PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET
by ROBERT K. MURRAY
Among the many controversial facets involving the life of the twenty-ninth president of the United States, few have prompted more conjecture and analysis than the choosing of his cabinet. The fact that one of his selections achieved the distinction of being the only cabinet officer to go to jail, that another resigned under a cloud of suspicion, and still a third narrowly missed criminal conviction, places Warren Gamaliel Harding in a unique position as a cabinet-maker. With this record it is little wonder that Harding's skill as a judge of men has been consistently downgraded both by historians and popular writers. Early observers, such as William Allen White, Frederick Lewis Allen, Mark Sullivan, and Samuel Hopkins Adams, all agreed that the Harding cabinet was a crazy quilt of both good and bad, with the bad far outweighing the good.1 Later writers, such as Frederick L. Paxson and Andrew Sinclair, soften the emphasis somewhat but basically arrive at the same conclusion.2 Thus, despite the recognized excellence of certain cabinet choices, the poor selections have captured the lion's share of popular and scholarly attention and have brought down upon the whole selection process a verdict of failure. But this verdict is based largely on the later scandals and not on the actual process of cabinet-making itself. Lost to view is Harding's personal wrestling with the alternative choices, the demands of the contemporary political situa- tion, and his own commitment to certain goals and principles. Until these factors are fully examined, the verdict of failure is at best incomplete and at worst erroneous.
NOTES ARE ON PAGES 185-188 |
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 109
With the taste of a stunning election
victory still in his mouth, President-
elect Warren Harding announced from the
front porch of his Marion, Ohio
home on November 5, 1920, that he
intended to leave the next day for a
month's vacation trip to Texas and
Panama, but that immediately upon his
return he would consult the "best
minds" of the country about his cabinet
and his future course of action. He warned
that all speculation in the interim
about cabinet selections would be
unfounded because he did not propose to
name anyone until he returned to Marion,
which he now dubbed "the Great
Listening Post."3
No sooner had Harding's special train
pointed southward than the press
was filled with intense speculation.
Each issue brought forth new names "on
the highest authority" or
eliminated old ones on the basis of the latest infor-
mation from "someone close to
Harding during the campaign." On the very
day Harding left, the New York Times contained
an editorial which prophe-
sied that Frank O. Lowden and General
Leonard Wood would be in the
cabinet.4 Others picked Senators Henry
Cabot Lodge and Harry S. New as
sure bets, while speculation for
Secretary of State centered around Charles
Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, or Senator
Philander C. Knox.5
Harding returned from Panama to
Washington on December 5. He was
aware of the newspaper comment and was
amused by most of it, but not by
the constant inference that the cabinet
would be packed with senators and,
indeed, that a "senate
oligarchy" would dictate the choices and set adminis-
tration policy. A hang-over from press
coverage of the Republican convention
and popularized by Democratic Governor
Cox during the campaign, this
charge of senate control was much on the
President-elect's mind when, on
December 5, the opening day of the third
session of the Sixty-sixth Congress,
he delivered a brief farewell address to
his senate colleagues. Expressing his
regret at leaving, he added this
interesting declaration:
Something has been said about the
"Senatorial oligarchy." Of course
everyone here knows that to be a bit of
highly imaginative and harmless
fiction...When my responsibilities begin
in the executive capacity, I
shall be as mindful of the Senate's
responsibilities as I have been jealous
for them as a member; but I mean at the
same time to be just as insistent
about the responsibilities of the
executive. Our governmental good
fortune does not lie in any surrender at
either end of the Avenue.6
Harding came into the presidential
office under obligation to no one. True,
he owed his Ohio supporters and a few
close friends, such as Harry M.
Daugherty, a debt of gratitude, but he
had received the nomination and
achieved final victory without
"deals" or promises. This gave him a freer
hand in selecting his official family
than most presidents have enjoyed.
He avowedly set out to acquire an
independent-minded, first-class cabinet.
His hope was to attract equals and not
echoes or rubber stamps. He hoped
to follow the tradition of Washington
and Lincoln in this respect, and not
Wilson. But he recognized there were,
necessarily, some restraints. Said he
to reporters, when lecturing them once
on the problems of cabinet-making:
Three things are to be considered in the
selection of a Cabinet. First,
there is the man's qualification for
public service. That is the most
110 OHIO HISTORY
important consideration of all. Second,
there is the attitude of the public
concerning the man under consideration.
Third, there is the political
consideration. As to that--well. This is
going to be a Republican
Cabinet.7
Despite having certain definite views on
cabinet selections, Harding was
no dictator. Indeed his political career
had been based on the adjudication
of differences and compromise. Always
attracted to party solidarity and a
firm believer in collective party
wisdom, Harding by choice, and not by force,
elected to consult widely -- the
"best minds" -- before making final decisions.
As a result, never had there been such a
pilgrimage of the party faithful
to a president-elect as occurred at
Marion, "the Great Listening Post," after
December 10. For the next month, as high
as six or seven leaders per day
funnelled through Harding's makeshift
office, being asked and giving advice
on a variety of matters, including
cabinet selections. No shade of opinion
was excluded. Once, when it came to
Harding's attention that Republican
house members were disgruntled because
of the preponderance of senators,
he ordered Will Hays, who was in charge
of the invitations, to include more
congressmen. Indeed, Hays found his
guest list constantly expanding as one
after another of the party's leaders
were requested to appear at Marion.8
At the same time, Harding consulted and
relied on "unofficial" representa-
tives in the field who reported to him,
especially on matters relating to the
cabinet. From time to time he gave them
specific assignments, and they
always sent their impressions directly
to him. The five most important of
these men were Harry M. Daugherty,
Charles D. Hilles, Senator Joseph
Frelinghuysen, Senator Harry S. New, and
Senator Frank Brandegee.9 Hard-
ing also sought the independent advice
of his running mate, Calvin Coolidge,
but Coolidge's cold personality made his
effectiveness minimal. Having made
a campaign promise that if elected he
would break precedent by bringing
the vice-president into cabinet
meetings, Harding believed it wise to consult
with him on cabinet choices. There is no
evidence, however, that Coolidge
ever played a significant role. In fact,
Brandegee took such a dim view of
Coolidge's contributions and talents in
general that he once wrote Harding:
"None of us here think much of the
idea of making the V.P. a Cabinet
officer 'Emeritus.'"10
There is no question that Harding was
the focal point of all discussions
on cabinet selections and was always in
command. The reins of decision he
held tightly in his own hands. He
rapidly became discouraged, however, by
the lack of advisory unity he discovered
among the "best minds." Worse,
he found himself suddenly the vortex of
subtle intrigues and cabals designed
to sway him one way or another. He soon
learned that the "big men" he
wanted for his cabinet also possessed
"big enemies" and that political con-
siderations often were used to cancel
out superior qualifications. Once, in the
midst of discouragement, he wrote to his
Ohio friend, Malcolm Jennings:
"What a job I have taken over. The
man who has a Cabinet to create has
one tremendous task."11 To
another friend he confided, "My cup is full."12
And the agony that he suffered he never
wholly forgot. Later when seeking
presidential clearance for an essay about
the Administration for the Saturday
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 111
Evening Post, H. H. Kohlsaat wrote Harding: "I did not think it
wise to use
any of the stories you have told me of
your Cabinet making -- it might
embarrass." The President
wholeheartedly agreed.13
Despite his inner turmoil, Harding
weathered the ordeal of selecting a
cabinet quite well. Insiders were amazed
at his patience and tact, his cor-
diality and sincerity. William Howard
Taft came away from his Marion
interview convinced that Harding was
trying to "do the right thing," and
Nicholas Murray Butler left with a solid
impression of "his good judgment
and sound common sense." Butler's
talks with Harding convinced the Co-
lumbia University president that the
Ohioan possessed a "perfect familiarity
with the various troublesome elements in
his political party."14
The marathon discussions, confusing as
they were, soon convinced Hard-
ing of several things: the Secretary of
State had to be a man universally
respected by the country yet able to
work with all elements in Congress;
the Secretary of Agriculture should be a
practical farmer and not merely a
professor of farming or an agricultural
lobbyist; the Labor post should go to
someone identified with labor, possibly
a union member, but not of the
"radical element;" and the
Treasury position should be filled from the Middle
West and not from New York or the
Northeast. Harding was also convinced
that one, if not two, positions in the
cabinet should be reserved for his
friends -- men to whom he could turn for
personal advice and whose loyalty
he could absolutely trust.15
These convictions provided the basic
framework for Harding's subsequent
cabinet-making and were reflected almost
immediately by his action in filling
the first position -- that of Secretary
of State. Much foolishness has been
written about this appointment. White,
Sullivan, and Adams all contend
that Harding really wanted to give the
post to his friend, Albert B. Fall,
but that visitors to Marion shook him
out of this notion with their sharp
opposition. It was claimed that he next
considered George Harvey and finally
turned to Root before deciding on
Hughes.16
There is little question that Harding
wanted Fall in the cabinet, but there
is no indication in any of Harding's
correspondence that he ever seriously
pushed Fall as Secretary of State. The
truth is that Harding offered the
position to Hughes on December 10 when
the New Yorker appeared in
Marion as one of his first visitors.
Three days later, Hughes wrote
Harding that he had talked the matter
over with his partners and "was glad
to say that I have arranged to be free
to assume the responsibilities of which
you spoke."17 On
December 22, Harding replied that he was "delighted" with
Hughes's decision and regarded the
matter closed. They both agreed that no
announcement would be made until later.
Such an announcement -- the first
regarding a cabinet selection -- was
made on February 19, 1921.18
In the meantime, ignorant of this
decision, the press continued its specula-
tion while the politicians argued.
Anti-League Republicans, such as William
E. Borah, championed the cause of Senator
Knox. Senator Brandegee, another
"bitter-ender," contended that
if Harding could not appoint Knox, he should
at least nominate Lodge.19 A
few, such as Senator James W. Wadsworth,
112 OHIO HISTORY
Jr., and Charles Hilles of New York,
clamored for the selection of Root;
and, when Harding invited Root to come
to Marion in mid-December, specu-
lation soared that he was about to be
chosen.20 Since no offer to Root was
apparently forthcoming, press interest
shifted back again to Hughes. At the
same time, the Old Guard, frightened by
increasing rumors of Hughes's
appointment, quickly closed ranks behind
Root even though they still wanted
Knox. Senator Boies Penrose made an
eleventh-hour fight in late January in
a futile attempt to block Hughes's
selection by dangling Root before Hard-
ing's eyes.21
But Harding, as noted, had already made
his decision back in early
December and he stuck with it. Moreover,
it was his decision and Hughes
was his choice -- his first choice.
It was a fearless act of cabinet-making
statesmanship.22
Another early decision which stemmed
from a strong Harding conviction
was the appointment of Henry C. Wallace
(father of Henry A. Wallace) as
Secretary of Agriculture. He felt
Wallace fulfilled the requirement that the
holder of this post should be a
"dirt" farmer. During the campaign, he and
Cox had jousted verbally over this
matter, with Harding charging that the
Wilson Administration had appointed only
university presidents and pub-
lishers to the position while the
Republican party traditionally had selected
bona fide farmers.23 By a
curious twisting of the definition, Harding classified
Wallace as a "dirt" farmer;
but in so doing he did violence to the truth. Born
into a farming family in Adair County,
Iowa, Wallace, after attempting farm-
ing for five years, ultimately found
more interest in teaching -- he was for a
time an assistant professor at Iowa
State -- and in farm journalism than
in plowing.
Wallace had been invaluable to Harding
during the campaign. One of the
best known agriculturalists in the
United States because of his editorship
of Wallaces' Farmer, he had
helped write the 1920 Republican farm plank
and had been Harding's chief advisor and
speech writer on farm matters.
Wallace, himself, was an able stump speaker;
and his slashing attacks on
the Wilson Administration, together with
his personal influence among
agricultural organizations, were
important factors in swinging a massive
farm vote to Harding.24
Even before the election, Harding had
his eye on Wallace as a potential
Secretary of Agriculture. On November 1,
1920, Harding wrote to Wallace:
"If the verdict on Tuesday is what
we are expecting it to be I shall very
much want your assistance in making good
the promises which we have made
to the American people."25 After
the election, when other names were brought
forward as candidates, such as Senator
Arthur Capper and Marion Butler,
Harding barely gave them consideration.
Wallace was still his man even
though press speculation did not center
on the Iowan until late December.
By that time, Harding was subjected to
extreme pressure regarding the
Wallace selection. Some conservative
leaders and certain vested interest
groups objected strongly. Wallace's liberal
tendencies unsettled Old Guard
members while his editorial assaults
against the malpractices of the packing
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 113
and food processing industries earned
him the hatred of these powerful
elements. Delegations, headed by no less
than Everett C. Brown of the
National Live Stock Association and C.
B. Stafford, President of the Chicago
Live Stock Exchange, hastened to Marion
to protest his nomination. The
packers and millers also had their
spokesmen present. But Harding did not
waver, and Wallace joined Hughes on the
cabinet list.26
The Hughes and Wallace appointments were
not to the liking of the
President-elect's senate cronies or
close political friends. This was all the
more true of still a third selection --
Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Com-
merce.
It is clear from the Harding
correspondence that from the very beginning
he was attracted to Hoover as a cabinet
candidate. It is equally clear that
certain elements in the party, close to
Harding, lived in constant fear that
Hoover might be selected. From the day
that Hoover arrived in Marion
(December 12) to confer with Harding, a
bitter campaign was conducted to
keep Hoover out of the cabinet. On the
other hand, Hoover, even more than
Hughes, had a "good press,"
and there was wide support in the country at
large for his appointment.27
The opposition to Hoover was both
impressive and articulate. Frank
Brandegee stated the anti-Hoover
position succintly: "Hoover gives most
of us gooseflesh."28 Too
liberal in his social philosophy, too internationally-
minded, too popular, and too ambitious
for the Old Guard, Hoover was not
opposed for a particular cabinet
post, but for any. Senators Philander Knox,
Charles Curtis, and Reed Smoot voiced
immediate opposition, and warned
Harding that Hoover was non-party
oriented and would not "get along well"
with other cabinet officers.29 Not
only the Old Guard, but even Insurgent
senators, such as Hiram Johnson, were
skeptical. Harry New, one of Hard-
ing's "trouble-shooters" on
cabinet appointments, wrote to Marion shortly
before Christmas: "Many senators
have expressed the hope that Hoover
may be omitted. [They] fear the effect
of this [selection] in the Senate ...
[Johnson] says it [Hoover's nomination]
would be personally so offensive
to him that he hoped from that
standpoint that it might not be found neces-
sary."30 Harry Daugherty
reported essentially the same information: that
there was little support for Hoover
among congressmen, that the Hearst
papers were against him, and that even such
Progressives as Raymond
Robins, Gifford Pinchot, and George W.
Norris did not endorse him.31
Indeed, there was little
enthusiasm for Hoover in the Republican party
leadership. Among Harding's close
advisers, only Frelinghuysen supported
Hoover's appointment as
"politically wise" and believed him superior to other
suggested candidates, such as Albert
Lasker of Chicago and Eugene Meyer,
Jr., of New York City.32
Harding's attitude toward Hoover
remained unshaken throughout this
debate. On January 12, 1921, in reply to
a letter from Hoover in which the
humanitarian had strongly endorsed
Wallace's appointment as Secretary of
Agriculture, Harding wrote: "Your
opinion concerning [Wallace] is important
to me. Indeed, I hold you in such esteem
that your opinion on any matter
114 OHIO HISTORY
is of real importance."33 Under
the fierce attacks, "such esteem" grew even
stronger. On February 9, Harding wrote
Daugherty: "The more I consider
[Hoover] the more do I come to think
well of him. Of course, I have no
quarrel with those who do not think as I
do, but inasmuch as I have the
responsibility to assume, I think my
judgment must be trusted in the matter.
The main thing to consider at the present
is whether Mr. Hoover will accept
the post which I am prepared to offer to
him."34
Several days later on February 12,
Harding offered him the post of Secre-
tary of Commerce. The precise position
was really immaterial to Harding;
he simply wanted Hoover in the cabinet.
Hoover, on the other hand, was not
so anxious. On December 22 he had
already indicated to Harding (in rela-
tion to overtures about a cabinet
position made by Harding at their meeting
in Marion on December 12) that he did
not desire to enter public service,
and had requested the Ohioan to
"dismiss from your mind all thought of
my appointment."35 In view of
certain subsequent opposition, Hoover was
even less inclined to accept. Hence, considerable
persuasion was necessary.
At this point Harding asked Hughes to
intercede, and the New Yorker invited
Hoover to his Sixty-fourth Street
apartment to talk matters over.36 Will
Hays was also sent by Harding to
convince Hoover of the wisdom of entering
the cabinet. On February 22, in a phone
call from St. Augustine, where he
sought some relaxation prior to his
inauguration, Harding, himself, reaffirmed
to Hoover his deep desire to have him
join his official family and assured him
that he could have free rein in running
the Commerce Department if he
accepted.* In a final show of
determination, Harding wrote Hiram Johnson
a personal note acknowledging the
Senator's bitter opposition to Hoover,
but indicated that he believed Johnson's
fellow Californian would be an
excellent choice and requested Johnson
"to accept my judgment on this
particular matter."37 In
the face of such sincerity, Hoover wavered and the
next day, February 23, wired Harding
that although he much preferred to
remain out of public life, "I have
no right to refuse your wish and I will
accept the Secretaryship of
Commerce." Formal announcement was made
to the press a day later.38
Hoover's appointment as Secretary of
Commerce was intimately connected
with that of Andrew W. Mellon as
Secretary of Treasury. Contrary to later
assertions, Harding, in this instance,
not only displayed his independence but
also his political shrewdness. Mellon
was not Harding's first choice for the
Treasury post. Indeed, his name was not even
mentioned among the early
candidates: John Weeks (Massachusetts),
Charles Dawes (Illinois), Frank
Lowden (Illinois), and Charles Hilles
(New York). Of these men, Dawes
was Harding's favorite. During his visit
to Marion in mid-December, the
Chicago banker was asked by Harding if
he could be enticed into the cabinet,
and Dawes replied probably not, but no
final decisions were reached one
way or the other.39 Dawes
possessed some attractive advantages: the Chicago
and the Midwestern banking fraternity
strongly endorsed him; he was re-
nowned for his tenacity and ability to
effect efficiency and economy; and he
was fearless, frank, and unpledged to
any particular faction in the party.
* Harding granted a similar freedom to
and demonstrated an equally cooperative attitude
toward Henry C. Wallace, Secretary of
Agriculture. See "Disharmony in the Harding
Cabinet" below, pp. 126-136.
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 115
But many in the East did not like Dawes,
considering him too erratic for
their tastes. Temporarily these elements
united behind John W. Weeks as
their candidate and urged his selection
on Harding. The Ohioan, however,
was not impressed by eastern arguments
against Dawes and, further, indi-
cated that he did not wish the post to
go to a New Englander or a New
Yorker because of "Wall
Street" connotations. As late as Christmas, Harding
still inclined toward the Chicagoan,
despite eastern opposition.40
The first mention of Mellon was made by
Senator Knox. Mellon had been a
heavy campaign contributor and had close
contacts with the party leader-
ship through Senators Knox and Penrose.
Once, in early December, while
Harding was wrestling with the Treasury
problem and weighing the pros and
cons of the Midwest versus the East,
Knox remarked that if he wanted a neat
geographic solution as well as experience
and competency in the job, Pennsyl-
vania could provide the Pittsburgh
multi-millionaire. It was agreed that Mel-
lon should be invited to Marion for a
talk.41
A short time later, Knox happened to be
lunching with Mellon and Henry C.
Frick, and he indicated to Mellon that
his name had been mentioned in
connection with the Treasury post.
Mellon said he absolutely did not want it,
but both Frick and Knox urged him to go
to Marion and consider it if an
offer were made. But no direct offer was
made. Mellon journeyed to Marion,
had lunch with Harding, and chatted for
about an hour. Harding did mention
the Treasury position and inquired if
Mellon were interested. The financier
did not give a flat "no," but
he did remind Harding of his vast holdings and
the impropriety of making such a wealthy
man Secretary of the Treasury.
Harding asked him to keep the matter
open.42
The President-elect still wanted Dawes
as the Treasury Secretary but
was forced to recognize the logic of a
Mellon appointment. Besides, the
Pennsylvanian rapidly garnered the
support of both eastern and midwestern
banking elements, as well as the heavy
endorsement of Old Guard stalwarts.
Senators Knox and Penrose,
Pennsylvania's Governor William Sproul, offi-
cials of the Carnegie Institute, and
innumerable others attested to his "un-
excelled judgment and ability in matters
of finance." Charles H. Sabin,
President of Guaranty Trust of New York,
indicated solid eastern support
by writing Harding that "no wiser choice
could be made." Meanwhile,
Daugherty's soundings in the field were
likewise enthusiastic.43
This turn of events presented Harding
with an unexpected opportunity.
He was in the midst of fighting off the
bitter attacks on Hoover and badly
needed something to assure Hoover's
confirmation if that selection were
made. At the same time, he was juggling
simultaneously his preference for
Dawes and a desire to placate certain
members of the Old Guard, including
the eastern money
"establishment." In late January at St. Augustine, Hard-
ing met a second time with Dawes and
explained this complex situation to
him. Dawes stated again that he really
did not want the Treasury post and
indicated his own willingness to endorse
Mellon. Harding then requested
that Dawes not let it be known that he
was withdrawing his name from
consideration because the President-elect wanted to
outflank Penrose, Knox,
116 OHIO HISTORY
and others who were bitterly opposed to
Hoover. Harding told Dawes that he
intended to make Mellon Secretary of the
Treasury in exchange for Hoover
for Commerce. Shortly thereafter,
Harding sent Daugherty to Washington to
indicate to Senators Knox and Penrose
that Mellon was a possibility, but
only if their attacks on Hoover ceased.
Reluctantly, they agreed -- and Mel-
lon was appointed.44
In his talk with Dawes, Harding had
commented: "Mellon probably has
too much money for a Secretary of the
Treasury. I may get as much criticism
over his appointment as I would if I put
J. P. Morgan in that place."45 He
almost did, but Harding was fully aware
of what he was doing and was pre-
pared to live with it. Mellon was not so
sure about himself. The multi-
millionaire did not relish the personal
sacrifices he would have to make or
the criticism he would have to endure.
At the same time, encouraged by
Senator Knox, Mellon was intrigued by
the thought of entering the strange
world of politics. As Mellon, himself,
later described his ambivalent feelings:
"I really didn't want to come to
Washington [but] I did not want absolutely
to refuse."46 He finally
capitulated, and an announcement was made to the
press in the last week in February.
The financier's appointment was a
curious blend of politics, chance, wisdom,
and clever calculation. It was shrewd
cabinet-making at its best. In the end,
everyone won -- the Old Guard, both
midwestern and eastern banking in-
terests, Hoover and Hoover supporters,
and most of all, Harding. Not every
President could boast that one of the
wealthiest men in the world was in his
cabinet. Bernard Baruch once remarked to
Clarence W. Barron, publisher
of the Wall Street Journal, that
when he had refused in 1912 to take the
Treasury position, President Wilson had
protested with tears in his eyes:
"I have no objection to
wealth." Obviously, neither had President-elect
Harding.47
While these four cabinet selections were
based, to a large extent, on
Harding's own desires as well as the
superior qualifications of the candidates,
four other appointments represented the
normal surrender to simple political
expediency. In these cases, the
President-elect merely followed the advice of
his political advisers or the dictates
of party necessity. Immediately after
the election, there was press
speculation that both General Leonard Wood
and Frank O. Lowden, the main contenders
for the Republican nomination
in 1920, would find their way into the
Harding cabinet. Although the election
result demonstrated that there was no
great need to sacrifice cabinet positions
to the Wood faction, Harding and his
advisers were nevertheless aware of
the General's personal popularity and
newspaper support. The "Great Listen-
ing Post" was bombarded by requests
that Wood be made Secretary of War
in order to "salve his
disappointment" over losing the nomination. In a
Literary Digest poll, two hundred forty-two of three hundred Republican
editors endorsed him for this cabinet
position.48
Within Harding's advisory circle there
was considerable opposition to the
General. The charge was made that Wood's
appointment would disrupt the
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 117
Army and cause intense internal friction
because of his controversial career
as a professional soldier. Moreover, it
did not seem wise to have him pass
on the promotions of senior officers
under whom he had served or with whom
he had been in school. Some of Harding's
advisers were opposed to Wood
because of his popular appeal and the
fear of his future ambitions. Besides,
old wounds still remained from the
pre-convention campaign fight in Ohio
in which the General's forces had taken
several favorite-son votes away from
Harding. Also damaging was the fact that
Wood had not worked enthusiastic-
ally for Harding during the campaign.
Interestingly enough, Harding found
less validity in most of these reasons
than did his advisers, but agreed that
political necessity precluded Wood's
appointment. He expressed the hope,
however, of using Wood's talents
elsewhere and later appointed him governor-
general of the Phillipines.49
Political and geographic requirements
pointed ultimately to John W. Weeks
of Massachusetts for the War cabinet
post. An early contender for the post
of Secretary of the Treasury, he had
been supported by New England banking
interests. Senator Lodge was one of his
primary backers and relinquished his
drive to place him in the Treasury
position only after receiving assurance
that Weeks would secure a slot
"somewhere" in the cabinet. At one time or
other, he was considered for Postmaster
General and Secretary of the Navy.50
His credentials for both these latter
positions were rather impressive.
Weeks had been a member of the House
from 1905 to 1913 and then had
served six years in the Senate. While in
the House, he had been chairman of
the Committee on Post Office and Post
Roads; in the Senate, he had been
a member of the Military Affairs
Committee. In addition, Weeks had a naval
record. In 1877, at age seventeen, he
had enlisted as a cadet midshipman
and, four years later, graduated from
the Naval Academy. He served in the
regular Navy for two years and was
honorably discharged. During the
Spanish-American War he again donned his
naval uniform, signing on as a
lieutenant for the duration.51
Thereafter, he returned to Boston and to his
banking business, which expanded so
rapidly that it made him one of the
major bankers in the New England area by
World War I. His defeat for
reelection to the Senate in November 1918
was a surprise to the Republicans,
especially to some of his close Senate
friends, such as Lodge. But Weeks
continued his political service in other
ways -- along with Mellon, he was
one of the chief financiers of the
Republican campaign of 1920.
Harding and Weeks had been friends in
the Senate, and Harding was more
than willing to have him represent the
Northeast in the cabinet. The logical
place seemed to be Secretary of the
Navy. But through friends, Weeks re-
vealed that he did not want the Navy
position for the same reasons which
were being discussed against General
Wood for War: it would not be wise
for him to pass on the qualifications
and promotions of those with whom he
had served or attended school. Just
prior to Christmas, therefore, feelers
were extended from Marion as to whether
Weeks would accept the post of
Secretary of War. The Boston banker then
contacted his Senate friend,
118 OHIO HISTORY
Harry New, currently serving on the
Senate Military Affairs Committee, and
asked him if he should take War if
offered. New replied: "absolutely" -- and
quickly wrote Harding that he was
confident Weeks would accept the War
post.52
On January 15, 1921, Weeks was summoned
to Marion to talk with Hard-
ing, and, as the New York Times phrased
it, "cabinet matters were brought
up."53 Rumors circulated that Weeks had
been tapped for Secretary of War
because, by now, it was an open secret
that he had an aversion to the Navy
post. But more than a month elapsed
before Harding made an official an-
nouncement to the press. The reason for
the delay was not because of any
latent opposition on the part of
Harding, or anyone else, but simply because
he wished to wait until announcements
could be made about other cabinet
choices as well. Indeed, Weeks's
appointment was a popular one with the
party and also with the military.
Senator Wadsworth, chairman of the Senate
Military Affairs Committee, wrote to
Harding just after the decision had
been made: "I would like a dollar
for every Army officer and every member
of Congress who during the last two
months has expressed the hope that
Weeks could put his hand to this great
big task."54
The job of Secretary of Labor posed a
particularly thorny political problem.
Continuing labor disturbances in the
immediate postwar period focused
unusual attention on government-labor
relations, and the Republicans were
anxious to placate the rank and file of
labor if possible. The strategy in
selecting a person to head Labor had
already been outlined by Harry L.
Fidler, special labor affairs
representative of the Republican National Com-
mittee, in a lengthy twelve-page letter
to Chairman Will Hays on November
24, 1920. Fidler, who was a staunch
Republican and a member of the Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers, pointed
out the fact that the whole Gompers
clique in the American Federation of
Labor had fought Harding in the cam-
paign and that it would be a mistake to
reward them in any way. But,
warned Fidler, while the Secretary of
Labor "must be an anti-Gompers
man ... he must also be a practical
labor man." Fidler may have hoped that
the lightning would strike him, and Hays
did later mention his name for the
post. Fidler, however, was never
seriously considered for Secretary of Labor,
although his recommended course of
action was endorsed.55
Among the persons most mentioned for the
position were James Duncan,
William L. Hutcheson, T. V. O'Connor,
and James J. Davis. Head of the
Stone-Cutters' Union and a
vice-president in the A. F. of L., James Duncan
was Gompers' personal candidate who,
interestingly enough, was also sup-
ported by Lodge -- Duncan was from
Massachusetts. Despite Lodge's bless-
ing, Gompers' support proved the kiss of
death.56 Hutcheson, as General
President of the Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners, possessed con-
siderable rank and file labor support
but had no one in the Republican party
leadership strongly pushing him.57
T. V. O'Connor, however, was another
matter. As president of the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association, he
was vigorously championed by strong
elements in organized labor. He also had
the backing of numerous New York
businessmen as well as the support of
Nicholas Murray Butler. Originally
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 119
O'Connor had been a Democrat, but had
bolted that party because of Presi-
dent Wilson's postwar labor policy.
Moreover, he was solidly anti-Gompers,
a "conservative," and had
voted for Harding in 1920. But his earlier advocacy
of the closed shop and low tariffs had
created suspicion. And when Harding
requested that Charles Hilles check into
the record, he received some highly
adverse reports.58
Meanwhile, attention for the Labor
Secretary shifted to James Davis.
While Davis thought of himself as a
laboring man and had been an iron
"puddler" and an active union
member, he had long since become better
known for his lodge work.
Director-General of the Loyal Order of Moose and
one of the founders of Mooseheart (a
city of fatherless children in the Fox
River Valley, thirty-seven miles west of
Chicago), he was sometimes called
the "Napoleon of Fraternity"
and allegedly could call ten thousand men by
their first names.59 This
ability was a decided political asset as hundreds of
Moose lodges sent their endorsements of
"Puddler Jim" Davis to Marion.
When support also came from such labor
organizations as the Street Carmen's
Union and the Iron Moulders' Union,
Davis seemingly possessed an unbeat-
able combination -- especially since he
was also anti-Gompers, a hard-working
Republican party member, and had been a
staunch backer of Harding in
1920.60
The decision regarding the Labor post
was allowed to simmer until after
the Christmas holidays, while more
pressing cabinet business was settled.
Then, on January 7, Harding telegraphed
Davis to come to Marion to discuss
the "labor policy" of the new
Administration. Three days later he offered
Davis the position and Davis accepted.61
No announcement was made, how-
ever, and therefore press and labor
speculation continued regarding the
ultimate selection.
Sensing a decline in interest at Marion
in other potential candidates after
the Davis interview, many labor leaders
voiced concern over the possible
appointment of Davis. Indeed, the
various proponents of O'Connor, Hutche-
son, and Duncan joined forces after
mid-January to oppose Davis and threw
their combined weight behind O'Connor.
They did not consider Davis enough
labor-oriented to hold the post and
feared that his interest lay more in
Mooseheart than in the shops and mines.
In a last minute effort, without
mentioning names, Gompers sent a lengthy
telegram to Harding on February
7 stating that "no man is fully
capable to fill the position of Secretary of
Labor who lacks the sympathy, respect
and confidence of the wage workers
of our country."62
If Harding needed a reason to re-enforce
his earlier decision to appoint
Davis, Gompers' antipathy provided it.
Davis's selection was purely political
and designed to offset the various
forces within the laboring groups, while
at the same time denying control of the
office to Gompers. As Senator
Wadsworth later recalled: "The
appointment was regarded as suitable. I do
not think any of us had the idea that
the appointee was a great statesman."63
Of the final two political appointments,
the selection of the Postmaster
General was the easier. While a number
of candidates existed, there was
never any doubt that Will Hays, chairman
of the Republican National Com-
120 OHIO HISTORY
mittee, could claim it if he wished.
This action was traditional. Strangely
enough, Hays did not relish the thought
of supervising the nation's mail and
really preferred the Commerce post. But,
Harding made it clear that the
latter position was beyond his reach (it
had already been reserved for
Hoover), and on January 17 he gave Hays
his choice either of the Post
Office or chairman of the Commission to
Reorganize the Government. Three
weeks later, after weighing the various
possibilities, Hays told Harding that
he would accept the cabinet job.64
The selection of Secretary of the Navy
was almost an afterthought and
came at the very end of the wearisome
process of cabinet-making. After
ex-senator Weeks dropped out of the
running for the post in late December,
it was decided to offer it to Frank
Lowden. Unlike their feeling toward the
Wood element, Harding's advisers expressed
a belated desire to reward the
Lowden faction and Lowden, himself, for
supporting Harding during the
campaign. When, on January 17, Lowden
received an invitation from Hard-
ing to join his official family as
Secretary of the Navy, he was surprised.
Frankly, he had nursed a hope of
becoming either Secretary of Treasury or
Secretary of Agriculture and felt
qualified to hold either post. But he hardly
knew the bow of a battleship from the
stem. Hence, after some soul-searching,
he telegraphed Harding his refusal. But
Harding persisted and reaffirmed
the offer not simply as a courtesy, but
because of a genuine desire for him to
enter the cabinet. When Lowden again
demurred, Harding attempted a third
time to get him to reconsider. Harding's
last telegram of February 14 read:
"I think a great public approval
awaits your acceptance. If you insist once
more on the impossibility, I will accept
its finality."65 Lowden insisted;
another candidate had to be found.
Edwin L. Denby's name had first been
mentioned to Harding by Weeks
at the time the latter had expressed his
preference for War rather than
Navy. Lowden had also mentioned Denby
during his series of refusals of
the Navy position.66 Almost
in desperation, Harding then turned in Denby's
direction, too.
Actually, on the basis of apparent
qualifications and availability, Denby
was an excellent choice. He had served
as a gunner's mate in the Spanish-
American War; and in 1917, although
forty-seven years old had dropped a
civilian law practice and enlisted as a
private in the Marines and was dis-
charged as a major at the end of War I.
Previously he had served six years
in Congress where, among other
assignments, he had been a member of the
House Naval Affairs Committee. Although
a "Big Navy" man, he was
regarded as being too conservative by
followers of Theodore Roosevelt and
lost his seat in the election of 1910. After World War
I he returned to Detroit
and made a fortune manufacturing automobiles.
In the pre-convention days
of 1920, he had been a Lowden man, but
worked diligently for Harding in
the regular election.67
On Washington's birthday, February 22,
Harding offered him the Navy
post. Denby could not have been more amazed. Said he:
"The invitation
took me off my feet. I was
overwhelmed." Certainly he was no less surprised
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 121
than the press. Reporters at St.
Augustine greeted the announcement of his
acceptance with: "Denby, Denby --
who is Denby?"68
Much mystery and drama has been written
into the relatively simple story
of Harding's selection of two of his
personal friends for cabinet positions.
His friendship for Albert Fall and his
friendship and gratitude to Harry
Daugherty gave them both a high priority
on his list of available candidates.
In the case of Fall, Harding simply
liked him. He was not alone. Fall had
an attractive personality. Born in
Frankfort, Kentucky in 1861, Fall had
worked in a cotton mill in Nashville
when he was only eleven years old;
at eighteen, he had studied enough law
to become a lawyer. Shortly thereafter
he set out for the Red River country and
for three years was a United States
marshal in the Panhandle area. Turning
next to prospecting in Mexico, he
worked the region around Zacatecas as a
mucker, ore sorter, and drill
sharpener. The year 1885 found him back
in the United States digging for
riches in the mountains of New Mexico.
During the Spanish-American War
he rode with Roosevelt and the Rough
Riders, and finally settled down in
Las Cruces, where he served in the
legislature of New Mexico territory for
three terms. He was elected to the New
Mexico Senate in 1902 and then to
the United States Senate in 1912. There,
wearing his broad-rimmed Stetson,
flowing black cape, and handle-bar
mustaches, he occupied an adjoining seat
to Senator Harding and became a
poker-playing crony of the future president
of the United States.69
But friendship was not the sole factor
in Fall's selection. Harding had
respect for his ability. So did others.
Fall was considered an expert on western
matters and also on Mexican and South
American affairs. He wrote the
Mexican plank into the 1920 Republican
platform. He had served on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee with
Harding and had been a strong
opponent of Wilson's League of Nations.
A ruthless gut-fighter, Fall was at
his best in the kind of give-and-take
political debate which automatically
endears a politician to party stalwarts.
Harding wanted Fall in the cabinet and
mentioned him casually in con-
nection with a number of positions. Yet,
he apparently considered him
seriously only for Secretary of the
Interior, and even then only after it
became clear that Hoover wanted Commerce
and not the Interior post. For
Harding, it was a marriage of his desire
with geography and expediency
rather than with any need for dispensing
spoils. Fall was from the West and
the Interior post generally went to a
westerner, just as Agriculture tradi-
tionally went to a midwesterner. That
Fall was basically anti-conservation in
his views evidently did not play a part
in Harding's calculations. Fall, in
turn, did not know definitely until late
January that he was to become
Secretary of Interior; hence later talk
of this appointment being the con-
summation of "deals" made with
oil interests at the 1920 nominating con-
vention is so much nonsense. His
appointment was the last to be officially
announced -- March 1.70
At no time was there any opposition to
Fall on ethical grounds. Indeed,
he was regarded as so far above
suspicion that on March 4 the Senate did
122 OHIO HISTORY
not even send his nomination to
committee but confirmed him by acclama-
tion, an honor never before granted to a
cabinet member. A few rabid conser-
vationists, such as Gifford Pinchot,
maintained a drum-fire of opposition to
the rumored Fall appointment during the
month of February, but they were
in a very small minority.71 From
virtually every point of view, the appoint-
ment was a perfectly logical one. As
Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of
Reviews, commented in 1933; "The Senator from New Mexico
was recom-
mended for a cabinet place by almost
every public man in Washington . . .
His appointment was made by Mr. Harding in
entire good faith."72
The selection of Harry Daugherty as
Attorney General, on the other hand,
was unquestionably the most
controversial appointment made by Harding.
From the Harding correspondence, it
becomes evident that Harding and
Daugherty were not "buddies"
in any sense of the term. They were friends,
but not to the exclusion of others.
Daugherty was not one of Harding's close
golfing or poker-playing companions.
Theirs was not a Damon-Pythias
relationship. Moreover, there was certainly
no subservience of Harding to
Daugherty. If anything, the relationship
was the other way around. Harding
showed him respect, but not deference;
Daugherty constantly deferred to
Harding. Of all the party leaders,
Daugherty had been absolutely loyal to
Harding and, more than any other man,
was responsible for Harding's eleva-
tion to the presidency. The
President-elect had a natural feeling of tremen-
dous gratitude for this man and in
appointing him simply desired to liquidate
his largest political debt.
From the outset, it was rumored that
Daugherty would be made a member
of the cabinet -- probably Attorney
General. His questionable Ohio past,
together with the host of extremely
high-placed enemies he had made as
Harding's political manager, caused immediate
cries of protest. From among
the stream of callers who visited
Marion, there was barely heard a kind word
for Daugherty. But Harding would not be
budged, any more than he would
be on the selection of Hoover. In
mid-December, to a protesting Senator
Wadsworth, he exclaimed: "I have
told him [Daugherty] that he can have
any place in my Cabinet he wants,
outside of Secretary of State. He tells
me that he wants to be Attorney-General
and by God he will be Attorney-
General!"73 When Dawes
met with the President-elect in Florida in January
and remarked that it would be a bad
appointment, Harding replied: "Well,
I wouldn't be here but for him. He has
asked me for the place, and I am going
to give it to him . . . I would not be
right with myself if I did not appoint
Harry."74 In answer to a letter
from William F. Anderson, Bishop of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, expressing
hope that he would not appoint
Daugherty, Harding stated bluntly that
he could not be "so much an ingrate
that I would ignore a man of Mr.
Daugherty's devotion to the party and to
me as an aspirant and a candidate."75
In his Inside Story of the Harding
Tragedy, Daugherty claims that he did
not want to be Attorney General and
urged upon Harding the appointment
of former Senator George Sutherland of
Utah instead.76 But whether he
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 123
formally asked for it or not, Harding
was determined to give him the post.
And there is little doubt that Daugherty
realized that a public offer would
give him increased prestige in the legal
profession and would help wipe out
the curse of dubiety on his past career.
To Ohio friends, he once confided
that one of the main reasons he might
take the position was so he could walk
down Broad Street in Columbus and tell
his arch-enemy and newspaper
man, Robert F. Wolfe, "to go to
hell."77 But it is also plain that Daugherty
was perfectly willing to abide by
Harding's decision and at no time put
pressure on him for the position. The
initiation of the offer certainly belonged
with Harding and not with his campaign
manager. Finley Peter Dunne,
writing in 1936, correctly gauged the
relationship: "I believe that if Harding
had refused him the appointment he would
have gone into a corner and
cried. But then he would have wiped away
the tears and come back and
served as faithfully as ever."78
Up to the moment of the formal
announcement, certain elements of the
press maintained bitter opposition to
Daugherty. This was especially true
with Louis Seibold of the New York World,
who was covering the political
scene at St. Augustine. His continuous
assaults on Daugherty stung Hard-
ing, and on February 21, seeing Seibold
in the crowd of reporters, the Presi-
dent-elect angrily stated: "I am
ready today to invite Mr. Daugherty into
the cabinet as my Attorney-General; when
he is ready there will be an
announcement, if he can persuade himself
to make the sacrifice."79 Later that
very day, Daugherty issued the
statement: "No man could refuse to serve
a friend and his country under the
circumstances."80 Seeing Daugherty a short
time later, Mark Sullivan, another
reporter who also had questioned his
qualifications, extended his hand in
congratulations: "Well, you're going to be
Attorney-General!" In apparent good
humor, Daugherty growled: "Yes, no
thanks to you, goddam you."81
In the midst of all this emotion, the
immediate merits of the appointment
were lost to sight. Daugherty was a
lawyer, and contrary to the opposition
propaganda, a shrewd one. True, he had
spent more of his time being a
lobbyist than a practicing attorney;
yet, that also had its advantages. He
knew lobbying tactics and was now in a
position to use such talent, if he
desired, for the protection of the
common good. As he once told Sullivan:
"I know who the crooks are and I
want to stand between Harding and them."82
Also, he was a consummate politician and
ace trouble-shooter. His potential
value to Harding in handling matters of
patronage was incalculable. But more
importantly, he was a proven and loyal
friend on whom the President-elect
could absolutely rely.
Later events, however, might cast doubt
on the validity of this assessment
as of March 1921. But even some of
Daugherty's contemporary detractors
ultimately mellowed their views. In
1935, in his book, Our Times, Sullivan
claimed that Daugherty was
"high-minded" about his fellow Ohioan and
"would not himself deliberately do
anything that might reflect on Harding."83
In that same year, Louis Seibold wrote:
"I have always believed that
124 OHIO HISTORY
Daugherty really wanted to protect
Harding."84 Writing in 1932, Daugherty's
own assessment of the situation was far
less charitable: "In a moment of
mental aberration I accepted the post of
Attorney-General in the Harding
Cabinet and made the tragic blunder of
my life."85
This was Harding's cabinet: two
Pennsylvanians, and one each from Cali-
fornia, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio,
Michigan, Iowa, Indiana, and New
Mexico. There were two bankers, an
automobile manufacturer, a lodge
director, a humanitarian, a rancher, a
farm-editor, an international lawyer,
and two professional politicians. The
cabinet was relatively young: Hays 41,
Hoover 46, Davis 47, Denby 51, Wallace
54, Hughes 58, Fall 59, Weeks 60,
Daugherty 61, and Mellon 65. There was
even a spread of religious affiliations:
Mellon and Hays were Presbyterian;
Hughes and Davis were Baptist; Weeks
was Unitarian; Daugherty was Methodist;
Hoover was Quaker; Wallace was
United Presbyterian; Denby was
Episcopalian; and Fall was unaffiliated.
Later, during the period of the oil
scandals, it was the vogue to sneer at
the "best minds" and
depreciate these selections. Journals such as the
New Republic and The Nation spoke of Hughes and Hoover as
mere
"deodorizers" for Daugherty
and Fall. Thus are myths born. In actuality, the
vast majority of the nation's press and
of its political observers had
greeted the final cabinet with approval
in 1921. Their chief reservation had
concerned only Daugherty. As the New
York Times put it: "From Hughes
to Daugherty is a pretty long
step." But aside from this, they appeared
content. Editorial comment used such
phrases as "high caliber" and "a
guarantee of success."86 Mark Sullivan,
writing in May 1921, called it
"one of the strongest groups of
Presidential advisors and department heads
in a generation."87 Another
contemporary observer, writing at the same
time, although skeptical of Harding's
own ability, admitted he had "sur-
rounded himself with able
associates."88 In an article for Atlantic Monthly
in March 1923, William B. Munro simply
stated a widely held belief: "No
presidential cabinet during the past
half-century has been better balanced,
or has included within its membership a
wider range of political experience."89
Only against this background can Harding
and his cabinet selections
be viewed with proper perspective. There
were no machinations of evil
intent; there were no "deals"
except the one to assure Hoover's place in
the cabinet; there were no long-range
plans for plunder and booty. Except
for Lowden, the persons whom Harding
really wanted, he got. Five of the
selections were his own (Hughes,
Wallace, Hoover, Fall, and Daugherty),
and four (all except Fall) were secured
in direct conflict with his advisers
or the party leadership. Mellon
represented no "sell-out" to Big Business,
but was a shrewd move in cabinet-making.
Except for the peculiar circum-
stances surrounding Hoover, Mellon would
probably not have been appointed.
Similarly, the Denby selection was the
result of chance and would not
have been made if Harding's own choice,
Lowden, had accepted.
Harding was not simply a cipher in the
selection process but was the
key figure in every critical instance. His penchant for
consultation may have
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET 125
made him appear weak and floundering. It
is true he was subject to occas-
sional fits of indecision. But these
periods were not debilitating, and in
the end he made the decisions and got
his way. Harding did a careful,
conscientious, and independent job of
choosing his cabinet. History's verdict
to the contrary has been unjust.
THE AUTHOR: Robert K. Murray is
Chairman of the Department of History
at The Pennsylvania State University.
PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET
by ROBERT K. MURRAY
Among the many controversial facets involving the life of the twenty-ninth president of the United States, few have prompted more conjecture and analysis than the choosing of his cabinet. The fact that one of his selections achieved the distinction of being the only cabinet officer to go to jail, that another resigned under a cloud of suspicion, and still a third narrowly missed criminal conviction, places Warren Gamaliel Harding in a unique position as a cabinet-maker. With this record it is little wonder that Harding's skill as a judge of men has been consistently downgraded both by historians and popular writers. Early observers, such as William Allen White, Frederick Lewis Allen, Mark Sullivan, and Samuel Hopkins Adams, all agreed that the Harding cabinet was a crazy quilt of both good and bad, with the bad far outweighing the good.1 Later writers, such as Frederick L. Paxson and Andrew Sinclair, soften the emphasis somewhat but basically arrive at the same conclusion.2 Thus, despite the recognized excellence of certain cabinet choices, the poor selections have captured the lion's share of popular and scholarly attention and have brought down upon the whole selection process a verdict of failure. But this verdict is based largely on the later scandals and not on the actual process of cabinet-making itself. Lost to view is Harding's personal wrestling with the alternative choices, the demands of the contemporary political situa- tion, and his own commitment to certain goals and principles. Until these factors are fully examined, the verdict of failure is at best incomplete and at worst erroneous.
NOTES ARE ON PAGES 185-188 |