MATTHEW OYOS
The Mobilization of the Ohio
Militia in the Civil War
Fort Sumter's fall in April 1861 broke
like a thunderclap over Ohio.
Overnight, fervent patriotism replaced
months of indecision regarding
Southern secession. When President
Abraham Lincoln called for
75,000 militia on April 15, thousands
of enthusiastic Ohioans rushed
forward. Among this mass, the state's
militia played an important role
in the first weeks of mobilization. At
the heights of state government,
officials struggled to overcome years
of neglect and put Ohio on a war
footing. From a lower level, existing
militia companies would supply a
base upon which authorities could
build. Although it showed some
strengths, Ohio's mobilization in the
Civil War demonstrated the need
for active federal direction of the
nation's militia forces.
In mid-nineteenth century America,
state militia organizations as-
sumed a crucial place in the national
defense. Ideally, the militia would
furnish a ready supplement to the
nation's regular army, a force that
totaled 1,108 officers and 15,259
enlisted men in early 1861. This
system originated in the nation's
colonial heritage and the first years of
independence. Distrustful of a large
standing army and powerful
central government, the Founding
Fathers gave the states considerable
responsibility for the country's
military establishment.1 Heavy reliance
upon the militia lessened following its
mixed performance during the
War of 1812 and was largely nullified
by the regulars' sound showing in
the Mexican War. Nevertheless, militia
forces still retained their status
as the nation's first reserve in 1861.
Mobilization in the Civil War
would put state military organizations
to their severest test ever.
Unlike previous American wars, the
enemy stood right at hand and
presented an immediate threat. In this
conflict, both sides lost the
luxury of time to prepare, which
America's geographic isolation would
have afforded in a major foreign war.
This loss of time especially
Matthew Oyos is a Ph.D. candidate in
history at The Ohio State University.
1. John Mahon, History of the Militia
and National Guard (New York, 1983),
2-3, 97.
148 OHIO HISTORY
plagued states that had failed to
maintain an adequate peacetime
militia. In Ohio, officials had tried to
upgrade military forces prior to
1861, but the state militia was sorely
lacking in many areas when the
call-up came. Weapons, equipment,
supplies, and uniforms all ran
short, and unsure leadership added to an
already trying situation. Still,
Ohio's existing militia system, however
rudimentary, laid the ground-
work for the eventual raising of 100,000
men by the close of 1861.
The story of Ohio's call-up allows not
only a study of a particular
mobilization but also illuminates many
of the militia's characteristics as
an institution. Based on volunteer
companies by 1860, the militia
served an important local function as
well as furnishing a federal
reserve force. In peacetime it
participated in patriotic celebrations,
quelled riots, and sponsored community
affairs. The local basis for
militia companies created priorities
that often differed from those of
federal authorities. Citizen-soldiers
entering national service wanted to
preserve units in which they had
invested time, labor, and pride during
peacetime. They desired to serve with officers
and men with whom
they had formed close associations both
as comrades and as neighbors.
In the years before the war and in the
first months of conflict, Ohio's
militia companies exhibited many of
these same attributes. As a result,
mistrust ensued between militia units
and the War Department, and
disorder plagued Ohio's early
mobilization effort.
In theory, the militia system should
have worked in close conjunc-
tion with the national government.
Federal authorities had the consti-
tutional responsibility of organizing,
arming, and disciplining militia
forces. Under legislation passed in 1792
and 1808, Congress established
the militia and began distributing arms
to the states proportional to
militia enrollments. For their part, the
states would have control over
officer appointments and the training of
citizen-soldiers.2 In Ohio, the
top military staff usually consisted of
the governor as commander in
chief with an adjutant general and
quartermaster general as his
immediate subordinates. Under this basic
staff existed a military
organization arranged hierarchically as
divisions, brigades, regiments,
battalions, and companies. When a
call-up came, the governor estab-
lished an allotment, and the adjutant
general forwarded these orders to
unit commanders. After these
instructions reached the company level,
a captain mustered men liable to service
and asked for volunteers. If
enough men failed to step forward,
compulsory assignment supposedly
took effect. All able-bodied white males
between the ages of eighteen
2. For the actual assigning of these
responsibilities see the United States Constitu-
tion, Article I, Section 8.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 149
and forty-five were legally subject to a
call-up. However, as the
mid-nineteenth century approached, most
states, including Ohio, be-
gan relying on volunteer companies as
their first-line forces.3
By the early 1850s, Ohio's militia
system had fallen into extreme
disrepair. At the highest level, the
posts of adjutant general and
quartermaster general had become
sinecures. As a consequence, the
state sometimes failed to file its
annual report to the War Department,
although its yearly arms allotment
depended upon this communication.4
Many of the higher commands went
unfilled, and the organization
existed more on paper than in actuality.
Those positions with occu-
pants often contained political
appointees who knew little about
military matters. Sometimes commanders
did not even know who
served as their immediate superiors and
subordinates.5 All hope of
making the universal obligation
meaningful had also passed away by
the early 1850s. The state now used
militia liability as a device to
produce revenue. For fifty cents or by
working on a public highway, a
man could dispense with each year's
militia duty.6
The arms situation was equally poor.
Through the years, authorities
had distributed weapons to volunteer
units with little discrimination
and then failed to provide for
maintenance and repair. As a result,
many muskets and other small arms simply
disappeared or became
unusable. Artillery pieces deteriorated
through display in public squares
or repeated use in firing ceremonial
salutes. Owing to this neglect, Ohio
would have been sorely pressed to arm
its troops even had the
command structure been in first-rate
shape.7
Many factors produced this weakness in
the state's militia system.
Outside of annual arms shipments, the
federal government did not
provide much leadership for the creation
of an effective force. As
mentioned, it stressed the regular army
rather than the militia after
1815. In any event, the prevailing
constitutional doctrine of states'
rights worked against active federal
guidance.8 Ohio's state govern-
3. Mahon, History of the Militia, 52-53,
60-61; William H. Riker, The Role of the
National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C., 1957), 21-22.
4. H. B. Carrington, Ohio in the
Civil War (Columbus, no date), doc. 3, p. 2.
5. John S. Fulton to the Quartermaster
General of Ohio, 18 October 1852, Corre-
spondence of the Adjutant General,
Governor, Armory Board and Other Correspon-
dence Relating to the Civil War,
1842-1847, 1850-1856, 1861-1918, Series 1629, Box 1,
Folder 4, Ohio State Archives, Office of
the Adjutant General, Ohio Historical Society,
Columbus, Ohio. Hereinafter cited as
series 1629, OHS.
6. Henry Stanberry, letter, 31 July
1846, Series 1629, Box 1, Folder 2, OHS; Riker,
National Guard, 27-29.
7. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 3, p.
1; Annual Report of the Adjutant General, 1860
(Columbus, 1861), 13.
8. Riker, National Guard, 35-37.
150 OHIO HISTORY
ment also entertained little interest in
a vigorous peacetime militia
during the early 1850s. The Indian
threat had receded long ago, and the
few volunteer companies could meet most
civil disturbances. Building
a substantial militia would have drained
state revenues when no need
for such a force seemed apparent. In a
national emergency, Ohio
counted on having time to raise and
organize its forces. Also, the
potential for political opposition
presented an obstacle. Earlier public
hostility indicated that a revival of
the militia system might spark
popular antipathy. Before volunteer
companies assumed the role of
active forces in the 1840s, militia
musters evoked ridicule, disdain, and
deliberate evasion. Unless an obvious
need arose, any effort at
reviving the militia promised to attract
similar hostility.9
After 1855, Governor Salmon P. Chase and
opposition to the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 furnished the
impetus for militia reform.
Chase took office in 1856 as a prominent
figure in the emerging
Republican Party and a staunch opponent
of slavery. In the late 1830s,
he had been a leader in the abolitionist
Liberty Party and had exhibited
rigid anti-slavery views while a United
States Senator from 1849 to
1855.10 Soon after Chase assumed the
governor's chair, the Republican-
controlled legislature passed a series
of personal liberty laws to protect
the rights of free blacks and accused
fugitives. The laws did not block
enforcement of the federal fugitive
slave statute but did have the effect
of slowing the return of runaway
slaves.11 Although the personal
liberty legislation avoided a direct
clash, the actions of state courts put
Ohio and federal authorities on a
collision course. In one case during
1857, a state judge claimed jurisdiction
in fugitive slave actions, issued
a writ of habeas corpus, and then freed
the accused. The release raised
cries that Ohio had begun active
resistance against the federal law and
led Governor Chase to Washington in
hopes of resolving the matter. He
and President James Buchanan each agreed
to dismiss the affair, but
Chase later backed away from this
position. In the heat of his 1857
reelection campaign, he said that a
state had a right to enforce its own
laws and that the national government
should not overstep its bound-
aries. He pledged to defend state laws
against federal tyranny if
9. Riker, National Guard, 26-27,
29-32; Annual Report of the Adjutant General,
1859 (Columbus, 1860), 3-5.
10. Salmon P. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, 22
January 1855, "Diary and Correspondence
of Salmon P. Chase," Annual
Report of the American Historical Association, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C., 1903), 267; Salmon P.
Chase to Charles Sumner, 20 January 1860,
"Chase Diary," 284; Dick
Johnson, "The Role of Salmon P. Chase in the Formation of
the Republican Party," The Old
Northwest, 3 (March, 1977), 25-26, 35.
11. George Porter, "Ohio Politics
During the Civil War Period," Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics, and
Public Law, 50 (1911), 18-21.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 151
Washington attempted any interference.12
To give this position some
weight, Chase turned to the Ohio
militia.
A vigorous militia would help
demonstrate that Chase was serious
about his stand on the state courts.13
At the very least, the governor
wanted a force ready for any contingency
as the 1857 confrontation did
not promise to be the last. Whether he
would have resorted to force
will remain unknown. During the next
federal-state conflict in 1859, the
Ohio Supreme Court unexpectedly struck
down a lower court's
issuance of the writ and thus ended
Ohio's legal offensive against the
Fugitive Slave Law.14 From
Chase's perspective in 1857, the mere
possibility of state resistance might
have forced the Buchanan admin-
istration's hand. A federal retreat on
enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act
would have marked a tremendous victory
for anti-slavery forces and
raised Chase's reputation both in Ohio
and in Republican circles across
the North.
With the fugitive slave controversy
supplying political incentive,
Governor Chase launched a concerted
campaign to revitalize the Ohio
militia. His first efforts brought a
revision of the state's basic militia
law. Passed in March 1857, this measure
retained much of the original
organization but also made some
important changes. The bill left in
place the overall command structure and
kept the state apportioned
into twenty-three divisions with every
county, except Hamilton, serv-
ing as the basis for brigade
organization. Owing to Cincinnati's large
population base, Hamilton County would
provide three brigades.
These larger units were not intended as
field commands; rather they
existed for purposes of administration
and recruitment. As one of its
major changes, the bill stipulated that
divisions or brigades apply
money left over from annual funding
allotments to build or acquire
armories. Through this measure,
lawmakers hoped to reverse the
deterioration of state arms stocks and
provide for the better care of
weapons. Most significantly, the bill
tried to bring all volunteer
companies under tight regulation. The
state government would no
longer furnish units with arms and
equipment unless minimum require-
ments were met regarding uniforms and
company size. This clause
aimed at controlling the arms
distributed around the state and at
regularizing the available companies.15
12. Albert B. Hart, Salmon Portland
Chase (Boston, 1899), 166-69.
13. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 3, p.
5.
14. Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner,
20 June 1859, "Chase Diary," 280-81.
15. Acts of a General Nature and
Local Laws and Joint Resolutions, 52nd General
Assembly, 2nd Session, vol. 54 (Columbus, 1857), 44-45, 58; Annual Report,
1860, 5;
Annual Report, 1859, 6.
152 OHIO HISTORY
A number of other reform measures
followed passage of the basic
law. By 1859, the state legislature had
given the divisions and brigades
a more logical structure. A plan also
passed to reduce the overabun-
dance of general officers burdening the
state organization.16 This
measure would have little immediate
effect, however, for it allowed all
men to retain their commands if they so
desired. To improve care for
public weapons and equipment even
further, work began on a state
arsenal building in Columbus, and
Adjutant General Henry B.
Carrington requested funds to pay
militiamen directly for the mainte-
nance of state weapons. Not content with
the simple passage of
legislation, Carrington dispatched the
Quartermaster General to travel
to each county and locate all public
arms. Those companies not
meeting state standards would have to
surrender any public weapons to
the Quartermaster General for return to
Columbus or for sale as
obsolete equipment. As a part of the
reform program, a fresh interest
arose concerning actual conduct in the
field. Officers held sudden
musters to test their unit's
preparedness, and discipline became stricter
at summer encampments.This stress upon
order brought a marked
reduction in drunkenness at the 1859
encampment and saw more time
devoted to the instruction of troops.17
As an important component in the Chase
reforms and a backbone of
the 1861 mobilization, Ohio's volunteer
companies merit a close
examination. Under the legislation of
1857, these units could exist as
artillery, light artillery, cavalry,
infantry, light infantry, or rifle compa-
nies. All but the cavalry and light
artillery units required a minimum of
forty men before the election of
officers and state recognition could
take place. The cavalry and light
artillery formations only needed a
minimum of twenty men before undergoing
organization. To encourage
participation, the state offered
volunteers certain benefits. While a
citizen-soldier, a man was not liable to
labor on the highways or to jury
duty. Fulfilling five years of service
exempted a volunteer from any
further peacetime militia obligation.18
The state's efforts to promote
the militia system proved successful
because the late 1850s witnessed
the addition of many new companies. For
instance, Dayton had three
organized formations in 1856 and one in
the process of organization.
16. Acts of a General Nature and
Local Laws and Joint Resolutions, 53rd General
Assembly, vol.
55 (Columbus, 1858), 162-63; Annual Report, 1859, 12, 16.
17. Annual Report, 1859, 5-7, 11,
14-16; Annual Report, 1860, 5-6; Salmon P. Chase
to the General Assembly, 2 April 1859,
Salmon P. Chase Papers, Ohio Historical Society,
Columbus, Ohio.
18. Acts, 52nd General Assembly, 47,
49-50; H. B. Carrington to D. L. Wood, 16
January 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder
1, OHS.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 153
These units had such titles as the
Montgomery Cavalry, the National
Guards, the Lafayette Jagers, and the
Montgomery Guards.19 By 1860,
the Dayton area had added the Clay
Guard, Dayton Light Guard,
Miamisburg Light Guard, and Dayton Light
Artillery to its military
formations.20 Other
communities also produced a series of new volun-
teer companies.21 Looking at
the overall situation in 1859, the adjutant
general could point with some pride
towards the militia's slow but
steady growth.22
The location and composition of the
volunteer units followed a basic
pattern. Almost all companies originated
in the state's largest towns
and cities. Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo by
far had the most numerous and active
militia organizations.23 In the
cities, the formation of companies would
encounter less difficulty as
there were more men with free time and
wealth to take an interest in the
militia. Also, city dwellers had a
larger demand for volunteer compa-
nies than rural residents as they were
more likely to experience civil
violence. The men who led these units
had a vested interest in their
communities. Company officers often
represented such middle-class
groups as store owners, small
manufacturers, and other proprieters.24
They were inspired not only by a desire
to keep order and a sense of
civic duty but also by a social
instinct. At this time, volunteer com-
panies served as an important center of
social life. Company musters
allowed neighbors to gather, and the
guard units periodically sponsored
events such as dances in which the
community could participate.25 The
chance to wear a uniform and have a
taste of military life also appealed
to some. Often gaudy and patterned after
European styles, company
uniforms attracted attention and
identified men as community leaders.26
The activities of the Guthrie Grays, a
prestigious unit from Cincinnati,
serve as an example of the companies'
civic responsibilities. Subject to
call-out at anytime to keep order, the
Grays prevented the lynching of
19. Dayton Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirror, 1856-57 (Dayton,
1856), 42.
20. Dayton Directory, City Guide, and
Business Mirror, 1860-61 (Dayton,
1860), 27.
21. Directory of the City of
Cleveland, 1859-60 (Cleveland, 1860), 22; Zanesville
Directory, City Guide, and Business
Mirror, 1860-61 (Zanesville, 1860),
24.
22. Annual Report, 1859, 13.
23. "Annual Report of the
Quartermaster General," in Annual Report, 1860, 28-29;
Dayton Directory, City Guide, and
Business Mirror, 1858-59 (Dayton,
1858), 27;
Columbus Directory, For Two Years Ending
April 1862 (Columbus, 1862), 135-136;
Toledo Directory (Toledo, 1858), 244.
24. Toledo Directory, City Guide, and
Business Mirrorfor 1860 (Toledo, 1860), 23, 67,
119, 123; Dayton Directory, 1860-61, 27,
175, 117, 120; Zanesville Directory, 1860-61,
24, 57, 67, 92.
25. Daily Ohio State Journal (Columbus,
Ohio) 3 January 1861, 2-3; 1 April 1861, 2.
26. Annual Report, 1860, 6-7.
154 OHIO HISTORY
a suspect in the murder of two policemen
during January 1861. More
often, the organization received the
call to take part in public celebra-
tions. In late January 1860, it
participated in ceremonies honoring the
Kentucky and Tennessee legislatures as
they visited Ohio. In February
of the following year, the Grays
escorted President-elect Lincoln
through Cincinnati as he traveled to
Washington for his inaugural.27
Beyond ceremonial functions, the Guthrie
Grays also demonstrated
the political clout possessed by
volunteer units. In 1859, members
sponsored a bill to guarantee the
continued existence of independent
organizations and won approval from the
General Assembly. Their
action responded to the state's efforts
to bring all militia formations
under its direct control. The law
allowed the Grays access to state arms
and granted the same exemptions from
public service that the regular
militia enjoyed. Under this measure, the
unit also protected the right to
dress as it wished. For the state
militia system, the bill had a limited
impact as it applied only to counties
containing cities with more than
80,000 residents, in essence just Hamilton
County. The measure still
demonstrated the influence that
volunteer organizations could attain.28
Despite the restricted nature of the
Guthrie Grays' actions, their
success in the General Assembly still
indicated the limited reach of
Governor Chase's reforms. When Chase
left office in 1860, the state
militia had a long road to travel before
it would become an effective
military system. According to Adjutant
General Carrington, the militia
yet suffered in the higher levels of
organization. He wrote in 1859 that
the state could not claim one complete
regiment, nor did it even
possess the capability to call forth
"one compact, well combined and
well disciplined battalion...."29 The arms
situation also remained
poor, a circumstance that plagued Ohio
right up to April 1861. At the
end of Chase's governorship, the state
had 1,360 muskets, 241 rifles,
and 11 artillery pieces under its
control. This stock of arms would
hardly fulfill requirements in a major
mobilization. Still scattered
around the state were arms with an
estimated value equivalent to 7,505
muskets.30 State budgeting
for the militia system also remained sparse.
Carrington claimed that Ohio's funding
for its Military Department was
low when compared to the militia
expenditures of other states. His
27. E. Hannaford, The Story of a
Regiment: A History of the Campaigns and
Associations in the Field of the
Sixth Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Cincinnati,
1868), 25-26.
28. Ibid., 24.
29. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 2, 1.
30. "Annual Report of the
Quartermaster General" in Annual Report, 1859, 18, 25;
Annual Report, 1859, 4-5.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 155 |
|
assertion bore out as the legislature furnished a contingency fund of only $200, and the quartermaster general had trouble living on an annual salary of $400.31 Overall, the number of men available for immediate call-up provided a measure of Ohio's readiness. State officials could count on less than 2,000 organized, equipped, and drilled militia in November 1859. By comparison, Massachusetts had 4,974 active militia and a state arsenal prepared to arm and equip five times that number. In New York, 18,595 uniformed troops stood ready, while Connecticut could boast of eight regiments and an arms surplus greater than Ohio's total weapons stock.32 Under the next governor, the situation in Ohio would not improve dramatically in the months remaining before the war. Salmon Chase's successor, William Dennison, continued the pro- gram of militia reform upon taking office in early 1860. A Republican, Dennison did not adhere to Chase's inflexible anti-slavery views, but he still wanted to upgrade the militia system. In the past, Dennison had
31. Annual Report, 1859, 13-14; Annual Report, 1860, 15. 32. Annual Report, 1859, 4-5. |
156 OHIO HISTORY
affiliated with the Whigs, and when that
party dissolved he helped
organize the Republicans in Ohio. In
addition to opposing slavery, he
had made his reputation through a
successful law practice and the
railroad business, not to mention his
work in the party machinery.33
During Dennison's first year in office,
the state government just
followed the same reforms begun in 1857.
Collection of arms continued
so that the quartermaster general could
report at the end of 1860 that he
had accounted for 3,229 muskets, 485
rifles, and 30 artillery pieces.34
The number of organized companies did
not rise greatly because the
state still counted less than 2,000
active militia at the close of 1860.
With no new reforms initiated during the
year, the drive for improving
the militia seemed to be gradually
losing momentum.35
Even the secession crisis following
Lincoln's election failed to spark
energetic preparations for war. From
newspapers and other sources,
the public received an awareness of
danger as Southern states began
withdrawing from the Union. The
potential for armed conflict loomed
especially large after federal
authorities refused to abandon Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbor.36 Yet
despite the possibility of trouble,
the Ohio militia system remained
quiescent. In the months preceding
the war, the state did not attempt to
increase the militia's readiness.
The General Assembly considered
resolutions to prepare the militia
system but produced nothing substantive.
Ironically, the only act
approved that affected the militia
passed on the day Southern guns
opened fire on Fort Sumter.37 Some
of the volunteer companies started
preparing on their own, but their
efforts amounted to very little. The
Guthrie Grays, for instance, entertained
a resolution to provide arms
and officers towards the creation of new
companies, but the proposal
suffered defeat. They settled only upon
firing a salute to the command-
er of Fort Sumter and the Union.38 Rather
than making preparations,
the volunteer companies went about their
business as usual in the
33. Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War:
Her Statesmen, Generals, and Soldiers, vol. 1
(Cincinnati, 1895), 20; James A.
Schaefer, "Governor William Dennison and Military
Preparations in Ohio, 1861," Lincoln
Herald, 78 (Summer, 1976), 52; Carl Wittke, ed.
The History of the State of Ohio, 6 vols. (Columbus, 1944), vol. 4: The Civil War Era,
by
Eugene Roseboom, 350.
34. "Annual Report of the
Quartermaster General" (1860), 28.
35. Annual Report, 1860, 11; Ohio
State Journal, 18 January 1861, 1.
36. Ohio State Journal, 10
November 1860, 3; 12 November 1860, 3; 12 April 1861,
2-3.
37. Ibid., 9 January 1861, 2; Acts of
a General Nature and Local Laws and Joint
Resolutions, 54th General Assembly, vol. 58 (Columbus, 1861), 81-83.
38. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 28-29.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 157
winter of 1861. They remained content to
participate in various
ceremonies and the usual social events.39
The militia's inaction originated in an
anti-war mood that gripped the
state. Although talk of war flourished,
most people wanted peace.
Fighting their fellow citizens appalled
many, and some question
remained about resisting secession.40
In the legislature, the Republican
majority was badly split on how to
handle the issue of disunion and the
continuing question of the Fugitive
Slave Law. On secession, a spirit of
reconciliation prevailed. The
Republicans appeared willing to endorse
a constitutional amendment that
protected slavery where it already
existed, but hostilities commenced
before both chambers fully consid-
ered the measure.41 The
general sentiment to avoid war accounted in
large measure for the militia system's
failure to launch preparations.
From the highest reaches of the state
government down to company
commanders, people hesitated to take
provocative actions.
The attack on Fort Sumter drastically
reversed feeling in Ohio.
Hopes for peace evaporated. Instead,
unbridled patriotism and a desire
for the fight seized the people. After
hearing of the fort's surrender on
April 14, mobs of enthusiastic citizens
poured on to the streets of
Ohio's communities.42 Viewing
such displays of popular emotion, one
observer proclaimed that "the
people have gone stark raving mad!"43
The next day, President Lincoln issued
his call for 75,000 militiamen,
a proclamation greeted with applause in
Ohio. Instructions from the
War Department soon followed assigning
the state its quota of men
under the call-up. Ohio would raise
thirteen regiments of infantry and
could place one major general and three
brigadier generals at federal
disposal. The men enlisted under this
requisition would serve for only
three months, as most authorities
believed that one campaign would
end the war.44
39. Ohio State Journal, 3 January
1861, 2-3; 9 January 1861, 2; 1 April 1861, 2.
40. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 27-28;
Wittke, History, 273-74.
41. On April 17, the state senate gave
its approval to the amendment, two days after
the call-up. Wittke, History, 375-76;
Reid, Ohio in the War, 20-21.
42. Harry L. Coles, Ohio Forms an
Army, Ohio Civil War Centennial Commission,
no. 5 (Columbus, 1962), 3; William
Kepler, History of the Three Months' and Three
Years' Service from April 16, 1861,
to June 22, 1864, of the Fourth Regiment Ohio
Volunteer Infantry in the War for the
Union (Cleveland, 1886), 14-15.
43. Jacob D. Cox, Military
Reminiscences of the Civil War, vol. 1 (New York,
1900), 3.
44. Altogether the state would
contribute 10,153 men, much more, of course, than it
could count as active militia; William
Dennison to Abraham Lincoln, 15 April 1861, The
War of the Rebellion: A Compiliation
of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series III, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1899), 73; Simon
Cameron to
William Dennison, 15 April 1861, Official
Records, Series III, vol. 1, 68-69. Hereinafter
the Official Records, Series III,
vol. 1, will be cited as O.R.
158 OHIO HISTORY
Although federal requirements far
exceeded Ohio's active militia
force, state volunteer companies still
supplied the foundation for the
mobilization. In the very first
regiments organized, the active militia
played a dominant role. Such units as
the Cleveland Grays, Dayton
Light Guards, Columbus Videttes, and
Rover Guards of Cincinnati
tendered their services at first word of
the requisition. All told, twenty
of these organizations filled the
complement of the first two regiments.45
In the atmosphere prevailing after
Sumter's fall, state officials eagerly
accepted companies without any objection
as to composition. They
valued any assistance offered and prized
the experience that the
prewar units represented.
The companies making up the First and
Second Regiments, howev-
er, did not enter service without some
change in their organization.
Most had to recruit new members because
companies required be-
tween seventy and 100 men to qualify for
the call-up. Judging from
prewar arms distribution figures, the
large majority of units had only
forty to fifty active members prior to
hostilities.46 Obtaining enough
men did not prove difficult owing to the
reigning climate of war fever.
In Columbus, the State Fencibles posted
notices around the city
announcing the unit's desire for
recruits. Early on April 16, one day
after the President's proclamation, the
company had filled its rolls.47
The Fencibles' sister units had an
equally good response, for they had
all reached Columbus by April 18 and
started forming into regiments.48
In this first muster of troops, the
state militia system had not yet
received a true test. The mobilization
seemed due more to the initiative
of local companies than to the direction
of state officials. Eager to
participate in the coming action, the
volunteer units flooded the state's
Military Department with offers once
word arrived of the call-up. In
reality, the state's capability to
mobilize men appeared rather limited.
Lacking an adequate military staff, the
governor and adjutant general
45. The full roster of these regiments
was as follows: First Regiment, Three-Month
Service, Company A-Lancaster Guards;
Company B-Lafayette Guards (Dayton); Com-
pany C-Dayton Light Guards; Company
D-Montgomery Guards; Company E-Cleveland
Grays; Company F-Hibernian Guards
(Cleveland); Company G-Portsmouth Guards;
Company H-Zanesville Guards; Company
I-Mansfield Guards; Company K-Jackson
Guards (Hamilton); Second Regiment,
Three-Month Service, Company A-Rover Guards
(Cincinnati); Company B-Columbus
Videttes; Company C-Columbus Fencibles; Com-
pany D-Zouave Guards (Cincinnati);
Company E-Lafayette Guards (Cincinnati); Com-
pany F-Springfield Zouaves; Company
G-Pickaway Company; Company H-Steubenville
Company; Company I-Covington Blues
(Miami); Company K-Pickaway Company. For
this listing see The Military History
of Ohio, 1669-1865 (New York, 1887), 148.
46. "Annual Report of the
Quartermaster General" (1859), 28-29.
47. Ohio State Journal, 17 April
1861, 2.
48. Wittke, History, 383-84.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 159
personally alerted the Columbus
companies about the requisition. The
night of April 15 both men visited the
homes of company officers and
told them to report their units in the
morning. They contacted
companies in other cities by telegraph
and left the same instructions.49
In retrospect, calling out troops
whether by foot or wire probably
amounted to the easiest task faced by
state officials. Taking care of
units once assembled and putting the
state on a war footing represented
much larger tasks.
The First and Second Regiments did not
stay in Ohio long enough to
tax the state's militia system. Concern
for the safety of Washington led
to the dispatch of the two regiments on
April 19, the day after assembly
in Columbus. Governor Dennison informed
the Secretary of War that
Ohio could send the regiments but
without much preparation. Despite
this warning, Secretary Simon Cameron
told him to send the troops.50
The War Department planned to supply the
regiments with full
complements of arms, equipment, and
uniforms once they reached the
capital.51 Unfortunately, the
governor of Maryland closed his state to
troop movements and thus blocked the way
to Washington. Without
the arms required to meet possible
resistance in Maryland, the Ohio
regiments remained in Pennsylvania.
Governor Andrew Curtin prom-
ised to provide for the men while they
were in his state. He boarded
them temporarily in the capital building
at Harrisburg but was unable
to furnish adequate supplies. Finally at
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on
April 30, the First and Second Regiments
entered the federal service.
They reached Washington in early May and
later participated in the
First Battle of Bull Run before their
three-month term expired.52
To the regiments' satisfaction,
mustering in as federal volunteers did
not upset their original company
organization. State militia units
traditionally harbored the concern that
federal authorities would try to
break up prewar formations before
accepting volunteers into national
service. The citizen-soldiers wanted to
serve in their peacetime units
and resisted being viewed just as fillers
for federal forces. These fears
did not materialize for the First and
Second Regiments because the
national government accepted the units
as offered. Few men suffered
rejection, at least among the officers.
Many of those captains, first
lieutenants, and second lieutenants who
had led their companies before
49. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1,
11-12.
50. William Dennison to Simon Cameron,
16 April 1861, O.R., 77.
51. Reid, Ohio in the War, 28.
52. Annual Report of the Adjutant
General, 1861 (Columbus, 1862), 6;
Coles, Ohio
Army, 5; Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of
Ohio in the War of the Rebellion,
1861-1866, and in the War with
Mexico, 1846-1848, vol. 1 (Akron,
Ohio, 1893), 19.
160 OHIO HISTORY
April 1861 retained positions of
command. The companies also man-
aged to keep the regimental officers
that they had elected. Thus the
troops would face the three-month's
service led by commanders with
whom most were long familiar.53 Close
ties between officers and their
units, however, did not necessarily
bring battlefield effectiveness.
Company leaders often held their
positions because of their promi-
nence in the community and not their
military prowess. Some who
proved competent at raising and drilling
men would fail under the test
of fire.
While the First and Second Regiments had
undergone assembly and
then dispatch from Columbus, state
officials had begun to put Ohio on
a war footing. They worked with
remarkable speed and accomplished
much in a short space of time. In the
General Assembly, Republicans
and Democrats acted together to support
the mobilization. Responding
to the governor's appeal for funds, the
Senate passed a $1 million
appropriations bill on April 16. Two
days later, the measure cleared the
House by a unanimous vote. It provided
$500,000 to carry out the
President's requisition, $450,000 to arm
and equip the Ohio militia, and
$50,000 for a special contingency fund.
Before the legislature ad-
journed on May 13, it passed a number of
other mobilization bills.
Lawmakers protected the property of
volunteers from debt execution
and acted to prevent arms shipments to
Southern states.54 They also
defined treason against the state of
Ohio, authorized more general
officers, and stipulated that contracts
for provisions go to low bidders.55
Accomplished in large part by
cooperation between the General
Assembly and governor, this war
legislation did much to counter the
state's inaction during the secession
crisis. Problems that arose during
the mobilization would suggest that
these measures had come too late.
53. Prewar records on existing volunteer
companies are sketchy at best. State records
such as the Annual Reports of the
Adjutant General lack detail in regard to these units.
A determination concerning the retention
of command personnel can be made by
comparison of company lists found in the
Roster of Ohio Soldiers with pre-1861 city
directories. Within the directories can
usually be found a section on military units that
contains a list of officers for local
companies; Cox, Military Reminiscences, 18-19;
William Dennison to General John E.
Wool, 20 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1,
OHS.
54. For the Governor's efforts to
enforce the latter measure see the following, William
Dennison to H. J. Jeivett, 20 April
1861, Adjutant General's Letterbook (April 20, 1861
- July 16, 1861), 65, Correspondence
from the Adjutant General, 1861-1876, 1880-1898,
Series 146, Box 1, Ohio State Archives,
Office of the Adjutant General, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited
as Series 146, AG's Letterbook, OHS. William
Dennison to Alfred Gaither, et al., April
29, 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's Letterbook,
190, OHS; William Dennison to T. W. King
and Company, 24 April 1861, Series 146,
Box 1, AG's Letterbook, 130, OHS.
55. Reid, Ohio in the War, 20-24;
Roseboom, History of Ohio, 380.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 161
One other bill passed by the General
Assembly provided the
governor with a larger military staff.56
This law was necessary because
the state maintained just a skeletal
Military Department in peacetime.
The adjutant general and quartermaster
general held the only two
full-time positions. Such offices as the
commissary general, engineer-
in-chief, judge advocate general, and
paymaster general remained filled
but became active only when a demand
arose. The need now was
obvious, and the governor took action to
expand the military staff. By
April 19, he had started organizing the
Commissary Department and,
two days later, indicated that he would
ask the legislature to authorize
assistant adjutant generals. These men
would help take the increasing
burden of work off their department
heads.57 Moving somewhat slower
in other areas, the state did not find a
surgeon general until early May.
At that time, Dr. G. G. Shumard received
the rank of colonel and began
to establish the Medical Department at
General Headquarters.58
While he expanded his military staff,
Governor Dennison also
appointed the four general officers
allotted under the federal quota. His
most important task was selecting a
major general. Dennison recog-
nized that he had no familiarity with
military matters and wanted the
new major general to function as his
principal military adviser. For his
first choice, he desired the services of
Major Irvin McDowell, an Ohio
native. McDowell, however, was attached
to the War Department and
unavailable for the assignment. Dennison
then turned to George B.
McClellan, a man promoted by some
prominent citizens of Cincinnati.
At the time, McClellan headed the
eastern division of the Ohio and
Mississippi Railroad, but he had
graduated from West Point and served
with distinction in the Mexican War. On
April 19, the governor ordered
McClellan to Columbus and made him major
general on April 23.59 In
his choices for brigadier general,
Dennison showed more regard for
politics. Only one of the three, Joshua
H. Bates of Cincinnati, had a
West Point background. The other two
held important positions in the
state senate. Jacob B. Cox of Warren,
Ohio, had obtained influence as
Republican Party leader, while Newton
Schleich of Lancaster, Ohio,
worked for the Democrats in the same
capacity. Though these last two
selections may have seemed poor on the
surface, they did have some
56. Reid, Ohio in the War, 23-24.
57. William Dennison to G. W. Runyan, 19
April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1,
OHS; William Dennison to William
Lawrence, 21 April 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's
Letterbook, OHS, 25.
58. Special Order no. 156, 8 May 1861,
Series 146, Box 1, AG's Letterbook, 309,
OHS.
59. Coles, Ohio Army, 7; William
Dennison to G. B. McClellan, 19 April 1861, Series
1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; Cox, Military
Reminiscences, 8-9.
162 OHIO HISTORY
redeeming military qualities. Both men
had participated in the state
militia, and Cox showed an independent
aptitude for military matters.60
Having designated his major commanders,
Governor Dennison also
organized a system of camps for troop
rendezvous. In this undertaking,
state officials again had to recoup from
the lack of prewar preparations.
Ohio did not possess a single camp in
April 1861 for assembling and
training its volunteer units. As a
consequence, the first days of the
call-up were marked by inefficiency and
discomfort for the troops.
Rather than hold companies back until
the state had constructed
camps, the governor allowed units to
pour into Columbus. Without any
means to house or feed the men,
authorities placed them in the city's
hotels at reduced rates and hired
contractors to furnish food. This
arrangement proved expensive but
provided an important stopgap
while the state established camps. By
April 22, the establishment of
camps was almost completed. Officials
had organized Camp Taylor in
Cleveland and occupied Camp Jackson in
Columbus. The Columbus
site stood at Goodale Park, a location
just north of downtown. Both
facilities helped alleviate mobilization
problems, but the state still had
to rely for a time on the services of
hotels and contractors.61
After assuming command in late April,
General McClellan further
improved the troop assembly process.
Adept at administration and
organization, he perceived the need for
a third major camp outside
Cincinnati. McClellan envisioned a
system where the state would
organize its regiments at other locales
and then ship them to the new
facility after mustering into federal
service. Also concerned about
defending the state's southern boundary,
McClellan selected a location
about thirteen miles outside of
Cincinnati along the Little Miami River
and a railroad line. On April 30, work
began on the site, which received
the name of Camp Dennison in honor of
the governor.62
On the whole, the efforts to mobilize
Ohio for war reflected well on
William Dennison. He should receive
credit for his leadership in the
legislature and his fairly rapid expansion
of the military staff. Dennison
also did well by appointing an
experienced military adviser and by
working hard to surmount the problems of
organizing troops. Howev-
er, he brought upon himself many of the
difficulties associated with the
60. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 7-8,
27-28; W. Cooper, Sketches of the Senators
and Representatives in the
Fifty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Ohio
(Columbus, 1861), 7, 25; Annual
Report, 1861, 7.
61. Reid, Ohio in the War, 28-29;
Coles, Ohio Army, 6; Cox, Military Reminiscences,
18-19; J. A. Peem to H. B. Carrington,
24 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS.
62. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 12,
21; George L. Wood, The Seventh Regiment: A
Record (New York, 1867), 20, 23-24.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 163
call-up. The gathering of units without
any prior preparations led only
to confusion and great expense for the
state.
Dennison acted expeditiously because
Ohio needed to organize at
least eleven more regiments and faced
the possibility of federal
requisitions in the future. To assist
the raising of new units, Adjutant
General Carrington tried to use the
existing framework of divisions and
brigades. Officers of these commands
communicated with him, either
asking for instructions or reporting the
progress of recruitment in their
areas.63 The effectiveness of
the divisions and brigades seemed ques-
tionable, at best. When the eleven
regiments underwent organization,
the state did not observe the
mobilization structure established under
the divisions and brigades. Rather,
units originating in general geo-
graphic areas formed the new regiments.
The Fourth Ohio Volunteer
Infantry, for instance, came from
companies raised in Wayne, Stark,
Knox, Delaware, Marion, and Hardin
counties, a grouping that did not
fit any prewar divisional arrangement.
At year's end, the adjutant
general confirmed the system's
uselessness in his annual report. He
recommended abolishing the divisions and
brigades and advocated sole
reliance on regiments and companies as
the basis of organization.64
In the Third through the Thirteenth
Regiments, the existing militia
companies assumed an important role.
Like their counterparts in the
First and Second Regiments, they joined
their respective units with
their prewar organizations essentially
unchanged. The new regiments
differed, however, in that none
contained a majority of prewar com-
panies, a fact showing that the supply
of trained units had been quickly
depleted. Using this limited resource
wisely, the state distributed the
companies throughout the regiments,
seemingly to serve as a leaven of
experience. Thus in the Third Regiment,
the Governor's Guards of
Columbus provided companies A and B,
while the Steuben Guards and
Montgomery Guards of Columbus received
slots as Company I and
Company K respectively.65 The
other regiments followed a similar
pattern in their composition.66 It
should be added that the recruitment
63. Major General J. S. Norton to H. B.
Carrington, 18 April 1861, Series 1629, Box
4, Folder 1, OHS; G. McFall to H. B.
Carrington, 17 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 3,
Folder 7, OHS.
64. Annual Report, 1861, 171.
65. Ohio State Journal, 25 April
1861, 2. The Ohio State Journal lists the Montgomery
Guards as Company J in the Third Ohio
Volunteer Regiment. Presumably, this is an error
on the newspaper's part because the
military did not use the letter "J" to designate
companies. Instead, letter assignments
ran from "A" through "K" with the letter "J"
excepted.
66. Ibid., 26 April 1861, 2; Kepler, Fourth
Regiment, 22; Cox, Military Reminiscenc-
es, 34.
164 OHIO HISTORY
of volunteers into the existing
companies broadened even further the
base of experience. With many citizens
clamoring to serve, some units
grew to such an extent that they
reformed into two or three new
companies. All these expanded units
remained together in the same
regiments. Though willing to modify
their old organizations, the
militiamen did not show any inclination
to serve in different outfits.67
One prewar unit increased so much in
number that it claimed
regimental status. Cincinnati's Guthrie
Grays accomplished this feat
and took their place as the Sixth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry. Coming from
the state's most populous city, the
Grays had built a robust organiza-
tion in the prewar years. Formed in 1854
by a breakaway group from
the Rover Guards, the unit had attracted
so many members by 1858
that it organized into two companies and
called itself a battalion. Very
proud of their outfit, the prewar
volunteers did not dissolve it during
the 1861 mobilization. Rather, they
preserved the two original compa-
nies and just raised the rest under
their sponsorship. Though the
Guthrie Grays now called themselves a
regiment, the unit's composi-
tion actually resembled that of the
others forming under the call-up.
The only difference was that the Grays,
rather than the state, had
controlled the regiment's recruitment.68
As suggested, the majority of companies
in the Third through the
Thirteenth Regiments did not exist
before the war. An inspired
citizenry raised these units after the
President's proclamation of April
15. Recruitment often followed a process
whereby certain community
leaders would announce their intent to
establish a company. They then
held a public meeting at which speakers
delivered emotional speeches
to whip their listeners' patriotism to
new heights. Following the
orations, the sponsors of the new units
would take the names of
volunteers. In this charged atmosphere,
the rolls were not long in
filling. Organization proceeded after a
company achieved the requisite
seventy to 100 men. Normally, the men
who had raised the unit became
its officers. Often, they had some claim
to military knowledge through
a prior militia experience or service in
the Mexican War. With their
officers in place, the companies then
offered their services to the
adjutant general and hoped for
acceptance into one of the regiments.69
67. Ohio State Journal, 26 April
1861, 2.
68. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 18-22,
30-37; William Dennison to W. K. Bosley, 19
April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder
1, OHS; Charles F. Goss, Cincinnati: The Queen
City 1788-1912, vol. 1 (Cincinnati, 1912), 316-17.
69. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 14;
Coles, Ohio Army, 7; Theodore Wilder, The
History of Company C. Seventh
Regiment, O.V.I. (Oberlin, OH, 1866),
2-3; H. B.
Carrington, order, 17 April 1861, Series
1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; John F. Schutte
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 165
Having both old and new companies in the
regiments created certain
imbalances. Upon assembly, the new units
had to elect regimental
officers to field and staff commands.
Most men were unfamiliar with
the military qualities of those standing
for election and consistently
selected officers on the basis of their
prominence in prewar militia
companies. Leaders of the existing
volunteer units thus gained a
dominant role in the new regiments.70
Having commanders with at
least some claim to military experience
proved beneficial, but inequal-
ities in equipment, arms, and uniforms
contained the potential for
resentment. The original members of the
prewar militia companies
normally possessed weapons and other
supplies, while men in the new
units went without as a result of
shortages in state stocks. For example,
some men would have tents for shelter,
while others had to fend for
themselves, especially when hotels and
other lodgings were not
available.71 The regiments
adopted a standard form of clothing as one
way to ease the inequalities. As with
its other war supplies, Ohio
suffered from a severe shortage of
regulation uniforms. To get men out
of civilian clothing or impractical
militia costumes until the state
produced enough uniforms, units imitated
the clothing worn in the
Italian unification movement. The
"Garibaldi uniform" consisted of a
red flannel shirt, blue trousers, and
soft felt hat.72 With a clothing
standard established, the regiments
could begin developing some
degree of cohesion.
Although the state could not supply the
regiments with uniforms,
arms, or equipment, the muster into
federal service proceeded without
delay. When the muster took place in
late April and early May, it
occurred at Camps Jackson, Taylor,
Dennison, and a new state facility
near Cincinnati named Camp Harrison. The
induction process seemed
to go smoothly for the Ohio volunteers.
They had to undergo physical
examinations before acceptance, but few
suffered rejection. Federal
regulations stipulated a thorough
medical check, but examiners did not
apply these rules rigidly. One officer
from the Sixth Ohio arose from a
sickbed to avoid missing the enrollment.
He gained acceptance by
painting his cheeks to hide the flush
and by managing to stand
to William Dennison, 17 April 1861,
Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; W. Wilson to
H. B. Carrington, 17 April 1861, Series
1629, Box 3, Folder 7, OHS; W. C. Ferguson to
H. B. Carrington, 17 April 1861, Series
1629, OHS; Kepler, Fourth Regiment, 15-16, 22.
70. For the regiments that followed the
first thirteen, Governor Dennison sought out
men with educations from West Point. He
found fourteen and appointed them to
regimental commands. See Coles, Ohio
Army, 7.
71. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 33-34.
72. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 13-14.
166 OHIO HISTORY
throughout the procedure.73 In
all, entry into the three-month service
caused few problems for the Ohio units.
Federal authorities accepted
the regiments as offered and did not
break up formations or remove
officers. Therefore the regimental
commands, prewar militia compa-
nies, and newly raised companies passed
into national service almost
untouched .74
As these units were preparing for the federal
muster, the Ohio
military establishment had become
strained to the breaking point.
Although the state could not hope to
arm, clothe, and equip all the men
in the federal quota, Adjutant General
Carrington had accepted com-
panies far above the required number. He
seemed to have lost his head
in the first rush of war and accepted
offers without keeping count. As
a result, Ohio had a total of 30,000
volunteers two weeks after the
President's call-up. Ten thousand went
towards filling the federal
quota, but that still left a large body
of men on hand.75
Not wanting to dampen the passion for
war, Carrington and Gover-
nor Dennison hesitated to disband the
excess units. Dennison first tried
to relieve Ohio of responsibility by
requesting an expansion of the War
Department quota. He wrote to Secretary
Cameron explaining that he
had accepted too many men in the
confusion of the call-up. Saying that
Ohio would have at least twenty
regiments, the governor asked
Cameron to take them all into federal
service. He reasoned that the
national government would eventually
require the troops, acceptance
would boost morale in Ohio, and a large
federal army could intimidate
the South.76 Despite
Dennison's arguments, Cameron was unmoved
and turned down the request.77 Determined
not to disperse the men,
Dennison and Carrington turned to the
state legislature for help. Here
they received a sympathetic hearing. On
April 26, a law passed
allowing the retention of nine extra
regiments as a state militia reserve.
This force would protect the state from
Confederate invasion and also
stand ready to fill any future federal
requisitions. The state also kept
4,000 additional men to serve as a
second reserve. Any units that still
remained would be dissolved.78
73. William Dennison to J. D. Phillips,
1 May 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's
Letterbook, 226, OHS; Directions for
Enlisting and Organizing Volunteer Forces in
Ohio, 1861, (Columbus, Ohio); Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 36;
Military History of Ohio,
148-49; Wood, Seventh Regiment, 21.
74. Kepler, Fourth Regiment, 23-25;
Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 34-36.
75. Coles, Ohio Army, 6; Annual
Report, 1861, 6; Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 3, 9.
76. William Dennison to Simon Cameron,
22 April 1861, O.R., 101-02.
77. Simon Cameron to H. B. Carrington,
27 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 9,
OHS; Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 9.
78. Annual Report, 1861, 6-7.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 167
Ohio's retention of the excess companies
proved extremely fortu-
nate. When Confederate forces cut the
strategically important Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad in western
Virginia, the state reserve force
furnished the first Union response. Not
mustered into federal service,
these troops crossed the Ohio River in
late May and reopened the
railway by occupying Grafton, Virginia.
On June 3, they routed a small
Confederate force at Philippi. McClellan
had chosen the reserve troops
for this task because he wanted to save
the federalized Ohio regiments
for a larger campaign in Virginia's
Kanawha Valley. The federal
regiments were also in the process of
reorganization and thus unavail-
able for immediate service in western
Virginia. Serving for three
months, Ohio's reserve forces performed
well and brought credit upon
Dennison, Carrington, and the General
Assembly for retaining the
excess troops.79
Weapons for the reserve force had to
come mainly from outside
Ohio. In the first weeks of war, the
state could not arm men called
under the federal quota, much less those
in reserve units.80 On April
27, Carrington reported that he had
8,000 unarmed men at Camp
Jackson and 5,000 men lacking weapons at
Camp Taylor. To deal with
this situation, the governor sent
Quartermaster General David L.
Wood and, later, Colonel C. P. Wolcott
to the East Coast to purchase
needed armaments. These men, however,
met only limited success
because of competition with buyers from
other states.81 Though Ohio
had shown much initiative, the federal
government would serve as the
state's chief supplier, and it acted
with relative dispatch to provide
relief. The army sent 10,000 muskets
from the Springfield Armory on
April 25 and, four days later, added
3,000 more to that total. Also,
Major General John E. Wool directed
Illinois to furnish Ohio with
5,000 muskets from state stocks. In its
efforts to arm, however, the
state did not neglect local businesses.
It hired such firms as Hall,
Aryres, and Company of Columbus to
provide caissons, battery
wagons, and traveling forges for
artillery outfits. The state also
contracted with Miles Greenwood of
Cincinnati to rifle smoothbore
muskets and set up a laboratory for
manufacturing ammunition.82 By
79. James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire:
The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York,
1982), 159; Annual Report, 1861, 7;
Cox, Military Reminiscences, 42-44; Carrington,
Ohio, doc. 1, 6-7.
80. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 10.
81. H. B. Carrington to S. W. Cochrane,
27 April 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's
Letterbook, 175, OHS; William Dennison
to General D. L. Wood, 18 April 1861, Series
1629, Box 4, Folder 26, OHS; Coles, Ohio
Army, 6-7, 19.
82. Major General John E. Wool to
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, 25 April 1861,
O.R., 114; Major General John E. Wool to Simon Cameron, 29
April 1861, O.R., 127;
168 OHIO HISTORY
the beginning of May, Ohio could count
on significant supplies of
weapons to arm not only the troops under
federal requisition but a
substantial portion of the reserve
forces.
In early May, a new federal call for
troops supplanted the arms
situation in importance. President
Lincoln issued a proclamation on
May 3 asking for 42,034 volunteers to
enlist for three years or the
duration. Under the requisition, Ohio's
obligation was nine regiments.
This number had little relevance because
the new call eventually aimed
at converting the existing three-months
regiments into more permanent
units. The Secretary of War soon
instructed governors to muster their
three-months regiments into the
three-year service. Applying only to
units not yet sent forward, this order
did not compel three-month
volunteers to convert their enlistments.83
To Ohio, the three-year call
meant that the entire force of eleven
regiments would undergo reorga-
nization. The First and Second Regiments
were not subject, having
long since departed for Washington. This
fresh set of orders hampered
Ohio's ability to put its federalized
regiments in the field and caused
much discontent in the ranks. The
changeover also caused a break-
down in communications between Columbus
and Washington.
To carry out the reorganization, all
eleven regiments gathered at
Camp Dennison. Trouble broke out at once
over the appointment of
officers. The regiments had originally
assembled under state law,
which required the election of
commanders. Under federal jurisdiction
that rule no longer applied, and the
governor possessed full powers of
appointment. When this regulation became
known, discontent spread
throughout the ranks. Men worried that
they would have new officers
imposed upon them without any
consideration of their sentiments.
They saw in the federal rule a danger to
the companies and regimental
staffs with which they had first entered
the service. Removing the old
officers would go far towards destroying
the militia character of the
various units. Whether attached to
organizations with prewar origins or
those raised after April 15, troops
wanted to serve under officers whom
they had chosen.84
The fears about officer appointments
proved unfounded. Among the
eleven regiments, past commissions were
reaffirmed if officers wanted
Richard Yates to Major General John E.
Wool, 30 April 1861, O.R., 147; "Annual Report
of the Quartermaster General," in Messages
and Reports to the General Assembly and
Governor of the State of Ohio, 1861 (Columbus, 1861), part 1, 587-88; Coles, Ohio Army,
22.
83. Fred S. Shannon, The Organization
and Administration of the Union Army,
1861-1865. vol. 1 (Cleveland, 1928), 35-36.
84. Annual Report, 1861, 6;
Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 45-46.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 169
to join the three-year service.85 In
retrospect, the volunteers need not
have worried much about losing their
commanders. Because Governor
Dennison controlled the appointment
process and not federal officials,
a wholesale overthrow of officers was
not likely. Removing command-
ers would have risked a political
uproar, especially when communities
found out what the governor had done to
local units.
After concerns dissipated over officer
appointments, the conversion
to three-year regiments moved rapidly. A
large majority in all grades
enlisted in the long-term service. Among
regimental staffs, almost
every officer committed himself, and
most company officers followed
suit. In the enlisted ranks, about 75
percent made the conversion, while
approximately 25 percent declined
reenlistment.86 As these figures
indicate, the prewar militia and newly
raised companies passed suc-
cessfully into the three-year service.
Those men who did not sign up
would remain with the regiments until
their three-month term had
ended. Although they stayed, recruiting
commenced to fill their places
in the three-year service. Of the
volunteers who chose not to reenlist,
their reasons usually concerned the
length of service or disappointment
with military life. Some felt that their
homes and businesses could not
withstand three years in the army.
Others who had enlisted in the first
rush of patriotism now found their
spirits flagging due to the drudgery
and hardship of camp life.87
The retention of the three-month men
soon caused difficulties in
Camp Dennison and with Washington. With
new recruits filling vacan-
cies in the three-year enlistment,
quarters at the camp soon bulged
from overcrowding. Insubordination arose
as three-month and three-
year soldiers clashed over prerogatives.
To regain control, state
authorities wanted to separate the
three-month men from the rest.
They deemed that the best solution lay
in an immediate mustering out
with pay. The governor and his military
staff made repeated appeals to
Washington for permission to discharge
the three-month men. Suffer-
ing from its own unpreparedness, the War
Department failed to
answer. Frustrated by Washington's
silence, Ohio took matters into its
own hands. The colonels of each regiment
ordered all three-month men
85. Annual Report, 1861, 6;
William Dennison to Simon Cameron, 29 May 1861,
O.R., 242-43.
86. The Roster of Ohio Soldiers provided
the data necessary for these determinations.
Making calculations based upon every
regiment and company would have been a
daunting task. A sampling was taken,
therefore, of regimental officers in the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Ohio
Volunteers. To examine retention of company officers
and enlisted men, samplings of at least
three companies were each taken from the Fifth,
Sixth, and Tenth Ohio Regiments. See
pages 85-104, 107-24, 133-47, 179-200, 209-33.
87. Wilder, Company C, 8-9;
Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 45-46.
170 OHIO HISTORY
recruitment because it scattered two to
three thousand unpaid and
thoroughly disillusioned soldiers across
the state. Convinced that the
government did not keep its promises,
these men discouraged others
from volunteering.89
President Lincoln himself issued orders
dealing with the short-term
enlistees. Aware of the situation at
Camp Dennison, Lincoln did not
want the three-month men released. He
felt that such an action would
be a breach of faith and directed that
Ohio reincorporate these troops
into their regiments. Unfortunately, the
damage to future recruitment
had already occurred before these orders
arrived.90 Responsibility for
this problem rested primarily at the
door of Governor Dennison and his
military staff. They acted irresponsibly
in allowing the dispersal of the
three-month men without federal
approval. However, the War Depart-
ment's failure to respond in a timely
fashion brought some of the blame
upon it as well.
In Camp Dennison, the training and
outfitting of the regiments
continued despite the controversy over
the three-month men. These
units finally took to the field in late
June fully armed, equipped, and
uniformed. Under George McClellan, now a
major general in the U.S.
Volunteers, the Third through the
Thirteenth Regiments would see
their first action in western Virginia.91
The battles fought there would
make McClellan's reputation and bring
him command of the Army of
the Potomac.
As noted, the First and Second Regiments
were not included in the
three-year reorganization. Since the
prewar militia dominated in those
two regiments, their fate is worth
pursuing. Soon after the Battle of
Bull Run in late July 1861, the
regiments' three-month term expired,
and they were detached in early August.
Reorganization commenced
almost at once, and by October mustering
into the three-year service
had taken place.92 Having had
a different experience than their sister
units, the prewar companies did not
survive in the First and Second
Ohio. Many men who had served their
three months and experienced
battle felt they had done their duty and
owed no further obligation.
Others reenlisted, but their presence
did not preserve the units' original
militia character. Too few stayed, and
many now served in different
commands. The experience of Company A in
the First Regiment seems
88. Annual Report, 1861, 6-7.
89. Annual Report, 1861, 7.
90. Coles, Ohio Army, 13-14; Annual
Report, 1861, 7.
91. Annual Report, 1861, 7.
92. Roster, vol. 2 (Cincinnati,
1886), 1, 31.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 171
typical. Originally the Lancaster
Guards, the company retained only its
old captain in the three-year service,
and he soon received a promotion
out of the unit. No other officers
reenlisted nor did many of the men in
the ranks.93 Some of the
three-month men did offer their services again
later in the war.94 They
would join as individual volunteers, however,
because the militia's role had ceased after
the first call-up.
In a conflict of the Civil War's
magnitude, units simply could not
maintain their militia character. Over
the course of time, the conduct of
war took a natural toll. Company rolls
underwent a large changeover
due to the massive casualties inflicted
by this bloodiest of American
wars. As seen in the Lancaster Guards,
some men performed well and
received promotions that took them out
of their units. Others likely
transferred to different companies or
exhibited incompetence and were
discharged. The natural attrition of
warfare simply dictated against the
prewar militia maintaining its integrity
throughout the struggle. In
terms of the whole war, gigantic
manpower requirements swamped the
antebellum militia. Ohio had less than
2,000 active militiamen before
April 1861 but would provide over
340,000 men by the fighting's end.
In terms of regiments, the state's total
contribution amounted to 221
infantry, 13 cavalry, and 3 artillery
units.95
By the closing months of 1861, the state
possessed a military system
that could meet large manpower
requirements. Ohio's troop-raising
effort improved in part because
Washington had begun supplying
consistent leadership, although
inefficiency remained until Edwin M.
Stanton became Secretary of War in 1862.96
In July 1861, the federal
government had made permanent the
states' role in raising volunteers.
As in the past, the government issued
calls and assigned quotas, but the
states produced the men and organized
regiments.97 National author-
ities, however, began to keep a close
watch on state recruiting. Three
times each month the governor had to
submit a report about recruiting
conditions and follow the army adjutant
general's requests regarding
troop movements.98 In
addition, the governor now had a fully experi-
enced Military Department in Columbus to
handle federal assignments.
93. Ibid., vol. 1, 3-4; ibid., vol. 2,
3-7.
94. Ibid., vol. 1, 8; ibid., vol. 7
(Cincinnati, 1888), 189.
95. Eugene Roseboom and Francis P.
Weisenburger, A History of Ohio (Columbus,
1969), 200; "Annual Report of the
Adjutant General, 1865" in Messages and Reports to
the General Assembly and Governor of
the State of Ohio for the Year 1865 (Columbus,
1866), 77-83.
96. McPherson, Ordeal, 162.
97. Shannon, Organization, 46.
98. Simon Cameron to William Dennison,
18 November 1861, Series 1629, Box 4,
Folder 9, OHS.
172 OHIO HISTORY
His staff had seen many changes in top
personnel since the war's
outbreak. Excitable Henry B. Carrington
resigned as adjutant general
to take a colonel's commission in the
army. He remained in Columbus
as commander of the U.S. Eighteenth
Infantry.99 His replacement was
C. P. Buckingham, an able administrator
and West Point graduate.
After being condemned for incompetence
by the legislature, Quarter-
master General Wood and the commissary
general had exited, and the
governor had found more resourceful
replacements. With a seasoned
military staff now in place, the
mistakes made during the first call-up
would not be repeated.100 Finally,
the extreme shortages of arms,
equipment, and uniforms lessened after
the summer of 1861, although
manpower requirements had risen. The
Northern war economy had
started gearing up, but quality and
periodic deficiencies still remained
problems. 101
Before a proper military system evolved,
Governor Dennison had
sustained a severe political battering.
Newspapers picked up on the
gaps in the first call-up and made an
issue of Dennison's performance.
Critics especially seized upon Ohio's
lack of war materials and
complained about the suffering endured
by volunteers. Also, the high
cost of contracting for provisions
raised charges of profiteering.
Producing a growing uproar, these
criticisms had generated the legis-
lature's demand for the replacement of the
quartermaster and commis-
sary generals.102 The outcry
would begin to abate after the supply
shortages eased, the state's military
staff became more proficient, and
troops commenced moving into the field.
Facing reelection that fall,
Dennison received a crippling political
wound from the complaints of
the spring. Never an inspiring leader,
he failed even to receive his
party's nomination. 103
In their treatment, critics did not give
the Dennison administration
its fair due. Although unprepared and
guilty of blunders, Ohio's state
officials did many things well in the
first months of war. Governor
Dennison recognized immediately the
state's unpreparedness and his
own lack of military knowledge. He
devoted considerable energy to
mobilizing Ohio for war and finding
competent military advisers. Faced
with a critical shortage in war
materials, Dennison acted with dispatch
99. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 15.
100. Coles, Ohio Army, 8;
Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 13, 15; Annual Report, 1861, 30;
Reid, Ohio in the War, 29-30.
101. Coles, Ohio Army, 20-22;
U.S. Quartermaster General to David Tod, 12 August
1862, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 10,
OHS.
102. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 31-32;
Wittke, History, 384.
103. Wittke, History, 381; Reid, Ohio
in the War, 61.
Ohio Militia in the Civil War 173
in locating outside resources and in
lobbying the War Department for
aid. The governor and his military
advisers also showed a good degree
of foresight when they pushed the
creation of a militia reserve.This
force became a valuable asset when
Confederate forces threatened in
western Virginia.
Despite such displays of good judgment,
the Dennison administra-
tion still deserved much criticism. At
times, officials acted in haste and
with bad results. Although the militia
reserve turned out to be
fortuitous, it originated out of
Adjutant General Carrington's unre-
strained enthusiasm and failure to keep
track of companies. On top of
this mistake came the decision to remove
the three-month enlistees
from Camp Dennison. Undertaken without
War Department orders,
this action spread discontented men
around the state and appeared to
hurt later recruiting. The most serious
charges about shortages of
material, however, must cut with a
two-edged sword. As the state's
chief executive, Dennison had to bear
ultimate responsibility for any
shortfalls in the mobilization. On the
other hand, the prewar climate in
which he operated had not encouraged
preparations, and some news-
papers, the vehicles of later censure,
had advised peaceable secession
before April 1861. In such an
environment, the governor had done well
to continue his predecessor's militia
reform program.
Although upgraded before 1861, Ohio's
prewar militia system gave a
mixed performance after the outbreak of
war. The elaborate structure
of divisions and brigades proved almost
worthless in the mobilization.
Often, command positions existed only on
paper, or the occupants
possessed little competence in military
matters. The state's existing
volunteer companies were the most
beneficial to the mobilization.
Although sent off without proper arms,
uniforms, or equipment, the
companies composing the First and Second
Regiments provided a
quick response to Washington's appeal
for defenders. The companies
that remained in Ohio also were useful
in the mobilization effort.
Sometimes expanding into two or three
new units, these organizations
supplied a core of experience upon which
the state could build the next
eleven regiments. Owing to the existing
militia's small size, its impact
in the war effort was limited to the
first call for men. As demands came
for more troops, the direct recruitment
or drafting of volunteers took
precedence, and the militia receded to
the role of a home guard. 104
As part of Ohio's first contribution of
troops, the prewar volunteer
companies exhibited certain qualities
that have since characterized the
104. "Annual Report of the Adjutant
General," in Messages and Reports to the
General Assembly and Governor of the
State of Ohio for the Year 1863 (Columbus,
1864),
367-68.
174 OHIO HISTORY
militia or National Guard. The men in
these units had great pride in
their organizations and wanted to serve
in them when called to the
nation's defense. Since the states
handled the first call-up almost
entirely, the prewar militia passed
without problem into the three-
month federal service. A traditional
distrust of national authorities was
evidenced, however, during the
restructuring into three-year regi-
ments. Apprehensive that they might lose
their officers, the soldiers
complained until reassured that their
preferences would be respected.
These protests slowed the mobilization
process somewhat, but a
favorable resolution brought a large
majority into the three-year
service.
Ohio's performance in the first months
of war raised serious
questions about the militia's future
value in the national defense. In
mistakes and deficiencies of resources,
the state did not stand alone.
The 1861 mobilization demonstrated that
the nation could not rely on
the states alone to maintain a
sufficient peacetime militia establish-
ment. Even if they chose to develop
their militia, the states would show
an understandable tendency to build
forces that best fit local demands.
Ohio's few prewar militia units
functioned well in patriotic demonstra-
tions and in suppressing civil
disturbances but did not come close to
being an adequate national reserve
force. If the country wanted state
troops molded into an effective reserve,
the federal government had to
provide the necessary leadership. Only
it could enforce the general
standards and provide the resources
required to make the militia a
potent force. Though Ohio's militia
showed some bright spots in the
spring of 1861, the state took many
months to overcome its weak-
nesses. Luckily, the enemy was not close
at hand as first believed, and
Ohio had time to mobilize. In future
conflicts, such good fortune might
not shine on the state and nation.
MATTHEW OYOS
The Mobilization of the Ohio
Militia in the Civil War
Fort Sumter's fall in April 1861 broke
like a thunderclap over Ohio.
Overnight, fervent patriotism replaced
months of indecision regarding
Southern secession. When President
Abraham Lincoln called for
75,000 militia on April 15, thousands
of enthusiastic Ohioans rushed
forward. Among this mass, the state's
militia played an important role
in the first weeks of mobilization. At
the heights of state government,
officials struggled to overcome years
of neglect and put Ohio on a war
footing. From a lower level, existing
militia companies would supply a
base upon which authorities could
build. Although it showed some
strengths, Ohio's mobilization in the
Civil War demonstrated the need
for active federal direction of the
nation's militia forces.
In mid-nineteenth century America,
state militia organizations as-
sumed a crucial place in the national
defense. Ideally, the militia would
furnish a ready supplement to the
nation's regular army, a force that
totaled 1,108 officers and 15,259
enlisted men in early 1861. This
system originated in the nation's
colonial heritage and the first years of
independence. Distrustful of a large
standing army and powerful
central government, the Founding
Fathers gave the states considerable
responsibility for the country's
military establishment.1 Heavy reliance
upon the militia lessened following its
mixed performance during the
War of 1812 and was largely nullified
by the regulars' sound showing in
the Mexican War. Nevertheless, militia
forces still retained their status
as the nation's first reserve in 1861.
Mobilization in the Civil War
would put state military organizations
to their severest test ever.
Unlike previous American wars, the
enemy stood right at hand and
presented an immediate threat. In this
conflict, both sides lost the
luxury of time to prepare, which
America's geographic isolation would
have afforded in a major foreign war.
This loss of time especially
Matthew Oyos is a Ph.D. candidate in
history at The Ohio State University.
1. John Mahon, History of the Militia
and National Guard (New York, 1983),
2-3, 97.