McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 135
tional sovereignty."22 In
effect, Spain still clung to sovereignty over
Cuba and autonomy for the island.
At the same time that McKinley was
dealing with the Spanish
minister, he made a final attempt to get
the Cuban Junta to cooper-
ate. Rubens later explained that just
before McKinley's message went
to Congress, the president's emissary
told him that if the Cubans
agreed to the armistice, McKinley would
place a reference to Cuban
independence in his message. If they
refused, there would be no
mention of independence, and Rubens
rejected this half measure.
McCook reported to Elkins that the Junta
had decided to wait to see
what Congress would do, for it might
recognize Cuban independ-
ence as well as declare war on Spain. If
war came, the United States
would expel the Spanish and give Cuba
its independence. If Con-
gress took no action on McKinley's
message, McCook explained, the
Junta would then attempt to come to
terms with Madrid and was
considering paying Spain an indemnity of
up to $200 million to obtain
its independence.23 Thus, the
Cubans at this time would accept
nothing less than independence, while
Spain still provided only au-
tonomy.
The major question before McKinley's
cabinet was whether to ask
Congress for an additional delay in
order to determine what effect
Blanco's action would have on Cuban
events, an issue highlighted
by Woodford, who cabled McKinley
recommending continuation of
negotiations. Woodford believed the
Spanish government had gone
as far and as fast as it could and
predicted that if Spain were not
humiliated, it would provide before
August 1 a settlement either
through autonomy acceptable to the
insurgents, complete independ-
ence, or cession of the island to the
United States.24
McKinley's cabinet labored through the
afternoon and evening at-
tempting to reach consensus. First it
took up the draft message to
Congress which Day and Griggs had
authored and which had been
agreed upon earlier. This was reapproved
without any change of text.
The cabinet divided, however, over how
to treat Spain's ending of
hostilities. At one point McKinley's
cabinet decided to ask Congress
to delay action. McKinley then met with
a delegation of Republican
senators, among them Chairman Davis.
When the senators learned
that the president planned to request a
delay, they argued strenuous-
22. Polo de Bernabe to John Sherman,
Washington, April 10, 1898, Foreign Rela-
tions, 1898, 747-49.
23. Rubens, Liberty, 337-38;
Elkins Journal, April 11, 1898, Elkins Papers.
24. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April
10, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 747.