DISHARMONY IN THE HARDING CABINET: HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT
by EDWARD L. SCHAPSMEIER and FREDERICK H. SCHAPSMEIER
The campaign of 1920 was a twofold success for the Republican Party. Warren G. Harding brought the Grand Old Party back into national power, and he succeeded in reuniting the party. The rupture of 1912 had been healed. The cabinet represented all factions. During Harding's presidency party harmony was sustained by balancing the desires of the Progressive and conservative wings -- neither satisfying nor alienating either segment completely -- so as to maintain a semblance of unity despite strong differ- ences of opinion. As a skillful political leader, Harding also strove to retain the loyalty of the rural population. When farmers found themselves in economic distress during the postwar era, they discovered the Harding Administration was receptive to their pleas. It would be the Ohioan's suc-
NOTES ARE ON PAGES 188-190 |
HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT 127
cessors, spanning the decade from 1923
to 1933, who would destroy the
Harding coalition and drive the farm
vote to opposition parties.
In one area, in particular, there was
disharmony within the Harding
cabinet, but not disunity. Two members,
specifically, typified the polarity
of view with regard to agricultural
policy. Henry Cantwell Wallace, a former
Bull Mooser, was made Secretary of Agriculture.
He held to his Progressive
philosophy. His advocacy of programs to
assist the farmer was a strong
factor in securing Administration
support for remedial legislation. Herbert C.
Hoover, who had rendered valuable
wartime service for the Wilson Adminis-
tration, was selected to head the
Department of Commerce. He utilized
his influence to promote policies that
would not place the government in
a position of interfering with free
enterprise. His plan was to foster efficient
marketing, with government assistance,
but without federal intervention
into the economy. Hoover feared having
government in business, while
Wallace favored both federal regulation
and positive federal aid.
The prolonged conflict between Wallace
and Hoover within the Harding
cabinet was a contest of two contending
political economic philosophies and
a clash of personalities. Their enmity
began prior to 1921 and was to
continue into the administration of
Calvin Coolidge. After Wallace's death
in 1924, his son, Henry Agard Wallace,
continued the battle against
Hoover. Both Henry C. Wallace and
Herbert Hoover were strong-willed
men. As administrators they were
aggressive and fearless in advancing their
own ideas. Each enlarged his respective
department to the point where the
functions of the two collided. Also,
since each man had contacts in Congress,
together they succeeded in involving
diverse elements of the whole Repub-
lican party in their dispute that was largely centered
around the Commerce
and Agriculture Departments. While
Harding was President, Wallace's posi-
tion tended to prevail; and when
Coolidge occupied the White House,
Hoover's views gained ascendency.
Herbert Hoover first came into public
prominence in 1914, when he
served as director of Belgian Relief.
Soon after the United States entered
the war, Woodrow Wilson prevailed upon
the Iowa Quaker to accept the
post as Food Administrator. Under the
provisions of the Food Control Act
of August 10, 1917, President Wilson
delegated a vast amount of authority
to Hoover. As a mining engineer and one
who had been abroad for many
years, Hoover had had no experience or
familiarity with food production, yet
it was his task to insure the delivery
of vast amounts of foodstuffs. He
sought help from experts. One of the
people from whom he would solicit
advice was Henry C. Wallace.
In the Farm Belt the Wallace name was
well known. Henry C. Wallace
was editor of the Wallaces' Farmer, which
circulated widely in the Midwest,
and was the permanent secretary of the
Corn Belt Meat Producer's Associa-
tion. Wallace's father (who died in
1916) had been a member of Theodore
Roosevelt's Country Life Commission and
was a beloved figure in Iowa
during his lifetime. Henry C. Wallace's
son had already begun experiments
with hybrid corn and contributed to the
family farm journal by writing
128 OHIO HISTORY
articles on agricultural economics.
Hoover asked his fellow Iowan for
assistance, particularly in devising
means to "stimulate production." The
Food Administrator confided to Wallace
that he was empowered to "give
assurance of a market for
products." He was seeking a "basic system"
whereby the government "would
insure to the farmer a stabilized price which
he would know in advance."1 Wallace
responded quickly, suggesting the
formation of a Production Committee.2 A
Swine Commission was subse-
quently formed to devise a formula for
increasing the supply of pork and
lard. Henry C. Wallace was an official
member of this Commission and
although his son was not, he
nevertheless aided in the statistical computa-
tions needed to work out a price ratio
between corn and hogs. The Swine
Commission submitted its report to
Hoover on October 27, 1917.3
The origin of the Wallace-Hoover feud
began when the Food Adminis-
tration rejected the recommendation of
this commission. The latter's findings
had proposed a guaranteed price for
swine based upon the actual cost of
14.3 bushels of corn for the production
of 100 pounds of edible pork. The
Food Administration accepted a ratio of
only 13 to 1 and announced it
would try to "stabilize" the
price of hogs, but that this was not to be
considered a "guarantee backed by
money."4 Wallace protested immediately.
He wrote directly to Hoover. "It is
not high," Wallace argued in defense
of the 14 to 1 formula, "but
low."5 Dissention among farmers grew as the
cost of corn in 1918 exceeded a level
where it could be fed to hogs and
the latter still be sold at a profit.6
Wallace continued to appeal to Hoover
for a raise in the price ceiling on
hogs, but the Food Administrator was
adamant in his refusal to sanction
higher prices.7 Wallace became angry.
He held Hoover personally responsible
for the predicament and utilized the
Wallaces' Farmer to make his allegation a matter of public record.
Mincing
no words, he characterized Hoover as an
"exceptionally big-brained business
man" who could not seem to
understand that farmers could not produce
pork at a financial loss. Wallace charged
the Food Administration had dis-
played bad faith and sarcastically
suggested Hoover indulge in no more
"promises or agreements with
farmers until he is prepared, and has full
power, to carry them out."8 Hoover
maintained a public silence despite
this violent criticism. The Food
Administrator knew, and Wallace did not,
that an armistice was imminent. The need
for huge amounts of food to
sustain the war effort was over. The
government was no longer interested
in the further expansion of food
production.
With Woodrow Wilson an invalid and
reconversion of agriculture an
unplanned process, the economic status
of the rural sector declined steadily
after the cessation of hostilities.
Henry C. Wallace blamed the Democrats
in general and Hoover specifically for
the dilemma of the farm population.
He felt the farmer had been betrayed.
With a great flurry of patriotism the
farmers had been induced to expand
acreage and increase production, only
to become the victims of overproduction
and heavy indebtedness. Industrial
prices and wage levels remained
relatively high while agricultural commodity
prices declined rapidly. This left
farmers with unpaid mortgages and sagging
HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT 129
incomes. When the name of Herbert Hoover
began to receive prominent
mention as a possible candidate for the
Republican nomination for president
in 1920, Wallace resumed his public
attack upon the former Food Adminis-
trator. The Iowa farm editor claimed
Hoover was guilty of "deceit," because
of the attempt to "juggle the
figures and fool the farmers."9
Henry C. Wallace journeyed to Chicago in
June of 1920 to assist in
the preparation of a strong agricultural
plank in the Republican platform.
As finally written, it asserted the
right of farmers to share on "equal terms"
the benefits of the nation's wealth. The
G.O.P. committed itself to an
ambitious program whereby farmers would
be aided by a host of measures.
These included: "Adequate farm
representation in the appointment of gov-
ernment officials and commissions; the
right to form co-operative associations
for marketing . . .; the scientific
study of agricultural prices and farm produc-
tion costs . . . with a view to reducing
the frequency of abnormal fluctua-
tion; . . . the authorization of
associations for the extension of personal
credit; a national inquiry on the
coordination of rail, water and motor trans-
portation . . .; the encouragement of
our export trade; and end to unneces-
sary price-fixing and ill-considered
efforts arbitrarily to reduce prices of
farm products.10
Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois was
then a leading contender for
the Republican nomination. Wallace
worked for him and was influential in
getting the Iowa delegation pledged to
Lowden. When Senator Warren G.
Harding emerged as the nominee on the
tenth ballot, Wallace was dis-
appointed but agreed to support the
party's candidate. Senator Harding
took quick steps to unify dissident
elements in preparation for an aggressive
campaign. One to whom Harding looked for
help was Wallace, and the latter
responded generously. Soon there was a
cordial relationship between them.
Wallace prepared printed material for
circulation among farmers, wrote speech
material, and counseled the Senator on
agricultural matters. Wallace con-
ferred with Harding at Marion and came
away even more firmly convinced
the Ohioan was sincere in his
determination to resolve the problems con-
fronting agriculture.11 When
Harding campaigned in Iowa, Wallace personally
introduced him to farm leaders. The
Republican nominee was gratified over
the valuable aid he was receiving from
Wallace. He liked Wallace and trusted
his judgment. Even before election day,
Harding let his friends from Iowa
know, "if the verdict is what we
are expecting it to be I shall very much want
your assistance in making good the
promises which we made to the American
people."12
After his landslide victory,
President-elect Harding tried to cement the
unity of his party. Some of the liberals
within the Republican Party declined
to join the Administration, such as
Governor Lowden. When it became known
publicly that Henry C. Wallace was being
considered for the Agriculture post,
many conservatives also protested.
Herbert Hoover, who was offered the
Secretaryship of the Commerce Department,
wired Harding that despite
the "opposition" manifest
toward Wallace he personally felt the Iowan was
"admirably fitted for the
work." Hoover volunteered this testimonial even
130 OHIO HISTORY
though, he admitted, "Mr. Wallace
has been a bitter critic of mine in policies
of the Food Administration."13
Wallace was aware that his own views on the
tariff, government regulation, and
fiscal policies were not those of the majority
of his party, but he felt Harding really
wanted him in the cabinet to assist
agriculture. Before leaving for the
nation's capital, Wallace penned this
optimistic farewell in the Wallaces'
Farmer:
I go to Washington with less reluctance
because from the beginning
President Harding has taken an advance
stand for a sound national
policy as it relates to agriculture, and
I am sure he will do everything
the Chief Executive can do to promote
that end.14
Three factors fortified Wallace's
position within the cabinet. First, the
President liked him and was sympathetic
to the cause he represented. As a
newspaper publisher in Marion, Ohio and
later as a senator, Warren G.
Harding mingled with farm people. He
liked them. Harding's good nature
and his political instincts made him
receptive to measures that would help
the common people he knew. His
flexibility and tendency to be less doc-
trinaire were a tremendous contrast, for
instance, to that of his successor,
President Coolidge. Wallace found
Harding open to suggestions, especially
during informal occasions when they
played golf together. By bringing the
plight of the farmer to the President's
attention, Wallace discovered Harding
had a heart. The Chief Executive was
approachable when issues were reduced
to concrete ways in which farmers could
be helped.
Two other events contributed to
Wallace's effectiveness. In 1920, prior to
the Republican convention, Henry C.
Wallace participated in the formation
of the American Farm Bureau Federation.
He addressed its first national
convention and reminded the delegates
that the primary goal of the new
organization was "to secure
economic justice for the farmers."15 The AFBF
became an assiduous ally in the fight
for agricultural legislation. Another
source of strength for Wallace was the
development of the Farm Bloc. Two
Iowans, Senator William S. Kenyon and
Representative J. J. Dickinson (both
Republicans), initiated the formation of
a voting bloc of all rural representa-
tives in Congress.16 The
members of this bloc were not always in agreement,
since some were Progressives and others
were conservatives, differing, quite
naturally, in basic philosophy. However,
with occasional bi-partisan support,
the Farm Bloc did give Wallace the
congressional backing needed to promote
the type of program he sought to
promulgate. The momentum for much of
the legislation during the first two
years of Harding's term came from this
power bloc. With a Concurrent
Resolution, pushed through by this group
on June 7, 1921, a Joint Committee of
Agricultural Inquiry was established.
This was the first step taken to assess
the problems of agriculture.17 Wallace
was to initiate the second phase of
action during his first year as the Secretary
of Agriculture.
Immediately after assuming his post,
Wallace set about to strengthen his
own department and to build up a
groundswell of support for remedial farm
legislation. Plans were laid for the
establishment of the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, which was accomplished on
July 1, 1922. This bureau, with Dr.
HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT
131
Henry C. Taylor as its Chief, began a
massive survey and collection of
agricultural statistics.18 Ultimately
this data provided the basis for such
measures as the McNary-Haugen Bill.
Taylor and other department econo-
mists were imaginative and
progressive-minded. An Outloook Information
Service was inaugurated by the Bureau to
apprise farmers of market trends and
future demands for agricultural commodities.19
Wallace, under authorization
from Congress on March 3, 1921, began to
send agricultural attach??s abroad
to secure information about foreign
markets.20 To focus public attention upon
the plight of the rural sector, Wallace
pulled his greatest coup in securing
President Harding's approval for a
national agricultural conference.21
On January 23, 1922 over three hundred
delegates assembled in Wash-
ington, D. C., for a five-day
conference. The National Agricultural Conference
represented all major farm groups,
including the National Negro Farmers'
Association (a decision the President
made).22 Harding addressed the
gathering and although he agreed the
"grim reality of the present crisis in
agriculture" could not be denied,
he refrained from making any commit-
ments.23 Secretary Wallace
was more positive in his remarks. He enumerated
three areas for action. The first
included "legislative" means and the general
conference. The second area for action
comprised the "administrative and
educational" measures, which the
Department of Agriculture had already
programmed. Finally, the "farmers
themselves," he told the conferees, must
assert themselves either
"individually" or through their "organizations."24
This was an open bid for farm groups to
lobby for their interests. The invita-
tion was accepted. The leaders of the
Farm Bureau and other agricultural
groups were in the capital constantly
and were at hand whenever Wallace
needed assistance.
By the time of the mid-term elections of
1922, Henry C. Wallace could
honestly claim, as he did to a rural
audience in Greensburg, Indiana; "Since
March 1921 agriculture has had more
attention and sympathetic considera-
tion in the national capital than at any
other like period in our history."25
In a series of campaign speeches,
Wallace outlined the following record of
achievement: the capital of the Farm
Land Banks was doubled, Joint Land
Banks were allowed to modify interest
rates, the life of the War Finance
Corporation had been extended,
cooperatives were exempted from anti-trust
prosecution by passage of the
Capper-Volstead Act, an amendment of the
Federal Reserve Act allowed the
appointment of an agricultural representa-
tive, enactment of the Grain Futures
Trading Act regulated speculation on
the commodity market and passage of the
Packers and Stockyard Act
insured fair practices on the part of
the meat packing industry.26
Following the mid-term election, more
legislation favorable to farmers was
passed. This included the Agricultural
Credits Act of 1923, which established
twelve Federal Intermediate Credit Banks
and authorized the formation of
National Agricultural Credit
Corporations. The former banks dealt with
short term credit, and the latter
agencies issued loans for livestock. The
United States Warehouse Act was amended
to strengthen the regulatory
features to be enforced by the
Department of Agriculture.27 The amount of
132 OHIO HISTORY |
|
Progressive-type legislation enacted during Harding's three years as Presi- dent was not duplicated again until the days of the New Deal. The record of accomplishment was due to the power of the Farm Bloc, the lobbying of farm organizations, and Wallace's ability to coordinate the total effort -- all of which received Harding's support. Throughout this period Wallace main- tained a friendly working rapport with the President. He realized if Harding were aware of the difficulties encountered by farmers, the President would be sympathetic to remedial legislation. Thus Wallace kept the Chief Execu- tive informed. Harding's test for farm legislation seemed to be pragmatic rather than conventional, that is, not based on the criterion of economic orthodoxy. The President respected his Secretary of Agriculture and was fully aware of what Wallace was doing. In response to a Wallace note inform- ing the President of a speech to be given in Ohio, Harding took the oppor- tunity to praise his Secretary of Agriculture. "Even at the risk of embarrassing you," wrote Harding to Wallace, "I am going to say that the Department in the last two years has rendered a particularly notable service along a some- what new line." The President then elaborated: There was a time when the Department was looked upon as an instrument for inducing constantly larger and larger production from the farmers, rather regardless of the questions of markets and market- ing, of transportation, of financing, and other things of that sort . . . |
HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT 133 |
|
We have come upon a time when these other questions demand atten- tion, and I think the country owes a great deal to the fact that we have a new direction given to important activities of the Department. I mean, that these broader questions have been given a consideration and atten- tion which formerly was not always recognized as due to them.28 The insight into the agricultural problem reflected by this letter from the President was an inspiration to Wallace. The Secretary felt confident. Harding grasped the overall picture. Because he felt sure of his position, Wallace had been working out the details of an important and different type of legislation. By 1923 the Department of Agriculture was ready to sponsor a proposal for an export corporation -- a measure that came to be known as the McNary-Haugen Bill. This measure, as well as the proposed Norris Export Plan of Senator George Norris of Nebraska, were bold innovations. The Bill would place the government into a position of direct intervention for the financial benefit of the farmer. A federal corporation was to be estab- lished to purchase surplus farm commodities for resale abroad. Wallace was sure the President would not object, even though conservatives considered this project tantamount to socialism.29 Just when Wallace needed Administra- tion support the most, the tragedy of Harding's sudden death intervened. When Calvin Coolidge assumed the presidency, Henry C. Wallace no longer had a friend in the White House. The new Chief Executive was to be his foe. |
134 OHIO HISTORY
Herbert Hoover found the new President
possessed a kindred spirit re-
garding his own dislike of federal
meddling into the economic affairs of
agriculture. Hoover was a staunch and
persistent opponent of measures that
would increase the role of the
government. He first made known his dis-
approval of the Norris Export Plan in
1921, when he informed J. R. Howard,
the president of the American Farm
Bureau Federation, it would be a
dangerous "return of the
Government" into the private sector in its "most
vicious form." He could not condone
a scheme whereby the "Government
would be entering into competition with
the normal process of business."30
The McNary-Haugen Bill was considered by
Hoover to be equally dangerous.
Writing to C. C. Teague, the president
of the Citrus Growers' Association,
Hoover claimed the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics was the "father of
the McNary-Haugen Bill." The Bureau
according to Hoover had never
"offered a constructive idea for
the assistance of cooperatives." Being
"naturally Socialistic in
mind," he charged, "they turn to Socialism as a
solution."31
The solution to the farm problem, as
Hoover saw it, was adherence to the
inexorable law of supply and demand.32
Thus he approved of measures that
made credits available to farmers and
championed the creation of marketing
cooperatives. For example, Hoover
supported the Lenroot-Anderson Bill
(which became the Agricultural Credits
Act of 1923) and favored the
Williams-Capper Bill, which would foster
the development of cooperatives.33
But he would go no further. Hoover's
only real experience with agriculture
had been his contact with leaders of
cooperatives, particularly in the state
of California where he resided. In an
address to the Citrus Growers' Associa-
tion in 1924, Hoover enunciated his
philosophy:
I wish to state at once my firm faith
that the future of our marketing
of agricultural products lies in the
large development of the cooperative
principle. I am equally convinced that
California experience has demon-
strated that the cooperatives can
adequately carry their transactions
only up to the terminal markets, and that
wholesale and retail distribu-
tion from that point must rest in the
hands of individual distributors.34
It was obvious that Hoover placed
cooperatives in the same category as
trade associations. He believed firmly
"if all agricultural production were
organized completely into great
cooperative units, it would be possible to
bring about economic adjustments in one
or two years in the same way that
industry is able to do it."35
His advocacy of efficient marketing aided the
passage of the Cooperative Marketing Act
of 1926, the only important farm
legislation to come out of the Coolidge
Administration. It was also the
underlying philosophy of the Federal
Farm Board, the key agency created
to help agriculture during Hoover's own
term as President. Neither measure
was effective, since the problems
confronting the rural population were too
complex to be resolved merely by
fostering efficient marketing. The basic
problem of agriculture was surplus
production. Either some means had to be
devised, as was done in 1933 with the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, to curtail
output; or markets had to be found for
the huge amounts of food and fiber
produced by the American farmer. This
task of enlarging demand had to be
HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT 135
done by raising domestic consumption and
through the restoration of world
trade. It was only with the advent of
the New Deal, however, that attempts
were made to accomplish all of these
goals.
The very year the McNary-Haugen Bill
came before Congress for the very
first time, in 1923, President Coolidge
revealed his own opinion of such a
proposal in his message to Congress. He
told the assembled lawmakers on
December 6, 1923:
No complicated scheme of relief, no plan
for Government fixing of
prices, no resort to the Public Treasury
will be of any permanent value
in establishing agriculture.
Simple and direct methods put into
operation by the farmer himself
are the only real sources of restoration
. . . I do not favor the permanent
interference of the Government in this
problem.36
With the new President's views
paralleling his own, Herbert Hoover sought
to enlarge the role of the Department of
Commerce in the formation of
agricultural policy. Ever since 1921,
when Agriculture Department attaches
were sent overseas to stimulate foreign
trade, Hoover had fought to restrict
this field to his own department. In a
letter to Congressman Walter F. Brown,
Chairman of the Reorganization
Committee, Hoover contended that Depart-
ment of Agriculture activities which
duplicated those of the Department of
Commerce, both domestically and abroad,
should be curtailed. "The func-
tions of the Department of Agriculture
should end," he insisted, "when
production on the farm is complete and
movement therefrom starts."37
Henry C. Wallace contested this position
of Hoover with a strong rebuttal.
In a statement sent to Representative
Walter Brown in January of 1923,
Wallace argued forcefully that Secretary
Hoover was, in effect, telling the
farmer to take his crops and "sell
them for what the buyer is willing to pay,
and then go right back home and produce
more as quickly as possible, taking
no thought of the possible demand, nor
of the price" Wallace thus ridiculed
Hoover's proposition and condemned any
move to remove any of the vast
activities of the Department of Agriculture
and transfer them to the Depart-
ment of Commerce. He even attacked the
work of the Commerce Department,
claiming its overseas work amounted to a
mere gathering of "market gossip."38
Farm leaders were alerted and a torrent
of support for Wallace resulted.
Congress, the President, and Hoover all
received protests from major farm
organizations.
The battle between Hoover and Wallace
increased in tempo after the
introduction of the Jones-Winslow Bill.
This measure intended to establish a
bureau within the Department of Commerce
with exclusive jurisdiction for
the collection of information, including
material relating to agriculture, in
all foreign countries. Coolidge gave
Administration blessing to the bill, but
Wallace organized enough opposition to
defeat it in the House on June 5,
1924.39
It had become obvious that Henry C.
Wallace was completely at odds
with the Administration. Rumors
circulated that Wallace was about to be
eased out, but Coolidge declined to do
this prior to his campaign for re-
election.40 Wallace took
advantage of this hesitancy to assume a political
136 OHIO HISTORY
stance quite at odds with his Chief.
When Coolidge asked Wallace for his
opinion on a marketing bill, which both
the President and Hoover were
ready to support, Wallace answered:
"Personally I doubt the wisdom of the
Federal Government actively promoting
the organization of cooperative
associations."41 Despite Coolidge's
opposition to the McNary-Haugen Bill,
the Secretary of Agriculture appeared before
the House Committee on Agri-
culture to testify for the plan. Farm
papers were already beginning to refer
to the bill as the "Wallace plan
for a government export corporation."42
Wallace spoke well of the
Norris-Sinclair Bill (another export corporation
plan) and openly endorsed the
McNary-Haugen Bill. "In my opinion this
is the most helpful plan," he
testified, "that is the conclusion I have come
to."43 Again farm leaders rallied
around Wallace, and most major organiza-
tions, with the exception of West Coast
cooperatives, endorsed the experiment
of setting up a federal corporation to
handle surpluses.
Amid the struggle to secure enactment of
the McNary-Haugen Bill and
to stave off the encroachment of the Commerce Department
into agricultural
affairs, Wallace was forced to undergo
abdominal surgery. After a brief period
of recovery, he suffered a relapse and,
at the age of fifty-eight, died on
October 25, 1924. "Our
leader," acknowledged Henry C. Taylor, "who could
always be counted on was gone and we
were stunned."44 The fight for farm
relief collapsed for nearly a decade
with Wallace's passing. After Coolidge
won his mandate for another four years,
the McNary-Haugen Bill suffered
the fate of two vetoes -- one in 1927
and one in 1928. Thus the Department
of Agriculture no longer served as an
agency for the promotion of remedial
farm legislation.
The political in-fighting of Wallace and
Hoover within the Harding cabinet
was representative of a twofold contest.
The Progressive minority sought to
preserve its program, and, equally
important, the rural sector tried to resist
urban domination. With Harding at the
party's helm, these contending fac-
tions within the G.O.P. were reconciled
and the collision of opposing interests
was avoided. With great skill, he
extended a friendly hand to the Progressives
and also identified himself with the
agrarian cause. His last major farm
speech was a frank statement of that
sympathy. To a huge audience at the
fair grounds in Hutchinson, Kansas on
June 23, 1923, he defended govern-
ment intervention on behalf of the
farmers. To those who would criticize
his Administration for advancing the
concept of federal aid, President Hard-
ing replied: "I tell you frankly
that I am proud to be able to . . . tell you
of what has been done, because in so
doing it we have served not only the
farmer but everybody else in this
land."45 The farm population was a loyal
element of the Republican Party and he preserved
its allegiance. Thus, we
see that by maintaining a working
coalition through Administration support
for agricultural legislation, by
preventing disharmony from becoming disunity,
and by his sincere attempts to help
farmers -- the people whom he knew --
Warren G. Harding displayed leadership
ability and a liberal ideological
outlook, too frequently overlooked by
historians.
THE AUTHORS: Edward L. Schaps-
meier is Associate Professor of History
at
Illinois State University. Frederick H.
Schapsmeier is Associate Professor of
His-
tory at Wisconsin State University, Osh-
kosh.
DISHARMONY IN THE HARDING CABINET: HOOVER-WALLACE CONFLICT
by EDWARD L. SCHAPSMEIER and FREDERICK H. SCHAPSMEIER
The campaign of 1920 was a twofold success for the Republican Party. Warren G. Harding brought the Grand Old Party back into national power, and he succeeded in reuniting the party. The rupture of 1912 had been healed. The cabinet represented all factions. During Harding's presidency party harmony was sustained by balancing the desires of the Progressive and conservative wings -- neither satisfying nor alienating either segment completely -- so as to maintain a semblance of unity despite strong differ- ences of opinion. As a skillful political leader, Harding also strove to retain the loyalty of the rural population. When farmers found themselves in economic distress during the postwar era, they discovered the Harding Administration was receptive to their pleas. It would be the Ohioan's suc-
NOTES ARE ON PAGES 188-190 |