Ohio History Journal

MONROE BILLINGTON

AND CAL CLARK

 

Ohio Clergymen, Franklin D. Roosevelt,

and the New Deal

 

When Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated President on March 4,

1933, the United States was in the deepest economic depression in its his-

tory, a crisis which brought the economic and political systems to the edge

of breakdown and threatened social chaos. Worsening conditions had

forced numerous banks to close before the new President and Congress or-

dered a banking "holiday." The stock market was at low ebb. Industrial

production was down to 56 percent of the 1923-25 level. Out of a labor

force of 52 million, one wage-earner in four did not have ajob to support

himself or his family. Another 5.5 million laborers were only partially em-

ployed. In farming areas conditions were hardly better. Unable to sell corn

for a profit, midwestern farmers burned the previous year's crop to keep

away winter's cold. Essentially no markets existed for southern income

crops such as cotton, tobacco, and peanuts.¹

Under such conditions, at the new President's initiative, Congress

passed dozens of major bills and hundreds of lesser ones to attack the prob-

lems the Great Depression had created. Compared to the previous Herbert

Hoover administration, the Democrats appropriated unusually large sums

of money to attack Depression woes. The nation's political leaders cre-

ated a vast bureaucracy to administer the multiplicity of agencies and pro-

grams which sprang up in response to economic need. A flurry of activi-

ty occurred as the government's leaders inaugurated and implemented a

"New Deal for the forgotten man."

 

 

 

 

Monroe Billington is Professor of History at New Mexico State University. Cal Clark is

Professor of Government at the University of Wyoming. They thank the College of Arts and

Sciences Research Center at New Mexico State University for providing funds (minigrant

no. 1-3-43543) to research this essay.

 

1. Maurice L. Farrell, ed., The Dow Jones Averages, 1885-1970 (New York, 1972);

William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1931-1940 (New York,

1963), ff.; Frank Freidel, The New Deal in Historical Perspective (Washington, 1959), 1 ff.;

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Cambridge, 1957),

248-56.

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22                                           OHIO HISTORY

These momentous political events, in turn, stimulated questions con- cerning the impact of the New Deal. How effective were the New Deal measures? How did Americans respond to them? What else could gov- ernment do to help? On September 23 and 24, 1935, the President mailed a form letter to members of the clergy in the United States. The letter read as follows:   Reverend and dear Sir:   Your high calling brings you into intimate daily contact not only with your own parishioners, but with people generally in your community. I am sure you see the problems of your people with wise and sympathetic understanding. Because of the grave responsibilities of my office, I am turning to representative Clergymen for counsel and advice,-feeling confident that no group can give more accurate or unbiased views. I am particularly anxious that the new Social Security Legislation just enacted, for which we have worked so long, providing for old age pensions, aid for crippled children and unemployment insurance, shall be carried out in keeping with the high purposes with which this law was enacted. It is also vitally important that the Works Program shall be administered to provide employment at useful work, and that our

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Ohio Clergymen                                                      23

 

unemployed as well as the nation as a whole may derive the greatest possible ben-

efits.

I shall deem it a favor if you will write me about conditions in your community.

Tell me where you feel our government can better serve our people.

We can solve our many problems, but no one man or single group can do it,--we

shall have to work together for the common end of better spiritual and material

conditions for the American people.

May I have your counsel and your help? I am leaving on a short vacation but will

be back in Washington in a few weeks, and I will deeply appreciate your writing

to me.

Very sincerely yours,

[signed] Franklin D. Roosevelt²

 

The number of clergymen in the United States in 1935 was about

200,000. The White House staff mailed the President's letter to 121,700

of the nation's clergymen, apparently to every minister, priest, and rabbi

whose addresses were available. Slightly more than 100,000 letters

reached the addresses, and approximately 30,000 clergymen from all sec-

tions of the nation responded to the President's query.³ Letters poured in

from representatives of all major religions and denominations as well as

many small religious groups in the United States. Since Roosevelt him-

self had a religious background and was a church member,⁴ many cler-

gymen identified with him and felt obliged to give their honest, personal

responses to the presidential inquiry. These clergymen were cognizant of

public opinion about and reaction to the governmental attempts to respond

to myriad problems during the Great Depression. Their responses mani-

fested wide varieties of socioeconomic, political, ethnic, and regional

interests.

Deeply involved in the day-to-day lives of the members of their con-

gregations, clergymen in the Midwestern states were peculiarly qualified

to respond to the President's letter. Since Ohio serves well as a microcosm

 

 

2. A slightly edited version of this letter is Printed in Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The

Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vols., New York, 1938-1950),

vol. IV, 370.

3. Organized by states, these letters are housed in eighty-one archival boxes in the Cler-

gy File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

4. For information on Roosevelt's association with and membership in the Protestant

Episcopal Church, as well as his religious thought, see Frank Freidel, Franklin D Roosevelt:

The Apprenticeship (Boston, 1952), 20, 81 ff.; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion

and the Fox (New York, 1956), 29,237,452ff.; Rex G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt:

A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Garden City, N.Y., 1957), 30-33, 502; Thomas H.

Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt (East

Lansing, Mich., 1958), 3-11,24.

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24                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

both of the Midwest and the nation, how Ohio clergy viewed the New Deal

should reveal much about how Ohioans, Midwesterners, and Americans

viewed it.

The Ohio Clergy File in the Roosevelt Library contains 470 letters. Of

this number 217 letters did not indicate the religion or denomination of

the writer. Four other letters were statistically insignificant in regard to

the writer's religion, since each of them represented a different denomi-

nation. Table 1 lists the breakdown of the remaining 249 clergymen in re-

gard to their religious affiliation. Also, it lists the percentages of these nine

major religions or denominations in regard to the total number of the 249

respondents. Methodists and Presbyterians together comprised 55 percent

of the total number of these known respondents, while 11 percent of the

total was Episcopalians. Baptists, Congregationalists, and Roman

Catholics constituted 9, 8, and 7 percent of the total, respectively. Luther-

ans and ministers of the Disciples of Christ each made up 4 percent of the

total. Rabbis of Jewish congregations were 2 percent of all the respond-

ing clergymen.

In 1936, 2,934,248 persons were members of Ohio's 8,864 religious

congregations.⁵ Assuming an average of one clergyman per congregation,

the 470 clergymen who responded to FDR's letter constituted slightly more

than 5 percent of the total number of clergymen residing in Ohio at that

time, a statistically significant portion of the total.

Each of the Ohio letters has been coded as to its general tone toward

Roosevelt and the New Deal: (1) very unfavorable, (2) unfavorable,

(3) neutral, (4) favorable, and (5) very favorable. Table 2 shows that these

clergymen were supportive of the New Deal by a margin of 51 percent to

29 percent, with 20 percent neutral. This favorable percentage was some-

what lower than FDR's nationwide support in the 1932 and 1936 presi-

dential elections in which he received 57 percent and 61 percent, respec-

tively, of the total votes cast.⁶ However, it was quite indicative of the state

of Ohio. In 1932 Ohioans cast 50 percent of their votes for FDR, and that

percentage rose to 58 in 1936.⁷

The relatively low approval rate among Ohio clergymen to some extent

reflected the fact that Ohio was a largely Republican state. But many Ohio

clergymen approved the New Deal because of their intellectual and pro-

fessional commitment to social services and because of their firsthand ex-

 

 

 

5. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Religious Bodies,

1936. Vol. I. Summary and Detailed Tables (Washington, 1941), 264.

6. See Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America at the Polls, A Handbook of Amer-

ican Presidential Election Statistics, 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh, 1965), 7, 9.

7. See Presidential Elections Since 1789 (Washington, 1975), 90.

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Ohio Clergymen                                                 25

perience with deadening poverty in both rural and urban areas. A careful reading of the letters for both their tone and specific comments reveals that Ohioans' support mainly devolved from the reality of economic depriva- tion, not social theory or political preference. A number of Ohio clergymen were effusive in their support for the Pres- ident. A Cleveland minister confessed to be "thoroughly in sympathy with the program of the New Deal. ..."8 A minister from Canton reported: "Your aims and purposes have ... my hearty approval. The majority of my congregation appreciate what has been accomplished thus far and hope and pray that New Deal measures may continue and be strengthened."9 But         8. F.H. Groom to FDR, Sept. 27, 1935, Ohio Clergy File, Roosevelt Library. (All sub- sequent letters referred to in this essay are in the Ohio Clergy File.) 9. R.W. Blemker to FDR, Sept 27, 1935.

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26                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

Roosevelt had severe critics. Representative of those hard on the Presi-

dent and the New Deal was a Dayton minister who wrote, "I hope you are

not so far removed from the common people that you think us a bunch of

ignorant people. ... ."10

The fact that the Ohio clergymen as a group were slightly more inclined

to favor rather than oppose the New Deal is admittedly hardly astonish-

ing. What is more significant is their relative interest in the various issues

associated with the New Deal and FDR and the quite substantial variations

which occurred in the clergymen's degree of support for or opposition to

specific issues. Thus, each of the Ohio clergymen's letters has been sub-

jected to analysis in terms of the specific issues mentioned in them. For

this analysis, each response on each issue has been coded (1) highly un-

favorable, (2) unfavorable, (3) favorable, or (4) highly favorable.

The subjects of these letters were surprisingly concentrated in a few is-

sues. Of the twenty-three issues which one or more Ohioans specifically

mentioned, five were cited by so few respondents that they were statisti-

cally insignificant. Six of the remaining eighteen issues were mentioned

by more than one-fifth of the responding clergy. These most salient issues

were social security (54 percent), prohibition repeal (38 percent), public

works programs (30 percent), agricultural programs (27 percent), bu-

reaucracy and corruption (26 percent), and relief (22 percent).

Six other issues ranged from 12 percent to 6 percent saliency. In order

of saliency they were: budgets and debt, taxes, the constitutionality of the

New Deal, the munitions embargo during the Italian-Ethiopian war, the

National Recovery Administration, and bank closing laws. The final six

salient issues were: the Civilian Conservation Corps, government re-

strictions on business, arms expenditures, the Tennessee Valley Author-

ity, activities of the President's family, and the diplomatic recognition of

Russia.

Another interesting result of the analysis of the specific issues is that

only one of them (the National Recovery Administration) evoked any-

where near an even division of opinion. Six of the eighteen issues evoked

approval rates of 66 percent or more, while eleven of them evoked approval

rates of 33 percent or less. In other words, the clergymen perceived neg-

atively eleven of the eighteen issues which drew statistically significant

comments, despite their overall support of the New Deal. Only the Ten-

nessee Valley Authority, the munitions embargo, social security, the

Civilian Conservation Corps, public works programs, and bank closing

 

10. A.H. Gulledge to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935.

11. The five statistically insignificant items were: Roosevelt's stand against the veter-

ans' bonus, the regulation of public utilities, the devaluation of the dollar, the United States

taken off the gold standard, and the National Youth Administration.

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Ohio Clergymen                                               27

 

laws elicited positive responses from the Ohio churchmen. These re-

sponses revealed that while the Ohioans generally approved the principal

policy thrust of the New Deal, they leveled substantial criticisms at a ma-

jority of the particular facets of the Roosevelt program.

A better appreciation of this can be gained by considering the issues in

four specific groupings. The first group includes government programs

aimed at helping particular sectors of the American population; the sec-

ond group concerns issues of morality; the third group focuses on per-

ceived governmental abuses; and the fourth group touches on foreign pol-

icy issues. Tables 3 through 6 summarize the Ohio clergy's positions on

these subjects by presenting the number and percent of clergymen com-

menting on an issue and the percent of these comments which could be con-

sidered favorable.

At the most general level, the New Deal aimed to restore the American

socioeconomic system to normal operating order and particularly to pro-

vide immediate aid to those suffering from the severe dislocations of the

Great Depression. The Ohio clergymen who wrote to FDR commented on

eight specific topics concerning governmental programs attempting to im-

plement these goals: social security, public works programs, agricultur-

al policies (especially the Agricultural Adjustment Act), relief programs,

the National Recovery Administration, bank closing laws, the Civil-

ian Conservation Corps, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The data in

Table 3 indicate that the clergymen had quite different perceptions of these

issues, strongly favoring five, strongly disapproving two, and dividing

equally on one.

Social security was by far the most salient of all the eighteen issues, be-

ing mentioned by over one-half of the Ohioans, and it was an extremely

popular program as it elicited an 86 percent approval rating. Clearly, the

clergy deemed its potential beneficiaries, particularly children, the aged,

and the disabled, well worthy of solicitude. From a practical standpoint,

these groups often represented the clergymen's own parishioners hardest

hit by the Depression. The ministerial approval closely reflected general

public opinion. Between 1936 and 1940 repeated surveys showed that over

90 percent of the citizenry supported social security and old age pen-

sions.12

Referring to the recently-passed Social Security Act, a minister em-

ployed by the Cincinnati Good Will Industries wrote: "We ... wish to ex-

press our high appreciation for this splendid legislation looking towards

social justice for the masses of the people."¹³ Another Protestant minis-

 

 

12. Rita James Simon, Public Opinion in America, 1936-1970 (Chicago, 1974), 25, 27.

13. R.E. Scully to FDR, Oct. 12, 1935.

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28                                           OHIO HISTORY

ter referred to the legislation as "a very good piece of work which will prof- it the people greatly."14 Despite the overwhelming support for the social security legislation, positive reaction to it was not unanimous. Some writ- ers were concerned about possible abuses in the program, while others wondered how it could be kept nonpolitical. A Methodist minister in Dunkirk expressed these concerns this way: "A law of this kind is sure to be abused by persons who would not try to provide for the 'rainy day' but would look forward to the pensioning age as their only hope [and] . . . it is next to impossible to keep measures of this kind out of partisan politics."15 Nearly one-third of the Ohio clergymen made references to the New Deal's public works programs, and 71 percent of those expressed support. Most of these favorable comments focused upon the provision of aid to and regained dignity for the participants, rather than the broader economic impact of the project. From Petersburg came this response: "Your Work Program in which you seek to employ usefully all needy and able-bodied men, meets with our hearty approval. We believe that when America shall be at WORK, there shall be less time for evil."16 The majority views expressed by the Ohio clergy on public relief pro- grams were quite different from the majority views expressed on public works programs. Relief programs were quite salient since over one-fifth of the clergymen mentioned them, ranking them sixth in overall impor-       14. Samuel S. Isa to FDR, Oct. 22, 1935. 15. A.L. Vandegriff to FDR, Oct. 11, 1935. 16. Joel C. Krumlauf to FDR, Nov. 2, 1935.

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Ohio Clergymen                                             29

 

tance. But relief was not at all popular: 85 percent of the clergymen who

commented on it did not approve. Evidently most of these churchmen were

imbued with a strong work ethic. They believed that the dole would make

people lose their initiative and that easy government money would en-

courage indolence and laziness. A Presbyterian minister from Morrow

wrote: "Many people who do not deserve relief and who could work are

merely living off the Government."¹⁷ A Catholic priest serving a south-

ern Italian parish in Cleveland had mixed feelings about relief: "That the

poor have been helped on a large scale by the various relief plans is ob-

vious, but whether the nation has been benfited [sic] permanently by them

I think is open to question. Something of the independent spirit that char-

acterised the poor boy in years gone by has definitely disappeared-a loss

of a very precious though intangible commodity."¹⁸

Fifteen percent of the clergy commenting on relief were acutely aware

that government handouts had prevented many Americans from starving

to death; they favored temporary relief measures for moral and humani-

tarian reasons. A minister teaching at Oberlin College reminded the Pres-

ident that "Direct Relief is essential for many people who, by reason of

age, sickness or other incapacity, cannot render service of any kind to the

community."¹⁹

The New Deal directed much attention to the problems associated with

agricultural regions. Since Ohio had its share of rural areas, surprisingly

only one-fourth of the state's clergy mentioned agricultural policies or

problems in their letters to the President. Even more surprising was that

FDR's agricultural initiatives were quite unpopular: they received only a

15 percent level of support. The great majority of the writers on this sub-

ject, including some from urban areas, simply could not fathom the moral-

ity or economic efficacy of killing pigs and plowing under crops at a time

when widespread hunger and even starvation stalked America.

Among those who disliked the President's agricultural efforts was a pas-

tor from Chagrin Falls who wrote, "I regret to state that many people here

are thinking dam and some [are] quite hot ... over the monumental hog

killing spree. .."²⁰ Typical of the minority voices regarding the gov-

ernment's agricultural programs to combat the heartbreaking conditions

in rural areas was a minister in Wilmington who was happy New Dealers

recognized that "our basic industry, farming, is as worthy of the protec-

tion and encouragement of the government as is manufacturing."²¹

 

 

17. Joseph D. Ryan to FDR, Oct. 8, 1935.

18. W. O'Donnell to FDR, Sept. 27, 1935.

19. Robert E. Brown to FDR, Oct. 5, 1935.

20. Thomas D. Henshaw to FDR, Sept. 28, 1935.

21. A.H. Wilson to FDR, Sept. 26, 1935.

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30                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

The Civilian Conservation Corps, a program to put unemployed young

men to work helping to conserve the nation's natural resources, received

the attention of a small portion of the Ohio clergy. The combination of the

CCC's employing young men who otherwise could not find jobs, of mas-

sive and effective conservation programs, and of an agency that was well

administered caused it to receive an approval rating of 76 percent, mak-

ing it the fourth highest program approved by the clergy. Expressing the

favorable opinions of others as well as himself, a Presbyterian minister

from Westerville wrote: "I am ... of the opinion that the Civilian Con-

servation Corps are rendering a valuable service to our youth and the na-

tion."²² A Congregationalist from Covington expressed reservations

when he stated that "the C.C.C. work is clothed with more Military interest

than I can approve of."23

The New Deal's efforts to correct faults in the nation's banking system

and to restore the public's confidence in that system and in the economy

in general caused 6 percent of the Ohio clergymen to comment on the ad-

ministration's bank closing laws, 66 percent of these respondents ex-

pressing approval. A minister from Gahanna expressed these positive

thoughts this way: "The folks in this section will always remember your

decisive and courageous way in dealing with the bank situation at the very

beginning of your administration and the subsequent security assured de-

positors through insurance.²⁴

The National Recovery Administration, designed to provide temporary

government regulation of the nation's businesses in order to speed national

economic recovery, drew comments from 7 percent of the clergymen, one-

half approving, one-half disapproving. Even though the NRA had been de-

clared unconstitutional and had been disbanded, some clergymen were sor-

ry the program was no longer operative. A favorable comment came from

a minister serving in a rural area near Bethel: "The NRA helped to cut

down unfair competition and to give a better deal to the laboring people.

I regret its removal."²⁵ A minister from West Elkton expressed a contrary

position when he wrote: "It seems to me good that the NRA is gone. The

weight of the device was on the wrong end of the social scales of justice."²⁶

The Tennessee Valley Authority was not particularly salient (3 percent),

but it received only favorable comments from those who mentioned it.

Even though Ohioans did not reside in the Tennessee Valley, they saw the

positive benefits coming from that great regional rehabilitation program.

 

 

22. Alonzo Alden Pratt to FDR, Oct. 9, 1935.

23. Cecil Leek to FDR, Oct. 16, 1935.

24. William F. Wolfe to FDR, Oct. 8, 1935.

25. Theron A. Zimmerman to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935.

26. Gordon Lang to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935.

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Ohio Clergymen                                                     31

Indeed, the positive response in a large degree stemmed from the hope that a similar future project might affect Ohio. Forthright advice went to the President from a minister in Lakewood: "Plan to use T.V.A. to start a sim- ilar development along the Ohio River or the Mississippi."27 Table 4 shows that the Ohio clergy, as their calling would suggest, were concerned about moral issues. This was obvious in their comments about the repeal of Prohibition and the divorces of the President's children. Many religious leaders and organizations, especially Methodists and Baptists, had a long tradition of opposition to the drinking of alcoholic beverages, and over the years those and other denominations had established com- mittees and commissions to work against that practice. When Prohibition was ended, the occasion brought forth a great outburst from the clergy. In Ohio the subject of liquor was the clergymen's second most salient issue, over one-third of them referring to it. Ninety-eight percent of them were critical of FDR's support of repeal, many not only opposing repeal but also blaming the return of legalized alcohol for all manner of social problems on the American scene. For them the President was directly responsible for these undesirable developments. A minister from Oxford wrote: "The administration forfeited the confidence of the evangelical clergy ... by its support of repeal .... Liquor advertising, drunken driving, and polit- ical corruption are increasing, while there is little evidence of any seri- ous effort to check the ravages of this social curse. No amount of social security legislation can overcome this major evil of the return of this liquor traffic."28 A Methodist minister from Zanesville was equally critical, in- cluding an implied threat in his comments: "It is entirely unnecessary for me to remind you, Mr. President, of the moral results of the melancholy legislation that repealed the eighteenth amendment .... But righteousness is not dead, and what is to be seen since liquor was permitted to flow will make every decent American pause, think, consider, and remember, when       27. John Sommerlatte to FDR, Oct. 14, 1935. 28. Cecil Daniel Smith to FDR, Oct. 1, 1935.

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32                                                 OHIO HISTORY

 

the next presidential election comes round. Good citizens everywhere are

determined that liquor shall not rule this country and shall not continue

to debauch mankind, corrupt our morals, prostitute our politics, buy our

newspapers, and turn our boys into drunkards and our girls into drunkards

wives."²⁹

Like other clergy across the nation, Ohio's religious leaders considered

themselves the moral guardians of American society, and those in this sam-

ple expressed concern about the divorces of the President's children. Not

one clergyman approved of these highly-publicized actions of FDR's sons,

more than one reminding Roosevelt that his children were violating God's

law and that the President's family members were obliged to set an ex-

ample for the general population. Representing these clergymen was a

Lutheran from Alliance who wrote: "The righteous people of this Nation

were shocked when two members of your family received divorces with-

in a year, . . . none of them founded on Scriptural Authority."³⁰

This moral ire carried over into intense opposition against what the re-

ligious leaders perceived as governmental abuses and excesses. On the five

issues of bureaucracy and corruption, larger government budgets and debt,

excessive taxation, perceived violations of the Constitution, and govern-

ment restrictions on private businesses, the Ohio clergy were strong in their

opposition, as indicated by the data in Table 5.

Concerns about bureaucracy/corruption caused that issue to be ranked

fifth in salience among the eighteen issues which the Ohioans mentioned.

Perhaps these concerns about corruption reflected a displeasure with

state politics, since Ohio had long traditions in machine politics and ques-

tionable patronage practices.³¹ A Catholic priest from Barnesville warned

the President of a possible danger to the administration of the "Works pro-

gramme," namely that some part of it "may find its way into unjust and

unscrupulous hands in its particular administration thereof."³² A Protes-

tant minister from Middletown made this suggestion: "If a social program

is to be really human, the administrators should not be nominated by po-

litical organizations but by men with human interests, i.e. school super-

intendents and principals, heads of ministerial associations and Y.M. and

Y.W.C.A. secretaries. These people would not graft from the fund .. ."33

Despite Roosevelt's promise in his 1932 presidential campaign to bal-

ance the nation's budget, the New Deal programs drained the national trea-

 

 

29. Thomas Adshead to FDR, Oct. 19, 1935.

30. S.D. Myers to FDR, Oct. 10, 1935.

31. For example, see Peter W. Porter, Cleveland: Confused City on a Seesaw (Columbus,

1976), chaps. 3-5.

32. M.J. Sullivan to FDR, Oct. 8, 1935.

33. Jerome C. Schulz to FDR, Oct. 16, 1935.

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Ohio Clergymen                                                    33

sury and plunged the nation deeper into debt. Twelve percent of the cler- gymen commented upon the government's policy in regard to budgets and debt, and 95 percent of these respondents were critical of the trend toward unbalanced budgets and a burdensome national debt. A Lutheran minis- ter in Lindsey reported the beliefs of the members of his congregation: "We ... no longer believe in Santa Claus, nor in the Easter Rabbit; and yet we are asked to believe that the spending of five billion dollars . . . will re- turn prosperity to this country. How that is possible is beyond our under- standing. And the result will be that our children and our children's chil- dren will receive unbearable burdens."34 A Methodist minister in New Lexington expressed similar sentiments: "I strongly deprecate and de- nounce the many unwise, unholy, foolish and asinine policies you have championed ... [including] the spending of countless billions ... ."35 Since government spending was resulting in these massive deficits, the New Dealers proposed new taxes to help the government pay for some of its expenses. Eighty-five percent of the Ohio clergy who commented on the taxation policies were critical. A Bible teacher reported that there were "few happy taxpayers" in East Liverpool,36 while a respondent from Cleveland reminded the President of the "sorrowful fact" that "the con- sumer is taxed directly and indirectly and can buy less and less from a dwindling income."37 A few clergymen were more concerned about acquiring needed services than in worrying about how to pay for them. A Columbus minister assumed such an attitude when he wrote, "We urge you and the Congress at once       34. Alwin J. Prange to FDR, Oct. 2, 1935. 35. L. I. Hart to FDR, Oct. 5, 1935. 36. B.H. Shadduck to FDR, Oct. 22, 1935. 37. J.J. Kennedy to FDR, Oct. 23, 1935.

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34                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

to levy such additional taxes as may be necessary to meet our necessary

expenses. Let's pay as we go."³⁸

The question of the constitutionality of the New Deal measures con-

cerned thirty-six of the Ohio clergy. Among the 67 percent who opposed

the New Deal's apparently unconstitutional approach to solving the na-

tion's problems was a minister from Toledo who wrote: "Any tampering

with the fundamental law of our land, the Constitution, will be resent-

ed .... Our nation schooled in the sacredness of this document will not

easily be influenced to forsake its guarantees."³⁹ But not all clergymen

were critical in this issue. A Jewish rabbi from Youngstown supported

FDR as he tried to solve economic woes, arguing that his actions in regard

to the Constitution were justified. He wrote: "We must have an interpre-

tation of our Constitution in keeping with our growing industrial life and

social progress. Our Constitution must be an ever-living force, not a dead

letter. The Constitution was made for the people, not the people for the

Constitution. The spirit and purpose of our Constitution are important, not

its letter."⁴⁰

Even though several clergymen made specific comments about the Na-

tional Recovery Administration, others expressed their opinions about the

general trend of government restrictions on business. The vast majority

of these (88 percent) were unhappy with such developments. A Congre-

gational minister from Cleveland made a point of expressing this unhap-

piness this way: "While people generally are agreed that the stimulation

which was given our life by the steps which were taken by the Government

in 1933 and successive months were necessary and commendable, the time

has now come, on the other hand, to permit private enterprise a greater re-

sponsibility in building a new prosperity in our industrial life."⁴¹

A number of Ohio clergymen showed interest in foreign affairs.

Thirty-seven discussed Roosevelt's munitions embargo in the Italian-

Ethiopian war and twenty-one mentioned the nation's arms expenditures.

Several clergymen who referred to the munitions embargo and arms ex-

penditures related them to the general themes of neutrality and peace. The

munitions embargo almost surely attracted attention because it was im-

posed during the same week that most of the clergy were receiving their

letters from President Roosevelt. Table 6 shows that the respondents who

commented on the munitions embargo almost universally approved it, that

issue receiving the second highest approval rate of all eighteen subjects

 

 

 

38. Arthur R. Leonard, Oct. 6, 1935.

39. S.C. Michelfelder to FDR, Sept. 26, 1935.

40. I.E. Philo to FDR, Oct. 18, 1935.

41. Ferdinand Q. Blanchard to FDR, Sept. 26, 1935.

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Ohio Clergymen                                                   35

mentioned. A Methodist in Canton had only praise: "Your prompt action regarding the Italian-Ethopian situation was decisive and must be regarded .. as one of the several courageous stands you have taken."42 General- ly the clergymen were unhappy with the nation's armament expenditures. A Presbyterian minister expressed these sentiments when he reported that he "sincerely disapprove[d] of all militaristic tendencies of the adminis- tration, the increased appropriations for army and navy, [and] the im- pending naval building program ...."43 Fourteen ministers commented upon the Roosevelt administration's de- cision to extend diplomatic recognition to Russia, 86 percent of these re- ligious leaders disapproving that action. A Baptist minister in Lockland responded: "It is my candid opinion that the present administration made a collosal [sic] blunder in the recognition of Godless and communistic Russia."44 Underlying these foreign policy comments were anti-communism sen- timents militating against diplomatic relations with the USSR and a paci- fism causing support for the arms embargo and opposition to increased de- fense spending and war. More importantly, the somewhat small number of respondents in the area of foreign affairs pointed up the fact that im- mediate economic problems were more central to the clergymen and their flocks than issues "out there." In conclusion, Ohio clergymen displayed a remarkable consensus about the New Deal. They realized that the grave economic and social disrup- tions accompanying the Great Depression called for the American gov- ernment to take radical remedial actions. Thus, they strongly supported several key elements in the New Deal which attacked the Depression at the local level and helped the recovery of many destitute Americans. These     42. C.W. Danford to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935. 43. John P. McConnell to FDR, Nov. 2, 1935. 44. B.H. Hillard to FDR, Sept 28, 1935.

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36                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

clergymen, however, were far from blind or unthinking New Deal loyal-

ists. They deplored policies which they perceived as promoting personal

immorality among their parishioners such as the repeal of Prohibition,

"easy money" from the dole, official immorality (e.g., corruption and war-

mongering), and mismanagement (e.g., financial irresponsibility and bu-

reaucratism). They supported the New Deal but not without significant

reservations. Ohio clergymen of the 1930s were pragmatic and undoctri-

naire about the New Deal and the role of government in the daily lives of

individual Americans.

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