GEORGE B. COTKIN
Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence:
Industrial Conflict in the
Hocking Valley, 1884-1885
In 1904 Boston trade unionist Frank K.
Foster called the strikebreaker
an "industrial excresence . . . the
Iscariot of the industrial world."
That same year novelist Jack London
coined his famous definition of
the "scab." A strikebreaker,
wrote London, "is a two-legged animal
with a corkscrew soul, a water-logged
brain, and a combination back-
bone made of jelly and glue. Where
others have hearts he carries a
tumor of rotten principles." So
damnatory was London that he thought
strikers had the moral right to kill
those who took their jobs and broke
their struggle.1
Like most trade unionists and radicals
of his time, London assumed
that strikebreakers and violence went
hand in hand. Labor historians
have also shared this view. In a recent
survey of industrial violence,
H. M. Gitelman contends that the
introduction of strikebreakers in-
variably produced sharp conflict.
"Most worker-initiated strike vio-
lence," wrote Gitelman, "took
the form of physical assaults upon
strikebreakers and upon fellow employees
who attempted to cross
picket lines."2 Similarly,
Philip Taft and Philip Ross believed that
strikers responded "to
strikebreakers with anger. Many violent out-
breaks followed efforts of strikers to
restrain the entry of strikebreakers
and raw materials into the plant."
In their wide-ranging survey of in-
dustrial violence, Taft and Ross found
strikebreakers physically at-
tacked in the Anthracite Strike of 1902,
the Westmoreland County coal
strike of 1909-1912 and a host of other
labor disputes.3 Additionally,
George Cotkin will receive his Ph.D. in
History from The Ohio State University in
June 1978.
1. Frank K. Foster, "Reply to
President Eliot," The Papers of Charles W. Eliot, Har-
vard University; Jack London, "The Scab,"
(1904) as quoted in Leonard Abbott, ed.,
London's Essays of Revolt (New York, 1928), 65.
2. H. M. Gitelman, "Perspectives on
American Industrial Violence," Business His-
tory Review, XLVII (Spring 1973), 11, 15.
3. Philip Taft and Philip Ross,
"American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character,
Strikebreakers, Evictions and
Violence
141
Gitelman, Taft and Ross argue that the
presence of armed guards,
particularly in coal mining communities,
usually led to armed and
violent confrontations.4
If workers shared Foster's and London's
instinctive aversion to the
strikebreakers and if industrial
violence is commonly provoked by the
introduction of strikebreakers, then one
would expect to find in the
Hocking Valley coal strike of 1884-1885
a perfect case study to prove
the strikebreaker-industrial violence
thesis. The main conditions for
violence were present: coal operators
brought immigrant strikebreakers
into a predominately native-American
mining community and insured
their work by posting armed guards at
their properties. However, vio-
lence directed against the
strikebreakers was rare, and when violence
actually flared, and it did, it was
directed against the property of the
coal companies, especially those
structures necessary for the continued
production of coal during the strike.
Tensions between Hocking Valley coal
miners and coal mine oper-
ators certainly antedated the start of
the Hocking Valley coal strike
of 1884-1885. Miners complained about
the high prices charged by the
company store, unfair work rules and the
lack of steady work. They
thought nothing good could come of the
increasing monopolization of
the valley's mines. With the decline in
the local ownership of the
mines, operators joined together in the
spring of 1883 and consolidated
their holdings under one company, the
Columbus and Hocking Coal
and Iron Co., derisively called
"the Syndicate" by the miners. At
roughly the same time, operators created
the Ohio Coal Exchange to
handle their labor relations in a
centralized manner. Corporate offices
in Cleveland now dictated labor policies
in the Valley.5 Miners thought
the Syndicate out to rob them of their
traditional rights. Local miner
Andrew Brown believed that the Syndicate
wished to break the "Ameri-
can miner down to the level of the
pauperized miner of Europ [sic]."6
Christopher Evans, President of District
One of the Ohio Miners
and Outcome," Violence in
America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, eds.
Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New
York, 1969), 301, 381-82. Taft pre-
sents the same conclusions in briefer
form in "Violence in American Labor Disputes,"
American Academy of Political and
Social Science Annals, CCCLXIV (March
1966),
127-40. In a recent article on the
Hocking Valley coal strike of 1884-1885, Frank Lev-
stik connects the introduction of
strikebreakers with the beginnings of violence. "The
Hocking Valley Miners' Strike,
1884-1885: A Search for Order," The Old Northwest,
II (March 1976), 55-56.
4. Taft and Ross, "American Labor
Violence," 301-02; Gitelman, "Perspectives," 15.
5. John W. Lozier, "The Hocking
Valley Coal Miners' Strike, 1884-1885" (M. A.
thesis, The Ohio State University,
1963), 36-37.
6. Andrew Brown to Governor George
Hoadly, September 18, 1884, The Papers of
George Hoadly, The Ohio Historical
Society (hereafter cited as Hoadly Papers).
142 OHIO HISTORY
Amalgamated Association, considered the
Syndicate a gigantic monop-
oly "bent upon crushing poor
humanity."7
Sharp and unilaterally imposed wage
reductions precipitated the
Hocking Valley coal strike of 1884-1885.
In March 1884 operators
slashed the rates for coal mined from 80
cents to 70 cents per ton.
Given the soft demand for coal and the
increasing competition from
out-of-state fields miners reluctantly
accepted the pay cut. One month
later the operators asked the miners to
accept another reduction, this
time down to 50 cents per ton. The
miners refused to agree this time,
and they continued mining coal at the
old wage rate until late June.
The operators then decided to unilaterally
cut the rate to 60 cents per
ton and on Friday evening, June 20, they
posted the new tonnage rates
at the mines. On Monday, June 23, the
miners stayed home. Accord-
ing to Christoper Evans, three thousand
miners and one thousand
helpers struck, closing down forty-six
mines in the valley.8
It was a long and grueling strike,
"the bitterest strike in the entire
mining industry of America," wrote
economist Edward Bemis in 1888.9
Lasting for over nine months, the strike
ended in total defeat for the
miners when on March 18, 1885, the last
strikers announced in New
Straitsville that they accepted the
operators' terms. The work stoppage
lasted so long because of intransigence
on the part of both the operators
and the miners. Under heavy competition
from other coal fields, es-
pecially those in the Pittsburgh area,
southern Ohio coal operators used
the strike to win a more favorable
market position by breaking the
miners' union and reducing their wage
bill. In sharp contrast, the
miners sought to maintain their old wage
rates and conditions of work
and prevent the operators from forcing
them to become "voluntary
serfs and miserable menials."10
In its general outlines, then, the
Hocking Valley coal strike of
1884-1885 resembled many labor disputes
of the Gilded Age and closely
followed the pattern of the big Hocking
Valley coal strike of 1873-
1874.11 In that conflict the operators
had successfully used strike-
breakers to end the strike, and in 1884
they again recruited strike-
breakers to keep their mines in
production and thereby break the eco-
nomic power of the miners' union. On
July 14, a few weeks after
7. Testimony of Christopher Evans, Proceedings
of the Hocking Valley Investigation
Committee (Columbus, 1885), 31-32 (hereafter cited as Proceedings).
8. Levstik, "Miners' Strike,"
56.
9. E. W. Bemis, "Mine Labor in the
Hocking Valley," Publications of the American
Economic Association, VIIl (July 1888), 27.
10. Testimony of John McBride, Proceedings,
308.
11. For a complete account of the
1873-1874 strike see Herbert G. Gutman, "Recon-
struction in Ohio: Negroes in the
Hocking Valley Coal Mines in 1873 and 1874," Labor
History, III (Fall 1962), 243-64. Also see Lozier, "Coal
Miners' Strike," 40-43.
Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence 143 |
|
the miners refused to work for lower wages, the first group of strike- breakers accompanied by one hundred Pinkerton Guards entered the Valley. The operators had initially tried to hire skilled coal miners as strikebreakers, but they were unsuccessful, and most of the first group of three hundred strikebreakers were unskilled Italians. "All members of our Order," the Knights of Labor declared, "will stay away . . .until the difficulty is settled." The operators were forced to rely upon unskilled laborers, mainly Italians, Germans, Poles, Hun- garians, Swedes and some Virginia Negroes to fill their labor needs.12 The arrival of strikebreakers and their armed guardians caused little trouble. The pro-labor Hocking Sentinel considered the new laborers a "social ulcer in our midst," but most Valley miners also agreed with the paper's advice to "keep cool, be peaceable, orderly and re- spect all offices and conduct themselves according to law." The recep- tion accorded the strikebreakers was so mild that the operators sent the Pinkertons away on July 26. As the strike entered its second month the strikebreakers appeared safe and unmolested.13 12. Gutman, "Reconstruction," 256-257. Journal of United Labor, August 25, 1884; Testimony of J. A. Donley, Proceedings, 81; Testimony of Christopher Evans, Ibid., 46; New Lexington Herald, December 18, 1884; Hocking Sentinel, August 14, 1884. 13. Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 60-64; Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 57-58. |
144 OHIO HISTORY
Valley miners did not believe the
strikebreakers "menacing and ter-
rible" as Jack London would later
describe them.14 Instead, local miners
viewed the strikebreakers as misguided
and uninformed, but morally
innocent. The operators used
"disreputable methods" and misrepre-
sented the conditions in the Valley to
lure foreign-born strikebreakers
into the mines, stated union leader John
McBride.15 Not only were the
strikebreakers deceived, but they were
thought by Hocking Valley
strikers to be the epitome of exploited
and servile labor. Miner J. A.
Donley sympathized openly with their
plight. "They don't lead a very
happy life," he stated, "they
are starving about half the time . . . and
when a man is hungry, I don't think his
life is very happy."16
Two other perceptions held by miners
tended to lessen antipathy
toward the strikebreakers. First, proud
Hocking Valley coal miners re-
fused to believe that unskilled foreign
laborers could take their places,
despite the fact that the operators had
imported the latest machinery
to aid the unskilled strikebreakers. One
newspaper report stated, "the
general opinion among older miners is
that the Italians will prove a
failure."17 The miners,
perhaps blinded by craft pride, refused to be-
lieve themselves replaceable.
Another factor worked against reprisals
upon the strikebreakers. The
miners believed that their strike was
being fought for basic human
rights as well as wage increases. The
miners were engaged "in a
decisive battle between monopoly on the
one hand and organized
labor on the other."18 Miner
R. H. Miller characterized his profession
and the Syndicate's greed more
poignantly. Miller accepted physical
injury and degredation as part of the
price that miners paid for defying
nature's laws. Nature punished miners
for taking her precious minerals
by making them "humpbacked,
undersized, and bowlegged." But Miller
was repelled by the Syndicate's attempts
to humiliate further the poor
and physically degraded miners by
refusing to pay them a decent
wage.19 Consequently, the
miners perceived the strikebreakers not as
machines or villians but as pitiable men
robbed of their basic human
dignity. Striking miners uncovered in
the slavish strikebreakers the
human misery that they themselves sought
to avoid.
Their empathy toward the immigrant
strikebreaker increased with
reports that the newcomers were
voluntarily leaving the mines or rebel-
14. Abbott, ed., London's Essays of
Revolt, 65.
15. Testimony of John McBride, Proceedings,
308.
16. Testimony of J. A. Donley, Ibid.,
87.
17. Athens Messenger, July 17,
1884; Hocking Sentinel, July 17, August 14, 1884.
18. Ibid., July 31, 1884.
19. Testimony of R. H. Miller, Proceedings,
118.
Strikebreakers, Evictions and
Violence 145
ling against the operators. At the end
of July the Athens Messenger
reported that "lately imported
Italian miners are abandoning work
. .
in a body." The former strikebreakers, the story continued, were
then taken "in hand by the
strikers" and given breakfast and the as-
surance of transportation out of the
valley.20 The Hocking Sentinel
devoted considerable space to the
shooting of an Italian strikebreaker
by a Pinkerton guard. Apparently, the
strikebreaker had become noisy
after heavy drinking. Unable to quiet
the Italian down, the angry
Pinkerton shot him to death. After this
incident many enraged Italian
miners left their new jobs. The
newspaper account characterized the
strikebreakers' "job action"
in terms that must have elated striking
miners. "The uprising of the
Italians in defense of an injury to one of
them," the paper stated,
"shows conclusively that they will be as
vigorous in their demands for justice as
have been those who labored
in the mines before them."21
Convinced that the strikebreakers were
capable of noble sentiments,
the strikers pursued a peaceful policy
toward these new men. Im-
mediately upon entering the Valley the
strikebreakers were greeted by
strikers' verbal appeals that they
return home. The initial confrontation
between striker and strikebreaker was
peaceful. A man identified as a
leading Nelsonville striker told the
Athens Messenger that the strikers
would use persuasion and not force to
convince strikebreakers to leave
the mines.22 Thus the
newspaper reported that while foreign laborers
"continue to arrive in this valley
by squads, they are not here long
before being induced by the strikers to
abandon work."23
The striking miners believed their
"persuasive eloquence" would
work, and remarkably, this strategy
succeeded for a time in convincing
many strikebreakers to leave. But such a
tactic was doomed to failure,
because for every handful of
strikebreakers who left, hundreds more
arrived to take their jobs in the mines.24
By November 1884 over 1,500
strikebreakers were at work in fifteen
Hocking Valley mines.25 Per-
plexed by the failure of their arguments
to convince more strike-
breakers to leave, some miners resorted
to psychological intimidation
of the newcomers. In January 1885
strikers were reported to be arming
themselves. According to an observer,
the miners intended the guns
for show and hoped that the strikebreakers
in the Nelsonville area
20. Athens Messenger, July 31,
1884.
21. Hocking Sentinel, September
18, 25, 1884.
22. Athens Messenger, July 17,
1884.
23. Ibid., July 31, 1884.
24. Ibid., August 7, 1884.
25. Lozier, "Coal Miners'
Strike," 61.
146 OHIO HISTORY |
|
would be frightened into leaving their jobs. Such incidents remained few and they usually failed, however.26 The introduction of strikebreakers into the Valley had failed to pro- voke a violent confrontation either with the operators, their hired Pinkertons or with the replacement labor force itself. When violence did start it came from another quarter. Many miners lived in housing owned by the Syndicate and at the end of July the news quickly spread that the operators would soon begin evictions of those still on strike. Local observers were convinced that such action was designed to inflame the miners. The Hocking Sentinel believed that the purpose of the evictions is to provoke men whose wives and children are driven into the storm to a breach of the peace . . . so that the state authorities can be called to aid in forcing the outrage which the lousy Italians and the armed Pinkertons failed to accomplish. Eviction is dangerous in downtrodden Ireland. It is not an American system and had best not be enforced.27
26. Wm. Dalrymple to Governor George Hoadly, January 26, 1885, Hoadly Papers. Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 60-62; Athens Messenger, August 7, 1884. 27. Hocking Sentinel, July 31, 1884. Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 57. |
Strikebreakers, Evictions and
Violence
147
The miners vowed to resist forcefully
evictions and the Syndicate's
"total disregard of the rights of
others." Operators were warned that
their property would be destroyed if
they evicted miners from company
housing.28
Despite these warnings, the operators on
July 31, 1884, evicted
some miners and sued in court to remove
all strikers from company-
owned housing. By August 2, violence
flared as miners assaulted mine
guards and fired at a Hocking Valley
train.29 Sporadic violence con-
tinued for a few days, but then
subsided. Most miners and their families
ignored their eviction notices, and,
faced with widespread civil disobe-
dience, the operators feared to act. The
evictees also had their day in
court before Judge Elias Boudinot, a man
openly sympathetic to their
cause. Boudinot ruled that the rental
agreement signed by the operators
with the miners was not voided by a strike.
To rub salt on the opera-
tors' wounds, Boudinot forced the
plaintiff, a Syndicate-affiliated coal
mine owner, to pay all of the court's
costs.30
The question of the operators' right to
evict strikers from company-
owned housing remained the key to violence
in the Valley. After
another court on August 25 allowed the
operators to evict strikers,
close to four hundred miners rioted in
Buchtel.31 Still another court
ruled on August 28 against the miners'
right to remain in company-
owned houses during a strike. When
miners are discharged, the court
ruled, the house rental contracts cease
to be in effect. Immediately
after this decision was rendered, one
observer predicted that "trouble
may be expected." The evictions of
the final days of August and the
early part of September coincided with
widespread conflict and dis-
ruption. A number of strikers attacked
the camps of strikebreakers at
Lonstreth, Snake Hollow and
Straitsville. In the attack some two or
three hundred shots were fired. Later,
near Straitsville, strikers set the
hopper of Mine Number Seven on fire.32
The New York Times contended that
the bloodshed and destruction
resulted from miners being "goaded
to madness" after having been
28. M. P. Finegard to Governor George
Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers: Testimony of
John McBride, Proceedings, 307.
29. Lozier, "Coal Miners'
Strike," 72; Athens Messenger, August 7, 1884.
30. Ibid.; Lozier, "Coal
Miners' Strike," 71-72. In a letter to Governor Hoadly prior
to the trial, Boudinot accused company
guards of keeping "by force and violence . . .
free citizens from Public Highway,"
and argued against the need for Pinkertons in the
valley. Elias Boudinot to Governor
George Hoadly, July 15, 1884; Telegram to Gov-
ernor George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly
Papers.
31. Levstik, "Miners' Strike,"
58.
32. Lozier, "Coal Miners'
Strike," 71-72; G. R. Carr to Col. Dill, September 4,
1884,
Hoadly Papers; Levstik, "Miners'
Strike," 58.
148 OHIO
HISTORY
driven from their homes.33 The strikers' violent acts forced
local law
enforcement officials to declare life
and property in imminent danger.
Hocking County Sheriff J. J. McCarthy
wired Ohio Governor George
Hoadly, "I am worn out . . . All means in my power are
exhausted
to repress disorder and protect life and
property. Please send
militia immediately and save further
bloodshed."34
The Governor dispatched the militia, and
he made a personal
visit to the Valley as well. In
Nelsonville strikers demanded of the
governor "What's to become of the
people turned out of houses?"
"I will send them tents,"
replied Hoadly.35 The violence abated with the
moral and physical presence of the
militia, the easy acquisition of tents
and the willingness of home-owning
miners to take in evictees. With
calm apparently restored, Hoadly
withdrew the bulk of the militia
in mid-September.36 Occasional
violence continued over the next few
months. Significantly, much of it was
directed against the company
housing once inhabited by strikers. A
number of company homes were
burned to the ground in mid-November,
including a new boarding
house built to house strikebreakers near
Straitsville.37
If violence to prevent evictions
represented a "defensive" effort by
strikers, violence against company
property was a more "aggressive"
tactic designed to help win the actual
strike. On the offensive, union
miners attacked poorly guarded mine
buildings, tools, hoppers, shutes
and bridges that were key links in the
movement of coal already
mined. Some actual coal mines were set
on fire but since such con-
flagrations could burn for years this
practice was soon discontinued
when it became clear that such tactics
permanently destroyed the
miners' means of livelihood.38
These skillful attacks greatly panicked
the operators and their allies.
A railroad president wrote to the
governor of Ohio that strikers
have burned coal hoppers, set fires to
the mines several of which are still
33. New York Times, September 2,
1884.
34. W. E. Hamblin to J. J. McCarthy,
September 10, 1884; J. J. McCarthy to Gov-
ernor George Hoadly, September 10, 1884;
John Brashears to Governor George Hoad-
ly, August 31, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
35. Hocking Sentinel, September
4, 18, 1884; New Lexington Herald, September 11,
1884.
36. T. T. Dill to Governor George
Hoadly, September 8, 1884, Hoadly Papers. E. B.
Finley to Governor George Hoadly,
September 11, 1884, The Papers of the Adjutant
General, The Ohio Historical Society,
Series 154 (hereafter cited as Adjutant General
Papers); Andrew Brown to Governor George
Hoadly, September 18, 1884, Hoadly
Papers; Lozier, "Coal Miners'
Strike," 72.
37. Athens Messenger, November
13, 27, 1884.
38. President of the Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad to Governor
George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers;
Athens Messenger, October 16, 1884.
Strikebreakers, Evictions and
Violence 149
burning. Last night all our wires were
cut, we learn through messengers
that a serious attack . . . burned three
of our bridges on Monday Creek and
Sand Run branches. Are the operators and
our railroad Company to be left
at the mercy of such men or can we have the protection
of the state so
that the operators can work their properties & the
railroad be open.39
Each actual fire brought forth a torrent
of rumored arson plots. The
operators and their supporters thrived
on rumors of anticipated vio-
lence, hopeful that they might bring
large numbers of state militiamen
back into the Valley. When stationed
there, the militia protected the
operators' property and investments at a
cost substantially lower than
that of an army of Pinkertons.40
The operators, as well as other
observers, correctly analyzed the
relationship between actual acts of
sabotage and the miners' goal of
preventing strikebreakers from mining
coal. The burning of the Central
Coal Company's shutes at New
Straitsville just one day prior to the
arrival of strikebreakers at that mine
highlighted such incidents of
directed violence. One newspaper
concluded that the destruction of the
shutes ended any need for strikebreakers
in the area.41 Similarly,
in January 1885, it was reported that
the sending of imported Negro miners to
work near New Straitsville is
supposed to be the cause for firing the
tunnel at Bristol, as in that manner,
transportation is checked, and so would
be the work of the imported colored
men.
The tactic of directed violence failed
also. As the winter dragged
on many miners were either forced to
return to work or to seek jobs
in other fields. Efforts by local
business and civic leaders to mediate
the dispute were rejected by Syndicate
operators confident of their
ability to maintain production with a
corps of imported strikebreakers.
In March defeated miners returned to
work on the operators' terms.
Wages in Syndicate mines started at
forty cents per ton, while fifty
cents was paid in other parts of the
Valley.
Strike violence in the Hocking Valley
coal strike followed the pattern
uncovered by George Rude and other new
social historians in their
studies of pre-industrial violence. When
conflict occurred during a food
riot or strike, Rude found that it was
directed against private property
39. President of the Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad to Governor
George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers.
40. Governor George Hoadly to Col. T.
Dill, September 3, 1884; Col. T. Dill to Gov-
ernor George Hoadly, September 3, 1884,
Adjutant General Papers; M. M. Greene to
Governor George Hoadly, September 1,
1884, Hoadly Papers.
41. New Lexington Herald, September
4, 1884.
42. Ibid., January 8, 1885.
150 OHIO
HISTORY
and not against individuals.43 Despite
their frustration in fighting a
losing battle, Hocking Valley miners
conducted themselves in an essen-
tially disciplined and humane manner.
While painfully aware that the
mines must be kept closed, the strikers
refused to attack the strike-
breakers because they saw them as fellow
victims of a harsh economic
system. Instead, the miners vented their
anger and violence in an es-
sentially pre-industrial mode.
Because they were perceived as unknowing
pawns of the opera-
tors, strikebreakers escaped the
violence that later marked mine strikes
in the twentieth century. Perhaps this
change in perception and action
resulted from twenty years of additional
labor strife; perhaps it re-
sulted from the breakdown of community
solidarity between the work-
ing class and the middle class and
within the working class itself.
Whatever the reason for this
transformation, in the Hocking Valley
coal strike of 1884-1885 the strikers
imposed clear limitations upon
the forms of violence they employed and
the objects toward which
their violence was directed.
43. George Rude. The Crowd in History, 1730-1848
GEORGE B. COTKIN
Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence:
Industrial Conflict in the
Hocking Valley, 1884-1885
In 1904 Boston trade unionist Frank K.
Foster called the strikebreaker
an "industrial excresence . . . the
Iscariot of the industrial world."
That same year novelist Jack London
coined his famous definition of
the "scab." A strikebreaker,
wrote London, "is a two-legged animal
with a corkscrew soul, a water-logged
brain, and a combination back-
bone made of jelly and glue. Where
others have hearts he carries a
tumor of rotten principles." So
damnatory was London that he thought
strikers had the moral right to kill
those who took their jobs and broke
their struggle.1
Like most trade unionists and radicals
of his time, London assumed
that strikebreakers and violence went
hand in hand. Labor historians
have also shared this view. In a recent
survey of industrial violence,
H. M. Gitelman contends that the
introduction of strikebreakers in-
variably produced sharp conflict.
"Most worker-initiated strike vio-
lence," wrote Gitelman, "took
the form of physical assaults upon
strikebreakers and upon fellow employees
who attempted to cross
picket lines."2 Similarly,
Philip Taft and Philip Ross believed that
strikers responded "to
strikebreakers with anger. Many violent out-
breaks followed efforts of strikers to
restrain the entry of strikebreakers
and raw materials into the plant."
In their wide-ranging survey of in-
dustrial violence, Taft and Ross found
strikebreakers physically at-
tacked in the Anthracite Strike of 1902,
the Westmoreland County coal
strike of 1909-1912 and a host of other
labor disputes.3 Additionally,
George Cotkin will receive his Ph.D. in
History from The Ohio State University in
June 1978.
1. Frank K. Foster, "Reply to
President Eliot," The Papers of Charles W. Eliot, Har-
vard University; Jack London, "The Scab,"
(1904) as quoted in Leonard Abbott, ed.,
London's Essays of Revolt (New York, 1928), 65.
2. H. M. Gitelman, "Perspectives on
American Industrial Violence," Business His-
tory Review, XLVII (Spring 1973), 11, 15.
3. Philip Taft and Philip Ross,
"American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character,