Ohio History Journal

NOEL FISHER

 

Groping Toward Victory: Ohio's

Administration of the Civil War

 

 

 

The American Civil War posed a vast challenge to the limited administra-

tive capacities of the national and state governments, both North and South.

As the chaos of 1861 painfully revealed, recruiting large numbers of men,

supplying them with weapons, uniforms, and equipment, and transporting

them to the field were tasks initially beyond the ability of any American gov-

ernment to perform efficiently. To sustain a long war, therefore, both the

North and the South had to increase the size and efficiency of their military

administrations. Both sides, though the Union more than the Confederacy,

would adapt fairly quickly to the demands of the war, and within a year they

would manage to build and maintain armies far larger than any in previous

American experience. Yet even by 1865 there were areas in which administra-

tion was still defective.l

The experience of Ohio illustrates well both the process and the difficulties

of developing administrative systems for the war. Ohio began the conflict

with a militia system still in the early stages of reform, a military staff made

up largely of political appointees, and a nearly empty armory. Its initial mo-

bilization was typically chaotic, and errors in the first months of the war

plagued not only Governor William Dennison but also his successor,

Governor David Tod. Haphazard federal policies, shortages of resources, dis-

agreements with the War Department, and mere inexperience all created nu-

merous difficulties, as did a resentment of increases in executive power. But

Ohio's three war governors, Dennison, Tod, and John Brough, all proved to

be dedicated and innovative administrators, and by 1863 most areas of Ohio's

mobilization were functioning smoothly. Part of the state's success, though,

resulted from simply abandoning numerous responsibilities to the federal

government and focusing on a narrow range of activities, particularly recruit-

ing.

 

 

Noel Fisher received his Ph.D. from The Ohio State University in 1993.

1. Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men (Madison, 1971); Richard D. Goff, Confederate

Supply (Durham, 1969); Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A

Biography of M. C. Meigs (New York, 1959); Fred Albert Shannon, The Organization and

Administration of the Union Army (Cleveland, 1928); Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and

Conflict in the Confederacy (New York, 1924).

• 1
 

26                                                        OHIO HISTORY

 

The story of Ohio's wartime mobilization has been told several times and

from several different perspectives, and it is not the purpose of this article

simply to relate that story again.² Its focus, rather, is on the development of

administrative systems in the state: the structure and functions of the staff,

the role of the militia, the methods developed by Ohio for recruiting and sup-

plying its soldiers, and the effectiveness with which Ohio carried out these

tasks.

 

The Military Staff

 

Ohio's military staff structure underwent a number of changes in the first

two years of the war. Several positions were added, the responsibilities of

some offices expanded dramatically while others were practically eliminated,

and a number of administrators who proved inept were replaced. Despite nu-

merous changes, however, the number of men who actually directed Ohio's

mobilization was strikingly small, and increases in the size of the military

staff did not nearly match the increase in responsibilities that came with the

war.

The militia laws of 1857 established a staff of seven officers: an Adjutant

General, who would also act as Inspector General; a Quartermaster General; a

Paymaster General; an Engineer in Chief; a Judge Advocate General; and two

Aides-de-Camp. The governor was also granted authority to organize a com-

missary department and a medical department, headed by a Commissary

General and a Surgeon General, respectively, but these departments did not ex-

ist in April 1861. In the prewar period staff positions were essentially politi-

cal appointments, with limited pay, status, and responsibilities, and were fre-

quently filled by men of limited abilities. This situation improved only

slightly in early 1861, when the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General

were given office space in the statehouse and an increased budget.³

Due to these and other weaknesses, Ohio's staff was unable to manage ef-

fectively the initial mobilization. Adjutant General Henry B. Carrington ac-

cepted far too many companies in the first two weeks and was subsequently

forced to dismiss many of them. This action created considerable resentment,

 

 

2. Richard H. Abbott, Ohio's Civil War Governors (Columbus, 1962); Eugene H. Roseboom,

The Civil War Period, 1850-1873, in The History of Ohio, ed. by Carl Wittke, vol. 4 (Columbus,

1944); Emelius O. Randall and Daniel J. Ryan, History of Ohio: The Rise and Progress of an

American State, vol. 4 (New York, 1912); Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen,

Her Generals, and Soldiers, 2 vols. (New York, 1868).

3. Militia Law of Ohio, Being an Act to Organize and Discipline the Militia and Volunteer

Militia, Passed March 28, 1857 (Columbus, 1857); Ohio, Annual Report of the Adjutant

General, 1861 (Columbus, 1862), 420-21; General Regulations for the Military Force of Ohio,

with Laws Pertaining Thereto, Compiled and Prepared by Henry B. Carrington (Columbus,

1861), 7, 76-79, 157, 192-93.

• 2
 

Groping Toward Victory                                                    27

 

reduced the initial enthusiasm for the war, and lost the state a number of re-

cruits. Carrington also mislaid muster rolls and confused the order in which

companies had been accepted, leading to numerous disputes among units con-

cerning their designation. Mistakes in supply were equally numerous and

costly. Tents and camp equipment were shipped to the wrong locations,

many of the items contracted for in April and May were defective, and Ohio's

first two regiments were sent to Washington, D.C., without arms. To com-

pensate for the limitation of his staff, Dennison attempted to shoulder much

of the administrative burden himself. He not only rallied the state and called

in volunteers, he also personally negotiated contracts for uniforms and arms,

arranged transportation for soldiers and supplies, and provided funds for these

activities. But the governor, though possessed of seemingly unlimited en-

ergy, lacked experience in military affairs, and many of his actions were faulty

as well.⁴

Once the pressure of the initial mobilization had eased, therefore, Dennison

took a number of steps to strengthen his staff. First, he replaced two key of-

ficers. In July Carrington resigned to accept a colonel's commission in the

regular army and was succeeded by Colonel C.P. Buckingham, a dedicated and

efficient administrator. Buckingham unsnarled the bureaucratic tangle that

Carrington had left, located or reconstituted missing records, increased the

clerical staff, and instituted new procedures to speed the formation of compa-

nies and regiments. Buckingham was called to the War Department in July,

and he was succeeded first by Brigadier General Charles H. Hill, then by

Brigadier General Benjamin R. Cowen, both of whom were equally efficient.

The Quartermaster's Department also changed hands. In October 1861

Quartermaster General D.L. Wood resigned to raise a regiment and was suc-

ceeded by Colonel George B. Wright, who remained in this office until the

end of the war. Wright was zealous and hard working, and he made strenuous

attempts to acquire the best arms and equipment possible for the state's

troops.⁵

 

 

4. Governor William Dennison to Hon. Stanley Matthews, 18 April 1861, Dennison to

General L. A. Sheldon, 19 April 1861, Governor's Correspondence, 1862-1864, Series 142,

vol. 3, Adjutant General, Civil War, Administration, Ohio Historical Society, hereinafter cited

as Series 142, OHS; Ohio, Annual Report of the Adjutant General, 1862 (Columbus, 1863), 289-

90; Matthew Oyos, "The Mobilization of the Ohio Militia in the Civil War," Ohio History, 98

(Summer-Autumn, 1989), 147-74; Harry L. Coles, Ohio Forms an Army (Columbus, 1962);

Roseboom, Civil War, 380-81; Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 159-66; Joshua G. Bates,

Ohio's Preparation for the War (Cincinnati, 1884); Reid, Ohio in the War, 25-29, 54-55;

Captain Guthrie to Quartermaster General D. L. Wood, 14 June 1861, Telegraphic Dispatches

to the Quartermaster General, Series 134, vol 1, Office of the Adjutant General,

Quartermaster General, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, hereinafter cited as Series

134, OHS.

5. Annual Report, 1861, 151, 168; Annual Report, 1862, 291; "Annual Report of the Adjutant

General," in Messages and Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio

for the Year 1863 (Columbus, 1864), frontpiece; "Annual Report of the Adjutant General," in

• 3
 

28                                                        OHIO HISTORY

 

In addition to securing more capable administrators, Dennison also ex-

panded his staff. In April the state legislature granted the governor authority

to appoint several assistant quartermaster generals and aides-de-camp and a

medical board to examine and certify regimental surgeons. Dennison also es-

tablished a Commissary Department, headed by George W. Runyan, and ap-

pointed an assistant adjutant general to ease the load on Carrington. Both the

Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General in turn hired a large force of

clerks to process the mountains of paperwork in each office. By 1863, for

example, the office of Quartermaster General included an Assistant

Quartermaster General, a Chief Clerk of Ordinance, an Assistant Clerk of

Ordinance, a Bookkeeper/Auditor, an Assistant Bookkeeper/Auditor, a

Transportation Clerk, a Ticket Clerk, a Superintendent of the State Arsenal,

and a Superintendent of the State Laboratory. All these additions gave the

governor a staff of reasonable size, and one capable of performing effectively

the tasks of mobilization.⁶

But this pleasant situation was short-lived. The Ohio legislature was reluc-

tant to fund an establishment of this size, and the belief in the spring of 1862

that the war was nearly won increased this reluctance. In April 1862 the leg-

islature eliminated the office of Assistant Adjutant General, and the next

month it allowed the commissions for Commissary General and Judge

Advocate General to expire. As explained below, the loss of the Commissary

General and Judge Advocate General was not critical, but the elimination of

the Assistant Adjutant General was a serious blow. In addition to its prewar

duties of writing regulations for the state forces, issuing yearly reports, and

heading the state militia, the Adjutant General's office was expected to exam-

ine muster rolls, oversee the formation of regiments, help devise recruiting

policies, maintain the flow of reports to Washington, D.C., advise the gover-

nor, manage the reorganization of the state militia, and compile lists of offi-

cers and men from Ohio serving in the war. Much of this work the Adjutant

General was required to supervise personally, and having an assistant had con-

siderably eased this load. The position of Assistant Adjutant General was not

restored for over a year, and to compensate the Adjutant General was forced to

 

 

 

Messages and Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year

1864 (Columbus, 1865), frontpiece; Governor William Dennison to Quartermaster General D.

L. Wood, 14 October 1861, Governor Dennison's Military Correspondence, Series 1606, vol.

1, Office of the Adjutant General, Civil War, Administration, Ohio Historical Society,

Columbus, Ohio, hereinafter cited as Series 1606, OHS.

6. Annual Report, 1861, 151, 178; General Regulations, 79, 157, 192-93, 226-29, 249;

Annual Report, 1862, 288-89; "Report of the Quartermaster General," in Messages and

Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1863

(Columbus, 1864), 534, 592; "Annual Report of the Adjutant General," in Messages and

Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1865

(Columbus, 1866), 5-6.

• 4
 

Groping Toward Victory                                           29

 

increase his clerical staff well in excess of his budget.⁷

While some offices expanded dramatically, others almost disappeared, either

because their duties were transferred to federal officers or because they were

found to be of little use. In late 1861, for example, the War Department

agreed to take responsibility for arming, equipping, and feeding all recruits as

soon as they arrived in camp, and the state Quartermaster General and

Commissary General were left to care for only the state troops. Thus in early

1862 these offices were combined into one. Experience also demonstrated

that the Engineer in Chief, Judge Advocate General, and Aide de Camp had

few duties to perform for the war, and these offices were likewise merged into

a single position.⁸

 

 

Recruiting

 

Recruiting was by far the most important and demanding task that the state

governments performed in the war. Raising men and organizing them into

units was a complex, laborious task that became increasingly difficult as pub-

lic enthusiasm for the war declined. Recruiting was also an inherently politi-

cal process, and the fairness, efficiency, and diplomacy with which it was car-

ried out would not only influence support for the war but also affect the polit-

ical fortunes of the governor and his appointees.

Systems for recruiting in Ohio evolved almost constantly throughout the

war. The increasing difficulty of securing men spurred numerous innova-

tions, but the desire of the governor to secure maximum control over the pro-

cess, and the quest for more efficient methods, also contributed to change.

Ohio's mechanisms were generally quite effective, and the state's governors

devised a number of innovations that the War Department subsequently

adopted. But as was common, Ohio's success came at a high price in

bonuses, inequities, and corruption.

The state militia was supposed to provide a ready means for mobilization in

the event of war. But the militia in Ohio, as in other states, had declined pre-

cipitously in the antebellum period. Musters had been held less and less fre-

quently, militia laws ignored, and arms supplied by the federal government

neglected and lost. Thus, when Salmon P. Chase assumed the governorship

in 1856, he made militia reform a priority. The result was a new set of mili-

tia laws, passed in 1857, and increased public attention to the topic of state

defense. The 1857 laws required the enrollment of all white males ages eigh-

teen to forty-five, their attendance at three musters per year, and an annual

 

 

7. General Regulations, 76-78; Annual Report, 1861, 151; Annual Report, 1862, 288-90;

"Annual Report," 1863, 359.

8. "Annual Report," 1863, 527.

• 5
 

30                                                       OHIO HISTORY

 

brigade encampment of two to six days. They also authorized the formation

of volunteer companies, who were required to serve for five years and who

would be the first units called in an emergency. Finally, the new legislation

created a military staff and an elaborate structure of brigades, regiments, and

divisions.⁹

These laws were typical of those found in other states, but they were im-

possible to implement. The organization of regiments, brigades, and divi-

sions was a paper structure that served mostly to create a large number of

high-ranking offices. Furthermore, the state legislature refused to appropriate

sufficient funds to supply and train even a small portion of the available

manpower. Thus, in subsequent years Adjutant General Carrington advocated

a number of changes in the laws, particularly a shift from universal service to

the recruitment of a limited number of well-trained companies, who would be

paid for their service. This suggestion was ignored, but in 1861 the state leg-

islature reduced the number of divisions and created a more realistic structure.

For the most part, however, the reform years were frustrating. The legislature

was tightfisted, the public showed little interest in reform, and Carrington

was forced to spend much of his time tracking down arms previously received

from the federal government.l⁰

Ohio thus entered the war with a small and still developing militia. In

1860 Carrington could report only twelve hundred enrolled infantry, two ar-

tillery batteries, and a handful of cavalry. Ohio's first two regiments had to

be patched together from volunteer companies, while the next eleven were

completed through an equally haphazard process. The governor simply issued

recruiting commissions to applicants who seemed capable of raising compa-

nies or regiments, and these men in turn located recruits. The system, such

as it was, relied on individual influence and initiative and the public's

widespread enthusiasm for the war. Recruiters were required by law to report

regularly to the adjutant general on their activities or lose their commissions,

but enforcement of this regulation was lax.11

After the initial mobilization, therefore, Dennison and Adjutant General

Buckingham initiated a number of changes to make recruiting more efficient.

Their first step was to improve the process by which troops were organized

and mustered into federal service. Under existing regulations, companies had

 

 

 

9. Militia Law; Reid, Ohio in the War, 18-19.

10. Ohio, Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the

Year 1859 (Columbus, 1860), 1-9; Ohio, Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor

of the State of Ohio for the Year 1860 (Columbus, 1861), 5-8, 10-12, 17; General Regulations,

401-02, 425-26; Annual Report, 1861, 169-77.

11. Annual Report, 1861; Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, Directions for Enlisting and

Organizing Volunteer Forces in Ohio (Columbus, 1861); Oyos, "Mobilization;" Coles, Ohio

Forms an Army; Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 159-66; Bates, Preparation for the War;

Reid, Ohio, 25-29.

• 6
 

Groping Toward Victory                                        31

to be recruited to full strength before the men could be enrolled. Regiments, likewise, had to be completed before regimental officers could be appointed and begin drawing supplies. Early recruits, thus, had to endure an indefinite period of uncertainty, lasting from a few days to a few weeks, until their units were fully organized. During this time they could receive no supplies, equipment, or subsistence from federal stores, and they were under the author- ity of no officers. This situation created considerable hardship and discontent, and a number of troops responded either by deserting or by transferring to other units, in Ohio or other states. Others who remained created discipline problems or complained to relatives, politicians, or the press. Thus, in August 1861, under pressure from Ohio and other states, the War Department established new mustering procedures for both companies and reg- iments. These new regulations allowed recruits to be mustered in as half companies and authorized the appointment of a regimental quartermaster, sur- geon, and assistant surgeon at the beginning of a regiment's organization. Shortly thereafter the War Department modified these orders further and autho- rized the mustering of a lieutenant at the beginning of a company's organiza- tion. Company and regimental officers could then requisition and distribute

• 7
 

32                                                          OHIO HISTORY

 

supplies to recruits as the men arrived. These changes not only accelerated

mustering, they also ensured that a recruit would be provided for as soon as he

arrived in camp. This system was retained until March 1864.12

Dennison's second important step was to secure complete control over the

recruiting process. This move involved the governor in conflicts with both

the War Department and influential figures in Ohio, but Dennison's insis-

tence on control, though politically motivated, was necessary to the estab-

lishment of a rational system for recruiting. The issue of control emerged in

the summer of 1861, when Secretary of War Simon Cameron issued recruit-

ing commissions for two cavalry regiments and a battery of artillery. Shortly

thereafter, Cameron authorized Major General John C. Fremont to raise two

cavalry regiments in Ohio for service in Missouri, while two other men re-

ceived commissions for two additional regiments of cavalry. Cameron failed

to inform Dennison of most of these actions, and the governor had to discover

them on his own. Dennison, angry that his own authority had been com-

promised, complained that Cameron's appointees were hampering recruiting

for infantry regiments, and in August he demanded that the War Department

give him undiluted control over recruiting in his own state. Cameron agreed

and promised to issue no more commissions. Shortly thereafter the War

Department formally established Dennison's control over recruiting. In

September the federal adjutant general, Lorenzo Thomas, ordered all persons

in Ohio raising troops to report immediately to Dennison and gave the gover-

nor supervision over their work. Then in December Thomas issued orders

that further clarified the governor's authority: "During the organization of new

regiments in the state of Ohio, and until the muster rolls are completed, the

Governor of the state will have exclusive control there, and he is authorized to

transfer companies, detachments-whether mustered into the service or not-

from one regiment to another, as he may find necessary to complete their or-

ganization."¹³

 

 

 

12. Annual Report, 1861, 165-69; Colonel C.P. Buckingham to A. E. Merritt, 14 August 1861,

Military Correspondence of the Adjutant General, 1861-1876, Series 146, vol. 3, Adjutant

General, Administration, Ohio Historical Society, hereinafter cited as Series 146, OHS;

Governor William Dennison to Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron, 15 August 1861, Cameron

to Dennison, 15 August 1861, The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and

Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C., 1880-1900), hereinafter cited as O.R., Series III, vol.

1,416; Buckingham to Major W. J. Cramm, 29 August 1861, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 7, OHS;

Department of the Adjutant General, General Orders No. 75, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 8,

OHS; Assistant Adjutant General Thomas A. Vincent to Colonel James A. Wilcox, 31 March

1864, Correspondence of the Adjutant General, Governor, Armory Board, and other

Correspondence Relating to the Civil War, 1842-47, 1850-56, 1861-1918, Series 1629, Box 3,

folder 13, Ohio Historical Society, hereinafter cited as Series 1629, OHS.

13. Governor William Dennison to Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron, 1 August 1861, 23

August 1861, O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 377, 447; Dennison to Cameron, 16 August 1861, Series

1606, vol. 1, OHS; Annual Report, 1861, 162-63, 167; Department of Adjutant General, Special

Orders No. 243, 10 September 1861, Special Orders No. 319, 3 December 1861, Series 1629,

• 8
 

Groping Toward Victory                                              33

 

Dennison's final reform, and perhaps his most important, was the creation

in the fall of 1861 of a network of county military committees. By this

point the governor had recognized that the labor of mobilization was far

greater than he and his staff could accomplish on their own. The committees

thus were established to provide a reliable means of conducting the work of

mobilization at the local level and to link local communities to the state gov-

ernment. The county committees consisted of from four to ten men, and

eventually they were called on to perform a multitude of tasks.   They

screened and recommended candidates for commissions, organized recruiting

rallies, helped administer the draft, pressured deserters to return to the ranks,

raised and distributed funds for soldiers' families, and helped reorganize the

state militia. They also granted local figures input into decisions, provided

the governor with information, and mediated federal and state authority.14

Governor David Tod, who succeeded Dennison in January 1862, continued

his predecessor's quest to improve Ohio's methods of recruiting. Tod's most

important innovation was the shift to recruiting by districts, a change that

was prompted by a dangerous lag in volunteering. In May 1862 Tod had is-

sued commissions for three new infantry regiments, but after six weeks of ef-

fort none was near completion. Thus, when President Abraham Lincoln

called for 300,000 men in July 1862 and Ohio faced the daunting task of rais-

ing 37,000 recruits, Tod and Adjutant General Charles H. Hill realized the ne-

cessity for creating a new system. Their solution was to divide the state into

eleven recruiting districts, ranging in size from three to nine counties, and,

with the aid of the military committees, to assign each district a portion of

Ohio's quota. Some districts were in turn divided into subdistricts with their

own quotas. Tod reasoned, correctly, that this system would improve recruit-

ing in at least three ways. First, it would give regiments a local identity,

strengthen ties between soldiers and communities, and generate increased sup-

port for the war. Second, the new system would spur recruiting by placing

the responsibility for meeting the state's quota on individual communities.

Any district that failed to meet its assignment would be marked as deficient

and face embarrassment accordingly. Finally, recruiting by districts was a

major step toward the creation of an organized system for raising men. It

abandoned the haphazard reliance on individual initiative and placed the re-

sponsibility on townships and counties; it also attempted to balance the mili-

tary demands on all areas of the state.¹⁵

 

 

Box 3, folder 7, OHS; John A. Gurley to President Abraham Lincoln, 16 September 1861, O.R.,

Series III, vol. 1, 519-20.

14. Annual Report, 1862, 300-01; "Annual Report," 1863, 449-53; "Annual Report," 1864,

13-14, 257-61, 273-74; Abbott, Civil War Governors, 16; Reid, Ohio in the War, 70-71, 217-19.

15. Governor David Tod to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 20 August 1862, O.R.,

Series III, vol. 1, 421; Tod to Provost Marshal James B. Fry, 28 October 1863, O.R., Series III,

vol. 3, 943; Annual Report, 1862, 298-301, 303-08; "Annual Report," 1864, 273-74.

• 9
 

34                                        OHIO HISTORY

Tod also attempted to tap new sources of manpower, but here his success was more mixed. Tod's first target was the state's immigrant population. In July 1862 he issued recruiting commissions for three German and one Irish regiments and granted the recruiters considerable aid and latitude. The results, though, were somewhat disappointing. One German regiment was com- pleted, but recruiting for the other two lagged, and by some error they were sent to Kentucky before they could be filled. The Irish regiment fared even worse. After two months of work its original recruiters had failed to com- plete even a single company and had somehow lost all the enlistment papers. Another officer then took up the work, but he managed to recruit only one company and fragments of others. In December these were inserted into an- other regiment then forming, and no more such units were authorized. Other states had successfully organized ethnic units, but Ohio may have waited too long to make the experiment.16 Ohio was only somewhat more successful in recruiting African-American troops. Both Dennison and Tod rejected numerous offers of service from     16. Annual Report, 1862, 302-03.

• 10
 

Groping Toward Victory                                                35

 

African-Americans in the first two years of the war, and Tod had not objected

when recruiters from the 54th Massachusetts, the famous black regiment orig-

inated by Governor John Andrew, officered by the Massachusetts elite, and

filled out with prominent free blacks, operated in Ohio. But by the summer

of 1863 official attitudes had changed. Manpower quotas were bearing heavily

on the state, the draft was looming, and the administration was determined to

obtain every recruit possible. Thus, when in May 1863 the War Department

authorized Ohio to raise one regiment of African-American troops, Tod

pushed this project with great energy. He quickly issued recruiting commis-

sions, established a special camp of rendezvous near Delaware, created a vol-

unteer fund for the support of families of recruits, and issued a proclamation

asking for assistance and support from the population. By November eight

companies had been completed, but the War Department then stopped recruit-

ing and ordered them sent to the Fifth United States Colored Troops near

Nashville. State authorities were thus denied the opportunity to field a full

regiment with an Ohio designation. In January 1864 Ohio received a second

chance, when Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton authorized a second unit.

Recruiting for this regiment, subsequently designated the 27th United States

Colored Troops, preceded more rapidly, and it was completed within a few

months. Nonetheless, Tod's hopes of relieving the burden on the white pop-

ulation by recruiting blacks were disappointed. Ohio received credit for

slightly over five thousand African-American recruits, but due to the state's

early resistance to their service, lack of incentives for recruits, and lack of

support for their families, hundreds more served in federal units or those of

other states.¹⁷

Least successful of all were Ohio's efforts to recruit in the South. In July

1864 the War Department authorized Northern governors to employ a limited

number of recruiting agents in occupied territory. Governor Brough saw this

as yet another means of filling the state's quotas, and soon Ohio had numer-

ous agents scouring Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and other states for

men. But these manpower brokers, who had expected quick results and easy

profits, soon became discouraged. They faced stiff competition from the

agents of other states, while Union officers, particularly Major General

William T. Sherman, were hostile and uncooperative. And the existence of

 

 

17. Office of the Adjutant General, General Orders No. 143, 22 May 1863, Governor David

Tod to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 27 May 1863, Stanton to Tod, 27 May 1863,

Assistant Adjutant General C. W. Foster to Tod, 18 June 1863, Tod, "To the People of Ohio,"

22 June 1863, Tod to Stanton, 26 June 1863, Stanton to Tod, 27 June 1863, O.R., Series III, vol.

3, 215-16, 229, 380-81, 402, 419; Foster to Tod, 11 January 1864, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 10,

OHS; Provost Marshal General James B. Fry to Governor John Brough, 20 July 1864, Series

142, Vol. 3, OHS; Foster to Brough, 20 September 1864, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 12, OHS;

"Annual Report," 1863, 299-300; Charles H. Wesley, Ohio Negroes in the Civil War

(Columbus, 1962); Reid, Ohio in the War, 176-77.

• 11
 

36                                            OHIO HISTORY

only a single camp of rendezvous, at Bridgeport, Alabama, made the expenses of transporting and feeding recruits unusually high. Within a few weeks most of Ohio's agents had returned, bringing back only a handful of men.18 Recruiting by districts created a more structured, ordered system of raising men and created an incentive for communities to fill their quotas. The strongest motivation for individual recruits, however, was provided by boun- ties. Some communities began offering bounties in the first months of the war, and after 1862 the practice became almost universal. The amount paid to recruits varied considerably, but by 1864 the average bounty was around four hundred dollars, and some areas offered as high as eight hundred dollars. In all, Ohio paid twenty-three million dollars in local bounties during the war. These were in addition to the bounties offered by the federal government. 19     18. Governor John Brough to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 14 July 1864, 18 July 1864, Provost Marshal General James B. Fry to Brough, 18 July 1864, Stanton to Brough, 4 August 1864, O.R., Series III, vol. 4, 494, 514-515, 575-76; Hugh Carey to Brigadier General Benjamin R. Cowen, 2 August 1864, 16 August 1864, Series 1629, Box 1, folder 7, OHS; "Annual Report," 1864, 271-72. 19. Eugene C. Murdock, Ohio's Bounty System in the Civil War (Columbus, 1963); Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 184.

• 12
 

Groping Toward Victory                                           37

 

Under the recruiting system created by the federal and state governments,

bounties were an inevitable development. But they did not constitute in any

way an organized system, nor were they under the control of the state gov-

ernment. Bounties were raised by local communities, and to a great extent

the system was operated by private brokers who brought in recruits and then

took part, or all, of the bounty as their fee. Governor Brough began to inves-

tigate the bounty system in 1864, and soon he became one of its fiercest crit-

ics. In February 1865 Brough sent Stanton a long indictment that charged

that bounties were creating a vast system of inequity and corruption. Urban

districts, which could pay higher bounties, drew off manpower from poorer

rural areas. Many recruits lost their bounties to brokers, while others secured

their payments and then deserted. Finally, Brough charged that the bounty

system had corrupted at least half the deputy provost marshals in Ohio.

According to his investigation, numbers of these officials were in league with

bounty brokers and were paid large sums for their cooperation. Brough thus

recommended that the entire system be reformed, but his charges came too

late to have much effect.²⁰

Until 1864 Ohio's organized militia system played a relatively minor role

in the recruiting process. The initial mobilization took most of the available

companies, and the subsequent demands of the war left the Adjutant General's

office little time to rebuild the force. It was not until 1863 that the state leg-

islature passed "An Act to Organize and Discipline the Militia," a set of laws

that provided for the formation of new militia companies on the same plan as

the 1861 laws. Major General John Hunt Morgan's raid across the Ohio

River and the state's panicked response disrupted the reorganization process,

but militia encampments were held in August and September, and by

December over 167,000 men had enrolled. But the resulting force was as un-

wieldy as the prewar militia, and in March 1864 the Ohio legislature made a

second, more fundamental attempt at reorganization. The new laws abandoned

the ideal of universal service, dissolved the enrolled militia, and retained only

the volunteer militia. The resulting force, now known as the Ohio National

Guard, was more centralized than the old and more under the authority of the

governor and the Adjutant General. Men wishing to form companies had to

apply to the county military committees for recommendation; they were then

given recruiting commissions by the governor. Companies would have to

give bond before they could receive arms, and the governor was granted au-

thority to disband units that failed to pass inspection or who refused to report

for service when ordered out.²¹

 

 

20. Governor John Brough to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 6 February 1865, O.R.,

Series III, vol. 4, 1149-51; "Annual Report," 1864, 6-8.

21. Governor William Dennison to Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron, 19 August 1861,

O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 430; "Annual Report," 1863, 362-428; "Annual Report," 1864, 8-14,

• 13
 

38                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

The 1864 laws marked the beginning of the modern National Guard in

Ohio. Of more immediate importance, the new militia created an opportunity

for Brough to make a dramatic contribution to the war. In April 1864 the

governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin drafted a plan to

raise 100,000 three-months troops. The primary purpose of this force was to

free up more men for Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's impending cam-

paign in Virginia by replacing veterans now serving in garrisons and on rail-

road lines. This scheme was popular in Ohio, for it would allow volunteers

to make a short-term, relatively safe contribution to the war. This prospect

fueled enthusiasm for the militia, and all over the state new companies were

quickly enrolled. By the end of May Ohio had sent 35,000 militia to the

East, where they served not only as garrison troops but also with the Army of

the Potomac.²²

Although not all its methods were successful, Ohio exceeded its total man-

power quota for the war and outdid most other states in recruiting. But Ohio

failed in its attempts to devise an effective system for replacing losses in ex-

isting regiments. This was a vexing problem shared by all states and one that

no government ever solved. In 1861 the War Department had authorized reg-

imental officers to detach men from their units and send them home to recruit

replacements, and this system was supposed to keep existing regiments at full

strength. But regimental recruiters brought in few troops, and many regi-

ments shrank to less than half their original numbers. Tod believed that the

problem was that the men sent to recruit had no incentive to carry out their

duties, and he proposed to remedy that defect. In May 1862 he suggested

combining all recruits not yet mustered into full companies. Officers dis-

placed by this process would be given forty days to complete a new company;

if they failed they would lose their commissions. The War Department ig-

nored this suggestion, but two months later the governor proposed a similar

scheme. Noting that "recruiting officers for new regiments have their com-

missions to earn; those of the old have theirs in their pockets," Tod again

suggested giving these men an equally powerful incentive. Regimental

commanders, or the governor, would appoint noncommissioned officers to re-

cruit, with the promise of a commission when they met their quotas. But the

War Department misunderstood Tod's scheme. Stanton replied that, under

General Orders No. 88, noncommissioned officers already could be sent home

to recruit for existing companies and they needed no commissions to do so.

 

 

266; Roseboom, Civil War Period, 405; Reid, Ohio in the War, 130-33.

22. Governors John Brough, Oliver P. Morton, Richard Yates, W. M. Stone, and James T.

Lewis to President Abraham Lincoln, 21 April 1864, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to

Brough, 16 May 1864, 26 May 1864, Lincoln, "Special Executive Order Returning Thanks for

the Ohio Volunteers for 100 Days," O.R., Series III, vol. 4, 237-38, 384, 411, 707-08; "Annual

Report," 1864, 18-37, 267; G. W. Carey to Brough, 7 May 1864, Series 1629, Box 4, folder 3,

OHS; Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 254-55.

• 14
 

Groping Toward Victory                                                39

 

Only if an entire company were required could the governor issue recruiting

commissions. Tod subsequently proposed other schemes for bringing old reg-

iments up to strength, but none was implemented.²³

Even so, the shrinkage of existing regiments remained a critical problem.

On 18 August 1862 the War Department notified Tod that 37,500 men would

be required to bring the state's units to full strength, and in March 1863

Sherman estimated Ohio's deficit at 50,000. Thus, in September 1863 Tod

again urged that officers and men "ready for promotion" be sent home to re-

cruit with the reward of commissions if they succeeded. This time the War

Department responded favorably and authorized the governor to issue recruit-

ing commissions, set quotas, and establish time limits for meeting them.

Tod was pleased with this success, but he proposed to expand his scheme fur-

ther. Arguing that the deputy provost marshals in Ohio were "comparatively

idle and will make good recruiting officers," the governor suggested setting

quotas for them as well, again with the promise of a commission for meeting

them. Provost Marshal General James B. Fry replied that he had been con-

templating a similar scheme, though his employed bounties as an incentive

rather than commissions, and agreed to allow Tod to try his own plan. Even

with these innovations, however, Ohio failed to attain many recruits to beef

up its existing regiments. The state's deficit continued to grow, and in March

1864 the War Department revoked the authority of the governor to issue re-

cruiting commissions for old regiments. Shortly thereafter Stanton invited

Brough to devise his own scheme for filling existing regiments, but the war

ended before any effective solution could be found.²⁴

 

 

Supply

 

In April 1861 Ohio was largely unprepared for the manpower demands of

the war, having only the militia and the volunteer companies as a foundation

for recruiting. But Ohio's preparations in the area of supply were even more

inadequate. The state possessed only a small amount of arms and equipment,

and its capacity to acquire more was severely limited. Dennison was a great

 

 

 

23. Office of the Adjutant General, General Orders No. 69, 28 August 1861, Series 1629,

Box 3, folder 7, OHS; Governor David Tod to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 23 May

1862, Tod to President Abraham Lincoln, 28 July 1862, Tod to Brigadier General C. P.

Buckingham, 1 August 1862, Buckingham to Tod, 4 August 1862, O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 66-67,

269, 289, 293.

24. Brigadier General C.P. Buckingham to Governor David Tod, 18 August 1862, O.R.,

Series III, vol. 2, 407; Major General William T. Sherman to Tod, 12 March 1863, O.R., Series

III, vol. 3, 65-66; Tod to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 18 September 1863, Tod to

Provost Marshal General James B. Fry, 25 September 1863, Fry to Tod, 29 September 1863,

O.R., Series III, vol. 3, 822, 839, 849-50; Fry to Tod, 23 September 1863, Series 1629, Box 4,

folder 2, OHS.

• 15
 

40                                                         OHIO HISTORY

 

improvisor, but even so the first months of the war were characterized by

shortages and defective supplies. By the end of 1861 the state had simply re-

linquished most of the tasks of supply to the federal government.

The condition of the state arsenal at the beginning of the war was pitiful.

Despite the efforts of the Adjutant General to collect arms scattered around the

state, in April 1861 Ohio possessed only about 2700 muskets, a few hundred

swords, some old artillery pieces, and a small quantity of camp equipment.

Quartermaster General Wood could furnish only parts of three regiments with

infantry accoutrements, and he could find not a single tent. Even worse, fear

of invasion in southern Ohio forced the governor to retain some arms for state

defense, and Ohio's first two regiments were sent off without weapons.²⁵

But Governor Dennison was resourceful, and immediately he began scour-

ing the country for supplies. He sent Wood and Judge Advocate General C.P.

Wolcott to Washington, D.C., and New York City to purchase arms, and

eventually the two men brought back almost 12,000 muskets and rifles.

Dennison also persuaded Miles Greenwood, a large machine works in

Cincinnati, to repair and alter old muskets. In late April the War Department

sent 10,000 muskets and 400,000 cartridges, with the promise of more to

come, while Governor Richard Yates of Illinois donated an additional 5,000

muskets. The governor also contracted with a number of firms in Ohio and

surrounding states for blankets, tents, canteens, powder, and ammunition, and

he established a state laboratory in Columbus to manufacture powder and

ammunition.²⁶

Through these means Ohio managed to arm and equip its first regiments.

But the state's resources, financial and industrial, were simply unequal to the

demands of the war, and the Quartermaster General simply could not fully

supply all the thousands of recruits pouring into camp. Throughout the

summer and fall of 1861 Dennison received a steady stream of complaints that

troops were serving without uniforms, cookware, infantry accoutrements, and

reliable arms. Dennison had hoped that Major General George C. McClellan

 

 

25. Captain John H. Dickerson to Quartermaster General D.L. Wood, 1 May 1861, Wood to

Dickerson, n.d., Wood to Major General George C. McClellan, 27 May 1861, 19 June 1861,

Series 134, vol. 1, OHS; Colonel C.P. Buckingham to Colonel E.P. Scammon, 24 July 1861,

Series 146, vol. 3, OHS; "Annual Report of the Quartermaster General," in Annual Report,

1861, 581-82.

26. Governor William Dennison to Quartermaster General D.L. Wood, 17 April 1861, 18

April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, folder 1, OHS; Dennison to Wood, 18 April 1861, Series 1629,

Box 4, folder 26, OHS; Dennison to Colonel C.P. Wolcott, 17 April 1861, 18 April 1861,

Dennison to E.B. Dennison, 18 April 1861, Dennison to John English, 18 April 1861, Dennison

to Scott & Brown, 18 April 1861, Series 142, vol. 3, OHS; Major General John E. Wool to

Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott, 23 April 1861, 25 April 1861, Wool to Secretary of

War Simon P. Cameron, Governor Richard Yates to Wool, O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 106-07, 114-

15, 127, 147-48; Major John Symington to Wood, 17 June 1861, Series 134, vol. 1, OHS;

Dennison to J.W. King, 29 April 1861, Series 146, vol. 4, OHS; Coles, Ohio Forms an Army,

19-22; Reid, Ohio in the War, 57-60.

• 16
 

Groping Toward Victory                                                    41

 

would take over the administration of supply and solve these problems, but

the general soon left the state, and Dennison was again left to his own

means.27

Dennison recognized the state's limitations, and increasingly his solution

was simply to abandon efforts at supplying troops on his own and turn to the

federal government for aid. The War Department, which recognized the prob-

lems created by numerous state and federal officials competing for supplies,

proved receptive to Dennison's appeals.          In August United States

Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs instructed the U.S. quartermas-

ter in Columbus, Captain John Dickerson, to supply all Ohio regiments with

cookware and utensils. Shortly thereafter, Meigs expanded the order to in-

clude tents and complete sets of infantry accoutrements. Finally, in early

1862 the War Department issued orders that made purchasing supplies solely

a federal responsibility. Under this arrangement the state quartermaster gen-

eral simply submitted requisitions to the federal quartermaster.²⁸

These arrangements were altered slightly in 1862 and 1863. Shortly after

Tod assumed the governorship he became dissatisfied with the performance of

the federal quartermasters and made some efforts to resume state contracting.

In July the War Department had to remind him, and other governors, that it

alone provided all arms, equipment, and supplies for federal recruits. But Tod

continued to press for some adjustments in the existing system, and in

August Stanton agreed that the state quartermaster could take over the distri-

bution, though not the acquisition, of weapons and accoutrements. But the

trend toward complete federal responsibility was irreversible. Tod's supply ar-

rangements also proved unsatisfactory, and in October 1863 federal quarter-

masters resumed the distribution of arms.²⁹

Ohio's experience with providing food and shelter to its troops followed a

similar pattern. Ohio had no commissary department in April 1861, and thus

 

 

 

27. "Resolution, General Assembly, State of Ohio," 24 April 1861, Hunter to Governor

William Dennison, 3 June 1861, William Dennison Papers, 1860-62, MSS 305, Ohio Historical

Society, hereinafter cited as MSS 305, OHS; E. Kingman to Quartermaster General D.L.

Wood, 27 June 1861, Series 134, vol. 2, OHS; Dennison to "Chairman, Committee on

Resolutions of 7th August 'Democratic Convention,' Cleveland, Ohio," 14 August 1861, Series

1606, vol. 1, OHS; Dennison to Captain J.H. Dickerson, 30 November 1861, Series 1606, vol. 2,

OHS; Major General George C. McClellan to Quartermaster General D.L. Wood, 13 May

1861, 14 May 1861, Series 134, vol. 1, OHS; Reid, Ohio in the War, 29.

28. W.F. Caggen to General J.W. Bates, 19 August 1861, Governor William Dennison to

Captain J.H. Dickerson, 7 September 1861, 8 September 1861, 25 September 1861, 26

September 1861, Series 1606, vol. 1, OHS; "Annual Report, Quartermaster General," 1861,

596-97.

29. Assistant Adjutant General C.P. Buckingham to Governor David Tod, 11 July 1862,

Series 1629, Box 3, folder 8, OHS; Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to Tod, 9 August 1862,

Tod to Stanton, 11 August 1862, O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 342, 355-56; "Annual Report of the

Quartermaster General" in Messages and Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of

the State of Ohio for the Year 1863 (Columbus, 1864), 536-37.

• 17
 

42                                                       OHIO HISTORY

 

in the first weeks of the war Dennison was forced to improvise in this area

also. He hastily established a commissary department, appointed agents to

set up camps throughout the state, and contracted with local hotels and other

suppliers for meals. Given the crush of mobilization, these arrangements

were the best that could be contrived, but they created discontent nonetheless.

Troops suffered from exposure and poor hygiene, and meals were often late

and inadequate. These improvised arrangements were also quite expensive,

and frequently contractors overcharged for their services. Soon the complaints

of soldiers reached the public and the press, and the state legislature officially

requested that it be allowed to examine all contracts that Dennison had

made.³⁰

Dennison recognized the defects of these arrangements as well as anyone,

and in May 1861 he turned to the War Department for aid. But the federal

government refused to support troops that were not yet mustered into federal

service. In July, therefore, Dennison appointed a new Commissary General,

Columbus Delano, expanded the Commissary Department, and fixed the max-

imum rate for rations at thirty cents per day per recruit. Delano in turn ap-

pointed one or two assistant commissaries for each camp and renegotiated a

number of contracts with suppliers. The new Commissary Department

brought some regularity to the area of subsistence, but the results were still

unsatisfactory, and the costs were bearing heavily on the state. Dennison

thus continued to press the War Department to take over the task of feeding

and sheltering Ohio's recruits. Finally, on October 1 Washington sent a fed-

eral commissary to Columbus and ordered him to assume all existing con-

tracts, reimburse the state for its expenses thus far, and provide subsistence

for all recruits as soon as they reached camp.³¹

Abandoning all subsistence and supply responsibilities to the federal gov-

ernment was a logical step that freed Ohio from a heavy, perhaps unmanage-

able, burden. It also left Ohio recruits at the mercy of federal officers, how-

ever, and created conflicts between state and federal authorities. On several

occasions state officials charged the War Department with neglecting Ohio's

troops, and in turn federal administrators complained that state authorities

were ungrateful and unreasonable. Most of these conflicts were smoothed

over, but a few created considerable tension.

 

 

 

30. Governor William Dennison to G.W. Runyan, 19 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, folder

1, OHS; Dennison to General W.H Lytle, 19 April 1861, Series 142, vol. 3, OHS; Hon. N. Bill

to Adjutant General H.B. Carrington, 23 April 1861, Lieutenant Colonel George B. Senter to

Dennison, 25 April 1861, MSS 305, OHS; John Q. Lane to Quartermaster General D.L. Wood,

5 May 1861, 24 May 1861, A.H. van Voorhees to Wood, 20 May 1861, 21 May 1861, 25 May

1861, S.E. Brown to Wood, 21 May 1861, 22 May 1861, 24 May 1861, Series 134, vol. 1, OHS;

"Annual Report of the Commissary General," in Annual Report, 1861, 539; Coles, Ohio Forms

an Army, 6-7, 16-19.

31. "Annual Report, Commissary General," 1861, 541-43; Adjutant General, Directions.

• 18
 

Groping Toward Victory                                        43

The first such exchange occurred in May 1861. Dennison had been in- formed that the War Department was hoarding 55,600 smoothbore muskets, 1200 rifled muskets, and 1300 "Harpers Ferry rifles," and immediately he sent a request for 25,000 muskets and all the rifles to arm the state militia. Secretary of War Cameron replied curtly that the War Department could sup- ply only troops actually in federal service and pointed out that Ohio had al- ready received more than its quota of 10,000 muskets. Cameron's refusal was valid, but it was also insensitive and insulting, and Dennison resented it ac- cordingly. A similar, more serious conflict occurred six months later. In October 1861 Dennison again received information, again of doubtful origin, that Cameron had sent New York 13,000 Enfield rifles and several hundred Springfield rifles. The governor immediately reminded the War Department that seven Ohio regiments were waiting for arms and asked, "Has not Ohio reason to complain?" Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott assured Dennison that his information was completely inaccurate and that Ohio had not been deprived, but the governor remained dissatisfied.32 The dispute over arms surfaced once more in mid-1862. Tod had continued Dennison's campaign to acquire better weapons, and finally in July Assistant Secretary of War P. H. Watson promised to ship 10,000 Austrian muskets.     32. John K. Mansfield to Governor William Dennison, 1 May 1861, MSS 305, OHS; Dennison, "Requisition," 4 May 1861, Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron to Dennison, 9 May 1861, Dennison to Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott, 30 October 1861, Scott to Dennison, 30 October 1861, Dennison to Scott, 21 December 1861, Scott to Dennison, 21 December 1861, O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 159, 183, 610-11, 756.

• 19
 

44                                                     OHIO HISTORY

 

He then reminded Tod that the War Department had sent Ohio 10,000 Enfield

rifles in May 1862 and inquired of their whereabouts. Quartermaster General

George Wright replied that he had distributed 3400 to four regiments, had sent

5500 to Cincinnati, and had retained the rest in the state arsenal for the mili-

tia. But Watson ignored Wright's explanation, accused him of misplacing the

Enfields, and again asserted that Ohio had already received its quota of first-

class weapons. The correspondence then became vindictive. Wright defen-

sively repeated his account of the Enfields, pointed out that Ohio would soon

have 15,000 men mustered and in need of arms, and argued that Watson's

shipment would be insufficient. He then charged the War Department with

hoarding 80,000 Springfields, denied that Enfields were equivalent to

Springfields, and asked why Ohio could not receive its share of the better

weapon.³³

Both sides eventually bent, though not gracefully. In August the War

Department sent 6300 Springfields, with a promise to ship more as soon as

possible, and allowed Wright to recall the 5000 Springfields from Cincinnati.

But Watson could not resist a final insult. He again asserted that Ohio had

lost the Enfields shipped in May; he also claimed that the War Department

had only 27,000 Springfields, rather than 80,000, and expressed his wish that

Wright would "count the Springfields sent to Ohio by the same multiplying

rule." Wright, in turn, assured Watson that "state authorities entertain no

suspicion of injustice from the General Government," but then insisted, one

final time, that only Springfields were acceptable arms. This unpleasant

correspondence finally ended in October.³⁴

 

 

Conclusion

 

The administrative systems that Ohio employed in the Civil War were a

patchwork of the traditional and the modern. Established institutions such as

the militia and established mechanisms such as bounties continued to play an

important role; at the same time, the demands of this war far exceeded any in

previous experience, and traditional practices had to be bolstered by a number

of new mechanisms. In the realm of manpower, for example, traditional re-

cruiting by prominent individuals remained important, but increasingly the

use of recruiting districts, the centralization of mobilization, and the draft lim-

 

 

 

33. Assistant Secretary of War P.H. Watson to Governor David Tod, 19 July 1862,

Quartermaster General George B. Wright to Watson, 21 July 1862, Watson to Tod, 8 August

1862, Wright to Watson, 8 August 1862, O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 234, 241, 329-30.

34. Assistant Secretary of War P.H. Watson to Quartermaster General George B. Wright, 12

August 1862, Wright to Watson, 13 August 1862, Watson to Wright, 15 August 1862, Wright to

Watson, 15 August 1862, Watson to Wright, 19 October 1862, Wright to Watson, 20 October

1862, O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 365, 379, 393, 394, 673, 674-75.

• 20
 

Groping Toward Victory                                           45

 

ited, and transformed, this method.

With few precedents, and with surprisingly little guidance from the War

Department, state officials had to develop these new systems largely on their

own. Their success depended on their creativity, administrative experience,

and political instincts, and the results varied widely from state to state. Some

policies were disastrous failures, while others became models for other states

and the War Department.

Ohio's administrative record in the Civil War was quite mixed. Ohio

proved less capable of securing supplies on its own than other states such as

New York or Connecticut, and it had to seek federal aid quite early in the

war.³⁵ In part this failure reflected the state's more limited finances and man-

ufacturing base, but in part it also resulted from poor direction by Governor

Dennison. In the area of recruiting, conversely, Ohio was conspicuously suc-

cessful. Ohio exceeded its total manpower quota for the war, and the state

avoided all but two drafts. Furthermore, Dennison, Tod, and Brough all de-

veloped recruiting procedures that were subsequently adopted by the War

Department, and they transformed recruiting from an ad hoc, chaotic process

into a relatively orderly, logical system. Ohio had its share of failures, but

overall the state's leaders proved to be resourceful, and they kept pace with the

war.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

35. John Niven, Connecticut for the Union (New Haven, 1965).

• 21