Ohio History Journal
OHIO IN THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1824.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
The characterization of the period of
Monroe's presidency as
the "Era of Good Feeling" has
done much to obscure the true
nature of the decade 1815-1825. It has
been rather generally
thought of as a period in which the
Jeffersonian Republican party
so completely dominated that the rival
presidential candidates of
1824
represented substantially the same
principles and policies.
Recent scholarship is showing the
superficiality of this view, and
revealing the fact that the years in
question were years of disin-
tegration for the Republican as well as
for the Federalist party,
and of recombination of political
elements into new party group-
ings.
The basic fact in the party
transformation of this epoch is
the revolutionary change which took
place in the relations of the
great economic interests and
geographical sections. The Federal-
ist and Republican parties were
originally organized on the basis
of conditions existing about the time of
the adoption of the con-
stitution. Their geographical basis was
the region between the
Alleghany Mountains and the Atlantic.
But by the end of the
first quarter of the nineteenth century
a new world had come into
being west of the mountains. One person
in fifteen of the popu-
lation of the United States lived beyond
the mountains in 1790;
in 1830 the ratio was six in fifteen.
This relative increase in the
West meant that the center of economic
and political power, as
well as of population, was moving
westward. One result was an
alteration of the relative weight of the
economic groups engaged
respectively in ocean commerce,
manufacturing, staple-growing,
and farming. Another result was a
disturbance of the political
alliance between economic groups and
geographical sections in-
volved in the two original parties.
Finally, new groupings and
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154 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
alliances resulted, forming the new
party groupings of the Jack-
sonian Era.
To these changes is due, in the last
analysis, the decline and
fall of Federalism. To them is due also
the disruption of Re-
publicanism; for the Republicanism of
the original southern states
was at odds in many ways with the
"young" Republicanism of the
rising West. In consequence of differing
interests, on questions
of internal improvements, the protective
tariff, and interpretation
of the constitution, especially, the Old
South and the New West
diverged. By 1824 the Republican name
had ceased to represent
any vital union between the two wings of
the party.
The working of the influences which
disrupted the Repub-
lican party and foreshadowed the new
party groupings can no-
where be studied to better advantage
than in the State of Ohio.
By 1824 Ohio led the western states in
population and ranked
fourth in the Union. Unlike Kentucky and
Tennessee, she had
no son of her own in the campaign of
that year, so that her
attitude was less affected by local
pride. Moreover, the mingling
of sectional elements in her population
made the conflict within
her bounds fairly typical of the contest
in the country at large.
With these considerations in mind, it is
evident that Mr.
Roseboom's monograph is more than a
study in local Ohio politics.
It throws light upon the political
situation in the entire United
States. It is an example of that
intensive analysis of local con-
ditions upon which alone sound
generalizations can be based.
Mr. Roseboom's study was presented as a
thesis in candi-
dacy for the degree of Master of Arts in
American History in
Ohio State University.
HOMER C. HOCKETT,
Department of American History,
Ohio State University.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
I.
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 157
1. General features of election of 1824.
2. Ohio in election of 1824.
II.
SITUATION IN
THE BEGINNING .............................. 161
1. Probable issues.
2. Candidates. Strength and weaknesses.
3. Possible alignments.
III. THE PRELIMINARY CAMPAIGN..............................
170
1. The legislative nomination.
2. The Clinton movement.
3. Politics of 1823.
4. Revival and decline of Clinton.
5. Calhoun in Ohio.
6. The Congressional caucus and its
effects.
IV. PARTIES AND CONVENTIONS
................................. 180
1. The Jackson movement.
2. The Clay electoral ticket.
3. The Adams electoral ticket.
4. The Adams-Jackson proposed alliance.
5. The Jackson convention.
6. The Clay meeting at Columbus.
7. The Adams meeting at Columbus.
V. THE CAMPAIGN FOR CLAY
.................................. 191
1. Tariff and internal improvements.
2. Other features of Clay's strength.
3. The slavery issue.
4. The Bank issue.
5. Charges against Clay's private life.
6. The Clay-Crawford coalition charge.
7. Rumors of withdrawal.
VI. THE CAMPAIGN FOR JACKSON
.............................. 200
1. Personal nature.
2. Jackson and western interests.
3. Idea of united west.
4. Attitude of other parties toward
Jackson.
(155)
156 Contents.
PAGE
VII. THE CAMPAIGN FOR ADAMS
................................ 205
1. Adams' arguments.
2. Attacks on Adams personally.
3. Adams and the domestic policy.
VIII. THE ELECTION BY THE PEOPLE..............................
214
1. The vote.
2. Analysis of the returns.
3. Results of the popular election.
IX. THE HOUSE ELECTION
..................................... 218
1. The Ohio situation.
2. The House election.
3. Effects in Ohio.
4. Was the result acceptable?
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................... 223
OHIO IN THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1824.
BY EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM, M. A.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION - GENERAL FEATURES.
When James Monroe became president of
the United States
it seemed to many superficial observers
that party divisions were
at an end and that the country would
never see a recurrence of the
bitter party spirit so evident in that
period of our history when
foreign relations were of primary
importance. The close of the
Napoleonic Era seemed to mean the end of
party strife in the
United States, and the terms Federalist
and Republican lost their
early meaning. But the disappearance of
party divisions could
not be permanent. New problems were
arising during Monroe's
administration which were to be the
sources of party and sec-
tional divisions, which have never since
been absent from
American politics.
In the election of 1824 these
problems first show themselves
as political issues and out of this
election comes a new alignment
of parties and the complete break-up of
the old Republican party
so long dominant in national affairs.
Because it is the great
transition election from the old era to
the new, the election of
1824 is of more than ordinary
importance.
In this campaign appear the beginnings
of the characteristic
features of the American party system as
it is known today.
Party conventions, addresses to the
people, semblances of party
organizations, division of local parties
on national issues, all be-
gin to take form while the old party
machinery, of which the
congressional caucus was a conspicuous
feature, is relegated to the
scrap heap. New machinery better fitted
for growing democracy
was in process of construction.
The most obvious feature of the campaign
of 1824 and the
one by which it is best remembered is
the large number of can-
(157)
158 Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
didates. Under the Virginia presidents
the election of the chief
executive had ceased to be a real
contest but the year 1824 showed
that such a condition was not to become
permanent. Growing
democracy was demanding a larger share
in choosing the presi-
dent, and statesmanship and long
training were beginning to be
regarded with distrust in some quarters.
In this campaign at one
time or another there were at least
seven candidates, though not
all formally nominated, and one or two
others were considered
as possibilities. Adams, Calhoun, and
Crawford from Monroe's
cabinet, Clay and Lowndes from Congress,
DeWitt Clinton, and
Andrew Jackson comprise the active list.
This number was re-
duced to four at the election.
The number and prominence of the
candidates and the bit-
terness of the campaign have caused many
historians to overlook
the issues and regard the campaign as
largely decided on personal
grounds. To take this view is to
overlook the underlying sec-
tional issues. The personality of a
candidate always plays a
strong part in presidential campaigns,
and this was true in 1824 as
it has been since. But to pass by the
issues is to lose what is per-
haps the most significant feature of
this election.
The strong national feeling following
the war of 1812 was
giving way to the demands of sectional
interests. The South,
feeling the burdens of the tariff, was
aligned in opposition to the
protective system and was showing a
noticeable lack of en-
thusiasm over internal improvements by
the national government.
New England was divided between her
commercial and manufac-
turing interests but was still inclined
to oppose the tariff. The
Middle States were strongly for
protective tariff to encourage
their manufactures and for internal
improvements to secure
western markets. The West, almost wholly
agricultural and suf-
fering from lack of markets, was
strongly in favor of both in-
ternal improvements and tariff. It felt
that its demands had been
too long ignored by the national
government and that the time
had come when western interests should
be given the considera-
tion the size and importance of that
section deserved.
Then, too, there was the partially
dormant slavery question
which had arisen in 1820 over the
Missouri question. At first
it seemed probable that this would play
a leading part in the
presidential campaign, but, as nothing
appeared to cause further
|
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 159 |
|
|
160 Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
friction, it was pushed into the
background by more pressing
questions, though it still had a real
influence on the election.
With these opposing sectional interests
at work no candidate,
with so many competitors in the field,
could hope to carry the
election unless he conciliated opposing
interests. This explains
why the candidates themselves said so
little about the issues and
conducted the campaign on personal
grounds. But their sup-
porters in the various states fought it
out on these issues and it is
to the local campaigns that one must go
to understand the real
significance of the election.
Ohio in this election offers an
interesting study of the forces
of sectionalism. By 1824 Ohio had become
the most important
of the western states and ranked fourth
in the whole union in
population although she had been a state
for only two decades.
Her population had come from all
sections in varying numbers
and this partly explains the sectional
character the contest of 1824
assumed in the state. Ohio was both
western and northern in her
interests. Drawn to the other western
states by their common
need for internal improvements and a
protective tariff, she was
partly repelled by the slavery existing
in some of them. United
with New York and Pennsylvania in
opposition to slavery and in
favor of tariff and internal
improvements, she was kept from a
union with the rest of the North by the
opposition of the com-
mercial Northeast to western policies.
Though the South had
been the chief market for the products
of Ohio, the opposition of
that section to the tariff and internal
improvements, besides
the slavery question, made a union of
the South and the North-
west an impossible thing. Thus Ohio
found herself both western
and northern in her interests, and the
attempts to choose the
presidential candidate who would best
represent her resulted in
a bitter struggle which remained in
doubt to the very last.
Of the more important states only New
York and Ohio were
really doubtful. This situation in the
former state was due
largely to the fact that the legislature
chose the electors and its
attitude was very uncertain. But in Ohio
it was a question of
how the people would vote and
partisanship reached a white heat.
This was an unusual situation as
previous presidental campaigns
had aroused but slight interest in the
state, the vote always fall-
ing far below that cast at state
elections. Ohio was so over-
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 161
whelmingly Republican that the small
minority of Federalists had
made but slight efforts for their
candidates. Besides, the elec-
toral vote of Ohio had not been of
sufficient importance to affect
the general result and the country at
large was little interested in
what the state did. But in the electoral
college of 1824 she was
to have sixteen electoral votes, and,
furthermore, was not com-
mitted to any one candidate. It was a
prize well worth fighting
for. Thus in 1824 for the first time,
Ohio played that important
part in a presidential election which
has been attributed to this
state in so many campaigns since.
CHAPTER II.
THE SITUATION IN THE BEGINNING.
The Ohio campaign began as in other
states very early in
Monroe's second term but it can hardly
be regarded as other
than political maneuvering and sounding
of public sentiment
until the legislative caucus, early in
January, 1823. From this
time on the campaign was actually under
way though it did not
assume its final form until the spring
of 1824 when the field of
candidates was reduced in Ohio to the
three who finally made
the race.
In the early stages the slavery issue
resulting from the
Missouri Compromise loomed large. It was
expected that this
would largely determine the election.
Charles Hammond, who
played an important part in the Ohio
campaign and who dis-
liked Adams because of his desertion of
the Federalist party,
wrote at the time of the Missouri
struggle: "A new state
of parties must grow out of it. Give me
a Northern President,
whether John Quincy Adams or DeWitt
Clinton, or anybody
else, rather than that things should
remain as they are."1 Yet
Hammond, always an opponent of slavery,
found this issue
so subordinated in 1824 that he took
charge of Clay's campaign
in Ohio and opposed the northern
candidate.
Edward King, writing from Ohio to Rufus
King in No-
vember, 1822, said of the situation:
"Ohio is decided at present
1Smith, Charles Hammond, 32.
Vol. XXVI-11.
162 Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
for Mr. Clay, and I know no person, who
would be able to alie-
nate her, except Clinton, who would
receive the support of the
North and Eastern part of the State. He
(Mr. Clay) will un-
doubtedly be the first choice, and I
think Mr. Adams the second.
If, however, the Missouri question
should present itself, in the
contest, Ohio probably would leave her
favorite and support
Mr. Adams."2 King was
not personally friendly to Adams.
Some two months later he further
expressed his belief
that the Missouri question would play a
part in the election.
"It does not appear to me," he
said, "that the country has not
so soon recovered from the Missouri
question, and that the
Eastern States, if they find the South
and West too strong,
will be inclined to cry out 'No
Slavery', and by these means
compel Ohio and the Western free states
to abandon their
choice and unite in this policy."3
The editor of the Western Herald and
Steubenville Gazette,
James Wilson, grandfather of Woodrow
Wilson,4 expressed in
rather violent language his opinion of
southern threats to
divide the union.5 He charged that Clay was the friend of
slavery, that he had yielded to southern
threats in the Missouri
question and might yield to them on the
tariff for the supposed
integrity of the union.6 Yet by the spring of 1824 this same
editor was ready to declare for Clay. He
explained that, while
he had hoped the Missouri question would
have a strong effect
on the election, the northern states had
selected their candidates
without reference to it and there was no
further use in agitating
it when there were nearer and more vital
interests at stake.7
This was the view of many who had been
strongly opposed to
the Missouri compromise.
Clay himself was keenly aware of the
Ohio situation in
regard to the slavery issue. Writing to
Francis Brooke in
2King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus
King, VI, 487.
3Ibid., VI, 497.
4Hunter, "The Pathfinders of
Jefferson County," Ohio Archaeolog-
ical and Historical Society
Publications, VI, 271.
5Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, March 1, 1823.
6Ibid., March 22, 1823.
7Ibid., April 24, 1824.
Ohio in the
Presidential Election of 1824. 163
February, 1824, he said: "As I have
told you before the north-
western states will go for Mr. Adams, if
they cannot get me.
They will vote for no man residing in a
slave state but me,
and they vote for me because of other
and chiefly local con-
siderations, outweighing the slave
objections. On that you may
depend."8 This was
doubtless true at this time. The Jackson
movement had not yet developed great
strength, and its partial
success in the Northwest at the election
must be attributed
largely to Jackson's personal popularity
and to the fact that
Clay had to face two candidates in each
of these states. With
the slavery issue more prominent Jackson
would probably have
been injured more than Clay in the
North.
With the absence of any further events
to stir up the
slavery question and with economic
interests demanding to be
taken care of, tariff and internal
improvements became the
dominating issues, or rather issue, as
they were usually taken
together to form one policy known as the
"domestic policy".
For some years prior to 1824 there had
been a growing
demand in the West for legislation by
the national govern-
ment to provide for western interests.
With increasing agri-
cultural production, very inadequate and
unsatisfactory markets,
and general business depression in the
early twenties, Ohio and
her neighbors came to regard their
future as inseparably con-
nected with internal improvements and a
protective tariff.
The cost of transportation over the
mountains restricted
the eastern market. New Orleans, the
principal outlet of the
West, had serious disadvantages. The
voyage down the Mis-
sissippi and back was long and
difficult, navigation was unsafe
due to obstructions in the river, the
climate was not healthful.
Shippers in the northwestern states had
to wait until there was
sufficient water in the Ohio and upper
Mississippi, which caused
all shipments to be made at one time and
thus flooded the New
Orleans market, so injuring prices that
often Ohio farmers
preferred to let their produce go to
waste at home. The falls
of the Ohio at Louisville offered a
further disadvantage. On
the other hand, the eastern market could
be reached only through
8Clay, Works, IV, 86.
164 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
a national system of roads and canals.
The Cumberland road
had reached Ohio, the Erie canal was
nearing completion in
New York, and a Chesapeake and Ohio
canal was under dis-
cussion. Ohio desired to take advantage
of new routes to the
East by a system of canals which would
connect the interior
counties with the Ohio River and Lake
Erie and thus enable
them to make use of both the Ohio river
outlet to the South
and the Erie canal to the East.
Extensive preparations were
being made for the proposed canal system
in Ohio and the
assistance of the federal government was
especially desired.
Furthermore, the southern part of the
state was interested in
a proposed canal around the falls of the
Ohio. Hence internal
improvements became a kind of obsession
with the people of
Ohio and visions of wonderful prosperity
floated before them.
Closely connected with this was the
tariff question. The
development of home manufactures through
the tariff in order
to furnish a home market for
agricultural products and make
the United States economically
self-sustainng was a western
ideal. This would relieve the
unprofitableness of agriculture,
diversify industries, open new channels
for capital and labor,
and the whole country would profit
thereby. Internal improve-
ments would enable the products to reach
the markets cheaply,
the tariff would enlarge these markets
by furnishing new de-
mands for raw materials and food
supplies.
Ohio newspapers were full of articles
showing the necessity
of such a policy. "Unless the
western country can prevail upon
the government to provide means for
transporting its surplus
agricultural produce to a certain and
safe market, and unless
their manufactures be so protected as to
be placed on a per-
manent footing, property will continue
to depreciate, and poverty
and misery will be our constant
companions,"9 said the Steuben-
ville Gazette. The picture of conditions
in Ohio as seen by the
Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette was
depressing. Ordinary
channels of wealth were overcrowded,
professions full, com-
peting merchants and shopkeepers driving
each other into bank-
ruptcy, agriculture overcrowded and
declining. In the fall and
9Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, Feb. 7, 1824.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 165
winter of 1822-3 most of the provisions
shipped from the Cin-
cinnati market involved almost all
shippers in loss; in the winter
of 1823-4 shipments of provisions were
nearly one-half less than
those of the previous year; land sales
had greatly fallen off. If
the markets of the European wars could
be brought back, said
the editorial, industry would revive;
but that situation would
not likely recur soon again, and now
Europe was feeding her-
self. In the United States eighty-three
out of every hundred
persons were farmers raising a surplus.
The remedy, then,
concluded the article, must be a large
and permanent home mar-
ket, and this could only come by
increasing duties to foster
manufactures and to furnish new openings
for labor.10
With such sentiments so general it is
not surprising that
Ohio felt such an interest in the
presidential election. Congress,
it was felt, was favorably disposed
toward the West11 but ex-
tensive plans for internal improvements
had been checked by
the executive. Monroe was tolerated
rather than liked. His
administration received some praise in
general terms, but for
the most part the end of his term was
awaited with impatience
by westerners, who desired the
succession of a man with fewer
constitutional scruples.
The Cincinnati National Republican
declared that there was
no hope for national aid to internal
improvements during the
Monroe administration. "There is a party of politicians at
Washington, whose consciences are so
tender, or whose minds
are so contracted, that no general
system of internal improve-
ments can be anticipated, from the
councils of the nation, until
there is a radical change in the
Executive department."12 A
little earlier this same paper expressed
similar sentiments on
the tariff bill then before Congress,
whose failure it attributed
to the influence of the treasury
department. "How long we
shall be compelled to suffer by the
contracted view of our public
interests, which can embrace only the
growth of cotton and
tobacco, and the necessary means to
provide for these articles,
10 Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, May 18, 1824.
11Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, March 25, 1824.
12Cincinnati National Republican, July
23, 1823.
166 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
a profitable foreign market, we pretend
not to say; but we in-
dulge a hope, that the proceedings of
the present Congress will
awaken a spirit of universal inquiry
among the people, and
produce such a change in the federal
administration, as will
ensure to it that wisdom which can
discern the necessities of
the country, and that liberality of
feeling which will prompt to
the adoption of the most efficient
measures for its relief."13
It was all-important, therefore, that
the next administration
be favorable to western interests. The
candidate Ohio supported
must above all else be an advocate of
the domestic policy. Said
the Cincinnati Gazette: "So far as
we have been able to learn
the sentiments of this state, we
believe, however they may differ
on other subjects, that they pretty
generally agree in this one
important point:-that we ought to
support that man for the
Presidency, other things being equal,
who will most effectually
encourage domestic manufactures and
internal improvements."14
Other papers uttered similar sentiments.
The Steubenville
Gazette declared that "the question
is not now whether this can-
didate or that candidate is a democrat
or a federalist, but
whether he is a friend or an opponent to
domestic industry and
internal improvements."15 As
the Chillicothe Supporter and
Scioto Gazette, ardently for Clay,
expressed it, "this is a sine
qua non - an article of faith, to which
every political aspirant
must subscribe, before he can expect to
be honored with their
suffrage."l6
With this "article of faith"
in view, the chances of the
various candidates may now be
considered. William H. Craw-
ford, the Secretary of the Treasury, was
at first regarded as the
leading candidate by the nation
generally but he did not have
the slightest chance at any time of
carrying Ohio. The fact that
he was most strongly supported in the
southern states where
tariff and internal improvements were
most unpopular was alone
enough to condemn him. His silence on
these questions com-
13 Cincinnati National Republican, March
4, 1823.
14Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
Jan. 6, 1824.
15Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, in Scioto Gazette, Aug.
2, 1823.
16Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Aug. 2, 1823.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 167
pleted his destruction in the west. The
fact that he was from
a slave state and the supposed intrigues
in which he was engaged
for the presidency were further counts
against him. His few
supporters in Ohio were largely personal
friends and, in the
absence of a Crawford electoral ticket,
supported Clay.
The other southern candidate was
Calhoun, the death of
Lowndes giving him South Carolina's
united backing. He was
quite favorably regarded in Ohio despite
the fact that he was
from a slave state. His advocacy of
national measures, espe-
cially internal improvements, won him
many supporters in Ohio
and early in the campaign he seemed to
have a chance in the
state. But Calhoun could not compete
with Clay in advocating
tariff and internal improvements while
the latter had the further
advantage of being a westerner. His
candidacy overshadowed
Calhoun's.
Henry Clay was the leading candidate in
Ohio almost from
the beginning. He was a westerner, a
strong advocate of both
protective tariff and internal
improvements, and a champion of
western interests. He was well known
personally in Ohio and
had a host of friends in the state. On
the vital issues there was
no man whose sentiments were better
known or more strongly
expressed. Indeed, Clay made himself so
acceptable to the West
that he ruined his cause in the other
sections. But to Ohioans
there were at least two important
objections to Clay as their
candidate, namely, his attitude toward
the Missouri Compromise
and his connection with the United
States Bank, which was un-
popular in the state. His apparently
southern views on the
Missouri question aroused considerable
opposition to him at first
but declined in importance as the
campaign progressed. His
position as attorney for the United
States Bank injured him in
certain localities, yet the opposition
on this score was not wide-
spread. Certain political charges raised
against him proved to
be as important as these objections just
mentioned.
Adams as the northern candidate drew to
his support in Ohio
those opponents of slavery who believed
in the necessity of elect-
ing a northern president to end the long
monopoly the South had
maintained over the executive
department. As the state of Ohio
was practically unanimous against the
extension of slavery, in
168 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
the absence of other issues, Adams might
well have succeeded
in carrying the state in 1824, as Clay's
friends at first greatly
feared. But the domestic policy as the
dominant issue worked
injury to Adams. His apparent silence on
this question was
misconstrued in many quarters as
opposition to tariff and internal
improvements and played an important
part in the election.
DeWitt Clinton never announced himself
as a candidate be-
cause his own state would not support
him but he was regarded
as a possible candidate up to the time
the electoral bill failed
in the New York legislature. In Ohio
Clinton found strong
support. He was from a northern state,
as Adams was. But
unlike the latter, he was known as the
great apostle of internal
improvements, for the Erie canal was
largely his work. Thus
Clinton seemed to many Ohioans to be the
one candidate who
could draw western support from Clay and
northern support
from Adams, and unite the two sections
behind him for the in-
terests of both. The Ohio movement for
Clinton had a real
popular basis, and had New York appeared
favorable to her
native son, he would have run a very
strong race in the
Northwest.
Andrew Jackson was not taken seriously
in Ohio at first but
his personal popularity drew to him a
party which grew as the
campaign progressed until it seemed as
if Ohio would be swept
away by the magic name of Jackson. But
it would be a mistake
to assume that the Jackson party had
only a personal basis. Its
candidate was proclaimed as the strong
advocate of western in-
terests as well as democracy, and though
his stand on the tariff
and internal improvements was rather
uncertain compared with
Clay's attitude, it satisfied his
supporters who demanded a united
West back of him.
From this general survey of the
candidates it is seen that
Ohio was drawn two ways. The Clay men,
and after them the
Jackson followers, urged the necessity
of a united West behind
a western candidate to secure the
triumph of western interests,
which, they asserted, were, after all,
the true national interests.
This union of all the western states
appealed strongly to the
people of Ohio but was open to a serious
objection which the
Ohio Monitor, friendly to Adams, set
forth early in the campaign.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 169
It declared that the idea of a western
sectional alignment was
delusive, that the division would be
northern and southern, as
the North required protection to
agriculture and manufactures
while the South opposed such a policy.
Then the editorial went
at the heart of the question. "If a
western interest is intended
to effect the election of a president,
as is proposed by all who
speak of the feasibility of electing a
western president, it must
include all the southern states, and one
or more of the middle
states, and if a western candidate is
elected by such votes he
must be governed by their policy."17 In other words
the western
states were not strong enough to elect
their own candidate on
such a frankly sectional platform as
Clay's, while southern votes
could only be secured at the sacrifice
of those interests most
vital to the West.
Ohio's other alternative was a union
with the states to the
east of her on the basis of their common
interests in regard to
slavery, the tariff, and internal
improvements. Both Adams from
New England and Clinton from New York
were prospective
northern candidates. If a union were to
be effected between
Ohio and her western neighbors and the
East, then one section
would have to give up its favorite
candidate. That the former
as the younger and less populous should
yield to the older section,
was the argument of the Adams and
Clinton men.18 "The west",
said the Steubenville Gazette, "has
no interest distinct from the
interest of the grain growing and
manufacturing states to the
east."19 But however
true this may have been, there could be
no agreement on the candidate they were
to support in common.
Since the states in each section found
it impossible to agree on
a single candidate for their section, it
was too much to expect
the two sections to unite. The results
of the election showed this.
Yet in the House election of 1825 it was just such a union
of West and East as this proposed one
that elevated John Quincy
Adams to the presidency. Had it been
effected before the election
of 1824 it might have produced happier
consequences for all
concerned.
17 Ohio Monitor, Feb. 15, 1823.
18Delaware
Patron, Mar. 18, 1824.
19Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, Mar. 1, 1823.
170 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
The chief interest of the Ohio campaign
lies in this struggle
between northern and western candidates
and the attempted union
of sections.
CHAPTER III.
THE PRELIMINARY CAMPAIGN.
The campaign of 1824 in Ohio may be said
to have begun
with the legislative caucus early in 1823. Prior to
this time
there was no definite alignment of
parties though newspapers
advocating their favorites were having
preliminary skirmishes.
When the legislature met in December,
1822, it was seen that
sentiment was nearly equally divided for
and against a legisla-
tive caucus to nominate a presidential
candidate. Henry Clay
had just been nominated by the Kentucky
legislature1 and his
friends were anxious to see the Ohio
legislature take similar
action. An attempt made early in the
session failed as it was
deemed inexpedient to take action so
long before the election.
But the friends of Clay in Congress were
very urgent that the
Ohio legislature take action. "The
idea of some holding back
in expectation that Clinton will be
brought forward is most
extraordinary," wrote
Representative Barber, who urged Clay's
nomination and declared that the contest
lay between Crawford
and Clay in the country at large.2 Representative
David Trimble
of Kentucky, writing to Allen Trimble,
then speaker of the Ohio
Senate, urged immediate action.
"All depends upon Ohio, but
it is especially necessary that she
should express her mind by
some mode that will leave no doubt of
her intentions. A state
caucus, or something like that. Think of
this seriously, and if
you do anything, the sooner the
better."3
The Clay men worked energetically and
succeeded in having
a caucus called for January 3, 1823. Of
the 102
members of the
legislature about 90 were present.
Speaker Trimble presided. A
motion that it was inexpedient to
proceed to make a nomination
1Frankfort (Ky.) Argus, in Columbus
Gazette, Dec. 5, 1822.
2Cutler, Life and Times of Ephraim
Cutler, 182.
3Papers of Gov. Allen Trimble, Old
Northwest Genealogical Quar-
terly, X, 301.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 171
at that time was voted down by the close
vote of 43 to 47.
Whereupon most of the friends of the
other candidates withdrew
and left the Clay men in control. A vote
was then taken on the
presidential question, Clay receiving
50, Clinton 5, Adams 1,
Calhoun 1.4
The Clay men were much pleased with
their success, the
Columbus Gazette claiming that many of
those who had opposed
a nomination at that time and had
withdrawn from the caucus
were friends of Clay.5 Henry
Clay, himself, who arrived in
Columbus a few days after the holding of
the caucus, wrote to
Francis Brooke expressing his
satisfaction with the result. "Con-
sidering the great efforts made from
without to prevent any legis-
lative expression of public opinion, the
proof which is afforded
by the vote here is extremely
strong."6
Naturally, the supporters of other
candidates were dis-
pleased at the action of the
legislators. It was declared pre-
mature and inexpedient,7 and
not deserving any consideration
since Clay had obtained only fifty
votes, less than half of the
membership of the legislature, despite
all the efforts made by
his partisans.8
The Ohio nomination certainly added
prestige to Clay's
cause in the state and elsewhere, but it
had a tendency to turn
the fire of the supporters of all the
other candidates against
him, while the circumstances of the
nomination led to charges
of intrigue and disregard of public
sentiment, which were
repeated and enlarged until they came to
be urged as one
of the principal reasons why Clay should
be defeated. The
Jackson press especially delighted to
compare the popular
nomination of Jackson with the caucus
endorsement of Clay,
which was classed with the very
unpopular congressional
caucus as means by which intriguing
politicians subverted the
people's will.
4Columbus Gazette, Jan. 9, 1823; Ohio
Monitor, Jan. 4, 1823.
5 Columbus Gazette, Jan. 9, 1823.
6 Clay, Works, IV, 70.
7John McLean to Allen Trimble, Jan. 31,
1823, Papers of Gov. Allen
Trimble, Old Northwest Genealogical
Quarterly, X, 302.
8 Cincinnati
National Republican, Jan. 14, 1823; March 4, 1823.
172 Ohio Arch. and
Hist. Society Publications.
At about the same time the legislators
were taking action
at Columbus, a movement of another sort
was in progress
at Cincinnati. On December 24, 1822, a poplar meeting was
held to express a presidential
preference. A preliminary meet-
ing on December 7 had appointed a
committee to consider the
various candidates, and this committee
reported to the meet-
ing of the 24th. The report
recommended DeWitt Clinton
for the presidency. The resolution as
adopted pointed out the
importance and mutual interdependence of
agriculture, com-
merce, and manufactures, the necessity
of their protection
and fostering care by the government,
and the need of a
chief executive who should be free from
contracted views and
local prejudices; declared that DeWitt
Clinton possessed the
necessary attainments including liberal
and enlightened views
of national policy to qualify him for
the high office; and
recommended him to the people of Ohio
and the Union as a
candidate. Legislative nominations
were disapproved of,
and committees of correspondence were
formed to further
Clinton's cause. More than three hundred
attended the meet-
ing and only three negative votes were
cast on the resolutions,
according to a friendly newspaper.9
This was the beginning of the Clinton
movement in Ohio
which for a time caused much uneasiness
in the Clay follow-
ing and not without cause. Clinton was
strong in two sections
of the state where Clay was weak. Around
Cincinnati Clay's
connection with the United States Bank
had injured him
while Clinton, the friend of internal
improvements, was highly
regarded. In the northern and eastern parts of the state
Clinton was popular because he was both
a free state man
and a friend to roads and canals while
Clay's slavery views
were distrusted by the people there, who
were largely from
northern states. The Cincinnati National
Republican in its
advocacy of Clinton put special emphasis
on his friendliness
to internal improvements. The Western
Herald and Steuben-
ville Gazette in the other section of
the state urged his candi-
dacy first of all because he was a
northerner and opposed to
9Cincinnati National Republican, Jan. 1,
1823.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 173
the extension of slavery. Thus he
possessed the chief elements
of strength of both Adams and Clay
without their weaknesses.
His cause was warmly advocated by at
least two important
newspapers while some others, apparently
for Adams, were
quite friendly. The Delaware Patron, an
Adams paper, openly
expressed its belief that Clinton could
carry the state but de-
clared his election out of question
because he was not con-
sidered in his own state.10
Through the spring and summer of 1823 the Clinton
move-
ment made little progress, largely
because New York was not
favorable, but late in the year a
concerted movement for him
took place in Ohio which for a time made
him a strong rival
of Clay and Adams. This can best be
taken up in another
connection.
The Adams following in the state, while
not so large as
Clay's in numbers, was not easily drawn
to other candidates.
Composed largely of former New
Englanders, this party clung
tenaciously to the New England candidate
and made ability,
integrity, morality, and opposition to
slavery its chief tenets
while at the same time asserting its
candidate's friendliness to
protective tariff and internal
improvements. Those to whom
opposition to slavery seemed of first
importance joined the
Adams movement making the Secretary of
State a strong can-
didate throughout the whole Northwest.
An attempt had been made in 1822 to
discredit Adams in
the West by the publication of the
Russell letters in which it
was charged that Adams had proposed at
Ghent in 1814 to
grant to Great Britain the right of
navigating the Mississippi
in return for the use of the
Newfoundland fisheries by the
Americans. 11 Adams successfully refuted
the charge but it
aroused him against Clay, whom he
thought responsible.
Writing of this in his diary, he said,
"Clay's conduct through-
out this affair towards me has been that
of an envious rival--
a fellow-servant whispering tales into
the ear of a common
master. He has been seven years circulating
this poison against
10Delaware Patron, in the Ohio Monitor,
May 3, 1823.
Niles' Register, XXII, 198, 209, 220,
296, 327; XXIII, 6, 9.
174 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
me in the West, and I have now no doubt
that Russell's letter
was brought forth upon suggestions
originating with him."12
Adams was more friendly to Calhoun, and
Clay to Crawford at
this time. Clay was partially drawn into
the Russell affair
by a letter 13 he wrote
denying certain statements make by
Adams but offering no proof because, he
said, he did not desire
to get into a controversy with him.14
Adams demanded com-
plete proof15 but Clay
refused to enter further into the affair.
His action did him no good, and even his
friends thought it
unwise that he should have written the
letter at all.16 The
charge raised by Russell was used
against Adams in the Ohio
campaign but played a very minor part as
the latter's able de-
fense had deprived it of its importance.
His opponents found
a more effective means to discredit him
in Ohio. The whole
affair only served to make a wider gap
between Adams and
Clay, which was unfortunate for both.
Considering the long period until the
election would take
place the year 1823 was surprisingly
full of presidential politics.
Charges and countercharges were hurled
back and forth by
ardent partisans. In Ohio the Clay men
had to bear the brunt
of the attack because of the leading
position Clay was holding
and because of the prestige the
legislative nomination had given
him as Ohio's candidate.
The National Republican of Cincinnati
took the lead in at-
tacking caucus nominations, whether
congressional or state.
It regarded Clay in an unfriendly light
and attacked Crawford
as the prince of intriguers. Calhoun was
declared to be too
young and lacking in the experience of
statesmanship.17 Jack-
son was praised for his great services
to the country, but was
declared utterly unfit for the
presidency as his talents were
those of a soldier. His advocates were
urged to cease their
12J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI, 49.
13J.
Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI, 116; Cincinnati National Republican,
Jan. 7, 1823.
14 Clay
to Brooke, Jan. 8, 1823, Works of Clay, IV, 70.
15J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI, 117.
16 Clay to Brooke, Jan. 31, 1823, Works
of Clay, IV, 71.
Cincinnati National Republican, March
14, 1823.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 175
officious efforts.18 Yet,
curiously enough, in less than a year
this same paper was strongly urging the
election of Jackson.
But the National Republican was not the
only paper guilty
of changing its politics. The Steubenville Gazette was so
bitter against the southern states and
any candidate from that
section that the Scioto Gazette was led
to advise the Steuben-
ville editor, James Wilson, to go forth
and preach a crusade
against the "southrons".19 Yet before many months had passed
the fiery editor had come out for Clay,
admitting that slavery
would play little part in the
election.20
The Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette
favored Calhoun
but at his withdrawal went over to
Clay.21 There was no in-
consistency in this, however, as both
Clay and Calhoun were
regarded as friendly to internal
improvements and the tariff,
and this paper put these issues above
all others.
These are only examples of the shifting
of party groups
in the state before the contest became
definitely limited.
A proposal of an eastern paper, made
early in the cam-
paign, to run Governor Morrow or former
Governor Worth-
ington for vice-president was looked
upon unfavorably by the
Clay leaders as an attempt to secure
Ohio's support to Adams
by an offer of the second place to the
western state. The Scioto
Gazette declared that the people of Ohio
were determined to sup-
port Henry Clay for president and that
nothing but "the act
of God" could induce them to alter
their resolution.22 This
rash statement returned to plague its
author again and again
during the closely fought campaign. The
suggestion of an
Ohio man for the vice-presidency dropped
out of sight, finding
little support anywhere.
Late in 1823 the Clinton movement took
on renewed life.
The National Republican in a significant
editorial urged the peo-
ple of the middle states and the west to
put an end to the
Cincinnati National Republican, May 6,
1823; May 13, 1823.
19 Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Aug. 2, 1823.
20Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, April 24, 1823.
21Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
March 5, 1824.
22 Chillicothe
Supporter and Scioto Gazette, in the Columbus Ga-
zette, June 5, 1823.
176 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
intrigues and cabals and factional
strife and unite on a candi-
date, DeWitt Clinton, who was decidedly
the most popular in
Ohio. The West would yield the
"partialities of personal at-
tachment" to higher considerations.23
On December 2, a large meeting
of Jefferson county citizens
held at Steubenville nominated Clinton
for president and Andrew
Jackson for vice-president.24 The National Republican on the
same day announced that New York would
support Clinton
and that he would be a candidate, 25 an
assertion at variance
with the real situation. On December 16
a public meeting was
held at Cincinnati to name a
presidential candidate, Mayor Bur-
net presiding. The crowd proved so large
that the building
could not hold it. The Steubenville
resolutions were adopted
and Clinton named for the presidency by
a vote of 450 for him
to 330 for all other candidates.26
The Cincinnati meeting aroused much
enthusiasm among the
Clinton followers and plans were
immediately set on foot to
hold a meeting at Columbus early in
January which would be
more than a local expression of
sentiment. The meeting, when
held, did not prove to be a Clinton
endorsement affair at all.
About four-fifths of those present were
from Columbus and
vicinity, and were more inclined towards
Clay than Clinton.
After much hot debating, especially over
slavery charges
directed against Clay, the meeting voted
to adjourn without
making a nomination. The Clinton followers
desired to re-
main and nominate their candidate but
the confusion became
so great that they were forced to give
up the attempt.27 The
National Republican charged the Clay men
with adjourning
the meeting to prevent Clinton's
nomination since Clay could
not have received a majority.28
The Columbus meeting injured the Clinton
movement and
23National Republican, Sept. 19, 1823.
24Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, Dec. 4, 1823.
25National Republican, Dec. 2, 1823.
26Ibid., Dec. 19, 1823.
27 Columbus Gazette, Jan. 15, 1824;
Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Ga-
zette, Jan. 20, 1824.
28 National Republican, Jan. 27,
1824.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 177
gave opposing papers an opportunity to
cast ridicule upon it.29
But the decline of the movement was not
due to this failure
but to the very apparent fact that
Clinton had never an-
nounced himself a candidate and that New
York had shown
little enthusiasm for him.
A few other Clinton meetings
were held in Ohio30 but his
cause was declining. The Western
Herald and Steubenville Gazette early in
February admitted
that Clinton's chances were doubtful.31
The National Repub-
lican would not concede his cause
hopeless until news came
of the failure of the bill in the New
York legislature to pro-
vide for popular election of the
presidential electors.32 This
doomed the Clinton movement as the New
York legislature,
which chose the electors, was completely
dominated by Van
Buren and his friends, who were hostile
to Clinton. The
National Republican blamed the Clay men
in New York for
the defeat of the electoral bill33 and
grew increasingly hostile
to Clay, eventually declaring for
Jackson.
On April 1O the Clinton committee of
correspondence at
Cincinnati formally dissolved.34 Of the ten members seven
declared for Clay, three for Jackson.
The Cincinnati Gazette
declared that the majority of the
Clinton men followed the
majority of the committee and joined the
Clay forces, but the
remarkable growth of the Jackson
strength around Cincinnati
seems to indicate that Jackson benefited
most by Clinton's
failure there. The movement for Clinton
was an ambitious
project to unite New York and perhaps
New England with
the Northwest but it failed because
local considerations were
too strong in each case. Thus Adams was
left as the only
northern candidate to compete for Ohio's
vote with two western
candidates. This necessitates a brief account of the disap-
29 Scioto Gazette, Jan. 17, 1824;
Hamilton Intelligencer and Adver-
tiser, Jan. 27, Feb. 17, 1824;
Cincinnati Gazette, Jan. 20, 1824.
30National Republican, Feb. 13, Feb. 24;
Cincinnati Gazette, Feb.
17, 1824.
31 Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, Feb. 7.
32 National Republican, April 9, 1824.
33 Ibid., April 9, April 13, April 16,
1824.
34 National Republican, April 13;
Cincinnati Gazette, April 16.
Vol. XXVI-12.
178 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
pearance of the Calhoun party, for
Calhoun was still in the
race in the early months of 1824.
Calhoun was popular in Ohio because of
his strong stand
for internal improvements but he was
never a leading candidate.
With Clay in the field he could hardly
hope to win the state's
electoral votes from the great western
advocate of the domestic
policy. Still his friends kept up the
fight in his behalf and
had several newspapers quite friendly to
his cause. So long
as he had a chance to carry
Pennsylvania, Calhoun was given
consideration in Ohio. Neither the Adams
nor the Clay men
were very hostile to him, as each
probably had hopes of eventu-
ally securing the support of his
followers in case his chances
did not warrant a contest in the state.
The Scioto Gazette
did, however, question whether Calhoun's
tariff sentiments
were exactly in unison with those of
Pennsylvania and the
West though it gave approval to his past
career.35
The National Republican, favoring
Clinton, was hostile to
Calhoun. It declared him not qualified
in age, experience, or
public service,36 and later
charged him with trying to supplant
Adams whom it was supposed he would
ultimately support.37
It referred to him as "a man of
second-rate talents, although
of first-rate pretentions."38 and
when his withdrawal was an-
nounced declared he had never had any
real popularity and
was just discovering the fact himself.39
Yet this same paper
was soon obliged to give Calhoun its
hearty support for the
vice-presidency on the Jackson ticket.
Calhoun's leading Ohio supporter was
William McLean, the
Postmaster General. He was quite active
in urging Calhoun's
claims40 and was much
disappointed at the action of the Ohio
legislators in naming Clay as their
choice.41 But his activities
35Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Feb. 26, 1824.
36 National Republican, March 14, 1823.
37 National Republican, Jan. 9, 1824.
38 Ibid., Jan. 13, 1824.
39Ibid., March 5, 1824.
40Trimble, "Memoirs of an Old
Politician," Jour. of Amer. History,
III, 617.
41McLean to Trimble, Jan. 31, 1823,
Papers of Gov. Allen Trimble,
Old Northwest Genealogical Quarterly, X,
302.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 179
subjected him to some criticism,
especially his use of the mails
for Calhoun pamphlets and newspapers.42 The declaration of
the Harrisburg convention in
Pennsylvania for Jackson led to
Calhoun's withdrawal. His leading
newspaper in Ohio, the
Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
went over to Clay as the
champion of the domestic policy and the
Calhoun movement
quietly dissolved. The race in the state
was now between
Adams, Clay and Jackson.
In national politics the most important
event of the early
campaign was the holding of the
congressional caucus in Feb-
ruary, 1824, which named William H.
Crawford as the Repub-
lican candidate for the presidency.43 The caucus was very un-
popular in Ohio and the West. Western
democracy was very
bitter against the selection of a
presidential candidate by mem-
bers of Congress as this meant to
westerners intrigue and cor-
ruption and perversion of the people's
will. The fact that
Crawford, most disliked of all
candidates in the West, was
the beneficiary of the caucus only added
fuel to the flame. In
Ohio, even the Clay papers, which had
been rather friendly to
Crawford, joined in the general
denunciation of the sixty-six
members of Congress who had dared to
hold a caucus. Only
one Ohio man, Benjamin Ruggles, United
States Senator, at-
tended the caucus, and he was chosen its
chairman. For this
he brought down upon himself an
avalanche of criticism, which
for a time threatened to blast his
political career.
A few extracts from leading newspapers
will show how in-
tense feeling was against the caucus and
its nominee. The Na-
tional Republican called it "the
second edition of the Hartford
convention" and declared its
members were principally apostate
Federalists.44 The Delaware
Patron, an Adams organ, ex-
pressed its gratification that
"amidst all the blandishments of
intriguers and the arts of
corruptionists, but one member of
the Ohio delegation has been seduced
from the path of duty,
42Columbus Gazette, Feb. 26, Mar. 11,
Mar. 25, 1824; Cincinnati
Advertiser, Jan. 10, 1824.
43Washington Republican, in Hamilton
Intelligencer, Mar. 2, 1824.
44 National Republican, Feb. 27, 1824.
180 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
to the imminent hazard of his popularity
and usefulness."45 The
Columbus Gazette, a Clay paper, declared
the conduct of Mr.
Ruggles "at variance with that of
the balance of our representa-
tion in Congress, and also with that of
the great body of the
people of this state."46 Clay himself was quite aroused and
wrote to Brooke that "the miserable
attempt at a caucus" would
destroy whatever prospects Crawford had.47
The only expression of sentiment
favorable to the caucus
was a public meeting at Zanesville held
to indorse its action.
But the opponents of the caucus
controlled the meeting and the
few favorable to it were forced to
withdraw to another room
where they passed resolutions approving the
action of the
caucus.48 The failure of this
attempted indorsement only caused
further ridicule and showed how
impossible it was for Crawford
to expect any support in Ohio.
All discussion of the Crawford candidacy
could be omitted
from this account of the Ohio campaign
were it not for its rela-
tions to the Clay candidacy and the
threatening complications
which resulted therefrom; for Clay's
opponents capitalized the
unpopularity of Crawford in the state
and used it with effect
against Clay. But this will be taken up
in connection with the
Clay campaign.
CHAPTER IV.
PARTIES AND CONVENTIONS.
The Ohio campaign was now definitely
limited to Adams,
Clay, and Jackson. The rise of the
Jackson movement needs
to be explained as it was the most
striking political phenomenon
of the spring of 1824. The candidacy of
Andrew Jackson had
previously aroused little attention in
Ohio, and though it found
some newspaper support, in general it
was not taken seriously.
Adams and Clay were the leading
candidates with Clinton
45Delaware Patron, Mar. 4, 1824.
46Columbus Gazette, Feb. 26, 1824.
47 Clay, Works, IV, 86.
48 Ohio Republican, Mar. 6, in Scioto
Gazette, Mar. 11; Steubenville
Gazette, Mar. 13.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 181
threatening and Calhoun a kind of
second-choice favorite of
the Clay and Adams men. But the
democratic character of the
Jacksonian movement and the personal
popularity of the "old
hero" could not help but make a
strong appeal to the west,
and with the decline of Clinton and
Calhoun this became very
evident.
In Cincinnati the trend toward Jackson
was surprisingly
strong. The Cincinnati Advertiser had
been urging Jackson's
cause but it was joined in April by the
National Republican, thus
giving the Jackson men two influential
newspapers in their sup-
port. The nomination of Jackson by the
Harrisburg convention
had caused much jubilation and, coming
at the same time as
the failure of the Clinton and Calhoun
movements, raised the
hopes of the Jackson men in Ohio to a
high pitch. Jackson
meetings were held in some counties in
April to forward his
candidacy.1 A Cincinnati meeting on
April 17 proved rather
small compared with the large Clinton
meeting of the previous
December2 but it was the
beginning of the Jackson organization
at Cincinnati.
In May the Jackson corresponding
committee of Cincinnati
and Hamilton county issued an address3
which was the first
general statement of the principles of
Jacksonian democracy in
Ohio. It attacked the system of
appointing members of Con-
gress to offices in the administration
as a source of danger;
declared that "ill-founded
constitutional scruples" had intervened
to prevent appropriations for national
purposes, while truly un-
constitutional measures were pursued
with avidity when it suited
those in power, that talent and
respectability had no weight in
securing offices in opposition to
executive favor; and demanded
a thorough reformation. It declared that
the situation called
for a man who "will always consider
talent and integrity the
only qualifications for promotion",
"whose mind has never been
contaminated with the corruption of
foreign courts, nor seduced
by the etiquette of the minions of
arbitrary power-who pro-
motes and encourages the manufactures of
his own country, and
National Republican, April 27.
2Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
April 20.
3National Republican, May 18.
182 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
was never duped by the wily insinuations
of foreign ministers;
the man who never linked himself in with
the corruptionists
of the day, nor put himself forth for
public office in any case
but where his services were essential to
the safety and welfare of
the nation." It closed with a
stirring appeal to the uncorrupted
part of the community to support the
savior of his country,
called forth like the great Cincinnatus
of old to save the nation.
This was the war cry of Jacksonian
democracy, the appeal
to the people. But it is to be noticed
that the address did not
neglect the questions of the domestic
policy, for it is to be
doubted whether the appeal would have
gotten very far had
Jackson been suspected of unfriendliness
to the fundamental
western interests. Nevertheless the
Jackson campaign was based
first of all on the popularity of
Jackson, other issues being rather
subordinated.
On May 29 the Jackson committee called a
convention to
be held at Columbus on July 14 to form a
Jackson electoral
ticket.4 Meanwhile friends of
the other candidates had not been
idle. Both Clay and Adams electoral
tickets had appeared.
The Columbus Gazette of March 25 printed
for the first
time a list of Clay electors headed by
William Henry Harrison
and former Governor Thomas Kirker, and
containing the names
of a number of members of the last
legislature. This ticket had
been agreed upon the previous winter by
friends of Clay at Co-
lumbus, principally members of the
legislature. It was imme-
diately attacked as a Crawford ticket in
disguise,6 as the work
largely of a leading Federalist, and as
containing former Federal-
ists on it.7
The leading Federalist referred to was
Charles Hammond,
campaign manager for Clay in Ohio.
Because of his prominence
in the campaign Hammond deserves some
notice here. He had
come to Ohio in 181O, a young lawyer of
Maryland birth, but
became editor of the Ohio Federalist at
St. Clairsville, arousing
much feeling against himself by opposing
the war of 1812. After
4 Cincinnati Advertiser, June 2.
5Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, April 15.
6National Republican, March 30, April 2.
7Ohio Monitor, in Hamilton
Intelligencer, April 20.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 183
this he served in the legislature for
several years, became supreme
court reporter, and, because of his
unusual ability, was retained
as attorney for the state in the famous
case of Osborn vs. The
Bank of the United States, when Ohio
attempted to tax the
Bank. He was pitted against Clay,
counsel for the Bank, but
felt no personal animosities and in 1824
became his political ad-
viser and campaign manager. Although the
son of a slave-holder,
Hammond was nevertheless a strong
opponent of slavery and
would have favored Adams in 1824 but for
the latter's desertion
of the Federalist party years before.
Nominally becoming a Re-
publican after his party's
disappearance, Hammond really re-
mained a Federalist at heart. He
disliked Jackson very much
and continued to oppose him until he
retired from public life.8
With headquarters at Cincinnati, the
heart of the Jackson
territory, Hammond directed Clay's
campaign with skill and
moderation though subjected to bitter
attacks personally. His
letters to the newspapers, especially
the Liberty Hall and Cincin-
nati Gazette, of which he later became
publisher, show a clear
perception of the true situation of the
Clay forces and how it
was to be met.
The Clay electoral ticket had hardly
appeared before an
Adams ticket was also published. On
February 18 the members
of the legislature friendly to Adams
met, and after passing
resolutions expressing their
determination to support a candidate
opposed to the slaveholding policy,
recommended an Adams
electoral ticket and appointed a
committee of correspondence.9
Calvin Pease, who had been chief justice
of the supreme court,
headed the ticket. He had headed the
Federalist electoral ticket
in 1812, a fact which the Clay men did
not neglect to point out.10
The list of proposed electors contained
several members of the
legislature, among them Nathaniel
McLean, brother of that ardent
Calhoun leader, Postmaster General
McLean.11
And now appears one of the strange
features of the cam-
8Smith's Charles Hammond, 12-36;
Mansfield, Personal Memories,
174-179.
9Ohio Monitor, in Delaware Patron, April
29.
10 Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, April 29.
11 Ohio Monitor, in Delaware Patron, May
20.
184 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
paign - the attempt of the Adams men to
secure the support of
the Jackson following by making Jackson
their vice-presidential
candidate. The plan was not confined to
Ohio nor did it origi-
nate there. Adams himself was probably
the one who suggested
the idea; at any rate it at once found
favor with him. Southard,
his cabinet colleague, warned him that
this might strengthen
Jackson for the presidency, but Adams
believed the idea cor-
rect in principle and the
vice-presidency especially suited to Jack-
son.l2 The plan was to unite
Jackson and Calhoun with Adams
by giving Jackson the vice-presidency
and Calhoun some place,
presumably in the cabinet, more suited
to his youth and activity.
This would strengthen the coming
administration against the ex-
pected alliance of Crawford and Clay and
add to it the much
desired western support.13
The Adams men in Ohio took up the plan,
and even before
their electoral ticket was published,
the Delaware Patron carried
the names of Adams for president and
Jackson for vice-president
at the head of its columns.14 With
the appearance of the "Free
Electoral Ticket", as the Adams
list was called, Jackson's name
appeared regularly as the
vice-presidential candidate. A Cin-
cinnati Adams follower, much alarmed at
Jackson's strength in
the Miami country, suggested a ticket
pledged to Adams and
Jackson and free to vote for either for
president as circumstances
should require.15 But the
Adams men had no intention of thus
weakening their support of the New
England candidate. They
continued to support Jackson for the
second place until late in
the summer when his name was quietly
dropped from the ticket.
This attempted union was doomed to
failure because Jack-
son had shown too much strength as a
presidential candidate to
be easily put into an inferior place.
His followers were too con-
fident of success to be willing to unite
themselves with the "aristo-
cratic candidate." Neither the
Adams nor the Clay men in
12Adams, Memoirs, VI, 253.
13 P. P. F. DeGrand to Gen. Dearborn,
Jan., 1824, Magazine of
Amer. Hist., VIII, 629.
14 Delaware Patron, April 8.
15 Cutler, Life and Times of
Ephraim Cutler, 189, H. D. Ward to
Cutler.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 185
Ohio seemed to have realized the
strength of Jackson's follow-
ing and each hoped for its eventual
union with themselves. The
Adams newspapers rather avoided
attacking Jackson's candidacy
until late in the campaign when union
was seen to be hopeless.
The Clay papers for the most part were
quite conciliatory
toward Jackson and his supporters until
it became evident that
he would not be withdrawn in Ohio. The
Cincinnati Gazette,
facing two Jackson papers at Cincinnati,
let loose at them rather
early, and in March was inviting General
Jackson to expose the
supposed corruption in the national
government and show what
was to be reformed.16 But it
was in an exceptional situation.
Throughout most of the state newspapers
were divided principally
between Clay and Adams and spent most of
their time attacking
each other to the neglect of Jackson.
The Jackson presses were not at all
lenient with Clay and
Adams, but, led by the National
Republican, indulged in a cam-
paign of such abuse and vilification
that Hammond formally pro-
tested through the Gazette against the
attitude of the National
Republican and urged that the campaign
be carried on without
indulging in personalities as there were
real grounds of difference
between the candidates.17 His protest went unheeded, and as a
result, before the campaign was over,
the Gazette and the Na-
tional Crisis, an Adams paper, were both
attacking the Jackson
men with their own weapons. The fierce
attacks of the Jackson
presses on their opponents and the fact
that Jackson was the
leading candidate around Cincinnati had
a tendency to draw the
Adams and Clay men somewhat more closely
together there than
elsewhere. They did not cease their
warfare, it is true, but they
did center their attacks on the Jackson
party. The way was thus
made easier for their eventual union.
No Jackson electoral ticket was
presented at the time the
other tickets appeared, but meetings
were held in various counties
in May and June and certain individuals
recommended as electors
in the different congressional
districts. The Jackson men con-
trasted the popular character of these
nominations with the man-
16 Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
March 19.
17 Ibid., May 21. Letter Signed
"L."
186 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
ner in which the Clay and Adams tickets
were prepared.18 The
final arrangement of the electoral
ticket and the formal presenta-
tion of Jackson's candidacy were to be
done by the state conven-
tion called by the Cincinnati Jackson
committee.
This convention was to be composed of
delegates chosen by
the people of the various counties. This
was the nearest ap-
proach to a regularly constituted
delegate nominating convention
that Ohio had yet seen. It was neither a
state nor a national
nominating convention but a kind of
state presidential ratifying
convention. It was one of the new
political practices of Jack-
sonian democracy and was on the model of
the Pennsylvania
Jackson convention at Harrisburg.
As it actually occurred the Ohio
convention proved a deep
disappointment to the followers of
Jackson. It met on July
14 but only a few delegates were
present, variously estimated
at from eleven to thirty, with only
eight or nine counties rep-
resented.19 It framed an
electoral ticket and appointed a com-
mittee to prepare an address to the
people. For some reason
the committee delayed publication of the
address until Septem-
ber, but as it was a kind of Jackson
platform it may be con-
sidered in connection with the
convention
The address,20 after praising
Jackson's integrity, patriotism,
and talents, proceeded to attack the
principle of legislative nomi-
nations as an interference with popular
elections and pointed out
as a horrible example of legislative
domination the state of New
York, expressing the fear that Ohio
would likewise become "the
sport of intriguing demagogues" and
"subject to the wickedness
and distraction of an organized system
of office brokerage, and
aristocratic domination." Both
congressional and state caucuses
were attacked.
The system of cabinet succession to the
presidency was as-
sailed because cabinet members through
their power and use of
the patronage could create powerful
parties in their favor. The
address declared that if either Adams or
Crawford were success-
18Hamilton Intelligencer, June 15;
National Republican, July 23.
19Columbus Gazette, July 22; Liberty
Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
July 23; National Republican, July 23.
20Hamilton Intelligencer,Sept. 27, Oct.
4.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 187
ful the nation would be distracted with
two contending parties,
"losing sight of the interests of
the people in a virulent and selfish
contest for power." Hence, a man
should be chosen, aloof from
intrigues and cabals, who would call
into public service "the most
intelligent and virtuous part of the
community."
Then it took up the question of Clay's
candidacy. This was
greatly deplored as unfortunately
producing a division among
those who entertained the same
sentiments as to a national policy,
and Clay was urged to withdraw on the
ground that there was no
reasonable expectation that he would
receive sufficient support to
reach the House of Representatives.
Another reason was that
he was much younger than his competitors
and could easily wait,
and being from the same section as
Jackson, should give way to
that hero and devoted patriot of two
wars. Furthermore, the
time honored practice of selecting the
president from the vener-
able sages of the nation should not be
departed from. Jackson
the last of the Revolutionary patriots,
without a congressional
caucus or cabinet influence to back him,
was emphatically the
candidate of the people and should be
chosen.
Part of the address was given over to a
biography of the
candidate and a eulogy of his talents
and abilities. Among other
things it was stated that "his
views of public policy, as to inter-
nal improvements and protection to
domestic manufactures,
eminently qualified him for the chief
seat in our national coun-
cils." This rather equivocal
statement contains the only direct
mention of the burning issues in
connection with Jackson, al-
though his friendliness to the domestic
policy is implied in several
places.
In conclusion Jackson's prospects were
set forth, 120 elec-
toral votes, including Ohio's 16, being
claimed for him and,
in case of Clay's withdrawal, Missouri
and Kentucky also, giving
him 137 votes, 6 more than a majority.
If all remained in the
race and the election went to the House,
the result would be im-
possible to foretell; "but from the
general impression which pre-
vails, that that body would elect the
candidate who had received
the greatest number of electoral vates,
and not incur the respon-
sibility and obloquy of selecting one
less popular with the people,
it is believed General Jackson would
there be chosen." Thus
188 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
early appears the democratic theory of
Benton and the other
Jackson men that it was the duty of the
House merely to ratify
the popular will by choosing the
candidate with the highest vote.
Calhoun was indorsed for the
vice-presidency because of his ad-
vocacy of internal improvements and
protection to manufactures.
This address of the Jackson committee
shows very clearly the
nature of the appeal that was made for
Jackson's election. It is
not his advocacy of any particular
measure nor his stand on im-
portant issues but his personality, his
services to the nation, his
democracy, and his freedom from intrigue
and corruption that
are set forth in his behalf. Sectional
feelings and great economic
questions are subordinated to a popular
appeal for the election of
a popular man. Democracy was asserting
its own importance.
The Jackson convention was not the only
one held in Ohio.
Both the Clay men and the Adams
folllowers held meetings at
Columbus in this same month which, while
not strictly delegate
conventions in the sense that the
Jackson assemblage was, were
quite similar to it in most respects.
On July 15 the friends of Henry Clay
attending the sitting of
the Federal Court at Columbus held a
public meeting to present
the claims of their favorite to the
people.21 Though only an in-
formal meeting it was, nevertheless,
more like a convention in
size and number of counties represented
than the Jackson party's
convention. There were about 300 present
and the meeting was
in charge of the three members of the
central committee of cor-
respondence. The committee reported the
written pledges of the
Clay electors to support Clay to the
end. This was to offset the
charge that they were to be delivered to
Crawford. Resolutions
were adopted by the meeting in favor of
Clay for president and
Nathan Sanford of New York for
vice-president, and a general
committee of one from each county was
appointed. As the elec-
toral ticket had been prepared the
preceding winter, the principal
business of the meeting was to issue an
address, which, unlike the
Jackson statement, appeared at once.
It discussed the origins of Clay's
candidacy, pointed out the
evils which reflecting men saw, as
Monroe's retirement ap-
Columbus Gazette, July 22; Scioto
Gazette, July 22, July 29.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 189
preached, in a struggle between members
of the cabinet for the
presidency and the dangers of continuing
"the same influence in
office, which virtually would be a
departure from the maxim, that
rotation in office was essential to the
preservation of the re-
public." Thus, on the principle
that no member of the cabinet
should be chosen, attention was
naturally directed to Henry Clay,
intimately acquainted with western
needs, known to the nation as
a liberal, intelligent statesman and to
the world as a fearless
American leader, successful at Ghent and
the first to raise his
voice for South America. On these
grounds, declared the ad-
dress, the citizens of the West
determined to nominate him as
Monroe's successor, and they support
that nomination on broad
national grounds, not sectional as has
been asserted.
Then followed a paragraph setting forth
Clay's strong ad-
vocacy of internal improvements at
national expense and the pro-
tection of domestic industry together
with an account of his work
to secure these objects.
Jackson's candidacy received
consideration. The presence
of another candidate in the West
supported with the same objects
in view was deeply regretted but the
opinion was expressed that
"the diversion will be much less
extensive and mischievous than
is by some supposed."
It is frankly admitted in the address
that Clay's only hope
of election was through the House of
Representatives but the
blame for this was placed upon the
presence of another candi-
date from the West. It was denied that
Clay's withdrawal
would result in an election by the
electors or would mate-
rially change the situation, except
possibly to place a member
of the cabinet in the presidential
chair, "an event, which it
was the first object of the friends of
Mr. Clay to prevent;
not in reference to the men, but to the
principle."
Then followed a list of the states in
which Clay had
strong hopes and a forecast of how Ohio
would vote. Nathan
Sanford of New York, chancellor of that
state and a former
United States senator, was put forward
as Clay's running mate
on the ground that he was devoted to the
same great national
interests.
In their opposition to cabinet succession
to the presidency
190 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
both the Clay and Jackson addresses
express similar sentiments
though the sentiments of the former are
more restrained. As
to the need for a united West they are
agreed; but as to
which candidate shall withdraw they
disagree. But the Clay
address makes a very different kind of
appeal to the voters.
Clay's election is urged because of what
he has accomplished
as a statesman and what he is
advocating. The economic and
sectional issues appear prominently in
the address. It is more
concerned with the issues, the Jackson
address with Jackson.
Soon after this meeting was held Clay
himself arrived in
Columbus to attend the sitting of the
Federal Court. His pres-
ence doubtless accounts in part for the
large number of Clay
men in Columbus at this time. He was
much pleased with the
general situation and wrote to J. S.
Johnston that the evidence
derivable from popular meetings all over
the state placed be-
yond all doubt the final result.22
The third meeting of this month was the
Adams gather-
ing, held on the same evening as the
Clay meeting by the friends
of Adams attendant on the Federal Court.23
It was called on
short notice and only a small number was
present. But an
address was issued, nevertheless,
calling upon the followers of
Adams to work harder and setting forth
his claims to the presi-
dency. It began by charging the
opposition, especially the Clay
partisans, with striving to create
distrust in the Adams ranks
and causing them to lose confidence in
their own strength. On
the vital question of Adams' attitude
toward western interests,
the address said: "Prejudices were
attempted to be excited
against Mr. Adams by representing him as
being unfriendly
to the interests of the West. The whole
tenor of his conduct
refutes the charge. We might retaliate
on our opponents, that
under a pretense of advocating the
rights of the West they are
advocating the interests of the
slaveholding section of the
nation. But this is not our wish; we
wish to create no sec-
tional feelings. We believe that Mr.
Adams, if elected presi-
dent, will be in fact a president of all
the states, that he will
22Clay to J. S. Johnston, July 21, 1824,
Works of Clay, IV, 97.
23 Ohio Monitor, in Delaware Patron,
July 22.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 191
not become subservient to the views of
any party of men or
the local interests, of any part of the
public."
Then followed a forecast of the
possibilities of Adams in
Ohio to show his followers that there
was plenty of incentive
to action. Especially was encouragement
derived from the
belief that Adams had the best chance in
the electoral college
and that Ohio's vote would prevent a
House election. Return-
ing to the question of western
interests, the address declared
Adams a consistent supporter of internal
improvements and
favorable to a protective tariff, and
concluded with a statement
of his high qualification for the
presidency.
As a whole the address gives the impression
that the Adams
men were on the defensive and at a
certain disadvantage. The
considerable space given to the issues
of tariff and internal im-
provements shows the difficulties the
Adams men were having
over these questions while their desire
to see the slavery issue not
entirely overlooked is evident. It
illustrated the strength and
the weakness of the Adams movement in
Ohio.
With these meetings at Columbus and the
addresses issued
by them the campaign entered on its
final stages. It now be-
came a desperate scramble for votes and
there was little in the
public or private life of a candidate
that was overlooked. To
understand the importance of the
questions raised and their in-
fluence upon the final result, a
somewhat detailed consideration
of the campaigns carried on by the
partisans of each candidate
is necessary.
CHAPTER V.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR CLAY.
The Clay campaign was vitally connected
with the interests
of the West. Clay's record, so far as
these were concerned, could
not be attacked and his followers made
much of his strong stand
on these questions. If the campaign was
to be fought out on the
issue of the friendliness of the
candidates towards the tariff and
internal improvements, then Clay was
Ohio's logical candidate.
Had there been any doubts as to his
attitude on these ques-
tions previously, there were certainly
no grounds for any after
192 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society
Publications.
the session of Congress of 1823-4 ended.
The General Survey
Bill, in which the advocates of internal
improvements felt such an
interest, received his hearty support,
while the tariff of 1824 was
strongly advocated by him. His speeches1
were reprinted with
favorable comment in newspapers all over
Ohio. Even the Cin-
cinnati Advertiser, strongly for
Jackson, praised Clay's defense
of the tariff2 and refused to
attack him during the whole cam-
paign though it urged his withdrawal in
Jackson's favor. The
Scioto Gazette probably expressed the
general opinion of Ohio
on the tariff of 1824 when it declared
it not quite equal to the
wishes of the friends of domestic
industry but a favorable be-
ginning.3
Clay thus came through the session of
Congress in a position
to make a strong bid for a united
western support. His vigorous
fight for both the protective system and
internal improvements
strengthened him generally throughout
the West and probably had
much to do with his success in Ohio. But
the very fact that he
was such a strong supporter of western
interests gave his can-
didacy such a sectional character that
he proved very unacceptable
to the other parts of the country. His
lack of support outside his
own section was a disappointment to him.4
But his attitude dur-
ing the whole campaign was probably
expressed in his letter to
Brooke in February, 1823, when he said,
"Connect yourself with
the West, and are you not, whether the
election is won or lost, on
the vantage ground?"5
Clay had other things in his favor. He
had been a firm and
consistent member of his party. His
advocacy of South Ameri-
can independence had endeared him to the
West as the fearless
champion of human rights. His followers
declared he had been
the particular guardian of western
interests at the negotiation of
the treaty of Ghent.6 In
short, Clay's previous career had in it
much for western Americans to admire and
little for them to
1Columbus Gazette, April 8, May 6.
2Cincinnati Advertiser, March 3.
3Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, July 1.
4Clay to Brooke, Aug. 28, 1823; Works of
Clay, IV, 78-83.
5Works of Clay, IV, 74.
6Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Feb. 26, 1824.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 193
criticise. But his attitude on the
Missouri question was a weak-
ness in Ohio. Very early in the campaign
he was charged with
opposing the restriction of slavery in
Missouri and bringing about
the second Missouri compromise in order
to add another slave
state to the Union.7 His
opposition to the views of the Ohio
congressional delegation on that
question was pointed out and
urged as a reason why Ohio should not
support him.8 Because
Adams was a northerner and would profit
most from the slavery
issue the Adams men relied largely on
Ohio's dislike of slavery
to injure Clay's chances. This was their
best weapon and they
made the most of it. It was kept before
the people, even in the
last stages of the campaign, in the
effort to injure Clay, but was
generally displaced in public interest
by other questions. A lead-
ing Adams paper, urging Ohio not to
support the advocate of
slavery, exclaimed despairingly:
"The ignis fatuus 'western in-
terest', is like to absorb every sound
moral and political considera-
tion."9
It is probable that the slavery issue
did keep many sincere
friends of internal improvements,
especially those of New Eng-
land birth, from supporting Clay. But
there were many others,
like Charles Hammond and James Wilson,
the Steubenville
editor, who were willing, though
opponents of slavery, to see it
slip into the background and more
pressing problems take its
place. Clay's friends were not without a
defense against charges
of friendliness to slavery. It was
stated that he had worked to
secure emancipation in the Kentucky
convention of 1798; that he
was a supporter of the American
Colonization Society; that he
never appeared at the bar against slaves
suing for their freedom
but had acted on behalf of many; that
his attitude on the Missouri
question was due to his constitutional
views and that he had
privately urged a member of the Missouri
convention to work
for gradual emancipation.10 At
any rate it was quite evident that
he was not an ardent pro-slavery
advocate or even from the
7Ohio Monitor, Feb. 22, 1823.
8Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette, Mar. 22, 1823.
9Ohio Monitor, in Delaware Patron, Sept.
16.
10 Article by "Seventy-Six,"
Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
May 7, 1824.
Vol. XXVI- 13.
194 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society
Publications.
South. He was a western man and this
overshadowed his sup-
posed southern sympathies.
But there was an incident in Clay's
career which threatened
to injure his chances in Ohio as much as
his slavery attitude.
This was his connection with the United
States Bank. The bank
had been very unpopular in the state for
its actions during and
following the panic of 1819.
The attempt to tax the bank, one
result of this dislike of that
institution, had brought on a bitter
contest in which the state had not
succeeded. Clay was one of
the principal attorneys for the great
corporation and thus caused
himself much criticism. The contest was
ended by 1824, how-
ever, and though the bank was by no
means popular in the state,
the question was regarded generally as a
dead issue, - so dead,
in fact, that the chief counsellor for
the state in the bank con-
troversy, Charles Hammond, became Clay's
campaign manager
while other opponents of the bank were
his supporters. But
there was a smouldering resentment which
occasionally showed
itself during the campaign in certain
newspapers unfriendly to
Clay.11
The connection of Clay with the bank did
not injure him
greatly except in the southwestern
section of the state where
local interests were involved. The
activities of the branch at
Cincinnati in 1821 and 1822, when the
business depression was
at its worst, had aroused much
bitterness. The branch had
suddenly called in its loans and then
discontinued business
causing much distress. Debtors were
shown no leniency and
as a result the bank acquired a
considerable amount of valuable
real estate.12 Clay, as legal
advisor for the institution, was
held partly to blame for this. While
this was not put forward
as strongly as some other charges, it
appeared often enough to
show that there was sufficient
deep-seated resentment against
Clay in Cincinnati to prevent his cause
from making much
headway. An article signed
"Cassius",appearing in the National
Republican, charged that Clay, though
opposed to the first
United States Bank, had favored
chartering the second and had
11 Ohio Monitor, Mar. 1, 1823; Hamilton
Intelligencer, Feb. 24, 1823;
Steubenville Gazette, Mar. 22, 1823.
12Burnet,
Notes on the Northwest Territory, 408.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 195
allied himself with it in order to have
its wealth and power back
of him in his efforts to reach the
presidency, and that he was
using his power as counsellor for the
bank to secure the support
of those indebted to it.13 Other articles
intending to discredit
him through his connection with the bank
appeared in the closing
weeks of the campaign.14 But the most significant of all is the
admission in the Clay organ of
Cincinnati, the Liberty Hall and
Cincinnati Gazette, that much prejudice
has heretofore existed
against Mr. Clay among the citizens of
this place on the sup-
position that he advised the
commencement of the suits against
the debtors of the branch bank."
The editorial admitted that
it still prevailed to some extent but
expressed the belief that it
was wearing away as it was without
foundation.15 It evidently
persisted, however, for the vote in
Cincinnati showed Clay least
popular of all the candidates. Charges
and misstatements of
facts can be combatted openly but
prejudices such as this one
persist in spite of all denials. The
bank issue, fortunately for
Clay, was largely confined to Cincinnati
and vicinity.
Though his opponents centered their
attack on Clay as a
public man, his private life was not
neglected. The Jackson
men, though indulging in personalities
against their opponents,
did not attack Clay's private character
because their own can-
didate was not invulnerable in this
respect. But the Adams
partisans, proud of their candidate's
character, hardly used the
proper restraint in attacking Clay. He
was charged with being
a gambler and a duellist and utterly
disqualified for the presi-
dency as to moral character.16 Crawford and Jackson were
not entirely neglected on this point
either. "When men of im-
moral character and dissolute principles
ascend to the helm of
government," said one writer,
"she will soon become the scoff
and derision of the world."17 Charges against Clay's private
life, however, were of little importance
compared to other ques-
13National Republican, Aug. 13, 1824.
14Ibid., Aug. 17, Oct. 15, Oct. 22,
1824.
15Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
May 14, 1824.
16 Numerous statements in the Ohio
Monitor and the Delaware
Patron.
17Letter to the National Crises, in
Delaware Patron, Sept. 2, 1824.
196
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society
Publications.
tions raised against him. But it was
neither his public career
nor his private life that furnished the
most successful issue
against him but a certain political
charge that appeared during
the campaign, was widely circulated, and
immediately disap-
peared at its close. This was the
supposed Clay-Crawford
coalition.
The friendliness of Clay and Crawford
was quite apparent
early in the campaign, and caused Adams
and Calhoun to draw
more closely together. There was a
feeling that the first two
would be eventually found on the same
side.l8 The hopeless-
ness of Crawford's cause in the West led
his supporters there
to join the Clay party. They were quite
welcome, but it led the
way to the charge that this union was a
part of a general plan
whereby the Clay and Crawford forces
were to unite and, in
case of either's cause becoming
hopeless, the other was to receive
the combined support of the two. Since
Crawford had little
strength in the West and Clay in the
East and South, it was
supposed that this alliance would work
well. But as Crawford's
chances were much brighter throughout
the nation as a whole,
this supposed agreement would give
Clay's western support to
Crawford in the end. The opponents of
Clay in Ohio seized
upon this charge as the best weapon to
use against his popularity.
If Ohioans could be made to believe that
support of Clay meant
eventually support of Crawford,
"the intriguer and corrup-
tionist" and opponent of Western
interests, then Clay's cause
would be irretrievably ruined.
As an actual fact this coalition never
had any existence ex-
cept in the newspapers of the opponents
of Clay. It had been
suggested by the Crawford men at
different times during the
campaign as it would have been greatly
to their advantage to
secure western support, if not in the
electoral college, at least
in the House of Representatives where
the election seemed cer-
tain to go. But Clay rejected all their
overtures. He was
unwilling to see his own chances
lessened, and besides saw the
impossibility of getting the West to
support Crawford. He wrote
to Brooke that Crawford's friends were
trying to exclude him
18 DeGrand to Dearborn. Jan., 1824, Mag. of Amer. Hist., VIII, 629.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 197
(Clay) from the House of Representatives
in the hope that the
western support would go to their
candidate. He declared this
plan utterly impossible because the
northwestern states would
certainly go for Adams in case of his
own exclusion from the
House election.19 Nevertheless
the Crawford party held on to
some hope of a coalition, for Hammond,
late in the campaign,
was urged from Washington to form a
union of the Clay and
Crawford forces. Clay apparently to
receive the vice-presidency.
He declined to act as agent in this
affair, for which refusal he
was commended by Clay, who declared his
purpose to refrain
from any arrangement or compromise.20
That is as far as the
idea of a coalition got. But some
knowledge of these overtures
and the statements of certain Crawford
papers outside of Ohio
and some Clay papers in the state
furnished sufficient basis to
the opponents of Clay to raise a
coalition charge and keep it from
losing force.
It appeared quite early in the campaign21 and apparently
was causing some trouble for the
Columbus Gazette found it
necessary in January, 1824, to make a
formal denial that Clay
intended to go over to Crawford in
expectation of becoming
Secretary of State.22 The
appearance of the Clay electoral ticket
in March brought forth the charge in
definite form. The Na-
tional Republican, most persistent in
raising this issue, declared
that the electoral ticket looked like a
Crawford ticket, that Clay
might withdraw, and that Ohio must be on
guard lest the state
be sold to Crawford.23
This at once drew an answer from Charles
Hammond, who
stated that the electoral ticket was a
Clay ticket through and
through and that so far as their second
choice was known a
large majority of the proposed electors
preferred Adams. He
admitted a personal preference for
Crawford.24 The Cincin-
nati Gazette at the same time issued a
denial of Clay's reported
19Clay to Brooke, Feb. 23, 1824, Works
of Clay, IV, 86.
20Smith, Charles Hammond, 36-37.
21For example, Delaware Patron, Aug. 6,
1823.
22Columbus Gazette, Jan. 22, 1824.
23 National Republican, March 30.
24Ibid., April 2.
198 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
withdrawal.25 The Scioto
Gazette pointed out the absurdity of
the electors having a second choice
since they were pledged to
Clay and could cast only one ballot.26
But the National Repub-
lican kept up the coalition charge,
pointing to the union of Clay
and Crawford men against the electoral
bill in New York,27 and
the statements of certain Clay papers in
Ohio friendly to Craw-
ford.28 The Muskingum
Messenger and the Mad River Courant
appeared unnecessarily friendly toward
the "Treasury candi-
date." A letter from Chillicothe to
the Richmond (Va.) En-
quirer, declaring that Crawford had many
influential friends in
Ohio but could not get the state's vote
until the election reached
the House, was produced as additional
proof.29 The Adams
partisans circulated the coalition
charge quite as industriously
as the Jackson leaders and warned the
people that voting for
Clay meant voting for Crawford.30
Coupled with the coalition charge were
frequent reports of
Clay's withdrawal. These two things were
by no means con-
sistent with each other, for the
coalition charge was based prin-
cipally on the belief that Clay would
remain in the race to hold
the West for Crawford, if not in the
electoral college, at least
in the House. His withdrawal before
election could hardly mean
that a Crawford ticket would carry the
state. But the Adams
and Jackson followers desired to see
Clay withdrawn in their in-
terest if possible; if not, that he
should be so discredited by the
coalition charge that he would lose
Ohio. Hence, both reports
were put forth, regardless of their lack
of consistency.
A Washington dispatch to the Columbus
Gazette declared
authoritatively that Clay would remain
in the fight to the end as
his withdrawal would only result in the
division of his followers
and would produce no effect on the final
result, whereas, "if, con-
trary to all probability, Mr. Clay
should not be returned to the
25Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
April 2.
26Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, April 15.
27 National Republican, April 16.
28Ibid., April 16, June 1.
29Ibid., June 22.
30Circleville Olive Branch, in Delaware
Patron, June 24; Delaware
Patron, July 15.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 199
House, his friends having done their
duty, will be able, by con-
centration, to control the event."31
The Chillicothe Supporter
and Scioto Gazette declared that Clay's
withdrawal would give
Ohio to Adams.32 As has been
seen, at the Columbus Clay meet-
ing of July, signed pledges of the Clay
electors to vote for Clay
alone were produced to put a stop to
both coalition and with-
drawal reports.33 But it did
not end here.
The National Republican charged that the
patronage of the
Treasury Department was being bestowed
on the friends of Clay
in Ohio and pointed to the appointments
of two Clay editors to
positions as public land agents.34 It kept up the charges of a
Clay-Crawford alliance to the end of the
campaign with increas-
ing bitterness. The Adams party likewise
continued it.35
The Scioto Gazette denied the truth of
it again and again,
and finally declared that, if Clay's
friends preferred Crawford,
the friends of the other candidates had
no right to complain as
their bitterness towards Clay had
labored to produce this very
result. It charged Adams and Jackson
with being in alliance in
Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi and the
Carolinas. "And is it
not now in contemplation to make another
transfer of all this
interest, so soon as the great question
at issue shall come before
the House of Representatives? If so, is
it becoming in the parti-
sans of Adams and Jackson to prate about
"coalitions" . . .?36
In view of what actually happened in the
House election, this
statement appears in a very curious
light indeed.
The closing days of the campaign were
marked by rumors
of Clay's withdrawal which gave his
followers much concern.
Handbills and pamphlets were
distributed, principally by Jack-
son partisans, declaring that Clay had
withdrawn and that his
friends in Kentucky had gone over to
Jackson.37 The Clay men
at Cincinnati prepared for such rumors
by organizing a "Clay
31 Columbus Gazette, July 1.
32Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, July 8.
33 Columbus Gazette, July 22.
34 National Republican, Aug. 13.
Ohio Monitor, in Delaware Patron, Sept.
16.
36 Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Sept. 30.
37 Ibid., Oct. 14, Oct. 21.
200 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society
Publications.
Committee of Vigilance" to
counteract any false reports and keep
the Clay followers on guard. A
double-column warning was pub-
lished in the Gazette urging the voters
to pay no attention to these
withdrawal rumors.38
The fact that Clay would receive little
support in the East
and the growing doubt that he would have
sufficient electoral
votes to reach the House were severe
handicaps for his followers,
as he well knew39 That they
succeeded in Ohio must be attri-
buted largely to the strength of the
party of western interests
which was able to overcome the worst
objections raised against
their candidate. The support of the
Crawford men in Ohio
probably did Clay's cause as much harm
as good, for their activi-
ties furnished the basis for the
strongest objection which the op-
ponents of Clay could make use of. In
this way alone could any
doubt be raised that a Clay victory in
Ohio meant a sacrifice of
western interests. Clay was
distinctively the candidate of the
tariff and internal improvement men of
the West, while Craw-
ford was just as distinctively not. Had
the coalition been effected
it would probably have cost Clay the
vote of Ohio and perhaps
the whole West. As it was, the supposed
existence of such an
alliance proved a serious factor, and
only the direct open manner
in which Hammond, General Harrison and
other Clay leaders
met the charge saved the day.
CHAPTER VI.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR JACKSON.
The nature of the Jackson campaign has
already been given
some consideration. As has been stated,
the campaign was based
largely on the personality and
popularity of the "old hero". It
was the man of the people against the
aristocratic party on the
one hand and the intriguers and
corruptionists on the other. Such
a campaign seemed irrational and without
basis to the Clay and
Adams leaders, who were inclined to
regard the Jackson move-
38Liberty Halland Cincinnati Gazette,
Oct. 1.
Clay to J. S. Johnston, Aug. 31, 1824,
Works of Clay, IV, 98.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 201
ment as a temporary outburst which would
soon pass away.
Each hoped to gain by it. Jackson was
regarded as a good sol-
dier but out of question for the
presidency.1
The attitude of Jackson toward western
interests deserves
notice. His supporters all asserted his
friendliness to the tariff
and internal improvements and declared
that, being the stronger
candidate, he should have a united West
back of him. People
generally seemed to have taken it for
granted that, because he
was a westerner, he was naturally a
tariff man and friendly to
internal improvements. At least there
was not much inclination
to raise the charge of unfriendliness to
western interests against
him. Jackson men could point to his vote
in the Senate for the
tariff of 1824 and his letter to Dr.
Coleman as evidences of his
favorable attitude towards the tariff.
The Coleman letter aroused
enthusiasm among the Jackson followers2
and doubtless aided his
cause with the friends of the tariff,
moderate though its expres-
sions were.
The Cincinnati Gazette accused Jackson
of voting without
principle on the tariff bill because he
had voted to strike out
duties on cotton bagging to please the
South, so it was charged,
and for the bill as a whole including
the duty on iron to please
Pennsylvania.3 It had already expressed its
suspicions of him
because his strongholds were in the
South, which was opposed
to the tariff.4 The Gazette
later argued that the next president
must be a friend of internal
improvements and domestic manu-
factures, and that the domestic system
had a thousand friends
more decided and efficient than General
Jackson.5 But this was
not directly charging Jackson with
hostility to western interests
and so did not carry far.
The partisans of Jackson were constantly
urging Clay to
withdraw so that their candidate could
have a united western
1For example, Chillicothe Supporter and
Scioto Gazette, Feb. 21,
1824; Aug. 19, 1824.
2Hamilton Intelligencer, June 29;
National Republican, Aug. 24.
3Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
May 28.
4Cincinnati Gazette, April 27.
5Cincinnati Gazette, in Chillicothe
Supporter and Scioto Gazette,
Aug. 12.
202 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
support since both stood for the same
interests. But the Na-
tional Republican seemed to believe that
this could only be
accomplished by bitterly attacking the
Clay men as intriguers
and corruptionists and referring to them
as "the caucus junto"
in order to discredit the Clay movement.
The Cincinnati Adver-
tiser took a most unusual attitude,
quite the reverse of the
other Jackson paper. It supported
Jackson but expressed great
admiration for Clay as a friend of
western interests and desired
him to withdraw, even suggesting that he
be made Secretary
of State if Jackson were elected.6 Its attitude was that the
West should unite on its strongest
candidate as against the can-
didates unfriendly to the West. The
editor, Moses Dawson,
proceeded on the theory that Jackson and
Clay had everything
in common in opposition to Adams.7 But
plausible as it sounds,
this was not actually the case. Clay was
represented more
especially the economic demands of the
West, Jackson, western
democracy; and these were by no means
identical, as the next
few years were to show.
Hammond answered the Advertiser in a
letter which shows
that he was under no delusions as to a
Jackson-Clay alliance.
He expressed his belief that Clay's
withdrawal would give Ohio,
as well as New York, New Jersey and
Indiana, to Adams. De-
claring the opposition of the great body
of Clay followers to
Jackson, he said, "It is their
sincere and honest conviction that
he does not possess the political
intelligence and judicial in-
formation indispensable in a president
of the States." He
warned the Jackson men not to attribute
the failure to elect a
western president to Clay: "Those
who support him are not
liege subjects, whom he can transfer to
General Jackson." He
declared that if Clay reached the House,
there might be a west-
ern president. "I believe that no man pretends that General
Jackson can be chosen by the
House."8
The Scioto Gazette in the last days of
the campaign de-
clared that there was not "the most
remote probability" of
Jackson's election by the House and
expressed the belief that
6Cincinnati Advertiser, Feb. 7, Feb. 28,
Mar. 3, 1824.
7 Cincinnati Advertiser, Sept. 11.
8 Ibid., Sept. 11, Letter signed
"L."
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 203
his interests would be transferred to
Adams.9 An Adams paper
had also expressed the same views.10
Both Clay and Adams
parties seemed to have regarded the
possibility of Jackson's
election by the House as a political
absurdity. Their leaders
distrusted him to such an extent that
any other candidate would
have been preferred to him. John C.
Wright, an Adams con-
gressman from Ohio, wrote to Ephraim
Cutler, expressing his
alarm at having "a military
chieftain, who has frequently been
known to be too violent to be restrained
by law, to rule over
us."11 This was the
typical attitude of many Adams and Clay
men.
But Hammond went far beyond this. While
he showed a
commendable moderation and restraint in
his public writings,
his private views of Jackson exhibit a
most astonishing bitter-
ness. "How is it", he wrote to
Clay, "that no one speaks freely
of this man? Instead of being a frank,
open, fearless, honest
man, is he not the victim of strong
passions and prejudices,
violent when irresponsible, cautious
when differently situated,
ambitious, vain and hasty, a fit
instrument for others to work
upon, subject to be governed by
flatterers, and still inclined to
hate every man of talents who has the
firmness to look through
him and speak of him as he deserves? I
think he is strongly
endowed with those traits of character,
and that if classed as a
mere animal, he would be a kind of
monkey tiger. I do not
know but that it would be well for such
a monster to be placed
in the Presidential chair for the next
term. King Snake suc-
ceeding King Log, and the citizen frogs
made to scamper. I
am almost sure that if I had been this
winter at Washington
I should have contrived to quarrel with
him. I dislike him
for cause, I hate him peremptorily, and
I could wish that his
supporters for the presidency, one and
all were snugly by them-
selves in some island of Barrataria, and
he be their king, pro-
vided, that they constituted the entire
population. They would
make a glorious terrestrial pandemonium,
and as fast as they
9Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Oct. 21.
10 Delaware Patron, Sept. 16.
11 Cutler, Life of Cutler, 185.
204 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
cut each other's throats the world
would be rid of very trouble-
some politicians, and in general, right
worthless citizens."12
The bitter sarcasm of the Clay leader
shows that he would
hardly have supported Jackson under any
circumstances, and
there are indications that this feeling
was rather general among
the leading Clay men. Considering these
things the eventual
union of the Clay and Adams parties was
not such an unrea-
sonable and unexpected event as the
Jackson presses later pro-
claimed it to be.
The attacks on the Jackson movement in
Ohio did not show
much force until late in the campaign
when Jackson's chances
appeared bright. They were confined
principally to attempts to
show Jackson's personal unfitness for
the presidency and do
not require much consideration here.
His past life was ex-
plored, and it was charged that he was
a duellist, had killed
Charles Dickinson and fought Benton;
had imprisoned Judge
Hall without authority; had resigned as
senator and as a judge
because he was not qualified; had
opposed universal suffrage in
Tennessee and was an aristocrat; had
engaged in controversies
with the governors of Georgia and
Louisiana and with the Sec-
retary of War; had violated the laws of
war and shown unusual
violence in the Seminole war; had
indulged in the sports of
the turf and the cockpit; in short,
possessed "an energy beyond
the law" and a number of personal
failings very undesirable in
a chief executive.13 A
number of pamphlets were circulated
against Jackson, the most important one
being sent from Ten-
nessee to Ohio under the signature of a
long-time enemy, Jesse
Benton, and enumerating in detail the
violent acts of Jackson's
earier life.14
Little restraint toward their opponents
was shown by the
followers of any of the candidates,
especially at Cincinnati, but
-an abusive campaign of personalities
almost from the beginning.
Yet when their opponents used the same
tactics, Elijah Hay-
ward, editor of the National
Republican, who was also chair-
Smith's Charles Hammond, 35.
13Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
Sept. 2, 14, 21, 24, Oct. 1;
Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Oct. 21.
14 National Republican, Oct. 19.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 205
man of the Ohio Jackson committee,
complained of their
unfairness and attempted to show that
Jackson had been badly
abused and maltreated.15 His
lack of consistency was quickly
taken advantage of by the Clay partisans
and he was silenced.16
Jackson's strength had greatly increased
in Ohio during the
progress of the campaign until it became
generally apparent that
he would run ahead of Adams and possibly
defeat Clay. It
now becomes necessary to consider the
course of the Adams
campaign and the decline of his chances.
CHAPTER VII.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR ADAMS.
John Quincy Adams was probably the most
severely attacked
and certainly the least understood in
the state of all three can-
didates. His cause was more vitally
affected by the important
issues at stake than either of his
competitors. This makes a
consideration of the Adams movement of
unusual interest.
The partisans of Adams carried on the
campaign with two
important arguments for their candidate,
namely, the necessity
of electing a man from the free states
and the high qualifications
of the New England candidate. The
slavery issue has already
been discussed and needs little further
consideration here. It
drew to Adams the New Englanders and
many from the Middle
States who believed opposition to
slavery the vital issue. One
element in the Adams following was the
Society of Friends, then
the principal opponents of slavery, who
were represented on the
electoral ticket.1 But, as
has been seen, the Adams movement
by no means included the whole number of
the opponents of
slavery but rather those who put
opposition to slavery above all
other considerations. To the extent to
which the Adams men
could make the slavery question the
leading issue depended their
chances of success in Ohio. They
realized that this was their
15National Republican, Oct. 1.
16 Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Sept. 30, Oct. 7.
17 Ohio Monitor, in Delaware Patron, May
20.
206 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
strength and made the most of it.2 But
circumstances were un-
favorable and other issues proved more
important.
The Adams partisans were very proud of
the talents, learn-
ing, experienced statesmanship, and high
moral character of their
candidate. In the emphasis they placed
on this last qualification
can be seen the New England influence in
the Adams camp. The
high qualifications of Adams were
recognized, even by his op-
ponents, who would have found it
difficult to attack him on these
grounds, but such qualities, though
everywhere admitted, were
not of the sort to arouse popular
enthusiasm. And there were
certain points where prejudices could be
developed against him.
The opponents of Adams attacked him very
bitterly on per-
sonal grounds. He was called a
Federalist and an aristocrat, a
friend of England, the son of his
father, a disbeliever in Chris-
tianity, and even a slave-holder.3 Every prejudice was appealed
to in order to injure his chances, and
every conceivable act of
his life that could be used was twisted
into something to his dis-
credit. For example, the fact that he
was a Unitarian furnished
grounds for some severe attacks on his
religious views in a
variety of forms4 and led the
Miami Republican, an Adams paper,
to urge that these persons who
questioned his religious beliefs
should hold a convention, not to decide
what these beliefs really
were but to determine what they should
be called so that there
might not be so many inconsistencies.5
Federalism was another charge used quite
extensively, for
Federalists had never been popular in
the West. Adams was
attacked both for belonging to that
party and for deserting it to
become a Republican.6 This
was intended to injure him with
both parties. The acts of the
administration of John Adams, the
Cunningham correspondence, the Pickering
controversy, some
early writings and speeches, were all
used to show the Federal-
2See Ohio Monitor, Delaware Patron,
Chillicothe Times, leading
Adams papers.
3See especially National Republican,
Cincinnati Advertiser, and the
Scioto Gazette.
4For example, National Republican, Sept.
10, Nov. 26.
5Miami Republican, in Chillicothe Times,
Aug. 11.
6For example, Chillicothe Supporter and
Scioto Gazette, April 29,
June 24, Sept. 9, Oct. 21.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 207
ism and the political inconsistencies of
the New England candi-
date. The National Republican declared
the contest was be-
tween the "second Washington",
referring to Jackson, and the
"second Adams".7
The Adams men answered the charge of
Federalism by
pointing out that Pickering, Otis, and
other old Federalists were
supporting Crawford8 while in
Ohio Charles Hammond, Judge
Burnett, Henry Bacon, Elisha Whittlesey,
General Beecher and
other former Federalists were supporting
Clay and that not a
leading Federalist was for Adams.9 So
far as any conclusions
may be drawn from the returns Adams
probably received the
bulk of the former Federalist vote in
Ohio, though this was of
slight importance. The reason was that
he was a New Englander
and received the votes of former New
Englanders, which in-
cluded most of the Federalists. His
supposed Federalism prob-
ably had little to do with the result.
Closely connected with this charge was
the attempt to arouse
feeling against Adams by calling him an
aristocrat and a mon-
archist. The acts of his father were
recalled to show what might
be expected of the son. It was charged
that he was the aristo-
cratic candidates and that he
possessed monarchical principles,11
the "Royal Candidate" of the
"hereditary house,"12 "that bigoted
aristocrat, whose principal merits
consist in a talent for sly
cunning, which distinguishes the titled
vassals of European gov-
ernments."13 Such a
system of attack could not help but appeal
strongly to the prejudices of many
western democrats, for in the
West a charge of aristocracy ranked not
far below high treason
in seriousness. Adams did nothing to
lessen these prejudices;
on the contrary, his very aloofness from
politics and his refusal
to make a public play for support seemed
to substantiate the
charges against him.
7National Republican, Sept. 3.
8Delaware
Patron, Mar. 11, Oct. 7.
9Ibid., Oct. 7, Oct. 21.
10 Mad River Courant, in Columbus
Gazette, May 29, 1823.
11Boston Statesman, in Hamilton
Intelligencer, July 26, 1824.
12National Republican, Aug. 24; Scioto
Gazette, Sept. 9, 1824.
13 National Republican, Oct. 29.
208 Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
Rufus King's opinion of Adams may well
be given here. He
said of him: "The opinion of his
integrity and of his superior-
ity as a learned statesman, is not
disputed by anyone; but with
these qualifications, which are of great
worth, a disinclination
toward him, grounded on the imputed
infirmities which belonged
to his father, and added to the want of
those properties which
produce and maintain personal
attachments, prevails to an ex-
tent that it will be found difficult to
overcome."14
The Adams movement lacked the popular
appeal of the
Jackson party. Hence, to carry the West,
it was all the more
necessary for the Adams men to make a
strong appeal to the
vital western interests in order to win
the friends of tariff and
internal improvements. Such an appeal,
in connection with the
prevailing dislike of slavery, might
have succeeded. But this is
where the Adams movement failed utterly.
The most remark-
able feature of the whole Ohio campaign
is found in this failure,
for it proved to be the one
insurmountable weakness of the
Adams candidacy-his supposed
unfriendliness to western in-
terests.
The Russell affair, previously
mentioned, had had this ob-
ject in view but had failed. The
question of the domestic
policy was then brought forward to
embarrass Adams. It had
made Crawford an impossible candidate in
the West and was
to prove a stumbling block for the
northern candidate. Be-
cause he was a New Englander, Adams was
regarded with some
suspicion in the West as New England had
been considered
unfriendly to western interests. It was
necessary for him to
prove that he was not narrowly sectional
and that the West
would not be made to suffer for the
benefit of commercial New
England. This he was unable or unwilling
to prove. Some
explanation of his attitude is
necessary.
The views of John Quincy Adams towards
the protective
system and internal improvements were
not those of the Vir-
ginia presidents. He was not troubled by
constitutional scruples
and was favorable to a national system
of roads and canals.
While not as strong a tariff man as Clay
was, he was satisfied
14King to C. Gore, Feb. 9, 1823, Life
and Correspondence of Rufus
King, VI, 499.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 209
with the tariff of 1824 and believed
opposing interests could
be conciliated by mutual concession.15
There was nothing in
his attitude on these questions which
could be regarded as
unfriendly to the West, but rather the
reverse was true Rufus
King, who was well acquainted with the
views of all the can-
didates, classified Adams with Clay and
Calhoun as a friend
of roads and canals and protection to
manufactures. This
seemed to be the general impression at
Washington, yet quite
early in the campaign the question began
to be raised in the
West whether Adams was not unfriendly to
western interests.
A clear direct statement from him would
have greatly aided his
cause but none came. Clay and Jackson by
their votes and
speeches in Congress could show where
they stood. Adams in
the office of Secretary of State had not
this opportunity and
refused to make one.
It was his firm belief that the
presidency should not be the
object of political intrigue but should
come to the best man as
the unbiased choice of the people would
show.17 So he utterly
refused to play politics and thus
handicapped his own cause.
It was quite in line with this policy
that he should refuse to
make public appeals to the voters or
permit his views on im-
portant questions to be publicly known,
as that would be play-
ing politics. Thus there came from him
no open irrefutable
statement of his views on tariff and
internal improvements,
despite the efforts of his friends to
obtain one.
But there was another reason. The
campaign was being
fought along sectional lines, and to
secure the support of one
part of the country by a strong
expression of opinion on an
important issue meant to lose the
support of another section.
An unequivocal indorsement of protective
tariff by Adams would
have caused him some embarrassment in
New England and per-
naps aroused opposition where he was
strongest. He had strong
hopes of securing southern votes, as
there was a considerable
Adams following in several southern
states. To declare strongly
15Adams, Memoirs, IV, 353.
16 Life and Correspondence of Rufus
King, VI, 495, 499.
17 Quincy, Life of Adams, 130; Adams, Memoirs, VI, 132.
Vol. XXVI -14.
210 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
for tariff and internal improvements
would destroy utterly his
chances in these states, as the example
of Clay had shown. On
the other hand it might not win him the
West, as he could
hardly hope to make himself as
acceptable there as Clay. Thus
policy as well as principle dictated
that he should avoid any
strong expressions of opinion.
Looking back over the situation in the
light of what hap-
pened later it seems likely that Adams
made a mistake. His
southern support did not materialize and
his hopes in the West
were destroyed, so he gained nothing by
his silence. On the other
hand, a stronger stand on the domestic
issues would not likely
have hurt him much in New England as
local pride and dis-
like of southern candidates were very
strong. At the same time
he might possibly have carried some
western states; but what
is of equal importance is that he would
probably have run sec-
ond in the important Clay states and
thus secured a stronger
claim to the vote of these states in the
House. The circum-
stances under which they did go for him
were such as gave
rise to the "bargain and
corruption" charge and furnished the
basis for the rise of a strong
Jacksonian party in these western
states.
The Ohio Adams leaders were quite aware
of the danger
confronting his candidacy in the state
and did their best to
offset it by evidence showing that his
views were entirely
friendly to western interests. Ephraim
Cutler wrote to a friend
in the District of Columbia for some
expression of the views
of Adams. The latter answered that he
could state positively
that Adams had very recently expressed
himself clearly in favor
of the constitutional power of the
government to carry on works
of internal improvement and was quite
favorable to the idea;
that he was generally in favor of
protecting manufactures in
all cases where it could be done without
too much affecting
other interests.18 But this
was information at second hand.
On May 8 Postmaster-General McLean asked
Adams for
leave to send a letter the latter had
written him favorable to
internal improvements to his brother in
Ohio, who was on the
18Cutler, Life of Cutler, 186.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 211
Adams electoral ticket and on whose
behalf McLean had secured
this expression of Adam's opinion. The
Secretary of State de-
clared he had no objection to this but
wished him not to permit
the letter to get in the newspapers
"as that would look too
much like advertising my opinions".
McLean said he would
take care of that.l9 Thus the
very purpose of the letter was
defeated.
The Delaware Patron tried to explain the
attitude of Adams
from the letter of a correspondent at
Washington saying that
Adams could not openly avow his views
because he was habit-
ually opposed to electioneering but that
he was really the father
of internal improvements as he had
offered the first resolution
in the Senate in 1807 calling for a
report from the Secretary of
the Treasury on roads and canals.
Gallatin's report was a re-
sult of this.20 This
statement had been made before and an-
swered by the Scioto Gazette, which
published an extract from
the Richmond (Va.) Enquirer to show that
Worthington of
Ohio was the author of the resolution in
the Senate which had
really called for Gallatin's report;
that the report, when sub-
mitted, had been ordered printed in
large numbers by a com-
mittee of which Adams was chairman
simply to postpone action;
that Adams in 1807 had voted against a
bill concerning removal
of obstructions to navigation on the
Ohio; that he had voted
against the Cumberland road amendment in
1804.21 This evi-
dence was neither very recent nor very
strong but it served its
purpose in raising doubts as to the real
views of Adams.
The Gazette followed this up by pointing
out that three-
fourths of the representatives from New
England and New York
voted against the General Survey Bill,
most important to the
cause of internal improvements, and that
the most active friends
of Adams were in this number.22 It
continued to emphasize the
necessity of the West supporting no man
whose sentiments on
these questions could in any way be
considered doubtful. "The
friends of Mr. Adams appear to be very
sensible, that if the
19Adams, Memoirs, VI, 323.
20 Delaware Patron, Feb. 5, 1824.
21 Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Jan. 10, 1824,
22Ibid., Feb. 26.
212 Ohio Arch. and
Hist. Society Publications.
Presidential election turns on this
point- as most assuredly it
will - his prospects of support, in any
one of the states west of
New York, are not very flattering.23
The passage of the tariff bill brought
further trouble. The
vote of the Massachusetts delegation
against it was taken as evi-
dence of Adams's opposition to it.24
The Richmond (Va.) Con-
stitutional Whig, a Virginia Adams
paper, took this very attitude
and assured the people of Virginia that
Adams was opposed to
the "ruinous policy" of the
tariff and that the interests of
Massachusetts and Virginia in regard to
the tariff, and roads and
canals, were one.25 At once
the Clay and Jackson presses in
Ohio seized upon this as authoritative
evidence that all they had
been saying about Adams was true.26
Furthermore, the New
York American, an anti-tariff newspaper
of New York City, de-
clared for Adams.27 This
seemed to be further proof. Thus the
activities of Adams partisans in other
states were a continual
source of embarrassment to his followers
in Ohio. This illus-
trates clearly the sectional aspect of
the campaign, which made
it so difficult for any candidate to
take a definite stand.
The friends of Adams published many
extracts from his
speeches and writings to show his
friendliness toward western
interests but usually these were rather
general in their terms and
not of very recent date.28 Letters were printed from persons
who were acquainted with Adams,
purporting to give his opin-
ions,29 but the indirect
nature of this evidence only made it all
the more apparent that he was making no
clear public statements
of his views.
23Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Mar. 25.
24Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
Apr. 27; National Republi-
can, June 18.
25Richmond Constitutional Whig, in
Columbus Gazette, June 3.
26Cincinnati Advertiser, May 22; Scioto
Gazette, June 24, July 1;
Nat. Rep., June 18.
27Cincinnati Gazette, in Scioto Gazette,
June 24.
28For example, Miami Republican, in
Delaware Patron, June 3;
National Crises, in Delaware Patron,
July 23; Hamilton Intelligencer,
July 6, Letter by a Subscriber.
29Torch Light in Delaware Patron, Aug.
12; National Crisis, in
Chillicothe Times, June 23.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 213
Still the evidence was strong that Adams
had been favorable
to internal improvements and even the
tariff, and ordinarily
would have been considered sufficient.
But in the heat of a
presidential campaign only the most
direct, unequivocal, public
expression of sentiments could be
accepted as proof, and this
was what was lacking. The burden of
proof, unlike the case of
Jackson, rested with the Adams party and
the doubts were not
cleared away. The Adams meeting at
Columbus in July devoted
a large part of its address to an
attempted refutation of the
charges of their candidate's
unfriendliness to the domestic policy,
but the source of information, in which
they had "implicit con-
fidence", remained unrevealed.30
The campaign went to its conclusion with
doubts still being
expressed as to the real sentiments of
the New England candi-
date and the burden proved a heavy one
for his followers to
bear. The Scioto Gazette, in one of its
last issues before the
election, reiterated the charges that it
had been among the first
to make. "It has been proved beyond
the possibility of a doubt",
declared its editor, "that he
(Adams) always has been, and now
is, decidedly hostile to internal
improvements and the protection
of national industry."31 The
final appeal of that ardent Clay
supporter deserves to be given here.
"The western states, op-
pressed almost beyond sufferance by the
changes which have re-
cently taken place in the political
world, and by a system of policy
which renders unavailing the fertility
of their soil, and the in-
dustry of their citizens, must
inevitably sink to the lowest depth
of human wretchedness, should the
election terminate in the
choice of a president unacquainted with
their wants, or indif-
ferent to their complaints."32
In that statement lies to a considerable
degree the reason
why John Quincy Adams did not carry
Ohio. He had not met
the vital issues in a way that would win
for him the confidence
of the West. It is one of the paradoxes
of political history that
the candidate least affected by
sectional prejudices or constitu-
tional scruples toward these vital
interests should be badly de-
30 Delaware Patron, July 22.
31 Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette, Oct. 21.
32Ibid., Oct. 21.
214 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
feated in the state where they were most
popular largely because
he was believed to be unfriendly or
indifferent toward them.
His failure to carry Ohio was very
costly to him. The sixteen
electoral votes of the state added to
his total would have given
him 100 electoral votes, one more than
the total for Andrew
Jackson. Thus Adams, and not Jackson
would have come be-
fore the House as the leading candidate,
and Clay, in throwing
his influence to Adams, would have been
ratifying the popular
will. The "bargain and
corruption" cry, if raised at all, would
have lost much of its force and the
future have been changed
for all concerned. This is, of course,
mere speculation but it
shows the interesting possibilities that
lay in Ohio's electoral vote
in 1824.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ELECTION BY THE PEOPLE.
Election day came with numerous
pamphlets and final ap-
peals to the voters being circulated.
Despite the heat of the
campaign and the bitterness of its last
stages the vote cast was
disappointing. At the election for
governor, held early in Octo-
ber, the total vote was 76,634,1
the largest vote ever cast in the
state, although the campaign of Allen
Trimble against Governor
Morrow had received little attention in
the newspapers, being
almost entirely obscured by the
presidential contest. But the
total vote at the presidential election
was only 50,024,2 two-
thirds that of the gubernatorial
election.
The Clay men attributed this to the
overconfidence of their
friends in the interior counties who did
not attend the polls in
large numbers.3 The Cincinnati Advertiser blamed the
defeat
of Jackson on the apathy of the people
in the northern and north-
eastern counties.4 A better
explanation is that it was generally
expected all over the country that no
candidate would receive a
majority of the electoral vote and that
the election would cer-
1Ohio Election Statistics, 1914; p. 3.
2Ibid., p. 3.
3Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
Nov. 16.
4Cincinnati Advertiser, Nov. 17.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 215
tainly go to the House of
Representatives. Hence the choice of
the electors was not of so much
importance.
Though the Ohio vote was not so large as
was expected it
was far larger than that cast at any
previous presidential con-
test, the largest vote prior to 1824
having been 10,721 in 1812.5
Ohioans had not been in the habit of
voting at presidential elec-
tions as they had at elections for
governors, when large votes
were usually polled; so that, after all,
the vote in 1824 was a de-
cided advance. The absence of a real
contest in earlier elections
explains the light votes prior to 1824.
In 1828 the total was
130,993,6 an astonishing increase.
Early returns from the populous
southwestern counties
seemed to indicate that Jackson was
successful, but as the returns
from the interior and northern counties
came in Clay's vote grew
until the final returns read: Clay,
19,255; Jackson, 18,489;
Adams, 12,280.7
A brief consideration of the returns
shows some interesting
results. Jackson carried the
southwestern counties from Darke
on the Indiana border to Adams county on
the Ohio River, ex-
cepting only Preble. This group included
Darke, Montgomery,
Warren, Butler, Hamilton, Clermont,
Brown, and Adams. Of
these, Hamilton and Butler were the
largest counties in popula-
tion in the state. In each of these
counties, except Montgomery
and Warren, Jackson had an actual
majority over both his op-
ponents.
Pike, which touches Adams county, and
perhaps should be
included in this group, was carried by
Jackson as was one in-
terior county, Perry. In the eastern
part of the state, he was
successful in the adjoining counties of
Columbiana, Jefferson,
and Harrison, and two near this group,
Wayne and Coshocton.
The fact that Clay was able to carry
Stark and Tuscarawas kept
Jackson from having a solid block of
counties just south of the
Western Reserve.
To the surprise of his followers Adams
did not carry all the
5 Ohio Election Statistics, 1914, p. 2.
6Ohio Election Statistics, 1914, p. 2.
7Ohio Election Statistics, 1914, p. 3;
Columbus Gazette, Nov. 11,
1824.
216 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
Western Reserve, losing the four middle
counties, Lorain, Cuya-
hoga, Medina, and Portage, to Clay. In
the geographical center
of the state the New England candidate
carried the three ad-
joining counties of Union, Marion, and
Delaware. In the south-
east on the Ohio River, the three Adams
counties were Wash-
ington, Meigs, and Athens. Greene,
adjoining the Jackson group
in the southwest, was the only other
county in which Adams was
successful.
Clay had all the others, including most
of the interior and
northwest, portions of the eastern and
southern parts of the
state, and the four Reserve counties and
Preble, mentioned be-
fore.
With two or three exceptions the
counties carried by each
candidate were in groups. In the
southwest Jackson's victory
was probably due to the prejudices
against Clay there, as has
been explained, and the strong Jackson
organization at Cincin-
nati, which sent out newspapers and
pamphlets, and organized
committees all over the Miami country.
In the eastern part of
the state the counties settled largely
by Pennsylvanians went for
Jackson, as Pennsylvania was
overwhelmingly for him and this
influence reached across the border. The
number of Germans,
or Pennsylvania Dutch, was large in
several of the eastern coun-
ties,8 and to these the
Jackson committee had made a special, and
rather alarming, appeal.9
The portions of the state carried by
Adams were in nearly
every case those settled originally by
New Englanders and con-
taining an influential New England
element, as in the Western
Reserve, the Delaware group, and the
three southeastern coun-
ties, where the first permanent settlers
in the state had located.
But the Adams men were disappointed at
the result in the Re-
serve where Clay had run very well,
probably because of the
great popularity of internal
improvements there. The Erie canal,
nearly completed, would give the Lake
counties a waterway to
New York City while the proposed Ohio
canal system would
connect them with the interior of the
state. Cleveland would
then become a city of real importance.
8Faust, German Element, I, 422.
9Letter of Atwater, Delaware Patron,
Nov. 25.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 217
Clay's vote requires little explanation.
It was natural for
Ohio to support the candidate who best
represented her interests,
and his plurality would probably have
been larger had his
chances in the whole country seemed
brighter. As it was, with
a real doubt existing as to whether he
would have sufficient votes
to reach the House of Representatives,
he had carried the largest
state west of the Alleghanies despite
the appeals of those oppos-
ing him for Ohio not to throw away her
votes on a hopeless can-
didate. It shows the hold the domestic
policy had upon the peo-
ple of the state. Most of the Scioto
Valley, the interior coun-
ties, with few exceptions, and the
thinly settled northwest gave
Clay large pluralities. These parts of
the state felt especially
the necessity for roads and canals to
give them outlets to the
markets and to make their lands
profitable. Although Clay had
less than two-fifths of the total vote,
he had carried more than
half the counties of the state. The
distinctly rural counties, ex-
cept where peopled by New Englanders,
had gone largely for
him.
It is a significant fact that about
four-fifths of the counties
were so decided in their preference that
they gave the candidate
of their choice a majority over both his
competitors, not a mere
plurality. In most localities there was
a decided predominance
in favor of some one candidate. The
strength of parties had
not become generally distributed
throughout the state.
The result of the election caused
satisfaction but not jubila-
tion among the Clay partisans for their
plurality had been very
narrow. The Jackson presses immediately
set up the cry of
coalition. It was charged that a portion
of the Adams "Swiss
Corps", as the National Republican
called them, had joined with
the friends of Clay to defeat Jackson
when they saw that the
cause of Adams was hopeless.10 Clay's
large vote in the Western
Reserve was pointed out as proof of
this. Such an idea had
not even been hinted at by the Jackson
papers before the elec-
tion, for the Clay and Adams parties had
been showing any-
thing but a friendly spirit toward each
other.
10Cincinnati National Republican, Nov. 19; Cincinnati
Advertiser,
Nov. 17.
218 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
This charge was at once denied by the
Cincinnati Gazette
and the absurdity of such a coalition in
the lake counties and
nowhere else was pointed out.11 But
the National Republican
reiterated its belief in it, though no
proof was given, and blamed
the "Caucus Junto" for
dividing the West and laying the founda-
tions of another Burr intrigue in the
House of Representatives,
"without promoting the restless
ambition of their chief."12 The
Advertiser hoped that the Clay electors
would vote for Jackson
and thus undo the damage,13 but
such an idea was never con-
sidered.
With the meeting of the electoral
colleges interest turned
to the approaching House election.
CHAPTER IX.
THE HOUSE ELECTION.
It was not definitely known until after
the electoral colleges
had met that Clay would not be among the
first three, so his
friends generally avoided expressing any
opinion as to the House
Election. But Clay had virtually decided
already to support
Adams. He had written to Hammond late in
October that
Crawford's caucus nomination, the state
of his health, and the
principles he feared his administration
would adopt were strong
objections to his (Clay's) supporting
him.1 The Clay-Crawford
coalition charge had disappeared with
the election and a new
Adams-Clay coalition seemed to be
forming.
That the Jackson party was well aware of
this is shown by
the attitude of the Cincinnati National
Republican. It began to
express great fears of intrigue as did
the Advertiser as well.2
On December 28 the former made a bitter
attack on the "Ohio
Caucus Junto." "We
understand," it said, "that some of the
leaders of this aristocracy, since the
fall of their idol, have
directed all their mighty forces to
rendezvous at Washington
11Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette,
Nov. 19.
12National Republican, Nov. 23.
13Cincinnati Advertiser, Nov. 17, Nov.
24.
1Smith's Charles Hammond, 37.
2 Cincinnati Advertiser, Dec. 4.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of 1824. 219
City, where they are destined to follow
in the train of John Q.
Adams, and serve as whippers-in to his
party. It is really amus-
ing to observe with what facility some
of the chief men of the
Clay party in Ohio, men who have
pretended to be the cham-
pions of a liberal and enlightened
policy for the protection of
Domestic Manufactures, can veer about,
as interest or ambition
may dictate, and become the humble
supporters of a man notori-
ously opposed to 'domestic measures.' Is
the public sentiment
of Ohio to be not only disregarded, but
outraged? The vote
of this state, in Congress, cannot be
given to Mr. Adams with-
out a wanton and flagrant violation of
trust."3
This was the warning of the Jackson
party but it went
unheeded. The National Republican now
began to assume that
Jackson's election was certain and spoke
of the bright prospects
before the people in his approaching
administration.4 It declared
the reported Adams-Clay coalition was to
be expected from the
course some of Clay's partisans had been
taking in Ohio but
that Clay would not succeed in dividing
the West.5 This con-
fident tone was doubtless assumed for
effect, for it had no basis
in fact.
Meantime Clay had written his letter to
Blair declaring his
intention of voting for Adams and
expressing his fear that
pernicious results might come from the
election of a military
candidate. "What has great weight
with me is the decided
preference which a majority of the
delegation from Ohio has
for him (Adams) over General
Jackson."6
Although most of the Ohio
representatives had probably
made up their minds already, as Clay's
letter and the threaten-
ing attitude of the Jackson papers
indicate, a meeting was held
to determine finally their action and to
make public their inten-
tions.7 Soon afterwards it
was publicly announced by the Ohio
and Kentucky delegations that they would
support Adams.8
3National Republican, Dec. 28.
4Ibid., Jan. 14, 1825.
5Ibid., Jan. 18, Feb. 15, 1825.
6Clay to Blair, Jan. 8, 1825, Works of
Clay, IV, 107.
8 Adams, Memoirs, VI, 478.
7Adams, Memoirs, VI, 473; Address of
Clay to The Public, 1825;
Append., p. 31, Letters of McArthur and
others.
220 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
Amid great excitement the House election
was held and
Ohio gave her vote to Adams. The
delegation voted, ten for
Adams, two for Crawford, two for
Jackson.9 Bartley, Beecher,
McArthur, McLean, Sloane, Vance, Vinton,
Whittlesey, Wright
and Patterson voted for Adams; Wilson
and Ross for Craw-
ford; and Gazlay and Campbell, from the
southwestern part
of the state, for Jackson. The vote of
the representatives was
thus decisively for Adams.
The news of the election was quietly
received in Ohio. The
Adams party was well pleased with the
result,10 the Clay men
apparently satisfied,11 and the Jackson
partisans indignant. The
National Republican published the news
under the heading, "The
long agony is over - the Bourbons are
restored."12 In its suc-
ceeding issues it bitterly attacked the
Ohio congressmen for
misrepresenting their constituents and
the interests of the West.13
The Hamilton Intelligencer warned the
people to remember those
representatives who had been faithful to
their trust and those
who had trampled upon the wishes of the
people.14
It now remains to consider whether the
result was really
satisfactory to the state or whether it
was a violation of the
expressed public will, as the Jackson
partisans declared. They
made much of the fact that Jackson,
according to the popular
vote, was the second choice of the
state, and should have re-
ceived its vote, with Clay excluded from
the House. But this
is a doubtful claim, for there is no way
of finding out with
entire certainty which candidate was the
second choice of the
19,000 voters who had supported Clay as
their first choice. If
their leaders rightly represented their
wishes, and there is nothing
to indicate otherwise, then Adams was
their choice and the Ohio
delegation in Congress was correctly
interpreting public senti-
ment, for the combined Adams-Clay vote
in the state was a
large majority of the whole. The best
evidence that Ohio was
satisfied is found in the congressional
election of 1826, when
twelve of the fourteen representatives
elected were administra-
9National Intelligencer, Feb. 11.
10Delaware Patron, Feb. 24.
11 Columbus Gazette, Feb. 24; Scioto
Gazette, Feb. 20.
12National Republican, Feb. 13.
13Ibid., Feb. 22, Feb. 25, March 8.
14Hamilton Intelligencer, Feb. 28.
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 221
tion supporters.15 Of the ten
who voted for Adams in the
House election, eight were candidates at
this election and all
were re-elected. This does not indicate
any repudiation by the
people.
The charge that the members of the Ohio
delegation voting
for Adams were tools of Clay and were
sacrificing western in-
terests to his ambition is without
basis. Their preference for
Adams is not at all surprising when the
general distrust of
Jackson felt by the Clay leaders in Ohio
is considered. As has
been shown before, they had always
regarded Jackson as an
impossible choice. Hammond, in a letter
already referred to,16
written the preceding September, had
stated the opposition of
the great body of Clay men to Jackson
because of his lack of
fitness for the office and warned the
Jackson men that the Clay
supporters were not liege subjects to be
transferred at will to
Jackson or any one else, as Clay saw
fit. The explanations of
some of the Ohio representatives who
voted for Adams in the
House may be given here as serving to
corroborate what has
already been sufficiently dealt with,
the incongruity of a Jack-
son-Clay alliance, and to make clear the
basis of the Adams-
Clay union.
Duncan McArthur, afterwards governor,
declared that
Ohio's interests were being jeopardized
by the course Jackson
and his friends were pursuing towards
internal improvements
and the tariff. "On the other hand,
it was evident, that, for the
support of those measures, our only
reliance was upon the
friends of Mr. Adams, the identity of
interest between Northern
and Western States, and the liberality
of the Eastern members
of Congress."17 This
statement contains the reason why the
Clay to the Public, Appendix, 30-61.
Adams-Clay alliance was a natural
logical union. Members of
Congress were in a position to know the
real views of the can-
didates towards the tariff and internal
improvements, and, with
the heat of the campaign past, the Ohio
members were far more
inclined to trust Adams than Jackson
with his large southern
support. McArthur further declared that
an even more serious
15 Niles' Register, 155-6.
16 Cincinnati Advertiser, Sept. 11,
Letter signed "L."
17Letters of Ohio Representatives given
in An Address of Henry
222 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
consideration was the qualifications of
the candidates. "So far
as I was acquainted with the sentiments
of Mr. Clay's friends,
I do not believe that they could have
been prevailed upon to
have supported the election of General
Jackson upon any con-
ditions whatever . . ." This
statement is quite in line with
the views of Hammond expressed long
before.
Mordecai Bartley, also a future governor
of Ohio, stated
that it was well known that Clay's
friends from Ohio would
not in any event have supported Jackson
because Adams was
their second choice and was believed to
be the second choice of
a majority of the people of the state.
Bartley declared he would
not have voted for Jackson in any event
as he was far inferior
to all other candidates in abilities and
was no real friend to
tariff and internal improvements.
Samuel F. Vinton, another member of the
delegation, said
that his constituents knew many months
before the election that
Adams was his second choice. Elisha
Whittlesey, who for many
years represented the Western Reserve in
Congress, declared that
there was never any doubt about whom
Clay and his friends
would support. Other members of the
delegation expressed
similar views.
Considering the general attitude of the
Clay men during the
campaign and after, there is little
inconsistency to be found.
They had never at any time given the
Jackson party grounds
for believing that they would support
Jackson. They had at-
tacked Adams because there was doubt
about his friendliness
to tariff and internal improvements.
They had not attacked
Jackson especially on these questions
because they believed him
utterly unfitted for the presidency
regardless of what his views
on these questions were. In the House
election they had chosen
the former because they believed him
better qualified and be-
cause they believed western interests
would be made secure by
him rather than by Jackson with his
large southern support.
It was an economic alliance of the North
and West. There
was no sacrifice of western interests,
as the Jackson partisans
charged, by the election of Adams.
Rather the reverse was
true, if the policy of the new president
toward internal improve-
ments be considered. The House election
saw the union advo-
cated at the beginning of the campaign
by the Adams and
Ohio in the Presidential Election of
1824. 223
Clinton followers finally achieved, but
in a way no one had
then foreseen and under conditions which
made its permanence
very doubtful. The economic alliance of
North and West, based
on their harmony of interests, proved
too strong for the South
to break, but the political union,
resting on this, succumbed
before the rising tide of Jacksonian
democracy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
NEWSPAPERS.
I. OHIO NEWSPAPERS.
Chillicothe.
Friend of Freedom, February 18 and 25,
1824. (Discontinued.
Only three numbers published.)
***Chillicothe Times. (Succeeded Friend of Freedom. First
number April 21, 1824.)
*Chillicothe Supporter and Scioto
Gazette.
Cincinnati.
*Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette.
**National Republican and Ohio Political
Register.
**Cincinnati Advertiser.
Columbus.
*Columbus Gazette.
***Ohio Monitor and Patron of Industry.
(For 1823 only.)
Delaware.
***Delaware Patron.
Hamilton.
**Hamilton Intelligencer and Advertiser.
Steubenville.
*Western Herald and Steubenville
Gazette. (Scattering num-
bers, 1823-24.)
II. NEWSPAPERS OUTSIDE OHIO.
Baltimore.
Niles' Register.
Washington.
National Intelligencer. (Dec. 23,
1824-Nov., 1825.)
National Republican and Steubenville
Gazette were originally for
Clinton. Friend of Freedom opposed Clay
and was probably for Clinton.
Cincinnati Gazette was originally for
Calhoun.
The common practice used by newspapers
of copying important
articles from other papers makes the
above list more extensive than it
*For Clay.
**For Jackson.
***For Adams.
224 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
actually appears to be and has made
possible a considerable use of ex-
tracts from many papers whose
files were not available.
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Containing Certain
Testimony in Refutation of The Charges
Against Him Made by General
Andrew Jackson, Touching The Last
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Adams, Charles Francis, Editor. Memoirs
of John Quincy Adams;
Comprising Parts of His Diary from 1795
to 1848. 12 vols., Philadel-
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Burnet, Jacob. Notes on The Early Settlement of the North-
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Colton, Calvin, Editor. The Works of
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10 vols.,......New York and
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Cutler, Julia Perkins. Life and Times of
Ephraim Cutler ......Cin-
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Faust, Albert Bernhardt. The German
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Hunter, W. H. "The Pathfinders of
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King, Charles R. The Life and
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1803-1843 .......Cincinnati,
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Springfield, 1914.
"Side-Lights upon the Presidential
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Magazine of American His-
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Smith, William Henry. Charles Hammond
and His Relations to
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1884. Published for the Chicago
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Stanwood, Edwin. A History of The Presidency
...... Boston, 1906.
Trimble, Allen. Papers of Governor Allen
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Turner, Frederick J. Rise of The New
West, 1819-1829. The
American Nation: A History. Vol. 14
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