ELIZABETH AND KENNETH FONES-WOLF
The War at Mingo Junction: The
Autonomous Workman and the
Decline of the Knights of Labor
In early February 1887, workers at the
Laughlin and Junction steel
plant in Mingo Junction, Ohio, walked
out protesting a violation of
traditional work rules. Members of both
the Knights of Labor
(KOL) and the Amalgamated Association of
Iron and Steel Workers
(AAISW), the men applied to each for
assistance. While the Amalga-
mated quickly recognized the importance
of work rules and shop-
floor conditions in the plant and thus
sanctioned the strike, the
leaders of the Knights refused to stand
by the men. This dispute
erupted into a bitter war between the
two organizations which tested
the Knights' appeal to rank and file
steel workers nationwide. In-
deed, the incident at Mingo Junction is
important in gaining a broad-
er insight into the Knights'
relationship to the trade unions as well as
understanding the Order's rapid decline.
Recently, historians have found that no
strict dichotomy sepa-
rated late-nineteenth century workers
organizations according to
their commitment to reformism, political
action and wage-conscious
trade unionism. Studies focusing on such
cities as Boston, Detroit,
Pittsburgh and Toronto reveal that
working-class organizations
overlapped in both goals and membership.
The Knights and trade
unions grew simultaneously, drawing upon
each other's strength and
support.1 While this new work has put to
rest the outdated explana-
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf is the Associate
Editor of the Samuel Gompers Papers at the
University of Maryland. Kenneth
Fones-Wolf is the Assistant Curator of the Urban Ar-
chives at Temple University and is a
Ph.D. candidate in History. The authors thank
Stuart Kaufman of the University of
Maryland for helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
1. See, for example, Jama Lazerow,
" 'The Workingman's Hour': The 1886 Labor
Uprising in Boston," Labor
History, 21 (Spring, 1980), 200-20; Richard Oestreicher, "So-
cialism and the Knights of Labor in
Detroit, 1877-1886," Ibid., 22 (Winter, 1981) 1-30;
Francis Couvares, "Knights, Trade
Unionists and Local Politics in Pittsburgh,
38 OHIO HISTORY
tions of dualism in the labor movement,
more detailed investigations
of the breach of the Knights-trade
unions' symbiotic relationship are
still needed.
The incident at Mingo Junction offers a
clear picture of one such
breakdown in the Order's strength. This
failure on the Knights' part
was considered crucial because it
occurred among unionists highly
receptive to the KOL. The Amalgamated,
as a body, was at that time
considering a wholesale merger with the
Order, and the Mingo steel-
workers had been devoted Knights. The
KOL's inability to hold
these workers severely damaged its
reputation among trade unionists,
especially because newspapers carried
accounts of the struggle
throughout the country.2 Furthermore,
the Mingo incident provides
insights into the structural problems
that the Knights confronted
when dealing with shop-floor conditions.
The KOL officials called in
to help resolve the Mingo grievances
exhibited little understanding
of the issues that the local
steelworkers considered important.
Finally, the Mingo "war"
reveals the Knights' insensitivity to the
"autonomous" workmen, the
group of skilled craftsmen who con-
trolled conditions on the shop floor.
These workers were the back-
bone of the labor movement.3 At
Mingo, the autonomous workmen
had forsaken their exclusive craft
unions for the broader solidarity of
the Knights, but when the Order
continually refused to recognize
their interests, they quickly sought the
protection of their fellow
craftsmen. The KOL's lack of support for
the skilled workers in the
Mingo war was indicative of problems
that plagued the Knights
among autonomous workmen in other
trades. Thus, all of these fac-
tors commingled to give the incident at
Mingo Junction an importance
far beyond the number of workers
involved. Even contemporary re-
ports acknowledged the impact that Mingo
would have: the issues,
concluded the Steubenville Daily
Herald, "have been lost to sight in
1867-1887," and Gregory Kealey and
Bryan Palmer, "'Braver Deeds in Store': The
Knights of Labor in Toronto," both
papers presented at the Knights of Labor Centenni-
al Symposium, Newberry Library, Chicago,
May 17-19, 1979. See also our article,
"Knights Versus the Trade
Unionists: The Case of the Washington, D.C., Carpenters,
1881-1896," Labor History, 22
(Spring, 1981) 192-212.
2. The struggle appeared in the press
both regionally and nationally; see, for exam-
ple, New York Times, Feb. 19, 25,
28, 1887; Detroit Free Press, Feb. 26, 1887; St. Louis
Globe-Democrat, Feb. 26, 1887.
3. The concept of the autonomous workman
was developed in Benson Soffer, "A
Theory of Trade Union Development: The
Role of the 'Autonomous' Workman," Labor
History, 1 (Spring, 1960), 141-63, and elaborated more fully in
David Montgomery, Work-
ers' Control in America: Studies in
the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles
(Cambridge, England, 1979), ch. 1.
War at Mingo Junction 39
the face of the greater questions which
the trouble has brought
forth between the two
organizations."4
Located at Mingo Junction, in
southeastern Ohio, in early 1887 was
a manufacturing complex which included
an iron works, a Bessemer
steel plant, a nail mill and a nail
factory. The Junction Iron Company,
founded in 1873, and the Laughlin Nail
Company had, in the early
1880s, joined together to form the
Laughlin and Junction steel plant,
which sold most of its product to the
nail plant. By the late 1880s,
the Laughlin and Junction complex was
the largest in Jefferson Coun-
ty, employing over 750 workers turning
out 275 tons of steel per day
and 6,000 kegs of nails weekly.5
The 290 workers at the Laughlin and
Junction steel plant, in the
midst of a rising national labor
movement, had organized Knights of
Labor Local Assembly 4488 in 1885. The
assembly functioned as an
industrial union; in 1886 it negotiated
its first scale of wages and re-
newed its agreement with the steel plant
in January 1887. LA 4488 in-
cluded skilled, semiskilled and
unskilled workers in the plant, but
unlike a union, it appealed upwards in
the Knights' pyramid-like
structure to a District Assembly and a
General Assembly comprised
of people engaged in any occupation
except law, banking or bartend-
ing.6 District leaders may or
may not have had any knowledge of a
particular industry.
The Order's structure and its inclusive
nature created some dissat-
isfaction among members at the Mingo
mill. KOL law did not ex-
clude management from membership, and
the Master Workman (or
executive officer) of the Mingo local
assembly was a mill foreman. In
addition, the foreman served as chairman
of the workers' mill com-
mittee, which negotiated with the
company. The workers, raising the
question of conflict of interest,
contended that the mill committee
had consistently ignored their
grievances. Shortly after the signing of
the new contract, some of the
steelworkers complained about the
new scale of wages. As Master Workman,
the mill foreman had visit-
4. Steubenville Daily Herald, Feb. 26, 1887 (hereafter cited as SDH).
5. History of the Upper Ohio Valley, 2 vols. (Madison, Wis. 1890), vol. 2, 64-65; Twen-
tieth Century History of Steubenville
and Jefferson County, Ohio and Representative Citi-
zens (Chicago, 1910), 291-92.
6. Among the standard works on the
Knights are Norman War, The Labor Move-
ment in the United States, 1860-1895 (New York, 1929); and Gerald Grob, Workers and
Utopia: A Study of Ideological
Conflicts in the American Labor Movement, 1865-1900
(New York, 1969). Specific information
on LA 4488 came from Jonathan Garlock, "A
Structural Analysis of the Knights of
Labor: A Prologomenon to the History of The
Producing Classes," (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Rochester, 1974), ap-
pendix 5, 368.
40 OHIO HISTORY
ed other steel mills to gather
information about wages and work
rules. LA 4488 framed its scale upon his
information and forwarded it
to District Assembly 137 for further
consideration and for correction
of errors. DA 137's Executive Board,
whose members were not steel-
workers, and thus were unaware of
conditions, wages and customs in
the trade, reviewed the scale without
comment or recommendations.
During this process in November and
December 1886, discontented
Knights, some of whom had previously
been members of the
Amalgamated Association of Iron and
Steel Workers, contacted the
AAISW concerning the organization of a
lodge at Mingo.7
The Amalgamated, formed in 1876, united
all of the craft unions
that represented skilled workers in the
industry. The unions which
consolidated were the United Sons of
Vulcan, including boilers and
puddlers, the Associated Brotherhood of
Iron and Steel Heaters,
Rollers, and Roughers, consisting of
those employed at the furnaces,
the Iron and Steel Roll Hands' Union,
and the United Nailers.8 The
skilled workers in these crafts formed
an elite group within the mills.
They functioned like
"autonomous" workmen, usually hiring and fir-
ing their own helpers and apprentices,
contracting for certain jobs
and pay scales within the factory, and
dividing their earnings among
their crews. Their control of the skills
of production gave them power
against their employers, and their
control of jobs and conditions
made them the core of unionism in the
iron and steel industry.9
These craftsmen placed a good deal of
importance upon traditional
work rules, such as the regulation of
output, the number of appren-
tices, the length of apprenticeship, and
the work done by helpers,
because it was through those rules that
they maintained their status
vis a vis both the company and the less-skilled workers. New
condi-
tions in the industry brought about by
the conversion from iron to
steel production, however, were already
challenging the control of
such workers. Reductions in the numbers
of skilled workers needed
7. National Labor Tribune, Feb. 26, 1887 (hereafter NLT); Amalgamated
Association
of Iron and Steel Workers, Report of
Convention Proceedings, 1887, 1936-37 (hereafter
AAISW Proc.); Knights of Labor, Report
of the Proceedings of the General Assembly,
1887, 1368 (hereafter KOL Proc.);
Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, Feb. 19, 1887 (hereafter
WDI).
8. David Brody, Steelworkers in
America: The Non-Union Era (New York, 1960),
50-51; Horace B. Davis, Labor and
Steel (New York, 1933), 22-24; Jesse S. Robinson, The
Amalgamated Association of Iron,
Steel and Tin Workers, Series 38,
Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Studies in Historical and
Political Science (Baltimore, 1920), 10, 19-20.
9. John William Bennett, "Iron
Workers in Woods Run and Johnstown: The Union
Era, 1865-1895," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1977), 1-75;
Soffer, "Trade Union
Development," 142, 151-53.
War at Mingo Junction 41 |
|
for production, internal conflicts among the various crafts, and the loss of supervisory status all undermined the exclusive nature of the AAISW. The Knights of Labor, more responsive to the semi- and un- skilled workers in all industries, were attempting to organize steel mills on a non-exclusive basis. Its all-inclusive philosophy of organiz- ing seemed better fitted to the realities of the new steel production, despite KOL leaders lack of expertise in the industry. In some cases, the Knights organized the unskilled and semi-skilled workers in a mill and the Amalgamated retained the skilled workers, as there was still a need for some craftsmen in steelmaking. In other cases, such as Mingo Junction, the KOL succeeded in also organizing the skilled workers. The craftsmen at Mingo found the principles of broad labor solidarity espoused by the Knights appealing. However, the compe- tition with the KOL caused changes within the Amalgamated which began broadening its membership to include more than just the old craft elite. In fact, both the AAISW and the KOL had organized about 4000 new members in the last few months of 1886.10 But re- gardless of which organization the skilled workers joined, they found it difficult to give up their traditional work rules carried over from iron production.
10. Revised Constitution and General Laws of the National Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (Pittsburgh, 1886), Article XVIII, Sect. 2; Bennett, "Iron Workers," 33-55; Brody, Steelworkers in America, 27-49; Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," Review of Radical Political Economics, 6 (1974) 115-80; Dan Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor Process: The Transformation of U.S. Industry, 1860-1920 (New York, 1980), 71-125. |
42 OHIO HISTORY
Sensing the growing conflict over
members between the Knights
and the Amalgamated, the Order's General
Master Workman, Ter-
ence V. Powderly, invited the AAISW to
affiliate on a basis that
would guarantee its complete autonomy
within the KOL. The local
lodges were considering this issue at
the time that Mingo Junction
workers approached the Amalgamated,
hoping for more effective un-
ion representation.11
Mingo steelworkers, upon consulting with
AAISW President
William Weihe, discovered that their
scale was considerably lower
than that negotiated by the Amalgamated.
Although some of the
men proposed an immediate demand for
Amalgamated prices, Weihe
advised that their only honorable course
was to stand by the signed
scale until it expired. Despite Weihe's
unwillingness to support a
breach of the contract, on January 31,
1887, skilled steelworkers at
the Laughlin and Junction plant asked
him to come to Mingo and
immediately organize an Amalgamated
local.12 The men also planned
to retain their KOL membership. On
February 3 at a crowded meet-
ing, Weihe formed Mingo Lodge 22, taking
in heaters, rollers and roll
hands. The steel workers agreed that
they would not violate their
present scale, signed by LA 4488. They
would, however, observe the
AAISW's work rules, since the Knights'
committee had never signed
the company-posted rules. Weihe, in
turn, assured the men that if
the company "should endeavor to
enforce anything upon them in
the future that was tyrannical or
injurious to the trade, and they
preferred the Association to take up
their cause, that such would be
done accordng to our laws."13
Weihe's promise was almost immediately
tested in a conflict that
began the very day of Lodge 22's
formation. That morning, Thurs-
day, February 3, a large crane in the
steel department broke, pre-
venting those workers who were paid by
the amount of steel pro-
duced from earning a full day's pay.
Although the manager,
Alexander Glass, believed the repair
would take six or seven hours,
the company demanded that the men remain
pending repair, but did
not agree to make up for any loss in
pay. On this point, Glass referred
to the rules posted in the mill
providing that "no minimum tonnage
would be guaranteed, only actual tonnage
paid." The workers as-
serted that they had never formally
agreed to those rules and that it
was customary "when a mechanical
break-down occurred and the
11. Davis, Labor and Steel, 224-25; Robinson, The Amalgamated
Association, 46-48.
12. AAISW, Proc., 1936-37.
13. Ibid.; WDI, Feb. 21, 1887.
War at Mingo Junction 43
company requested the men to remain
until the repairing was done,
then the men would receive equal to an
average day's work, no matter
what the tonnage was during the
day." This was also an AAISW
rule, and, in fact, applied to the
workers in the Junction Iron Compa-
ny who operated under an Amalgamated
contract. Unable to reach
an agreement, the day shift left the
mill. The next morning the day
turn learned that the entire crew had
been fired for its action. The
mill committee immediately conferred
with Glass, who agreed to re-
instate all but seven men. This was
unacceptable to the men on the
day turn and they refused to work, even
though the night turn con-
tinued.14
The KOL and the Amalgamated immediately
tried to resolve the
difficulty. Between February 4 and 7,
local representatives of both
organizations met separately with the
Laughlin and Junction manag-
ers without success and then sent for
national officers. The KOL sent
M. J. Kavanaugh of DA 137, a merchant,
and shoe worker Hugh
Cavanaugh, Master Workman of DA 48 and
member of the KOL
General Executive Board. William Weihe
came to aid the AAISW
Lodge. The Knights' officers, hoping to
maintain KOL control over
the mill, and not understanding the
significance of work rules in the
industry, sympathized with the company's
position. At a conference
on February 8, they agreed to refrain
from making an issue over the
discharged men or the question of
payment during mechanical
breakages. DA 137 Master Workman John J.
Shuttleworth posted a
notice in the mill signed by Glass
informing the Laughlin and Junc-
tion workers that they should cease
violating their contract. In turn,
the company assured the workers that
they were willing to stand by
the contract and relied "on the K.
of L., and the K. of L. only, for
operation of the works."15
In siding with the company, the Knights'
officers inadvertantly
pushed their members into the arms of
the Amalgamated. The steel-
workers, many of whom were members of
both the KOL and the
AAISW's newly formed lodge, were
disturbed by the notice. Con-
cerned by their reaction, Weihe, AAISW
Vice-President Dennis
O'Leary and the mill committee met with
the KOL officers and pro-
posed that the workers be allowed to
decide which organization
should represent them during the
controversy. The KOL officials re-
fused and promised only to seek some way
of preventing future recur-
rences of the problem. Nevertheless, the
Amalgamated officers met
14. WDI, Feb. 12, 19, 21, 1887;
KOL Proc., 1887, 1368-69.
15. KOL Proc., 1887, 1369; AAISW Proc.,
1887, 1938-39, 2077.
44 OHIO HISTORY
with the members of Lodge 22, who chose
to have the difficulty set-
tled by the Amalgamated.16
The AAISW instituted its formal
grievance procedures. The Sec-
ond District Executive Committee, which
included representatives
from the Mingo Junction area, met with
the plant manager, Glass. Ne-
gotiations failing, the Executive
Committee voted to legalize the origi-
nal walkout and to shut down the entire
mill, including the night
shift which had continued to work.
Skilled workers in all depart-
ments, representing 150 of the 290
employees, struck on Thursday,
February 10, and forced the plant's
closing.17
The strike brought the Amalgamated and
the Knights into open
conflict, testing each organization's
strength and the cohesiveness of
their members' loyalty. The Knights
immediately met resistance
from the skilled craftsmen. DA 137's
Executive Committee ordered
the men, including the seven discharged
workers, back to work,
leaving the cases of the men to an
arbitration committee. The steel-
workers ignored the order, stating they
would not return to the mill
until the seven were fully reinstated
and the rule governing breakages
was in force. Fearing that they were
losing control of the situation,
DA 137 officers asked for assistance
from Powderly, who sent General
Executive Board member William H.
Bailey, a coal miner, to Mingo.
Bailey met with the company officials
and felt that the earlier
agreement should be satisfactory to the
men. But the skilled
workers, their faith in the Knights
shaken, decided to wait for an
Amalgamated-negotiated agreement which
would vindicate their
stand. Weihe conferred with the company
president W. L. Glessner
but could not resolve the difficulty.18
While the craftsmen had been
genuinely attracted to the Knights'
principle of labor solidarity, their
continued loyalty depended on the
maintenance of their traditions.
Bailey's inability to obtain a quick
settlement escalated the impor-
tance of the situation and exposed the
internal contradictions con-
fronting the officers of the Knights. On
the one hand, the KOL was
organizing the steel industry on an
industrial basis in direct competi-
tion with the AAISW. Because it had
recently lost a widely-
publicized battle with the Cigarmakers'
International Union in New
York City, it needed to prove an ability
to be effective in handling
shop-floor conditions. Bailey, for example,
believed that the Knights
16. AAISW Proc., 1887, 1939-40,
2077.
17. Tenth Annual Report of the [U.S.]
Commissioner of Labor, 1894: Strikes and Lock-
outs (Wash., D.C., 1896), vol. 1, 950-53.
18. AAISW Proc., 1887, 1939-40,
2077-78; WDI, Feb. 14, 1887; SDH, Feb. 12, 1887;
KOL Proc., 1887, 1369.
War at Mingo Junction 45
had to maintain control at Mingo, and
wrote Powderly: "if we back
down that kills our Order in all iron
mills as it proves that we are
unable to take care of their
interests." On the other hand, certain
factions in the KOL counseled
cooperation rather than antagonism
with the trade unions. Indeed, the KOL
General Executive Board
was inviting several unions, including
the Amalgamated, to join the
Order while retaining their autonomy. In
the middle of the Mingo
difficulties, General Executive Board
member John W. Hayes ad-
vised moderation, urging Bailey to
cooperate with the Amalgamat-
ed.
19
Bailey arranged to meet with Weihe in
nearby Steubenville on
February 17. Despite Hayes's suggestion,
Bailey at first assumed a
belligerent posture, declaring that
"not a wheel should turn in the
mill" unless under KOL rules. He
threatened to send to Johnstown
or Chicago for loyal Knights as
strikebreakers. To Weihe's repeated
suggestion that the workers decide who
should represent them, Bai-
ley responded that the men were
"rebels and renegades." Finding
Weihe unshaken by threats, Bailey
finally proposed a joint committee
from both organizations. Weihe opposed
the suggestion, contending
that the company would play one group
against the other and de-
stroy effective representation. In fact,
the presence of joint KOL and
Amalgamated representation at the
Braddock mills had nearly de-
stroyed both organizations.
Nevertheless, Weihe conveyed Bailey's
proposal to the AAISW District Committee
which rejected it.20
Unable to settle their differences, KOL
officers tried to call the
workers back to their jobs on the
following day. Again unsuccessful,
the company officials nevertheless
remained loyal to the Knights,
meeting daily and "waiting, like
Macawber, for something to turn
up."21 The Knights continually
threatened to enforce the contract
by opening the mill with scabs,
antagonizing not only the workers in
Mingo Junction, but also members of the
Knights in other cities. By
February 20, Bailey had promised the
company to start the plant by
the twenty-fourth and provide enough men
to successfully operate it
or withdraw.22
19. William H. Bailey to Terence V.
Powderly, Feb. 20, 1887; J. W. Hayes to Bailey,
Feb. 16, 1887; and Hayes to Powderly,
Feb. 19, 1887, all in Terence V. Powderly Papers,
Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C.
20. AAISW, Proc., 1887, 1940-41; SDH,
Feb. 18, 19, 1887; John A. Fitch, The Steel
Workers, vol. 4 of the Pittsburgh Survey, Paul Kellogg,
ed. (New York, 1911), 111.
21. SDH, Feb. 21, 1887.
22. St. Louis Globe Democrat, Feb.
26, 1887; Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette, Feb.
26, 1887.
46 OHIO HISTORY
The Mingo men refused to be intimidated
by the Knights' threats.
For many of the skilled workers, the
conflict had crystallized some of
the inherent difficulties with the KOL.
Its officials, who were negoti-
ating with the company, were not
steelworkers and did not under-
stand or sympathize with the workers'
complaints. One Knight steel-
worker complained that "there is
not a practical man among the
leaders here. One is a coal miner, two
others are glassworkers, and
another is a fish peddlar [sic]. What do
they know about settling the
difficulties of a steel plant?"23
But the workers were not prepared to
reject the Knights out of hand. Another
striker clearly analyzed their
expectations for both the KOL and the
AAISW:
We are Knights of Labor and desire
always to continue to be so, but we also
claim the hitherto undisputed right to
join an organization which looks after
us and us alone, and which gives us
protection, making our wages the same
as at every place in the country. Let me
tell you how the Knights and the
A.A. stand. The K. of L. organization is
a general practitioner of medicine,
who treats every disease known to
medicine, and is no wiser for one disease
than another. The Amalgamated
Association is the specialist who has devot-
ed years of study to one disease and
knows everything connected with it.
The K. of L. is a great order and its
principles are such that every friend of
labor should uphold, but the Amalgamated
is the physician for our case,
because it knows our disease and its
proper remedy.24
Five days after the meeting between
Weihe and Bailey, the steel-
workers, anxious to return to work and
expecting to remain in both
the KOL and the AAISW, passed
resolutions similar to the earlier
proposal; namely joint representation by
LA 4488 and Lodge 22.
Surprised, Weihe met with the workers
and then at their request
arranged a meeting on February 22 with
the officers of the Knights.
Bailey, Kavanaugh and general organizer
A. G. Denny, a glassworker,
represented the Knights. On behalf of
the Amalgamated were
Weihe, William Martin, the national
secretary, Second District depu-
ty C. F. Kaufman and two Lodge 22
members, brothers Sweeney and
Campbell. In this case, as throughout
the conflict, the AAISW in-
volved local workers in its decisions,
while the Knights relied on dis-
trict or national leaders. Bailey agreed
to the rank and file position of
joint representation if the
Amalgamated's involvement were kept
"strictly secret." The
AAISW representatives objected,
contending
that the Mingo steelworkers never
intended that Lodge 22 be a silent
partner. AAISW leaders referred the
proposition back to the Lodge
23. KOL Proc., 1887, 1369-70; SDH,
Feb. 24, 25, 1887; WDI, Feb. 21, 1887.
24. WDI, Feb. 24, 1887.
War at Mingo Junction 47 |
|
and invited Bailey and Denny to present their side, but they de- clined. The following day, in a discussion open only to Lodge 22 members, the rank and file unanimously rejected the proposition and expressed indignation at the "trick to obliterate Amalgamated Asso- ciation from the steel works."25 Even before Lodge 22's meeting, Bailey and Kavanaugh, deter- mined to end the strike, posted a notice that the mill would definite- ly start the following morning, with new men if necessary. Bailey is- sued a statement through the press to all KOL steelworkers that "having exhausted all honorable means to induce a portion of our members who have refused to comply with the laws and orders of the Knights of Labor in fulfilling an agreement between the order and the Laughlin and Junction Steel Company," that they were com- pelled to open the plant to all Knights' tonnage workers. The KOL
25. NLT, Mar. 12, 1887; AAISW Proc., 1887, 1942-44, 2026-27, 2078-79; WDI, Feb. 25, 1887. |
48 OHIO HISTORY
actively recruited strikebreakers,
sending William Nightingale to
Johnstown with the message that fifty
steelworkers were wanted in
Mingo at union wages. The Knights'
leaders in Mingo justified these
actions by claiming that the workers had
abrogated their rights as
Knights when they failed to make a
written statement of their griev-
ances to the District Executive Board at
the outset of the trouble.
The KOL leaders contended that they were
simply disciplining re-
calcitrant members by ending a senseless
strike. Furthermore, the
KOL had entered into a solemn contract
with the company. "For the
honor of the Knights of Labor,"
they insisted, they had to fulfill
their part of the bargain.26
Bailey's efforts failed to attract
skilled workers for the mill. On
February 24, most of the Mingo craftsmen
remained loyal to the
Amalgamated and stayed away from the
plant. Knights in Johnstown
prevented their members from answering
the call for strikebreakers,
and Nightingale was able to send only
two men to Mingo. The com-
pany tried to start the mill with
unskilled men, but Laughlin and
Junction president Priest admitted that
the inexperienced men had
made only two ingots instead of the
normal three and "left the rest to
'spoil.' " Unlike some steel mills
at the time, the Mingo mill was not
so technologically advanced as to be run
by semi- and unskilled
men. In any event, fewer men reported
the following day as communi-
ty pressure mounted against the
strikebreakers. Strikers visited the
homes of the local strikebreakers,
intimidating them with threats to
their lives and gun shots in the air.
Furthermore, the AAISW issued
a circular stating that Bailey had
usurped its power by declaring an
AAISW strike over and that "no man
with union principles will come
there to work."27
Tension peaked during this last KOL
attempt to retain control of
the mill. Newspaper headlines declared
"war to the knife" between
the Amalgamated and the Knights, and the
leaders traded accusa-
tions. Weihe charged that Laughlin and
Junction wanted KOL dom-
inance because the Knights' scale was
lower and fewer men were
employed than in Amalgamated mills.
According to Amalgamated
National Secretary Martin, Bailey was
interfering in a local matter, and
if Powderly understood the situation
"he would not permit the No-
26. KOL Proc., 1887, 1370; SDH,
Feb. 25, 26, 1887; WDI, Feb. 25, 1887.
27. SDH, Feb. 25, 26, 1887; WDI,
Feb. 27, 1887. For an example ofa mill where tech-
nology had already completely undermined
the status of skilled workers, see Henry B.
Leonard, "Ethnic Cleavage and
Industrial Conflict in Late 19th Century America: The
Cleveland Rolling Mill Company Strikes
of 1882 and 1885," Labor History, 20 (Fall,
1979), 524-48.
War at Mingo Junction 49
ble Order of the Knights of Labor to be
made a cat's paw to wipe out
an order (the AAISW) that has done more
to make the Knights of
Labor what they are than any other
distinctive trade union." On
the other side, Hugh Cavanaugh of the
Knights charged that the
AAISW had been "trying to get its
fangs in at the Mingo steel plant
for some time, and has finally succeeded
in winning the affections of
the men by misrepresentation."28
Through all the struggles and
negotiations, the Knights failed to
come to grips with the issues central to
the skilled workers. Whereas
the KOL stressed the inviolability of
the contract, the AAISW
leaders understood that the contract
that had been signed and ac-
cepted by the men was not at issue.
Instead, the strike dealt only
with traditional work rules which were
not part of the negotiated
agreement. The skilled workers refused
to entrust their work rules to
KOL officials. Their distrust was
exacerbated by a rumor that the
Knights also intended to equalize the
wages of skilled and unskilled
workers in the mill.29 The
broad principles of the KOL had not com-
pletely wiped out the desire for status
distinctions between skilled
and less-skilled workers. Furthermore,
the Knights attempted to
dictate a settlement and failed to
include mill workers in the negotia-
tions. The AAISW obtained the confidence
of the craftsmen by
their constant willingness to allow the
men to decide who should
represent them, by including local
delegates in the negotiations, and
by seeking worker ratification of any
agreement.
The Amalgamated's basic understanding of
skilled workers' con-
cerns, and the pivotal nature of craft
control of the production pro-
cess, forced the company to finally
negotiate with the AAISW, de-
spite the fact that it represented only
half the men in the mill. Seeing
that the Knights could not provide men
to operate the mill, on Feb-
ruary 26, W. L. Glessner and H. M.
Priest of the company signed an
agreement with Weihe, Martin and a Lodge
22 committee, giving the
Amalgamated jurisdiction over the plant.
The AAISW agreed to
maintain the original KOL scale of
wages; the company promised that
if mechanical breakages occurred and the
workers were requested to
remain pending repair, they would be
paid an average day's wage,
the standard Amalgamated rule.30
Immediately following the settlement,
officers from both organiza-
tions debated the incident's importance.
Martin claimed: "We have
28. SDH, Feb. 25, 1887; WDI, Feb.
21, 26, 1887.
29. SDH, Feb. 26, 28, 1887.
30. SDH, Feb. 28, 1887; Bennett,
"Iron Workers," 55-56.
50 OHIO HISTORY
met the arch enemy of trades unionism in
America and vanquished
him." The AAISW Secretary took
pains to distinguish the rank and
file from KOL leaders, stating that the
workers "do not approve of
Mr. Bailey's hatred for, and his defiant
and underhanded methods
of conducting an unwarranted attack on
trade unions." But he gloat-
ed that the "song that the
nightingale will sing this morning to the
four or five poor dupes he is expected
to bring to Mingo from Johns-
town, will fail to soothe their
sorrowing, when they know that their
chance to 'scab' has been quietly
snatched from them."31 Both Bai-
ley and Cavanaugh responded to Martin.
Bailey argued that the
Amalgamated had "won nothing but
recognition in a limited way
and we have lost nothing." He felt
that the KOL had already ob-
tained the promise of the same
settlement, and concluded that there
would be more trouble in Mingo before
the year was out. Cavanaugh
also refused to see that the KOL's
failure to stand by the skilled men
had pushed them into the Amalgamated. He
defended the strike-
breakers as "loyal men" who
desired "enforcement of the law of
their association," and again noted
that the strike did not concern
wages.32 The KOL leaders
still did not understand that traditional
work rules could be a matter of great
importance to skilled workers
and that the men felt that the Knights
would not defend that posi-
tion.
Consequently, the Mingo incident reflected
broader difficulties
that the Knights faced in holding
skilled workers. In fact, Bailey
himself recognized the lukewarm response
that he received from
rank and file Knights: "Of course
we were compelled to go into this
Mingo trouble, and once in we could not
back down. If our own peo-
ple had stood by us in the fight we
would have been victorious,"
but most Knights disapproved of Bailey's
handling of the strike.33
Although the KOL tried to downplay the
significance of this small
battle, it remained a thorn in the side
of its steel organizing drive,
and also in its attempt to prove to
workers that the Knights were the
equal of the trade unions in shop-floor
matters. Within a year, the
Amalgamated had voted to ban its members
from joining the KOL,
and the Knights' attempt at a national
steelworkers' union, like their
attempt at unions in other trades, had
failed. Similarly, LA 4488 had
disappeared from Mingo by 1888. Samuel
Gompers would continually
refer to the Mingo "war" as
one of the three or four most important
31. SDH, Feb. 28, 1887; WDI, Feb.
28, 1887.
32. WDI, Mar. 1, 2, 1887; NLT,
Mar. 5, 1887.
33. SDH, Feb. 28, 1887; WDI, Mar.
1, 1887.
War at Mingo Junction 51
incidents exhibiting the way in which
the Knights lost the sympa-
thy of rank and file workers.34
So far as the steel industry was
concerned, however, the victory of
the AAISW was a pyrrhic one. As
production shifted more and more
from iron to steel, the puddlers, who
constituted the backbone of
the Amalgamated, declined in numbers and
influence. No longer in
possession of an essential skill in the
more highly-mechanized steel
production process, fewer puddlers were
needed and the employers
gained control over the hiring, firing,
and, most importantly, the
training of steel workers.35 The
implications were not ignored by the
proud craftsmen of the AAISW. Secretary
William Martin, even as he
acknowledged his victory over the
Knights, pleaded with the Amal-
gamated to "take in every man in
the mills outside of common labor,
and him too, if necessary" to
regain complete control inside the
factories. He continued to repeat this
entreaty annually, but to little
avail.36 In 1892, Andrew
Carnegie launched the most devastating at-
tack on the AAISW at his Homestead
works, and the union began its
precipitous decline. Thus, at the
crucial juncture for iron and steel
workers in this rapidly changing
industry, the basis for industrial or-
ganization had been wiped out both by
the Knights' insensitivity to
the traditions of the autonomous workmen
and the craft exclusive-
ness of the Amalgamated. As the AAISW
clung to its increasingly an-
achronistic traditions, it proved as
incapable of moving into industrial
unionism as the KOL had been of meeting
the craftsmen's demands.
34. Samuel Gompers to Thomas Robinson,
Oct. 16, 1891, Gompers to A. W. Wright,
July 10, 1893, both in Samuel Gompers
Letterbooks, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. For the decline of the Knights in
the steel industry, see Robinson, The Amalgamat-
ed Association, 49-50.
35. See Bennett, "Iron
Workers," 1-75; Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor Proc-
ess, 71-125.
36. AAISW Proc., 1887, 2028-29;
Bennett, "Iron Workers," 55-56; Robinson, The
Amalgamated Association, 47-50. Stephen R. Cohen, "Steelworkers Rethink the
Home-
stead Strike of 1892," Pennsylvania
History, 43 (Apr., 1981), 161 suggests something of
the enmity developing between skilled
and less-skilled workers and its damaging impact
on unionism in the steel industry.
ELIZABETH AND KENNETH FONES-WOLF
The War at Mingo Junction: The
Autonomous Workman and the
Decline of the Knights of Labor
In early February 1887, workers at the
Laughlin and Junction steel
plant in Mingo Junction, Ohio, walked
out protesting a violation of
traditional work rules. Members of both
the Knights of Labor
(KOL) and the Amalgamated Association of
Iron and Steel Workers
(AAISW), the men applied to each for
assistance. While the Amalga-
mated quickly recognized the importance
of work rules and shop-
floor conditions in the plant and thus
sanctioned the strike, the
leaders of the Knights refused to stand
by the men. This dispute
erupted into a bitter war between the
two organizations which tested
the Knights' appeal to rank and file
steel workers nationwide. In-
deed, the incident at Mingo Junction is
important in gaining a broad-
er insight into the Knights'
relationship to the trade unions as well as
understanding the Order's rapid decline.
Recently, historians have found that no
strict dichotomy sepa-
rated late-nineteenth century workers
organizations according to
their commitment to reformism, political
action and wage-conscious
trade unionism. Studies focusing on such
cities as Boston, Detroit,
Pittsburgh and Toronto reveal that
working-class organizations
overlapped in both goals and membership.
The Knights and trade
unions grew simultaneously, drawing upon
each other's strength and
support.1 While this new work has put to
rest the outdated explana-
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf is the Associate
Editor of the Samuel Gompers Papers at the
University of Maryland. Kenneth
Fones-Wolf is the Assistant Curator of the Urban Ar-
chives at Temple University and is a
Ph.D. candidate in History. The authors thank
Stuart Kaufman of the University of
Maryland for helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
1. See, for example, Jama Lazerow,
" 'The Workingman's Hour': The 1886 Labor
Uprising in Boston," Labor
History, 21 (Spring, 1980), 200-20; Richard Oestreicher, "So-
cialism and the Knights of Labor in
Detroit, 1877-1886," Ibid., 22 (Winter, 1981) 1-30;
Francis Couvares, "Knights, Trade
Unionists and Local Politics in Pittsburgh,