-Leaguers remained apprehensive lest
he either endorse the Court or tone
down his criticism of the League now
that the Court was attached to it, Harding
did not budge from his position of
August 28th.9 To do so would have been to
upset the delicate political balance he
sought to maintain and to play into the
hands of the Democrats, who insisted
that the Court was inseparable from and
dependent on the League.10 "I am
for a Court," the Republican candidate as-
sured the powerful Henry Cabot Lodge,
"either under the original plan or, as part
of any new compact which we may make
with foreign countries, but certainly not
as an answer to our objections to the
League."1l
Following his election, Harding met with
Republican leaders in a series of
conferences at his home in Marion, Ohio.
As yet undecided about a concrete
foreign policy program, he nevertheless
took his campaign proposal seriously and
hoped to be able to implement it while
keeping his party, the public, and the Sen-
ate behind him.12 The
conferences confirmed what his campaign experiences had
already made all too obvious--to wit,
that while many Republicans could agree
on the need for a world court,
there were some who had no use at all for the World
Court and others for whom it meant a
great deal.13 When the conferences ended,
Harding's intentions with regard to the
Court were as clouded as ever, and they
remained so after he entered the White
House. Neither in his inaugural address
nor in his message to Congress on April
12 (in which he rejected League mem-
bership) did he provide any clue as to
his plans.14 For nearly two years there was
very little heard from the White House
about the World Court.
Without the assistance of Secretary of
State Charles Evans Hughes, Harding
might not have had an opportunity to
break his silence. Of all the men who headed
8. New York Times, August 29, 1920, 12:2-8.
9. Henry Cabot Lodge to Harding,
September 17, 1920, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, Massachusetts
Historical Society; Harding to Lodge,
September 1, 1920, Ibid.; Harding to Hiram Johnson, Septem-
ber 6, 1920, Hiram Johnson Papers,
Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.
10. For statements emphasizing the
relation of the Court to the League by James Cox, the Demo-
cratic presidential nominee, and by
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, see New York Times, Sep-
tember 16, 1920, 1:6, September 17,
1920, 10:8.
11. Harding to Lodge, September 20,
1920, Harding Papers.
12. Harding to Frank Brandegee, December
30, 1920, Ibid.
13. Several anti-Leaguers who talked
with Harding, among them Senator Albert Fall of New Mexi-
co and Philander Knox, the senator from
Pennsylvania and former secretary of state, were open-
minded about membership in a court,
providing it was unconnected with the League. New York Times,
December 31, 1920, 1:8, December 16,
1920, 9:1-2. Root, who naturally did not share their views,
came away from a long discussion with
Harding in mid-December in an optimistic mood, hoping that
membership in the World Court would
follow Charles Evans Hughes' installation as secretary of
state. Root to M. M. Adatci, February
22, 1921, Root Papers.
14. New York Times, March 5,
1921, 4:2, April 13, 1921, 1:8.
172 OHIO
HISTORY
the State Department between the wars,
none was more dedicated to the Court
than Hughes.15 It fell to him
to sound out the member-states belonging to the
Court as to the proper terms for
American participation and to formulate the
proposal which Harding sent to the
Senate. Harding presumably kept abreast of
progress towards a proposal, but
remained on the sidelines in this period of
preparation; as was his custom, he
acknowledged Hughes' superior talent and
expertise in foreign affairs by giving
him relatively free rein.
For more than a year, Hughes did nothing
about membership, partly because
the Court was not inaugurated until
January of 1922 but mainly because he was
preoccupied with the separate peace
treaties and the Washington Naval Confer-
ence treaties and felt compelled to
maintain the goodwill of the Senate by re-
maining aloof from the League and the
Court. He was sensitive, however, to
charges from pro-Leaguers that he was
deliberately snubbing both institutions,
and he was aware of a growing sentiment
for membership in the Court.16 On May
6, 1922, a delegation from the Federal
Council of Churches, one of the largest
groups in the peace movement, presented
him with a memorial favoring mem-
bership.17 Although Hughes
contended that entry was not immediately possible,
he not long afterwards received a letter
from a spokesman for the delegation
intimating that the Council would feel
obligated to begin a public movement for
membership even if the administration
were not prepared to act.18 Precisely what
effect the Council's stance had on
Hughes is hard to tell, but it may not have been
coincidental that several weeks later he
initiated discussions with the member-
states. In any event, his decision was
consistent with the thaw in the adminis-
tration's frigid attitude towards the
League, sufficiently advanced by mid-1922 to
permit the State Department to send
"unofficial observers" to meetings of League
agencies.
In early June the Secretary asked
William Howard Taft, then serving as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, to make inquiries about member-
ship during an upcoming visit to Great
Britain at the head of a distinguished
group of American lawyers. A leading
Republican, League sympathizer, and a
well-known advocate of a judicial
tribunal, the former President was eminently
qualified to act as a go-between. Not
wanting to work through the League or alert
the anti-Leaguers about possible
membership in the Court, Hughes chose to ap-
proach the member-states privately and
indirectly. Although this process proved
slow and somewhat awkward, it allowed
Hughes to prepare the Court proposal
without fanfare or controversy.
While in Britain, Taft spoke with Sir
Edward Grey, the former Foreign Secre-
tary, with Arthur Lord Balfour, the
British representative on the League Council,
as well as with Robert Cecil, who had
participated in drafting the League Cove-
nant, and with Walter Lord Phillimore,
who had co-authored with Root the plan
which formed the basis for the Statute
of the Court. All agreed that something
could be done to satisfy the two
conditions which Hughes believed indispensable
for membership; first, that the United
States not enter into any official relation
15. Merlo Pusey, Charles Evans
Hughes, 2 vols. (New York, 1951), II, ch. 57, is useful for Hughes'
general policy towards the Court, but
neither he nor any other author has described how Hughes
actually went about preparing the
proposal for membership.
16. Pusey, Hughes, II, 595-597.
Hughes was sensitive about his seeming indifference to the Court.
Hughes to Edwin Gay, August 1, 1922,
Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Library of Congress, hereafter
cited as Hughes Papers.
17. Memorial presented by
representatives of the Federal Council of Churches, May 6, 1922, deci-
mal files, Department of State,
Washington, D.C., 500.C114/172. Materials from State Department
files will hereafter be cited by file
number.
18. William Adams Brown to Hughes, May
15, 1922, 500.C1 14/184.
World Court 173
with the League or incur any obligations
under the Versailles Treaty; second,
that it enter as an equal with the other
member-states, having the right to partici-
pate in the election of judges. (The
Statute of the Court delegated to the Council
and Assembly of the League the right to
elect judges, which meant that the United
States would not automatically share in
this right as did other memberstates, all
of whom belonged to the League.)
Although pleased by Taft's optimistic report
after his return, Hughes remained
uncertain about the best method for securing
membership and he had no time to devote
to the problem, since he was about to
leave on an extended trip to Latin
America.19 Over the next several months it was
Taft who explored the problem in
correspondence with Cecil, Lord Phillimore,
and Root, which was turned over to
Hughes after his return.
With the benefit of the Taft
correspondence and other expert advice, Hughes
was able to formulate a proposal for
membership based on four reservations, the
two most important of which safeguarded
against any relation with the League
or Covenant and permitted participation
in the election of judges. Because of his
careful behind-the-scenes preparation,
Hughes was all but assured that the
member-states would find his terms
satisfactory and he could reasonably hope
for the Senate's approval as well. On
February 17, Hughes sent the proposal to
Harding, reminding him in a personal
note that it was consistent with his cam-
paign statements as well as with the
party platform and assuring him that the
reservations barred any entanglement
with the League.20 A week later Harding
sent the proposal to the Senate. The
upper house was caught by surprise, the only
intimation of the administration's
interest in membership having come four
months earlier in a speech by Hughes in
Boston.21 At that time Hughes had also
consulted Lodge, who remained
noncommittal.22 Neither Hughes nor Harding
apparently made any other attempt to
consult or secure the approval of other
Senate leaders regarding membership.
Moreover, Harding boldly submitted the
proposal only a day after the Senate had
rebuffed him by failing to act upon a
ship-subsidy measure which he strongly
favored. Since only six days remained
before adjournment, the Foreign
Relations Committee postponed consideration
until the next session. Hughes thought
the postponement advantageous because
it would provide a long interval in
which "all pertinent questions may be thor-
oughly discussed and public opinion find
expression."23
If Hughes anticipated a public response
which would swamp all opposition, he
soon had reason to be disappointed. The
next five months were the most turbu-
lent of Harding's presidency. Already
under fire from Republican dissidents for
his domestic views, Harding now had to
withstand an even more damaging as-
sault because of the Court proposal. Not
since the League fight had foreign af-
fairs and domestic politics combined in
such an explosive mixture.
During these months Harding pursued
membership with remarkable zeal con-
sidering his prior history of carefully
guarded ambiguity. He took personal charge
of the proposal, no longer leaving the
initiative entirely in Hughes' hands. His
public statements and private
correspondence reveal him as a well-meaning,
dedicated advocate of membership who was
convinced that the nation could as-
sist in extending the rule of law and
fulfill its obligation to the Court without de-
parting from a middle-of-the-road policy
of cooperation without entanglement.
19. William Howard
Taft to Hughes, July 21, 1922, 500.C114/236; Hughes to Taft, August 1, 1922,
Ibid.
20. Hughes to Harding,
February 17, 1923, 500.CI14/225a.
21. New York Times, February 25, 1923, 1:8.
22. Pusey, Hughes, 11, 598.
23. Hughes to John
Bassett Moore, March 16, 1923, 500.CI14/247a.
174 OHIO HISTORY |
|
If he valued membership for its own sake, he also realized that it could bring political gains as well; with the next election on the horizon, he would not want to disappoint those Americans who admired the Court or have his critics charge that his many campaign endorsements of the world court idea had been empty phrases. As he readily conceded, some sort of Court proposal was necessary as a "political gesture, to give evidence that we are keeping faith."24 Coupled with the Washington Naval Conference treaties, the proposal would demonstrate his ad- ministration's dedication to peace and non-entangling cooperation. Although the evidence is vague, it may also be that Harding considered calling another inter- national conference after the Senate acted upon the proposal, perhaps as a way of making good on his "associations of nations" pledge.25 The fact that Harding was so forthright in submitting the proposal and in as- suming personal control over it confirms the view that he had become more self- assertive by early 1923. Yet the fact remains that his enlarged conception of his
24. Harding to Jonathan Bourne, Jr., April 30, 1923, Harding Papers. 25. In one speech Harding spoke about a "voluntary conference" to bring understanding among nations and codify international law; New York Times, April 25, 1923, 2:2-5. In a letter written in mid-June but not made public until after his death, he denied that his repudiation of the League had "destroyed the hope that there may be found a way to world association and attending world under- standing." Walter Wellman, the journalist who received the letter, said that Harding was determined to have the country perform its international duty and that he wished the Court issue settled so that in the coming year he could issue invitations to a world congress. New York Times, August 27, 1923, 10:8. |
World Court 175
presidential role and the alteration in
his conciliatory style had definite limits.
As the Court controversy grew louder and
more menacing, he became uncertain
and apprehensive, with the result that
the Hughes proposal was left in the lurch
and the entire Court issue thrown into
confusion.
In his dealings with the Court's
critics, Harding always insisted that the vast
majority of Americans were on his side,
and the acclaim heaped on the proposal
seemed to indicate that he was right.
Applauded by many newspapers, the pro-
posal was also endorsed by a wide
variety of national organizations.26 A pro-
Court campaign also got underway through
the peace movement which would
soon make membership the nation's
foremost peace measure.27 Because many
peace groups were pro-League their
support was a mixed blessing for the admin-
istration, which wanted nothing more
than to divorce the League issue from the
Court proposal. Also ranging themselves
behind the proposal were most Demo-
cratic spokesmen, who thus ensured that
it would have bipartisan support. To be
sure, there were a few fervent
pro-League Democrats who sympathized with a
statement issued by Woodrow Wilson
calling for unconditional membership in the
Court and for entry into the League. Yet
most Democratic politicians realized
that there was no profit in rebuffing
the proposal, particularly since party leaders
had praised the Court during the
presidential campaign and since membership
could be construed as a step towards
closer association with the League.28 "It
looks as if we may get in [the League]
on the installment plan," quipped Senator
Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska.29 Less
charitable was the waspish Carter Glass
of Virginia, who shrugged off the
proposal as a "harmless thing, the lifting of a
hat to a passerby, so to speak."30
By minimizing the proposal's significance and
playing up the Court's relation with the
League, the Democrats knew they would
irritate the administration. They also
knew that Harding needed their votes to
attain the required two-thirds majority
in the Senate and that he had his hands
full with troublemakers in his own
party. They were content to back the proposal
in their own fashion while the
Republicans squabbled over it.
In spite of the proposal's apparent
popularity and bipartisan character, it at-
tracted a large and noisy contingent of
critics, all of them anti-Leaguers who
found membership in a "League
Court" repugnant and who feared that the closer
the United States got to Geneva, the
greater the danger of being entrapped in
the League itself. The New York
American, the premier daily in the Hearst chain,
warned that Harding was asking the
Senate to "make haste to put the United
States in a position of obedience to a
Supreme Court chosen by and controlled by
the League of Nations. Having refused to
be led into the League of Nations
through the front door, the American
people are now to be squeezed in through
the kitchen door."31 In
agreement with the Hearst press and other anti-League
newspapers were such organizations as
the Ku Klux Klan and the National Dis-
26. New York Times: May 3, 1923,
18:8 (American Federation of Labor); May 11, 1923, 8:3 (Na-
tional Chamber of Commerce); May 17,
1923, 8:1 (National Association of Manufacturers); April 18,
1923, 2:5 (National Republican Club);
April 15, 1923, 2:6 (League of Women Voters); September 1,
1923, 5:1 (American Bar Association).
27. In late May, for example, the
Federal Council of Churches appealed to over 20,000 congrega-
tions to inform their Senators of their
support, Ibid., June 1, 1923, 1:1; and in July the National Coun-
cil for the Prevention of War included
an endorsement in the platform for its "Law-Not-War" Day
which was to be celebrated in over 2,000
communities across the country, Ibid., July 28, 1923, 3:1.
28. Wilson's statement was printed in Ibid.,
April 14, 1923, 1:4.
29. Ibid., February 25, 1923,
1:8.
30. Ibid., April 25, 1923, 1:5.
31. New York American, February
28, 1923.
176 OHIO
HISTORY
abled Veteran's League as well as a trio
of well-known irreconcilables, Robert
La Follette, William E. Borah, and Hiram
Johnson.32
The protests of the anti-Courters caused
a good deal of handwringing among
administration stalwarts, who feared
that the controversy might further divide a
party already at odds over domestic
issues. Not only had the party fared poorly in
the 1922 midterm elections, but a
progressive bloc had emerged in Congress
which was expected to hold the balance
of power in the next session, and there
was talk of a third party in 1924. La
Follette, Johnson, and Borah were in vary-
ing degrees critical of the administration's
domestic program, and each was touted
as a possible presidential candidate.
Yet not only the mavericks were in revolt
against the proposal; it was likewise
denounced by two high party officials, the
chairmen of the Republican Congressional
Campaign Committee and of the Re-
publican National Committee.33 No one
was more distressed about the political
repercussions of the proposal than
Senator James Watson of Indiana, an anti-
Leaguer close to the White House, who
was reportedly working with Lodge and
Frank Brandegee of Connecticut, also an
anti-Leauger, to persuade Harding that
the controversy would split the party.34
Harding's Secretary of War, John Weeks,
was also apprehensive about the
controversy, as was Attorney-General Harry
Daugherty.35
In the face of mounting complaints and
anxiety, Harding remained steadfast
for nearly four months, refusing to
alter the proposal or to abandon the quest for
membership. To his worried secretary of
war he admitted that there were "diffi-
culties and embarrassments" arising
out of the proposal and that he was "not in-
different to the anxiety of my friends
both in and outside the administration";
nevertheless, he added, "I should
be quite without respect for myself ... if I
turned tail and ran away from it [the
proposal] because of threatening political
embarrassments. Most of the opposition
comes from men in the Senate who are
never concerned about the good fortunes
of the present administration, and not a
little of it comes from aspiring men who
are anxious to cause a division in the
party rather than think of the becoming
attitude of this republic in dealing with
the world solution of a problem which we
ourselves introduced."36
During this period Harding, along with
Hughes, Secretary of Commerce Her-
bert Hoover, and Root, laid out the case
for membership and replied to the allega-
tions of the anti-Courters in a series
of widely publicized addresses.37 In a speech in
New York before the annual luncheon of
the Associated Press, Harding denied
wanting to sneak the country into the
League "by the side door, or the back door
or the cellar door." Although
insisting that he did not want to make membership
a "party question," he
contended that the Republican party had often gone on
record in favor of a court and that
"if any party, repeatedly advocating a world
court, is to be rended by the suggestion
of an effort to perform in accordance with
32. "Seeing Ghosts in the World
Court," Current Opinion, LXXIV (May 21, 1924), 651; New York
Times, July 1, 1923, 1:2;16:2. For Borah's views see John
Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah and the
Outlawry of War (Athens, 1957), 75; for Johnson's, New York Times, March
9, 1923, 1:5;3:4, for La
Follette's, "The World Court,"
La Follette's Magazine, XV (May 1923), 68.
33. New York Times, April 21,
1923, 1:1, "The Republican Rumpus," The Literary Digest, LXXVII
(June 9, 1923), 10-11.
34. New York Times, April 25,
1923, 1:5, 8.
35. Harding to John W. Weeks, April 12,
1923, Harding Papers; Daugherty to Harding, April 24,
1923, Ibid.
36. Harding to Weeks, April 12, 1923,
Harding Papers.
37. New York Times, April 28,
1923, 2 (Hughes); April 12, 1923, 1:1; 6:1-4 (Hoover); April 27,
1923, 7:1 (Root).
World Court
177
its pledges, it needs a new appraisal of
its assets."38
The national response to this speech
pleased Hughes and Hoover, whose sup-
port of Harding's position helped offset
the protests from critics and doubters,
and the President himself thought that
"on the whole" the proposal was now "in
pretty good shape."39 In
order to avoid unnecessary controversy, Harding kept
his own public statements to a minimum
for the next several months, but he con-
tinued to solicit support in numerous
personal letters, in what amounted to his
own private campaign of persuasion.
Directed at influential citizens on both sides
of the issue, the letters left no doubt
that his heart was set on membership and
that he was anxious to remove objections
arising from the Court's relation to the
League.40
In the weeks following the Associated
Press speech, the controversy, instead of
abating, grew more intense. There were
reports that Borah planned to join with
La Follette and George Moses, the New
Hampshire irreconcilable and chairman
of the Senate Campaign Committee, in a
summer campaign against the pro-
posal.41 Even more
dismaying was a letter from Lodge to the Governor of Mis-
souri, made public on April 29, warning
that the Court's relations with the League,
particularly in the election of judges,
posed such serious difficulties that the Sen-
ate might not be content with the Hughes
reservations.42 The Massachusetts
senator was only one of seven Republican
members of the Foreign Relations
Committee who either disapproved of the
proposal or had doubts about it.43 Fol-
lowing a visit to the White House,
Watson of Indiana reported that about twenty-
two senators were disinclined to accept
membership without reservations mak-
ing it plain that the country was not
entering the League.44 Of the few Senate Re-
publicans siding publicly with the
administration, not one was of the stature of
Borah, Lodge, or La Follette. The
proposal's future in the Senate was uncertain
at best. Meanwhile as the controversy
grew more divisive, farm protest raged
through the prairie states, rumors of
scandal gathered around the administration,
and dissension persisted among
Republicans because of domestic issues.
It was under these circumstances that
Harding made an unexpected and un-
wise about-face on the Court issue. Some
time before departing on his "voyage
to understanding" to Alaska on June
20, he decided that a compromise was in
order. Having tried unsuccessfully to
allay fears about the consequences of mem-
bership in the "League Court,"
he sought to quiet them once and for all by rec-
ommending a separation of the Court from
the League. His compromise plan
called upon the League to give up its
administrative relation with the Court, its
exclusive right to request advisory
opinions, and its role in the elections of judges.
The member-states would either conduct
elections apart from the League or,
38. Ibid., April 25, 1923, 2:2-5.
Harding told a friend that his speech was intended to "clarify the
atmosphere" and that he was
especially concerned about "quietly divorcing the International Court
from the League of Nations
proposition." He thought he had done so when the proposal was submitted,
but it now appeared that "a good
many extremists have so persistently urged that this is the beginning
of a fellowship in the League that the
whole situation has been greatly embarrassed." Harding to John
A. Stewart, April 19, 1923. Harding
Papers.
39. Hughes to Harding, April 26, 1923,
Hughes Papers; Hoover to Lewis H. Smith, April 25, 1923,
Herbert Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library, West Branch, hereafter cited as Hoover
Papers; Harding to Nicholas Murray
Butler, May 1, 1923, Harding Papers.
40. The letters went to acquaintances
and prominent citizens such as Mrs. Thomas Winters, an
official of the National Federation of
Women's Clubs, Harding to Winters, May 3, 1923, Harding Pa-
pers; and Frank Munsey,
anti-League editor of the New York Herald, Harding to Munsey, May 12,
1923, Ibid.
41. New York Times, May 16, 1923,
21:1-2.
42. Ibid., April 29, 1923, 1:1;
3:1.
43. Ibid., May 16, 1923, 21:1,
May 22, 1923, 4:2.
44. Ibid., June 7, 1923, 21:4.
178
OHIO HISTORY
alternatively, have the judges fill
vacancies with appointees of their own choice.
According to George Harvey, the
anti-League Ambassador to Great Britain who
drafted the plan, Harding was determined
to secure membership, but he wanted
to avoid an inevitable disaster for his
party by uniting it behind a compromise. If
the Democrats rejected the new
arrangement, Harding believed they would re-
veal their insincerity about membership
and forfeit public support.45 It seems
clear that the beleaguered President was
prepared to make major concessions to
the anti-Court faction in order to keep
the party together and to facilitate Senate
approval of membership. Once these
critics were silenced, there were only the
Democrats to worry about, and they
presumably would find it awkward to reject
the compromise without appearing to
place their loyalty to the League ahead of
their support for the Court. As for the
member-states, Harding must have been
persuaded that they would accept his
recommendations for the sake of American
membership. He had been assured by
Harvey that the British would approve
taking the election of judges out of the
hands of the League, and the ambassador
may have offered similar guarantees
about other important member-states as
well. To what extent, if any, Harding
consulted with Hughes about the new plan
is unknown, but it is possible that he
accepted it over Hughes' objection. Accord-
ing to an associate in the State
Department, Hughes approved of the new method
for electing judges but expressed
"considerable doubt whether it would be prac-
ticable from a world point of
view."46 Not one to ignore political realities or the
opinion of the Senate, the secretary
nonetheless could not have been pleased
with a decision to substitute a
cumbersome, hastily conceived compromise for a
proposal to which he had given thorough
consideration and which would satisfy
the member-states.
At St. Louis, the first stop on his
cross-country journey, Harding introduced
the new plan to a convocation of ten
thousand Rotarians and a nationwide radio
audience. Disingenuously describing the
plan as an amplification of his original
proposal rather than as a compromise, he
stated that with the Senate's permis-
sion he would begin negotiations with
the member-states in the expectation that
they would understand that he wanted
membership in a genuine world court and
on an equal basis and without loss of
sovereignty. Turning to the Court critics, he
stated that he was "interested in
harmonizing opposing elements" and that he
was "more anxious to effect our
helpful commitment to the court" than he was
"to score a victory for executive
insistence."
I shall not attempt to coerce the Senate
of the United States. I shall make no demand
upon the people. I shall not try to
impose my will upon anybody or any person. I shall em-
bark on no crusade.47
Clearly this was not the militant
Harding of the Associated Press address who
45. Shortly alter Harding died, Harvey
revealed to Calvin Coolidge that he was the author of the
compromise plan. See his memorandum of a
conversation with Coolidge in Willis F. Johnson, George
Harvey: "A Passionate
Patriot" (Boston, 1929), 395. In
another memorandum presented to Coolidge
at that time he outlined the strategy
behind the plan. "The United States and the World Court", en-
closure in Harvey to the President [Coolidge], August
17, 1923, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library of
Congress.
46. The Diary of William Phillips
[unpublished], June 22, July 6, 1923, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, hereafter cited as Phillips
Diary. Phillips, an Assistant Secretary of State, believed that
Harding's "idea was that if the
Court was self-appointing he might be able to keep the irreconcilables
in line, otherwise our participation
would be doomed; [n.d.], Ibid.
47. James W. Murphy, comp., Speeches
and Addresses of Warren G. Harding, President of the
United States, Delivered During the
Course of His Tour from Washington, D.C., to Alaska and Re-
turn to San Francisco, June 20 to
August 2, 1923 (privately published,
1923), 3747 (hereafter cited as
Harding's Last Speeches).
World Court 179 |
|
spoke, but Harding the conciliator, mindful of the discord in his party, respectful of the Senate, ready to meet his anti-League critics half way. The kindest judgment one can pass on the St. Louis plan is that it was a well- intentioned blunder. While the compromise did silence some anti-Courters, Borah among them, others continued to assail membership, including Johnson and the Hearst press.48 Beside raising doubts among pro-Court Republicans, the plan angered the Democrats, who damned it as impracticable and harmful to the, Court.49 Membership had become a partisan issue and Harding had jeopardized Democratic votes which were indispensable to the passage of any proposal for membership. Signs of distress also appeared in the peace movement; one pro- Courter informed Hughes that the plans of his group for a newspaper poll were collapsing because of opposition to the speech in both parties.50 In the highly un- likely event that the plan had succeeded in uniting the country and the Senate, it
48. New York Times, June 29, 1923, 10:2; "Hiram Johnson's Opening Gun," The Literary Digest, LXXVIII (August 4, 1923), 16; New York American, June 23, 18:1-2. 49. New York Timers, July 1, 1923, VII, 1:3-5. 50. Samuel Colcord to Hughes, August 2, 1923, Hughes Papers. |
180
OHIO HISTORY
still would have foundered because of
objections from the member-states, who
would have been loathe to sever the
Court from the League.51
Unfortunately, Harding's own assessment
of the response to the St. Louis plan
is unknown. Nevertheless it is
significant that he continued to affirm his desire
for membership to audiences on his
"voyage to understanding," but never again
referred to the compromise nor to the
original proposal.52 This suggests that he
thought it expedient to accentuate the
need for membership rather than dwell on
the vexing issue of precisely what terms
he endorsed. Returning to the strategy
of his presidential campaign, he took
refuge in ambiguity so as to protect himself
from politically harmful dissent and
provide time in which to determine a proper
course of action. What course he would
have chosen had he lived there is no way
of telling, but in a major address he
was to have delivered in San Francisco he
intimated that his primary concern was
to find a reasonable and acceptable
method for entry without insisting on
having his own way:
As President, speaking for the United
States, I am more interested in adherence to such
a tribunal [the World Court] in the
best form attainable, than I am concerned about the
triumph of Presidential insistence. The big thing is the firm establishment of the court
and
our cordial adherence thereto. All
else is mere detail. No matter what the critics may say,
we have the obligation of duly
recognizing constituted authority, and I had rather have the
Senate grant its support and have the
United States favor the permanent court than pro-
long a controversy and defeat the
main purpose. I respect the Senate
precisely as I would
have it respect the Presidency, and I
can appraise opposition which is conscientiously in-
spired.53
Still faithful to the principle of
membership, Harding clearly preferred to build
agreement through cooperation with the
Senate, thereby avoiding the contro-
versy a militant strategy would produce.
It is evident from Harding's behavior in the last phase of the
conflict that he
reverted to a strategy of
consensus-building and deference to the power and pre-
rogatives of the Senate which he would
not have considered inappropriate when
he entered the White House. No doubt
recalling Wilson's defeat on the League
issue, he chose to be a conciliator
rather than a crusader. This was a familiar and
comfortable role which had proved
effective in the past in managing the Court
issue. During the 1920 campaign he had
defused the issue by means of a nebu-
lous endorsement of a world court; once
in office, he kept quiet about the issue,
leaving it to Hughes to choose the appropriate
time and method for transforming
the endorsement into concrete policy. It
was a sign of self-assurance and de-
termination on Harding's part that he
submitted the proposal without the ad-
vance approval of Senate leaders and on
the heels of a serious setback in the
upper house on a high-priority domestic
measure. For a time after the controversy
51. Phillips was informed by the French
Ambassador that the member-states would never consent
to the plan. Phillips himself felt that
Harding, in addition to having made membership impossible, had
enormously weakened the nation's
prestige by "giving away so palpably to the irreconcilables";
Phillips
Diary, June 25, 1923.
52. For Harding's remarks about the
Court while on his journey see Murphy, Harding's Last
Speeches.
53. Ibid., 385, italics added.
The San Francisco speech was prepared by the White House staff in
Washington and reached the presidential
party at Vancouver. With Harding's approval, Hoover made
some changes "pledging his
administration to the World Court and to a larger degree of world co-
operation in maintaining peace which I
knew Secretary Hughes would approve." Herbert Hoover,
The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 2 vols. (New York, 1952), II, 50. In a memorandum,
"President
Harding's Last Illness and Death,"
dated August 25, 1923, Hoover noted that the speech seemed to
be much on Harding's mind and that he
thought it his most important message on foreign relations;
the memorandum is in the Hoover Papers.
World Court 181
began, he stood his ground, offering
additional proof of a more activist presi-
dential style by taking the proposal
under his own care and by making a substan-
tial contribution to efforts to rally
public support and disarm the proposal's critics.
But as the struggle grew more heated,
the party fell into greater disarray and the
proposal's prospects in the Senate grew
dimmer-all this with a presidential
election in the following year. At St.
Louis Harding took remedial action to silence
anti-League critics and make membership
more palatable to Republican sena-
tors. His compromise plan, while offered
in good faith and under trying circum-
stances, provoked partisan conflict with
the Democrats and jeopardized the
membership he sought to assure. From the
St. Louis speech to his death less
than a month later, conciliation and
ambiguity were the keynotes of Harding's
approach to the Court issue. His San
Francisco statement resembled his 1920
position in its avoidance of specifics
and its insistence on cooperation with the
Senate as opposed to its conformity with
his own viewpoint. His performance in
this final test of his leadership
reveals a President who had, indeed, grown in de-
termination and initiative, yet who
remained a harmonizer, intent on quieting
discord in his own party and on
cooperating with, rather than dictating to, the
Senate. On the Court issue it was the
"old" Harding who gained the upper hand
in the end.
ROBERT D. ACCINELLI
Was There a "New" Harding?
Warren G. Harding and the
World Court Issue, 1920-1923
In the past ten years a revised, more
flattering image of Warren G. Harding and
his administration has appeared in
historical writing.1 Although many historians
still hold the Harding presidency in low
esteem, a group of revisionists has sought
to upgrade its reputation. These
revisionists do not agree in all respects about
either Harding or his administration,
but they have produced more positive evalu-
ations than previous interpretations.
Their writings indicate that the adminis-
tration, while not without its glaring
defects, had its fair share of accomplish-
ments and originated domestic and
foreign policies which persisted well into the
1920s. Harding himself, once judged a
flat failure and the worst chief executive
in the nation's history, is depicted as
an earnest, hardworking, politically shrewd
President of modest talent and moderate
views-one of the lesser men to occupy
the White House, but not necessarily the
worst.
Refusing to dismiss Harding as an
incompetent, do-nothing President, a num-
ber of writers have contended that he
became increasingly more confident, inde-
pendent, and assertive during his
abbreviated stay in office, and that he signifi-
cantly altered his style of leadership
and his conception of the presidency. They
have argued that upon entering office he
intended to govern in close cooperation
with Congress, his cabinet, and party
leaders, acting as a counselor and concili-
ator rather than as a dynamic chief
executive in the tradition of Theodore Roose-
velt or Woodrow Wilson. His Whiggish
conception of the presidential office and
of executive-congressional relations,
his own personal insecurity and easy-going
nature, and his affinity for harmony
inclined him towards a non-aggressive po-
litical style suited for achieving
consensus and reducing friction. As a result,
however, of a heightened sense of the
responsibilities of his office, greater po-
litical maturity, and the frustration of
coping with a divided and often hostile
Congress, he shifted to a more
forthright posture and came to display greater
initiative and determination in
advancing his domestic and foreign program. By
late 1922 he had become bolder and more
hard-hitting--a "new" Harding had
taken command in the White House.2
1. Louis W. Potts, "Who Was Warren
G. Harding?" The Historian, XXXVI (August 1974), 621-
645, is an excellent survey of
perspectives on Harding since his death. Also helpful for recent apprais-
als is Eric F. Goldman, "A Sort of
Rehabilitation of Warren G. Harding," The New York Times Mag-
azine, March 26, 1972, pp. 42-43, 80-88.
2. Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era:
Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis,
1969), 127-128, 376, 422, 533-534;
Robert K. Murray, The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory
and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge
Era (New York, 1973), 22-23, 41-43,
70-73; 75-78, 86-87, 93,
98-99; Andrew Sinclair, The Available
Man: The Life Behind the Masks of Warren G. Harding (Chi-
cago, 1965), 208-211, 240, 245; Francis
Russell, The Shadow of Blooming Grove: Warren G. Harding
in His Times (New York, 1968), 552-553. In spite of a generally
sensationalistic and sour treatment of
Harding, Russell does concede that the
President tried to break from his past in his last months in
office.
Dr. Accinelli is Professor of History at
the University of Toronto.