JAMES E. HANEY
Blacks and the Republican
Nomination of 1908
Theodore Roosevelt's decision not to
seek the Republican presidential nomina-
tion in 1908 left the field open to
several Republican hopefuls, but his influence in
the party and control of its machinery
made it clear that the candidate he sup-
ported would win the nomination as well
as the national election that followed.
This was especially important when it is
remembered that national politics dur-
ing the first decade of the twentieth
century was dominated by the Republican
party. As a minority party, the
Democrats offered the American people only sec-
tional candidates with little or no
national appeal.
There were several Republicans whose
national reputations and positions on
the major issues of the day caused
Roosevelt to consider them as serious con-
tenders for the party's nomination in
1908. The leading contenders were Charles
E. Hughes, governor of New York, and two
members of the Cabinet, Secretary
of State Elihu Root and Secretary of War
William H. Taft. Hughes, Root, and
Taft were followed by Senator Joseph B.
Foraker of Ohio whose presidential
ambitions were on the rise with the
approach of the party's national convention in
June.
Hughes, one of the leading reform
governors of the nation, first gained na-
tional attention in 1905 as counsel for
the "Armstrong Committee," a legislative
committee of the New York State Senate
investigating insurance and related
frauds. Partly as a result of the diligent
work he performed as counsel, the As-
sembly passed a number of laws which
extended greater protection to insurance
policy holders, attempted to prohibit
corporations from making political contribu-
tions and influencing the outcome of
elections, and curtailed the activities of
lobbyists and special interest groups.
More important for the nomination in 1908,
however, was the fact that Hughes was
able to parlay his role in these investiga-
tions into a victory over the New York
Republican machine of Benjamin Odell
for the party's gubernatorial nomination
in 1906. As a candidate for governor,
Hughes had the support of the national
administration; President Roosevelt sent
Secretary Root to Utica to deliver an
address in Hughes' behalf which some his-
torians contend played an important role
in the outcome of the election.1
Although he had helped to elect Hughes
governor of New York in 1906, Roose-
velt felt he would not make a good
presidential candidate and could not compare
1. Harold Gosnell, Boss Platt and His New York Machine; A Study of the Political Leadership of
Thomas C. Platt, Theodore Roosevelt, and Others (New York, 1924), 277-284; Philip C. Jessup,
Elihu Root, 2 vols.
(New York, 1938),
118-123.
Dr. Haney is Assistant
Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.
208 OHIO HISTORY |
|
with Root or Taft "either morally, intellectually, or in knowledge of public poli- cies." Roosevelt believed that the best course to pursue in reference to Hughes' political ambitions was to help reelect him as governor in 1908. He might be de- feated by the Democrats, the President confided in a friend, "but whether he is beaten or not, his nomination will strengthen the national ticket, not only in New York, but in a good many other states as well."2 Roosevelt further believed that if the New York machine nominated someone else, a person not identified with reform, it would have a bad effect on the national ticket and might undermine his attempt to get progressive reform measures through Congress. It also appears Roosevelt wished to intervene in New York on Hughes' behalf more out of con- tempt for the "bosses" than out of respect for Hughes as a reformer. Roosevelt believed he would be helping to undermine the same gang of machine politicians who had opposed his own programs during his governorship of the state in 1899.3 Unlike Hughes, Senator Foraker numbered among the President's enemies. He was therefore considered a long shot for the nomination by the many blacks who supported him in appreciation of his defense of the 167 black soldiers of the
2. Theodore Roosevelt to "Athos" [Elihu Root], Washington, August 15, 1908, Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 128. 3. Hughes' reform candidacy was opposed by the New York Republican machine of Thomas C. Platt. While Roosevelt was governor, Platt opposed his efforts at civil service reform and reform of the state's penal code. Platt was also behind the move to have Roosevelt selected by the Republican party as McKinley's Vice-President in 1900 in the belief that he was helping to bury him politically as well as helping to diminish his influence in New York politics. For more on the various disagree- ments between Roosevelt and Platt, see Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 53, 94, 105, 118, 145-146. |
Blacks and Republicans
209
25th Infantry whom Roosevelt had
dishonorably discharged in November 1906,
for their alleged involvement in a
disturbance in Brownsville, Texas. The en-
suing controversy between the two men
over what became known as the "Browns-
ville Affair" made it unlikely that
Roosevelt would endorse Foraker for the nomi-
nation. He believed Foraker had little
or no moral scruples and was simply play-
ing the Brownsville incident for its
sensationalism and the mileage he could get
out of it for the nomination in 1908.
Roosevelt's energies before the convention in
June were directed more at trying to
keep Foraker from receiving the nomination
than they were in having his own man
selected. Despite this, Foraker's candidacy
remained strong, especially among blacks
who regarded him as their agent in
repudiating Roosevelt's summary
dismissal of their soldiers.4
With Hughes and Foraker eliminated as
candidates he could possibly support
for the nomination, Roosevelt's choice
boiled down to Root or Taft. Root, he be-
lieved, would make the best President,
but Taft the best candidate.5 While Root
might have been his first choice for the
nomination, Roosevelt was convinced, as
was Root, that he would make a poor
candidate because of his image as a "Wall
Street Lawyer." His candidacy, the
President feared, would not be acceptable
to many Republicans in the West who were
injured in the general economic re-
cession of 1907.6 Taft, like Root,
supported Roosevelt's policies but was less than
enthusiastic about the prospects of
seeking the nomination. Contending that he
was not a politician in the traditional
sense of wishing to become President, he
said he wanted to avoid the rough and
tumble of convention politics and longed
to retire to "a contemplative
position," perhaps as a member of the Supreme
Court (a position he would later hold)
after his tenure in the War Department.7
Taft was unduly modest. It was generally
known after 1906 that President
Roosevelt was grooming him as his
successor, although he received no "absolute
commitments" from the President to
that effect until May of that year. This oc-
curred following a long conversation at
the White House on the party's prospects
in 1908. After his talk with Roosevelt
the secretary wrote his wife that during
their interview he had found Roosevelt
"full of the presidency and wanted to talk
about my chances." He went on to
delight her by noting Roosevelt thought he was
the one "to take his mantle"
and believed he could be nominated and elected
with few difficulties.8
After Roosevelt decided on Taft as his
successor, arrangements were made to
increase his support in the South. Both
men knew an important ingredient in win-
ning the nomination was the control of
the Southern delegations from the eleven
former Confederate states that attended
the national convention. These states
at times controlled as many as one-third
of the votes necessary for a victory in
the convention. Since the disputed
Hayes-Tilden election in 1876, when the Re-
publican party agreed to an official end
of Reconstruction in the South, almost all
Republican presidential hopefuls wrote
off the South as far as its support in the
national election was concerned,
conceding the entire section to what was de-
veloping into a "solid South"
where the Democrats controlled practically the
4. Cleveland
Gazette, December 8, 15, 29, 1906, January 19, 26, March 9, 16,
April 13, 20, 1907.
5. Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 123.
President Roosevelt was quoted as saying that if he "had the power
of a dictator he would appoint Elihu
Root President, and Secretary of War Taft as Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court." Herman H.
Kohlsatt, From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recollections of Our
Presidents (New York,
1923), 161-162.
6. Jessup, Elihu Root, 11,
123.
7. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William H.
Taft, 2 vols. (New
York, 1939), 1, 337, 342;
Kohlsatt, From McKinley to Harding, 161-162.
8. William H. Taft to Mrs. Taft,
Washington, May 4. 1906, Jessup, Elihu Root, 11, 123; Kohlsatt,
From McKinley to Harding, 161-162.
210 OHIO
HISTORY
entire Congressional delegations to
Washington by the turn of the century. Never-
theless, they all recognized that, while
they stood a chance of winning the na-
tional election without carrying a
single Southern state, they could not win the
Republican nomination without strong
support from the South in their national
convention.
It was the realization of this political
peculiarity that prompted Taft to write in
one of his letters after he admitted his
candidacy "that the South has been the
section of rotten boroughs in Republican
politics," and it would be a delight to
him "if no Southern state were
permitted to have a vote in the national conven-
tion except in proportion to its
Republican vote in national elections." But, he
quickly added, "when a man is
running for the Presidency...he cannot ignore the
tremendous influence, however undue,
that the Southern vote has and he must
take the best way he can honorably to
secure it."9 It was also the realization of
the "tremendous influence" the
South had in the national convention that
prompted Roosevelt to persuade Frank H.
Hitchcock, First Assistant Postmaster
General and specialist in the management
of Southern delegations, to resign his
position and work full time in the
interest of Taft's candidacy in the South.10
In the meantime, Taft was doing his best
to encourage his own candidacy in
the South. In August 1906, he made his
first public appeal for Southern support
when he went to North Carolina to
address a session of the state legislature at
Greensboro. The national press billed
the address as his "keynote" for the Re-
publican nomination. Although addressing
a Democratic legislature, he directed
most of his attention to the
"lilywhite" Republican sentiment that was rapidly
spreading throughout the Republican
party in the South. Lilywhite Republicans
were those Republicans who had
cooperated with blacks before the latter were
disfranchised in the various Southern
states, but after that event, were willing to
join hands with Southern Democrats who
sought to remove blacks from all po-
sitions of influence in Southern
politics. Such Republicans were frequently desig-
nated "lilywhites," especially
by black newspaper editors, to distinguish them
from "White Republicans" who
stood on the same platform of black political
rights as William Lloyd Garrison,
Abraham Lincoln, and Charles Sumner. The
lilywhites' influence grew stronger in North
Carolina following the constitutional
disfranchisement of more than ninety per
cent of the state's black voters in 1901.
Some lilywhite Republicans in North
Carolina, like those in several other
Southern states where the black voters
were constitutionally disfranchised by
1906 (Mississippi, South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Alabama) favored removing
the remaining small percentages of black
voters who still met the suffrage re-
quirements; but most were concerned only
with eliminating those influential
black political leaders scattered
throughout the state, many of whom had received
presidential appointments for their
active support of the party throughout the
North following the general
disfranchisement of their people. All who supported
the doctrine of "lilywhitism"
agreed that in order for the Republican party to at-
tract more white independent and
Democratic support, in the words of one, "the
Negro must go."11
In his address to the North Carolina
legislature, Taft took a position on black
suffrage and on the place of the race in
Southern politics that was designed to
9. Taft to W. R. Nelson, Washington,
January 18, 1908, Pringle, The Life and Times of William H.
Taft, 1, 347.
10. George H. Mayer, The Republican
Party, 1854-1964 (New York, 1964), 301; Pringle, The Life
and Times of William H. Taft, I, 347.
11. John R. Lynch, The Facts of
Reconstruction (New York, 1970), 239-323; Washington Bee,
July 4, 28, 1906; Cleveland Gazette, September
1, 1905; Adams to Roosevelt, July 12, 1906, Theodore
Roosevelt Manuscript Collection, Library
of Congress. Hereafter cited as Roosevelt Papers.
Blacks and Republicans 211
please North Carolina lilywhite
Republicans. Perhaps he hoped to give encour-
agement to those in Georgia who were
working closely with the Democrats to
disfranchise black voters. While Taft
did not support black disfranchisement
through the various frauds perpetrated
by the disfranchisement constitutions-
he said that he favored a restricted
franchise where the educated and property
holding portion of the race would be
allowed to vote-he believed their suffrage
would have to be protected through
judicial action on the part of the Supreme
Court rather than through any
legislative action that might be initiated by Con-
gress.12 This position placed
him in opposition to such earlier efforts as the de-
feated Lodge Federal Election, or
"Force Bill," of 1890 where the Republican
party made its last serious attempt to
enforce black suffrage in the South through
the use of federal police to protect
those who were driven from the polls by fraud,
intimidation, or violence. In addition,
many believed the Secretary's position on
black suffrage in the South meant he
would not insist on enforcing section two
of the Fourteenth Amendment should he
become President. This section required
Congress to reduce the representation in
the House of those states that reduced
their voting rolls by disfranchising any
portion of their citizens.13
In addition to his views on black
suffrage and his attitude toward the enforce-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Taft's
part in the Brownsville Affair also
enhanced his popularity among a large
number of Southern Republicans since
Roosevelt's dismissal order and the War
Department's issuance of the order
caused many to link their names when
they discussed the incident. In all fairness
to Taft, however, it must be noted that
he did not initially approve of the order
and had tried to get the President to
modify or withdraw it before it was made
public.14
But when Roosevelt insisted on removing
the soldiers from the army, Taft sup-
ported the decision through many of his
letters and public utterances on the sub-
ject, declaring on one occasion that he
believed the order "was fully sustained by
the facts."15 When
Foraker's Senate Investigating Committee on Brownsville
issued its Minority Report on the Affair
in April 1908, which criticized the lack of
concrete evidence used by the President
and the War Department in dismissing
the soldiers, it was Taft who suggested
that Roosevelt send a special team of pri-
vate investigators, at a cost of $1500,
to Brownsville to seek out "additional evi-
dence" that might be used to prove
a stronger link between the soldiers and the
Brownsville disturbance.16
If Taft's views on black suffrage, the
reduction of Southern representation in
the House, and the Brownsville Affair
made his candidacy popular among many
Southern Republicans, these same views
caused many black Republicans in the
North, especially those in Ohio,
Massachusetts, and New York, to oppose his
selection as the party's nominee. Black
opposition to his nomination was strong-
est among black newspapers such as the Cleveland
Gazette, the New York Age,
and the Boston Guardian, all of
which supported Foraker because of his Browns-
ville stand in defense of the 25th
Infantry. These newspapers and their editors
12. Cleveland Gazette, July 21,
1906, New York Age, July 12, 1906.
13. Washington Bee, July 4, 28,
1906; Cleveland Gazette, September 1, March 25. 1905, July 21.
1906.
14. Washington Bee, November
10, December 17, 1906, Cleveland Gazette, July 21, November
21, 1906, January 12, 19, March 9, 16,
30, 1907.
15. Taft to Roosevelt, Washington, July
7, 1907; Pringle, The Life and Times of
William H. Taft,
1, 327.
16. Joseph B. Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 2 vols.
(Cincinnati, 1917), II, 246; Everett Walters,
Joseph Benson Foraker: An
Uncompromising Republican (Columbus, 1948), 244; James A. Tinsley.
"Roosevelt, Foraker, and the
Brownsville Affray," Journal of Negro History, LV (1956), 43-44.
212 OHIO HISTORY
were joined in their opposition by a
number of black protest organizations, in-
cluding the Niagara Movement, the
Afro-American League, and the Boston Con-
stitutional League.
The earliest opposition to Taft came
from the Niagara Movement, a black pro-
test movement organized in 1905 by W. E.
B. DuBois, who, after the 1903 publi-
cation of his Souls of Black Folk, became
one of the most persistent critics among
black leaders of the Republican party's
attitude toward his race's constitutional
rights. DuBois was also critical of the
national leadership of Booker T. Washing-
ton whom he charged was willing to
compromise black civil and political rights
for the advancement of his own
ideological or personal position within the country
and party. Meeting in their third annual
session in Boston in September 1907,
DuBois and members of the Niagara
Movement addressed an appeal to the
"500,000 free black voters of the
North," giving them political directions in refer-
ence to the Republican nomination in
1908. They were told to work against Taft's
nomination or that of any other
"Brownsville Republican" who had supported
Roosevelt's dismissal of the soldiers.
Should one of these win the nomination, the
appeal continued, then blacks should
work against their candidacy during the
election, even if it meant a Democratic
victory. This position supported DuBois'
contention that an avowed enemy of the
race was better than a false friend.17
Several leaders of the Niagara Movement
continued their organization's oppo-
sition to Taft after their annual
session in Boston. The Reverend Reverdy Ran-
som of New York, editor of the A.M.E.
Church Review, denounced Roosevelt's
economic policies and warned his people
against Taft in an address in 1908.
Speaking before a large gathering in
Philadelphia, Ransom accused Roosevelt of
allowing blacks and poor people to
suffer during the economic recession of 1907,
stating that because of Roosevelt's
economic policies, "starvation stood in the
door of every man and conditions would
be no better if Taft were elected in his
place."18 This same
theme was echoed in Boston where William M. Trotter, edi-
tor of the Boston Guardian and
one of the founders of the Niagara Movement,
led the way in organizing the National
Negro American Political League to op-
pose Taft's nomination and election in 1908.19
Finally, in Taft's own home state of
Ohio black Republicans of Cleveland or-
ganized the Ohio branch of the
Afro-American Council. This organization best
summarized the race's opposition to Taft
as the party's nominee when it included
as one of the first items on its agenda
a petition to be circulated among the city's
black population and carried to the
convention in Chicago. The petition opposed
Taft because of his Greensboro address
dealing with black suffrage and the re-
duction of Southern representation and
because of some of his public statements
on Brownsville where he accused the
soldiers of being guilty before they were
tried in court. It called upon blacks in
Ohio and throughout the nation to join the
League in its efforts to defeat Taft or
any other Republican whom Roosevelt sup-
ported for the nomination.20
The opposition to Taft's selection by
black newspapers and protest organiza-
tions prompted President Roosevelt to
resort to a familiar Republican tactic of
giving a few black politicians a
presidential appointment in order to bring the
race back into its traditional alliance
with the Republican party. While there were
17. Chicago Broad Ax, September
7, 1907; Baltimore Afro-American, September 15, 1907; see also
Elliott M. Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBois:
Propagandist of the Negro Protest (New York, 1969), 102-103.
18. New York Age, February 20,
1908.
19. Boston Guardian, April 11,
1908; Washington Bee, April 11, June 13, 1908; see also Stephen
R. Fox, The Guardian of Boston:
William M. Trotter (New York, 1971), 110-112.
20. Cleveland Gazette, April 18,
1908.
Blacks and Republicans 213
several instances of Roosevelt's use of
this tactic during his first administration,21
the best illustration in the controversy
surrounding Taft's nomination occurred
over the appointment of a black in Ohio,
the home state of both Foraker and Taft
where black opposition to the
Brownsville decision was perhaps the strongest.
In addition to using his power of
appointment to influence black public opinion in
Taft's favor, Roosevelt also attempted
to strike at Senator Foraker for his oppo-
sition to the dismissal of the 25th
Infantry.
Several days after he delivered his
message to Congress on the Brownsville
Affair--where he justified his
constitutional authority and defended his moral
position in dismissing the
soldiers--Roosevelt wrote Booker T. Washington, the
famous black educator of Tuskegee
Institute in Alabama. Washington had served
as one of his advisors on black
patronage since the controversial Washington-
Roosevelt White House Dinner in October,
1901.22 The President requested from
him "the names of two or three
first-class men in Ohio, men who were good Re-
publicans, in addition to men of the
highest character who would be up to the
standards of an Internal Revenue
Collector" in the state. He was explicit in ref-
erence to the location of the proposed
appointment, instructing Washington to
send him the name of "a first-class
colored man from Cincinnati,"23 the home
and political base of both Foraker and
Taft.
For the prospective appointment in
Cincinnati, Washington recommended
Ralph W. Tyler, a journalist from
Columbus who had more than twenty years
of work as a newspaper correspondent,
including some work on two of the white
dailies of Columbus, the Columbus
Dispatch and the Ohio State Journal. Wash-
ington arranged an interview at the
White House for Tyler that was attended by
Roosevelt and his Private Secretary,
William Loeb.24 During the interview the
President asked Tyler, as he had asked
Washington, for the names of two black
applicants besides himself whom he could
nominate and expect the Senate to
confirm as Collector of the Port of
Cincinnati. Tyler hesitated before answering,
insisting that the President should not
think of nominating any of the black poli-
ticians from Cincinnati for the position
since the loyalty of most of them toward
his administration could be questioned.
Most of them, he said, were closely con-
nected with Foraker and, for the most
part, had supported him on Brownsville.
Roosevelt next wanted to know whether
the two Senators from the state, For-
aker and Charles Dick of Akron, would
support Tyler's confirmation in the Sen-
ate if he were nominated as Collector of
Cincinnati. Realizing that one of the pur-
poses for appointing a black man in
Cincinnati was to undercut Foraker's grow-
ing appeal to many blacks in Ohio,25
Tyler replied that while he felt he could get
Senator Dick's endorsement for a
position in Cincinnati or Washington, he would
21. Roosevelt used his power of
appointment during his first administration to bring blacks around
to support the Republican party in
several states including Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North
Carolina, and South Carolina. For
additional information see Booker T. Washington to Roosevelt,
November 6, 1901, Roosevelt Papers; J.
A. Smythe to George B. Cortelyou, November 10, 1902, E. J.
Scott to W. D. Crum, April 21, 1904,
Washington to Charles Anderson, December 23, 1904, Booker T.
Washington Manuscript Collection,
Library of Congress. Hereafter cited as Washington Papers.
Washington Bee, January 8, 1905; New York Age, March 9,
16, 30, 1905.
22. When Roosevelt became President
after McKinley's assassination in September 1901, he in-
vited Washington to the White House for
consultation on various social and political matters in the
South. During their meeting, lunch was
served and the President's detractors said that the visit and
lunch were part of an effort by
Roosevelt to encourage social equality between the races. Booker T.
Washington, My Larger Education:
Being Chapters From My Experiences (New York, 1911), 170-
171, 174-178: Roosevelt to Washington,
September 14, 1901, Roosevelt Papers.
23. Roosevelt to Washington, December
25, 1906, Roosevelt Papers.
24. Ralph W. Tyler to Washington,
February 4, 1907, Washington Papers.
25. Tyler to
Washington, February 4, 1907, Washington Papers.
214 OHIO
HISTORY
not seek Foraker's, although he was
certain that Foraker would be less likely to
oppose him for the position than any
other black man the President might nomi-
nate. Roosevelt was evidently impressed
with Tyler's answers for as the interview
drew to a close he turned to Loeb and
said, "Mr. Loeb, I believe we will try to put
it through with Mr. Tyler." But
first, he wanted to check with his son-in-law,
Representative Nicholas Longworth of
Cincinnati, before he acted on the nomi-
nation.26
Tyler left the White House and went
directly to the House of Representatives
to confer with Longworth on the expected
appointment. When he informed him
of the interview with Roosevelt and the
possibilities he would be made Collector
of the Port in Cincinnati, Longworth
expressed surprise, which later changed to
bitter disappointment, that Roosevelt
was thinking of naming a black man to one
of the most influential patronage
positions in his district, giving Tyler a fore-
warning that he would oppose his
selection.27
On his return to Columbus, Tyler wrote
to Washington at Tuskegee to bring
him up to date on his interview with
Roosevelt and Loeb as well as his talk with
Longworth. He told Washington the
President had been impressed with his an-
swers to a number of questions he had
asked and that he believed Roosevelt was
ready to make the announcement of his
appointment. But Tyler doubted that
Longworth would be willing to go along
with the President's choice, or the se-
lection of any black man for that
matter, without raising strong objections that
could jeopardize the nomination in the
Senate. Tyler felt that Longworth's pos-
sible objection could be overcome by
Washington's influence and friendship with
Roosevelt, and he requested the educator
"to make a simple phone call to the
President or Secretary Loeb,"
saying that Tyler was the man for the job and
should be nominated without delay.28
Washington did not think it wise or ex-
pedient to make such a phone call. He
wrote Tyler that even if Longworth op-
posed his appointment, or the
appointment of any other black man in his district,
Roosevelt would still have to make a
black appointment from the state to show
the race he was not hostile to their
constitutional rights as some of the black news-
papers in Cleveland and other cities in
Ohio were charging. Tyler, Washington
believed, was in the best position to
receive such an appointment.29
Meanwhile, further complications
concerning the appointment developed when
the Cincinnati Enquirer, a
newspaper owned and printed by Taft's family, ran a
story which said Roosevelt had intimated
to a confidential source that Foraker
would soon give him the name of a black
man for an important presidential po-
sition in Ohio, without specifying the
Collector's office in Cincinnati. According
to the story, if Roosevelt and Foraker
compromised their differences on Browns-
ville, there was a strong possibility
that Tyler would not be given the Cincinnati
post since it was believed Foraker
favored another black man for the job. Tyler
sent a copy of the story to Washington,
but the attempt at a compromise between
Roosevelt and Foraker on Brownsville-if
there was ever a compromise in the
making-never matured. Roosevelt put a
damper on the story several days after
it appeared by informing Washington he
"meant to stand by Tyler" for the Col-
lectorship, but said he was having
difficulties and might be forced "to stand by
somebody in Toledo for geographical
reasons." It did indeed appear that the
President intended to "stand by
Tyler" for he wrote Washington the following
26. Tyler to Washington, February 4,
1907, Washington Papers.
27. Washington to Anderson, January 14,
1907, Washington Papers.
28. Tyler to Washington, February 4,
1907, Washington Papers.
29. Washington to Anderson, January 14,
1907, Washington Papers.
Blacks and Republicans 215
week that he would send Tyler's name to
the Senate as Collector of the Port of
Cincinnati as soon as the term of the
white incumbent expired.30
While Roosevelt believed Tyler's
appointment as Collector was one way to in-
fluence black Republicans in Ohio and
bring them back into their traditional
alliance with the party, he also
believed this nomination, or the nomination of
any black man to such an important
patronage position, could stir up strong anti-
black sentiment throughout the state,
especially if white Republicans in Cincin-
nati opposed the appointment. As a
matter of fact, Roosevelt remembered that
one of the greatest controversies on the
race issue during his administration con-
cerned the nomination of a black man,
Dr. William D. Crum, as Collector of the
Port of Charleston. White Republicans in
the state were able to block Senate
confirmation of Crum's nomination for
more than three years.31 With this in mind
Roosevelt let the story out of the White
House that he was considering Tyler for
the Collectorship as a feeler to see how
white Republicans of Cincinnati would
react.32
The President was correct in his belief
that many white Republicans in Cin-
cinnati would react violently to the
nomination of a black man to the Collector-
ship. When they heard he was thinking of
making Tyler Collector, many reacted
not unlike those in Charleston who had
opposed Crum's confirmation in 1902.
In addition to being bitter over the
fact that a black man was to be given a post
envied by many politicians in the city,
some also complained that Roosevelt was
playing politics with the Collector's office;
that Tyler was not from Cincinnati and
would not be familiar with the people
with whom he would have to work as Col-
lector. A small group went so far as to
vow that if the President nominated Tyler
or any other black man for the
Collectorship they would not support Longworth
when he sought reelection to the House
in 1908.33
By this time Foraker was aware of
Roosevelt's plans in his home town, and he
attempted to counter them before the
President could send Tyler's name to the
Senate for confirmation. Working through
one of his black lieutenants in Cin-
cinnati, Robert J. Harlan, he encouraged
several other blacks in the city to file
for the position, "thereby bringing
discomfiture to the President and forcing him
to abandon Tyler," as one of
Washington's informers told him.34 Thus, after more
than seven months of trying to create
the proper conditions to appoint a black
man in Cincinnati, white opposition and
Foraker's maneuvering forced Roosevelt
to abandon Tyler and reappoint the white
incumbent when his term expired. After
considerable indecision he finally named
Tyler as the Fourth Auditor of the Navy
Department in Washington where he was
confirmed by the Senate in early 1907.35
Instead of regaining the support of Ohio
blacks for the party and Taft's nomi-
nation as Roosevelt had anticipated,
Tyler's appointment, even as Fourth Auditor
30. Washington to Tyler,
January 14, 28, 1907, Tyler to Washington, January 25, 1907,
Scott to
Tyler, January
29, 1907, Washington Papers.
31. James F. Rhodes to Roosevelt,
December 23, 1904, Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27, 1906,
Roosevelt Papers:
William D. Crum to Whitfield McKinlay, October 31, November 3,
1902. Carter
G. Woodson Collection, Library of Congress; August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915;
Racial Ideologies in the Age of
Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor, 1963), 164, 242.
32. New York Age, March 7,
1907.
33. Newspaper clippings in Washington's
Manuscript Collection from the Cleveland Plain Dealer
sent to Washington by Tyler,
February 9, 12, 16, 1907; see also Washington Bee, February
9, 16,
1907; New York Age, February 7,
1907.
34. Anderson to Washington,
February 4, 1907, Iyler to Washington, February 22, 1907, Washing-
ton Papers.
35. Washington to Roosevelt, April 11, 1907, Washington to Tyler, April 11, 1907, Tyler
to Wash-
ington, April 10, 1907, Washington
Papers.
216 OHIO
HISTORY
of the Navy in far-away Washington,
served only to intensify their opposition to
the administration, since most of them
believed with Harry Smith's Cleveland
Gazette that Tyler had been appointed "in an attempt to
off-set executive action
in the Brownsville Affair and to win
blacks for Taft in 1908."36 Smith's Gazette
was echoed by George Myers, the
influential black barber and political jobber of
the famous Hollander House in Cleveland.
When he heard President Roosevelt
had nominated Tyler as Auditor of the
Navy, Myers declared that "it would not
stop the onward march of the black
deluge against him and Taft in Ohio." Roose-
velt's actions in appointing Tyler,
Myers said, "were palatable plain to even the
most illiterate Hammite." Blacks in
Ohio and throughout the nation were for For-
aker, and there was little Roosevelt
could do to alter the fact. In Myers' opinion
Roosevelt had a difficult if not
impossible task before him if he wanted to convert
blacks from Foraker to Taft. Myers
further believed that Tyler would not be con-
firmed by the Senate, but if confirmed,
"would not help the administration against
Senator Foraker."37
Although events later proved Myers to be
mistaken about Tyler's cooperation
with the administration against
Foraker's nomination, Tyler had said as much
shortly after Washington arranged the
White House interview for him. In one of
his several letters to Myers on the
subject of federal patronage before he was
nominated as Auditor, and when it looked
as if he would not be named as Col-
lector, Tyler had rationalized his
position. He wrote Myers he was not enthusias-
tic about being appointed by Roosevelt
since he knew that if he were he would
"be expected to fight against
Senator Foraker." Under such circumstances, he
had written, "I will say to the
President that Senator Foraker is a friend...and I
was not appointed with any understanding
that I would fight against him."38
Later after Myers learned the Senate was
going to confirm him as Auditor he
wired Tyler and told him "not to
sell his birthright for a paltry political office"
and urged him to accept the Auditorship
only on condition that he would not
compromise his feelings for Senator
Foraker.39
Meanwhile in March 1907, more than a
year before the national convention,
Foraker returned to Cincinnati where his
organization was waging a frenzied cam-
paign to capitalize on the growing
anti-Taft-Roosevelt-Brownsville sentiment that
was sweeping the state and threatening
to involve most Northern blacks. After
conferring with several of his more
influential supporters in Akron, Marion, and
Xenia,40 Foraker issued a
statement on his position in reference to the nomina-
tion. He said he would ask the Ohio
Republican Central Committee to meet in
Columbus within the immediate future to
issue a call for delegates for the na-
tional convention. The purpose was to
determine the state's choice for the nomi-
nation, himself or Secretary Taft.41
With Foraker's announcement of his candi-
dacy and calling for a session of the
state's Central Committee he was preparing
himself for a contest with Taft in their
home state to determine their respective
36. Cleveland Gazette, April 27,
June 8, 1907.
37. George A. Myers to Tyler, April 11,
12, 1907, George A. Myers Manuscript Collection, Ohio
Historical Society. Hereafter cited as
Myers Papers.
38. Tyler to Myers, April 13, 1907,
Myers Papers.
39. Myers to Tyler, April 12, 1907,
Myers Papers.
40. Among those consulted were Senator
Charles Dick of Akron, Chairman of the State Central
Committee, Warren G. Harding of Marion,
and L. C. Maxwell, a prominent black Republican in
Xenia; see also Anderson to Washington,
February 4, 1907, Tyler to Washington, February 4, 22,
1907, Washington Papers.
41. When the Committee assembled Taft
won the state's endorsement for the nomination by a vote
of fifteen to Foraker's six. William H.
Taft to Roosevelt, June 6, July 23, 1907, Arthur I. Vorys to Taft,
July 24, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
Blacks and Republicans 217 |
|
strengths among Ohio Republicans in hopes of "bringing about a public con- frontation between the friends of the administration and its opponents."42 Foraker's declaration of his candidacy and the increased overtures his organi- zation was making to capitalize on the anti-Taft-Roosevelt-Brownsville senti- ment in Ohio, New York, and several other Northern states, not only helped to bring about a public confrontation "between the friends and supporters of the administration in Ohio," but it also created a great deal of concern among friends of the administration outside the state, especially Washington, Tyler, and their supporters.43 Since most of the support for Foraker's nomination and the oppo- sition to the administration on Brownsville came from black newspapers, which carried most of the news concerning the various protest meetings, Tyler's appoint- ment by the President and his newspaper experience fitted the administration's purpose of helping to influence black public opinion on Brownsville and Taft's nomination before the national convention in June. At about the same time he was confirmed as Fourth Auditor of the Navy by the Senate, Tyler was appointed by Washington as one of the editorial writers for the New York Age, a newspaper edited by Fred R. Moore. The Age has been the most influential black weekly in the country when it was edited by T. Thomas Fortune and before it was purchased by Washington in the fall of 1907. It had carried on an anti-Roosevelt-Brownsville campaign and supported Foraker for the nomination since shortly after the dismissal of the soldiers in November 1906. Before Washington purchased the controlling interest in the newspaper from Fortune, the President had complained on several occasions that Fortune's editorials were doing much harm in undermining the administration's position on
42. Anderson to Washington, February 4, 1907, Washington Papers. 43. Anderson to Washington, February 4, 1907, Tyler to Washington, March 14, April 10, 1907, Washington to Roosevelt, April 11 , 1907, Washington to Tyler, April 11, 1907, Washington Papers. |
218 OHIO
HISTORY
Brownsville as well as misrepresenting
his attitude toward the race.44 The pur-
pose of Tyler's appointment as one of
the editorial writers of the Age was to undo
the damage done by Fortune and to help
swing black public opinion around to
support the President on Brownsville and
Taft's nomination and election.
Tyler began his assignment to influence
black public opinion in the interest of
the administration in an editorial which
appeared in the October 1907 issue of
the paper entitled "The Brownsville
Ghouls." By any account "The Brownsville
Ghouls" was a milestone in
scurrilous journalism--in a period when scurrilous
journalism was not unusual and was one
of the most controversial pieces of writ-
ings to come out of the entire
Brownsville incident. Its purpose was so obvious that
it was almost unbelievable to many of
the Age's readers, but moreso to its black
exchanges, which used it over and over
again to show the depths their competitor
would sink in its defense of Roosevelt
and Taft on Brownsville.
The editorial issued a blanket
indictment by condemning all those, black and
white, who had spoken out against the
President because of the Brownsville in-
cident as "human ghouls who preyed
upon the death and suffering of others for
their own financial or political
gains." It characterized the black supporters of
Senator Foraker as "buzzards,"
and attempted to convince blacks that color
prejudice had nothing to do with
Roosevelt's decision to dismiss the soldiers of
the 25th Infantry from the army without
honor. In Tyler's opinion the color ques-
tion in the Affair was a stone around
the race's neck. It had not been raised by
President Roosevelt, "whose many brave
and helpful acts have proved him to be
a real friend of the Negro"; or by
Secretary Taft, "another true friend of the race";
or by Senator Foraker, "who, after
all, simply raised a legal question in his de-
fense of the soldiers in the
Senate." Nor was the color issue raised by "the many
white friends of the race, in and out of
Congress." The color question in the
Brownsville Affair, said Tyler,
"was raised by black ghouls who were as much
enemies of Senator Foraker as they were
of President Roosevelt and Secretary of
War Taft and until the Satanic regions
open wide and swallow them we will
always have our human ghouls black and
white."45
From the printing of "The
Brownsville Ghouls" editorial in October 1907, until
Taft's convention victory in June 1908,
Tyler wrote and the Age printed similar
editorials in defense of Roosevelt on
Brownsville and in favor of Taft's nomina-
tion and election. Throughout this
period the Age played an important part in
helping to beat down all black newspaper
opposition to the administration, mak-
ing it the most outspoken supporter of
the administration among black news-
papers throughout the country.46
The initial reaction of many black
editors to the Age's campaign to influence
black public opinion was so intense and
hostile that Tyler suggested to Washing-
ton the establishment of what he called
a "Colored Press Bureau" under the di-
rections of R. W. Thompson. The bureau
would help control and influence these
editors in the interest of the
administration and generate greater support and
enthusiasm among those who were
non-commital or lukewarm to Taft's nomi-
nation. As envisioned by Tyler, the
bureau would gather favorable news items
of interest to blacks concerning the
administration's attitude toward the race and
dispatch them to most of the black
newspapers throughout the country. Tyler be-
lieved that by putting the relatively
obscure Thompson in charge of the bureau
44. New York Age, October 31,
1907, May 21, 1908; Cleveland Gazette, November 16, 30, 1907.
45. New York Age, October 17,
1907.
46. R. W. Thompson to Washington,
October 3, 1908, Anderson to Washington, September 10, 11,
1908, Scott to Tyler, March 26, 1908,
Washington Papers.
Blacks and Republicans
219
such news items could be
"incorporated judiciously" into opposition newspapers
without arousing the suspicion of many
of their editors. He said he would notify
the editors that he could cut their
expense by sending them weekly syndicated
letters from Washington covering all
news of interest to the race. Tyler realized
some of the editors might still be
suspicious of the project, and to encourage their
support he contemplated "mailing
them six or seven weeks of the letters free,"
believing this would at least temper
their criticism of the project until it could be
launched. Later a nominal fee of fifty
cents per newsletter would be charged
which would be used to cover Thompson's
salary as director of the Bureau.47
While Washington saw some advantages in
the project, he believed it was much
too risky. From his experiences with
many of the black editors, he wrote Tyler,
"some of those hostile to the
administration would find out about the project and
fire would come from them." While
Thompson was "a good and loyal friend,"
Washington feared he did not have
"the capabilities to handle such an extreme
and delicate matter." He was
"a bit enthusiastic and would therefore spoil
things."41
Nevertheless, three weeks after
Washington vetoed the project the office of
the New York Age was visited by
the New York member of the Republican Na-
tional Committee along with one of
Taft's campaign managers who had made the
trip from Washington with Tyler for the
purpose of consulting with Moore and the
editorial staff concerning additional
black newspaper support for Taft's nomi-
nation and election. Following this meeting
it was decided to organize a "Na-
tional News Bureau," looking toward
supplying black newspaper editors with the
same kind of news that Tyler had
outlined in his earlier letter to Washington.
Thompson was to be named director of the
bureau.
Washington's reactions to all of this
can only be guessed, but it is doubtful the
change of names from the "Colored
Press Bureau" to the "National News Bu-
reau" made the project any more
palatable to him. At any rate, Thompson was
given the additional responsibility of
making a canvas among black editors to
encourage their interest in the project
and after his survey reported to Washing-
ton that most of the editors contacted
"signified their desire for the services of-
fered by the bureau." But he feared
"the administration would not look good to
many of them until something was done
about Brownsville." He closed on an
optimistic note, however, feeling that
the situation was improving.49
If the Age's account of its own
campaign to influence black public opinion in
favor of Roosevelt and Taft can be
believed, the campaign has to be crowned one
of the most successful of its kind in
the annals of black journalism. Between the
establishment of the "National News
Bureau" and the party's national conven-
tion the newspaper ran a column entitled
"What the Negro Press Has to Say," in
which it reprinted comments and
observations from black editors throughout the
country concerning Taft's candidacy and
Roosevelt's Brownsville decision. Many
of these came from newspapers that had
been antagonistic or lukewarm toward
the administration because of the
Brownsville Affair. Many ran syndicated news
stories supplied by Thompson's bureau
and favorable to Roosevelt and Taft.50
47. Tyler to Washington, October 5,
1907, Washington Papers.
48. Washington to Tyler, October 7,
1907. Washington Papers.
49. Thompson to Scott, October 25,
November 3, 1907, Thompson to Washington, October 25,
1907. Washington Papers.
50. Washington to Frank Hitchcock, March
1, 3, February 1, 27, 1908, Hitchcock to Washington
February 27, 1908, Washington Papers.
Some of these newspapers included the Atlanta Independent,
the Savannah Tribune, the Topeka
Plain Dealer, the Birmingham Reporter, the Richmond Planet,
the Chicago Conservator,
and Augusta Baptist (Georgia), the
Charleston Southern Reporter, and the
Cleveland Journal.
220 OHIO HISTORY
Others, such as T. Thomas Fortune's Fortune
Freeman and W. Calvin Chase's
Washington Bee, also switched their support from Foraker to Taft, but
more out
of what appeared to be the hopelessness
of Foraker's chances of winning the
nomination than because of anything
Washington, Tyler, or the National News
Bureau said or did. Indeed, the attitude
of these editors best summarized the pre-
dicament that many of the black editors
found themselves in. Fortune had drifted
back into the newspaper business shortly
after he sold his interest in the New
York Age to Washington and by the beginning of 1908 edited a
struggling paper
out of Red Bank, New Jersey, called Fortune's
Freeman. He wrote in the Free-
man that "after mature reflection on President
Roosevelt and the Brownsville
decision," he had come to the
conclusion that his earlier attitude toward Taft's
part in the Affair had been harsh. He
now felt Taft had no alternative save to
follow Roosevelt's order to dismiss the
soldiers or resign from his Cabinet. Had he
chosen to resign (as Fortune had
suggested as editor of the Age shortly after the
War Department made the dismissal order
public) he would have "deprived the
country of his services" over a
matter in which he had little or no control.
From a political point of view, Fortune
continued, Taft stood an excellent
chance of winning the nomination, and
like Senator Foraker, "his friendship
toward blacks could not be
doubted." Thus he concluded, "Taft's record was
good, and if he win the
nomination," as it appeared he would, "the Freeman is
going to support him." W. Calvin
Chase's Washington Bee also saw the political
side of the issue, adding that all signs
pointed to Taft's victory at the convention
and if blacks shared in his success by
supporting him they would be rewarded. If
they should withhold their support and
Taft were nominated and elected with
the race arrayed against him, then they
could not expect any consideration dur-
ing his administration.51
By the time of the national convention
most black Republicans had drifted
back to support the party and Taft's
nomination, if for no other reasons than those
outlined by Chase and Fortune. The
Foraker movement was proportionately
weakened as they came back to the
administration and collapsed when most of
the thirty odd black delegates who
attended the Chicago convention climbed
aboard Taft's band wagon.52 When
the balloting was over Taft had received 702
of the 980 votes to Foraker's 16, 11 of
which came from Northern black delegates
in appreciation of his stand in defense
of the Brownsville soldiers. The convention
not only decisively nominated the
secretary of war as Roosevelt's successor, but
it also adopted a platform committing
him to the President's policies.53
Among later significant developments,
however, was the fact that in his con-
tinued eagerness to remove Brownsville
from any serious consideration on Taft's
candidacy among blacks during the
election, President Roosevelt accepted full
responsibility for the dismissal order
and ordered the War Department to release
all pertinent information on the
incident which showed that Taft had tried to have
him withdraw the order.54 In
addition, in a special message to Congress after the
election in December 1908, he made a
suggestion that many interpreted as a
tacit admission that he had been wrong
in dismissing the soldiers, the closest he
was ever to come to admitting that some
of the soldiers might not have known
anything about the disturbance at
Brownsville, and were consequently not guilty
51. New York Age, March 12, April
2, 9, 23, 30, May 28, June 4, 18, 1908; Boston Guardian, Jan-
uary 25, 1908.
52. Anderson to Washington, March 24,
April 1, 1908, Washington to Taft, June 7, 1908, Washing-
ton to Anderson, March 26, 1908, Scott
to Anderson, April 1, 1908, Washington Papers.
53. Henry C. Lodge to Roosevelt, June
22, 1908, Roosevelt Papers.
54. New York Age, March 12, 1908.
Blacks and Republicans
221
of a "conspiracy of silence."
He suggested that Congress pass legislation that
would allow the soldiers to reenlist in
the army "if they produced satisfactory evi-
dence that they were not involved in the
Brownsville raid."55 As a final note, the
majority of the 167 men dismissed
because of the disturbance were never rein-
stated. The Board of Inquiry that was
eventually appointed by the War Depart-
ment found only fourteen of the men
eligible for reinstatement but gave no rea-
sons why the others who applied were
found "unqualified."56
Thus despite more than two years of
black opposition to the President's Browns-
ville decision and the Taft nomination,
the secretary of war was eventually nomi-
nated and elected to the presidency. The
efforts of the Washingtonians to control
the dissemination of unpopular views
toward the administration were successful
to the extent that it was through their
activities that many blacks were convinced
they had little alternative save to
support Taft and the Republican party. Even
though Taft won the election against
William Jennings Bryan and the Democrats,
with the support of most black voters in
the North, the Brownsville Affair would
return eventually to haunt both him and
Roosevelt when they opposed each other
for the nomination in 1912. It helped to
fuel the conflict between the two men and
to aggravate a split in the Republican
party which finally led to the election of
the first Democratic presidential
candidate in twenty years.
55. New York Age,
March 12, 1908.
56. Walters, Joseph Benson Foraker, 246.
JAMES E. HANEY
Blacks and the Republican
Nomination of 1908
Theodore Roosevelt's decision not to
seek the Republican presidential nomina-
tion in 1908 left the field open to
several Republican hopefuls, but his influence in
the party and control of its machinery
made it clear that the candidate he sup-
ported would win the nomination as well
as the national election that followed.
This was especially important when it is
remembered that national politics dur-
ing the first decade of the twentieth
century was dominated by the Republican
party. As a minority party, the
Democrats offered the American people only sec-
tional candidates with little or no
national appeal.
There were several Republicans whose
national reputations and positions on
the major issues of the day caused
Roosevelt to consider them as serious con-
tenders for the party's nomination in
1908. The leading contenders were Charles
E. Hughes, governor of New York, and two
members of the Cabinet, Secretary
of State Elihu Root and Secretary of War
William H. Taft. Hughes, Root, and
Taft were followed by Senator Joseph B.
Foraker of Ohio whose presidential
ambitions were on the rise with the
approach of the party's national convention in
June.
Hughes, one of the leading reform
governors of the nation, first gained na-
tional attention in 1905 as counsel for
the "Armstrong Committee," a legislative
committee of the New York State Senate
investigating insurance and related
frauds. Partly as a result of the diligent
work he performed as counsel, the As-
sembly passed a number of laws which
extended greater protection to insurance
policy holders, attempted to prohibit
corporations from making political contribu-
tions and influencing the outcome of
elections, and curtailed the activities of
lobbyists and special interest groups.
More important for the nomination in 1908,
however, was the fact that Hughes was
able to parlay his role in these investiga-
tions into a victory over the New York
Republican machine of Benjamin Odell
for the party's gubernatorial nomination
in 1906. As a candidate for governor,
Hughes had the support of the national
administration; President Roosevelt sent
Secretary Root to Utica to deliver an
address in Hughes' behalf which some his-
torians contend played an important role
in the outcome of the election.1
Although he had helped to elect Hughes
governor of New York in 1906, Roose-
velt felt he would not make a good
presidential candidate and could not compare
1. Harold Gosnell, Boss Platt and His New York Machine; A Study of the Political Leadership of
Thomas C. Platt, Theodore Roosevelt, and Others (New York, 1924), 277-284; Philip C. Jessup,
Elihu Root, 2 vols.
(New York, 1938),
118-123.
Dr. Haney is Assistant
Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.