Ohio History Journal

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Book Reviews

Book Reviews

 

 

Four Hours in My Lai. By Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim. (New York:

Viking, 1992. ix + 430p.; maps, illustrations, notes on sources, notes on

text, bibliography, index. $25.00.)

 

On March 16, 1968, Charlie Company of Americal Division's 11th Light

Infantry Brigade attacked the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai expecting to en-

counter Viet Cong forces which Army intelligence had reported as operating

in the area. Finding no Viet Cong, and meeting no military opposition what-

soever, U.S. troops proceeded to murder an indeterminate number (probably

several hundred) of unresisting old men, women, and children; accompanying

the murders were torture, mutilations, rape, sodomy, and worse. A massacre

of the first magnitude, the whole affair, or "incident" as the Army would pre-

fer (Army authorities insisted that it never be termed a massacre), raised seri-

ous questions about the conduct of our troops in Vietnam, especially their

treatment of noncombatants.

International concern for the welfare of civilians, or noncombatants, in war

dates back to the Thirty Years War, which saw zealous Catholic and

Protestant forces compete for which side could commit the most homicide

and mayhem in general on largely defenseless civilians. Appalled, such emi-

nent jurists as Grotius and Vattel attempted to make the humane treatment,

when at all possible, of noncombatants during war an integral part of interna-

tional law. Over time, most of the "civilized" countries of the world honored,

with some violent exceptions, these new rules of the game. Even in the

twentieth century when such marvelous military innovations as high-level

aerial bombing made respect for the welfare of civilians virtually impossible,

it was understood that killing noncombatants intentionally was a crime

against international law for which perpetrators could be made to answer.

German and Japanese martial folk learned this harsh fact of life at a series of

post-World War II trials. (Some would argue later that both sides in the war

were guilty of war crimes. Yes, but both sides did not lose the war.)

That decent treatment of civilians was required by rule of law, and that the

United States, a major member of the prosecution at the postwar trials, was a

leading proponent of observance of the law makes what happened at My Lai

all the more painful and difficult to understand. In fact, as though to mock

the trials, some of the troops who committed atrocities there defended their

behavior on the same grounds as had German and Japanese war criminals.

Lieutenant William "Rusty" Calley, the only soldier convicted for anything

that happened at My Lai, used the German generals' defense at Nuremberg:

he was only following orders. Also making a case for following orders was