OHJ Archive

MARK PITCAVAGE

"Burthened in Defence of our Rights":

Opposition to Military Service in Ohio

During the War of 1812

The War of 1812 has long been famous as a war to which substantial op-

position existed in the United States. The nearness of the Congressional vote

over the declaration of war, the refusal of several New England states to pro-

vide militia for the invasion of Canada, and the Hartford Convention in 1814

are all notable examples of the degree to which the nation divided over the is-

sue of war with Great Britain.

Unfortunately, these incidents have led historians to concentrate on the po-

litical opposition to the War of 1812, viewing it as the natural outgrowth of

the Federalist-Republican battles of the early national period. Because

Federalists so vocally opposed the war, they receive attention at the expense

of other groups, and New England, that bastion of Federalism, receives atten-

tion at the expense of the rest of the country. The danger of concentrating

solely on political issues is that the effects of the war itself on American

communities-and thus public opinion-might be overlooked.¹

This article examines the opposition to military service that arose in Ohio

during the course of the War of 1812, the nature of that opposition, and its ef-

fects. Along with Kentucky and Tennessee, Ohio (dominated by Jeffersonian

Republicans) was one of the western states which cried out for war in 1811

and 1812, and whose citizens flocked to the colors when war appeared immi-

nent. As the war dragged on, however, Ohioans became less enthusiastic

Mark Pitcavage would like to thank Allan R. Millett, Joan E. Cashin, Mark Grimsley, and

Virginia Boynton for their advice and assistance in writing this article. Any errors are his own.

1. Of the standard scholarly histories of the war, the two which provide most coverage of

opposition to the war are Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana,

Ill, 1989), and J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the

Early American Republic, 1783-1830, (Princeton, N.J., 1983). John K. Mahon, The War of

1812, (Gainesville, Fla, 1972), provides some information. Recent specific studies of opposi-

tion include Edward Bryan, "Patterns of Dissent: Vermont's Opposition to the War of 1812,"

Vermont History, 40 (Winter 1972), 10-27; Sarah M. Lemmon, "Dissent in North Carolina

During the War of 1812," North Carolina Historical Review, 49 (Spring 1972), 103-18: Myron

F. Wehtje, "Opposition in Virginia to the War of 1812," Virginia Magazine of History, 78

(January 1970), 65-86; and Ellen P. Hoffman, "Unnecessary, Unjustified and Ruinous: Anti-

war Rhetoric in Massachusetts Federalist Newspapers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

University of Massachusetts, 1984).

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 143

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 143

about performing the military service required to conduct the war. Opposition

to service in the militia took three forms. The first substantial opposition

arose in communities along the frontier that feared Indian attack and the con-

sequences of sending their men away from their homes and families. The

second type of opposition came from communities and individuals that felt

they were bearing a greater part of the burden of the war than their neighbors.

The third type, arising only late in the war, took the form of a general war-

weariness characterized by considerable desertions and mass refusals to serve.

It was only in this last phase of opposition that Federalist propaganda had any

discernible impact.²

The Exposed Frontier

The initial response on the part of Ohioans to military service was largely

positive. Ohio Governor Return Jonathan Meigs and Michigan Territorial

Governor William Hull, commissioned a major general in the U.S. Army,

had few problems assembling 1,200 troops in the spring and summer of 1812

to march to Detroit. Indeed, a larger army could have been raised, but was not

2. As militia historian Jerry Cooper has noted, until recently most scholars who have exam-

ined the militia have followed the lead of nineteenth century Army officer Emory Upton,

whose The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1904) condemned the role

played in wartime by militia or volunteers. These studies tend to focus on wartime use of the

militia and federal mobilization efforts, and emphasize the value of the Regular Army as op-

posed to the poor performance of militia units; see Cooper, The Militia and the National Guard

in America Since Colonial Times: A Research Guide (Westport, Conn, 1993), 13-17, 51-56.

While historians of colonial America have examined the militia in a variety of social, religious,

economic, and ideological contexts, those studying the militia of the early republic have gen-

erally followed Uptonian themes. Thus Richard Kohn examines the failure of efforts to give

the federal government greater control over the militia in Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of

the Military Establishment in America (New York, 1975), 73-90, 128-38, and Lawrence

Delbert Cress explains the same failure as a result of republican ideology in Citizens in Arms:

The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982),

passim. John K. Mahon, in his History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York, 1983),

provides the most balanced overall depiction of the militia, including information on the state

level, but in The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800 (Jacksonville, Fla., 1960),

even he concentrates on the issue of greater federal control over the militia. More understand-

ing of the social background of the militia is Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The

Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865 (New York, 1973), 177-260. A satisfactory recent

overview of the militia system is Kenneth Otis McCreedy, "Palladium of Liberty: The

American Militia System, 1815-1861" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,

Berkeley, 1991). Specific studies of the militia in the period 1789-1815 are quite rare, but see

Martin K. Gordon, "The Militia of the District of Columbia, 1790-1815" (unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation, George Washington University, 1975); Jean M. Flynn, "South Carolina's

Compliance with the Militia Act of 1792," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 69 (January,

1968), 26-43; John K. Mahon, "The Citizen Soldier in National Defense, 1789-1815,"

(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1950); and Mark

Pitcavage, "Ropes of Sand: Territorial Militias, 1801-12," Journal of the Early Republic, 31

(Winter, 1993), 481-500.

144 OHIO HISTORY

because it could not be supplied. Ohioans were not just being patriotic, they

were being practical: a war against the British, many assumed, would in turn

reduce the pressures Indians placed on white settlers.³

Settlers' fears of Indians also provided the first significant opposition to

military service in Ohio in the summer and fall of 1812. People living along

the ill-defined "frontier"-which ran from southwest Ohio north by northeast

towards Lake Erie-viewed with alarm the prospect of stripping the frontier

of men capable of bearing arms by sending them to Canada. Not surpris-

ingly, they wanted the state and national governments to provide more protec-

tion, rather than less. Benjamin Mortimer, minister to a mixed community

of Indians and whites, observed to Governor Meigs that while fear of Indians

was one of the excuses used by those who would rather stay at home, "a still

greater number are in fact under much anxiety on this head, and represent to

themselves, that if during their absence, an Indian war should break out ...

their families would be in great danger of their lives."⁴

Similar sentiments came from a group of Richland County settlers, self-

described "young enterprising people who have brought our helpless families

to the gloomy wild." These families would be left defenseless by a calling-

up of the militia, "exposed to the brutal disposition of the merciless savages."

While the settlers realized their services were needed, they felt that "yet the

calls of our tender wives and infants ring louder in our ears than the calls of

consulted authority." A second petition from Richland County asked for arms

and for release from having to perform military service outside the county.⁵

Some settlers believed their work in taming the frontier was service enough

to the state. Others added economic arguments against military service. One

group of petitioners, for example, hoping for release from militia duty, noted

that they were the economic mainstays of both their families and of the fron-

tier community-families would suffer and crops would fail if they were

called away. This would result in "very flourishing townships in this

county" becoming entirely depopulated, and fertile fields returning to a howl-

ing wilderness. The Indian threat would increase the exodus, because the set-

tlers called out to militia service would take most firearms from the commu-

nity. With the remaining settlers without arms or ammunition, the petition-

ers asked, "what safety or what refuge they can have other than to take to their

heals [sic] and clear out as fast as possible ...."6

3. See Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 193-200, on the raising of Hull's army. For more infor-

mation on the effect that poor relations with Native Americans had on Ohioans, see James E.

Pallet, The Indian Menace in the Old Northwest, 1809-12, (Columbus, 1959), passim.

4. Benjamin Mortimer to Return J. Meigs, August 8, 1812, Reel 1, Frames 436-440, Return J.

Meigs, Jr. Papers, Microfilm Edition, Ohio Historical Society.

5. Citizens of Richland county to Return J. Meigs, August 17, 1812, September 4, 1812, Reel

1, Frames 509-10, and Reel 2, Frames 33-34, Ibid.

6. Petition to Return J. Meigs, June 17, 1812 (damaged), Reel 1, Frame 330, Ibid. In gen-

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 145

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 145

The news of Hull's shameful surrender of Detroit on August 16, 1812,

which reached Ohio some days later, only increased the clamor for protection

of the frontier, as settlers envisioned a horde of savage Indians descending

upon their communities. Governor Meigs ordered frontier militia generals to

take defensive measures, while armed citizens rushed to the frontiers in what

one newspaper described as a "spontaneous and rapid" movement. Militia

generals not on the frontier itself ordered units held in readiness to march in

case of emergency. One such general, John S. Gano, also argued that no

militia units should be sent to join the army, so that the frontier could be

protected. The surrender of General James Winchester's Northwestern Army

to the British in January 1813 only increased the concern about Indian at-

tacks.⁷

eral, spelling and grammar have not been altered in this article, although in one or two in-

stances slight punctuation has been added to enhance comprehension.

7. Ohio Centinel, September 23, 1812; Major General John S. Gano to Major Samuel

McHenry, September 16, 1812, in "Selections from the Gano Papers, 1,"Quarterly Publication

of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 15 (January-June, 1920), 1-105.

146 OHIO HISTORY

The pressure to protect the frontier eventually led Meigs to adopt a general

policy of exempting frontier settlements from militia drafts by allowing mili-

tia officers to except them from filling divisional quotas. Exactly when this

practice began is not clear. One militia general in 1815 claimed that Meigs

issued a general order in 1812 to that effect. However, a letter to Meigs in

April 1813 which complained that residents of Piqua, Ohio, were drafted to

serve 35 miles away (leaving their own settlement exposed), and called for the

governor to exempt from draft militia companies bordering on the frontier,

suggests such a policy was not yet in place. It is likely that the practice was

more informal than formal, although the state legislature, in its revision of

the militia laws passed February 9, 1813, gave the governor authority to ex-

empt the militia from frontier settlements from being called into service and

to make any further provisions thought necessary for the defense of the fron-

tier.⁸

Through 1813 and 1814, most frontier settlements were not called upon to

fill militia quotas for service away from their communities, but Thomas

Worthington questioned the practice when he became governor in late 1814.

Concerned about the defense of the frontiers of Ohio (as well as Indiana and

Illinois), Worthington proposed to Secretary of War James Monroe in

November 1814 a plan of defense arguing for, among other things, the divi-

sion of frontier militia regiments into six classes, each to serve as minutemen

(militia ready for immediate call-up) for two months, to meet every week for

drill, but to be exempt from all other militia duties. This measure, he argued,

Ohio had already substantially adopted. Actually, the state had adopted no

such measures, though Worthington desired them. In any event, the federal

government did not adopt the suggestions before the war's end.⁹

In early 1815 Worthington ended the policy of absolutely exempting fron-

tier militia units from duty outside their settlements, because he believed the

exemption promoted a decay of the militia in those areas. He could obtain

relatively little information about the condition of the frontier militia, be-

8. Colonel John Moore to Thomas Worthington, February 27, 1815, Reel 9, Frames 711-717,

Thomas Worthington Papers, Microfilm Edition, OHS; John Johnston to Meigs, April 8, 1813,

Reel 3, Frames 325-326, RJM Papers, OHS; Chapter 43, Section 39, "An Act for Disciplining

the Militia," February 9, 1813, Acts Passed at the First Session of the Eleventh General

Assembly of the State of Ohio. Later complaints by Johnston indicate that the problem existed-

at least near Piqua-through the end of 1814, and also give further evidence of the informality

of the practice. One militia general drew an exemption line through his division's territory, ex-

empting all outside of it. However, the officer's successor allowed no exemptions for militia

drafts. See Johnston to Othniel Looker, May 12, 1814 and October 7, 1814, Reel 1, Frames 69-

71 and 229-231, Othniel Looker Papers, Microfilm Edition, OHS.

9. Worthington to James Monroe, November 21, 1814, in Journal of the House of

Representatives of the State of Ohio, Thirteenth General Assembly, 116-18; Thomas

Worthington to Isaac Van Horn, February 4, 1815, Reel 1, Frame 23, Letters from the

Executive of Ohio, Executive Letterbooks Microfilm Edition (hereafter abbreviated as LEO),

OHS.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 147

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 147

cause militia returns were infrequent at this late stage of the conflict, and be-

cause those few returns available were in the possession of his adjutant gen-

eral, who lived in Zanesville, a considerable distance from the capital city of

Chillicothe. Worthington eventually sent a subordinate around to the various

regiments to ascertain their condition and the number of weapons they had,

with a view to reorganizing the frontier defenses (and in February appointed a

new adjutant general).10

Worthington's plan was essentially the one that he had suggested to

Monroe was already in operation: "I think it probable, I shall exempt all the

Battalions, immediately on the frontier . . . and organize them into minute

men, for their own immediate defence." However, the news of peace took

away much of the necessity for such actions. As a result, many frontier

communities successfully avoided most of the militia duty with which other

parts of the states had to comply.1l

An Equal Burden

While frontier communities protested the calling away of their men for mil-

itary service, people elsewhere in Ohio protested that they were being called

upon to provide an unequal share of military manpower. Like the settlers on

the frontier, these protesters were generally in agreement about the justness of

the war, and represented themselves as being willing to serve. But they cast

envious eyes at other communities whom they felt were called upon less of-

ten for troops.

Because Ohio had for some time been on a hostile frontier, where the pos-

sibility of military service was considerable, its lawmakers had designed the

state's militia laws in such a way as to spread the burden of such service as

equally as possible among the population. Unlike many other states, Ohio's

militia laws dictated two methods of military organization that both comple-

mented and contradicted each other. The militia throughout the state were di-

vided into standard military units of divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions,

and companies. But except for the hypothetical case of a general invasion of

Ohio, in which the whole militia could be called out to defend the state, the

divisions in practice existed as administrative units. The second form of or-

ganization occurred at the company level. According to law, militia captains

each divided their companies into eight distinct groups or classes. When the

governor or high-ranking officers acting on his orders ordered a militia draft,

10. Colonel John Moore to Thomas Worthington, February 27, 1815, Reel 9, Frames 711-

717, Worthington Papers, OHS.

11. Thomas Worthington to John Johnston, February 18, 1815, Reel 1, Frames 29-30, LEO,

OHS; Chapter 54, Section 43, "An Act for Organizing and Disciplining the Militia," February

14, 1815, Acts Passed, Thirteenth General Assembly.

148 OHIO HISTORY

the first class of each affected company would be ordered into service. The

next tour of duty required would fall upon members of the second class, and

so forth. The only exception to the principle that every ablebodied man

would perform his share of the duty was a provision that allowed men to pro-

cure substitutes for themselves.¹²

Not surprisingly, it proved impossible in practice to insure an equitable dis-

tribution of military service, which caused resentment among communities

that perceived others were not performing their fair share. Conscientious ob-

jectors-primarily Quakers and Shakers-formed the most visible target for

resentment. Many other states had long since listed members of the two sects

among their standard exemptions to military service, but Ohio had not done

so, although the 1809 militia law did allow those "conscientiously scrupu-

lous" of bearing arms to avoid service by purchasing a certificate for $3.50.

But the state legislature denied the petition of Shakers from Warren County

who wanted to perform work on the highways instead of doing military duty

in 1811. A legislative committee reported that it would be "inauspicious" to

interfere with the militia system during a time of crisis; that granting exemp-

tions to Shakers might cause Quakers, Mennonites, and other denominations

to claim exemptions as well; and that, perhaps most importantly, "even the

present applicants themselves in another memorial . . . spurn the thought of

having any distinction made between them and our other citizens."¹³

The outbreak of war increased the determination among Ohioans that

Shakers and Quakers should do their fair share. The 1809 provision for ex-

empting conscientious objectors for a fee fell by the wayside in the revisions

to the militia laws over the winter of 1812-13. An amendment in the House

to exclude all conscientious objectors from duty failed by a vote of forty-

seven to three. A committee on Quakers the same day recommended no ex-

emptions, even partial, from militia duty for the conscientiously scrupulous,

because it was "improper at the present momentous crisis to lessen the effec-

tive force of the state." The committee must have known, of course, that a

force of Quakers was hardly an effective force (officers as early as August

1812 reported that Quakers would not serve if called on to do so), but they

could not easily let some groups avoid military service while others did their

duty. "The Quakers are flanking about us, pleading for exceptions," com-

plained one lawmaker who wished that Congress would take the problem of

exemptions out of the hands of the states. The legislature held firm, however:

no conscientious objectors were excused by law from duty or paying fines for

the remainder of the war.¹⁴

12. Chapter 1, Sections 30-40, "An Act for Disciplining the Militia," February 14, 1809, Acts

Passed, Seventh General Assembly.

13. Ohio House Journal, Eleventh General Assembly, January 11, 1812, 175.

14. Ohio House Journal, Eleventh General Assembly, February 2, 1813, 224-29; Colonel

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 149

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 149

After the initial outbreak of support for the war, the burden of military ser-

vice was not borne very enthusiastically. Although the officers of his de-

tachment were cheerful, wrote one militia general to his superior in

September 1812, "the privates are like all other militia, uneasy and many de-

sirous of returning home and it will be with the greatest difficulty that they

can be induced satisfactorily to remain in the service two weeks." A year

later, after American victories leading to the recapture of Detroit in September

1813 and the Battle of the Thames in October, respectively, a Zanesville,

Ohio, newspaper congratulated its readers: "How cheering to the wife and

children of those militia now in service, to know that the dangers of battle are

no longer to be dreaded: and to those who fearful that another draft might

soon call them from their homes . . . what a pleasing reflection that the ne-

cessity for militia will be daily decreasing." Added to the dangers of battle, in

the minds of the militia, were the hazards of camp life, the economic hard-

ships caused by leaving home, and the long delays in getting paid for their

services (see below).¹⁵

Those communities protesting military service on the grounds of being

asked to perform more than their share took pains to demonstrate their patrio-

tism, the amount of service they had performed, and their willingness to serve

in the future. Junior officers of one regiment that had not filled its quota of

militia informed their divisional commander in August 1812 that they had al-

ready volunteered one company, despite the fact that most of the men had

families to provide for, and had that very day volunteered a large number to go

on yet another expedition. In fact, "in consequence of our turning out so

large a proportion . . . other regiments have not been burthened in defence of

our rights as we have done." The men were aware of the duty they owed their

"felow[sic] creatures and our families and our own persons in exercising a

laudable zeal in defense of our country . . . to sacrifice a full proportion of

time and property to the service of our country. . ." However, they believed

"as a regiment" they had already offered as much as circumstances permitted,

and so wanted relief from the latest draft. A similar protest from another unit

in the same division stressed that the militiamen had served their country and

beseeched their general to "grant relief by appointing to us only our share of

John Hindman to Major General Elijah Wadsworth, August 1, 1812, MSS 3133, War of 1812

Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society; Duncan McArthur to Thomas Worthington,

January 20, 1813, Thomas Worthington and the War of 1812: Vol. III of the Document

Transcriptions of the War of 1812 in the Northwest, (Columbus, 1957), 151. The refusal to ex-

empt Quakers may also have had roots in the fact that those Quakers who were politically ac-

tive tended to be Federalists, because of their opposition to the war; see William Cooper

Howells, Recollections of Life in Ohio from 1813 to 1840 (Gainesville, Fla., 1963 [orig. pub.

1895]), 33-34.

15. Brigadier General Simon Perkins to Major General Elijah Wadsworth, September 4,

1812, Elisha Whittlesey Papers, container 71, folder 1, WRHS; Muskingum Messenger,

October 20, 1813.

150 OHIO HISTORY

the burdens ...."16

Such militia attitudes led to sharp reactions against militia officers who

were deemed to have acted too enthusiastically in calling out the militia.

James Kilbourne, the central Ohio surveyor, manufacturer, and politician,

complained to Governor Meigs in 1812 about the "most ruinous and oppres-

sive system" operating in Franklin and Delaware counties under General

Joseph Foos. Foos, said Kilbourne, had called out the whole military force

(several hundred men) of both counties on what proved to be a false alarm,

then kept that force in service. While some units were later allowed to return,

two companies from Worthington were not, though forty-five men had fami-

lies "with not a person beside women and small children to do the smallest

chore of work," and others were landless laborers whose families depended

upon their daily presence. Captain Stephen Smith of Williamsburg,

Clermont County, had the unfortunate audacity to volunteer the services of

his company to the state. According to one observer, evidently a member of

the company, the men cheerfully made preparations to march, thinking that a

general call on the militia had been made, but then discovered that no com-

pany other than Smith's was to march. "The men," reported the observer,

"being freeborn Americans and jealous of their rights began to think that they

were some way imposed upon," then reacted with anger upon discovering that

Smith had several times solicited Governor Meigs for orders: "had not Smith

behaved in a humble manner he would not have escaped without blows...."

The observer, after stressing the amount of duty the local militia had will-

ingly performed, argued that the opposition arose from a love of liberty and

an abhorrence of tyranny and foul play, rather than disaffection from the gov-

ernment. "When an equal call of the militia is made," he assured the gover-

nor, they would step forward with willingness.l⁷

The zealousness with which Ohioans guarded their sense of military fair

play eventually reached the higher ranks, though whether from officers' sense

of equity or simply their desire not to anger the people whom they com-

manded is hard to say. Brigadier General George Kisling had to inform his

superior, John Gano, in early 1813 that a colonel from his brigade refused an

order to provide a company of militia from his regiment on the grounds "that

the order is oppressive in taking the whole of the company from the one

Regiment," and that other units had also been taken from that regiment.

(Kisling, also conscious of equalizing burdens, noted that the population from

which that regiment was drawn was much larger than his other regiment.)

Gano himself two days later, when issuing general orders for detachments of

16. Petition to Elijah Wadsworth, August 28, 1812, Ibid; Petition to Elijah Wadsworth,

October 22, 1812, Container 71, Folder 3, Ibid.

17. James Kilbourne to Return J. Meigs, 1812 (only date), Reel 2, Frames 537-538, RJM pa-

pers, OHS; John Morris to Meigs, September 8, 1812, Reel 2, Frames 86-87, Ibid.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 151

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 151

militia from his division, noted that, because two brigades situated on the

frontier had been more exposed and performed more duty, he would not call on

them for this detachment. This sort of justification was necessary to preempt

protests from the other brigades, and to demonstrate to the Fourth and Fifth

Brigades that their commanding general would not force upon them an undue

burden. Gano, like other militia officers, had to walk a tightwire between

military necessity and the outcry that military hardships perceived as unfair

would raise. It is not surprising that he felt "a militia office is truly an ardu-

ous, troublesome, expensive, and unthankful one if strictly and properly at-

tended to."¹⁸

The idea of equalizing burdens extended itself to economic issues as well, as

rich and poor suffered in differing degrees because of the war. Taxes bore

down more harshly on those of fewer means, and in addition, the wealthy

could avoid military duty by purchasing substitutes, or by occupying posi-

tions that would exempt them from service. Othniel Looker, acting governor

of the state in 1814, recognized the "undue pressure" of the militia system on

the poor, but suggested that if the burden were "judiciously apportioned," then

"the spirit of our citizens will be equal to any emergency."¹⁹

Because so many citizens of means found positions that let them avoid mil-

itary service, exemptions were the first symbol of economic inequality to

come under fire. Before the war began, Ohio exempted from military duty all

ministers of the Gospel, judges of the supreme court, presidents of the courts

of common pleas, jailkeepers, custom-house officials, postal workers, ferry-

men (on post roads), and those exempt by federal law. The revisions to the

militia law debated by the Ohio legislature over the winter of 1812-13 in-

cluded a proposal adding associate judges, sheriffs, and clerks of court to the

list of exemptions. Defenders of this measure argued that other states allowed

these exemptions, and that "the poor man who may have suffered, is obliged

to sit down in silence, and wait the return of [the armies] before he can have

that justice." Opponents replied that "no man holding a lucrative office, such

as that of sheriff, or clerk . . . ought ever to be exempt from military duty;

for if the office is worth holding, it will furnish the means of procuring sub-

stitutes." The measure failed, though so too did a simultaneous attempt to

remove the exemption for ministers of the gospel. The next revision of the

militia laws, passed at the very end of the war, actually saw most exemptions

removed from the list: only customs officials, postal workers, and ferrymen

could avoid the prospect of serving in the military or procuring a substitute.

18. Brigadier General George Kisling to Major General John S. Gano, February 2, 1813,

"Selections from the Gano Papers II," Quarterly Publications of the Historical and

Philosophical Society of Ohio , 15 (April-June, 1921), 25-80; Western Spy, February 13, 1813;

John S. Gano to Major Thomas B. Van Home, January 17, 1813, "Selections from the Gano

Papers II."

19. Ohio House Journal, Thirteenth General Assembly, 36-38.

152 OHIO HISTORY

Ohioans were determined that as many people as possible bear their share of

the burden.²⁰

However, equalizing the burden of the war did not extend very far towards

making the financial burdens of militia service more equitable, though there

were calls for such measures. As one newspaper observed, while the rich and

poor received equal personal protection from the militia, the poor also pro-

vided property protection for the rich. The newspaper called for taxes on

wealth so that the poor would not subsidize the wealthy in this way.²¹

In late 1814, Thomas Worthington, recognizing that willingness to per-

form militia duty existed only in proportion to the perception that the weight

of defense should rest equally on every member of the community, tried to

convince the legislature to make the system more fair. "Every man feels con-

solation and satisfaction under the conviction that he does not bear an unequal

proportion of the public burdens. Such a state of things will not fail to create

an attachment to the government and a readiness to contribute to its defence

and support." Worthington observed, however, that there were people able to

avoid much of the burden: the wealthy could avoid personal services by pay-

ing a fine, while men without families could absent themselves during drafts.

This threw the burden of support "on others in moderate circumstances, un-

able to pay the fine, with large families to maintain, whose sole dependence

for support is on the head of the family, and what is worse, taken by such

evasions of the law from their homes, when least expected and most unpre-

pared." The way the law operated, Worthington argued, the greatest share of

personal service fell upon that part of the community least able to bear it.²²

Worthington wanted more severe punishments for draft evaders, but he also

argued for using taxation as a way to equalize the contributions that citizens

made towards the war. Under his plan, all males eighteen and over in each

company district would pay an equal share, but property "real and personal" in

the district would also be taxed "in fair proportion with the other moiety."

The district would then use the money raised to engage substitutes equal to

the number of men required, or (in the event substitutes could not be ob-

tained) to pay the men drafted from the district. The men could either keep

the money as compensation, or use it to defray the cost of substitutes. Those

better off would thus help to subsidize the military burdens of the poor.

20. For prewar exemptions, see Chapter 1, Section 2, "An Act for Disciplining the Militia,"

February 14, 1809, Acts Passed, Seventh General Assembly. Changes to exemptions can be

found in Chapter 39, Section 29, "An Act for Disciplining the Militia," February 9, 1813, Acts

Passed, Eleventh General Assembly, and Chapter 54, Section 30, "An Act for Organizing and

Disciplining the Militia," February 14, 1815, Acts Passed, Thirteenth General Assembly.

21. Zanesville Express & Republican Standard, February 17, 1813.

22. Muskingum Messenger, November 9, 1814 (reprinted from the Washington Gazette);

Governor's Message to Legislature, December 21, 1814, in Ohio House Journal, Thirteenth

General Assembly, 104-05.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 153

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 153

Every man in the community would contribute, each more or less according

to his means.²³

This was too radical a scheme for the legislature, which did not adopt it.

Legislators recognized the problems that Worthington pointed out, but were

unwilling to adopt the sort of progressive taxation for which the governor

called. The measure that the legislature did adopt was one that affected far

fewer people. For "the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this

act with equality and justice to all descriptions of the militia," the revised

militia act prescribed that those individuals who had heretofore been exempted

from militia duty because of physical infirmity who owned a tract of land, a

house and lot in town, or were proprietors of a store, would be listed on the

local company muster rolls, and would have to pay equal shares, along with

all other militiamen, towards purchase of a substitute (this system is de-

scribed in more detail below).²⁴

This act would, to a certain extent, help to equalize the burdens of military

service by making certain members of the community who had not previ-

ously contributed to the public defense bear their fair share. It did not, how-

ever, act to remedy the problems with the militia system that Worthington

outlined. Community leaders were more willing to exhort people to con-

tribute to the war and to exercise charity towards neighbors in straitened cir-

cumstances than to advocate a new system of taxation. Be kind to the fami-

lies whose men are in service, advised one newspaper, because "it is a com-

mon cause, and the family of that man who by lot has been called into the

service, ought no more to suffer than those who have the means of living

well." But while many families did receive aid from others in their commu-

nity, hardships could never be altogether alleviated.²⁵

A Land Weary of War

As the war dragged on with no end in sight, spirits flagged considerably in

Ohio, and patriotic ardor lessened. As early as February 1813 the Zanesville

Express lamented the reluctance of Ohioans to turn out for defense: "The re-

port of a draft causes some to abscond, while others obstinately refuse to enter

the ranks of war, and set the laws at defiance-Where is the spirit of '76?

Where is the patriotism of 1812 ... ?" The patriotism had not disappeared

altogether, but the willingness to serve in the militia had slowly ebbed away.

Tiresome service in garrisons and frequent false alarms coupled with severe

lags in service pay led eventually to a virtual disintegration of Ohio's militia,

23. Ibid, 105-06.

24. Chapter 54, Section 49, "An Act for Organizing and Disciplining the Militia."

25. Muskingum Messenger, October 20, 1813.

154 OHIO HISTORY

and provided Ohio Federalists, who used discontent with the militia system to

oppose the war and Republicans, with political ammunition.²⁶

While no one doubted the importance of serving in the militia if threats to

Ohio were imminent, many disliked the most common forms of militia ser-

vice, which usually consisted of garrison duty or responding to real or sup-

posed British and Indian threats. "We have lately had afalse alarm which has

given considerable trouble," General Duncan McArthur confessed to Thomas

Worthington in 1813; "I have just returned from a ride of about 200 miles in

consequence of it. And in course of my travels called many off from their

harvest, who could illy spare the time." Those called off for false alarms-

like the militia noted earlier who served under Joseph Foos--seldom took

such occurrences lightly.²⁷

The most important false alarms for the Ohio militia were the Fort Meigs

incidents in 1813, the lasting consequences of which can be identified as the

26. Zanesville Express, February 17, 1813.

27. Duncan McArthur to Thomas Worthington, July 10, 1813, Reel 8, Frames 485-87,

Worthington Papers, OHS.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 155

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 155

turning point for people's willingness to serve in the military. Fort Meigs, a

strong fort constructed in early 1813, was situated on the Maumee Rapids in

northern Ohio, where its blockhouses and batteries protected supply lines and

the surrounding country. In the spring of that year, British general Henry

Procter and an army of over 2,000 regulars, militia, and Indians travelled

across Lake Erie to attack the fort, defended by only about 550 men under

William Henry Harrison. Procter resorted to siege warfare to take the fort,

beginning with an artillery bombardment on May 1, 1813. An attempt by

Kentucky militia a few days later to relieve the fort overran the British guns,

but a sharp counterattack by British and Indians resulted in almost 50 percent

casualties (mostly prisoners) for the 1,200 Kentuckians. But Procter, whose

militia were unhappy and whose Indians were leaving in large numbers, lifted

the siege on May 9 and returned to Canada. In July he returned, this time

with some 5,000 troops, and tried enticing the defenders of Meigs to leave

their fortifications, but with no success. Procter withdrew his forces a second

time, this time for good, as the American navy under Oliver Hazard Perry

soon achieved command of Lake Erie.²⁸

Fort Meigs became a problem for the Ohio militia because during the crisis

Governor Return J. Meigs had mobilized a force of several thousand Ohio

militia to come to the relief of the fort. Harrison, however, preferred instead

to rely on the Kentuckians to fight the British. Once the British left,

Harrison met Meigs and his militia at Lower Sandusky in mid-May. After

giving the troops an address praising their patriotism in assembling to relieve

the fort, Harrison dismissed most of them, keeping only a few Ohio militia.

Initially, Ohioans were simply proud of the "zeal and alacrity" that their citi-

zens had shown in turning out so many militia (estimates vary, but at least

2,000 actually marched) in so short a period of time. "Such zeal, such

promptitude, such patriotism was never surpassed in the annals of the world,"

gushed the Freeman's Chronicle in late May. "All ages and ranks of citizens

flocked by one noble impulse simultaneously to the standard of their country.

The aged veteran and the beardless stripling, the farmer, the merchant and the

mechanic mingled indiscriminately in the ranks.... We are confident that if

the fort had not relieved itself for 10 days longer, ten thousand men from

Ohio would have been on the march towards it." Another newspaper noted in

mid-May that the "honorable display of patriotism" was almost universal,

28. This account is largely drawn from Alec R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest

(East Lansing, Mich., 1958), 173- 93, 201-08; Mahon, The War of 1812, 159-64; and Reginald

Horsman, The War of 1812 (New York, 1969), 99-102. A contemporary author, Robert

Breckinridge McAfee, describes these incidents in more detail in History of the Late War in the

Western Country (Lexington, Ky., 1816), Chapters VI-VIII. The Canadian militia were un-

happy because they needed to return to Canada to plant corn in order to feed their families

during the winter.

156 OHIO HISTORY

and party distinctions done away with.²⁹

But the exultation at the initial relief of Fort Meigs soon turned sour,

largely because the events of the next few months, especially Procter's second

attempt to take the fort, caused what amounted to more false alarms for the

militia. They once more mobilized to defend against British invasion, but

never saw the enemy. As one officer observed in July, "The militia were col-

lecting again to relieve Fort Meigs . . . but the emergency must have been

great indeed to have roused the people at this busy season of the year.

Numbers however convened until the glad tidings were received that the Army

and the outposts were [safe]. You can hardly imagine, Sir, how joyful was

the news, to the laboring people of the state who are just beginning harvest.

To have been compelled to march at this period must have ruined many fami-

lies, and left the crops unattended." The Zanesville Express, which in May

had been so proud of how Ohioans of all political stripes had responded to the

siege of Fort Meigs, three months later was quite bitter that ". . the militia of

this state have once more been sent to chase the wild goose. They are or-

dered to return home, except 2,000 .... Such repeated calls upon the mili-

tia, and so much ado about nothing, is calculated to damage the ardor of their

patriotism, and to lessen their sensibility in behalf of their country. There

has been gross mismanagement somewhere." Similarly, the Freeman's

Chronicle was no longer speaking proudly of militia call-ups: ". .. our

Farmers and Mechanics are as patriotic and as willing to defend their rights as

any people under the sun-but they are irritated and disgusted at being

marched and countermarched as they have been during the last four or five

months, when no good has been effected by all their sacrifices." To some,

militia service seemed even less useful after the American victories at the

Thames River and on Lake Erie in the fall of 1813, which seemed to remove

any immediate threats to Ohio.³⁰

Militia alarms, real and false alike, caused Ohioans considerable economic

hardships, especially as active periods of campaigning usually coincided with

peak times of farming. Other militia-related hardships included militia fines

and problems in paying those who served; of the two, militia fines were less

of a problem, inasmuch as they applied only to those who refused to perform

their required duty. But the fines were resented, even though they allowed

those who paid to avoid serving. Eleven people were fined a total of $157.00

(a considerable sum) in December 1812 in Zanesville, and this was by no

means exceptional as fines for individuals who refused to serve tours of duty

could reach sixty dollars or more. The fines were made even more painful be

29. Freeman's Chronicle, May 28, 1813; Zanesville Express & Republican Standard, May

12, 1813.

30. Jesup N. Couch to Thomas Worthington, July 5, 1813, in Thomas Worthington and the

War of 1812, 212; Zanesville Express, August 18, 1813; Freeman's Chronicle, August 20, 1813.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 157

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 157

cause they often were not applied uniformly across the state. Depending upon

arbitrary enforcement by officers, militia companies might be fined heavily or

not at all. Because of the lack of uniformity, in fact, Governor Meigs directed

at least one militia general not to collect fines, an action which did little to

enforce discipline or to stop the arbitrary imposition of penalties. The case of

militiaman George Bright, an inhabitant of Lancaster, is instructive in this

regard. Bright was fined $120 in February 1814 for not performing a tour of

duty with the militia the previous winter. In his defense, he produced several

witnesses who testified that he had been sick almost all that winter.

However, when one of the members of his board of inquiry asked Bright

whether he would have served had he been healthy, Bright equivocated, saying

he did not know whether he would have, after which, in the words of the

clerk, "the court decided that he may as well be fined." Militiamen far more

158 OHIO HISTORY

158 OHIO HISTORY

circumspect and intelligent than Bright also found the imposition of militia

fines arbitrary.³¹

The most important cause of militia disintegration in Ohio, though, was

the fact that Ohio militia more frequently than not received pay for their ser-

vices only well after the fact, if at all. Ohio, with very little money of its

own, depended upon the United States to pay its militia for their services

when called up against Indians or the British. Consequently, compensation

for militia duty meant a tortuous process of delay and red tape leading all the

way to Washington, D.C., and back. Indifferent record-keeping and military

exigency often created additional problems. This knowledge that payment

would be slow in coming, if in fact it came, made the economic hardships

that militia service often entailed all the more threatening. How could the

head of a household take care of his family if he were to go on a six-month

tour of militia duty but not receive pay for an extended period of time?

The problem of nonpayment obviously created difficulties for officers try-

ing to raise troops. One officer tried to raise a company of militia in

Circleville in January 1813, but failed. The men would not volunteer, he told

Meigs, because they had not been remunerated for past services, "nor noticed

in any other way to distinguish them from the men who sit quietly at home,

heedless of their country's call, bettering their circumstances by the necessity

of the times." The problem worsened as the war progressed. A year later, the

same officer addressed Thomas Worthington: "The Militia draft will be very

oppressive at this time, and what makes it more discouraging to them, is that

government have been very remiss in paying those that have been out. There

is not a man in this Division, who will turn out at all, but what has been out

at one time or another; and you know that few of them have been paid. This

neglect on the part of the general government have begun to lose the patrio-

tism of the citizens of Ohio."³²

Worthington experienced the problem firsthand when he became commander

in chief of Ohio's militia in late 1814. Discussing the problems of raising a

regiment of militia with his adjutant general, Worthington noted that because

of the current state of militia organization, as well as the militia law, it

31. The example of militia fines is from the Zanesville Express & Republican Standard,

February 3, 1813. That it is not atypical can be seen by inspecting surviving regimental record

books. For instance, the record book for the Second Regiment, Fourth Brigade, Third Division

of Ohio Militia during the war contains mostly fines of small amounts for lack of equipment or

not appearing at muster, but several fines of $60 or more (often to be paid in monthly pay-

ments); see MSS 2396, Western Reserve Historical Society. The Third Regiment, First

Brigade, Second Division of Ohio Militia issued some very heavy fines; see the John Hayslip

Papers, MSS 2944, WRHS. For the Bright case, see "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in [the]

Case of George Bright," February 18, 1815, George Bright Papers, VFM 2733, OHS.

32. James Denny to Return J. Meigs, January 16, 1813, Reel 3, Frame 19, RJM Papers, OHS;

Denny to Thomas Worthington, February 12, 1814, Reel 9, Frame 44, Worthington Papers,

OHS.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 159

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 159

would be difficult to raise the desired number of men. "Other causes will con-

tribute to this effect," he observed, "and one principally I have much com-

plaint against because of the non-payment of those who have already per-

formed service." We must, he added, do the best we can.³³

By the beginning of 1815 the militia in Ohio had virtually collapsed. The

economic hardships, the fines, the lack of pay, the repeated call-ups-all with

no end in sight-caused support for the institution to drop to almost nothing.

The problems with the militia proved fertile ground for Federalist propaganda,

which many Ohioans felt fueled the problems in the first place.

Federalists, though few in number in Ohio, tried to use dissatisfaction with

the militia system to their advantage. One resident of Dayton, identifying

himself as "one of the people," warned his fellow residents in late 1813 that a

recent meeting of a board of militia officers that had produced a slate of candi-

dates for local office had been infiltrated by Federalists, who tried to have

"federal proceedings" pass as Republican ones. "Beware of snakes," the writer

declared, "something, is busy to make you believe it will have the militia law

altered, or modified, or repealed-that you will not have military duty to per-

form, or military fines to pay .... The scheme is to do away the militia sys-

tem, and make you believe that taxes on non-resident lands can . . . defray all

the expenses of the militia system." Whether or not the individuals in ques-

tion actually were Federalists, or had simply been labeled as such, is difficult

to say; what is important is that Federalists, or someone in sympathy with

them, were associated with opposing the militia system.³⁴

The most notorious Ohio Federalist was Charles Hammond, editor of the

Ohio Federalist, published in St. Clairsville in the eastern portion of the

state. Hammond frequently used invective and sarcasm in the pages of his

paper to oppose the war and the Republican leadership running it. He also of-

ten protested the "harassing calls on the militia." According to Isaac Van

Horn, the adjutant general, the efforts of Hammond's paper and other

Federalists "nigh put down the drafting of militia" in the region around

Zanesville and St. Clairsville in the late summer of 1814. "There are in-

stances of whole companies refusing to join," he stated, and though fines had

been assessed, none had yet been collected.³⁵

Such circumstances were by no means unusual in 1814. The Freeman's

Chronicle reported in March of that year that a recent draft of 1,400 militia

had not yet been half-filled. "A most culpable remissness exists some-

where," the editor stated, but could not pinpoint the source. Militia generals

33. Thomas Worthington to Isaac Van Horn, December 19, 1814, LEO Reel 1, Frames 07-

08.

34. Ohio Centinel, October 4, 1813.

35. The Ohio Federalist, January 5, 1815; Isaac Van Horn to Othniel Looker, August 16,

1814, Reel 1, Frames 162-163, OL Papers, OHS.

160 OHIO HISTORY

frequently had to inform their superiors that draft requirements could not be

met, and those who did turn out increasingly were substitutes. "Every exer-

tion is used," confessed one officer, "but the men refuse to march."³⁶

Van Horn was quick to attribute blame for the laxness in the militia to do-

mestic opposition. He had no doubt that it would take a great deal of effort to

make Ohio's militia effective, "seeing that a host of internal enemies to the

administration of the general government are exerting themselves to parralise

and render the militia as contemptable, and inefficient as possible." By late

1814, even his hometown Zanesville Express, a paper that took pains to

stress that though it was a federal newspaper it was not extreme, labeled the

state's inability to raise militia a heinous dereliction of duty. "Proh pudor!

[For shame!]" the newspaper exclaimed scornfully, "that Ohio the most war

loving state in the Union, except Kentucky, should be so wanting in patrio-

tism!"³⁷

By the tail end of 1814, the militia system was in complete disarray. The

state government had no idea how many weapons or men were in the frontier

areas, and across the state, especially in its eastern portion, men refused to

serve. Indeed, many militia units consisted almost entirely of substitutes

raised from fines collected from those not serving. Discharge certificates,

proving that one had performed a tour of duty, had become a medium of ex-

change, as militiamen sold them to citizens who wanted to avoid duty. The

state was unable to comply with federal requisitions of militia.³⁸

Worthington proposed revisions to the militia law, many explained above,

but to his irritation the legislature took no action on most of them,

"nonwithstanding we are threatened with destruction by both internal and ex-

ternal opposers and enemies." At the same time, frustration with the militia

system caused Worthington and the state legislature to consider alternative

means of furnishing a military force by doing away with compulsory militia

service entirely and creating in its place a state army of some 3,000 officers

and men for a period of two to three years. Ohio would offer this body of

men to the United States in lieu of militia drafts. Several other states had

considered creating state armies, most notably Massachusetts, which passed a

bill establishing one (never actually raised) largely in order to have a military

force free from federal control. Worthington, on the other hand, had no

36. Freeman's Chronicle, March 11, 1814; Brigadier General J. Patterson to Elijah

Wadsworth, September 30, 1814, Elisha Whittlesey Papers, Container 71, Folder 4, WRHS;

Brigadier General John Campbell to Wadsworth, December 12, 1814, Ibid.

37. Isaac Van Horn to Othniel Looker, May 11, 1814, Reel 1, Frames 62-64, OL Papers,

OHS; Zanesville Express, November 16, 1814. For another example of Van Horn's opinion of

the effect of political opposition, see Van Horn to Looker, April 9, 1814, Reel 1, Frames 15-16,

OL Papers, OHS.

38. On discharge certificates, see Duncan McArthur to Return J. Meigs, June 28, 1813, Reel

1, Frames 38-39, Duncan McArthur Papers, Microfilm Edition, Ohio Historical Society.

McArthur claimed that such exchanges occurred daily.

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 161

Burthened in Defense of our Rights 161

qualms about letting the general government use his state army; he simply

wanted to establish an alternative to militia drafts.³⁹

The legislature refused to create the corps of troops, causing another frustra-

tion for Worthington, who admitted he had been "very desirous" of it. What

the state government did do, however, was quite important: it fundamentally

transformed the nature of the militia system, eliminating the idea of equal

service. It openly admitted what had for some time become obvious, that the

militia system had devolved into a system of purchasing substitutes. Under

the revisions to the militia law passed by the Thirteenth General Assembly,

militia captains called upon for men would divide their militia company into

a number of classes, or groups, each of which would provide a single man. A

class could draft one of its members, or, the more likely possibility, its

members could together purchase a substitute. In essence, the legislature

provided Worthington with his state army by another route. By doing away

with the principle that every man should be required to perform military ser-

39. Worthington to Van Horn, February 4, 1815, LEO, Reel 1, Frame 23; Worthington to

James Monroe, January 17, 1815, Ibid, Frames 17-19.

162 OHIO HISTORY

vice the new laws changed the militia system into a recruiting service. The

ideal of the "citizen-soldiers" who would step forward to serve their country

was dropped in the face of the realities of war.⁴⁰

Conclusion

News that peace had finally been reached between the United States and

Great Britain reached Ohio only a little more than a week after the legislature

had passed the law altering the nature of the militia system. As a result,

though concern for the frontier existed for some time, most of the pressure on

the militia system evaporated. Later revisions of the militia law established a

rather more traditional system.

Ohio's experiences with the militia during the war, though, provide valu-

able insight into the relationship between the military and society. In Ohio,

only after several years of war did political opposition to it have an effect on

people's attitudes and actions. Rather, it might be argued that it was the war

itself, with its perceived hardships and the nation's lack of success at waging

it, that provided its own opposition. Many served willingly, while other

communities and individuals by their protests gave notice that they were will-

ing to serve as long as their service was matched by that of their fellow citi-

zens. The state ultimately failed to convince its citizens that the hardships

they endured were equitable. Under the resulting pressure, the militia system

metamorphosed into something quite different from the republican bulwark of

liberty it had originally symbolized, because the people rejected their

"people's army."

40. Worthington to Monroe, February 20, 1815, Reel 1, Frames 32-33, LEO, OHS; Chapter

54, Sections 44-45, "An Act for Organizing and Disciplining the Militia," Acts Passed,

Thirteenth General Assembly.

Ohio History Journal