BRIAN M. LINN
Pretty Scaly Times: The Ohio National
Guard and the Railroad Strike of
1877
The employment of the Ohio National
Guard at Newark during the
railroad strike of 1877 represents an
effective use of military force dur-
ing a potentially explosive labor
dispute. In contrast to West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
Missouri, and Indiana, the state au-
thorities of Ohio did not have to call
on federal troops to enforce civil
authority. During the strike, relations
between the militia and strikers
were not characterized by the violence
that occurred in such cities
as Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and
Martinsburg between strikers and Na-
tional Guardsmen. Historian Robert W.
Bruce, whose book is one of
the few treatments of the 1877 strike,
attributed this lack of violence
to factors outside the state itself:
Ohio got off lightly for two reasons.
Tie-ups to the east made it pointless to
break the freight blockage by force. And
the examples of Baltimore, Read-
ing, Buffalo, and above all, Pittsburgh,
made it seem wise not to try.1
Such an explanation gives inadequate
recognition to the part played
by the Ohio National Guard in reducing
domestic disorder. In Balti-
more, Reading, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh
the use of state troops to re-
store order led to bloody street battles
between soldiers and strik-
ers. In Ohio, the very opposite appears
true. Called up on July 20,
within a day of the strike at Newark,
the Guardsmen showed "an in-
telligent appreciation of the delicate
circumstances" in which they
were placed.2 As one
Guardsman noted:
Our policy has been to keep in the back
as much as possible .... We under-
stand our duty as "citizen
soldiers" and we return to our homes with the
Brian M. Linn is a Ph.D. candidate in
history at The Ohio State University. An
earlier version of this paper was
presented at the spring 1984 conference of the Ohio
Academy of History.
1. Robert W. Bruce, 1877: Year of
Violence (Indianapolis, Ind., 1959), 203.
2. Ohio, Executive Documents, Annual
Reports for 1877 Made to the Sixty-Third
General Assembly of the State of Ohio
at the Regular Session Commencing January 7,
1878, Part 2, "Annual Report of the Adjutant General of
the Governor of the State of
Ohio," 465. Hereafter cited as "Adjutant
General's Annual Report."
172 OHIO HISTORY
consciousness of having done our duty,
shown more forcibly by the fact that
we have prevented bloodshed, which is
the best evidence of our power.3
In Ohio the strike of 1877 began on
Wednesday, July 18, when fire-
men and brakemen stopped the 10 P.M. freight out
of Newark. New-
ark was the headquarters of the
Baltimore and Ohio R.R.'s Trans-
Ohio Division and a central point for
the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and
St. Louis Railroad (better known as the
"Panhandle" line) as well as
several trunk lines. The Newark railroad
yards covered some ten
acres and contained a variety of repair
shops, roundhouses, and slid-
ing tracks. About 10 percent of Newark's
population were employed
either in the yards or on the train
lines and the strikers could count
on strong community support throughout
the strike.4 Like strikers in
other areas, the Newark men hoped to
avoid federal intervention to
protect the mails. They thus allowed
passenger and mail cars to go
through, but ran all freight trains onto
sidings.
By early Thursday morning, July 19,
railroad officials in Ohio were
attempting to enlist both local and
state authorities to break the
strike. The railroads argued, and the
authorities agreed, that while it
was legal for employees to refuse to
work at reduced wages, it was not
legal for them to occupy railroad
property or prevent other men from
working. The problem was whether this
legal technicality could be
observed in the face of the determined
strikers at Newark.
It soon became apparent that the local
authorities in Newark could
not break the strike or even protect men
who wanted to work. The
strikers controlled the railroad yards
at Newark and ignored Samuel
H. Schofield, the sheriff of Licking
County, when he ordered them
to disperse. The railroad officials who
called at the State House in
Columbus had little better luck. Neither
Governor Thomas Young
nor Adjutant General Charles Karr were
in Columbus, and the offi-
cials had to talk with Rodney Foos, the
Governor's secretary. Foos
telegraphed the Governor for
instructions, but Young refused to do
anything beyond returning to Columbus
that night.5
3. Ohio State Journal, 27 July 1877.
4. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 572; "Memorandum Taken From the Dia-
ry of Frank Dennis, Engineer, at Newark
Divison-for the year 1877," Garret Hayes
Coleman Collection, MSS 105, Ohio
Historical Society, henceforth referred to as
"Dennis Diary"; Columbus
Dispatch, 19 July 1877; Ohio State Journal, 20 July 1877;
Dayton Daily Journal, 23 July 1877.
5. Rodney Foos to Governor Young;
Governor Young to Rodney Foos, Telegraphic
Correspondence 19 July 1877, MSS 158,
Ohio Historical Society. This collection con-
sists of copies of telegraphic
correspondence, often without proper identification or
time noted, dealing with the strike of
1877. Referred to hereafter as MSS 158. See also
Columbus Dispatch, 19 July 1877.
Pretty Scaly Times 173 |
|
On Friday, July 20, Sheriff Schofield again attempted to clear the strikers from the railroad yards at Newark. The strikers ignored Schofield's reading of the Riot Act and stopped another freight train. Consequently, just before noon Schofield telegraphed Gover- nor Young: Striking brakemen of B. & O. have gathered in crowds and refuse to allow trains to depart. They intimidate willing men with threats and if this fails use force. I have no forces of militia under my control and assistance I have is to- tally inadequate to preserve peace and property. I must beg you at once to send troops to this point and disperse the mob.6 Governor Young acquiesced and at 1:00 P.M. ordered the captains of four Ohio National Guard companies to mobilize their commands
6. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 582; Columbus Dispatch, 20 July 1877. There are conflicting accounts of whether violence was actually used to prevent freights from going out. An affidavit by the strikers denied any force: see Notarized Telegram to Governor Young, 20 July 1877, MSS 158. In retrospect some journalists con- cluded that the Sheriff's call had been premature, Ohio State Journal, 21 July 1877; Zanesville Daily Courier, 20 July 1877. |
174 OHIO HISTORY
"armed and equipped for duty to aid
the civil authorities in preserv-
ing life and property."7
The decision to call out the militia
quickly revealed a problem that
would play a key part in determining
which Ohio National Guard
units could be called up to handle civil
disturbances. The Guard
was in the process of rearmament and
many companies, including the
ones immediately around Newark, were
still equipped with obsolete
and inadequate weapons. The Governor's
decision to use single com-
panies from Springfield, Mount Vernon,
Circleville, and Zanesville
was based chiefly on the fact that these
170 soldiers would all have
modern breech-loading rifles.8 These
militia companies, once assem-
bled, encountered another problem that
hampered the Ohio Na-
tional Guard throughout the strike. The
Guardsmen waited at the
stations for railroad officials to
arrange transportation on the strike-
bound lines. At last, all four companies
were united at Columbus
and, accompanied by Governor Young and
Adjutant General Karr,
they arrived in Newark at 12:30 A.M.
After a large breakfast at the De-
pot Hotel the troops formed up and
marched through town to the
railroad yards where they were quartered
in a repair shop for the re-
mainder of the night.9
The following day brought strikers and
guardsmen close to fight-
ing. At 10 A.M. Governor Young, his
staff, railroad officials, and the
Guard's company commanders met to
discuss the situation. The rail-
road officials announced that they had
obtained firemen and brake-
men willing to work at reduced wages and
that all that remained was
to clear the railroad yard. The group
then drew up a plan to clear the
yards, using the companies in the repair
shop. Captain Alden Steele's
Champion City Guard and Captain David
Wood's Mount Vernon
Guard were assigned to remove strikers
from the central railroad
yard. The Circleville Guard under
Captain Charles Gorce and the
Zanesville Guard under Captain Frederick
Geiger were to form a line
along the western tracks to protect
westbound trains. Governor
Young instructed his officers that in
carrying out these orders they
were to avoid violence if possible.
Having received these instruc-
7. Adjutant General Karr to Captain
Steele, Adjutant General Karr to Captain
Wood, MSS 158; "Adjutant General's
Annual Report," 582-83, 618-20; Springfield Dai-
ly Republic, 20 July 1877; Zanesville Daily Courier, 20 July
1877.
8. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 618-22. One of the benefits of the strike
was that the Ohio National Guard was
given modern equipment by the federal govern-
ment.
9. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 572; Columbus Dispatch, 21 July 1877;
Springfield Daily Republic, 21 July 1877.
Pretty Scaly Times 175
tions, the officers returned to the
railroad yards, assembled their
companies, and attempted to carry out
their mission.10
It soon became clear that the Guardsmen
available were unequal to
the task. By now the Newark yard was
crowded with freight cars
and engines, cutting the companies off
from each other and pre-
venting them from coordinating their
effort. The Zanesville Guard
had to thread its way in a narrow column
to get to the western tracks.
Upon arrival, these Guardsmen found
themselves confronted by a
crowd of about 300 strikers who refused
to budge. Captain Geiger at-
tempted to placate the strikers by
telling them that he personally
had no quarrel with their actions but
that he had to follow his or-
ders. When the Zanesville and
Circleville troops tried to form a line
down the track, they were quickly
outflanked by the crowd, render-
ing the whole exercise futile. After the
captains had reported the sit-
uation to Governor Young by messenger,
the Governor decided that
"if trains were moved out a fight
between troops and strikers would
break out."11 Wishing to
avoid violence, especially with the Guards-
men so outnumbered, the Governor and the
Adjutant General decid-
ed to send the companies back to
quarters and call up new Guard
units. As one striker noted, it had been
"pretty scaly times."12
The decision to bring in more Guardsmen
necessitated another
day's wait. Moreover, the lack of
adequate weapons imposed limita-
tions; the 15th Regiment from Cleveland
had to be sent home be-
cause only two companies had rifles.
Eventually, five companies of
the 1st Regiment from Cincinnati and two
companies of the 4th Regi-
ment from Dayton were able to leave for
Newark on Saturday, July
21.13 After uniting at Xenia, the seven
companies passed through Co-
lumbus, suffering some abuse from a
crowd gathered at the depot,
and arrived in Newark at 2 A.M. After
consultation, the Guard officers
decided they would go off to a hotel to
sleep, leaving their men on
the trains. The forsaken soldiers spent
an uneasy night, for they had
heard rumors that the Newark railroaders
were "fierce and bloody
minded" and that the Springfield
Guardsmen had "given up their
guns and played baseball with the
strikers."14
By Sunday, July 22, there were
approximately 530 Ohio National
10. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 621; Ohio State Journal, 21 July 1877.
11. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 573.
12. "Dennis Diary."
13. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 573, 601-09; Ohio State Journal, 23 July
1877; Dayton Daily Journal, 23
July 1877.
14. Dayton Daily Journal, 23 July
1877.
176 OHIO HISTORY
Guard troops on duty in Newark. With
adequate forces at his dispos-
al, Young ordered all unauthorized
persons out of the railroad yards
by 6 A.M. in preparation for clearing them of strikers. Following
the
Governor's orders, the newly arrived
companies marched down to
the yard. As the troops crossed over the
bridge giving access to rail-
road property, Colonel Samuel Smith of
the 4th Regiment ordered a
small detachment under Lieutenant
Maurice Holden to remain and
prevent anyone from following the
Guardsmen over the bridge. Colo-
nel Charles Hunt, the ranking officer,
then organized the militia into
two commands. Hunt kept his own 1st
Regiment and put the Dayton
companies and the four other units under
Colonel Smith. The com-
panies then further divided into
clearing and guarding parties.
While this reorganization was taking
place, Lieutenant Holden's
force was coming under increasing
pressure. Holden's men faced a
large crowd that had assembled at the
bridge, demanding their
right of public access over the bridge
to the railroad yard. At the
same time, a substantial number of
strikers, estimated at about 200,
had crossed into the railroad yard and
now outflanked Holden. At
this point Assistant Adjutant General
Daniel Grosvenor almost precip-
itated a major tragedy. Arriving at
Holden's station, Grosvenor de-
manded that the strikers leave the yard.
When they defied him, he
raced off to the Surgeon's quarters near
the repair shop to announce
that bandages should be made up for
"blood must be shed."15
Fortunately, Grosvenor's panic did not
prove contagious and beyond
sending Captain Steele's unit to reinforce
Holden there was no precip-
itate action.
Captain Steele, when he arrived at
Holden's outpost, had no more
luck than Grosvenor in convincing the
strikers to leave the railroad
yard. However, he did not think the
situation was as serious as
Grosvenor had believed. His superior,
Colonel Smith, agreed with
Steele and noted, "no acts of
violence had been committed, nor suf-
ficient provocation given to justify a
resort to arms."16 Smith then or-
dered Steele's company to remain at the
bridge, but not to attempt to
clear the strikers. After a few hours
the strikers dispersed, perhaps
aware that by 11 A.M. railroad
officials had abandoned plans to move
trains that day.
The confrontation at the bridge marked a
crucial point in the
Newark strike. As Colonel Hunt remarked,
"for a short time collision
appeared inevitable but by the cool
behavior of both officers and
15. Ibid.
16. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 608-09, 572.
Pretty Scaly Times 177
men, what promised to be a desperate
encounter at close quarters
was avoided."17 As it
was, both sides could claim a victory. A strik-
er commented that "the soldiers
made a charge at the railroad boys
but they stood firm and dared them to
touch them."18 The sol-
diers, for their part, had stood their
ground against a much larger
group of strikers.
The dispersal of the strikers left the Ohio
National Guard in con-
trol of the railroad yards, but the
strike continued. The troops had
fulfilled the initial reason for their
mobilization - the "preservation
of life and property." It was now
up to the B&O and Panhandle offi-
cials to make good their promise to
supply the trains with firemen
and brakemen willing to work at reduced
wages. It soon became ap-
parent, however, that "all the
employees had either joined the strike
or become so intimidated that it was not
possible for the railroad to
furnish men."19 The
prospect of an immediate confrontation be-
tween strikers and Guardsmen receded
when this became known.
In fact, fraternization between
Guardsmen and strikers increased,
causing the Columbus Dispatch to
note sourly that the Guardsmen in
Newark had "nothing better to do
than play baseball and draw 2
dollars a day."20
The relative tranquility that existed in
Newark was shattered the
next day by the report that a mob of
Shawnee miners had captured a
train and was heading into Newark to
"clean out the military." The
troops were marched out Monday evening,
apparently oblivious to
the approaching danger and being
showered by bouquets from the
Newark ladies. The "mob"
turned out to be a citizen's committee
from Shawnee investigating a report that
Newark itself was held by a
mob. After a consultation with a Newark
citizens' committee com-
posed of strikers and townspeople, the
miners returned home. The
whole episode had a vaguely comic-opera
air to it. Captain Gorce was
heard to instruct his Circleville Guard
not to shoot any "children,
women, or freight cars."21
After this notable victory, the
Guardsmen found themselves "be-
ing cheered by the populace as they
march to dinner."22 The sol-
diers, in turn, entertained the citizens,
and themselves, with base-
17. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 606-07.
18. "Dennis Diary."
19. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 573; Circleville Union Herald, 27 July 1877.
20. Columbus Dispatch, 23 July
1877.
21. Circleville Union Herald, 27
July 1877; Springfield Daily Republic, 24 July 1877;
Dayton Daily Courier, 24 July 1877; "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 606-07, 621.
22. Dayton Daily Journal, 27 July
1877.
178 OHIO HISTORY
ball games, drilling demonstrations,
singing, and plays. One of the
few sources of unhappiness was the lack
of spare clothing. Few of the
men were issued knapsacks and even fewer
had thought to bring ex-
tra clothing. After a week in the hot
July sun their clothes were dirty
and torn.
With a stalemate existing in Newark, the
B&O's Trans-Ohio Divi-
sion manager, W. C. Quincey, believed
the Guardsmen might as well
go home. Colonel Hunt, probably speaking
for all the Guardsmen in
Newark, telegraphed Governor Young:
"Send us home; we are not
needed here."23 Young
agreed with these suggestions and ordered
all troops except Captain Steele's
company to return home on July 28.
Steele's men, somewhat disappointed at
being left alone in Newark,
organized a glee club, staged a
"very natural can-can," and played
more baseball. On July 29 the Governor
made a brief visit to Newark
and praised the Springfield troops for
their service, promising that
they could soon go home.24
On July 30, Governor Young decided that
an attempt to force the
issue at Newark would not result in
violence. He ordered the 1st and
3rd Regiments to Newark and the 4th
Regiment and two other com-
panies to Columbus. Numerous other units
of Guardsmen were or-
dered to remain ready in case their
services should be needed. Five
companies of the 1st left Cincinnati at
8:30 A.M., July 31, and joined
Captain Steele's lone company at Newark
at 2 P.M. After organizing his
men, Colonel Hunt learned that a freight
train from Dennison would
arrive shortly. When the expected train
failed to arrive, Hunt sent a
detachment up the track to look for it.
The men found the missing
freight a mile from Newark. Strikers had
boarded it, pulled the en-
gine onto a siding, and extinguished its
fires. This ended any ideas
Hunt might have had about breaking the
strike that day and the sol-
diers returned to Newark to await the
arrival of Ullery's 3rd Regi-
ment.
By the morning of August 1 over a
thousand militia had assembled
in Newark. B&O officials in Newark
announced that all employees
should report for work that morning and
urged Ullery to protect
strikebreakers from possible harm.
Ullery and William C. Quincey,
the manager of the B&O's
Trans-Central Division, quickly estab-
23. Hunt to Karr, 27 July 1877, Quincey
to Governor Young, 26 July 1877, MSS 158.
For the Ohio National Guard's activities
in Newark, Columbus Dispatch, 27 July 1877;
Springfield Daily Republic, 26 July 1877, 28 July 1877; Ohio State Journal, 27
July 1877;
Zanesville Daily Courier, 27 July 1877; Circleville Union Herald, 27 July
1877.
24. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 618-20; Springfield Daily Republic, 28 July
1877.
Pretty Scaly Times 179 |
|
lished that they had conflicting views of how best to break the strike. Ullery wanted to concentrate his forces in the railroad yard and maintained that his orders "were to protect the yard and start trains only, and not to detail any force to go with the trains."25 Quincey wanted troops to escort the trains and for some units to trav- el east and protect trains running through Bellaire. Young supported Quincey, and Ullery had to order his men to bring the frightened employees down to the yard and escort trains. He also sent two companies to Bellaire. Within a few hours, B&O officials had sent fourteen trains out of Newark. The railroad strike in Ohio ended on August 2. Most of the sol- diers withdrew from Newark within a week and the last company left on August 15. On August 16, Governor Young declared the "public emergency" over and praised the promptness of the Ohio National Guard's response and its "firmness of behavior in the presence of im-
25. W. C. Quincey to Governor Young, 1 August 1877, MSS 158. |
180 OHIO HISTORY
pending danger."26 Governor
Young, as did the editors of many
Ohio newspapers, took pride in the fact
that Ohio had been spared
both bloodshed and federal intervention
during the strike. One
newspaper, pointing to the potential
for violence between Guardsmen
and strikers at Newark and the bloody
clashes which had occurred
in other parts of the country, noted
"it is a most serious thing for mili-
tia to fire upon their fellow citizens
organized as disturbers of the
peace under exasperations for which
even the severest of us have
pity."27
Several times during the events of July
and August, clashes be-
tween the Ohio National Guard and
demonstrators appeared not
only possible but likely. That domestic
violence did not occur in
Ohio was the result of several factors.
As noted earlier, Robert W.
Bruce believes that outside factors
determined that there would be
no violent confrontation between
militia and strikers. Bruce points to
the existing total blockage of freight
lines to the east and the caution
inspired by the riots at Pittsburgh and
elsewhere as a reason why
"Ohio got off lightly" during
the strike.28 Bruce thus suggests that
neither the state government nor the
Ohio National Guard played a
substantial role in preventing violence
within the state of Ohio in
1877. However, most of the evidence
suggests a more likely conclu-
sion - that events in Newark were at
least potentially violent and that
bloodshed was avoided primarily due to
the actions of Ohioans.
One of the most important elements in
preserving peace was the
conduct of Governor Thomas Young.
Young, upon learning of the
strike in Newark, immediately went
there to view the situation him-
self. He consulted railroad officials,
Guard officers, and Newark citi-
zens, refusing to panic. There is
evidence that he exerted a moderat-
ing influence during the attempts to
clear the Newark yards on July 21
and 22. Young and Adjutant General
Charles Karr also refused to al-
low the formation of independent
vigilante committees or to enlist the
aid of private companies offering to
"put down this infamous riot and
insurrection."29 Young's
orders to his officers stressed "the best
discretion and judgment," and he
refused to sanction violent solu-
tions. At Newark residents conceded
that while "there had been
too much haste in calling out the
troops . . . Governor Young has
handled matters well."30
26. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 495.
27. Dayton Daily Journal, 6
August 1877.
28. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence, 203.
29. J. B. Phillips to Governor Young, 24
July 1877, MSS 158.
30. Ohio State Journal, 23 July
1877.
Pretty Scaly Times 181
The violence was also limited by the
behavior of the original strik-
ers at Newark. Unlike Pittsburgh, or
even Columbus, Newark con-
tained no large group of urban
unemployed. The quiet and deter-
mined actions of the strikers, their
earnest desire to explain their
cause, and the strict discipline they
maintained impressed both sol-
diers and correspondents. The strikers
also enjoyed strong and
peaceful support from the populace of
Newark. After the controlled
behavior of strikers and soldiers during
the confrontations of July 21
and 22, both townspeople and strikers
were on excellent terms with
the Guardsmen. The strikers offer to
help feed the Guardsmen, the
crowds who witnessed the Guard's drills
and amateur theatricals,
and the soldiers' admiration for the
Newark "belles," all made for
mutual friendships.
In the last analysis, however, the
behavior of the militia itself
played the key role in preventing
violence. Most of the Guardsmen
called into service were young men who
had little previous experi-
ence with domestic disorder. Hastily
organized, neither officers nor
men had a clear idea of what to expect
at Newark when they arrived.
Rumors of mob violence, riots, and
Guardsmen sympathizing with
strikers were common among the troops.
When they arrived in New-
ark, the Guardsmen found the town united
behind the strikers and
unwilling to sell the Guardsmen
"even a paper of tobacco."31 The
Guard's ability to not only secure the
railroad yards without violence
but to win over the populace speaks well
of the militia's discipline
and tact.
Thus the presence of the Ohio National
Guard played a major role
in the absence of domestic violence in
Ohio during the strike of 1877.
The lack of violence was not entirely
due to "outside" influences.
While soldiers and civilians were aware
of the disturbances in other
states, there is no indication in
official correspondence, officers' re-
ports, or newspaper articles that
knowledge of these events influ-
enced decisions within Ohio. Indeed, the
confrontations at Newark
occurred before news of the clash
between Pennsylvania troops and
strikers was well known. The available
evidence points to the conclu-
sion that events in Ohio were peaceful
chiefly because "the policy
from the first was to avoid bloodshed."32
This policy and the skill
with which the Ohio National Guard
implemented it were the chief
reasons Ohio escaped violence during the
strike of 1877.
31. Circleville Union Herald, 27
July 1877.
32. "Adjutant General's Annual
Report," 581.
BRIAN M. LINN
Pretty Scaly Times: The Ohio National
Guard and the Railroad Strike of
1877
The employment of the Ohio National
Guard at Newark during the
railroad strike of 1877 represents an
effective use of military force dur-
ing a potentially explosive labor
dispute. In contrast to West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
Missouri, and Indiana, the state au-
thorities of Ohio did not have to call
on federal troops to enforce civil
authority. During the strike, relations
between the militia and strikers
were not characterized by the violence
that occurred in such cities
as Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and
Martinsburg between strikers and Na-
tional Guardsmen. Historian Robert W.
Bruce, whose book is one of
the few treatments of the 1877 strike,
attributed this lack of violence
to factors outside the state itself:
Ohio got off lightly for two reasons.
Tie-ups to the east made it pointless to
break the freight blockage by force. And
the examples of Baltimore, Read-
ing, Buffalo, and above all, Pittsburgh,
made it seem wise not to try.1
Such an explanation gives inadequate
recognition to the part played
by the Ohio National Guard in reducing
domestic disorder. In Balti-
more, Reading, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh
the use of state troops to re-
store order led to bloody street battles
between soldiers and strik-
ers. In Ohio, the very opposite appears
true. Called up on July 20,
within a day of the strike at Newark,
the Guardsmen showed "an in-
telligent appreciation of the delicate
circumstances" in which they
were placed.2 As one
Guardsman noted:
Our policy has been to keep in the back
as much as possible .... We under-
stand our duty as "citizen
soldiers" and we return to our homes with the
Brian M. Linn is a Ph.D. candidate in
history at The Ohio State University. An
earlier version of this paper was
presented at the spring 1984 conference of the Ohio
Academy of History.
1. Robert W. Bruce, 1877: Year of
Violence (Indianapolis, Ind., 1959), 203.
2. Ohio, Executive Documents, Annual
Reports for 1877 Made to the Sixty-Third
General Assembly of the State of Ohio
at the Regular Session Commencing January 7,
1878, Part 2, "Annual Report of the Adjutant General of
the Governor of the State of
Ohio," 465. Hereafter cited as "Adjutant
General's Annual Report."