B. W. COLLINS
Economic Issues in Ohio's
Politics During the
Recession of 1857-1858
Historians are just beginning to
integrate the study of local and state
issues with the study of national
issues in American politics. For some
periods, federal issues are so
important and interesting that state history
tends to be reduced to a batch of mere
case studies detailing the local
impact of great national questions. One
period suffering acutely from
such neglect is the 1850s. Recently, however,
state and local history
has been given new prominence by the
challenging work of ethnocultural
historians on popular voting behavior.
Professor Ronald P. Formisano
has produced a rich analysis of the
emergence of Michigan's Republican
party, and Professor Michael F. Holt
stresses the influence of local
rivalries, policies, and anxieties in
the shaping of a Republican coalition
in Pittsburgh.' Banking issues have
been ably discussed for the Old
Northwest by William G. Shade, and
Professor Holt has put forward
a provocative interpretative synthesis
of the impact of state issues on
antebellum politics.2 At
present, however, the amount of published
literature on the interaction between
local, state, and federal issues in
politics in the 1850s is small, but
growing.3 This article seeks to add to
that literature.
B. W. Collins is Lecturer in Modern
History, The University of Glasgow, Scotland.
1. The general argument for such an
approach was put in Joel H. Silbey, The
Transformation of American Politics,
1840-1860 (Englewood Cliffs, 1967),
1-34;
Ronald P. Formisano, The Birth of
Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861
(Princeton, 1971); Michael F. Holt, Forging
a Majority: The Formation of the
Republican Party in Pittsburgh,
1848-1860 (New Haven, 1969); Frederick
C. Luebke
(ed.), Ethnic Voters and the Election
of Lincoln (Lincoln, 1971).
2. William G. Shade, Banks or No
Banks: The Money Issue in Western Politics,
1832-1865 (Detroit, 1972); Michael F. Holt, The Political
Crisis of the 1850s (New
York, 1978). For the older view that
traditional party issues disappeared during 1850s
see, for Ohio during Chase's
governorship, Albert B. Hart, Salmon Portland Chase
(Boston and New York, 1899), 149,
157-76.
3. William J. Evitts, A Matter of
Allegiances: Maryland from 1850 to 1861
(Baltimore, 1974); J. Mills Thornton,
III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society:
Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1978); Kevin Sweeney, "Rum,
Romanism, Repre-
sentation, and Reform: Coalition
Politics in Massachusetts, 1847-1853," Civil War
History, XXII (1976), 116-37; Dale Baum, "Know-Nothingism
and the Republican
Economic Issues 47
Analysis of local and state politics for
their own sake-and not
simply as reflections of national
political disputes-serves also to
remind one of two themes largely
overlooked in most historical accounts
of the mid-nineteenth century. The first
largely neglected theme is the
puzzling continuity in Democratic
support in the North.4 One might
expect the idea of continuity in
party support to emerge from studies
emphasizing the underlying and fairly
constant influence of religion and
ethnicity upon voting behavior. But
while ethnocultural historians
make much of the impressive continuities
in American party strength,
they also stress for the 1850s the role
of "cultural" preoccupations in
bringing about political change.
Formisano's complex account of
Michigan's politics in the 1850s depicts
a broad movement of opinion
to the Republican party, related to the
heightened evangelical tone of
public discourse, and affecting most
social and religious groups.5 This
emphasis is clearly correct for
Michigan, where the new Republican party
became much stronger than the Whigs had
been. Elsewhere, however,
the Democracts were not so firmly pushed
down into second place
by the formation of a purely Northern
Republican party. In many
Northern states, the Democrats remained
in the late 1850s, despite all
the defections and obloquy they had
suffered in the previous decade,
not only "respectable" but
healthy and combative minorities.6 Between
1852 and 1860, Democratic voting
strength fell in the North; but it did
not fall uniformly, or even
dramatically, in many states. In Michigan,
the average Democratic share of the vote
in the presidential elections
Majority in Massachusetts: The Political
Realignment of the 1850s," Journal of
American History, LXII (1978), 959-86. Other recent works of this kind
concentrating
on Southern secession are: William L.
Barney, The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama
and Mississippi in 1860 (Princeton, 1974); Michael P. Johnson, Toward a
Patriarchal
Republic: The Secession of Georgia (Baton Rouge, 1978). It should be noted that
much of the state material drawn upon by
Professor Holt in his Political Crisis
(pp. 271-72) comes from a large number
of seminar papers, most of them so far
unpublished.
4. This problem is discussed in Bruce
Collins, "The Ideology of the Ante-bellum
Northern Democrats," Journal of
American Studies, 11 (1977), 103-21; Joel H. Silbey,
A Respectable Minority: The
Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868
(New York, 1977), ch. 1; Holt, Political
Crisis, ch. 7. The best account of Ohio's
politics in the 1850s separates economic
issues from political events and argues that
by 1857-58 the "old issues"
associated with Jacksonian Democracy were dead:
Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War Era
1850-1873, Vol. IV of The History of the
State of Ohio (Columbus, 1944), 140-43.
5. Formisano, Birth of Mass Political
Parties, 289-331. There are, however, good
grounds for believing that the extent of
the defections from other parties to the
Republicans were exceptionally high for
the Old Northwest in Michigan: see Ray M.
Shortridge, "The Voter Realignment
in the Midwest During the 1850s," American
Politics Quarterly, 4 (1976), 193-222, esp. 206, 208.
6. Silbey, Respectable Minority, 12-23;
Collins, "Ideology of Ante-bellum Northern
Democrats," 120.
48 OHIO
HISTORY
of 1844 to 1852, inclusive, was 49.2
percent, while it was 42.7 percent
in the presidential elections of 1856 to
1864, inclusive-a substantial
though not an astonishingly great
decline of 6.5 percentage points.7
In Ohio, the figures for the same sets
of elections were 47.5 percent
and 44.3 percent, respectively. The loss
of relative support of only
3.2 percentage points was half that
inflicted upon Michigan's Demo-
crats. A general problem-explaining
continued Democratic popular-
ity among a sizeable minority of
Northern voters at a time when the
party was being abused as the tool of
the Slave Power-takes on a
further local complexion: why did the
Democrats experience such
relatively mild losses of popular
support in Ohio?
One explanation has already been adduced
by Professor Don E.
Fehrenbacher-racism.8 The
Northern Democrats appealed overtly to
race prejudice against an allegedly
Negro-loving, proto-abolitionist
Republican party. Racism was played up
especially in Ohio because the
state bordered on Kentucky and Virginia,
and consequently received a
steady influx of runaway slaves. By the
late 1850s, indeed, the Fugitive
Slave act of 1850 was enforced more
vigorously in Ohio than in any
other free state.9 Northern
Democrats in general welcomed the Supreme
Court's Dred Scott decision of March,
1857, for the very reason that
it denied to free black men any future
hope of becoming citizens.
Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois
wanted to exploit the opportunity
offered by the Dred Scott decision to
debate with Republicans the
desirability of black citizenship. 10 In
Ohio in particular, Democrats
posed as the passionate defenders of a
white man's commonwealth
against the abolitionist sympathizer,
Salmon P. Chase." They believed
that the Dred Scott decision would
benefit them in the gubernatorial
election of mid-October, 1857. Racism
was and continued to be a vital
part of Ohio Democrats' popular appeal.12
7. Figures for presidential elections
are taken from W. Dean Burnham, Presidential
Ballots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore, 1955) and Silbey, Respectable Minority, 22,
151.
8. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred
Scott Case (New York, 1978), examines the
electoral impact of the case. For the
general problem of Democratic party support
in 1857-58, see Bruce Collins, "The
Democrats' Electoral Fortunes During the
Lecompton Crisis," Civil War
History, XXIV (December, 1978), 314-31.
9. This is suggested by the figures in
Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers:
Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law
1850-1860 (New York, 1972), 204-06.
10. Douglas made the point in a speech
in June 1857. He said the validity of
the Dred Scott decision would be one of
the main political issues in the near future.
A Political Text-Book for 1860 (New York, 1860), 157.
11. The phrase comes from Portsmouth, Spirit
of the Times, Oct. 13, 1857. An
editorial in a leading Democratic
newspaper argued, "Chase and his leading Black-
Republican supporters are in favour of
measures which tend to bring to Ohio a large
negro population.... the free negroes of
the South think Ohio their promised land,
and are flocking here by
thousands." Cincinnati, Daily Enquirer, Oct. 4, 1857.
12. Silbey, Respectable Minority, 81-83,
190-91.
Economic Issues 49 |
|
But to understand the reason for the Democrats' relatively mild losses in Ohio, one needs to explore a second general theme too often overlooked in historical accounts of the 1850s. Modern democratic electorates and politicians are preoccupied with economic problems: inflation, employment, future economic development, and government finances. Yet, although state and local governments in the mid- nineteenth century were intimately involved with promoting economic development, few historians have fully explored the possible impact of local and state economic problems or disputes upon political debate and party appeal.13 The present essay provides information on, and an hypothesis about, the influence of economic questions in party politics in Ohio at a time when one would expect such matters to have been important. 13. The primacy of state government is argued for by Holt, Political Crisis, xi. Yet major, excellent studies of state economic policy are almost devoid of any consideration of party politics: see Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Chicago, 1968 edn.), chs v, vii; Oscar and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth: A study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969, revised edn.), chs. 9, 10. But see the pioneering article by Herbert Ershkowitz and William G. Shade, "Consensus or Conflict? Political Behavior in the State Legislatures During the Jacksonian Era," Journal of American History, LVIII (1971), 591-621. I have made these observations in Bruce Collins, "Non-Sectional Issues in American Politics, 1830-1875," Historical Journal, 21 (1978), 709-19. Some excellent work on national, economic issues has also |
50 OHIO HISTORY
The panic of 1857 ended a period of
tremendous economic prosperity
virtually uninterrupted since 1843. It
did not throw the country into deep
depression-as the crashes of 1837 and
1839, 1893, and 1929 did-but
it stopped economic growth in the North.
14 Ohio suffered fewer business
failures than did a number of states of
roughly comparable population. 15
But Ohio was a state of dispersed
market-towns and widely spread
commercial agriculture par
excellence. According to the census of 1860,
Ohio possessed a greater mileage of
railroads than any other state in
the Union and had acquired 2,424 of its
2,999 miles since 1850-a
sheer quantity of railroad building
exceeded only by Illinois' 2,757
miles.16 In 1857, an
estimated 30 percent of Ohio's total output of
mining, agricultural, and manufacturing
commodities were sent out of
the state.17 That estimate
crudely indicated Ohio's dependence on good
credit arrangements, sound distant
markets, and efficient transport
facilities. The financial crash,
beginning in late August with the collapse
of an Ohio insurance company operating
mainly in New York city,
predictably spread panic when it brought
bank suspensions, market
dislocation, and railroad failures to
the Midwest. It is symptomatic of
historians' preoccupation with federal
politics and sectional issues that
an event of such immediate significance,
suddenly ending a lengthy
period of economic growth, should have
been almost entirely ignored
in descriptions of late antebellum
politics.18 In Ohio, at least, the panic
vitally affected party politics and
partly explains why the Democrats'
popular appeal remained so reliable and
considerable for such a lengthy
period of time.
The panic of 1857 induced the Democrats
to indulge in traditional
been unfairly ignored: for example,
Helene S. Zahler, Eastern Workingmen and
National Land Policy, 1829-1862 (New York, 1941); Robert R. Russel, Critical Studies
in Antebellum Sectionalism (Westport,
Conn., 1972), chs. 5-7, 11: these
chapters appeared
originally in 1924, 1925, 1948, and
1928, respectively.
14. Douglass C. North, The Economic
Growth of the United States, 1790-1860
(New York, 1966 edn.), 206-14.
15. D. Morier Evans, The History of
the Commercial Crisis 1857-1858 (New York,
1969 reprint of 1859 edn.), 136-37.
16. Statistics of the United States,
(Including Mortality, Property, etc.) in 1860:
Compiled from the Original Returns
and Being the Final Exhibit of the Eighth Census
(Washington, D.C., 1866), 329-31.
17. C. C. Huntington, "A History of
Banking and Currency in Ohio Before the
Civil War," Ohio Archaeological
and Historical Society Publications, XXIV (Columbus,
1915), 469.
18. There is a short economic analysis
of the crash: George W. Van Vleck, The
Panic of 1857 (New York, 1943); Holt, Political Crisis, 199-201;
B. W. Collins,
"The Politics of Particularism:
Economic Issues in the Major Northern States of the
U.S.A., 1857-1858" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1975);
for the absence of any discussion of the
crash's impact on Ohio's politics, see Roseboom,
Civil War Era, 327-39.
Economic Issues 51
Jacksonian anti-banking rhetoric and to
place new emphasis on their
traditional belief in tight banking
regulations. Democratic publicists
displayed violent hostility to banks as
such. Their campaign effusions
of September and early October, 1857,
during the gubernatorial contest,
were not simply idle promises. The
Democratically controlled state
legislature of 1858 imposed new controls
upon banks and currency.
Even before the panic broke in late
August, 1857, Democrats were
urging upon Ohio's voters their own
ideas about banking regulation.
Continued partisan debate over
banking-often thought to have sub-
sided after the late 1840s19-was
provoked by differences of opinion as
to the proper way of taxing banks. From
1851 Democrats fought a
running battle with the Whigs and then
Republicans over the precise
method of taxing banks, always seeking
to impose higher taxes than
the banks thought acceptable or their
political opponents thought wise.
This dispute-shunted back and forth
between state and federal courts-
had still not been resolved by 1857.
Moreover, Democrats were angry
because a state act they passed in 1854
banning the circulation within
Ohio of notes issued by banks chartered
outside Ohio was repealed
by the Republicans in 1856. To make
matters worse, in early 1857 the
Republican legislature passed an
expansionist banking act which went
to a popular referendum in the autumn.20
To add spice and urgency to
these running disputes, the Democrats
exploited revelations of a massive
embezzlement in the state treasurer's
office made in June, 1857.
Although the embezzler, John G. Breslin,
was a former Democratic
state treasurer, his activities had been
covered up by his Republican
successor, and brother-in-law, William
H. Gibson.21 Although avoiding
19. James Roger Sharp, The
Jacksonians versus the Banks: Politics in the States
after the Panic of 1837 (New York, 1970), 158, concludes that an act passed in
1851,
marked the end of banking controversies
in Ohio. Obviously such controversies were
less important than they had been in the 1840s. But during
1850-60 at least fifteen
public acts and bills were passed or
extensively debated in Ohio's General Assembly.
And Shade has shown that public controversy
over banking continued in the 1850s.
See, Ernest L. Bogart, Financial
History of Ohio (Urbana, Ill., 1912), 280-96; Shade,
Banks or No Banks, 136-38, 187-89.
20. Huntington, "History of Banking
and Currency," 456-66.
21. Bogart, Financial History, 161.
The Democrats' campaign strategy before the
financial crash occurred was to attack
Governor Chase for neglecting the administration
of Ohio's affairs in favor of devoting
his attention to slavery disputes in Kansas. His
Democratic opponent for the governorship
accused Chase of being a "a novice in
financiering" and "too
dignified" to look after state administraive matters. E. B.
Andrews to Chase, Marietta, Aug. 20,
1857, Salmon P. Chase papers, Library of
Congress. (Andrews was reporting on a
speech made by the Democratic gubernatorial
candidate.) Before the panic broke,
however, Republican worthies seemed to anticipate
no electoral difficulties flowing from
the Gibson frauds. Indeed, the secretary-treasurer
of the Republicans' state central
committee, W. J. Bascom, hoped for a majority of
20,000 for Chase in October's election.
The actual majority was only 1,503. R. P.
Spalding to Chase, Cleveland, June 23,
1857, Salmon P. Chase papers, Pennsylvania
52 OHIO HISTORY
the use of embarrassing personal
attacks, the Democrats attempted to
capitalize on this scandal by demanding
the introduction into the
state of an independent treasury. Just
as Democrats in Congress
divorced the federal government's
finances from private banks during
the 1840s by setting up a federal
independent treasury, so Ohio's
Democrats argued that state financial
transactions should be untainted
by contacts with private banking
interests. This argument was advanced
before the panic began; it took on
greater force as a result of the banking
failures in September and October.
In one sense, the state elections of
1857 witnessed the last outburst
of traditional Jacksonian anti-banking
sentiment-a restatement of safe,
traditional prejudices-in American
politics. In another sense, however,
the election campaign and the events
immediately following it revealed
a perennial dilemma faced by a society
of producers: how to regulate
satisfactorily financial institutions
upon which everyone depended,
but which were often distrusted because
of their profiteering, shoddy
practices, and unreliability. Fear of
banks' power and practices in
Ohio was not new in 1857, for it had
inspired Democratic demands
for restraint upon banks in the
legislative wranglings over bank taxation
and bank expansion throughout the 1850s,
as well as earlier. But that
fear was expressed more pointedly in
1857.
Basically, the Democrats promised to
establish a state independent
treasury. As one newspaper stressed on
the eve of polling day, "NEXT
to the question, shall Ohio be preserved
a white commonwealth, the
Independent Treasury is the most important
issue in the canvass."22
Before the 1857 crash, the Cincinnati Daily
Enquirer had stated:
The Democracy are pledged to the
establishment of a State Treasury, wholly
independent of the banks in which the
money of the State shall be kept. They
are determined that the Treasurer shall
not have the power to loan out State
money to private bankers to speculate
with, and to be returned or not, as their
speculations are successful or their
inclinations prompt.23
This promise was expressed in thoroughly
populist terms. One local
Democratic convention resolved that
"the only safe manner of preserv-
Historical Society; W. J. Bascom to
Howe, Columbus, Aug. 8, 1857, Richard Howe
papers, Ohio Historical Society.
Roseboom, Civil War Era, 329.
22. Portsmouth, Spirit of the Times, Oct.
13, 1857; see also Marietta Republican
(a Democratic paper), Sept. 25, 1857: it
made five charges against Governor Chase,
including two on state finances and two
on Negro equality. In the safe southern Ohio
county of Fairfield, the local
Democratic newspaper put greater emphasis on the state
administrative and banking issues than
on attacking Chase over slavery. Lancaster,
Ohio Eagle, Sept. 17, 24, Oct. 1, 1857.
23. Cincinnati, Daily Enquirer, Aug.
25, 1857.
Economic Issues 53
ing the people's money from being
plundered is to establish a People's
Treasury, totally disconnected from all
corporations."24 In addition, the
election address issued by the state's
Democratic central committee
asserted that the Republican party,
"instigated and governed by bankers
and money-changers," was the stout
defender of a state treasurer's
office closely linked to, indeed
dependent upon, banks.25
Beyond this specific institutional
reform, Democrats looked forward
also to the banning of small
denominations of bank notes, to the replace-
ment of paper money by specie currency,
and, among some radicals
to the collapse of all banks in
the United States. A leading Democratic
newspaper, the Cincinnati Enquirer demanded
the banning of notes of
under $20 in denomination as a way of
reducing that unstable element
in the money supply which most directly
affected lower income
groups.26 Democrats generally
held that commercial transactions could
be conducted in notes of larger
denomination. But everyday transactions
(most incomes were about $7 to $15 per
week) should be conducted in a
currency not vulnerable to sudden and
appreciable fluctuations in value.
The Ohio Democrats' central committee
proclaimed:
The Democratic party looks forward to,
and is determined to bring about the
time, when the wages of labor shall be
paid in gold and silver, and the farmer
may ride home, after having sold his
wheat and corn, with a bag of specie on
the pommel of his saddle. 27
The very reasonable desire to supplant a
paper currency prone to
depreciation with a specie currency more
likely to be fixed in value was
embellished with self-righteous party
rhetoric. The Cincinnati Enquirer
pronounced, "It is the destiny of
all banks to fail in the United States.
This has been proved by our experience
of paper money for seventy
years."28 Democrats
should insist that no new banks be chartered in
order to help realize this historically
inevitable fact. Another Democratic
organ, the Cleveland Plain Dealer proclaimed:
Decennially, and sometimes annually, we
are called upon to warn the farmer,
mechanic and laboring men, against the
Rag Barons, Charter Mongers, and
Privileged Orders, who are after a
division of their hard earnings in the way of
bust up banks and repudiated promises to
pay. 29
24. Spirit of the Times, Sept.
15, 1857.
25. Address of the Democratic State
Central Committee to the People of Ohio
(Columbus, 1857), 5-6. See also Spirit
of the Times, Nov. 3, 1857.
26. Cincinnati, Daily Enquirer, Sept.
22, 23, 27; see also Sept. 1, 3, 30, Oct. 1, 7, 9,
1857.
27. Address of the Democratic State
Central Committee, 5-6.
28. Cincinnati, Daily Enquirer, Sept.
26, 1857.
29. Cleveland, Weekly Plain Dealer, Sept.
2 (also 9), 1857. See also Marietta
54 OHIO
HISTORY
These affirmations of party piety came
from all parts of Ohio: from
the prosperous cities of Cleveland and
Cincinnati, from rural counties,
and from north and south.30 One
prominent Republican newspaper
editor in Sandusky in the north warned
his party colleagues against
defending banks from popular ire.31
An Old Whig banker reflected
after the close gubernatorial election
that anti-bank feeling was genuinely
and deeply felt among the people, even
if it was provoked by
demagogues and was totally ill-founded.32
And Salmon Chase himself,
after squeaking through to a second term
as governor, blamed his
narrow scrape on feeble support from his
Republican colleagues and
on "disadvantages, growing chiefly
out of the concealment by our
Treasurer of his predecessor's
defalcation and the anti-bank clamor as
a consequence of the money panic."33
Thus their opponents seem to
have agreed with the Democrats' claim
that anti-bank sentiment was
rampant in 1857.
Republicans were not left entirely
stranded by popular anti-bank
feeling. During October and November,
another manifestation of such
feeling enabled the Republicans to pose
as defenders of local interests
against metropolitan interests. In nine
small towns, most of them
possessing about 4,500 people, local
"mobs" defended banks from
Republican, Sept. 4, 11, Oct. 9, Nov. 6, 13, 1857. For Republican
local newspapers'
counterattacks on Democratic
anti-banking rhetoric, see: Marietta Intelligencer, Sept. 30,
Nov. 4, 1857 (this paper said that local
banks should be supported); M'Connelsville,
Morgan Weekly Herald, Sept. 10, 24, Oct. 1, 1857 (this paper sought to show
that local
Democratic politicians were deeply
involved with banks); Athens Messenger, Oct. 2, 9,
1857 (this paper, edited by N. H. Van
Vorhes, Republican speaker of the state house
of representatives in 1856-57, argued
for an expansion of Ohio's banking facilities).
30. The point at issue here is the
applicability to Ohio of Professor Shade's general
argument that disputes over banking and
currency matters reflected deeper cultural
antagonisms between Yankee Protestants
and other ethno-religious groups. Following
that argument, one might associate
anti-banking and hard currency ideas with areas
of non-evangelical religious sentiment
and Southern settlement: areas less intent upon
commercial development. In Ohio, at
least, the legislators handled banking and currency
questions in a partisan way,
irrespective of regional differences. Democratic legislators
from northern counties in Ohio voted
with Democratic representatives from counties
of heavy Southern settlement. Shade, Banks
or No Banks, 172-74, 195-98, 252-53.
31. H. D. Cook to J. Sherman, Nov. 17,
1857, John Sherman papers, Library of
Congress. John Sherman was a congressman
in 1857. Henry Cooke edited a newspaper
in Sandusky until 1858, when he acquired
the Ohio State Journal. Roseboom, Civil
War Era, 54-55, 200-01.
32. R. Hitchcock to S. Ford, Jan. 13,
1858, Peter Hitchcock Family papers,
Western Reserve Historical Society. For
information on the political loyalties of these
men see, Roseboom, Civil War Era,
129, 256.
33. S. P. Chase to C. Sumner, Nov. 23,
1857, Charles Sumner papers, Harvard
University library; S. P. Chase to E. B.
Washburne, Nov. 1857, Elihu B. Washburne
papers, Library of Congress. One
Republican leader blamed his party's poor performance
in Cleveland on Democratic electoral
corruption (a standard excuse) and on Republican
supporters' apathy as a result of the
financial crisis and the Gibson frauds. Wm. Slade,
Jr. to Chase, Cleveland, Oct. 29, 1857,
Chase papers, Library of Congress.
Economic Issues 55
metropolitan bill-brokers.34 The
brokers were exercising their full legal
right to take notes received in major
commercial centers back to the
bank of origin for redemption in
specie. But any specie drain suffered
by banks obviously threatened those
banks with the necessity of
suspending specie payments altogether,
so endangering their entire
operations and their serviceability to
the local communities.
With these considerations in mind,
local crowds gathered in at least
nine towns to frighten off metropolitan
brokers, usually by threatening
them with tarring and feathering.
Democrats depicted such actions
as attempts by business elites to
thwart popular rights. When a
Cincinnati broker arrived at Piqua,
"The leading businessmen of the
place assembled their forces and
ordered Mr. Broker out of town."35
Another Democratic newspaper
complained, "The Banks have block-
aded their doors with mobs to intimidate
and drive away those holding
their notes. These bills are a total
loss to the holders, and a clear gain to
the aristocratic, swindling
banker."36 Republican newspapers, however,
argued that local people took
"spontaneous action" against "the carpet
bag gentry" of metropolitan
brokers.37 Trying to recoup ground lost
in September and early October,
Republican local newspapers posed
in late October and November as the
true defenders of small-town
enterprise against grasping
metropolitan financiers.
The Republican quest for a response to
Democratic anti-bank rhetoric
continued when the new legislative
session began in January, 1858.
Governor Chase suggested to the
Democratic legislature that more
banks be chartered in Ohio, but only if
notes of under $20 in
denomination were prohibited. Chase
sought to appease anti-bank
sentiment also by proposing a technical
reform of the laws governing
the rate of interest. He urged that
private banking houses, as distinct
from note-issuing banks, should no
longer be permitted to charge
10 percent interest on loans; a
standard rate of 6 percent (the maximum
34. The nine towns in which these
incidents occurred were, together with their
populations in 1860: Athens (2,852), Circleville
(4,383), Ironton (3,691), Lancaster (4,303),
Mansfield (4,581), Marietta (4,323),
Piqua (4,616), Springfield (7,002), and Xenia (4,658).
Six of these towns are listed in
Roseboom, Civil War Era, 141; I have added Circleville,
Ironton, and Lancaster, as noted in Athens
Messenger, Oct. 30, 1857; Marietta
Intelligencer, Nov. 18, 1857; Ohio Eagle, Dec. 3, 1857. It
might be noted that forty-five
towns in Ohio in 1857 had one or more
banks: Huntington, "History of Banking and
Currency," 468. The population
figures are from Population of the United States in
1860: Compiled from the Original
Returns of the Eighth Census (Washington,
D.C.,
1864), 372-96.
35. Cleveland, Weekly Plain Dealer, Oct.
21, 1857.
36. Lancaster, Ohio Eagle, Nov.
26 (also Nov. 5, 12, Dec. 3), 1857; Spirit of the
Times, Nov. 3, 1857.
37. Marietta Intelligencer, Oct.
14, Nov. 18, 1857. See also, Athens Messenger,
Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 1857.
56 OHIO HISTORY
rate which note-issuing banks were
permitted to charge) should be set.
The prevailing rate of 10 percent
allowed to banking houses "enables
the moneyed capitalist to absorb far too
large a share of the earnings
of the farmer, the mechanic and the
merchant."38 Republicans as well as
Democrats thus sought to devise measures
to meet what they sensed to
be public disquiet at economic
exploitation. But the real work of bank
reform was the Democrats'
responsibility. In that respect, the ebbing of
Jacksonian faith depicted by Professor
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., did
not drain Ohio's Democrats of their
traditional ideals.39
Continuity with the aims pursued by the
party in the 1830s and 1840s
was underscored by the Democrats'
policies in the state legislature.
First, the Democrats returned to a
favorite hobbyhorse-trying to tax
banks at the same rate at which ordinary
individuals were taxed. In
1851 and 1852-53, the state legislature
had imposed harsh taxes on
banks, though such taxes were deemed
unconstitutional by federal
courts and were replaced by a lower tax
passed in 1856 by Republicans.40
The new tax bill of 1858 was passed by a
vote of 57 to 42 in the lower
house and by 19 to 12 votes in the
Senate: a strict party vote in each
case, except for one representative.41
Voting on this measure reflected
no regional antagonisms and no special
economic interests, for Demo-
cratic counties were spread throughout
the state. And one-third of
counties represented by Democrats had at
least one bank; the Republican
counties' proportion was higher (26 of
44 counties), but not high enough
to suggest a clash of economic
interests.42 The key point was clear:
Ohio Democrats' commitment to tax banks
severely remained a
constant source of party unity and
purpose throughout the 1850s.
The second practical achievement of the
legislature of 1858 similarly
reflected traditional Democratic ideas.
The legislature set up a state
independent treasury, again by a
strictly party vote.43 Some Democrats
wanted all state taxes and expenditures
to be paid in specie or in federal
38. Ohio, General Assembly, Legislative
Documents for 1857 (Columbus, 1858),
part I, 356-59, 363-64, 370, 373,378.
39. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The
Age of Jackson, (London, 1946), chs. 25, 26;
"Whatever remained of the live
Jacksonian tradition had in the main, by 1858, entered
the Republican party" (p. 489).
40. Huntington, "History of Banking
and Currency," 456-62.
41. Ohio, General Assembly, Journal
of the House of Representatives: 1858 Session
(Columbus, 1858), 523 (party affiliation
as defined by the vote for the speakership,
p. 5); Journal of the Senate: 1858
Session (Columbus, 1858), 369-70, 4-5.
42. A list of Ohio's banks in January,
1857, is in Huntington, "History of Banking
and Currency," 468.
43. Journal of the House, 567.
For Democratic newspapers' praise for the independent
treasury, see Ohio Eagle, Apr. 1,
29, 1858; Marietta Republican, Apr. 30, Oct. 8, 1858;
Cleveland, Weekly Plain Dealer, Apr.
21, 28, July 28 (resolutions of Richland County
Democratic convention), 1858.
Economic Issues 57
Treasury notes. Some proposed that this
condition be delayed until
1872 rather than effected earlier.
Obvious objections to such measures
were raised. The collection of
$9,500,000 of taxes at one time would
create, according to one newspaper, a
chronic drain on Ohio's banks
and dire problems for the state's money
system. The party caucus
therefore, hammered out a less radical
measure-though still opposed
wholeheartedly by Republicans-which
made state and county treasurers
the custodians of public funds. These
local treasurers were obliged to
pay out specie for small bills owed by
the state or county, but were
left to find their own ways of obtaining
specie.44 A monetary bottleneck
was thus avoided while the essential
objective-separating state finances
from the banking sector-was secured. It
was this point that some
Republicans seized on in opposing the
legislation: "Banks are by this
law pronounced totally unworthy of
public respect or confidence."45
The legislature of 1858 postponed
action on a third banking problem.
In 1854, the Democrats had banned from
circulation in Ohio notes
of under $10 in denomination issued by
non-Ohio banks. In 1856, the
Republicans repealed this law.46 In
April, 1858, however, the Senate
passed a similar ban by a virtually
strict party vote, and the vast majority
of Democrats in the lower house (47 to
7) voted for immediate enact-
ment. But for no apparent reason the
lower house decided to drop the
measure until the following session.47
The Democrats made no radical changes
in 1858. But the party did
introduce practical banking reforms
thoroughly opposed by Repub-
licans. From the tone of the newspaper
comment of 1857 and from
the evidence of the small-town mobs'
actions of late 1857, the
Democrats' legislative activities
reflected deep popular concern about
the banks' failure in the financial
crisis. Banking continued to pose
difficult technical problems for the
legislators: Ohio's bank tax laws
were not brought into orderly shape
until 1861.48 However, public
disquiet abated as the banks resumed
specie payments by mid-1858.
44. Jan. 14, March 2, March 31, 1858,
Clippings Scrapbook, W. H. Smith papers,
Ohio Historical Society. This is an
extremely valuable set of newspaper clippings for
the legislative session. The date I cite is the date of
the correspondent's report, not
the date of the newspaper issue in which
it appeared. W. H. Smith was the Columbus
correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial.
Morgan Weekly Herald, Feb. 18, 1858;
Spirit of the Times, March 23, 1858; Roseboom, Civil War Era, 140-41.
45. Morgan Weekly Herald, Sept.
30, 1858: also Apr. 22, Oct. 7, 1858; Marietta
Intelligencer, Sept. 1, 1858; Stark County Democrat, Sept. 22,
1858; Athens Messenger,
Apr. 23, 30, Oct. 1, 1858.
46. Huntington, "History of Banking
and Currency," 446-48.
47. Journal of the Senate, 300; Journal
of the House, 567-68, 594.
48. Huntington, "History of Banking
and Currency," 463. Governor Chase himself
clearly saw the Democratic legislators'
work in sharp partisan terms. He wrote to
congressman Sherman, "Our
Legislature made itself generally odious: and there is a
58 OHIO HISTORY
The recession of 1857-58 marked, in Ohio
at least, the convergence
of two broad economic issues in state
politics. Traditional Jacksonian
banking questions-about state
independent treasuries, levels of bank
taxation, and restrictions on notes of
small denomination-continued
to unite Democrats and set them apart
from their political opponents.
But a new set of economic problems,
created by railroads, arose for
the first time in 1858 and cut across
party politics. This development
presaged the pattern of events following
the Civil War, when railroad
regulation-one of the three main
political issues in the states, together
with black suffrage and
temperance-totally eluded party ideology and
manipulation.49 Such failure
to hammer out fairly distinctive party
principles and solutions to major
economic problems constituted
something of a departure in American
politics: for, on most such
problems of grave public
concern-currency, banks and tariffs are
examples-parties tended to
formulate contrasting policies.50
Railroads throughout the country
experienced financial difficulties
as a direct result of the panic of 1857.
These difficulties partly arose
from expansion undertaken in the
mid-1850s: receipts did not rise
quickly enough to cover expenditures and
interest payments on
capital."51 Yet if the railroads
suffered financial hardship from the
general economic recession, Ohio's
state-owned canal had already
suffered acutely from railroad
competition, and by 1858 was losing
money heavily. Many legislators
therefore sought to sell the 800-mile
canal.52 The attempt to sell
the canal drew a highly pragmatic response
from the legislators: economic interest
came before ideology. A bill
providing for sale at a minimum price of
$2,500,000 was passed by the
lower house. Republicans favored sale
more clearly than did the
Democrats, but both parties split over
the issue: the vote was 25
Democrats and 29 Republicans for sale,
and 27 Democrats and 13
good spirit among the Republicans for
the coming campaign." S. P. Chase to Sherman,
Columbus, May 6, 1858, John Sherman
papers, Library of Congress. Ohio's leading
Democratic newspaper proudly boasted of
the legislature's achievements: Cincinnati,
Daily Enquirer, Apr. 9, 15, 1858.
49. Collins, "Non-sectional issues
in American politics," 717-19; James C. Mohr
(ed.) Radical Republicans in the
North: State Politics during Reconstruction (Baltimore,
1976).
50. Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of
Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841-1852
(Pittsburgh, 1967); Ershkowitz and
Shade, "Consensus or conflict?"; Collins, "Ideology
of the Ante-Bellum Northern
Democrats."
51. Albert Fishlow, American
Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-bellum
Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 171-89.
52. Roseboom, Civil War Era, 102,
104; Annual Report of the Auditor of State,
Ohio, General Assembly, Legislative
Documents for 1859 (Columbus, 1860), part II,
84, 99; Harry N. Scheiber, Ohio Canal
Era: A Case Study of Government and the
Economy (Athens, Ohio, 1968), 327-28.
Economic Issues 59 |
|
Republicans against it.53 Local interest chiefly influenced the vote: of 40 opponents of sale, 34 came from counties through which the publicly- owned canal or some of its privately-owned adjuncts passed, and 3 others came from counties very close to canals. Overall, representatives of 26 of the 35 counties served to some extent by canals voted against sale. The proposal, however, came to nothing, for the Senate postponed discussion of the matter until 1859, when the canal's fiscal position became even more dire. A bill to lease the canal was passed, but the terms stipulated were so stringest that no bids were tendered: not until 1861 was the canal leased out, for ten years.54 The attempted sale of the canal showed that some politicians were bemused by a central dilemma posed by corporate capitalism. Most representatives saw the sale of the canal as good budgeting and good politics combined. But two objections to this argument were raised. First, a financial recession was an inopportune moment in which to
53. March 26, 1858, Clippings Scrapbook, W. H. Smith papers; Journal of the House, 415. 54. There is a convenient map of the canal in Francis P. Weisenburger, The Passing of the Frontier, 1825-1850 (Columbus, 1941), 99, Vol. III in The History of the State of Ohio; Journal of the Senate, 240, 301; Roseboom, Civil War Era, 104-05. |
60 OHIO
HISTORY
sell state assets, for money would be
short and new investment unlikely
to be forthcoming. Secondly, it could
be argued that the canal was not
designed solely for profit, but as a
way of opening up new areas and
providing them with access to markets.
At least one leading opponent
to the proposed sale, Republican
representative Henry Dawes, argued
that railroads had lowered their rates
to destroy the canals, but would
promptly raise those rates once canal
competition was eliminated.55
Some grounds existed for such fears of
corporate power. Although
the sale bill of 1858 forbade transport
companies from buying the
state canal, it did not prevent railroad
directors and stockholders, as
individuals, from doing so.56 In response to the
financial crisis, some
railroads had already considered
raising their freight rates.57 Other
railroads sought to maintain their
share of the freight market by entering
pooling arrangements.58 Direct
grievances against railroad corporations
also emerged from the crash. The
Marietta and Cincinnati railroad,
for example, after going bankrupt
reorganized itself to begin operations
anew in 1860. Reorganization entailed
losses to mainly local stock-
holders, while the mortgage
bondholders-mostly metropolitan and
foreign capitalists-lost little in
paper values. Much local bitterness
against metropolitan interests ensued
and was later manifested in court
litigation.59 Moreover,
economic recession and railroads' financial
difficulties provoked resentment
against railroad's tendency to charge
long-distance through-rates
proportionally lower than short-distance
way rates. Such differential rates drew
a flood of petitions to the
legislature in 1860.60
None of these local discontents,
however, were articulated in party
rhetoric or policies. The railroad
companies themselves were numerous:
in 1860, Ohio had twenty-one railroads
operating fifty or more miles
55. J. P. Sperry to R. Howe, March 11,
1858; Howe to Sperry, March 18, 1858,
Richard Howe papers, Ohio Historical
Society. Sperry was a Republican state
representative; Howe was Resident
Engineer of the Ohio Canal. Morgan Weekly Herald,
Apr. 1, 1858; Marietta Intelligencer,
March 31, 1858, Jan. 12, 1859.
56. Feb. 11, 1858, Clippings Scrapbook,
W. H. Smith papers.
57. Washington Register, Sept. 9,
1858: newspaper clipping in Erasmus Gest papers,
Ohio Historical Society.
58. J. H. Barnes to Gest, Baltimore,
Nov. 28, 1857, E. Gest papers: this letter provides
details of pooling negotiations.
59. Taft and Perry to T. Ewing,
Cincinnati, Nov. 26, 1857, Thomas Ewing papers,
Library of Congress; John E. Pixton,
Jr., "Faith vs. Economics: The Marietta and
Cincinnati Railroad, 1845-1883," Ohio
Historical Quarterly, 66 (1957), 1-10. For
another example of rivalries between
different groups of investors-this time in the
Cincinnati, Wilmington, and Zanesville
railroad-see M. Bell Vennard, Jr., to Gest,
Baltimore, Nov. 10, 1857, E. Gest
papers.
60. Roseboom, Civil War Era, 115-17;
Harry N. Scheiber, "Urban Rivalry and
Internal Improvements in the Old
Northwest, 1820-1860," Ohio History, 71 (1962),
227-39; Marietta Intelligencer, Dec.
2, 1857.
Economic Issues 61
of track, whereas, for example, Illinois
had only twelve.61 Serving
regions rather than Ohio as a whole,
these various companies did not
draw statewide criticisms. And criticism
of practices such as differential
freight-rates was always vitiated by
popular pressure for good com-
munications. The basic confusion of late
nineteenth century politics-
how to cope with institutions which
everyone wanted but whose practices
disturbed many responsible community
leaders-affected Ohio on a
large scale for the first time in the
late 1850s.
But what relevance did such matters have
to purely party politics?
It seems-and this is an hypothesis
rather than a firm conclusion-that
expansive community and local interests
sustained party competition.
States where economic development was
most advanced and complex
tended to produce more competitive party
politics in 1860 than states
which had simpler economic structures.62
Of course, the most important
issues associated with economic
advance-the establishment and devel-
opment of railroads-could not be molded
into party doctrines or
platforms. But arguments about
particular railroads and transport
policy in general so divided localities
(towns and counties) and so
fragmented the state that competition
between "ins" and "outs" at
the local level flourished. Where
political parties were separated by other
beliefs-and in Ohio racism and traditional
banking questions were
divisive at least as late as 1857-those
parties' competitiveness was
reinforced locally by their emphasis on
local railroad issues in an entirely
random, pragmatic fashion. In that
sense, local railroad disputes
fueled party competition without being
amenable to statewide party
definition. 63
Because of the local, nonpartisan nature
of disputes over railroads,
and because they maintained their
traditional appeal by stirring up
Jacksonian anti-bank sentiment, the
Democrats remained a viable,
indeed very popular, party despite their
image as lackeys to the South.
But, if certain economic issues worked
so much in their favor, why
were they not more popular in the
midterm congressional elections
of late 1858? The elections occurred,
after all, in a period of economic
recession.
61. Statistics of the United States
(Including Mortality, Property, etc.), 329-31.
62. A measure of party competitiveness
is provided in Silbey, Respectable Minority,
22: the more competitive free states in
1859-60 were, in descending order of competitive-
ness, Illinois, New Jersey, Indiana,
Connecticut, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio; the
less competitive states, again in
descending order of competitiveness, were Michigan,
Minnesota, Maine, Rhode Island,
California, Massachusetts, and Vermont. The seven
more competitive states were clearly
more economically diversified than were the seven
less competitive ones.
63. For examples of efforts to promote,
or disputes over, local economic development,
see Athens Messenger, Sept. 18,
1857; Marietta Intelligencer, Sept. 16, 1857; M'Connels-
62 OHIO
HISTORY
Democratic electoral failure in 1858
partly reflected the party's
extreme embarrassment over the
disastrous policy pursued by President
James Buchanan in Kansas. It also
resulted from the Republicans'
capture of the remaining votes given to
the third party of 1854-57,
the Know-Nothings. In 1857, the
Know-Nothings had obtained just
over 3 percent of the gubernatorial
vote, as against just over 48 percent
obtained by Republicans and Democrats
alike. With the Know-Nothings
disappearing in 1858, the Republicans
advanced from receiving about
48.5 percent of the vote in state
elections in 1855, 1856, and 1857, to
52.9 percent in 1858.64 But Republicans'
success in retaining their
previous support while attracting new
supporters from the defunct
third party depended partly on their
handling of economic issues arising
from the panic. They attacked the
Democratic federal administration
for fiscal incompetence.
In March 1857 when James Buchanan became
president, the federal
administration had long enjoyed healthy
budget surpluses. But by
December 1857 the disruption of
international trade severely cut the
federal government's revenues, because
those revenues were largely
derived from customs receipts. In
December, 1857, and again in
1858, the federal government was forced
to resort to short-term
borrowing to maintain its income.65
This sudden and substantial
dependence upon short-term fiscal
expedients naturally exposed the
Democratic federal administration to
Republican attack. John Sherman,
as a young congressman from Ohio, made
his first congressional speech
on financial questions on 27 May 1858
with a carefully-researched critique
of administration policy. Previously
Sherman had devoted his attention
in Congress to slavery-extension issues,
but he now saw the need to
broaden his criticism of Democratic
policy. His speech was a success:
it was widely noticed and praised in
1858, and Sherman was still proud
of it when he wrote his memoirs in the
1890s.66 Ohio's Republicans
generally based their campaign for the
congressional elections of 1858
on opposition to slavery extension and
the political aggressions of the
Slave Power and on sustained
attacks on the Democratic federal
ville, Morgan Weekly Herald, Sept.
17, 24, Oct. 1, 8, 1857.
64. Shortridge, "Voter Realignment
in the Midwest during the 1850s," 207-18;
Tribune Almanac and Political Register
for 1856 (n.p., n.d.), 44, ibid;
for 1857, 57,
ibid;for 1858, 59, ibid;for 1859, 57.
65. Richard H. Timberlake, Jr.,
"The Independent Treasury and Monetary Policy
before the Civil War," The
Southern Economic Journal, XXII (1960), 92-103; New York
Times, Sept. 26, 28, 1857; Rafael A. Bayley, The National
Loans of the United States
from July 4, 1976 to June 30, 1880 (Washington, D.C., 1881), 74-75, 149-50.
66. John Sherman, Recollections of
Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet
(London, n.d.), I, 153-54; Collins,
"The Democrats' Electoral Fortunes during the
Lecompton Crisis," 327.
Economic Issues
63
administration for overspending and
fiscal irresponsibility. The tone
of the campaign was set in July by the
Union Republican state
convention. Whereas the party
conventions of 1856, 1857, and 1859
passed eight, fourteen, and ten
resolutions, respectively, the convention
of 1858 passed only four resolutions. A
resolution criticizing the federal
administration's fiscal record was
actually longer than the only other
substantive resolution, which opposed
the Lecompton constitution;
the administration was guilty of such
"ruinous and corrupt prodigality"
that the country had to choose between
"National Bankruptcy or
National Reform."67 This
charge was repeatedly made during the
campaign, and it was made, according to
Governor Chase, while
some Republican candidates adopted a
disgracefully weak line against
slavery extension.68
The Republicans have recently been
somewhat misleadingly portrayed
as the embodiment of confidence and
progressivism in the 1850s.69
Actually, however, when they became the
party of the majority in
Ohio in 1858, they espoused retrenchment
and conservatism. Economic
issues arising from the panic of 1857
thus helped the Republicans to
broaden their appeal and pose as the
sensible party of fiscal responsi-
bility in 1858.
Economic issues arising from the panic
of 1857 had four important
effects on Ohio's politics in 1857-58.
First, such issues furnished
evidence that Democratic public rhetoric
and legislative action were
distinctive on some major state
policies. Jacksonian anti-banking
rhetoric was regurgitated not for
reasons of political piety, but because
Ohio's banking system-its extent, tax
liabilities, and relations with
the state treasurer's office-was
unsettled. It is impossible to show
the impact of that rhetoric upon the
electorate. But clearly the
Democrats treated banking issues very
seriously indeed in the autumn
of 1857 in their efforts to win the
gubernatorial election. Race and
banking issues were probably the
main components of their electoral
appeal. Secondly, however, the
Republicans after the election were
able to turn public anti-banking
sentiment to their own advantage by
identifying themselves with the
grievances felt by small-town "mobs"
against metropolitan bill-brokers. The
actions of those "mobs" also
67. The Ohio Platforms of the Republican
and Democratic Parties from 1855 to
1881 inclusive (pamphlet, n.d., n.p.: in Western Reserve Historical
Society), esp. 7-8.
68. Athens Messenger, Sept. 3,
10, 1858; Marietta Intelligencer, Sept. 8, 15, Oct. 6,
1858; Morgan Weekly Herald, Apr.
22, 29, Dec. 2, 1858; H. Greeley to Chase, Sept. 28,
1858; Chase to Gerrit Smith, Oct. 12,
1858, Chase papers, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.
69. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free
Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican
Party before the Civil
War (New York, 1970).
64 OHIO HISTORY
provide evidence of the continuing
public interest in non-sectional
"political" issues. But during
1858 the banks recovered from the
financial crash. A longer-term financial
consequence of the panic was
felt by railroad companies. The third
significant effect of economic
issues was that various public
grievances at railroad practices were
not shaped into coherent party doctrines
or rhetorical appeals. Because
railroad problems and grievances were so
varied, they afforded great
scope for local party disputes and
thereby help to explain local variations
in party strength. But railroad problems
were not handled for party
purposes in the way that banking issues
had been in the rhetoric of
1857 and the legislation of 1858.
Finally, the fiscal plight of the
Democratic federal administration,
entirely resulting from the crash
of 1857, enabled the Republicans to
broaden their campaign rhetoric.
In mid and late 1858 the Republicans
wished to appeal to the remaining
Know-Nothing voters of the previous year
and to avoid concentrating
entirely on slavery extension issues
when the Lecompton problem was
effectively resolved in August, 1858.
The cry for federal retrenchment
in spending in 1858 helped the
Republicans to create a "safer," more
conservative image of themselves than
they had possessed in the days
of protest in 1854-56. In these ways, a
consideration of both economic
issues and the complex interaction of
state and federal questions is
essential to an understanding of late
antebellum politics.
B. W. COLLINS
Economic Issues in Ohio's
Politics During the
Recession of 1857-1858
Historians are just beginning to
integrate the study of local and state
issues with the study of national
issues in American politics. For some
periods, federal issues are so
important and interesting that state history
tends to be reduced to a batch of mere
case studies detailing the local
impact of great national questions. One
period suffering acutely from
such neglect is the 1850s. Recently, however,
state and local history
has been given new prominence by the
challenging work of ethnocultural
historians on popular voting behavior.
Professor Ronald P. Formisano
has produced a rich analysis of the
emergence of Michigan's Republican
party, and Professor Michael F. Holt
stresses the influence of local
rivalries, policies, and anxieties in
the shaping of a Republican coalition
in Pittsburgh.' Banking issues have
been ably discussed for the Old
Northwest by William G. Shade, and
Professor Holt has put forward
a provocative interpretative synthesis
of the impact of state issues on
antebellum politics.2 At
present, however, the amount of published
literature on the interaction between
local, state, and federal issues in
politics in the 1850s is small, but
growing.3 This article seeks to add to
that literature.
B. W. Collins is Lecturer in Modern
History, The University of Glasgow, Scotland.
1. The general argument for such an
approach was put in Joel H. Silbey, The
Transformation of American Politics,
1840-1860 (Englewood Cliffs, 1967),
1-34;
Ronald P. Formisano, The Birth of
Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861
(Princeton, 1971); Michael F. Holt, Forging
a Majority: The Formation of the
Republican Party in Pittsburgh,
1848-1860 (New Haven, 1969); Frederick
C. Luebke
(ed.), Ethnic Voters and the Election
of Lincoln (Lincoln, 1971).
2. William G. Shade, Banks or No
Banks: The Money Issue in Western Politics,
1832-1865 (Detroit, 1972); Michael F. Holt, The Political
Crisis of the 1850s (New
York, 1978). For the older view that
traditional party issues disappeared during 1850s
see, for Ohio during Chase's
governorship, Albert B. Hart, Salmon Portland Chase
(Boston and New York, 1899), 149,
157-76.
3. William J. Evitts, A Matter of
Allegiances: Maryland from 1850 to 1861
(Baltimore, 1974); J. Mills Thornton,
III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society:
Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1978); Kevin Sweeney, "Rum,
Romanism, Repre-
sentation, and Reform: Coalition
Politics in Massachusetts, 1847-1853," Civil War
History, XXII (1976), 116-37; Dale Baum, "Know-Nothingism
and the Republican