Public Opinion and the Chinese Question, 1876-1879 by GARY PENNANEN Diplomatic problems are not considered to have been of much conse- quence during the presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes. While not many pre- World War I judgments concerning the history of the period have escaped revisionism, an assessment of Hayes's diplomacy made by Charles R. Wil- liams in 1914 has withstood the test of time: "Few subjects of large im- portance in the foreign relations of the Government demanded action or attention during the administration of Mr. Hayes. For the most part all our dealings with foreign countries were amicable and were conducted without feeling or friction."1 This conclusion is still accepted by diplomatic historians even though several monographs and two scholarly biographies NOTES ON PAGE 201 |
140 OHIO HISTORY
of William Maxwell Evarts, Secretary of
State under Hayes, have added
more detail about specific incidents.2
Alexander DeConde concluded in a
recent comparison of American
Secretaries of State that Evarts "in fact, is
one of the lesser-known Secretaries, one
who dealt with no great interna-
tional problems."3 Judging
from the scant space devoted to foreign rela-
tions by Hayes's most recent biographer,
he too agreed with the Williams
assessment.4
Conclusions relating to the
insignificance of diplomacy during the Hayes
administration depend, in part, on the
assumption that the American public
did not become excited about foreign
policy. Allan Nevins stated that the
Virginius affair of 1873 "was the last formidable storm on
the sea of foreign
relations that [Hamilton] Fish had to
confront. Thereafter, no important
group of Americans were to become
aroused over any international prob-
lem until, more than a decade later,
Grover Cleveland threatened condign
[appropriate] action against Canada in
the fisheries dispute."5 Nevins' re-
mark was based upon a grossly distorted
image of public reaction to foreign
policy in the late 1870's and early 1880's.
In The Awkward Years, David M.
Pletcher has shown how public pressure
for foreign markets shaped the
diplomacy of the Garfield and Arthur
administrations.6 No overall study of
comparable depth exists for the problems
in foreign affairs during the Hayes
administration, but there is evidence
that during this period the public be-
came aroused by border troubles with
Mexico, a French attempt to con-
struct a canal through the Isthmus of
Panama, and Chinese immigration
that seemed to threaten the western
labor force.7
On no issue did Hayes and Evarts feel
the effect of public opinion as
much as that of Chinese immigration.
Although Chinese immigrants gen-
erally had been welcomed to the United
States in the 1850's and 60's to
assist in railroad building and mining
operations, a movement for their
exclusion made rapid headway during the
depression of the 1870's, especial-
ly on the Pacific Coast. Even before the
Panic of 1873, Chinese were dis-
liked in California. Beginning as early
as 1850, California discriminated
against the immigrants by a number of
means, including special mining
taxes, passenger taxes, head taxes,
school segregation, and laws forbidding
them to testify against white men.8
The chief restraint to the anti-Chinese
movement was the Burlingame
Treaty of 1868, which contained liberal
immigration provisions. Article V
permitted the free immigration of the
citizens of China and of the United
States "from the one country to the
other for the purposes of curiosity, of
trade or as permanent residents,"
and for those purposes both nations
reprobated "any other than an
entirely voluntary emigration." Article VI,
moreover, gave Americans visiting or
residing in China and Chinese sub-
jects visiting or residing in the United
States "the same privileges, immuni-
ties and exemptions in respect to travel
or residence as may there be en-
joyed by the citizens or subjects of the
most favored nation." Because the
Supreme Court ruled that state
legislation designed to restrict Chinese im-
migration violated these provisions, it
was necessary for the exclusionists
to seek revision of the treaty.9
THE CHINESE QUESTION 141
Hayes first became fully aware of the
Chinese issue during the campaign
of 1876. At the Republican convention in
Cincinnati, western delegates de-
nounced the evils of the Chinese labor
invasion and demanded a congres-
sional investigation of it. Although a
group of easterners led by George
William Curtis opposed the least effort
to interfere with the principle of
free immigration, the Republican platform
announced "the immediate duty
of Congress fully to investigate the
effect of the immigration and importa-
tion of Mongolians on the moral and
material interests of the country."10
The Democratic platform was more
forthright. It criticized a policy which
"tolerates the revival of the
coolie trade in Mongolian women imported for
immoral purposes, and Mongolian men,
hired to perform servile labor con-
tracts." As a solution, it demanded
"such a modification of the treaty with
the Chinese Empire, or such legislation
by Congress within constitutional
limitations as shall prevent the further
importation or immigration of the
Mongolian race."11
As the Republican candidate, Hayes found
himself caught up in the
controversial Chinese question. A
typical West Coast Republican summed
up his own reaction to the Chinese plank
in the platform: "It is just enough
to stir up the missionary and
humanitarian element of New England. Yet
not enough to conciliate the laboring
classes of the Pacific Coast."12 Some
Republicans advised Hayes to take a
strong stand against Chinese immigra-
tion if he wished to win votes in the
West,13 but others opposed such a
course. Mild as it was, eastern
Republicans resented the admission of the
plank in the platform. John Bingham, the
American minister in Tokyo,
wrote Hayes that the platform was all he
"could desire save the Chinese
resolution," the objectives of
which were sound, but the implementation of
which might lead to accusations that the
nation was unjustly treating the
Chinese. 14
Although Hayes avoided the Chinese issue
during the campaign, his
election did nothing to change the
situation, for anti-Chinese sentiment in-
creased. A joint congressional committee
set up to investigate the problem
released its report in February 1877.15
The anti-Chinese character of most
of the testimony taken by the committee
provided evidence for critics of
Chinese immigration. During the summer,
Chinese were attacked by hood-
lums in San Francisco, and under the
leadership of Dennis Kearney, the
California Workingmen's party adopted
the slogan, "The Chinese must
go."16 On August 13, a committee of
the California senate submitted a me-
morial to Congress recommending that the
United States and Great Britain
act together with China to abrogate all
treaties permitting Chinese to im-
migrate to the United States.17
While the committee publicly denounced
the evils of Chinese immigration, Hayes
received information to the con-
trary from a private source. An employer
of Chinese labor in California
reported that since the Chinese did not
have a friend on the committee,
there could not "have been a more
one-sided affair." He also praised the
Chinese for being "docile and
easily managed and controlled--while many
of the white laborers when they get a
few dollars ahead go off on a drunk."18
142 OHIO HISTORY
Critics of Chinese immigration contended
that the Chinese competed
unfairly with white labor because they
could live more cheaply than whites,
who often had families to support and
who were accustomed to better food
and housing. They argued that many
Chinese immigrants came to the
United States as coolies, whose passage
money was paid beforehand. Such
immigration, being involuntary, was
contrary to the Burlingame Treaty.
Socially, the Chinese were condemned for
living in crowded hovels, smok-
ing opium, having no wives, and
importing prostitutes from China. Politi-
cally, they were considered
unassimilable because they lacked experience
with republican institutions.19 "CALIGULA
issued a decree elevating his
horse to the dignity of Roman
citizenship," declared the San Francisco
Chronicle. "This was a mild proceeding compared to the
proposition of
trying to make American citizens out of
the offscourings of China that
have been poured on our shores."20
Despite the pressure, Hayes and
Secretary Evarts continued to ignore
the problem. Hayes failed to mention
Chinese immigration in his first
annual message,21 and Evarts neglected
it in his instructions to George F.
Seward, his minister in Peking.22 Their
silence is understandable. Not only
did the issue threaten to split the
Republican party, but also it posed a
threat to American relations with China.
Probably they hoped that the
agitation would cease as the country
returned to more prosperous times.
But their seeming indifference shocked
the Pacific Coast. The San Fran-
cisco Chronicle criticized
Hayes's message for "the total absence of any
allusion to the urgent demands of the
Pacific Coast for relief from the
evils of Chinese immigration." To
the Chronicle it appeared "utterly im-
possible to convince the people of the
East, or the Executive department of
the Government, that anything needs to
be done in the matter."23
The California legislature instructed
the state's representatives and sena-
tors to secure the cooperation of the
federal government in stopping Chi-
nese immigration. Accordingly, on
December 16, Congressman Horace F.
Page requested Hayes to make Chinese
immigration the subject of a
special message to Congress.24 His
congressional colleague, Horace Davis,
consulted personally with Hayes25 and
with Evarts. He complained that
Chinese immigration violated the
involuntary provisions of the Burlingame
Treaty. To stop the flow of coolie
labor, he recommended that the United
States pass the same kind of restrictive
legislation as the British had in
Australia, the Dutch in Java and Ceylon.
Davis estimated that there were
already 30,000 to 35,000 Chinese in San
Francisco; 80,000 to 90,000 in all
of California; and 150,000 to 175,000 in
the entire country.26 Quite clear-
ly, the majority of Californians wanted
an end to the influx of Chinese
labor.
Hayes finally responded with only a
statement of sympathy for the people
of the Pacific Coast in their desire to
check Chinese immigration.27 The
New York Times predicted that the
President would also send a special
message to Congress on the subject. This
he failed to do, however, when
it met in January 1878.28 Left without
Presidential leadership, both houses
of Congress passed a resolution, first introduced by
Senator Aaron A. Sar-
THE CHINESE QUESTION 143
gent of California, which, in the form
finally adopted by the House on
June 17, recommended that the President
open negotiations with China
to secure a change or abrogation of
existing treaties that permitted the un-
limited immigration of its citizens.29
Evarts had to await the arrival of two
Chinese ministers in Washington,
Chen Lan Pin and Yung Wing, on September
21 before he could even
act upon the demands of Congress. Then
he hesitated until November
21 before he finally inquired whether
their government wished to revise
treaty relations with the United States.
They replied that China wanted
to maintain its treaties with the United
States and that they had no in-
structions to negotiate on Chinese
immigration. They reminded Evarts
that if such immigration was
unacceptable, the Americans had only them-
selves to blame, for it was by the
efforts of the American people and their
former minister to China, Anson
Burlingame, that the treaty had been
arranged. Moreover, they did not believe
that the Chinese population of
the United States would grow as fast as
alarmists predicted because their
government did not encourage emigration
and because many immigrants
returned home.30
Although the attitude of the Chinese
ministers to treaty revision was
discouraging, Hayes maintained a facade
of public optimism. In his second
annual message, he announced the
establishment of the permanent Chinese
legation in Washington. "It is not
doubted," he added, "that this step will
be of advantage to both nations in
promoting friendly relations and re-
moving causes of difference."
Beyond this hope, he recommended no con-
crete solutions; nor did he even refer
to Chinese immigration specifically
by name.31 Again the Pacific
Coast felt slighted. Philip Roach of the Demo-
cratic San Francisco Daily Examiner wrote
Senator Thomas F. Bayard of
Delaware that "the quickest and
surest way of dealing with the problem
is by Executive Action; and President
Hayes should be held responsible
for not suggesting a modification in his
Annual Message. In 1874 Grant
did so."32
When Congress assembled in January 1879,
the House committee on
education and labor submitted a report
that criticized Presidential inac-
tion. It also urged Congress to pass a
bill allowing no master of a vessel
to take on board at a foreign port more
than fifteen Chinese passengers
with intent to bring them to the United
States.33 The fifteen passenger
bill passed the House on January 28 by a
vote of 155 to 72, and the Senate
on February 15 by a vote of 39 to 27.
The Senate added an additional
provision to the bill requiring the
President to abrogate Articles V and
VI of the Burlingame Treaty. The bill
was overwhelmingly favored by
western Senators, and also won the
support of eastern, southern, and mid-
western Senators such as James G. Blaine
of Maine, Lucius Q. Lamar of
Mississippi, and Allen G. Thurman of
Ohio.34
Soon after the House passed the bill,
newspapers throughout the country
began to speculate on the possibility of
a Presidential veto. Hayes's staff
filled page after page in one of his
scrapbooks with editorials on the sub-
ject. These indicate that major papers
of both parties throughout the East
144 OHIO HISTORY
unanimously favored a veto but that the
Pacific Coast overwhelmingly
supported the bill. Most midwestern and
southern papers supported the
veto with such notable exceptions as the
Chicago Tribune, Cincinnati
Enquirer, St. Louis Globe Democrat, and Richmond Dispatch.
"On the
whole," declared the Chicago Tribune,
"the legislation is justifiable, is
demanded by public sentiment, is free of
all moral, political, and com-
mercial objections." But few people
east of the Rocky Mountains agreed
with it.35
Letters and telegrams, as well as the
newspapers, kept Hayes informed
of public opinion on the fifteen
passenger bill. These show that even
though many eastern opponents of the
bill favored restrictions on Chinese
immigration, they opposed the
legislation because it involved a unilateral
modification that could be construed as
abrogation of the Burlingame
Treaty by the United States. One of
Anson Burlingame's friends reminded
Hayes that the people of the United
States could alter their Constitution
at pleasure, "but to change a
treaty requires also the consent of the For-
eign Power with whom it has been
made."36 John A. Dix, formerly Sec-
retary of the Treasury under Buchanan,
minister to France, and governor
of New York, urged Hayes not to sign
because there was nothing worse
than a breach of faith on the part of
the government. He accused "aspir-
ants for political preferment" of
dishonoring the nation by catering to
the laboring classes in order "to
conciliate them & gain their votes."37
Others believed that free immigration
was a basic principle of the coun-
try. George William Curtis thought it
amazing "that the Republican party
should be the first to shut the gates of
America on mankind."38 For the
United States to exclude immigrants,
wrote the president of Amherst Col-
lege, would be "to embody that
spirit of the Chinese themselves which the
civilized world has protested against
and fought against and which having
broken down in the Chinese we now adopt
as the principle of our own
national life!"39 One
religious paper expressed the forebodings of many:
"It is a dangerous precedent; for
with such discriminations once permitted,
some partisan outcry may call for the prohibition
of German, or Irish, or
English immigration."40
Religious leaders feared that China
might retaliate by disregarding treaty
protection accorded American
missionaries. "But the great consideration,
touching the heart of the whole Christian
Church of every devotion," a
Washington clergyman warned Hayes,
"is the danger of retaliatory action
in China."41 Fifty members of the
Yale faculty reminded him that the bill
would furnish China "all the
example and argument needed, according
to the usages of international law, to
justify it in abrogating this principle
of ex[tra]-territoriality. To do so will
throw out our countrymen living
in China from the principle of our
laws."42 The American Missionary As-
sociation and the Missionary Society of
the Methodist Episcopal Church
urged him to veto the bill,43
and Henry Ward Beecher, the eloquent
Brooklyn preacher, assured him that a
veto would receive the support of
ministers of the Gospel, teachers, and conservative men
of property.44
Eastern merchants also feared
retaliation. The Philadelphia Maritime
THE CHINESE QUESTION
145
Exchange warned Hayes that if he failed
to veto the bill, "the interests of
the trade and commerce of the United
States with the Chinese Empire
will be greatly imperilled."45
In New York the Chamber of Commerce
condemned the bill "as exposing the
merchant in his dealings to the con-
sequences of public dishonor; and
finally, as presenting the hasty action
of our Congressional Body in sorry
contrast with the more cautious and
dignified wisdom of the Heathen
Empire."46 Edwards Pierrepont, former
minister to Great Britain, could
"imagine no greater folly than to shut
ourselves out from the trade and the
reciprocal market of quite the most
populous Empire on earth . . . and how a
statesman can be willing to sac-
rifice our great advantage, which
England will seize, to a temporary clamor
is inconceivable."47
The Pacific Coast made a valiant, last
minute effort to prevent a veto.
'The state of feeling on the Pacific, as
I learn from all sources is intense
and universal," Senator Sargent
wired Hayes on February 25. He enclosed
a telegram from the editor of the San
Francisco Bulletin announcing that
"all prudent men dread Veto as
greatest possible calamity."48 From the
governors of California and Nevada, and
from the mayors of San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and Sacramento, Hayes
received telegrams, resolutions, or
memorials hostile to Chinese
immigration.49 Even commercial organiza-
tions such as the Portland Board of
Trade and the Astoria Chamber of
Commerce favored the bill.50 One
exception was provided by some Pres-
byterian, Congregationalist, Methodist,
and Baptist clergymen in San Fran-
cisco and Oakland, who preferred
"to see at present no Congressional ac-
tion on the Chinese question."51
A former employer of Chinese immigrants
praised them as "faithful and
industrious" and "plodding and intelligent,"
but a semi-literate ranch hand from
Nevada wrote that "able backed men
are beging for bred when all would have
employment at good wages if
the Pacific Coasts was not being litery
overrun with Chinamen."52
Republican organizations in California
pleaded with Hayes to sign the
bill for the future interests of the
party on the Pacific Coast.53 A telegram
from the editor of the San Francisco Morning
Call warned Senator Sar-
gent that "there are but few
persons here now who do not believe the
President ought to sign the bill. The
state will go Democratic if the bill
is Vetoed."54 By
supporting anti-Chinese legislation, California Republi-
cans had hurt the Democratic party.
Philip Roach complained to Senator
Bayard that "the Working men have
left us to follow the leadership of
Kearney a Republican," who
"has carried off two-thirds of our party by
his cry 'the Chinese must go.' "55 Republican
success depended upon the
party following Blaine on the Chinese
issue rather than other easterners,
such as Curtis and Beecher. The Portland
Daily Standard praised the
Plumed Knight from Maine: "Let him
lay aside 'the bloody shirt,' don the
armor of the warrior in defense of free
white labor, and cease not or flag
in the fight until the fiat of the
Government shall proclaim that the Chinese
must go."56
With the assistance of the advice he was
receiving, Hayes at last made
some conclusions of his own. Aside from
the damage that a veto might do
146 OHIO HISTORY
in the Far West, he undoubtedly realized
that it would be politically ad-
vantageous. His own sources of
information, editorials, letters, and tele-
grams, enabled him more accurately to
assess public opinion than could
Blaine or other eastern Republicans who
had supported the fifteen pas-
senger bill at the time of its passage.
Blaine seriously miscalculated eastern
opinion. "The sentiment against that
bill is growing very strong," Con-
gressman Garfield of Ohio recorded in
his Diary. "I am satisfied that Sena-
tor Blaine has made a great mistake in
his advocacy of it."57 Blaine's error,
in fact, cost him eastern support for
the Republican nomination in 1880.58
Even though Hayes did not, like Curtis,
think that free immigration was
a basic principle of the Republic, he,
unlike Blaine, wished to avoid dras-
tic solutions. Although he had concluded
that Chinese immigration was
"pernicious" and he was
willing to "consider with favor measures to dis-
courage the Chinese from coming to our
shores," he realized that the pres-
ent bill was "inconsistent"
with treaty obligations. "We have accepted the
advantages which the treaty gives,"
he noted in his Diary. "Our traders,
missionaries, and travellers are
domiciled in C[hina]. Important interests
have grown up under the treaty, and rest
upon faith in its observance."
If the United States abrogated the
treaty, he feared that American citizens
in China "would be left without
treaty protection." Moreover, he believed,
with others, that the Burlingame Treaty
was of our seeking. "If we assum-
ing it to have been a mistaken policy. [sic]
It was our policy. We urged it
on China. Our minister conducted
it."59
Secretary Evarts appears to have had
influence with Hayes also. Congress-
man Garfield's Diary records Evarts'
participation in a meeting held on
February 23: "I advised him [Hayes]
to veto the bill, and point out, fully
the iniquity of its provision --
Secretary Evarts was there and joined in
the discussion. I am sure the bill will
be vetoed."60 Following this meet-
ing, Hayes set down his decision in his
own Diary: "In the maintenance of
the National faith it is in my judgment
a plain duty to withhold my ap-
proval from this bill. We should deal
with China in this matter precisely
as we expect and wish other nations to
deal with us."61
Evarts, even more than Hayes, was aware
of the dangers of the unilateral
abrogation of a sacred treaty. The
Chinese ministers in Washington com-
plained to him that the bill was
offensive to their countrymen. They could
excuse the abusive language of the
common people as that of inferior
characters, but were shocked to hear
"eminent public men" using similar
words. They also requested protection
for the Chinese in San Francisco.
On February 28, Evarts assured them that
the United States would observe
its treaty obligations free from popular
and political considerations.62
Hayes's veto message, which may have
been written by Evarts, was sent
to Congress on March 1. It dealt
primarily with the history and provisions
of the Burlingame Treaty, the
constitutionality of the treaty-making pro-
cess, and the dangers of unilateral tampering
with treaty obligations. Hayes
pointed out that the power to make a new
treaty and to modify an exist-
ing treaty, as the fifteen passenger
bill proposed to do, was not lodged by
THE CHINESE QUESTION 147 the Constitution in Congress, but was the prerogative of the President with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. Moreover, the denuncia- tion of one part of the treaty by the United States liberated China from the whole treaty including the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 of which the Burlingame Treaty was only a supplement or amendment and which con- ferred important privileges on Americans in China. He did not believe that "the instant suppression of further immigration from China" justi- fied "an exposure of our citizens in China, merchants or missionaries, to the consequences of so sudden an abrogation of their treaty protection." At the same time, he promised to consider "renewed negotiations, of the |
difficulties surrounding this political and social problem." He also indi- cated that "the simple provisions of the Burlingame treaty may need to be replaced by more careful methods, securing the Chinese and ourselves against a larger and more rapid infusion of this foreign race than our sys- tem of industry and society can take up and assimilate with ease and safety."63 |
148 OHIO HISTORY
The bill's supporters in the House
immediately put the veto to a test.
A new vote was taken on the bill, but it
did not receive the required two-
thirds majority.64 Samuel
Randall, the Speaker of the House, privately
"denounced the anti-Chinese
business as bosh and clap trap," and stated
that he believed many men in the House
who voted to pass it over the veto
were glad it had failed.65 Even
though Congress sustained him, Hayes feared
that his message had been inadequate.
"You will approve of what is done,"
he wrote Beecher, "but may think a
fuller treatment of the subject ought
to have been given. You must consider
how pressed we are for time -- no
time to investigate and an ocean of
facts poured on us--"66
The veto was generally approved east of
the Rocky Mountains, but was
bitterly denounced in the West, even
though The Nation thought it was
based "on grounds to which the
'Hoodlums' of California can take no ex-
ception."67 On the following day, with
but three exceptions, dispatches
flooded the office of the Associated
Press in San Francisco bitterly denounc-
ing Hayes.68 In one town he
was burned in effigy. Despite the veto, the
people of the Pacific Coast did not
fully realize how much he sympathized
with them. They could not read the
comments in his Diary about what he
considered to be the perniciousness of a
population which could not as-
similate with Americans. "It should
be made certain by proper methods
that such an invasion can not," he
concluded, "permanently override our
people. It cannot safely be admitted
into the bosom of our American So-
ciety."69
The following year, Evarts sent a
three-man commission to China that
negotiated a new immigration treaty allowing
Congress to "regulate, limit,
or suspend" the immigration of
Chinese laborers. It provided the legal
basis under which Congress passed the
Chinese Exclusion Act of May 1882,
suspending the immigration of Chinese
laborers for ten years.70 By adher-
ing to treaty obligations and resorting
to diplomacy, Hayes preserved the
position of American missionaries and
merchants in China. William Dean
Howells, the editor of the Atlantic
Monthly, praised his decision: "The
Chinese veto-message was everything your
friends could have wished in
dignity, humanity and common sense of
justice. In that and the silver veto
and the New York Custom House business
and your good will to the irre-
claimable South, you have made history
of the best kind."71
The President made history, but history
has neglected the President's
achievement. Had he signed the bill, and
had China retaliated against
Americans residing in its Empire, there
might have been a serious crisis.
By making the right decision rather than
the wrong one, he prevented a
possible international conflict. But it
does not follow that Chinese immi-
gration was an insignificant diplomatic
problem, nor that the public failed
to become excited about it. Even so,
Hayes nevertheless listened for three
years to the public debate on the
subject before he felt compelled to break
his silence and provide Executive
leadership for the nation.
THE AUTHOR: Gary Pennanen is As-
sistant Professor in the History Depart-
ment at Wisconsin State University, Eau
Claire.
Public Opinion and the Chinese Question, 1876-1879 by GARY PENNANEN Diplomatic problems are not considered to have been of much conse- quence during the presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes. While not many pre- World War I judgments concerning the history of the period have escaped revisionism, an assessment of Hayes's diplomacy made by Charles R. Wil- liams in 1914 has withstood the test of time: "Few subjects of large im- portance in the foreign relations of the Government demanded action or attention during the administration of Mr. Hayes. For the most part all our dealings with foreign countries were amicable and were conducted without feeling or friction."1 This conclusion is still accepted by diplomatic historians even though several monographs and two scholarly biographies NOTES ON PAGE 201 |