Ohio History Journal

The President and the "Deacon" in the Campaign of 1912. The Correspondence of William Howard Taft and James Calvin Hemphill 1911-1912           edited by WILLARD B. GATEWOOD     The reform impulse of the progressive movement, strong and virile after a decade of growth, dominated the political atmosphere in which the presidential campaign of 1912 took place. So pervasive was its influence that the election turned out to be more of an intramural competition among various schools of progressive thought than a contest between conserva- tism and progressivism. From its beginning late in 1911, the preconven- tion campaign generated little optimism within conservative quarters of either party. Clearly the credos of Robert La Follette, Woodrow Wilson, and Theodore Roosevelt constituted the political mainstream. And those unable to endorse some version of progressivism found themselves stranded in a politically sterile backwater. Two such men, both keenly aware of their alienation, were President William Howard Taft, an Ohio Republican, and his close personal friend, James Calvin Hemphill, a southern Democrat. Their correspondence during the preconvention campaign not only offers a rather extraordinary example of interparty communication at a critical juncture in party politics, but also reveals much about the reactions of two men confronted with the prospect of political defeat. By the autumn of 1911 the president was in serious trouble. Not even his control of patronage and the Republican party machinery could be relied upon to stop the revolt against him. Although he may well have been less conservative than the Old Guard, progressives viewed his ad- ministration as a capitulation to reactionarism. Their hostility focused     NOTES ARE ON PAGES 73-75

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36                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

upon his stand in the tariff struggle, the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy,

and the battle to democratize the house of representatives. Early in the

preconvention campaign the progressive opposition crystallized into a

movement to prevent Taft's renomination. Many prominent progressives

rallied to Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin as the Republican

standard-bearer in 1912. But more foreboding for Taft's future was the

rising clamor late in 1911 for ex-President Theodore Roosevelt to enter

the race. Despite impassioned pleas from La Follette's supporters, Roose-

velt persistently refused to endorse their candidate. For the moment he

remained loyal to his hand-picked successor. Yet, since 1909 the relation-

ship between Taft and Roosevelt had cooled considerably. An unusual

combination of circumstances, ideological shifts, and personality differ-

ences conspired to drive them apart. In the fall of 1911 Taft himself, per-

haps unwittingly, set in motion a series of events that completed the es-

trangement and helped to push Roosevelt into the race.

One of Taft's acts was the initiation of an antitrust suit against the

United States Steel Corporation on October 27, 1911. The government

rested its case largely upon the corporation's absorption of the Tennessee

Iron and Coal Company in 1907. Since Roosevelt as president had tacitly

sanctioned the merger as necessary to ease the financial panic that year,

his reaction to the antitrust suit was immediate and violent. He interpreted

it as a personal affront and held Taft responsible for an act that singled

him out in 1907 as "either a fool or a knave"--either he had been "deceived

by the financiers or had been in league with them." But his reply to Taft

which appeared in the Outlook on November 18, 1911, was much more than

a mere defense of his role in the merger; it explained his approach to

the trust problem and revealed, among other things, how completely he

and his former protege had parted company. Roosevelt denounced Taft's

effort to restore competition by trust-busting as foolhardy and suggested

instead that large economic units be rigorously regulated by a federal

agency. The antitrust suit was a kind of turning point for Roosevelt, who,

bored by private life and desirous of a return to power, was inclined

thereafter to listen more attentively to the entreaties of those who urged

him to seek the Republican nomination. The comings and goings at Oyster

Bay only increased the apprehensions of Taft, who believed that Roosevelt

posed a far greater political threat than La Follette.1

Scarcely less disturbed by the developments within his own party was

Taft's Democratic friend in the South, James Calvin Hemphill. Known

as the "Deacon" because of his devotion to the Associate Reformed Presby-

terian Church, Hemphill had achieved national prominence as a journalistic

spokesman for Bourbon Democracy. The most distinguished phase of his

career was his twenty-year tenure as editor of the influential News and

Courier in Charleston, South Carolina. Then, after a brief interlude with

the Richmond (Virginia) Times-Dispatch, he moved to Charlotte, North

Carolina, in November 1911 to assume the editorial reins of the Daily

Observer, another mouthpiece of Democratic conservatism. As an arch-

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conservative in "the most thoroughly Bryanized region in the country," he knew by personal experience the meaning of defeat and the predicament of a minority faction. Throughout his long and futile search for another Cleveland, Hemphill had been a devastating critic of William Jennings Bryan, Ben Tillman, Theodore Roosevelt, and others whom he considered dangerous radicals and political vagabonds skilled in disturbing domestic tranquillity for the sake of political aggrandizement.2 Convinced that the Democratic party faced certain defeat so long as it remained under the "curse" of Bryanism, the editor longed for the emer- gence of a "safe and sane" conservative leader strong enough to lead the party back to power. He reveled in his self-appointed role as a president- maker and claimed to have been among the original discoverers of Wood- row Wilson, an honor he shared with two of his friends, George Harvey of Harper's Weekly and Henry Watterson of the Louisville Courier- Journal. From 1906 until early 1911, Hemphill enthusiastically promoted Wilson's political fortunes and characterized him as a conservative Demo- crat who would "fit the White House like a glove." By the spring of 1911, however, he could no longer ignore Wilson's obvious embrace of progres- sivism. Fearful lest his party fall prey to a new version of Bryanism, Hemphill repudiated Wilson and participated in a scheme to wreck his presidential campaign. After abandoning Wilson, he first looked with favor upon the candidacy of Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio, then threw his support to Oscar Underwood of Alabama. But his role in the Underwood

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38                                                 OHIO HISTORY

 

movement displayed none of the enthusiasm that marked his earlier support

of Wilson, probably because he understood only too well the obstacles to

Underwood's success. Actually the aspirant who best fitted his notion of

a strong, conservative candidate was his Republican friend Taft. In spite

of party complications, Hemphill's editorial praise of Taft began late in

1911 to appear more frequently and less circumspectly. His persistent

defense of the president and his vitriolic assaults upon Wilson in a Demo-

cratic newspaper ultimately forced its owners to restrict his editorial

freedom and thereby hasten his departure from Charlotte.³

The friendship between Hemphill and Taft began during the latter's

tenure as secretary of war under Roosevelt. The exact origin of their

acquaintance is not clear, but apparently it began sometime in 1907, when

Taft, already grooming himself to be Roosevelt's successor, was making a

bid for southern support. By 1908, at any rate, Taft was addressing Hemp-

hill as the "Deacon," a prerogative accorded only to the editor's intimate

friends. Shortly after his election that year Taft paid a two-day visit to

Charleston at the Deacon's request. Here the two easy-going, amiable men

swapped stories, talked politics, and ate good food. Described as the "balm

of Gilead" by the president, Hemphill became a frequent guest at the

White House during the next four years. So, whatever the origin of their

friendship, it was one of increasing intimacy and of long duration.⁴ The

two men were not only congenial spirits, but also ideological allies on many

important issues. Both were conservative by instinct and were deeply

suspicious of the "experimental radicalism" and "direct democracy fads"

of progressivism. Hemphill admired the president for his acquiescence in

southern racial mores and for the enemies he made among the "high speed"

progressives. Taft considered his friend a competent observer of the south-

ern scene and respected his advice on various questions concerning the

region.⁵ Although party differences seemed of little consequence,⁶ Taft

recognized that Hemphill had "a hard place to be known as a friend and

intimate of mine." Yet, so harmonious was their relationship that the presi-

dent once remarked: "You and I, my dear Hemphill, seem to collaborate

well."7

Toward the end of 1911 developments in the preconvention campaign

forced both Taft and Hemphill into even more difficult positions within

their respective parties. Both viewed the rising tide of progressivism with

anxiety and recognized the effects of their deviation from the prevailing

temper. But each tended to interpret his own predicament in terms of

political betrayal by a former ally. The president's contention that Roose-

velt was guilty of political infidelity was remarkably similar to Hemphill's

charge against Wilson. Both the president and the editor were, in their

views, victims of disloyalty and ingratitude. Their correspondence during

1911-12 reflected their moods of frustration and disappointment; the light-

hearted banter so much in evidence earlier gave way to a somber, bitter

tone. Although each sometimes saw hope where none existed, their letters

generally appear as exchanges between long-suffering outcasts engaged

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TAFT AND HEMPHILL                                               39

 

in mutual commiseration. Out of their feelings of alienation emerged a

new intimacy and a more thorough exchange of 'inside" or "special" in-

formation, i.e., revelations regarding internal party operations. Hemphill

furnished the president detailed accounts of various maneuvers within

the Democratic party, especially those designed to wreck the Wilson

presidential movement, and overtly championed Taft's candidacy as much

as the owners of a Democratic newspaper would allow. For his part, the

president kept Hemphill informed of developments within Republican

ranks, periodically summoned him to the White House, and complied with

his occasional requests for patronage.

In the autumn of 1911 Taft undertook a coast-to-coast speaking tour

largely in order to bolster his sagging popularity and to ascertain the

drift of public opinion. Upon his return, Hemphill wrote him on November

13, 1911:8

 

I am glad that you have finished your long journey and if you have

time I wish you would drop me a line to let me know for my own

information, not necessarily for publication, what your impression

is about the result of your expedition upon your political fortunes.

So many stories have been told about it, very few of which I believed,

and I should rather have your judgment than that of those who have

interpreted the signs of the time. I do not hesitate to say that if it

were not for your politics there is no man in the country that I would

rather have in the White House than you.

 

In response to Hemphill's request, the president wrote a lengthy letter

in which he analyzed the effect of his tour and commented on his political

position in general. Ironically enough, when Taft posted his letter (Novem-

ber 16, 1911), newsstands were already displaying the issue of the Outlook

that included Roosevelt's blast against his trust policy. It is doubtful,

however, that Taft read the article prior to writing the following letter:9

 

I have your letter of November 13th, and have read it with a great

deal of interest. I rejoice that you have assumed a position in which

you have complete independence and where I believe you can not only

make yourself useful to the South but to the country at large, and also

make some money for yourself.10

You and I have so many views in common that it will be a pleasure to

know that there will be such an able advocate of them right in the

center of the most hopeful situation in the South.11 I know you are

pretty near a free trader, while I am a protectionist, but I am a low

tariff man and I am working in the direction of lower tariffs. I hope

to be able to recommend some very substantial reductions in woollens

and cottons, and still save the industries in this country.12

In trust matters, I am not opposed to additional and supplemental

legislation, but I am opposed to the amendment of the present trust

law in any such way as to weaken its force. For years and years we

have heard a good deal of yelling about its enforcement. Now that

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40                                                 OHIO HISTORY

 

we are getting into such shape that it really amounts to something

and really enables us to break up these octopuses, there is a tremen-

dous cry that we are interfering with business and that the law can not

be understood. I have no objection to supplemental legislation which

shall denounce certain methods of unfair competition as misdemeanors

in order to assist the execution and enforcement of the general policy

of the law as embodied in the present statute,13 and I favor a federal

incorporation law of a voluntary character that shall enable large

corporations whose business is interstate, to have protection, by reason

of their incorporation, against the unjust nagging and parochial legis-

lation of the State legislatures. It might be entirely possible in such a

provision, to create a statutory executive tribunal to assist in the

supervision of such corporations, and also to act as an assistant to

the courts whenever the Court has to break up a combination, in order

to tell the Court the best method by which the combination shall be

broken up.14

In other words, that is a business question in which courts are not

generally fitted to deal most intelligently.

Meantime, these federal corporations that are doing business under

the authority of the United States, under the close supervision of the

executive tribunal that will insist on publicity and a full knowledge

of their affairs, will necessarily acquire a corresponding protection

from their position, and the fact that they are doing business without

being prosecuted.

This is my solution of some of the difficulties that have been en-

countered, but the great point, in my judgment, because of the issue

that concentrated wealth is making against the law itself, is to pre-

serve the law intact. What comes after that is more or less incidental,

but if they are going to break down the law, then I think it is a sorry

day for us and that we may just as well look forward to government

regulation of prices and State socialism.

You ask me about my trip. It was a very strenuous performance.

I doubt that any trip--except in an election--by anyone has been

more so. I was gone nearly fifty-eight days, and I made 330 speeches.l5

The Hearst papers, the [New York] World, and the United Press,

sent men to minimize the trip, and I have no doubt they did so. I am

not particularly troubled at their doing so because I did not go out

into the west for the purpose of gaining strength in the east. It will

be difficult for us [Republicans] to find any candidate but me, and

even the Wall Street growlers16 will probably find in my Democratic

opponent--if I am nominated--a more radical man than myself; at

least, one whose views are less certain in respect to the conservative

principles and institutions of our Government, and therefore they

will be bound to come to me anyhow.

What I went out for was to overcome the effect of constant and

persistent misrepresentation as to my attitude on several questions,

and I had an opportunity, by the trip and by the sensation of the

presence of a President in the State, to make speeches on the trusts,

on the peace treaties, and on my tariff vetoes and the Tariff Boardl7

and have them reported in full in the principal newspapers of the

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State and have them read just because I happened to be in the head- lines as the particular sensation of the day. In this way I got my case before the people, and since I have returned I have had a great many evidences that it was an advantage to me. Of course, if my case is not worth anything, then the advantage is very small; if it is worth anything and my personality has any influence, then the trip was of decided utility. [Charles D.] Hilles18 is the best politician I know. He can familiar- ize himself with the situation in a state and get information without appearing to stir up the waters, in a way that to me is quite marvelous. He came into contact with my friends in every one of the states that we visited, and he had a complete memorandum of the situation every- where, and is in constant communication with those who are interested to help me, in every state we visited. His name has been mentioned for chairman of the Republican Committee. I should hate to part with him for that purpose, and perhaps we can get someone--whose ap- pointment might not raise the same criticism as his would coming from my office--who can carry the matter as well as he; but at present I know of no such one. The insurgents [progressive Republicans] are gaining in fury against me. They are so bitter in their personal abuse that they become almost inarticulate. [Walter L.] Houser,19 LaFollette's manager, visited Wisconsin and sought to spread the idea that I was drinking

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42                                      OHIO HISTORY

 

heavily and in a condition of despair at the situation. I made a speech

in Chicago in which I stated the exact truth, and then because I did

not lie about the matter, it was said that I gave up. What I said was

that the lesson of the trip gave me very sincere hopes of Republican

victory at the next election, but that everyone must recognize the

critical character of the fight, with a view to the chastening that we

had at the last election [in 1910]; that I was hopeful that that was

only a chastening by defection of the Republicans and not by addition

to the Democrats; but that if it was otherwise and a Democratic ad-

ministration was to come in, we would loyally support it, with the

belief that it would not last much longer than the term. And I think

that states my view exactly.

As I figure it out from the late election, New York, Massachusetts,

and New Jersey are reasonably certain if you [Democrats] nominate

any man with more radical tendencies than I have, and that your party

is likely to do. LaFollette will try to beat me, and will try to elect the

Democratic candidate. I should prefer that he bolted outright than

that he stayed in the party and knifed me in his underhanded way. I

know that many of the insurgents will stay in the [Republican] Party

--[Albert B.] Cummins,20 for instance, whatever LaFollette does--

but they will not lend a hand with any degree of enthusiasm. However,

if I can carry New York and the Middle West, they can not beat me.

In Ohio the situation is not as clear as I should like to have it,

but the recent elections were all influenced by local considerations in

municipal matters, so that it is difficult to reason toward any result

in that State.21 Heretofore in national matters, it has gone Republican,

and, personally, I think there is no doubt about its doing so next

November.

I believe my case has been very much strengthened in the last year.

I think that these insurgents do not know how much they suffered by

their insincerity in the reciprocity fight22 and the exposure of the fact

that they have no principle to guide them except that of opposition

and personal antagonism to me. This is so narrow a platform that it

gains few supporters. No great body of men ever accepted as a stand-

ard to lead them, the "sore toe" of their leader, and that is the weak-

ness that LaFollette's followers have today. I do not know, but my

impression is that there is no one thing that has helped me more than

LaFollette's own speech against me on what he calls "sham" reci-

procity, and while he is an arch politician and a man of tremendous

industry and of great courage to do anything, however unscrupulous,

to accomplish his ends, he has defects in his qualities; for instance,

his supreme selfishness and his bitterness of spirit against all opposi-

tion, which he manifests by a personal rancor that, instead of heart-

ening, cools his followers.

The truth is that at the "rump" convention23 that was held at

Chicago, LaFollette cooled the enthusiasm of many there by insisting

that he should be nominated. [James R.] Garfield24 went there from

Oyster Bay [Roosevelt's home], I am told, with no authority from

Oyster Bay; and I think that is literally so; but, of course, he acquired

a certain sort of sympathy with his view and certain observations

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TAFT AND HEMPHILL                                             43

 

from the standpoint of a judicial observer, from the standpoint of a

man up a tree; and from that standpoint he gathered that Theodore

[Roosevelt] was opposed to the nomination of LaFollette, and there-

fore, took the ground that it was better not to declare for anyone--

a proposition that did not meet with Robert's [La Follette's] liking;

and as there were more delegates there from Wisconsin than from all

the other states, the nomination was decided upon.25

Now, Garfield is the leading progressive in northern Ohio, and they

make no declaration in favor of any particular candidate; they know

they are against me, but anybody else might be accepted. I have a letter

from a Congregational minister in Painesville, in Garfield's district,

this morning, in which he says that Garfield, in a Republican county

that never went Democratic before, was turned down by a vote of

700 because of the part he played in the convention at Chicago in

opposing my candidacy. I do not know the writer except that he is a

minister in that Church--that is, the Congregational Church--which

I suppose, in the Western Reserve, is about as Hell-fired as your Scotch

Presbyterian.26

I have run along in this way to give you my general view of the

situation. If we have a state-wide primary for presidential preferences

in some states, I think there is no doubt but what I could beat LaFol-

lette. The only complication that I see is the remaining popularity of

Roosevelt which they [Taft's opponents] might inject in order to make

a third candidate; and that may occur. But, few of the states have

meetings of the legislature, and the National [Republican] Committee

will never change the present method in the states by any change in

the general rule in favor of a presidential primary. They will leave the

matter to the states, and to the laws of the states, provided the selec-

tion comes within certain requirements, namely: (1) that the resort

to the people shall have been had after the first of January, 1912, and

(2) that it shall be in accordance with the law of the state or with

the direction of the State Central Committee, so that there will be

adequate machinery to make the primary a real decision rather than

one which by chicanery or violence can be made into a perversion of

the people's will.

I do not know, but I get word, for instance, from Oregon that I

can beat LaFollette in the presidential primary two to one. That is

the word that comes from a committee organized in my behalf, con-

sisting of both regulars and progressives, half and half--all of whom

are opposed to [Jonathan] Bourne27 as a faker and a joke. And from

San Francisco I get the same information. The progressives there

[in California] have mistaken their importance because of the im-

portance of the issue that carried them into power, to wit; the grafting

influence of the Southern Pacific [Railroad], and the popular protest

against it; and they have foisted on the state, against a reticent and

acquiescent conservative force, twenty-three amendments of a radical

character. They think they are at the top of the wave of their popular-

ity. Whatever they may think, they took no pains to amend the law,

which they amended in many other respects, which gave to the dele-

gates who were selected two years ago for county conventions, the

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44                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

right to select the delegates at the coming National Convention. Now

they have let in the women to vote, and they are hearing a rumble from

the female end of the electorate that, there are signs, they are yielding

to. They insist on having some voice in the selection of delegates, and

if there is a state-wide primary, why, the devil take the hindmost! I

am prepared to go in with the rest and see what will be done.

For another reason than mere good will to Californians, I was most

urgent in bringing about the exposition at San Francisco,28 because I

felt that would enable me to get through the Japanese treaty and to

save myself from a great many troubles growing out from attacks

on the Japanese. It has worked to a charm in the direction of the ob-

ject that I had in mind, and in the meantime has given me a standing

in San Francisco and the neighborhood that I never could have had

in any other way. The attitude of the people in this regard can not

be mistaken in my reception, and I add this to the other statements

that I have made in reference to the effect of the trip.

I can only say about it that the ghosts of the insurgents that were

raised against my coming into the various states, like Kansas, Ne-

braska, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Oregon and Cali-

fornia, are [sic] laid before I got there. At least, I did not see any

evidences of their presence. They may have risen again after I left,

and if you can believe the insurgent papers they were there sitting

on my shoulders and discouraging me. But, being a member of the

newspaper craft, you know what infernal liars your profession can

produce, and you will accept their stories accordingly. I had a slight

experience in that craft years ago,29 but constant effort has rid me

of the tendencies that pursued such a profession, and therefore you

must accept me as a truthful witness.

I hope to see you in Richmond30 and tell you over again what I

now tell you, and also congratulate you, which I do sincerely, on

your going into a place where you can wield greater influence than

you have ever wielded before and at the same can earn a dollar or

two for your own comfort.

I sincerely hope that you will send me, daily, a copy of your paper,31

so that when you come to see me I can have it prominent on my desk

as of yore.

 

On December 5, 1911, Taft sent a special message to congress on the

trust question in which he proposed voluntary national incorporation of

big businesses engaged in interstate commerce. He saw his proposal as a

"supplement to the Sherman Law" which would in no way modify his

campaign to destroy monopolies.32 His message sharpened differences that

already existed between him and Roosevelt concerning the solution to the

trust problem. Delighted by the message, Hemphill hastened to write the

president on December 6, 1911:33

 

That is a cracking good message of yours on the trust question.

I have said what I thought about it as nearly as I could in The Ob-

server this morning, as you will see by the scrap which I enclose.

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I hope to see you at the Gridiron Dinner Saturday night and if you have any special information you think I should have, that would be a good time for you to hand it to me.   While in Washington for the Gridiron Dinner, Hemphill was an over- night guest at the White House. During a Sunday morning stroll, he and the president discussed various topics related to the campaign. Hemphill described the revolt against Taft in North Carolina and assured him that Woodrow Wilson's "attempted pension grab" had cast doubt on Wilson's availability. The so-called "pension grab" incident had been "exposed" by the New York Sun on December 5, 1911. It revealed that, upon his retire- ment as president of Princeton University in 1910, Wilson had applied to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching for an annual pension. Hemphill seized upon the disclosure as evidence of Wilson's gift for deception, since obviously the pension was intended to finance his political ambitions rather than provide security for a teacher "worn out" in educational service. The editor apparently convinced Taft that the pen- sion episode would seriously damage Wilson's bid for the Democratic nomination.34 The excitement over the pension grab incident had scarcely abated when the so-called Manhattan Club affair created a new sensation in Demo- cratic circles. This new disturbance, which threatened to wreck Wilson's

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46                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

candidacy altogether, originated in what appeared on the surface as merely

a candid discussion among friends. On December 7, 1911, Wilson met

George Harvey and Henry Watterson at the Manhattan Club to discuss

"practical matters" related to his campaign. As Wilson prepared to leave,

Harvey asked him if there was "anything left of this cheap talk . . . about

my advocating you on behalf of the interests?" When Wilson frankly ad-

mitted that Harvey's support was causing him some difficulties in the West,

Harvey agreed to "apply the soft pedal" in his future editorials. Although

the meeting ended on a friendly note, it soon became the basis for what

has been described as an "anti-Wilson conspiracy" staged by Wilson's three

original sponsors, Harvey, Hemphill, and Watterson. Harvey, the real di-

rector of the scheme, appeared deeply "hurt" by the "peremptoriness" and

ingratitude of one whose fortunes he had promoted so long. Watterson, an

eyewitness of the affair, testified to Wilson's shabby treatment of Harvey.

And Hemphill, in constant contact with his friends Harvey and Watterson,

played the role of chief publicist in the scheme. The episode provided the

means by which the three conservative editors abandoned the Wilson

presidential movement. Their attempt, however, to use the episode to

destroy Wilson's bid for the nomination was an utter failure.³⁵ From the

beginning, Hemphill kept President Taft posted on the rapid developments

in the Manhattan Club scheme. In fact, he intimated a Harvey-Wilson

break in a letter to Taft on January 1, 1912,36 even before the story be-

came public:

 

I wish you a Happy New Year and all possible good luck. Henry

Watterson was here several days last week and spoke to a large and

intelligent audience Saturday night in behalf of the arbitration

treaties.37 While here he was interviewed, and he asked me before

leaving Charlotte if I would send you a copy of his interview as he

wished you to know what he sincerely thought of you and what he

also thinks of the cowboy patriot of New York [Roosevelt]. I enclose

the interview. I also enclose what I had to say editorially in The

Observer about the Colonel's [Roosevelt's] outrageous assault upon

you. The people of this country are finding him out. I think his treat-

ment of you is simply damnable. I wish I could see you as I could a tale

unfold about the pension-grabbing Governor of New Jersey [Wilson]

and his treatment of George Harvey and Watterson. It is the most

remarkable thing I have ever known in politics and I hope that I

shall be able to bring it out in The Observer a little later, but just at

this time I do not care to say anything about it. For cold-blooded

selfishness and utter disregard for all political commonsense, it is

the worst I have ever heard of.

 

The suggestion of an impending storm within Democratic circles na-

turally interested the president. But Hemphill's intimation of a rupture

between Harvey and Wilson which would adversely affect Wilson's bid for

the nomination was all the more tantalizing, because Taft feared Wilson

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TAFT AND HEMPHILL                                               47

 

more than any of the other Democratic aspirants.38 On January 3, 1912,

the president wrote Hemphill:39

 

I have yours of January 1st and have read the clippings you in-

closed with a great deal of interest. I read what Henry Watterson had

to say and thank him for his kindly words. I wish I could hear from

you what you intimate in respect to the pension grabber [Wilson].

When it appears in The Observer don't fail to call my attention to it.

 

On January 5, 1912, Hemphill verified rumors of a break between Harvey

and Wilson with a front-page story in the Daily Observer entitled "Harvey

Drops Wilson." The story included a highly colored version of the Manhat-

tan Club meeting designed to place Wilson in the worst possible light.

It conveyed the impression that Wilson was a "conscienceless ingrate"

willing to repudiate his "discoverer, friend and backer" for the sake of

making political capital with the "mob." Hemphill timed the publication

of the story so that it appeared on the eve of the Jackson Day Dinner,

an event that marked the beginning of the intensive scramble within the

Democratic party for convention delegates.40 The Daily Observer on Janu-

ary 5, 1912, had scarcely come off the press when Hemphill wrote Taft:41

 

I enclose a few scraps from The Observer this morning bearing

upon the pension-grabbing school teacher's [Wilson's] case, and I

think I have fired a shot this morning that will be heard around the

country. It is the most remarkable story of political ingratitude and

personal infidelity I have ever known. When I see you next time, I

can tell you some very interesting things about it, in which I am

sure you will rejoice.

 

Delighted by Hemphill's disclosure of the Manhattan Club affair, Taft

assured him:42

 

The Harvey-Wilson Episode is going to stir up the Democratic

politics for some time. It shows Wilson in a perfectly bloodless chase

for the White House and willing to sacrifice friendship.

 

Despite indications that the anti-Wilson scheme was backfiring, Hemp-

hill remained confident that "if the thing is worked right," the people would

drop Wilson "like a hot potato."⁴³ Even so, a note of pessimism regarding

the ultimate outcome of the Manhattan Club affair crept into the confi-

dential letter that he wrote Taft on January 18, 1912:44

 

You have seen by the newspapers during the last two or three days

some of the things about the Harvey-Wilson break, which I wrote

you I would like to talk to you about. It seems to me as if the school

teacher [Wilson] had it in the back of his head somewhere that he

would escape his position in the matter by throwing the blame upon

a long suffering and devoted Presbyterian by the name of Hemphill,

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48                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

now residing temporarily he hopes, in the town of Charlotte; but the

statements of Harvey and Watterson have checkmated that move. It

is to me a really painful thing that the school teacher should have

been so greedy and he was willing to desert his best friend for the

sake of making political capital with the mob. If the people of this

country were what they used to be, this exposure of the school

teacher's treachery to his friends would be sufficient to make him

impossible as a Presidential candidate.

Of course, I am writing to you with great feeling and in perfect

confidence. I enclose some scraps I have had in The Observer about

the matter, which may have escaped your attention.

 

The course of the campaign after mid-January 1912 only deepened the

anxieties of both Hemphill and Taft. Most painful for Hemphill was the

boomerang effect of the scheme to wreck Wilson's presidential movement.

Actually the outcome of the affair strengthened Wilson's position by rid-

ding him of those arch-conservative Democrats whose support had pre-

viously weakened his appeal to the progressives. But Hemphill had little,

if any, more cause for pessimism than Taft. The political event which most

profoundly disturbed the president was Roosevelt's announcement on

February 21, 1912, that he would seek the Republican nomination.45 As

soon as Hemphill received news of Roosevelt's announcement, he hastened

to reassure his friend in the White House that he had nothing to fear

from the "cowboy patriot":46

 

I enclose two scraps from the editorial page of The Observer this

morning, which may interest you. It is just as I expected it would

be, but I do not believe that the American people are fools enough

to trust the administration of their affairs in the hands of the wild

man [Roosevelt] who holds no friendship sacred; who makes no

pledges he feels bound to keep. I am really sorry for him, however,

because I believe this latest demonstration of his proves beyond

further question that he is crazy. You remember your promise to

send me a lot of matter for the article I told you I would write.

 

Although Taft might occasionally echo Hemphill's estimate of Roose-

velt's sanity, he suffered few delusions about the precarious state of his

own political future. He interpreted Roosevelt's entry into the campaign

as a serious threat to his own success and as the completion of the breach

between them. Seized by a mood of desolation and defeat, the president

naturally grew closer to those who remained faithful to his cause. He

could scarcely have failed to perceive that Roosevelt's announcement had

placed him in a position remarkably similar to that of his Democratic

friend in the South who had also been a victim of betrayal and ingrati-

tude. Certainly Hemphill saw the resemblance and, feeling that a new

bond existed between him and the president, availed himself of every op-

portunity to console Taft. In a letter to the president on March 9, 1912,

he wrote:47

• 14
 

TAFT AND HEMPHILL                                                49

 

That was a fine speech you made in Toledo last night,⁴⁸ and it

ought to appeal to the responsible people of the country. How it will

affect the cowboy contingent [Roosevelt's followers] and the fakers

and liars who are organized against you in your own party, I do not

know, but I have no idea in the world that the Colonel [Roosevelt]

will be re-elected. I am dead sure of winning my bet with Medill Mc-

Cormick that Mr. Roosevelt's name will not be mentioned in the

[Republican] Convention at Chicago.49 I enclose two or three scraps

from The Observer this morning which may be of interest to you and

which may have escaped you. I had a letter from [George] Harvey

last night telling me to go ahead with the article [contrasting Taft

and Roosevelt] and that he would print it either in the [Harper's]

Weekly or in the North American Review. The subject is so big, I

hardly know where to begin, but when the writing spirit comes upon

me, I shall take it up and do the best I can.

 

One of the most serious blows to Taft's campaign occurred in the

Illinois presidential preference primary on April 9, 1912, when Roosevelt

defeated the president by a vote of two to one. At the same time, the Demo-

crats in Illinois indicated that they preferred Champ Clark of Missouri,

the speaker of the house, to Woodrow Wilson.50 The day after Taft's

disaster in Illinois, Hemphill wrote him:51

 

I have read the reports from Illinois with regret, but I trust that

nothing the Colonel [Roosevelt] can do can defeat your renomination

by the Republican Convention in Chicago. I rejoiced that old Champ

[Clark] beat the Schoolmaster [Wilson], not because I love Champ

more, but Woodrow less. Conditions in North Carolina are not al-

together what you would like them to be, but I presume that the

situation here will improve for you a little later. I speak without

knowledge but I have an idea that the work of your special representa-

tives in this state has not been as active as it ought to have been.

This note is simply to advise you of my interest in your political

fortunes, and to say that I suppose that you will agree with me now

that your friend [Roosevelt] is unworthy of the confidence of any

honest man. I should like to hear what you really think about the

present situation, not for publication of course, but for my own

information.

 

Two days later, on April 12, 1912, President Taft responded to Hemp-

hill's request for a candid analysis of "the present situation." He sought

to explain the causes of his defeat in Illinois and predicted, quite erron-

eously, that he would defeat Roosevelt in the Pennsylvania primary. Taft

wrote:52

 

I have your letter in which you ask as to the result in Illinois and

the real situation from behind the scenes.

We were at a great disadvantage in Illinois due to the fact they

gave us but a week in which to make preparation for a campaign that

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50                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

the others had been working on for two months or more. They pro-

ceeded on the theory that they were going to have a primary; we had

supposed that we would not have a primary--certainly that if a pri-

mary was provided it would at least make provision for a month's

preparation. Then the character of the primary worked against me.

There were seven candidates for Governor; six of them not for me

and all of the six a little willing to trade except [Senator William]

Lorimer's candidate, who professed to be for me because he was

against Roosevelt.

As a matter of fact I did more against Lorimer in the first hearing

than Roosevelt or anybody else,53 and I have never worked with him

and never have been in sympathy with him. But Roosevelt was ap-

parently able, with the aid of lying newspapers, to convince the people

of Illinois that I was on the side of Lorimer, and it became a fight

against me as one of Lorimer's supporters.

I had not counted on more than eight delegates out of fifty-eight in

Illinois, and therefore am not greatly disappointed as you can see.

We shall get two delegates, and perhaps six. The weight of the vote,

however, is likely to work against me in other states.

The situation is not an easy one for me, to have my predecessor

and former friend running around the country attacking me on every

hand and charging me with all sorts of deviltry and evil association.

I might, of course, respond in kind and lead to a campaign of crimina-

tion and recrimination, but in such a campaign he would have a great

advantage over me because that is the kind of weapon he knows how

to use and I don't.

He [Roosevelt] has been in Pennsylvania the last two days and has

had great crowds there, I am told, and a warm reception. He has a

different kind of situation to meet there from that which confronted

him in Illinois. We have a machine that is pretty well organized and

disciplined, and the fight turns only on the delegates to Chicago and to

the State convention; and the business element throughout the State,

I doubt not, is with me. Some of the farmers are doubtless being led

off on the reciprocity issue. You will see what a somersault he has

turned in order to win the farmers.

It is curious that I had some correspondence with Mr. Roosevelt on

reciprocity and also on the Lorimer case, and he knows how I stood on

the Lorimer case; but he did not hesitate to link my name with

Lorimer's.

[Boies] Penrose54 says that we will get sixty out of the seventy-six

delegates in Pennsylvania--and probably sixty-six. I shall be content

with fifty. They expect to break even, at least.55 If we are to get sixty

delegates, that will give us around 400 down to Sunday, and we will

have to pick up only 139 out of the remaining 400 or 500 in order to

secure a majority. Of course, one can not tell in advance, but I should

anticipate that instead of getting 139 we would get double that, or

perhaps 200 more than the amount necessary for a choice.

It has not been easy to hold one's tongue under the conditions that

have existed, but I have thought it was better in view of my relations

with Roosevelt formerly, and in view of my position as President. I

• 16
 

did not think it dignified to get down into the ring of crimination and recrimination; and I am very sure that at mudslinging he is an artist and I am only a tyro--and I don't like it at any rate. I do not like to express to you my personal opinion of my opponent, because it wouldn't do you or me any good.   Taft's reluctance to engage in a battle of "crimination and recrimination" disturbed Hemphill. He feared that the president's "dignified" campaign might well cost him the nomination. Editorially Hemphill described Roosevelt as "the wildest man who has ever for personal gain flaunted the red flag of anarchy in the faces of self-governing people." At the same time, he urged his friend in the White House to "fight the devil with fire" by a more vigorous effort to expose the misrepresentations, hypocrisy, and

• 17
 

52                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

fraud perpetrated by Roosevelt.56 News of Taft's defeat in the Pennsyl-

vania primary on April 13, 1912, and the continued anti-Taft drift in

North Carolina prompted Hemphill to urge the president to "take the

stump" against Roosevelt. Taft replied on April 19, 1912:57

 

I have read with interest and relish the article in The Observer

on the 17th, which you enclosed in yours of that date.

I know how keenly you feel the situation which is, as you say,

critical. The fact that the Roosevelt Committee has filed a certified

statement with the Secretary of State of New York admitting the

expenditure of $4 for each Roosevelt voter in New York City, at the

recent primary, shows the length to which our adversaries will go.

Men conspicuous in the Steel Corporation and in the Steel pool are

furnishing the money and the organizing ability, but we shall fight on.

The next ten days will tell the tale.

 

In a letter to Hemphill two weeks later, on April 30, 1912, expressing

his appreciation for the editor's laudatory article to appear in Harper's

Weekly,58 the president not only manifested his bitterness toward Roosevelt

but also a growing despondency over his own political future. Taft wrote:59

 

I very greatly appreciate your courtesy in sending me a copy of

the excellent article which you wrote for Harper's Weekly. It is admir-

able, and ought to wield considerable influence.

If conditions were normal, the support which I am receiving from

the press would be sufficient to bring about renomination. The diffi-

culty, however, is that Mr. Roosevelt will not meet the issues with

thoughtful argument, but contents himself with arousing class

hatred--arraying the "plain people" against the "silk stocking" ele-

ment, and then posing as the only virtuous friend of the plain people.

If we lose Massachusetts, it will not be because we have neglected any

phase of the campaign, nor because our friends relaxed in their efforts.

 

Taft was victorious in the Massachusetts primary on April 30, 1912.

But whatever solace the triumph brought him was soon dispelled by the

devastating defeat which he suffered in his native Ohio three weeks later.60

Distressed by the outcome in Ohio, Hemphill wrote the president on May

23, 1912:61

 

I still have my money on you, but I am distressed by the result in

Ohio. There is no way to account for it that I see except that the

Roosevelt people actually bought the majority; in your state, known

of all men to be corrupt when it comes to suffrage. If you were half as

mad as some of your friends have been for a good many months, you

would not feel nearly so good probably, but you would experience a

degree of satisfaction that comes to some men when their savage

instincts have been appeased. If you know anything about the situation

that has not already been covered in what the newspapers have said--

• 18
 

TAFT AND HEMPHILL                                               53

 

and it is the highest tribute that could be paid you in my opinion

that the respectable newspapers of the country are almost unanimously

for you--I wish you would write it to me.

 

As the date of the Republican convention approached, Taft became

increasingly gloomy. He seemed to have become reconciled to the possi-

bility of defeat. On May 26, 1912, he wrote Hemphill:62

 

I don't know how the whole thing is coming out, but I am in the

fight to the end to win or lose! Of course, I'd like to win and mean to

win, but if they [Roosevelt forces] turn the trick against me, they'll

find I'm a pretty good loser.

 

On June 18, 1912, the Republican national convention assembled in

Chicago to nominate the party's presidential candidate. With the party

machinery tightly under his control, Taft was able to secure renomination

on the first ballot. Convinced that the whole procedure was a "saturnalia

of fraud," Roosevelt renounced his Republicanism and organized his own

Progressive party. Viewing these proceedings from the press box in the

convention hall was Hemphill, who had left his "ugly predicament" in

Charlotte earlier in June to become a "roving correspondent" for the New

York Times. Delighted by his friend's triumph over "the modern Robes-

pierre," Hemphill assured his readers that Taft's renomination guaranteed

"security of life and property, the integity of the courts, and the supremacy

of law." Throughout the campaign the journalist continued to display his

sympathy for Taft and his revulsion for Roosevelt and the "high-speed

progressives." But circumstances forced him to modify his position

regarding Wilson. When his employer, the Times, endorsed Wilson on June

28, 1912, and his party nominated him four days later, Hemphill accepted

"the inevitable" and prepared to make his peace with the man against

whom he had recently directed poisonous barbs hitherto reserved for

Roosevelt and Bryan. Although he had officially boarded the Wilson band-

wagon by mid-summer, his lack of enthusiasm indicated that he still

preferred Taft.63

The friendship between the Republican president and the Democratic

editor, strengthened by the alienation of each from the mainstream of his

party during the preconvention campaign of 1912, remained steadfast for

the next fifteen years. Relieved of the presidential burdens by his defeat,

Taft was content and happy, first as professor of law at Yale and later as

chief justice of the supreme court. In contrast, Hemphill's career after

1912 was one of disappointment and waning prominence. His role in the

preconvention campaign, which resulted in his virtual discharge as editor

of the Daily Observer, irreparably damaged his prestige in the world of

journalism. After leaving Charlotte, he drifted from one editorial post to

another and rapidly dropped into obscurity. He spent his last days editing

a small-town newspaper in his native South Carolina.64 Throughout these

years, he and Taft carried on a regular and frequent correspondence. In

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54                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

1915 Hemphill attempted to persuade his friend to enter the Republican

presidential race of the following year, but Taft assured him that his

candidacy was "resting in the tomb where it ought to be."⁶⁵ When Hemphill

died in 1927, Taft summed up his estimate of the man in a telegram to his

family:66

 

He was a man I loved and admired. He was honest, frank, and open-

hearted; an editor of great ability and experience; a hater of shams

and a supporter of good causes; he was a loyal friend.

 

THE AUTHOR: Willard B. Gatewood

is an associate professor of history at the

University of Georgia.

• 20