Ohio History Journal

Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment

Of Civil Government in the Philippines

 

By RALPH ELDIN MINGER*

 

 

 

ON APRIL 17, 1900, a brilliant, golden, sunny day, the

United States Army Transport Hancock with the Second

Philippine Commission on board pulled away from the

crowded dock at San Francisco, California, while whistles

shrieked a shrill farewell and the air rang with enthusiastic

cheers.¹ The boat had barely passed through San Francisco

Harbor when the commissioners began to hold their first meet-

ing.² All of them realized the stern nature of their task. The

physical character of the Philippine Islands, the nature of its

people, the uncertain social and political conditions prevailing,

and a host of other factors made the work of pacifying the

islands and creating a civil government complex. For William

* Ralph Eldin Minger is an assistant professor of history at San Fernando

Valley State College.

1 Herbert S. Duffy, William Howard Taft (New York, 1930), 86.

2 William Howard Taft was the president of the commission. The other four

members were Vice Governor Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, a Democrat and

former attorney general of that state; Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, a zoologist

on the faculty of the University of Michigan and the only member of the commis-

sion who had ever been in the Philippines; Henry Clay Ide of Vermont, formerly

chief justice of the United States Court in Samoa and therefore a man with some

experience in colonial government; and Bernard Moses of California, a professor

of history at the University of California and a writer of note on the history of

the Spanish colonies in America. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands

(Boston, 1928), I, 124-125; Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William

Howard Taft (New York, 1939), I, 165. The appointments of all the members

of the Philippine Commission were dated March 16, 1900. Dean C. Worcester,

The Philippines Past and Present (New York, 1930), 269.

The First Philippine Commission, appointed by President McKinley in Janu-

ary 1899 to study political conditions in the newly acquired islands and make

recommendations for their government, had a life of only one year.

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TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES              309

Howard Taft, president of the commission, it represented the

beginning of two decades in which much of his time, energy,

and thought was devoted to the problems created by an

increased American participation in world affairs. The star of

Taft was rising. At the time of his appointment to the com-

mission, the New York Times, after a brief resume of Judge

Taft's record, described it as one "of continuous and brilliant

success."³

Actually, Taft's was a placid star, not a comet against the

judicial and political sky. Born on September 15, 1857, in

Cincinnati, Ohio,⁴ he graduated with distinction from Yale on

June 27, 1878, the faculty of the university appointing him

salutatorian because he ranked second in scholarship in a class

of 132.5 It was preordained, of course, that William Howard

should study law upon his graduation from Yale, for as his

younger brother Horace observed later, "all of us Tafts went

into the law as naturally as we went from junior year to senior

year in college."⁶ So turning westward, Taft went back to

Cincinnati, where in 1880 he received his law degree from the

Cincinnati Law School and was admitted to the Ohio bar.7

This was followed by a period of years in which he engaged

in politics, held various minor political offices, practiced law,

and toured Europe.⁸ He went on the bench in March 1887,

when Governor Joseph B. Foraker appointed him to the

superior court of Cincinnati for the unfinished term of Judge

Judson Harmon, who had resigned. After serving the unex-

pired term of fourteen months, Taft was renominated by the

Republican party and in April 1888 was elected for a five-year

term.⁹ In 1889 President Benjamin Harrison offered him the

 

3 New York Times, February 7, 1900.

4 Robert Lee Dunn, William Howard Taft, American (Boston, 1908), 262.

Dunn's book carries a two-page appendix summarizing the chief events in Taft's

life to 1908.

5 Pringle, Taft, I, 44; Dunn, Taft, 262.

6 Horace Dutton Taft, Memories and Opinions (New York, 1942), 48.

7 Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, 268. Hereafter cited as D.A.B.

8 Ibid., 266.

9 Francis McHale, President and Chief Justice: The Life and Public Service of

William Howard Taft (Philadelphia, 1931), 45. Taft won by a vote of 21,025 to

14,844 over William Disney, the Democratic candidate. Ibid. This was the only

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310    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

post of solicitor general of the United States, and Taft

accepted, assuming office on February 4, 1890.10 Then, on

March 21, 1892, he resigned from this position to become

United States circuit judge for the sixth judicial circuit and

ex-officio member of the circuit court of appeals of the sixth

circuit, which included Cincinnati.11 Taft had served eight

years on the federal bench when, on February 6, 1900,

President William McKinley announced his appointment as

president of the Second Philippine Commission, a post he had

not sought.12

Henry F. Pringle, his biographer, states that Taft knew

"as much--and as little--about the Philippine Islands as the

average American."¹³ At a later date, Taft admitted that this

was indeed the case.14 This did not mean, however, that Taft

was totally devoid of ideas about the Philippines. Before leav-

ing the United States, he had formed some rather general con-

ceptions as to what the commission needed to accomplish.

When the commission had convinced the Filipinos of its desire

to give them individual liberty and a large measure of political

self-government, Taft felt that they would become more

tractable than they had been up to then.15 He thought it

especially important that the Filipinos have the benefits of all

the constitutional guarantees of individual liberty contained

in the state and federal constitutions in the United States. He

believed firmly that the restoration of peaceful conditions and

the establishment of a successful government were not the

work "of a day, or a week, or a month, or indeed of a year"

but rather that of several years of intensive work.16

 

office, except for the presidency of the United States, which Taft achieved by

popular vote. D.A.B., XVIII, 266-267.

10 D.A.B., XVIII, 267.

11 Pringle, Taft, I, 122.

12 New York Times, February 7, 1900; Duffy, Taft, 79; Pringle, Taft, I, 159-

160.

13 Pringle, Taft, I, 157.

14 Address at Nashua, New Hampshire, February 19, 1908. William Howard

Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

15 Taft to Harrison Gray Otis, April 14, 1900. Taft Papers. All letters subse-

quently cited are in this collection unless indicated otherwise.

16 Taft to E. B. McCagg, April 16, 1900.

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TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES                311

During the voyage to the Philippines, the Hancock made

stops at Honolulu, Yokohama, and Hong Kong.17 The re-

ports received at every port by the commission from individ-

uals familiar with conditions in the Philippines stressed two

themes--that public affairs had been woefully mismanaged by

the American authorities and that any hope of achieving

pacification in the islands soon was unfounded.18 Taft was

disturbed in particular by information that the United States

Army was disgusted with the Filipinos because they fought a

bush type of warfare and had come to regard them as and

treat them like "niggers."19 Such social prejudice appeared

to be especially strong among the "ladies of the Army," and

the commission proposed to end it as quickly as possible. In

general, Taft feared that the conduct of the United States

Army toward the natives had not been as conciliatory as it

should have been.

There was one ray of hope in an otherwise depressing situa-

tion. On arriving at Hong Kong, Taft sent a cable to Major

General Arthur MacArthur, the military governor in the

Philippines.²⁰ In reply, Taft and his fellow commissioners

received a reassuring response: "Cordial greeting and warm

welcome await the commission."21 The members of the com-

mission were very glad to receive this cable because, as Taft

reasoned, "it argues strongly that MacArthur intends to co-

operate as fully as he can with the commission, and that he

does not intend to pursue the policy which Otis²² pursued of

ignoring the old commission, and making light of its efforts."²³

 

17 Duffy, Taft, 86.

18 Taft to Helen H. Taft, May 30, 1900.

19 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 2, 1900.

20 Ibid.

21 Taft to Helen H. Taft, May 31, 1900.

22 The reference is to Major General Elwell S. Otis, who was designated

military governor of the Philippine Islands on August 29, 1898. On May 5, 1900,

General Otis was relieved at his own request and returned to the United States.

General MacArthur was selected to succeed him. Forbes, The Philippine Islands,

I, 74, 102. General Otis was famed for his inefficiency and indecision. As General

MacArthur once put it, "Otis is a locomotive bottom side up, with the wheels

revolving at full speed." Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, Douglas MacArthur

(New York, 1952), 19.

23 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 2, 1900.

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312    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

The solicitude and warmth of General MacArthur seemed

to augur well for a spirit of cooperation and compromise

between the commission and the military regime. In personali-

ties Taft and MacArthur could not have presented a more

striking contrast. And in order to provide a full background

for subsequent developments, it is necessary to delineate briefly

the character and background of the colorful general.

Arthur MacArthur's military career encompassed the life

of the United States Army from Fort Sumter through the

Spanish-American War.²⁴ Born in New England, raised in

Wisconsin, he had enlisted in the Union army in 1862, when

only seventeen years old.²⁵ Covering himself with distinction

in some of the key battles of the Civil War, he had achieved

the rank of colonel of volunteers at the age of twenty.²⁶ For

valor at Missionary Ridge, the major commanding the

Twenty-Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers recommended the

Medal of Honor for Arthur MacArthur, but it was not

awarded to him until June 30, 1890.27 At war's end he dedi-

cated himself to regular army service in what subsequently

was to prove one of the dreariest periods in all of United

States military history.²⁸ It was perhaps an unusual choice,

coming as it did at a time when ambitious men of caliber found

more lucrative and fruitful outlets for their talents in industry

and finance. At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War,

Colonel MacArthur was made a brigadier general, being

advanced shortly thereafter to the rank of major general.²⁹

MacArthur was an active participant in the battles with the

Spaniards in the Philippines, led most of the big campaigns

 

24 Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the

President and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1951), 24.

25 Francis Trevelyan Miller, General Douglas MacArthur: Fighter for Freedom

(Philadelphia, 1942), 23-25.

26 Lee and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 15; Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story

of Douglas MacArthur (New York, 1954), 6.

27 Lee and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 15. Apparently the recommendation

for a Medal of Honor was buried and lost in the whirl of events. In a review of

Civil War medals almost three decades later the oversight was corrected. Hunt,

The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur, 5.

28 Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President, 24.

²⁹ New York Times, September 6, 1912.

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TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES                313

against Aguinaldo's insurrectos, and emerged a national

hero.³⁰

Never renowned for his economy in the use of words,

General Arthur MacArthur had a flair for the flamboyant and

the grandiloquent.31 Long accustomed to authority, he was

quite naturally impatient with the seemingly laborious process

of civilian law and order. As a strong commander he harbored

powerful convictions about personal government, especially in

the remote regions of American control, and may well have

rationalized the psychological importance of an "emperor"

figure upon the Orientals.³²

On June 3, 1900, a blistering, hot, tropical Sunday, the

Hancock anchored in Manila Bay and the commissioners re-

tired to the ship's cabin to await the arrival of Major General

MacArthur.33 Instead, however, the general sent his launch to

bring the five commissioners ashore and an artillery battalion

escorted them to the Ayuntamiento, the civil building of the

city of Manila, where General MacArthur had his headquar-

ters. General MacArthur extended a formal but most cordial

welcome to the members of the commission and an hour later

he came out to the Hancock to return their call.³⁴ Taft thought

him "a pleasant looking man, very self-contained." The next

day Taft and MacArthur had lunch informally at Malacanan

Palace.³⁵ Although he suggested that the commission find

offices elsewhere than in the Ayuntamiento, the general did not

press the point and soon arranged separate offices for each

commissioner in that building which were "pleasant and

 

30 Miller, General Douglas MacArthur, 67-68; Rovere and Schlesinger, The

General and the President, 24-25.

31 For one who had distinguished himself in a judicial career, Taft may well have

appeared as plain and pedestrian--while a strange irony of history was to place him

in juxtaposition to his complete antithesis. However, the antagonism that arose

between the two men, as the narrative will conclusively demonstrate, developed

only gradually over an extended period of time.

32 Although this comment may appear unfair to the general, it would seem that

he was not averse to supplying his own person to fulfill the image. However, it is

doubtful that the Filipinos thought in terms of an "emperor" figure.

33 Pringle, Taft, I, 167-169.

34 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 3, 1900.

35 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 5, 1900.

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314    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

cool."³⁶ He even helped Taft to find a suitable residence.

After having been in Manila slightly more than a week, Taft

indicated in a family letter that General MacArthur had been

"exceedingly cordial, and I find him a very satisfactory man

to do business with."³⁷ And in a letter to President McKinley,

Taft noted that General MacArthur had been "most courteous

and anxious in every way to cooperate with us to bring about

the end we both have in view."38 Taft's initial estimate of

conditions in the Philippines was sober, optimistic, and firm:

The situation in Manila is perplexing. You meet men who are com-

pletely discouraged at it; you meet men who are conservative but very

hopeful of good results; and you meet men who have roseate views of

the situation. My own impression is that the back of the rebellion is

broken, and that the state of robbery and anarchy which exists in the

islands where the soldiers are not in control has induced a number of

leading generals, quite a number of whom have been captured, to take

the view that surrender is the best course. This is perhaps an optimistic

view . . . and I believe there is more reason to believe in it this time

than any time before. I am very anxious that civil government shall be

established. The Army is a necessary evil, but it is not an agent to

encourage the establishment of a well-ordered civil government, and the

Filipinos are anxious to be rid of policing by shoulder straps. . . . We

shall be here two months at least before we assume the powers that are

given us, and in that time we shall have occasion to make many inves-

tigations.³⁹

The Philippine commission came to Manila armed with a

lengthy set of instructions, drafted principally by Elihu Root

as the secretary of war,40 and issued by the president only ten

days before they sailed from San Francisco. Basically, these

instructions established the principle that the Filipinos were to

have the widest possible control over their own affairs.41

 

36 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 13, 1900.

37 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 12, 1900.

38 Taft to William McKinley, June 15, 1900. William McKinley Papers, Library

of Congress.

39 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 12, 1900.

40 Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938), I, 354.

41 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the

Annual Message of the President, House Documents, 56 cong., 1 sess., No. 1,

pp. xxxiv-xxxix.

• 7
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES          315

They authorized the transfer, on September 1, 1900, of all

legislative power in the Philippines from the military governor

to the commission, which for its part was to establish provin-

cial and municipal governments and prepare the central gov-

ernment for complete transfer to civilian authority. The com-

mission was instructed to remember that the government they

were to create was designed for the happiness, peace, and

prosperity of the Filipinos, and the measures they adopted

should conform to the fullest extent possible, consonant with

just and effective government, to the customs, habits, and

even prejudices of the people of the Philippine Islands. At the

same time, the instructions continued, the Filipinos were to be

reminded that their experience in government was meager,

and that the United States adhered to certain basic principles

of government considered essential to the rule of law and the

maintenance of individual liberty. If these principles of gov-

ernment should conflict with local laws of procedure and

customs, then the latter must give way. The instructions care-

fully set forth a bill of rights similar to the amendments to the

United States Constitution. but generally the main body of

Philippine laws was to be maintained with as little interference

as possible. In short, they were much more than instructions

to a commission--"they were the outline and the framework

within which the civil government of the Philippines was to

be formed and to develop."⁴²

The instructions were also, in the apt phrase of one author-

ity, "thick with paternalism," but considering the general out-

look of the McKinley administration and the expansionist

sentiment in the United States, they were surprisingly

liberal.⁴³ With the perspective provided by the passage of more

than half a century and an increased and clearer knowledge of

the issues, conflicts, and passions involved, they stand quite

well the test of critical examination and evaluation. As was to

be expected, many Filipinos were not satisfied. The heart of

their argument was stated succinctly by one of their greatest

 

42 Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 354.

43 David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York, 1947), 85.

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316    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

statesmen, Ramon Magsaysay, when he wrote, "There is no

substitute for complete self-government."⁴⁴

The independence issue overshadowed all others that Taft

was to face in the Philippines. Before the end of his first

month in the islands, he had formulated some tentative con-

clusions on the subject. The idea that the Filipinos could

govern themselves, was, Taft felt, ill-founded.⁴⁵ They were

in many respects, he found, "nothing but grown up children,"

who would need the training of "fifty or a hundred years"

before they would realize what Anglo-Saxon liberty was.

Of the educated ones among them, most were "profound

Constitutional lawyers," who could discuss "with eloquence

and volume" American constitutional questions and were

"most glib in running off the Phrases." Unfortunately, how-

ever, they had not the slightest conception of practical ques-

tions and how to solve them.

By the middle of July 1900 Taft was sufficiently sure of his

conclusions to write directly to the secretary of war, Elihu

Root, about his wards:

The population of the Islands is made up of a vast mass of ignorant,

superstitious people, well intentioned, light-hearted, temperate, some-

what cruel, domestic and fond of their families, and deeply wedded to

the Catholic Church. They are easily influenced by speeches from a

small class of educated meztizos, who have acquired a good deal of

superficial knowledge of the general principles of free government, who

are able to mouth sentences supposed to embody constitutional law, and

who like to give the appearance of profound analytical knowledge of

the science of government. They are generally lacking in moral charac-

ter; are with some notable exceptions prone to yield to any pecuniary

consideration, and are difficult persons out of whom to make an honest

government. We shall have to do the best we can with them. They are

born politicians; are as ambitious as Satan, and as jealous as possible

of each other's preferment. I think that we can make a popular assembly

out of them for the Islands provided we restrain their action by a legis-

lative council to be appointed by the Governor, and a qualified veto for

the Governor, if we can take 18 months or 2 years as a preliminary

44 Ramon Magsaysay, "Roots of Philippine Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXV

(1956), 31.

45 Taft to John M. Harlan, June 30, 1900. The quotations in the remainder of

this paragraph are drawn from this revealing letter.

• 9
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES                     317

period during which the Commission, with some representative Fili-

pinos, shall legislate for the Islands.⁴⁶

Even before the arrival of the commission in the Philip-

pines, Taft had hoped that the United States Senate would

pass the Spooner bill, which in essence provided for the

establishment of civilian control in the Philippines, and that

the house of representatives would concur.⁴⁷ He felt that the

passage of this measure would give the commission the addi-

tional sanction of congressional action, which would prove to

be important in its work. Subsequent events were to vindicate

Taft in the importance that he attached to this measure.⁴⁸

Two days after the arrival of the Philippine commission in

Manila, MacArthur suggested to the war department that an

offer of "complete immunity for past and liberty for future"

be made to all those Filipinos who had not violated the laws

of war and who would renounce insurrection and accept the

sovereignty of the United States.⁴⁹ President McKinley agreed

46 Taft to Elihu Root, July 14, 1900.

47 Taft to Charles P. Taft, April 23, 1900. In January 1900 Senator John C.

Spooner of Wisconsin had introduced a bill which provided that, after the Philip-

pine insurrection had been suppressed, the president, until the congress provided

otherwise, should have "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern

the said islands," with the powers being "vested in such persons and . . . exercised

in such manner as the President . . . shall direct for maintaining and protecting

the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and

religion." Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the

United States (Norman, Okla., 1951), 73. This bill met stiff resistance in the

senate. Many senators, led by George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, opposed any bill

which by implication indicated our intention of remaining in the Philippines. Ibid.

In addition, many congressmen were perfectly content to let the president admini-

ster the islands under his powers as commander-in-chief of the army. Finally, the

bill was redrafted as an amendment to an army appropriation bill by Secretary

Root and Senators Lodge and Spooner and became law on March 2, 1901. John A.

Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (New York, 1953), 207. This amend-

ment transferred the government from a military to a civilian basis. Thereafter,

the president was to govern the Philippines by authority of congress, and not in

his capacity as commander-in-chief of the military forces. Maximo M. Kalaw,

Philippine Government (Manila, 1948), 68-69. The Spooner amendment thus

"ended the military regime in the Philippines." Arturo M. Tolentino, The Govern-

ment of the Philippines (Manila, 1950), 156.

48 It is interesting to note that the projected frame of government for the Philip-

pines, including an elected assembly, a legislative council, and a qualified veto for

the governor, recapitulates our own colonial experience, except that the Filipinos

were now placed in the role of the colonials.

49 Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 65.

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318    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

with this suggestion after expanding the proposal by pro-

viding a ninety-day period for acceptance of these terms and

authorizing the payment of thirty pesos to each Filipino who

presented to the military authorities a rifle in good condition.

General MacArthur issued this amnesty proclamation on

June 21, 1900.50 Taft was not sure how much good it would

do but remained hopeful. However, as he watched MacArthur

negotiate with the various Filipino factions, he began to have

misgivings. Although he made allowances for the fact that

the general had been ill, yet Taft did not believe him "as keen

witted" and "clear-headed" as was mandatory in dealing with

such political matters.51 As for MacArthur's censoring of a

reporter's dispatch which was critical of his role in these nego-

tiations, Taft found such action "revolting" and "utterly un-

American."⁵² And when it appeared that MacArthur resented

the commission's efforts to investigate other matters, Taft

predicted trouble for the future.⁵³ He was certain of it upon

learning that the military governor was asking the war depart-

ment to diminish the commission's power of appointment, for

such action contained "the seed of a controversy" between the

civil and military authorities.⁵⁴

Taft's critical view of General MacArthur's abilities and

actions soon received ample confirmation in the latter's han-

dling of an important insurgent leader, Pedro A. Paterno.⁵⁵

After being released on parole in early July 1900 on the

strict understanding that he was not to engage in any activi-

ties hostile to the United States, Paterno had written an

article in the Philippine newspaper El Progreso advocating

 

 

50 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 21, 1900.

51 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 27, 1900.

52 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 5, 1900.

53 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 8, 1900.

54 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 18, 1900.

55 Pedro A. Paterno had served in the cabinet of Emilio Aguinaldo during the

short-lived Philippine Republic of 1897, was second in authority to Aguinaldo, and

had acted as the representative of the insurrectos in negotiating the pact of Biac-

na-bato of December 14, 1897, which ended the insurrection of 1896. Taft to

Charles P. Taft, July 7, 1900; Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 25, 1900; Kalaw,

Philippine Government, 43-44.

• 11
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES               319

independence under an American protectorate.⁵⁶ Clapped in

jail again for this indiscretion, Paterno quickly repented and

was once again put at liberty.⁵⁷ Resourceful and infinitely

imaginative, he now proposed a three-day grand fiesta, which,

in the Philippine tradition, would be replete with music,

speeches, fireworks, marching, and dancing.⁵⁸ This fiesta,

intended as a celebration of the amnesty granted by General

MacArthur and designed to eclipse any previous festival in

Philippine history, was suggested as an event of pure enter-

tainment and good will.⁵⁹ Since the proclaimed purpose of the

festival was the promotion of the cause of peace and because

"if there is one thing more than another that a Filipino likes,

it is a fiesta," Taft gave his approval.⁶⁰ As he wrote to Secre-

tary Root:

The fiesta which is coming off, if it does not result in a fiasco, as I

hope it may not, will be quite an important event, in that it brings home

to the people the fact that peace is near at hand, and is a recognition by

them that they would like to have peace.⁶¹

The fiesta was scheduled to begin on July 28, 1900. That

morning Taft learned that Paterno and others among the

Philippine leaders had written speeches advocating the cause

of independence and at the very least a protectorate relation-

ship between the United States and the Philippines.⁶² Accord-

ingly, he declined to attend a banquet prepared for the first

evening and by way of a rebuke wrote the following to

Paterno:

We are advised that a number of the speeches which have been sub-

mitted to you for delivery this evening in express terms support the

view that an independent government should be established in these

 

56 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 30, 1900; Taft to Root, July 26, 1900; Taft to

Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.

57 Taft to Root, July 26, 1900.

58 Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 25, 1900; Taft to Root, July 26, 1900.

59 Taft to Root, July 26, 1900; Duffy, Taft, 97-98.

60 Taft to Root, July 26, 1900.

⁶¹ Ibid.

62 Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.

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320    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Islands under the protectorate of the United States. . . . In other words,

that the United States should assume responsibility to the world for a

government in which it could exercise no direct influence.

No one having any authority to speak for the United States has ever

said one word justifying the belief that such a protectorate will be estab-

lished. It is impossible. We of the Commission who are sent here with

instructions to establish a civil government have no authority whatever

to consider or discuss such a proposal.

By destroying the power of Spain in these Islands, and accepting the

sovereignty thereof, the United States assumed a responsibility to the

world to establish here a civilized government of law and order, which

should duly respect the rights of all, whether foreigners or natives. It

proposes to meet this responsibility by making a government in which

the citizens of the Islands shall exercise as large a measure of self-

government as is consistent with the establishment of law and order.

. . . Further than this the government of the United States will not go.⁶3

Taft finally went to the banquet after Paterno appeared at

his house and entreated him to come, but it was held under

such restricted conditions, no speeches being allowed, that the

affair turned out to be a fiasco.⁶⁴ Although Taft's position in

this matter appears to have been, and was, in fact, arbitrary,

it was a reflection of a basic conviction--that the Filipinos

would have to go through a period of tutelage before they

could assume fully the responsibilities entailed in complete

self-government. The outcome of the banquet measurably

lessened his respect for MacArthur. Taft felt that Mac-

Arthur, who bore the official responsibility, had bungled in not

keeping firm control over the affair, especially in regard to the

political content of projected speeches.⁶⁵ He came to hold a

diminished regard for the general's political astuteness and

his grip on the situation.

To Mrs. Taft he poured out his discouragement with

MacArthur and particularly the problems their relationship

would pose for the success of his mission.⁶⁶ The more he had

to do with the general, "the smaller man of affairs" he thought

 

63 Taft to Pedro A. Paterno, July 28, 1900.

64 Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.

65 Taft to Root, July 30, 1900; Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.

⁶⁶ Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 29, 1900.

• 13
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES              321

him. "I have no doubt that he is a good soldier but his experi-

ence and his ability as a statesman or politician are nothing,"

he wrote. In a caustic comment he noted that MacArthur had

"all the angularity of military etiquette and discipline and he

takes himself with the greatest seriousness." In this instance

Taft appeared to have been less liberal than the general, but

MacArthur, once roused to the political implications of the

fiesta, proposed measures which appeared to Taft to be "al-

most brutal in their severity." MacArthur felt that the ban-

quet should be suppressed unless Taft were willing to attend,

and proposed to arrest any Filipino who made speeches offen-

sive to American officials.⁶⁷ In the end when Taft attended the

banquet, it was in order to "let the matter down easy."⁶⁸ This

was perhaps indicative of his deeply entrenched conservatism,

his avoidance of extremes--on the one hand, he would not hold

out false hopes of immediate independence and democracy, nor

would he, on the other hand, impose a policy of brutal re-

pression.

But the central disagreement between the two men came

over the fundamental question of how soon civil rule should

be established. While Taft and the other members of the com-

mission hoped that many towns and provinces might soon be

given civil governments, American soldiers, engaged in a grim

and thankless jungle war, were deeply skeptical.⁶⁹ Taft had

characterized the Filipinos as our "little brown brothers," but

Robert F. Morrison, writing in the Manila Sunday Sun,

countered with a piece of doggerel that mirrored the senti-

ments of many American soldiers:

I'm only a common soldier-man in the blasted Philippines;

They say I've got Brown Brothers here, but I dunno what it means.

I like the word Fraternity, but still I draw the line;

 

67 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 29, 1900; Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.

68 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 29, 1900.

69 Taft to Root, July 26, July 30, 1900; Forbes, The Philippine Islands, I, 125;

Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present, 273; Ernest L. Klein, Our Appoint-

ment with Destiny: America's Role on the World Stage (New York, 1952), 119;

John Holladay Latane, America as a World Power, 1897-1907 (New York, 1907),

82-99; Lee and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 18-23.

• 14
 

322    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain't no friend

of mine.⁷⁰

Alarmed by what he viewed as widespread Filipino disaffec-

tion, MacArthur took a dim view of the commission's optimis-

tic proposal that a native constabulary would inspire popular

support for the military campaign against the insurrectos.71

The general, Taft informed Secretary Root, "regards all the

people as opposed to the American forces and looks at his task

as one of conquering eight millions of recalcitrant, treacherous

and sullen people."72 Despite verbal allegiance to the theory of

civil control, MacArthur appeared to trust only "the strong

hand of the military." Taft believed that the proper exercise

of police powers was an integral part of the preparation

needed by the Filipinos toward the ultimate goal of stable self-

government.73 And in this respect he did not seem to fear the

possibilities of sabotage in the actual operations of the force.

In 1901 the commission organized the Philippine constabulary

and in due course the constabulary was to justify the confi-

dence placed in it by the commission.74

As the first of September 1900 drew near, the date on which

the commission was to take up its legislative functions, the

members of the commission formally expressed their desire

for harmony with the military government.75 MacArthur

was receptive to an invitation to attend commission meetings

and even proposed a conference to resolve points of friction in

their relationship.76 At this juncture Secretary Root stepped

into the picture to clarify the boundaries of authority between

the military and the commission. His explanation that the

commission's power of appointment included the power of re-

 

70 Mark Sullivan, Our Times (New York, 1926-35), I, 7.

71 Taft to Root, July 30, November 30, 1900; Taft to J. B. Bishop, November 30,

1900.

72 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900.

73 Taft to Root, July 30, 1900.

74 Forbes, The Philippine Islands, 203-207; Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philip-

pines: A Study in National Development (New York, 1942), 733-734.

75 Taft to Arthur MacArthur, August 23, 1900. Elihu Root Papers, Library of

Congress.

76 MacArthur to Taft, August 24, 1900. Root Papers.

• 15
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES              323

moval, while helpful, was counterbalanced by his confirmation

of the military governor's full control over civil officials.77

Actually Root did not clarify the important question of where

ultimate authority lay. Thus mutually reassured, Taft and

MacArthur conferred on August 30, 1900, and as Taft re-

ported to Root,

the General expressed himself as disliking much the cutting down of the

power of the military Governor and transferring it to the Commission,

but he said that he was very anxious to assist in every way the Admini-

stration and to carry out its purposes, but that the Commission was an

anomalous body and that the plan was likely to result in discord unless

there was hearty co-operation, which he proposed to give and that he

was willing to abide any construction put upon the instructions.⁷⁸

Nevertheless, on a basic issue of policy like the constabulary

question, MacArthur was still "very, very, sensitive." For his

part, Taft was scornful of MacArthur for being "weak

enough to express great personal humiliation in having his

power as Military Governor cut down in this wise and to give

us the opportunity to know how anxious he has been to avoid

the transfer."

It was apparent to Taft that MacArthur was exceedingly

jealous of his prerogatives as military governor. In fact as

Taft reported to Elihu Root, MacArthur now felt that the

office of military governor had been "mediatized."⁷⁹ By way

of explanation, Taft said that MacArthur felt he had suffered

a deep and painful personal humiliation in the loss of power

and authority he had been accustomed to exercising and which

he had felt to be his due. In a letter to his brother Charles,

William Howard related the growing estrangement between

the two men, which he attributed to the "formality and mili-

tary etiquette" which MacArthur insisted upon observing

with the commission, coupled with "certain sensitive points"

by the general on matters of policy.80 Taft felt convinced that

77 Root to Taft, August 28, 1900. Root Papers.

78 Taft to Root, August 31, 1900. The two quotations in the following paragraph

are taken from this important letter.

79 Taft to Root, September 18, 1900.

80 Taft to Charles P. Taft, August 31, 1900.

• 16
 

324     THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

the vast majority of Filipinos were desirous of ending military

control because of its "abrupt and unconciliatory character,"

and confessed that he himself felt "impatient at it."81 Nor

were relations helped by the fact that General MacArthur

gave "no social recognition of the presence of the Commission

here."82

In the uncertain stalemate that existed between general and

judge, the latter enjoyed one supreme advantage, which a more

authoritarian personality might have employed with deadly

effect. After all, it was Taft who could write at all times to

Secretary Root explaining his side of the case.83 Such com-

munication was apparently foreclosed to MacArthur, whose

channel was limited to his military superiors in Washington.

And it should be noted that Taft was a voluminous corres-

pondent, who left no phase of the Philippine situation un-

touched in his letters to the secretary of war. Had he been

bent upon the destruction of General MacArthur, he certainly

had every opportunity for accomplishing this purpose. Yet, as

he stated to Secretary Root, he wished to do MacArthur "full

justice," and within the limitations of human frailty he ap-

pears actually to have attempted to do exactly that.84

Why did Taft not urge upon the secretary of war the im-

mediate transfer of all powers in the Philippines to civilian

hands-thus, in effect, abolishing MacArthur's governmental

powers? The probable answer lies in Taft's innate caution,

for he felt that "the change to a civil government should be

made with care and deliberation."85 At this time, it must be

 

81 Ibid.

82 Taft to Charles P. Taft, September 12, 1900.

83 One writer described the enormous powers exercised by Secretary Root in the

following manner: "The power of the Secretary of War in the new possessions

was unlimited. His brief cable was law; his verbal utterance to an Army officer

about to take charge of a province or an island was as binding as a sealed and signed

decree. Through the governors-general or the military commanders the Secretary

was the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary for the millions of people in

the Philippines and in Cuba." Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding:

A Personal Narrative, Covering a Third of a Century, 1888-1921 (New York

1922), I, 256.

84 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900.

85 Taft to Gustavus H. Wald, September 7, 1900.

• 17
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES              325

remembered, he was in the process of formulating his con-

ceptions of administrative policy and wanted to avoid a pre-

mature transfer of authority. He was feeling his way in an

area in which there were no precedents as guideposts--and as

was characteristic of the conservative jurist, he was not going

to take precipitate action.

For all of his reservations about the general, Taft did indi-

cate in his correspondence some of the positive features of the

military governor. Thus he pointed out that MacArthur was

strongly in favor of cultivating the good will of the Filipinos,

and the failure of other military officers to take such a course

met with strong opposition from the general.86 In addition,

Taft credited MacArthur with being hostile to the tendency

of many military officers and their wives "to draw the color

line" in dealings with the Filipinos. As for MacArthur's gen-

eral military abilities, his bearing, his devotion to duty, and

his personal qualities, Taft had only the highest of praise.87

But the basic difference between the two men was continu-

ing and profound. Taft summed up his attitude in one highly

concentrated sentence:

General MacArthur is a very courtly, kindly man; lacking somewhat

in a sense of humor; rather fond of profound generalizations on the

psychological conditions of the people; politely incredulous, and politely

lacking in any great consideration for the views of any one as to the

real situation who is a civilian and who has been here only a compara-

tively short time, and firmly convinced of the necessity for maintaining

military etiquette in civil matters and civil government.⁸⁸

An uncertain stalemate was the significant aspect of the

status of the military governor and the Philippine commission

at the end of 1900. The basic problem--one of jurisdiction,

the age-old problem of where the ultimate power lay--was

finally clarified by the enactment of the Spooner amendment on

 

86 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900.

87 Taft to Root, August 18, November 14, 1900.

88 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900. On another occasion, Taft remarked about one

of General MacArthur's pronouncements: "The obscurity of the language is its

safety." Taft to Root, September 26, 1901.

• 18
 

326   THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

March 2, 1901.89 Up to this time the legal basis for the gov-

ernment of the Philippines had found its sanction in the presi-

dent's constitutional power as commander-in-chief. Now the

president's actions were confirmed by congress, and the presi-

dent was given full authority to proceed with the establishment

of civil government. Actually the president had already been

exercising this authority, but congress wanted to put the

matter on a longer range basis and remove any areas of doubt.

The significance of this change was not lost upon General

MacArthur, who now informed Taft that the new status re-

duced their dispute of the previous months to "an academic

question."⁹⁰ This was so because now there was definitely to

be a civil government and the role of the military would per-

force be subordinate. More astonishing to Taft was the

revelation that MacArthur had never really accepted the

underlying basis for their past relationship, for MacArthur

indicated frankly that he had viewed the president's instruc-

tions to the commission as "an unconstitutional interference

with his prerogative as Military Commander in these islands."

In short, MacArthur felt that these instructions were "ultra

vires under the constitutional limitations upon the powers of

the President as a commander-in-chief."

This extraordinary language, with its even more astounding

conclusion, was mystifying to Taft, a man who had spent

most of his life in the pursuits of law. He tried hard to com-

prehend what it was that MacArthur was saying. In effect,

if MacArthur's ipse dixit meant anything, it meant that the

president of the United States had acted unconstitutionally in

issuing instructions which impaired the military powers of a

commander in the field. Taft wondered how anyone could

stray so far afield--was it not obvious that the powers of a

commander in the field could derive only from the war powers

or the powers as commander-in-chief of the man who was his

superior? As Taft put it:

 

89 Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 73-74.

90 Taft to Root, March 17, 1901. The quotations in the remainder of this para-

graph are taken from this letter.

• 19
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES             327

 

It has always been a curious phase of political human nature to me

to observe that men who have not had the slightest knowledge of legal

principles and who do not claim to have had any legal education feel

entirely at home in the construction of the constitution and in using its

limitations to support their views and to nullify action, the wisdom of

which they dispute. The constitution has not often been used to main-

tain undiminished the absolute legislative, executive, and judical power

of a subordinate military commander as against the express orders of

his constitutional commander in chief.⁹1

The constitutional question was not the key issue, as Mac-

Arthur himself clearly indicated. What was at stake was the

very real and apparently very painful diminution of his au-

thority which was implicit in the Spooner amendment. Mac-

Arthur frankly told Taft that the "strain" to which he had

been subjected by the cutting down of some of his powers and

the transferring of others was "so great that he could not

endure it much longer." Normally, an increase in responsi-

bility produces strain, but in this case the opposite seemed to

prevail. Perhaps the answer lay in what MacArthur termed

his "extreme humiliation," for, according to Taft, as Mac-

Arthur saw it, "it was the cutting down of his power and the

interference with his efficiency by the cutting down of his

power that had the element of humiliation in it." Although he

did not desire to leave the Philippines until a civil governor

was appointed, MacArthur felt the transfer should now be

made as quickly as possible. The statement of humiliation was

astounding to Taft, who felt that MacArthur, far from oc-

cupying an insignificant position, in fact held the most im-

portant position that the United States could assign to a

soldier--he was in command of sixty-five thousand men and

exercised, in addition, a large civil authority. MacArthur's

position was comprehensible to Taft only on the basis that the

general no longer regarded himself as a soldier, but looked

upon himself as a kind of proconsul, the first American to

occupy that position in United States history.

 

91 Taft to Root, March 17, 1901. The two quotations in the next paragraph are

drawn from this informative letter.

• 20
 

328    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Within a few months a civil governor would assume the

commanding general's civil functions, for Secretary Root had

already decided to make a surgical separation of the military

and civilian authority. Up to this time Secretary Root had not

clarified in explicit terms what the boundaries of authority

were in the Philippines. But the situation had now changed;

in the opinion of the secretary of war the establishment of

civil government would hasten the pacification of the Philip-

pines, would end the evils inherent in an unduly-long con-

tinuance of military government, and would "get the army out

of the governing business and get its officers back to the per-

formance of their proper function as soldiers."⁹² However,

Root delayed changing the command until Taft became gov-

ernor.93 The foregoing principles he enunciated in clear and

explicit language in his instructions to Major General Adna R.

Chaffee, the successor to General MacArthur.94 He reaf-

firmed a basic historical principle when he stated:

We intend to discontinue the military government of the Philippine

Islands and to establish a civil government which will be supreme there,

subject only to review by the executive and legislative branches of the

United States Government here, and to which the Army will bear sub-

stantially the same relation that the Army bears to the civil government

here.⁹⁵

On the fourth of July, 1901, William Howard Taft at last

became civil governor of the Philippines with unchallenged au-

thority.96 Symbolically, General MacArthur departed on the

same day that Taft assumed his new position. The departure

was on a friendly basis.97 Taft held a reception in Mac-

Arthur's honor and accompanied the general to the dock.

Upon his arrival in San Francisco, General MacArthur de-

clared that the new civil administration was welcome both to

the Filipinos and to the military, "to whom the civil task was

92 Root to Adna R. Chaffee, February 26, 1901. Root Papers.

93 Taft to Charles P. Taft, May 17, 1901.

⁹⁴ Root to Adna R. Chaffee, February 26, 1901. Root Papers.

95 Ibid.

⁹⁶ New York Times, July 5, 1901.

97 Helen H. Taft, Recollections of Full Years (New York, 1915), 210.

• 21
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES              329

hard and tedious," and expressed the view that "the two de-

partments are well set apart."98

Taft was clearly the victor, and in his inaugural address as

civil governor of the Philippines he made it clear where the

ultimate authority lay, although he did not exult in his tri-

umph.99 His speech is especially meaningful to one familiar

with the developments which had preceded it. Taft reviewed

the events of the past as significant stages in the eventual road

to permanent civil government on a more or less popular basis.

This speech also provides a basic insight into Taft's subse-

quent success as a great colonial administrator, for, as he put

it,

government is a practical, not a theoretical, problem and the successful

application of a new system to a people like this must be brought about

by observing closely the operation of simple laws and making changes

or additions as experience shows their necessity.¹⁰⁰

Inferentially he alluded to the controversy with General

MacArthur, although, of course, he did not do so directly. He

contented himself with the truism that there would be "the

same cooperation in the future" that there had been in the past

and that "the possible friction which may arise" between the

civil and the military in the future would have no encourage-

ment from "those in whom is the ultimate responsibility."101

There was work enough and more for all who were truly con-

cerned with the regeneration of these islands.

In his peroration Taft invoked divine blessings upon the

cause of the United States, a cause which he conceived in pro-

foundly paternalistic terms. The goals to strive for were the

attainment of liberty, order, and prosperity for the Filipinos,

but always within the context of American guidance and tutel-

age. No instinct was more basic in the man than a kind of

98 New York Times, August 19, 1901.

99 William Howard Taft, Present Day Problems: A Collection of Addresses

Delivered on Various Occasions (New York, 1908), 1, 4-5.

100 Taft, Present Day Problems, 3-4. Lord Curzon provided another basic insight

when he said: "Taft was the first Saxon to love the Malay--and the Malay

returned it." Edward H. Cotton, William Howard Taft: A Character Study

(Boston, 1932), 53-54.

101 Taft, Present Day Problems, 9.

• 22
 

330    THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

inherent paternalism so characteristic of an American aristo-

crat who conceived of duty and responsibility in terms that

might be expressed in the words, government for the people,

but by no means by them.

One final but basic dispute between MacArthur and Taft

should be noted. Perhaps fundamental to the entire struggle

for power was the ideological couching of the difference. For

MacArthur the main burden of his thinking was tactical and

strategic. To a senate committee on the Philippines in the

spring of 1902 he elaborated his philosophy when he stated:

The archipelago, I think, perhaps is the finest group of islands in

the world. Its strategic position is unexcelled by that of any other posi-

tion on the globe. The China Sea, which separates it by something like

750 miles from the continent, is nothing more or less than a safety moat.

It lies on the flank of what might be called a position of several thousand

miles of coast line; it is in the center of that position. It is therefore

relatively better placed strategically than Japan, which is on a flank,

and therefore remote from the other extremity; likewise, India, on

another flank. The Philippines are in the center of that position. It

affords a means of protecting American interests which, with the very

least output of physical power, has the effect of a commanding position

in itself to retard hostile action.¹⁰²

It is significant that such considerations played no part in

the thinking of William Howard Taft.103 Rather Taft was

concerned with the political relationship between the islands

and the United States. His thoughts on this subject found

their fullest expression in a letter written early in 1904, when

the question of Philippine independence arose again. It was

not true, he wrote, "that any independent self-government of a

people is better than the best government by any other people."

And he summed up his thoughts in this concluding paragraph:

We have a definite, practical problem in the Philippines, and it serves

no useful purpose to hinder its solution by discussing what we are going

 

102 Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Senate Documents, 57 cong., 1 sess., No.

331, Pt. II, p. 867.

103 In my study of Taft's correspondence, I found no allusions to the tactical or

strategic importance of the Philippines for the United States.

• 23
 

TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES               331

 

to do fifty or a hundred or one hundred and fifty years hence, or by

binding ourselves to a fixed course so far in advance....When we shall

have made a successful government; when we shall have developed and

educated the people; when we shall have created an independent public

opinion--then the question what shall be done may well be left to both

countries; for if America follows her duty, as I am sure she will ulti-

mately, I do not think that the Filipino people will desire to sever the

bond between us and them.¹⁰⁴

When the immediate and urgent problems were solved, as

Taft saw it, the way would be paved for the assumption of

larger responsibilities. But in the meantime it was idle and

mischievous to hold out false hopes as a delusive torment to

those who were not likely to realize them. In a growing mutual

trust and confidence, the future would bring its own solutions.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

104 Taft to William Lawrence, February 16, 1904.

• 24