JAMES N. GIGLIO
Lawyer as Lobbyist:
Harry M. Daugherty and the
Charles W. Morse Case,
1911-1922
Of all President Warren G. Harding's
1920 Cabinet selections, none received more
opposition than the Attorney General
appointment of Harry M. Daugherty-a fel-
low Ohioan who had directed the
presidential nomination campaign. Both the
press and various public officials
considered Daugherty a freewheeling lobbyist with
a rather unsavory past. To buttress
their assessment they uncovered the in-
discretions that had sometimes
characterized his early career.' The most discussed
incident was Daugherty's 1911-12
involvement in the Charles W. Morse case, which
reemerged to embarrass him further as
Attorney General in 1922. No matter how
one might evaluate Daugherty's role in
that case, it provides some of the best in-
sights into the nature of Daugherty's
character and his utilization of political in-
fluence to enhance his law practice.
By early 1911 Daugherty's political
career had already undergone several set-
backs, and in January of that year a
Democratic Ohio General Assembly rejected
him in favor of Democrat Atlee Pomerene
for United States Senator. That
Daugherty received the most Republican
votes in the legislature made the defeat no
easier to accept.2 The one
consoling factor was his continual friendship with Presi-
dent William Howard Taft whom he had
helped to nominate in 1908. It was felt,
however, that Daugherty most likely
could still command support of the Taft organ-
ization in Ohio for a future senatorial
bid. Until such time, he focused his attention
upon a law practice that represented
some of the leading corporations in the United
States, including the American Tobacco
Company, Armour and Company, and the
Western Union Company. Indeed, as senior
partner in the Columbus, Ohio, law
firm of Daugherty, Todd, and Rarey, the
energetic and politically astute Daugherty
became one of the leading lobbyists in
the Midwest. A 1911 vanity book, Club Men
of Columbus in Caricature, portrayed him walking down the street protectively
lead-
1. See, for example, the lengthy article on Daugherty in the
New York World, February 17, 1921. See
also Robert K. Murray, The Harding
Era: Warren G. Harding in His Times (New York, 1968), 106-107.
2. Prior to 1914, the General Assembly
elected Ohio Senators. The voting generally went by party
line.
Mr. Giglio is Assistant Professor of
History at Southwest Missouri State University.
192
|
ing a little trolley car and telephone with each hand.3 Five years earlier he had represented the meatpacking interests in Washington, D. C., against certain provisions of the proposed Hepburn Bill.4 Allied with him in the 1906 undertaking was Thomas B. Felder, Jr., a Democrat politician and attorney from Atlanta, Georgia, who like Daugherty, spent his time around legislative halls and committee rooms rather than poring over legal volumes in a law library. Both men had represented similiar interests which had brought them together several years earlier, igniting a friendship that would continue into Daugherty's Attorney Generalship. In 1911 Felder introduced Daugherty to the Charles W. Morse case. The chunky and unattractive Morse became one of the most daring promoters and speculators in the United States at the turn of the century. Born in Bath, Maine, in 1856, he quickly exhibited a talent for capitalizing on opportunities. At age seventeen Morse was employed by his father as a $30 a week bookkeeper, but the young Morse soon hired someone else to do the work for $10 a week. He used the remainder to pay his way through Bowdoin College. By graduation he already had made a small fortune in the shipping business. He then joined with his father and a cousin in an extensive ice shipping and lumber transporting operation. By 1897 Morse gravitated to Wall Street as he began to dominate the New York ice market. Two years later the "Ice King" created the American Ice Company, an overcapitalized merger that quickly doubled the price of ice, causing a tremendous
3. Ohio State Journal (Columbus), August 7, 1912; W. A. Ireland, Club Men of Columbus in Caricature (Columbus, 1911), 421. 4. Harry M. Daugherty to Charles Dick, February 15, 1906, Box 7, Charles Dick Papers, Ohio Histori- cal Society; Daugherty to Joseph Benson Foraker, February 9, May 9, 1906, Box 48/D, Joseph Benson Foraker Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society. Specifically, Daugherty opposed the "ventilation, refrig- eration, or icing" clause which would enable the Interstate Commerce Commission to prevent meat- packers like Armour and Company from using their private refrigeration car lines to extort or discrimi- nate against various other shippers. Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 6374. 193 |
194 OHIO HISTORY
public outcry. An investigation
followed, disclosing that he had received important
docking privileges from Tammany Hall
after bribing Mayor Robert Van Wyck and
Tammany Boss Richard Croker with shares
of American Ice Company stock. The
inquiry forced Morse's retirement from
the business with profits estimated at
$12,000,000.5
Morse's next ventures were in shipping
and banking. In six years he had a vir-
tual monopoly of coastal shipping from
Bangor to Galveston. He succeeded as
handsomely in financial circles. In a
few years of collaboration, Morse, F. August
Heinze, a leading copper speculator, and
E. R. Thomas, a young man of inherited
wealth, controlled almost a dozen New
York banks, including the Bank of North
America. Such control permitted them to
speculate with depositors' funds. They
also organized a profitable copper pool
which collapsed in 1907, contributing to that
year's panic. Both Morse and Heinze were
forced to retire from banking during the
scare. As a grand jury proceeded into
Morse's illegal activities, which the panic
fully exposed, United States District
Attorney Henry Stimson gathered enough evi-
dence to send him to prison on
fifty-three counts of criminally misapplying the
funds and making false entries in the
books of the Bank of North America.
In November 1908 he was sentenced to a
stiff fifteen year term in the Atlanta
Penitentiary. An unsuccessful appeal
followed during which time Morse spent ten
months in the Tombs of New York City.
Finally, in January 1910 he began his At-
lanta imprisonment. Confinement
temporarily ended the career of one who had
spent an appreciable part of his life
narrowly skirting fraud and crime. Yet, Morse
lamented that "there is no one in
Wall Street who is not daily doing as I have done."
To Morse, the indictment occurred
because the Theodore Roosevelt administration
had wanted a victim or scapegoat.6
Less than one year after Morse's
imprisonment, requests for pardon began to
reach President William Howard Taft. The
prisoner's family initiated a number of
these appeals. Gilbert Pevey of Boston,
representing Morse's wife, even managed
to obtain a hearing with Taft. Public
officials were also active in Morse's behalf.
In December 1910 Senator Eugene Hale of
Maine, respecting Mrs. Morse's request,
presented a petition to the White House.
Four months afterwards, New York attor-
ney, James M. Beck, later President
Warren G. Harding's Solicitor General, recom-
mended that Taft pardon Morse. Thousands
of other pardon, commutation of sen-
tence, and reinvestigation requests
followed, bearing signatures of many prominent
public officials. Undoubtedly, the
encouragement and efforts of Mrs. Morse had
much to do with the rather remarkable
demonstration.7
In May 1911, however, Taft refused to
grant a pardon, although he consented to a
review after January 1, 1913. By then
Morse would have been in a better position
for at least a commuted sentence, since
Henry Stimson, the former prosecuting at-
torney, now advised that the sentence
might be shortened to five years. Stimson
5. The best published account of Morse's
escapades is found in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of
William Howard Taft (New York, 1939), II, 627-637; New York Times, July
25, 1926; Dictionary of Amer-
ican Biography (D.A.B.), XIII, 239-241; Frederick Lewis Allen, The Lords of
Creation (Chicago, 1966),
116-117.
6. D.A.B., 239-240; New York Times, July 25, 1926; Henry L.
Stimson to George Wickersham, De-
cember 17, 1910, Pardon Case File
204-43-407, Washington National Records Service (NRS), Suitland
Maryland.
7. White House Memorandum, undated,
Folder 1189, Presidential Series II, William Howard Taft Pa-
pers, Library of Congress; ibid., James
M. Beck to William Howard Taft, March 14, 1911. See also
Pringle, Taft, II, 629. The
various requests and petitions are contained in Pardon Case File 204-43-407,
NRS.
Charles Morse Case 195
had succumbed to a feeling shared by
many conservative lawyers, politicians, and
businessmen: Morse's sentence had been
excessive. Their sentiment was partly in-
fluenced by the 1909 judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals which had con-
cluded that the sentence was
"excessive and unusual." Stimson also conceded that
his approval of the original sentence
had come at "the close of the most difficult case
that I have ever tried, where the work
of prosecution had been done under extreme
pressure, and where the investigation
... had brought into my mind a large number
of collateral facts bearing unfavorably
upon Morse's character." He, however, fa-
vored no less than a five year
incarceration for Morse because of the seriousness of
his crimes, and the Circuit Court of
Appeals generally affirmed his opinion.8 As it
turned out, Morse's release would come
much sooner than anyone thought possible.
That it did come so quickly was in part
due to the efforts of Harry Daugherty.
The Ohio lawyer first became involved
with the Morse case in the early summer of
1911 when Felder requested his legal
assistance. To this day the circumstances of
this initial involvement are unclear.
Daugherty would later claim that their only in-
terest in Morse was to obtain his
testimony so as to resolve several civil actions con-
cerning investors of the dissolving
Metropolitan Steamship Company which Morse
once headed. Under no circumstances were
they initially interested in securing
Morse's freedom. By 1917, however,
Felder did admit that Fred Seely, the propri-
etor of the Atlanta Georgian, had
asked him to pursue Morse's release because of
Seely's "benevolent and charitable
interest in the fate of Mr. Morse." Felder then
related that he had requested his friend
Daugherty because Daugherty "stood as
close to the President as any other
lawyer or citizen in the United States... ."9
With whatever initial intent, Daugherty
and Felder sought to visit Morse. On
July 25, 1911, Warden William H. Moyer
of the United States Penitentiary at At-
lanta received notification from the
Attorney General's office that they wished to see
Morse "upon a matter related to a
civil proceeding" involving the Metropolitan
Steamship Company. Moyer was ready to
comply until Daugherty requested an
unprecedented private interview.10 When the warden and the Department of Jus-
tice refused to waive regulations,
Daugherty on July 28 telegraphed a political co-
hort, Charles Hilles, who was also
Taft's private secretary, that he was unable to "se-
cure facts necessary to handle Morse
matters properly and professionally without
such an interview." He asked Hilles
to obtain the consent of the Attorney General
for a "reasonable
request." Because this did not
materialize, the persistent
Daugherty wrote the secretary again on
August 2 that his "blood is somewhat riled
about this matter" and that he
would commit "every drop of blood and every pound
of energy . . . to the issue until right
prevails." He did not at the time relate to
Hilles that he wished to procure Morse's
release. By August 29, 1911, however,
Daugherty told him that it was
impossible to transact civil litigation without the full-
time cooperation of Morse. Apparently,
his restricted visits with Morse were not at
all adequate. He then indicated that he
must also explore the criminal aspect of the
8. Henry L. Stimson to Wickersham,
December 17, 1910, ibid.; see also James A. Finch to Wicker-
sham, January 15, 1912, ibid.
9. Daugherty to Taft, November 17, 1915,
Box 327/7, Series III, Taft Papers; Congressional Record, 67
Cong., 2 Sess., 7378. See also
New York Times, January 19, 1912; Harry M. Daugherty and Thomas
Dixon, The Inside Story of the
Harding Tragedy (New York, 1932), 114.
10. Robert La Dow to William Moyer, July
25, 1911, Department of Justice File 60-120197, National
Archives; Moyer to La Dow, July 27,
1911, telegram, ibid.
196 OHIO HISTORY
Morse case because of the grave change
in the prisoner's health. Daugherty
painted an extremely dark picture:
His life is speeding away with increased
... rapidity day by day. His right side, as you know,
is paralyzed and shriveling at a great
deal faster rate than when sent here. He has Bright's
disease and his confinement is making
him worse so fast that I can see a change in each re-
turning visit here. He has fainting
spells and in fact, I do not believe he is likely to live
eighteen months in prison.11
Daugherty supported his contention with
a statement from Dr. Alfred L. Fowler
of Atlanta, "one of the most eminent
physicians in this part of the country." A for-
mer prison physician, Fowler had
concluded after his January 1911 examination of
Morse that he suffered from a form of
Bright's disease, an inflamation of the kid-
neys. Certain that the President would
pardon Morse if he knew the facts,
Daugherty told Hilles that he and Felder
must see Taft as soon as possible. He
concluded with a patronizing postscript:
"Please congratulate the President upon his
speech and position and upon the general
approval of the public."12
President Taft, about to depart on a
western tour, had no time for a conference.
He instead recommended that Daugherty
refer the Morse matter to Attorney Gen-
eral George W. Wickersham. Daugherty and
Felder not only saw the Attorney
General but also interviewed Stimson,
the district attorney in the prosecution of
Morse, the trial judge, and the pardon
attorney. Daugherty even arranged a meet-
ing with Theodore Roosevelt who had been
President at the time of Morse's trial.
Daugherty's and Felder's letters,
meanwhile, continued to flow into the White
House. Daugherty constantly badgered
Hilles regarding the urgency of the case.
On at least two occasions he cornered
him for lengthy conferences, one of which
Daugherty arranged after learning that
Hilles was coming to Ohio to attend his
father-in-law's funeral.13
A few weeks after Taft's return,
Daugherty and Felder wired Hilles, requesting an
appointment with the President. Hilles
promptly fixed a tentative time.l4 The fol-
lowing day, on November 22, the
penitentiary physician, Dr. J. Calvin Weaver, noti-
fied Wickersham of Morse's condition
after a consultation with Dr. Fowler:
Morse is drowsily apathetic and sleeps
continuously: pulse sharp .. .; his lower eyelids are
chronically swollen ..., his urine is
markedly hematuric bloody, and the quantity for the last
twenty-four hours amounts to only twelve
ounces and which normally should be fifty
ounces; microscopic examinations of his
urine discloses red blood cells, granular casts and
blood casts; diagnosis that of Bright's
disease; patient is surely and rapidly losing ground and
11. Daugherty to Charles D. Hilles, July
28, 1911, telegram, Folder 1189, Series II, Taft Papers; ibid.,
August 2, 1911, Box 48, Charles D.
Hilles Papers, Yale University Library; ibid., August 29, 1911, Folder
1189, Series II, Taft Papers.
12. Dr. Alfred L. Fowler to Whom It May
Concern, August 28, 1911, Pardon Case File 204-43-407,
NRS; Daugherty to Hilles, August 29,
1911, Folder 1189, Series II, Taft Papers.
13. Rudolph Forster to Hilles, September
23, 1911, memorandum, ibid.; Daugherty to Theodore
Roosevelt, September 16, 1911, Box
175/7, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; Daugherty
to Roosevelt, September 21, 1911, Box
175/12, ibid.; Daugherty to Hilles, September 11, 1911, Folder
3257, Series II, Taft Papers; Daugherty
to Forster, September 19, 1911, Folder 1189, ibid.
14. Daugherty and Felder to Hilles,
November 21, 1911, telegram, Folder 1189, ibid. Hilles scrawled
that they could see Taft on Saturday at
11:40 A.M.
Charles Morse Case 197
there can be no doubt but that his time
is now drawing to a close and that liberation only will
prolong his life and even that not for a
long period.15
Daugherty's telegram that same day made
the diagnosis appear conservative. He
cautioned that Morse might not live
another twenty-four hours.16
Morse's condition concerned Taft enough
to confer with Wickersham and the
Surgeon General of the Army on November
24 before meeting with Daugherty and
Felder. The President told the latter
two that he had decided to transfer Morse to
the Fort McPherson hospital at Atlanta
for thirty days of observation. There, the
President explained, Morse would be well
treated and could employ his own physi-
cians. Taft's humane action was hardly
in Daugherty's and Felder's interests, how-
ever. Morse, as it was later revealed,
had handsomely retained them to secure his
release. According to an August 4
agreement, Daugherty was to receive a $5,000
retainer from Morse, and if Morse was
set free, Daugherty and Felder were to be
paid $25,000. Morse could terminate the
agreement after January 1, 1912, by giv-
ing ten days written notice. A few weeks
later, he had promised an additional
$100,000.17 Consequently,
Taft probably stunned the two attorneys when he dis-
closed his decision to have Morse
transferred instead of released.
Daugherty's first impulse was to
telephone Hilles after the meeting with Taft.
Failing to make connections in
Washington, he wrote to Hilles upon returning home
that he had been very conservative in
presenting Morse's condition due "to his high
regard for the President ...." One week later Daugherty came more to the
point,
arguing that "Morse was excessively
sentenced and his life is hanging in the bal-
ance." Morse "willnever be
well," Daugherty pleaded; "he is liable to die any day
and yet he may live a short time if he
were to be released and allowed to take treat-
ment peculiar to his desease."
Daugherty explained that he did not want to in-
fluence Taft but asked Hilles to inform
the President that he was seeking a pardon
on the basis of Morse's condition.l8
The medical reports on Morse's progress
in mid-December did not completely
collaborate Daugherty's assertions, but
they did promote Morse's eventual release
from prison. On December 21, J. A.
Fowler, the Acting Attorney General, in-
formed Taft that civilian physicians at
Fort McPherson agreed with the post sur-
geon's diagnosis the previous week-that
further imprisonment would shorten
Morse's life. Taft, who had requested
the examinations, hardly felt that these re-
ports justified his immediate release. He
wrote Wickersham on December 24 that
"what is certified is that he is
suffering from an incurable disease which may not ter-
minate his life for years, but that
imprisonment is likely to shorten his life." Taft
15. Wickersham to Taft, November 22, 1911,
ibid. Two civilian physicians also independently exam-
ined Morse in this period. One detected
no organic abnormalities whatsoever; the other concluded that
a previous rheumatic condition had
"crippled his heart" and his urine indicated a probable Bright's dis-
ease. The latter physician argued,
however, that if Morse were allowed to remain "perfectly quiet and at
ease, he could live as well in prison as
on the outside...." See Dr. William Simpson Elkin to Walter H.
Johnson, November 1, 1911 and Dr. E. C. Davis to
Johnson, November 1, 1911, Pardon Case File
204-43-407, NRS.
16. Daugherty to Hilles, November 22,
1911, telegram, Folder 3527, Series II, Taft Papers.
17. White House Memorandum, November 24,
1911, Folder 1189, ibid., Congressional Record, 67
Cong., 2 Sess., 7317, 7378; New York Times,
May 21, 1922.
18. Daugherty to Hilles, November 25,
1911, Folder 3527, Series II, Taft Papers; ibid., December 8,
1911, Folder 1189.
198
OHIO HISTORY
judiciously concluded that he would
commute Morse's sentence if the doctors veri-
fied that he would die in two weeks.19
He recommended the detention of Morse at
the post hospital along with a monthly
summation of his medical condition.
Daugherty and Felder were very active in
the final weeks of December 1911 in
pursuading the administration to come to
a more favorable decision. The Ohio
lawyer pressured Wickersham, Hilles, and
the prison officials to expedite reports
and recommendations involving Morse.20
Both attorneys were instrumental in the
selection of Dr. Fowler to act with the
post surgeon in the examinations and treat-
ment of the ailing prisoner. Although Taft
refused to see Felder, the attorney asked
Hilles on December 26 to deliver a
letter to him, outlining what he had proposed to
say in an interview. Three days later
Daugherty telephoned from the New Willard
Hotel in Washington to indicate that he
would be "very glad to see the President on
the Morse matter ...."21 Their
leverage was the declining health of Morse.
On December 30 a board of medical
officers at Fort McPherson revealed its find-
ings after a careful examination of the
convict. The report stated that Morse suf-
fered not only from Bright's disease but
also from a chronic valvular disease of the
heart and a slight arteriosclerosis
(hardening of the arteries). The board was of the
opinion, however, that Morse was not
under any danger of death but that because
of this despondent condition, continued
confinement would hamper any improve-
ment. George Torney, Surgeon General of
the Army, who wrote the cover letter to
the report, nevertheless concluded that
Morse would die unless he were removed
from the depressing influence of
imprisonment. Ten days later Daugherty and Fel-
der relayed Dr. Fowler's diagnosis which
confirmed Torney's conclusion. Accord-
ing to Major David Baker, the post surgeon,
in still another report on January 12,
Morse's health was so grave that he
could not be transferred to Hot Springs for fur-
ther treatment. Finally on January 17
Torney reported that Morse had deterio-
rated to the point that he would
probably live less than one month if he remained
confined and no longer than six months
even if his sentence were commuted. Par-
ticularly alarming to Torney was the
heart blockage that Morse had suffered two
days earlier.22
The concerned Wickersham submitted
Torney's report to the President with the
recommendation that he terminate Morse's
sentence. On the following day, Janu-
ary 18, Taft reiterated Torney's
conclusions in announcing Morse's commutation of
sentence even though the Surgeon General
had not placed the prisoner's life expect-
ancy within the two-week period. What
Taft did not reveal was that he had re-
ceived a telephone call from a mutually
close friend of Daugherty's. Daugherty
had asked John McLean, the publisher of
the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Washing-
ton Post to urge Taft to go ahead
with commutation of the sentence. McLean, who
briefly looked into the Morse matter,
did exactly that.23
19. J. A. Fowler to Taft, December 21,
1911, ibid.; Taft to Wickersham, December 24, 1911, ibid.
20. Daugherty to Hilles, December 17,
1911, ibid; Daugherty to Wickersham, December 17, 1911, Par-
don Case File 204-43-407, NRS; Daugherty
to J. A. Fowler, December 21, 1911, ibid.
21. Felder to Hilles, December 26, 1911,
Folder 1189, Series II, Taft Papers; Felder to Taft, December
26, 1911, Pardon Case File 204-43-407,
NRS; White House memorandum, December 29, 1911, Folder
1189, Series II, Taft Papers.
22. George Torney to the Adjutant
General of the Army, December 30, 1911, ibid.; Daugherty and Fel-
der to Taft, January 9, 1912, ibid.; Wickersham
to Taft, January 12, 17, 1912, ibid.
23. Congressional Record, 67
Cong., 2 Sess., 7378. See also Mark Sullivan, Our Times, 1900-1925, VI,
The Twenties (New York, 1935), 21n. Pringle is in error in stating that no parole
system then existed.
According to the Criminal Parole Act,
effective in 1910, Morse would have had to serve five years, how-
ever, to be eligible for parole.
Pringle, Taft, II, 637; Henry Wise to Wickersham, December 23, 1910,
Pardon Case File 204-43-407, NRS.
Charles Morse Case 199
Taft's action is perplexing because it
seemed out of character. Historians have
often alluded to his uncompromising
attitude, especially toward corporations sus-
pected of violating antitrust policies.
To Taft the law was the law; antitrust action
was initiated regardless of the firm and
individuals involved.24 That
approach
brought him into an October 1911
confrontation with Theodore Roosevelt over the
U. S. Steel Corporation which Roosevelt
as President had excluded from antitrust
action. Taft clearly wished to apply
that same legalistic policy toward pardons. In
March 1910 he said that one need not
"be afraid that pardons will be granted too
readily in this administration."
This statement was in line with one he would make
in October that he "sought in every
way to avoid interfering with the administration
of justice by yielding to maudlin
sentimentality." 25 The implication was that he
would continue to be strict and opposed
to favoritism of any sort.
Unlike many seriously ill convicts,
Morse did not die in prison. As has been
stated, his affluence induced Daugherty
and Felder to strive for a release, and his
notoriety led to a number of appeals for
pardon by prominent and conservative
people who generally supported
administration policy. Others challenged Morse's
fifteen year sentence. The pardon
attorney, James A. Finch, and the former prose-
cuting attorney, Henry Stimson, had
suggested a reduction to five years. On Janu-
ary 15, 1912, Finch would finally
recommend an immediate commutation because
Morse was allegedly near death.26 The
trial judge, Charles Hough, also advised a
commutation of sentence conditional upon
Morse's ill health because "he is no
longer that danger to the [commercial]
community which in health I believe him to
be...."27
Apparently, these expressions and the
medical reports overwhelmed Taft into ac-
quiesence. A most significant factor, nevertheless,
was still Harry Daugherty who-
with Felder-had alerted the President of
Morse's deteriorating health. With the te-
nacity of a bulldog, Daugherty had then
encouraged Taft, Wickersham, and Hilles
to suspect the very worst about Morse's
condition, which underwent considerable
medical scrutiny. In fact, no one was
more persistent about Morse's release than
Daugherty-who was expected to play an
important part in the President's 1912
nomination. It is not too much to
believe that Taft's desire to please a political
friend caused him to devote more
attention to the possibilities of commuting Morse
than he otherwise would have done. The
President's military aide, Archie Butt,
best explained Taft's sometimes
contradictory actions: "He is easily influenced to do
what he wants to do, but he is stubborn
as an ox when he gets set in the other
direction." 28
If Morse had died as predicted, his
commutation would have been relegated to
the realm of trivia. Later events,
however, made this case one of the most bizarre
episodes in the history of Executive
clemencies. After making several trips to Ger-
many to undergo "water cures,"
the now robust Morse returned to New York in
early 1913 eager again to engage in
business pursuits. He organized the Hudson
24. See, for example, James C.
German, Jr., "The Taft Administration and the Sherman Antitrust
Act," Mid-America, LIV (July
1972), 172-186. German points out that Taft did not hesitate to take ac-
tion against corporations directed by
his personal friends.
25. Pringle, Taft, II, 626.
26. Finch to Wickersham, January 15,
1912, Pardon Case File 204-43-407, NRS; see also New York
Times, August 5, 1917.
27. Charles Hough to Finch, January 17,
1912, Pardon Case File 204-43-407, NRS.
28. Archie Butt, Taft and Roosevelt,
the Intimate Letters of Archie Butt, Military Aide (New York,
1930), II, 591.
200
OHIO HISTORY
Navigation Company which he hoped would
become the springboard of a modern
United States mercantile marine that
would touch all European and South Ameri-
can ports. That fall ex-President Taft
commented in a lecture that Morse's newly
found energy "shakes one's faith in
expert examinations." 29
Despite the embarrassing questions
raised about Morse's recovery, Daugherty
again boldly requested the retiring Taft
administration to drop a bribery indictment
against another client, Peter G.
Thompson, a Cincinnati businessman. The reason
was Thompson's alleged poor health and
innocence. On February 11, 1913,
Daugherty explained to Attorney General
Wickersham that Thompson was
As pure minded a man as lives in the
state of Ohio. He is also sick and I doubt if he will
ever be better unless he is relieved of
the worry of this indictment. Unfortunately Mr.
Thompson's wife died about ten days ago
and I have no doubt but that her life was
shortened on account of the worry and
distress incident to the prosecution. About the only
hope Mr. Thompson has of regaining his
health so that he can attend to business again
would be for him to go abroad, where he
could be free from care and would receive proper
attention.
Most assuredly, he contended,
"every banking and business interest in Cincinnati
would approve this course and I do not
believe there would be a single criticism
from anybody in the world if you were to
take this action," and concluded by con-
gratulating Wickersham on his splendid
record as Attorney General. Daugherty
also visited Wickersham on at least one
occasion, but the administration refused his
request.30 Perhaps, one Morse
case was embarrassment enough.
In time the Morse episode became quite
discomforting to Daugherty, too, partic-
ularly after he decided in late 1915 to
seek the 1916 Republican senatorial nomi-
nation in Ohio. The press and political
opponents criticized his involvement in the
Morse case and his apparent deception of
Taft. Since he felt their sting, he wrote
Taft on November 17 explaining that one
"who has lived in more or less of a storm
all of his life and been in the thickest
of the hardest fights naturally has enemies."
He complained that "disgruntled,
disappointed, ambitious persons and certain yel-
low newspapers" were soiling his
character in claiming that he had duped the ad-
ministration. He then requested Taft to
write him a letter to the effect that "I did
not discuss the Morse case with you;
that anything I did in that matter was done
through Attorney General Wickersham;
that I never deceived you about the matter
or anything else, and that I have your
confidence and respect." 31
In other words, Daugherty asked Taft to
be untruthful so as to further his political
career. The former President was more
than willing to help, for Daugherty had
been one of the most staunch Taft men in
the 1912 campaign. On November 22,
1915, Taft repaid a political debt:
"I write to say that in no way did you influence
me in respect to the application for
pardon of Charles Morse. My recollection is
that you told me you were counsel for
Morse, but that you declined to present the
29. New York Times, January 11,
March 17, November 16, 1913; January 11, 1916. In early 1916 Taft
also delivered a similar speech at
Bangor, Maine, causing Morse to threaten the ex-President with legal
action. Taft replied: "For you to
say that you will hold me responsible for true statements I have made
or shall make, is an exhibition of the
most unlimited audacity in history. The sooner you begin the suit
the better." Charles W. Morse to
Taft, February 14, 1916, copy; Taft to Morse, February 15, 1916, copy,
Box 47, Henry Stimson Papers, Yale
University Library.
30. Daugherty to Wickersham, February
11, 1913, Wickersham to Daugherty, February 13, 1913, tele-
gram, Department of Justice File
60-151887.
31. Daugherty to Taft, November 17,
1915, Box 327/7, Series II, Taft Papers.
Charles Morse Case 201
matter to me." The latter of Taft's
two statements was clearly untrue. Daugherty
managed to receive a less affirmative
but favorable response from Wickersham.32
Regardless of Daugherty's eventual
primary defeat, the presentation of these letters
momentarily silenced the critics.
In late 1920 and early 1921 the Morse
case again hung on Daugherty wherever
critics discussed his credentials for
the Attorney Generalship. The issue received
considerably more attention in February
1922 when the Department of Justice
brought charges against the elusive
Morse, his three sons, and twenty other persons
for using the mails to defraud investors
in the U. S. Steamship Company. This ac-
tion followed an earlier grand jury
indictment in 1920 when Morse, his three sons,
and eight others were charged with
having conspired to defraud the United States
Shipping Board of large quantities of
federal money and property. Apparently, af-
ter war was declared against Germany in
1917, governmental demand for ships pro-
vided shipping magnates like Morse with
opportunities for lucrative contracts.
Morse contracted to furnish the
Government twenty-four steel and twelve wooden
vessels. He managed to deliver only two
wooden ships prior to the armistice.
Eventually nineteen ships were handed
over. What compounded Morse's failure
was the fact that the money he had
borrowed from the U. S. Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration was used to construct shipyards
instead of ships. He also appropriated
governmental equipment for his own
purposes.33 Yet, in 1922 Morse charged that
Daugherty was prosecuting him because of
a disagreement over a retainer arising
out of his 1912 commutation. Morse's
statement spurred Daugherty's critics to
delve more deeply into the case.
On May 2, 1922, Senator Thaddeus H.
Caraway of Arkansas questioned
Daugherty's integrity to prosecute war
fraud cases since, as an attorney, Daugherty
had specialized in getting criminals out
of prison and was still associated with Fel-
der in unethical cases. Specifically,
the zealous and vitriolic Democrat accused the
Attorney General of having had Morse
freed for a sizeable payment. In a later
Senate speech on May 20 Caraway included
into the Congressional Record a pho-
tostatic copy of a contract for
"civil and criminal matters" that Daugherty and Fel-
der had consummated with Morse on August
4, 1911. The compact had provided
Daugherty with a $5,000 retainer,
expenses not to exceed $1,000, plus $25,000 which
he and Felder would divide after Morse's
release. In addition, they were to receive
twenty-five percent of whatever sum they
were able to recover from the Metropol-
itan Steamship Company matter. Caraway
also managed to secure, probably from
Morse, a copy of a letter from Daugherty
to Morse dated April 13, 1913, which re-
minded Morse of his financial
obligations as stated in the August 1911 contract.34
The most interesting revelation in the
Morse case, however, came two days later
when Caraway presented a copy of an
October 12, 1917 letter from Felder to Leon
0. Bailey of New York. Felder had
requested that the New York attorney help in
recovering the $25,000 which Morse had
neglected to pay. He explained that
Morse had also promised to pay an
additional $100,000 after his release.
Daugherty and he, Felder continued, had
attempted to collect from Morse on nu-
32. Taft to Daugherty, November 22,
1915, copy, Letterbook 38, P370A, Series III, ibid.; New York
Times, May 24, 1922.
33. Ibid., July 25, 1926, January
13, 1933; New York Herald, February 28, 1922; D. A. B., 241.
34. Congressional Record, 67 Cong., 2
Sess., 6175, 7317. See also New York Times, August 5, 1917. An
example of the continuing association of
Daugherty and Felder was the case involving the Bosch Mag-
neto Company. Congressional Record, 67
Cong., 2 Sess., 7318.
202 OHIO HISTORY
merous occasions. Pleading lack of cash,
Morse had tried to reimburse them with
worthless stock. The disappointed
Daugherty, according to Felder, had "com-
plained very bitterly of our treatment
by Morse. .. ." On one occasion he had con-
fronted Morse in a hotel room in New
York where he had denounced him in "un-
measured terms, declining emphatically
to accept the stocks tendered either as
collateral or payment." 35
Morse's quick recovery after the
commutation of sentence had deterred the two
attorneys from filing suit against him.
Felder explained that they had feared that
the Wilson adminstration would have
remanded Morse if they had agitated the
matter in any way. "I have not been
unmindful of the damaging evidence secured
by the Department of Justice,"
Felder wrote, ". . . to ascertain whether or not a
fraud had been perpetuated upon the
Government by Morse in his efforts to obtain
his freedom .. ." Daugherty and
Felder somehow discovered that the department
had evidence revealing that, after the
physicians had been appointed to examine
Morse and before they had arrived,
"soap suds or chemicals . . . would be taken by
him to produce a hemorrhage of the
kidneys, and that as soon as the examination
was over. . . the patient would
recuperate rapidly." Felder assured Bailey that nei-
ther he nor Daugherty had any knowledge
that Morse had deceived the doctors.
Caraway was quick to remind the Senate,
however, that Morse had given
Daugherty and Felder full control of the
case. Consequently, he demanded
Daugherty's resignation as Attorney
General.36
Daugherty attempted to respond to
Caraway's initial accusations. He informed
his friend, Senator James E. Watson of
Indiana, that he had had no part in the crim-
inal aspect of the Morse case.37 Watson
communicated that information to the Sen-
ate on May 2 where Caraway challenged it
two weeks later by producing the August
1911 contract and the other relevant
correspondence, which Daugherty did not con-
test. In defense Daugherty released the
1915 Taft and Wickersham letters which
stated that he had never approached the
President directly about the case.
He also denied that he had received any
compensation from Morse, although he ad-
mitted that he had accepted $4,000 from
Felder, which he claimed was about half of
the expenses he incurred in the case.38
Only Daugherty's assertion that he had ob-
tained $4,000 from Felder seems correct.
However, there is no known documented
evidence that substantiates Caraway's
claim that Daugherty and Felder had en-
gaged in any fraud in respect to Morse's
health. Morse had a history of heart and
probable kidney disorders which
incarceration might well have aggravated.39
His later recovery is not necessarily an
indication that deceit had been committed.
35. Ibid., 7378-7379.
36. Ibid, 7318, 7374, 7379. While
Taft was aware of the possible deception surrounding Morse's re-
lease, he refused to believe that
Daugherty had been involved. He wrote Daugherty a sympathetic letter
when Caraway attacked him. Taft to
Daugherty, May 21, 1922, Copy, Box 516/6, Series III, Taft Papers.
The author failed to locate in the
National Archives or elsewhere the "damaging evidence" Felder al-
luded to. There is, however, a 1917
letter from Henry Stimson's former assistant attorney who now as-
serted that Morse was guilty of gross
fraud in obtaining his release. See Henry Wise to Francis Caffey,
November 12, 1917, Pardon Case File
204-43-407, NRS.
37. Ibid., 7317; New York Times,
May 21, 1922.
38. "The Case of Attorney General
Daugherty," Outlook, LXXXI (June 7, 1922), 247; Congressional
Record, 67 Cong., 2 Sess., 6175.
39. Report of the Board of Medical
Officers, December 1911, Pardon Case File 204-43-407; Major
General Leonard Wood to Wickersham,
December 18, 1911, ibid; Felder to Taft, December 26, 1911,
ibid. The possibility exists, however, that all sources which
had information on Morse's medical history
received it from Morse.
Charles Morse Case 203
Some forms of Bright's disease (for
example, acute nephritis) eventually heal with-
out medication and without damage to the
kidneys. The medical profession in
1911 lacked the expertise to distinguish
accurately the acute from the more serious
chronic nephritis, which meant certain
death.40 Morse in fact later stated
that the
Italian physician who examined him in
1913 claimed that he did not have Bright's
disease but a much less serious
"irritation of the duct caused by sharp uric acid crys-
tals. . .."41 The probability exists that the American
doctors innocently diagnosed
Morse's kidney condition wrongly.
This is not to say that collusion was
impossible. Morse could have taken a chem-
ical to severely irritate his weakened
kidneys, as Felder had written in 1917. That
action would not be completely out of
character, particularly since there was no im-
mediate hope for his release. Despite
Felder's disavowals, Daugherty and he could
also have been involved. Their actions
in the early 1920's especially reveal an
unethical, if not a criminal, disregard
for justice.42 Moreover, their contract with
Morse, as Caraway pointed out, gave them
absolute control. It also stipulated that
Morse's release was to be the only basis
for substantial renumeration. Such a pro-
vision can tempt even the most
scrupulous attorney.
Collusion might also have necessitated
the cooperation of a physician. Dr. Alfred L.
Fowler, the former prison physician, is
a possible suspect. He had resigned un-
der an alleged Department of Justice
investigation in early 1911.43 Prior to that res-
ignation, it was Fowler who had first
diagnosed Morse's ailment as Bright's disease.
Daugherty and Felder consulted him in
July 1911, quoted his diagnosis to the ad-
ministration, and then employed him to
stay with the hospitalized Morse during the
critical weeks of December 1911. At that
time the more specialized Fowler exer-
cised an influence over the diagnoses of
other physicians examining Morse.44
Interestingly, eleven years later Fowler
again became prison physician at Atlanta
immediately after Daugherty became
Attorney General.45 While one can make a
circumstantial case for collusion, the
fact remains that neither Caraway nor anyone
else has provided the direct evidence to
prove it.
Undoubtedly, Caraway's desire to expose
Republican maladministration and
fraud was responsible for his
undocumented charge. But the expose of Felder in
the Senate as a notorious corruptionist
who had become persona non grata in Geor-
gian legal and political circles would
undoubtedly have encouraged suspicion. In
1924 Felder was convicted along with
Gaston B. Means for conspiracy to bribe gov-
ernment officials in the Glass Casket
fraud case. He was fined $10,000 and auto-
40. Benjamin F. Miller, M. D., The
Complete Medical Guide (New York, 1967), 411-412; conversations
with urologists Ross Dees Blades,
October 10, 1972, and Herbert Warres, November 6, 1972, Springfield,
Missouri. Dr. Arthur Knabb, a retired
physician who began his practice in the second decade of the
twentieth century, contended that
physicians had treated acute nephritis by prescribing a proper diet,
plenty of rest, and nursing care which
Morse managed to receive while in Europe. Interview, October
21, 1972, Springfield, Missouri.
41. Morse to Taft, February 14, 1916,
copy, Box 47, Stimson Papers.
42. See James N. Giglio,
"The Political Career of Harry M. Daugherty" (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, The Ohio State University, 1968), 281-288,
353-365.
43. Anonymous physician, United States
Penitentiary to Bert M. Fernald, copy, January 21, 1922, Par-
don Case File 204-32-115, NRS.
44. Dr. Fowler to Daugherty and Felder,
December 23, 1911, copy, Pardon Case File 204-43-407,
NRS; Daugherty and Felder to Taft, January 16, 1912, ibid.
45. Congressional Record, 67
Cong., 2 Sess., 7378; R. K. Heston to the author, October 25, 1972. Hes-
ton is chief of the Civilian Management and Technical
Staff of the National Personnel Records Center,
St. Louis, Missouri, where Dr. Fowler's
sketchy personnel folder as prison physician is now housed.
204 OHIO HISTORY
matically disbarred.46 On
March 11, 1926, Felder died in a Savannah, Georgia, ho-
tel of acute dilation of the heart and
of acute alcoholism.
As for Charles Morse, he was acquitted
in a long and costly trial involving gov-
ernment ship building contracts. A
subsequent civil suit in 1925 against Morse's
business, the Virginia Shipbuilding
Company, resulted in a settlement for the Fed-
eral Government of over eleven and a
half million dollars. The second indictment
against Morse and his sons, which
involved mail fraud, never resulted in a trial
against Morse because he was adjudged
too ill to stand trial as a result of a recent
paralytic stroke. The charges against
his sons were dismissed after a jury disagreed.
In January 1933 Morse died of pneumonia,
almost three years after the death of the
President who had commuted his sentence
twenty years earlier.47
Daugherty also was to suffer reverses
after the Morse case exposure. The culmi-
nation of charges that he was ethically
unfit to serve as Attorney General led to his
forced resignation in March 1924. The
Morse episode itself had little to do with his
dismissal, but it did reveal Daugherty
as an ambitious and resourceful lobbyist who
displayed poor taste in pursuing Morse's
commutation. He surely knew that Felder
sought him because of his political
association with the administration. What com-
pounded this questionable conduct was
his misrepresentation of Morse. He did not
inform the Taft administration that he
had earlier contracted with Morse for his re-
lease. The August 4 contract in fact was
consummated more than three weeks be-
fore Daugherty expressed grave concern
about Morse's health.48 Later,
Daugherty's request that Taft and
Wickersham lie in his behalf further damned his
conduct. Overall, the Morse involvement
reflected unfavorably upon all major par-
ticipants, but it also provided a revealing
penetration of why Daugherty became
such an often criticized public figure.
46. Congressional Record, 67 Cong., 2 Sess., 7318-7320; New York Times, March
13, 1926.
47. D. A. B., 241; New York Times,
July 16, 1926, January 13, 1933.
48. Daugherty's first expression of
concern to the administration about Morse's health came on August
29, 1911. See Daugherty to
Hilles, August 29, 1911, Folder 1189, Series II, Taft Papers.
JAMES N. GIGLIO
Lawyer as Lobbyist:
Harry M. Daugherty and the
Charles W. Morse Case,
1911-1922
Of all President Warren G. Harding's
1920 Cabinet selections, none received more
opposition than the Attorney General
appointment of Harry M. Daugherty-a fel-
low Ohioan who had directed the
presidential nomination campaign. Both the
press and various public officials
considered Daugherty a freewheeling lobbyist with
a rather unsavory past. To buttress
their assessment they uncovered the in-
discretions that had sometimes
characterized his early career.' The most discussed
incident was Daugherty's 1911-12
involvement in the Charles W. Morse case, which
reemerged to embarrass him further as
Attorney General in 1922. No matter how
one might evaluate Daugherty's role in
that case, it provides some of the best in-
sights into the nature of Daugherty's
character and his utilization of political in-
fluence to enhance his law practice.
By early 1911 Daugherty's political
career had already undergone several set-
backs, and in January of that year a
Democratic Ohio General Assembly rejected
him in favor of Democrat Atlee Pomerene
for United States Senator. That
Daugherty received the most Republican
votes in the legislature made the defeat no
easier to accept.2 The one
consoling factor was his continual friendship with Presi-
dent William Howard Taft whom he had
helped to nominate in 1908. It was felt,
however, that Daugherty most likely
could still command support of the Taft organ-
ization in Ohio for a future senatorial
bid. Until such time, he focused his attention
upon a law practice that represented
some of the leading corporations in the United
States, including the American Tobacco
Company, Armour and Company, and the
Western Union Company. Indeed, as senior
partner in the Columbus, Ohio, law
firm of Daugherty, Todd, and Rarey, the
energetic and politically astute Daugherty
became one of the leading lobbyists in
the Midwest. A 1911 vanity book, Club Men
of Columbus in Caricature, portrayed him walking down the street protectively
lead-
1. See, for example, the lengthy article on Daugherty in the
New York World, February 17, 1921. See
also Robert K. Murray, The Harding
Era: Warren G. Harding in His Times (New York, 1968), 106-107.
2. Prior to 1914, the General Assembly
elected Ohio Senators. The voting generally went by party
line.
Mr. Giglio is Assistant Professor of
History at Southwest Missouri State University.
192