HARDING ADMINISTRATION AND RECOGNITION OF MEXICO
by EUGENE P. TRANI |
|
A long period of turmoil in Mexico temporarily came to an end in December 1920 with the assumption of the presidency by General Alvaro Obregon. It thus seemed to be a ripe time for the reopening of diplomatic relations be- tween Mexico and the United States and settlement of American claims against the Mexican government. President Woodrow Wilson, however, by this time in his lame-duck period in office, reacted as William Howard Taft had done eight years earlier. He left the problems of recognition and claims -- which arose from policies embodied in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 -- to his successor Warren G. Harding. The problem of recognizing Obregon was, of course, tied to previous diffi- culties. After the fall of General Victoriano Huerta in 1914, Venustiano Carranza had come to power. Although recognized conditionally in 1915, Carranza became quite a problem. Trouble became serious over application of provisions of the 1917 Constitution, and in the United States some Repub- lican Senators led by Albert B. Fall of New Mexico began to look carefully into relations with Mexico. The Fall Committee in a long report of May 28, 1920, indicated that Mexico under Carranza was no safe place for American citizens or investments. The United States, it remarked, should withdraw recognition until a government capable of stability and willing to comply with international obligations came to power. Obligations included responsi- bility for American lives and property, understanding that certain provisions of the 1917 Constitution did not apply to Americans, and immediate appoint- ment of commissioners to decide claims and solve disputes concerning the international boundary. Only after these stipulations were satisfied should
NOTES ARE ON PAGES 190-192 |
138 OHIO HISTORY
the United States extend recognition. If
unfavorable conditions continued,
the report recommended the American
government should issue a warning
that it proposed to terminate the
conditions the Mexicans were unwilling
or unable to stop, though it had no
plans to make war on the Mexican
people.1
Before the Fall Committee had completed
its investigation and delivered
its recommendations, the United States
was relieved of further contention
with Carranza. There had been increased
Mexican dissatisfaction with him;
and Mexico's popular military hero,
General Obregon, gained control of
Mexico City in early May 1920. Carranza
fled to the mountains and was
slain in the state of Puebla. Obregon's
supporter, Adolfo de la Huerta, became
Provisional President.
At this juncture there was some
consideration of recognition by the Wilson
Administration. De la Huerta appointed
Fernando Iglesias Calderon as
Mexico's confidential agent in
Washington, and Calderon approached the
State Department; but Obregon, the
obvious successor to de la Huerta, told
the American Charge d'Affaires in Mexico
City, George T. Summerlin, that
Calderon could not speak for the Mexican
government.2 Roberto Pesqueira
succeeded Calderon in October. Later
that month Secretary of State Bain-
bridge Colby announced conditions for
recognition of de la Huerta's regime,
which included a mixed claims commission
to determine damages caused by
the Mexican revolution, nonenforcement
of apparent retroactive provisions
of the 1917 Constitution, and
recognition and servicing of the Mexican
foreign debt.3 Both de la Huerta and
Obregon stated that Mexico would pay
all it owed to citizens of the United
States and would not apply the retro-
active aspects of the Constitution, but
they also felt that their government
should be recognized without any prior
agreements. With approval from
Obregon, de la Huerta turned down
Colby's offer for recognition. Wilson
followed the negotiations closely, eager
for an opportunity to settle the crisis.
But the State Department fell into
hesitation, and the Mexican government,
convinced by Republican politicians that
it could not afford to deal with the
out-going President -- Harding seemed
assured of election in November --
issued a statement depriving Pesqueira
of authority to continue the discus-
sions.4
Though de la Huerta did not obtain
American recognition, his administra-
tion had prepared the way for internal
peace. He suppressed the revolts of
General Pablo Gonzalez and Pancho Villa.
With the country at peace and at
the tasks of rehabilitation, an election
was held on September 8, 1920.
Obregon won an overwhelming majority for
a four-year term as president,
beginning December 1. His inauguration
increased pressure on Wilson to
recognize Mexico. The ceremony was
attended by the governors of Texas
and New Mexico and other Americans
favoring renewal of relations. Wilson
received messages from the governors of
Arizona, California, Illinois, Michigan,
and Oklahoma requesting recognition, as
well as letters from Chambers of
Commerce of such major cities as St.
Louis, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.5
All were concerned with trade and were
alarmed at the possibility of further
confiscations by the Mexican government.
RECOGNITION OF MEXICO
139
Wilson, and for that matter Obregon,
refused to reconsider their positions.
Mexican Foreign Minister Alberto J. Pani
later said, in April 1923, as he
looked back at the situation,
"Wilson's term of office was already nearing its
end.... It is not surprising, therefore,
that during the short lapse of three
months ... nothing important was done,
or even attempted, to normalize the
diplomatic relations between the two
countries."6 Mexico waited patiently
for Harding to become President. In
November 1920, after Harding's election,
Obregon announced his pleasure with the
results and declared American-
Mexican problems at an end. He described
Wilson as Mexico's "most terrible
enemy" and March 4, 1921, as a
"day of deliverance."7
The day of deliverance from
nonrecognition did not come so quickly. The
Mexican problem that confronted
Harding's Secretary of State, Charles Evans
Hughes, was compounded by Harding's
announcement that the new Secretary
of the Interior was to be none other
than Albert B. Fall, whose name was
hated throughout Mexico. During the
Huerta era, Fall had proposed the
occupation of Mexico by an army of
500,000 men to open and maintain
communications between the seaports and
Mexico City and to assist in
establishing constitutional government.
Fall indicated that no change of
policy would come from the Harding
Administration. He said that so long
as he had anything to do with the
Mexican question, no government would
be recognized which did not first enter
into a written agreement to protect
American citizens and their property
rights in Mexico.8 Fall boasted that
Obregon would have to "sign on the
dotted line" regarding a claims commis-
sion, boundary commission, the
non-retroactive effect of certain articles of
the 1917 Constitution, religious liberty
for Americans, protection of American
citizens and property, and inclusion of
the above in a formal protocol.9 Many
observers claimed these proposals were
tantamount to asking for a rewriting
of the Mexican constitution. There
seemed little doubt Fall's ideas would
influence the new President of the
United States, a close friend of the former
New Mexican Senator.
Recognizing that he had been too hopeful
for immediate improvement of
relations, Obregon attempted to take
away the causes of complaint. He set
aside many of Carranza's decrees, issued
oil permits, and announced that
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution would
have no confiscatory or retroactive
application.10
To the new Secretary of State there was
something more important and
necessary than Obregon's pledge to
protect American interests, and for that
matter than Fall's demand for immediate
indemnity for losses and injuries
since 1910. Secretary Hughes felt that
the proposed program of reform in
Mexico, instead, constituted a threat to
American interests and therefore
decided that the Mexicans had to sign a
pact furnishing stipulated safeguards.
With this in mind Charge Summerlin
presented Obregon with a Draft Treaty
of Amity and Commerce on May 27, 1921,
that was intended to regulate and
promote commercial intercourse and
remove all causes of difference. It pro-
vided that America would not recognize
the Mexican government until
guarantees, necessary to safeguard
rights legally acquired by American
citizens prior to the 1917 Constitution,
were offered.11 The proposed treaty
140 OHIO HISTORY
contained eighteen articles; sixteen
were the usual formalities; the first two,
concerned the major difficulties between
the United States and Mexico. They
provided that nationals of either
country living in the other should enjoy all
rights and privileges accorded to native
citizens, offered reciprocal assurances
against confiscation and expropriation
except for public purposes and then
only with prompt payment of just
compensation, and guaranteed that
neither the 1917 Constitution, which
included the right to impose on private
property such limitations as the public
interest might demand, nor the
Carranza agrarian decree of January 6,
1915, would apply retroactively.
The United States also asked for
restoration, where possible, of all that
Americans had lost since 1910,
compensation for that "which it is not
possible to restore," and
reciprocal guarantees for nationals of either country
of freedom to worship.
This devastating diplomatic shot fired
across the border preceded the
following announcement by Hughes:
The fundamental question which confronts
the Government of the
United States in considering its
relations with Mexico is the safe-
guarding of property rights against
confiscation .... Whenever Mexico
is ready to give assurances that she
will perform her fundamental
obligation in the protection both of
persons and of rights of property
validly acquired, there will be no
obstacles to the most advantageous
relations between the two peoples ....
Accordingly this Government
has proposed a Treaty of Amity and
Commerce . . . in which Mexico
will agree to safeguard the rights of
property .... The question of
recognition is a subordinate one, but
there will be no difficulty as to
this, for if General Obregon is ready to
negotiate a proper treaty it is
drawn so as to be negotiated with him
and the making of the treaty
in proper form will accomplish the
recognition of the Government
that makes it.12
When Mexico proved willing to discharge
its international obligations,
Hughes continued, recognition would take
place. He withheld recognition
because he contended that the Mexican
government was founded on violence,
the country was too unsettled for
security without guarantees, and assur-
ances on retroactivity of the 1917
Constitution were necessary.
Secretary Hughes had not determined this
policy on the spur of the
moment. As a lawyer, he dealt with
recognition in a logical manner. He
did not judge by traditional European
standards, but by American standards.
He recognized the right of revolution
and maintained he was not attempting
to interfere with internal concerns of
any country. He quoted Thomas
Jefferson who, when Secretary of State
in the 1790's, wrote that America
could not deny any nation the right
"whereon our own government is
founded" -- to govern by whatever
form it pleases and change forms at will
and transact business with nations
through whatever organ it thinks proper:
king, convention, assembly, committee,
president or anything else. To Jeffer-
son, the will of the nation was the only
essential. Hughes saw this policy
used throughout the history of United
States recognition of governments.
He quoted Secretary of State James
Buchanan to the effect that the
United States always had recognized de
facto governments. Buchanan had
maintained that all nations had the
right to reform political institutions
RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 141
according to their will and pleasure,
but a government had to be capable
of maintaining itself and "then its
recognition on our part inevitably
follows."13
Hughes's ideas of recognition came from
these precedents as well as others.
Secretary of State William H. Seward had
introduced the idea that the
United States would not recognize a
government established by force in
violation of constitutional principles,
until the people approved the regime.
Seward had declared that a new
administration had to be "sanctioned by
the formal acquiescence and acceptance
of the people." Hughes admitted
it was difficult to determine the will
of the people which could be manifested
by continued acquiescence. In any case,
he stated, a wise precaution was
to give time to enable any new regime to
prove its stability and the apparent
acquiescence of the people.
William McKinley's Secretary of State,
John Hay, had added to the
recognition policy of the United States
the ability of the proposed country
to fulfill international obligations.
Hay felt it insufficient that a government
be only in control of the machinery of
administration. David Jayne Hill,
Acting Secretary of State in 1900, had
written that the rule of the United
States was to defer recognition until a
government was in possession of the
machinery of the state, with assent of
the people, "in a position to fulfill
all the international obligations and
responsibilities incumbent upon a
foreign State under treaties and
international law."
Hughes agreed that ability to perform
international obligations was im-
portant, though not enough. For him
there had to be both ability and
action. Harding's Secretary cited a
precedent. Wilson's government had
refused to recognize the Soviet regime
in Russia on ground that it had
repudiated international obligations.
Wilson had justified his position, accord-
ing to Hughes, by stating that
"American property held in Russia under valid
titles had been confiscated without
prospect of indemnification, and that
those in control of the regime at Moscow
were intent upon doing all within
their power by insidious propaganda and
the promotion of strife to destroy or
embarrass existing governments
throughout the world."14 Turning to Mexico,
Hughes noted that the United States had
refused to recognize Huerta; and
although it had conditionally recognized
Carranza, Mexican assurances with
respect to international obligations had
not been satisfactorily fulfilled. Con-
sequently, Wilson withheld recognition
of Obregon. Hughes thus adopted the
adamant position of his predecessor,
Colby. Mexico would have to agree to
specific conditions before receiving
recognition by the United States.
When attacked, Hughes defended his
position vigorously. Before the
Chamber of Commerce in Washington on May
26, 1922, he declared no state
is entitled to a place within the family
of nations if it destroyed the foundation
of honorable intercourse by confiscation
and repudiation.15 In addition to
public defenses, Hughes and his
department worked to keep the President's
support. Under Secretary of State Henry
P. Fletcher in November 1921 wrote
President Harding that difficult as the
Mexican problem appeared, it was one
of "common honesty and fair
dealing, and should be squarely met." Harding,
content at this time to leave the State
Department in charge of foreign policy,
142 OHIO HISTORY
agreed, and nothing arose for a time to
change his mind about the proper
American attitude toward Mexico. In
fact, the President replied, current
policy was "quite in harmony with
all that I said during the political campaign
of 1920, and it is quite in harmony with
everything which has been said
directly or indirectly to President
Obregon."16 Later, in March 1922, public
demands for a change in policy induced
Hughes to write the President that
the United States was "simply
insisting that, as a sine qua non of international
intercourse, property rights and
obligations shall be secure and when it
appears that a regime is adopting a
confiscatory policy, we cannot enter into
relations with it until we are satisfied
that valid titles and rights acquired
under its own laws will be
respected." Hughes thought it a simple operation,
but important. Harding again agreed.17
One must note that the two fundamental
criteria -- present and future
stability (including acceptance by the
people), as well as ability and willing-
ness to fulfill international
obligations -- were part of American recognition
policy before Hughes took control of the
State Department. And while Hughes
could not help but regard material
interests of American citizens, his in-
sistence on a preliminary treaty before
recognition did not depart from
American practice, as has been shown. He
never went so far as Albert Fall
desired, demanding changes in the
Mexican constitution, but asked only for
a commercial treaty.
The Mexican President was in sharp
disagreement with the Harding
Administration. Obregon had agreed with
de la Huerta's refusal of Colby's
conditions for recognition. Although the
Mexican government did not imme-
diately reply to the draft Treaty of
Amity and Commerce, he let his opposi-
tion be known. The day after Summerlin
presented the treaty, Obregon
announced that acceptance and signing of
a convention to obtain recognition
would place in doubt the rights Mexico
had to privileges established by
international law.18 Foreign
Minister Pani informed Summerlin that Mexico
was over a hundred years old and that
many nations had recognized the
Obregon government. Therefore, Pani
said, it was neither possible nor
expedient for Mexico to sign a
convention or treaty before being fully recog-
nized. He maintained that "the
priority of the convention or treaty with
respect to recognition, or the simultaneity
of these two acts or their fusion,
considering that the signing of the
former could imply or signify at the same
time the renewal of diplomatic relations
between the two countries, would
give recognition a conditional character
and would gravely injure the
sovereignty of Mexico."19
Obregon, throughout the year 1921,
refused to accept the treaty, but did
announce his intention to settle all claims and protect
American investments
in Mexico. To President Harding on June
11, 1921, he wrote concerning the
three main American points of worry --
application of Article 27 of the 1917
Constitution, procedure to settle and
determine claims for damages caused
by the revolution, and payment of the
external debt.20 All three would be
solved, he wrote, in accordance with
American wishes, though not by signing
RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 143
a treaty. He directed his
representatives to make known that Mexico would
enter into agreements with all
governments to adjust claims for damages
incurred during the revolution.
Harding publicly showed little change of
heart. The President said he
approved of the draft treaty and
believed such an agreement necessary.
Privately he was beginning to feel more
at ease in foreign affairs and showed
a surprising understanding of the Mexican
position. Because "the Mexican
Government professes a desire to do
everything we have asked except that
they are seeking to avoid the appearance
of submission to our dictation,"
he wondered if the United States should
arrange for a special envoy to bring
"a speedy conclusion of the
arrangements which are so essential to the
welfare and concord of both
governments."21 He left the problem with Secre-
tary Hughes, who decided to accept
Harding's suggestion. Obregon's reaction
to this new American approach was only
to reply that his statement had
called for a mixed claims commission and
he hoped the United States would
participate.22
To the Mexican congress in September
1921, Obregon restated his posi-
tion, noting the impossibility of
accepting the draft treaty regardless of how
it was presented. Since the Mexican
government was a legally constituted
government, it would be humiliating to
have to sign a treaty before recogni-
tion, especially one which contained
stipulations contrary to some of the
precepts of the Mexican Constitution.23
There was some basis for Obregon's
assertion. His government had restored
peace and order, was of proven
stability, and his domestic reforms were
stimulating the economy. If he accepted
the treaty, his enemies could have
called up Mexican pride against him.
From the beginning of negotiations until
November 1921, the two govern-
ments maintained positions assumed at
the outset. American Charge d'Affaires
Summerlin in mid-November submitted a
convention to the Mexican Foreign
Office to be signed after the
ratification of the Treaty of Amity and Com-
merce, to create a mixed commission to
examine claims. Mexican Foreign
Minister Pani countered by reiterating
Obregon's policy concerning recogni-
tion. Pani reproposed creation of a
mixed commission to handle claims of
American citizens resulting from the
revolution, which would bring about
the desired renewal of diplomatic relations.
Claims to be considered by the
commission would extend from November
10, 1910 to May 3, 1920. After
recognition, the countries would then
sign a general convention for settlement
of claims arising since July 4, 1868.24
Pani would go no further. He would
not agree to limit his government's
control over Mexican natural resources
and domestic policies, as the American
proposal seemed to indicate to the
Mexican policy makers.
The State Department hesitated, and so
Pani's note went unanswered until
February 1922. Summerlin, on
instruction, then informed the Mexican
government that the United States would
decline Pani's proposal "unless the
rights of American citizens acquired
prior to the adoption of the 1917 Consti-
tution are adequately safeguarded."
Summerlin restated that the proposed
144 OHIO HISTORY
draft Treaty of Amity and Commerce
provided the prerequisite guarantees.
Moreover, after study, the State
Department still could see nothing in the
treaty opposed to the fundamental laws
of Mexico, unless the present regime
planned to enforce the retroactive and
confiscatory powers of Carranza's
constitution; to make progress toward
recognition the Mexican government
should indicate its objections to the
treaty, and then Obregon should put
it into a form acceptable to both
parties. Otherwise, Summerlin concluded,
"it would be futile to engage in
any discussions of the claims conventions
themselves."25 Clearly
Hughes deemed guarantees against confiscatory and
retroactive action more important than
adjudication of existing claims. He
continued to insist on the passage of
the proposed Treaty of Amity and
Commerce before any claims convention
could be called.
Pani continued also to reiterate earlier
counterproposals: a convention to
settle claims of the revolutionary
period, then implicit recognition of Obregon
by the United States, and then a
convention to settle claims since July 4,
1868. Turning to rights legitimately
acquired before the 1917 Constitution,
the Foreign Minister noted lack of
agreements did not mean no guarantees.
Article I of the proposed Treaty of
Amity and Commerce was not necessary,
for guarantees existed because of
policies adopted by his government. Pani
answered the American request to list
objections to the proposed treaty by
noting that if Obregon accepted it, he
would violate the Mexican Constitution
by invading the prerogatives of the
legislative and judicial branches and
would disrupt proper government in
Mexico. Pani felt a constitution "would
have to be respected above
treaties."26
While each side continued to pay tribute
to the "high purposes" of the
other, hope for a quick end of
difficulties disappeared. The United States
government again publicly insisted on
the signing of the Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, while the Mexicans
continued adamantly to state they could
not agree to such a treaty as a
condition of recognition, especially since its
provisions were unconstitutional and,
therefore, illegal.27
The Mexicans meanwhile had made a
careful attempt to improve the faith
of foreign investors. Two days before
President Obregon delivered his annual
message to his congress in September
1921, the Mexican Supreme Court
handed down the first of five decisions
relating to injunction proceedings of
oil companies to prohibit the
utilization of decrees made by the former
Carranza government. These decisions
stated "that petroleum properties
in the process of development before May
1, 1917, when the present constitu-
tion took effect, are protected from a
retroactive application of the fourth
paragraph of Article 27."28
Although concerned only with cases where owners
had transformed privileges into acquired
rights by some productive act, the
decisions applied to many disputed
claims and gave oil concessionaires a
feeling of security. And another act
soon brought Obregon closer to the
demands of financial circles. In July
1922, the Mexican Financial Minister,
former President de la Huerta, and the
International Committee of Bankers
signed an agreement in New York City.
Mexico recognized important financial
RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 145
conditions -- a foreign debt principal
of $517,000,000 from government bonds
and railroad debts, plus interest in
arrears to the amount of $207,000,000.
Bankers under leadership of Thomas W.
Lamont waived the accrued interest.
They spread payments, with low interest
rates, over forty-five years. The
Mexican government also made a solemn
pledge to restore railways to private
ownership in as good condition as when
seized.29
At first glance the concrete acts by the
Mexican government did not seem
to convince Washington. Secretary of
State Hughes still considered the
international situation unsatisfactory;
he had received new complaints about
retroactive application of Article 27 of
the 1917 Constitution. He continued
to see no constitutional objection to
the proposed treaty but felt Mexico
would not agree because "signing of
such a treaty would not be in harmony
with the public sentiment of Mexico and
that it would not be ratified by the
Mexican Senate." Hughes also noted
the main concerns of the American
government: need of agreement on the
foreign debt and oil deposits, lack
of validation of land titles issued to
Americans before 1917, and the inade-
quacy of the Mexican Supreme Court
rulings as protection against retroactive
and confiscatory application of the
Mexican constitution in land seizure cases.
Despite these reservations, however,
there was a definite softening of the
American position. With respect to the
proposed treaty, Hughes wondered
"if the Mexican authorities will
not enter into an appropriate treaty binding
Mexico to respect the valid titles which
have been acquired under Mexican
laws prior to the Constitution of 1917,
the question remains in what manner
shall such assurances be given."30
By early 1923 there were rumors of
impending recognition. States such
as New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Illinois,
Colorado, as well as cities--Detroit,
Philadelphia, St. Louis, San
Francisco--sent delegations to Mexico City,
attempting to encourage commerce. Thus
pressure mounted on the Harding
Administration to recognize Obregon. In
March 1923, Senator William E.
Borah of Idaho, a leading spokesman on
foreign policy, spoke in favor of
recognition to a huge gathering in
Jersey City. Foreign governments were
also a cause of concern, because of
their demands on the State Depart-
ment for a change in policy. In response
to all of these pressures, the
Administration prepared to adjust its position.
Harding, aware of the public clamor for
recognition and of Mexican refusal
to accept any of the proposals by
Secretary Hughes, seemingly then took
negotiations from the State Department.
He appointed General James A.
Ryan, a retired army general who was the
representative of the Texas Oil
Company in Mexico, as intermediary. The
sequence of events was probably
in this order. Ryan had returned to
Washington in late March from Mexico,
had received Harding's permission for an
informal conference, and then had
cleared the proposal through the State
Department. Ryan then issued an
invitation for direct negotiations to
President Obregon. His friendship with
both Presidents as well as his interest
in settling the difficulties between the
two countries made him the natural
mediator.31
146 OHIO HISTORY |
|
Another factor speeded Harding's new approach -- the resignation of a strong advocate of nonrecognition, Albert B. Fall. Evidence regarding the Teapot Dome scandals was beginning to appear. To General Ryan on April 9, Obregon said he was pleased with the sug- gestion for direct negotiations and if Harding would appoint two delegates, he would also. The Mexican President even offered Mexico City as the logical place for negotiation, close to the source of the disputes. In a first draft of his reply to the State Department, he stated that representatives were not to "broach a discussion of the Mexican legislation in force, or touch the point of whether an agreement prior to the renewal of diplomatic relations . . . is relevant or irrelevant." In the letter that Obregon finally signed these stipu- lations, at the request of General Ryan, were omitted. Ryan, however, promised Obregon that "the commissioners would adjust their conduct to what was expressed in the deleted part of the letter."32 The State Department accepted Ryan's proposal, hoping news of the meeting would be released at the same time in both countries. Washington agreed with the Mexican proviso that delegates should meet and report conclusions. Pani proposed an identic statement: With a view to hasten the reaching of a mutual understanding between the Governments of the United States and Mexico, two American com- missioners and two Mexican commissioners will be appointed to meet for the purpose of exchanging impressions and of reporting them to their respective authorities. The hospitality of Mexico City has been offered to the American commissioners as the city's guest of honor, and the commission will convene there. The names of the commissioners will be announced later.33 |
RECOGNITION OF MEXICO
147
The two countries publicly announced the
meeting and shortly listed
their delegates. President Harding named
as delegates Charles Beecher
Warren, former Ambassador to Japan, and
John Barton Payne, former
Secretary of the Interior and at the
time the president of the American Red
Cross. Mexican representatives were
Senor Ramon Ross, the General Director
of Public Benevolence, and Licentiate Fernando
Gonzalez Roa, former Sub-
secretary of the Interior. The meetings
were to take place in the Foreign
Affairs Ministry at No. 85 Avenida
Bucareli, in Mexico City, and thus became
known as the Bucareli Conference.34
In a long instruction to Payne and
Warren, Secretary Hughes pointed out
that the fundamental issue between the
United States and Mexico was "the
safeguarding of American property rights
in Mexico, especially as against
a confiscatory application of the provisions
of the Mexican Constitution of
1917." Principal questions were
restoration or proper reparation for lands
taken from American citizens prior to
May 1, 1917, satisfactory assurances
against confiscation of subsoil
interests in lands owned by Americans, and a
claims commission.35
The attempt to force Mexico to sign a
treaty of amity and commerce had
failed. All the United States now sought
were guarantees for property rights
and a satisfactory claims commission.
The first meeting of the Bucareli
Conference took place on May 14, 1923.
After words of welcome by Ramon Ross,
Charles Warren stated the United
States desired no special privileges,
but only what was justly due any nation.
Gonzalez Roa then agreed "to
exchange impressions about the Mexican-
American situation in order to reach a
mutual understanding between the
two countries, and inform their
government for a definite conclusion." Dis-
cussions covered a variety of subjects:
American claims against Mexico,
interest on the foreign debt,
restoration of railroads to their owners, partition
of large estates, taxation of oil
exports, and retroactive features of Article 27
of the Constitution in regard to land
and subsoil resources. That month,
May, saw discussion of nationalization
of subsoil deposits, but no agreements.
Delegates turned to the agrarian problem
in June. Part of July was taken
up with informal meetings to draft the
special and general claims conventions,
and on July 19 and 20 the commissioners
agreed on the agrarian problem.
Settlement of the petroleum problem
occurred on August 2. Meantime, on
July 27, the commissioners formally
approved the text of the general and
special claims conventions.36
There were only minor troublesome
issues. The Americans were bothered
by the drinking of Ross and the long
digressions of Gonzalez Roa. After
complaints to Obregon, both difficulties
ceased. The conferences recessed on
August 3, in observance of the death of
President Harding, but the tragedy
had no effect on the outcome of the
meetings.
The Mexicans made few concessions; the
claims conventions could have
been signed two years earlier. The
Mexican commissioners supported the
view of the Mexican Supreme Court that a
positive act was necessary to
transfer the privilege of extracting
petroleum into an acquired right and per-
148 OHIO HISTORY
sons who had not made such an act
"would be conceded preferential rights to
the fuel products beneath the surface
which they owned and, upon application
to the Mexican national government,
would be granted permission to avail
themselves of these rights." The
Americans dissented. On the land question
the Americans accepted the Mexican
proposal to pay land claims in twenty-
year, five percent bonds, with notation
that this was no precedent in respect
to lands otherwise expropriated. But the
Americans opposed the Mexican
conclusion that ten percent added to the
value of these lands for revenue
purposes would be the amount to be paid
back. The special claims convention
covered damages through revolutionary
acts within the period November 20,
1910 to May 31, 1920. Claims were to be
judged by a commission of three:
an American, a Mexican, and a person
selected by the two nations or by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague. Claims had to be filed
within five years of the commission's
first meeting -- all decisions were final
and the Mexican government would pay in
gold. The general claims con-
vention, proposed by Pani in 1921,
covered both countries since July 4, 1868.
A procedure similar to the special
claims settlement was set up.37
In late August 1923, both governments
approved the conventions, and the
United States formally accorded recognition
to the Obregon government on
August 31.38
Secretary Hughes derived great
satisfaction from settlement of this long-
standing feud and in the next year,
1924, was willing to respond to Mexican
pleas for arms and munitions to put down
the revolution of General de la
Huerta on the eve of election of
Obregon's close comrade, Plutarco Elias
Calles, to the presidency. The
long-drawn-out settlements of the claims
commissions were disappointing to the
United States. With a Panamanian
umpire for the general commission and a
Brazilian for the special commission,
settlement -- disadvantageous to
American interests -- was delayed until
1941. This is another question, beyond
the scope of the present essay, as
are dissents of the American delegates
to Mexican decisions on the oil and
agrarian controversy. Recognition,
however, came long before these disputes
were cleared.
In final analysis the Americans backed
down in 1923. The Mexican govern-
ment from the outset said it would never
buy recognition at the cost of
dignity, and did not. As pressure in
favor of recognition increased, the
American government had to abandon its
position. A legal-minded Secretary
of State was temporarily by-passed by a
President, conscious of public
opinion, who sought to end the
controversy. Warren Harding accepted the
idea of a conference to discuss all problems, and his
successor Calvin Coolidge
accepted its decisions although it left
many problems unresolved.
THE AUTHOR: Eugene P. Trani is
Assistant Professor in the History
Depart-
ment at Southern Illinois University,
Car-
bondale.
HARDING ADMINISTRATION AND RECOGNITION OF MEXICO
by EUGENE P. TRANI |
|
A long period of turmoil in Mexico temporarily came to an end in December 1920 with the assumption of the presidency by General Alvaro Obregon. It thus seemed to be a ripe time for the reopening of diplomatic relations be- tween Mexico and the United States and settlement of American claims against the Mexican government. President Woodrow Wilson, however, by this time in his lame-duck period in office, reacted as William Howard Taft had done eight years earlier. He left the problems of recognition and claims -- which arose from policies embodied in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 -- to his successor Warren G. Harding. The problem of recognizing Obregon was, of course, tied to previous diffi- culties. After the fall of General Victoriano Huerta in 1914, Venustiano Carranza had come to power. Although recognized conditionally in 1915, Carranza became quite a problem. Trouble became serious over application of provisions of the 1917 Constitution, and in the United States some Repub- lican Senators led by Albert B. Fall of New Mexico began to look carefully into relations with Mexico. The Fall Committee in a long report of May 28, 1920, indicated that Mexico under Carranza was no safe place for American citizens or investments. The United States, it remarked, should withdraw recognition until a government capable of stability and willing to comply with international obligations came to power. Obligations included responsi- bility for American lives and property, understanding that certain provisions of the 1917 Constitution did not apply to Americans, and immediate appoint- ment of commissioners to decide claims and solve disputes concerning the international boundary. Only after these stipulations were satisfied should
NOTES ARE ON PAGES 190-192 |