DAVID L. PORTER
Ohio Representative John M. Vorys
and the Arms Embargo in
1939
During the last few years, Congress
increasingly has favored a reduction in Ameri-
can commitments to foreign nations. This
action has reversed a long-standing pol-
icy of globalism stemming from World War
II. Congress probably has not wit-
nessed such widespread
noninterventionist sentiments since shortly before World
War II, when the legislative branch
refused to repeal the arms embargo or permit
munitions sales to belligerent nations.
Numerous historians have analyzed the con-
troversial attempt to repeal the arms
embargo at the regular 1939 session, but have
devoted surprisingly little space to the
significant role of freshman Republican John
M. Vorys of Ohio in leading a determined
movement to cling to the bastions of non-
interventionism.' This study
investigates the crucial role played by this Ohio Con-
gressman in preventing Congress from
removing the arms embargo before the out-
break of World War II.
Vorys, a member of a prominent Ohio
family, rose quickly in the world of poli-
tics. The second of four sons, he was
born June 16, 1896, in Lancaster and began
his education in the public schools
there. His father, Arthur, who practiced law and
served as city solicitor of that upper
Hocking Valley industrial center, later joined
the law firm of Sater, Seymour and Pease
in Columbus. Arthur also served as a
State Superintendent of Insurance and as
a Republican national committeeman.
After the family had moved to the
capital city, young Vorys graduated in 1914 from
East High School and entered Yale
University. Following the outbreak of World
War I, he enlisted in the Naval Reserve
Flying Corps, saw action overseas as a
fighter pilot, and rose to the rank of
Second Lieutenant. Returning to Yale to earn
a B. A. degree in 1919, he taught the
next year in Changsha, China, and spent 1921
and 1922 as an assistant secretary for
the American delegation at the Washington
Naval Disarmament Conference. Vorys
received a law degree in 1923 from Ohio
State University and joined his father's
firm. He then began dabbling in politics,
serving in 1923-24 as a representative
from Franklin County in the Ohio General
Assembly and sitting the next two years
for the Tenth District in the Ohio senate.
An aviation enthusiast and author of an
article on airplane supervision, he was ap-
1. The most comprehensive work on
neutrality revision is Robert Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality
(Chicago, 1962).
Mr. Porter is Assistant Professor of
History, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.
pointed in 1929 as Ohio's first Director of Aeronautics and then resumed his private law practice.2 After Democrat Franklin Roosevelt entered the presidency in 1933, the conserva- tive Vorys became increasingly disenchanted with events in the nation's Capitol. He disliked the growing tendency of the Federal Government to infringe upon states' rights, protested the rapid growth of executive power under a Democratic President, and consistently disapproved of Roosevelt's New Deal programs. A critic of Roosevelt's pro-labor policies, he opposed the Wagner Act of 1935 estab- lishing collective bargaining, favored an investigation of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, and advocated reducing funds for the Works Progress Administration and other federal relief agencies. In addition, he denounced the President's at- tempt in 1937 to enlarge the Supreme Court.3 Impatient at remaining on the sidelines, Vorys aspired to holding a national elec- tive office. He capitalized in 1938 on what the New York Times classified as a "ti- dal wave of anti-New Deal and anti-CIO sentiment" in Ohio and captured a seat in the United States Congress as a Representative from the state's Twelfth District (Franklin County). Ohio Republicans fared remarkably well in the 1938 elections, as John Bricker and Robert A. Taft replaced Democratic incumbents for governor and United States Senator, respectively, and nine other Republicans joined Vorys in unseating Democratic Congressmen. Shortly after the Seventy-sixth Congress con-
2. U. S. Congress. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, 1961); "John M. Vorys," Current Biography, 1950, p. 588. 3. For these views, see folders on the subjects in Boxes 3 and 4, John Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society. There is no biography of Representative Vorys. |
John M. Vorys 105
vened in January 1939, Vorys joined the
prestigious Foreign Affairs Committee and
worked hard in his new position.4
Congressman Vorys rapidly won popularity
among a majority of his Franklin
County constituents. Representing
farmers, businessmen, and many employed in
state government and at the educational
institutions in the county, he was reelected
easily in November 1940, and even
returned 25 percent of his campaign funds to the
donors. His supporters generally
criticized the tendency of the New Deal to favor
organized labor over big business,
protested the rapid expansion of the Federal
Government bureaucracy, and believed
that the 3,000 mile Atlantic Ocean ade-
quately protected the United States from
any foreign invasion.5
Between 1918 and 1938, the United States
had pursued largely isolationist poli-
cies. Preoccupied with the economic
depression, Congress had concentrated on do-
mestic affairs in enacting relief,
recovery, and reform measures to eliminate the ling-
ering unemployment problem. In foreign
affairs, a Senate committee, headed by
isolationist Republican Gerald Nye of
North Dakota, charged that bankers and mu-
nitions makers had drawn the United
States into World War I for financial profits
and drafted numerous proposals designed
to prevent American involvement in any
future war. Revisionist scholars and
journalists also denied that American security
had been at stake in World War I and
cautioned that interventionist actions should
be avoided in the future. In response to
these pressures, Congress approved the
Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934
prohibiting loans to any foreign country default-
ing on debt payments, and between 1935
and 1937 enacted a series of neutrality
laws preventing the United States from
exporting arms, ammunition, and imple-
ments of war to any belligerent country.
All warring nations wishing to purchase
non-military goods in the United States
were required to pay cash for such items
and to transport them in their own
vessels.6
By late 1938 the Roosevelt
administration began advocating a revision of isola-
tionist policies. After Hitler pledged
to Great Britain and France at the Munich
Conference of September 1938 not to seek
any additional European territory, the
German dictator within two months
intensified both Nazi rearmament and per-
secution of the European Jews. In
response, Roosevelt promptly requested $300
million for national defense and
recalled the American ambassador to Germany,
Hugh Wilson; State Department officials
recommended that Congress revise the ex-
isting neutrality laws at the next
session by repealing the arms embargo and placing
all trade on a cash-and-carry basis. In
his annual message to Congress in January
1939, the President complained that
American neutrality laws "may actually give
aid to an aggressor and deny it to the
victim." He also intimated that he favored
neutrality revision, but did not make
any specific recommendations about legisla-
tion and left the issue in the hands of
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair-
man Key Pittman of Nevada.7
Pittman, however, delayed acting on the
neutrality question for over two months.
Besides being more interested in western
silver legislation than in foreign affairs
4. New York Times, November 1938;
Current Biography, 1950, p. 588; John Vorys to Author, May 2.
1968. For election, see Milton
Plesur, "The Republican Comeback of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV
(October 1962), 525-562.
5. For constituent views, see Boxes
3 and 4, Vorys Papers.
6. See John Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions
Inquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton Rouge,
1963); Warren Cohen, The American
Revisionists (Chicago, 1967); Divine, Illusion, 81-228.
7. Robert Divine, The Reluctant
Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York, 1965),
55-57.
106 OHIO HISTORY
measures, the moderate internationalist
did not press for action principally because
isolationists controlled the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Roosevelt also re-
mained silent on the issue until German
forces on March 15 suddenly violated the
Munich Pact by conquering all of
Czechoslovakia. The President then publicly
urged Congress to act, prompting Pittman
on March 20 to introduce a bill repealing
the arms embargo and putting all
commerce on a cash-and-carry basis. Pittman's
Foreign Relations Committee again
disappointed the President by holding lengthy
hearings from early April to mid-May and
by failing to reach any agreement on
neutrality, thus letting the cash-and-carry
provision expire on May 1.8
The German annexation of Czechoslovakia,
meanwhile, alarmed Great Britain
and France. British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain, who had made territorial
concessions to Hitler at the Munich
Conference, particularly was dismayed by the
latest German action and indicated for
the first time determination to stand up to
the Nazis. Fearing that Poland might be
the next target of expansion, Chamberlain
on March 30 promised that Great Britain
and France would provide assistance to
the Polish Government in case Hitler
attacked that East European nation. The
guarantee, though, meant little in
reality because Great Britain and France would
face geographical barriers in providing
direct assistance to Poland and lacked mili-
tary personnel to open up a second front
against Hitler.9
Congressman Vorys, meanwhile, strongly
favored continuing American neutrality
policies toward Europe. Besides claiming
that European developments did not en-
danger American security, he insisted that
the 3,000 mile Atlantic Ocean would pre-
vent Germany from launching an effective
air or land assault upon the United
States. Protesting that New Deal
programs had enhanced Roosevelt's power con-
siderably, he hoped to maintain strict
congressional control over the President's
movement into European affairs. The Ohio
Republican particularly opposed
granting Roosevelt broad authority
either to determine aggressors or to sanction the
selling of arms to belligerent nations
in Europe because such leeway would permit
him to declare war, a privilege which
the Constitution specifically gives to the legis-
lative branch.
With bitter memories of the World War I
experience, Vorys hoped to avoid a re-
currence of similar American involvement
in future European affairs. In addition
to stressing that the United States had
spent $33 billion and suffered 116,000 deaths
in the conflict, he asserted that the
American crusade to save the world for democ-
racy had not prevented the rise of
European dictatorships. A midwesterner sus-
picious of the influence of the eastern
establishment upon the Federal Government,
the Ohio Republican alleged that bankers
and munitions makers had drawn the
United States into World War I for their
financial profits against American interests.
Vorys feared that idealism and
profiteering might embroil the nation in another Eu-
ropean conflict, leaving similar
legacies of massive spending, heavy casualties, and
unfulfilled ambitions.10
On the other hand, Vorys had no sympathy
for Hitler or Mussolini. He criticized
the Axis leaders for pursuing
dictatorial tactics and violating fundamental individ-
ual liberties, and particularly for
promoting themselves as peacemakers. "Hitler
8. Fred Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln,
1963), 131; Divine, Illusion, 241-251.
9. Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, 63-64.
10. For Vorys' views on foreign policy, see
Boxes 3 and 4, Vorys Papers.
John M. Vorys 107
has the ability," the Congressman
contended, "by eloquent and plausible mis-
statements of fact, law and history, to
convince his own people that he is peaceful
when he isn't, truthful when he
isn't." Although acknowledging that Hitler might
attempt to move into Western Europe,
Vorys intensely desired to keep the United
States out of foreign wars, opposed
taking punitive action against Hitler, and in-
sisted that "we have no assurance
that the threat of our force will be sufficient to
stop war."11
From the outset, Vorys criticized three
specific Senate proposals for changing the
neutrality laws toward Europe. Opposed
to allowing the President "a free hand in
assisting France and Great
Britain," Vorys denounced a controversial amendment
proposed by interventionist Elbert D.
Thomas (Democrat-Utah) designed to
empower the Chief Executive to send arms
and raw materials to attacked nations.
The Thomas amendment specifically was
designed to assist China, but Vorys
warned that it "might affect some
other situation we haven't thought of." On the
other hand, he disapproved of a proposal
sponsored by isolationists Gerald Nye
(Republican, North Dakota), Joel Bennett
"Champ" Clark (Democrat, Missouri),
and Homer T. Bone (Democrat, Washington)
to remove existing neutrality legisla-
tion and to return to traditional
principles of international law. Finally, he criti-
cized the portions of the Pittman bill
intended to repeal the arms embargo. Vorys,
though, liked certain features of that
bill, especially the sections preserving the exist-
ing neutrality law and prohibiting the
President from defining an aggressor.12
Even though Europe seemed more important
to the administration, Vorys pre-
ferred more active American responses on
the Asian front. Following in the Re-
publican tradition, he warned, "our
interests are not involved in Europe the way
they are in the Orient" and claimed
that Japanese expansion in Asian countries
posed a greater threat to American
security than did German or Italian activity at
that moment. Vorys contended that Japan
had disobeyed the Nine Power Treaty
of 1922, which outlawed aggression in
the Far East, by attacking China in 1937 and
by establishing puppet regimes in Inner
Mongolia, North China, and Nanking. He
remarked, "We have no treaty in
Europe comparable to the nine power Pacific
treaty that is being violated daily,
with increasing affrontery."13
In practical terms, the Ohio Republican
urged that the United States cease imme-
diately shipping scrap iron, oil, and
other war materials to Japan. An arms em-
bargo, Vorys insisted, would force Japan
to stop attacking China within six months
and would aid American defense policy by
"preventing a possible triumph of a fu-
ture potential enemy in the
Pacific." If munitions sales to Japan were terminated,
Vorys contended that Congress would not
be surrendering additional authority to
11. Vorys to Joseph McGhee, September
26, 1939, Box 3. Vorys Papers; Congressional Record, 76
Cong., 1 Sess., 8151. For views toward
Hitler, see Boxes 3 and 4, Vorys Papers.
12. Vorys to Miss Elizabeth Jones, March
24, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers; Vorys to Mrs. Harold Kauf-
man, April 22, 1939, Box 4, ibid. For
Thomas amendment, see Congressional Record, 76 Cong.. I Sess..
1347. For Nye-Clark-Bone amendment, see
New York Times, March 29, 1939.
13. Vorys to Miss Ellen Benbow, April
28, 1939, Vorys to Charles Seymour, April 27, 1939, Vorys to
Members of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, June 3, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers. The Nine-Power Treaty
was an international recognition of the
Open Door in China, first stated by the United States at the turn
of the twentieth century. The United
States, Japan, Britain, France, China, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and
Portugal agreed to respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and to refrain from taking ad-
vantage of China's weakened position to
seek special commercial rights or privileges at the expense of
other signatory powers. The treaty did
not commit its signers to any kind of action if one of them vio-
lated the treaty. David Shannon, Between
the Wars: America, 1919-1941 (Boston, 1965), 51-52.
108 OHIO
HISTORY
Roosevelt because "the President
[already] has power to declare an embargo in the
Chinese-Japanese War."14
During April and early May, the freshman
Vorys received his official baptism on
the neutrality issue. He participated
actively in exploratory House Foreign Affairs
Committee hearings and interrogated
various witnesses, ranging from Congressmen
to pressure group spokesmen, who
typically detected flaws in the existing law but
usually refrained from supporting any
particular neutrality bill. In response to his
vigorous campaign for a "straight
out Japanese embargo," Vorys encountered a
stormy reception from most witnesses,
and lamented, "I am discouraged at the ex-
perts who say that this would be
provocative, bad economics, etc."15
In the meantime, President Roosevelt was
upset that Pittman's committee had
procrastinated on the neutrality issue
and turned to the House of Representatives
for assistance. At a White House
conference held on May 19, Roosevelt personally
urged prominent Representatives to
repeal the arms embargo by the middle of July
(when the British royalty were scheduled
to visit Washington) and prompted the
State Department to draft legislation
for House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair-
man Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York).
Within ten days Bloom proposed the State
Department measure to the
Democratic-controlled committee. The Bloom bill
sanctioned arms sales to belligerents,
permitted American ships to transport cargoes
abroad, authorized the President to
designate combat zones, and otherwise dupli-
cated the earlier Pittman proposal.16
With the President's measure directly
before the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, Vorys became further embroiled
in the neutrality controversy. When
Bloom ordered the committee to conduct
hearings in early June on his measure,
Vorys engaged the chairman in tactical
warfare over which proposals should have
top priority. The Ohio Representative
did not favor giving immediate consid-
eration to the Bloom bill and demanded
that the committee first give attention to
various proposals designed to place arms
embargoes upon Japan. Bloom naturally
advocated quick approval of the State
Department proposal and, fearing that hear-
ings on the Japanese bills might take
several days or even weeks, used his authority
as chairman to prevent Vorys from
speaking in the committee. After failing to in-
fluence Bloom, Vorys wrote a candid
letter on June 3 to his committee colleagues
stating directly what he had not been
permitted to say in person:
I feel we are making a great mistake trying
to determine our possible conduct as to future
wars in Europe before we determine our
present conduct as to an existing war in the Orient;
we have let our excitement about what may
happen to our remote interests in Europe blind
us to what is now happening to
our immediate interests in the Pacific. We have no treaty in
Europe comparable to the nine power
Pacific treaty that is being violated daily, with increas-
ing affrontery. The people back home
don't want us to interfere in Europe; but they are de-
manding that we stop supporting Japan in
this uncivilized, immoral conquest that violates
our treaty rights and threatens our
national interests.
I do not insist on any particular bill
and am committed to no specific proposals, but I feel
certain that if we solve this immediate
Far Eastern problem first it will go far toward solving
14. Vorys to Jones, March 24, 1939,
Vorys to Seymour, April 27, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers.
15. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Hearings, "American Neutrality Policy,"
April-May, 1939 (Washington, D.C.,
1939); Vorys to Kaufman, April 22, 1939, Vorys to H. Schuyler Fos-
ter, Jr., April 17, 1939, Box 4, Vorys
Papers.
16. Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, 58-59.
John M. Vorys 109
the rest of our international problems,
and that until we decide this immediate problem, we
cannot reach any very satisfactory
conclusion on the general problem... .
Committee Democrats, led by Chairman
Bloom and Luther A. Johnson of Texas,
seized the initiative from Vorys and
strongly defended a Europe-first policy. Fol-
lowing the approach advocated by the
Roosevelt administration, they asserted that
German and Italian aggression in Europe
posed a greater threat than Japanese ac-
tions in the Pacific to American
interests and advocated repeal of the arms embargo
to assist victims of Axis expansion in
Europe. They also hoped to aid Great Britain
and France in defeating Nazi Germany
before these countries were themselves
overrun. Exhibiting little concern about
increasing presidential power in foreign
affairs, the Democrats favored
designating authority to Roosevelt to discriminate in
favor of attacked nations and to discourage
potential aggressors from provoking
war. Since the administration controlled
fifteen of twenty-five seats, the committee
turned deaf ears to Vorys' pleas and
opened hearings June 5 on the Bloom bill as
scheduled.18
Unable to sway the committee to delay
hearings, Vorys vowed to cripple the
chairman's measure. The Ohio Republican
attempted to restore part of the 1937
Neutrality Act by introducing an
amendment to prohibit the export of arms and
ammunition to all belligerents. He again
encountered insurmountable resistance,
and blamed ultimate committee rejection
of the embargo on "the New Deal major-
ity." Vorys, falling a few votes
short (12-8) of preventing the committee from re-
porting the Bloom bill, promptly denounced
the action in a minority report. He
feared the President might commit the
United States to assist attacked nations mili-
tarily and denounced giving him
authority to declare combat zones. Cognizant of
Roosevelt's earlier attempts to dominate
Congress, Vorys warned colleagues, "We
should not evade our responsibility by
granting the President additional power" and
vowed to wage an intensive battle in the
House against the Bloom bill. Besides
planning to utilize extensive debate to
delay voting, he hoped to arouse American
public opinion so as to encourage
congressional defeat of the measure and to secure
House approval of amendments
"keeping us out of war entanglements with foreign
conflicts."19
Boldly challenging several veteran
Representatives, Vorys battled vigorously
against neutrality revision on the House
floor. Administration officials selected
Democrat Luther Johnson of Texas, an
effective debater, expert tactician, and excel-
lent organizer, to direct floor strategy
for the advocates of arms embargo repeal.
Also chosen was Majority Leader Sam
Rayburn of Texas, an industrious and
shrewd Representative, to assist in the
struggle for approval of the Bloom bill. In
another move, the administration wisely
persuaded Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Bloom to play a subordinate
role because he possessed only mediocre
speaking talents and often told off-beat
jokes at improper times.
17. Divine, Illusion, 266-268;
Sol Bloom, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York, 1948), 233;
Vorys to Foreign Affairs Committee, June
3, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers; New York Times, June 6, 1939.
Republicans Fred Crawford of Michigan
and Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York, along with Democrat
John Coffee of Washington had introduced
bills to place arms embargoes upon Japan.
18. See majority report of U. S.
Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 856,
"Neutrality Act of 1939," June
17, 1939 (Washington, D.C., 1939).
19. New York Times, June 7, 8,
17, 1939; Vorys to Mr. and Mrs. John 0. Gockenbach, June 30, 1939,
Vorys to Henry Durthaler, June 14, 1939,
Box 4, Vorys Papers; House Foreign Affairs Committee Report
856, "Neutrality," 21-24.
110 OHIO
HISTORY
Although freshmen Congressmen rarely
steal the limelight, Vorys delivered a ma-
jor floor address on June 28 for the
noninterventionist forces, criticizing the pro-
posed repeal of the arms embargo as a
step toward involvement in European affairs
and cautioning "the way to peace is
not to promise or threaten to fight anybody."
Despite conceding that Roosevelt desired
to keep the United States out of bellig-
erent conflicts, Vorys warned "if
you threaten enough you get into war" and admon-
ished, "we should furnish to no
nation the means of murder in wartime." Greeted
with widespread applause at the end of
the speech, Vorys later explained, "Some of
the members told me that I was
persuasive because I didn't claim too much for my
position and didn't criticize too much
those who had other views."20
In hopes of outmaneuvering
administration forces, Vorys sought to rescue victory
from the throes of defeat. The Ohio
Republican adeptly assumed the offensive the
next evening by introducing his
committee amendment to prohibit the sale of arms
and ammunition to all belligerents, but,
in an attempt to attract support from some
vacillating Democrats, did not include
aircraft and other possible implements of war
on the embargo list. After the House
rejected this plan, Republican Hamilton Fish,
Jr., of New York, a Foreign Affairs
Committee colleague of Vorys, the same night
arranged a deal with wavering Democrats
and promised that he and other Republi-
cans would support the Bloom bill in
exchange for their approval of the Vorys
amendment. Several Democrats either
swallowed Fish's bait or left the floor tem-
porarily when he requested a teller
vote, thus enabling the House to reverse its ear-
lier decision and narrowly (159-157)
approve the arms embargo amendment.
Vorys understandably rejoiced over the
deal and the sudden turn of events which
temporarily negated the Bloom bill and
seemingly doomed the prospects for Ameri-
can military intervention in European
affairs.21
Although stunned, administration leaders
soon struck back with a rare parlia-
mentary device. Before crowded galleries
and a packed House floor, Luther John-
son surprised the Vorys forces the next
day by proposing, in effect, the removal of
the arms embargo amendment and thereby
nearly (180-176) defeated the con-
troversial restriction on munitions
sales. Visibly angered, Johnson forces increased
the drama by refusing to concede defeat
and by insisting upon a roll call to reverse
the outcome. Both sides expected another
close tally and watched the suspense in-
tently. Republican Clifford Hope of
Kansas remarked, "It is going to be a close
fight" because the
"Administration is straining every nerve to get this bill through,"
while Democrat J. Hardin Peterson of
Florida labeled the situation as "a tug of war
from the start." To the astonishment of most present,
however, Vorys' supporters
registered a smashing victory over the
bewildered administration forces and, ex-
ceeding even Vorys' wildest
expectations, easily (214-173) restored the arms em-
bargo.22
A formidable bipartisan coalition had
rallied behind the Ohio Republican's
cause. Over one-fourth of the Democrats,
afraid of being tabbed publicly as inter-
20. Divine, Illusion, 269;
"Washington Correspondents Name Ablest Members of Congress in Life
Poll," Life, March 20, 1939,
13-17; Congressional Record, 76 Cong.. I Sess., 8151-8152; New York Times,
June 30, 1939: Vorys to Edward Hume,
July 18, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.
21. For developments, see Congressional
Record, 76 Cong., I Sess.. 8320-8321, 8325; New York Times,
June 30, 1939.
22. Congressional Record, 76
Cong., 1 Sess., 8502-8503, 8511-8512; New York Times, July 1, 1939;
Clifford Hope to Herman Rome, June 30,
1939, Legislative Correspondence, Box 150, Cliford Hope Pa-
pers, Kansas State Historical Society;
J. Hardin Peterson Newsletter, July 6, 1939, Box 20, J. Hardin Pe-
terson Papers, University of Florida
Library.
John M. Vorys 111
ventionist, followed the safer route by
supporting the Vorys amendment and were
joined by an overwhelming 95 percent of
the Republican Representatives. Vorys
promptly labeled the measure as
nonpartisan because "it would have been impos-
sible for the Republicans to have put
through the amendment for a modified arms
embargo without Democratic support"
and also since "distinguished Republicans,
such as [James W., Jr.] Wadsworth and
[Bruce] Barton of New York, spoke and
voted against it." Further
discounting political motivations, Vorys observed, "I
know of no measure that has come up
since I have been down here where there was
more searching of hearts and attempting
to vote our real convictions as to the ulti-
mate best way to keep America out of
war."23 As a result of
the sudden alliance, ad-
minstration forces again had failed to
remove the controversial restriction against
munitions sales or to sanction American
military assistance to belligerent nations.
Bolstered by their resounding victory,
the Vorys forces took even bolder steps.
Republican George H. Tinkham of
Massachusetts, an isolationist colleague of
Vorys, sought to send the measure back
to the Foreign Affairs Committee and thus
kill all efforts at the 1939 session to
repeal the arms embargo. But Democratic
whips reformed their shattered
batallions just enough (196-194) to reject the Tink-
ham proposal, as twenty-six of their
party members, who had voted for the Vorys
amendment, rejoined the administration
forces and turned the tide against the isola-
tionist forces this time.24
After the exciting maneuvering and
tallies, the House anticlimactically (201-187)
gave the seal of approval to the
modified Bloom bill. Vorys, thankful that numer-
ous Democrats had supported his embargo
amendment earlier, abided by Fish's
pledge and supported the revised
measure. He had made concessions regarding
munitions sales and presidential
discretionary authority, but actually had sacrificed
little because he already had appended
the arms embargo amendment and had suc-
ceeded in retaining most of the 1937
Neutrality Act. Republican Hope of Kansas
aptly summarized the situation for the
Vorys forces by remarking, "The bill, as
passed, was much less harmful than the
one which was originally introduced [be-
cause] the House adopted a number of
good amendments."25
In letters to constituents, Vorys portrayed
vividly the impact of the House out-
come. The Congressman considered the
approval of his amendment as a major
step toward keeping the United States
out of war and out of foreign alliances. He
particularly praised international law
experts and "the overwhelming majority of
just plain American people" for
facilitating the retention of the arms embargo.
Adamantly defending noninterventionist
policies toward European nations, he still
cautioned that the United States should
not sell any belligerent "things with which
23. Roll Call Data, 76th Congress,
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, University of
Michigan; Vorys to Hume, July 18, 1939,
Box 4, Vorys Papers. For further substantiation of the biparti-
san nature of the neutrality issue, see
J. Wilburn Cartwright Washington Newsletter, July 3, 1939, Box
168, J. Wilburn Cartwright Papers,
University of Oklahoma Library. On the Vorys amendment, 61 of
225 Democrats, 149 of 156 Republicans,
and 4 of 6 third party members favored restoration of the em-
bargo.
24. Congressional Record, 76
Cong., I Sess., 8512-8513; New York Times, July 1, 1939. On the Tink-
ham vote, 35 of the 228 Democrats, all
156 Republicans, and 3 of 6 third party members favored re-
commital. Data, Consortium.
25. Congressional Record, 76
Cong., I Sess., 8513-1814; Hope to Stanley Esser, July 3, 1939, Box 150,
Hope Papers. On the final roll call, 193
of the 226 Democrats, 5 of the 156 Republicans, and 3 of the 6
third party members approved neutrality
revision. Data, Consortium.
112 OHIO
HISTORY
to kill each other." He advised
instead "of attempting to arm victims of aggressors
we ought to stop arming
aggressors"-meaning Japan.26
The Roosevelt administration, Vorys
contended, exaggerated the seriousness of
the European situation. He claimed that
American tourists returning from abroad
and stock market leaders both pictured
Europe as "apparently settling down to a so-
lution of her problems without war"
and that the only European war cloud he could
see appeared in "the American
newspapers." Besides doubting that the retention
of the arms embargo "would have any
substantial military effect on the situation in
Europe," Vorys quickly reminded
repeal advocates that the United States still could
furnish many supplies to belligerent
nations and promised that "if and when the
struggle in Europe becomes our struggle,
we will do our part."27
European events, Vorys maintained, still
continued to sidetrack congressional at-
tention from more critical Far Eastern
problems. He intensified his campaign to se-
cure House action on Japanese embargo
legislation and finally induced Chairman
Bloom to open hearings on July 18, but
complained that Secretary of State Cordell
Hull "intends to do nothing about
the Japanese situation at this time." To Vorys'
pleasant surprise, however, Secretary
Hull in late July seized the initiative from
Congress on the Japanese issue and
warned Japan the United States would termi-
nate the commercial treaty of 1911
within six months.28 The Vorys forces in the
House seemed to be gaining support for a
prompt consideration of the Japanese
threat. The executive branch, still
zealously campaigning for repeal of the arms
embargo, had lost another bruising
battle with the Vorys group. Roosevelt priva-
tely denounced the House action toward
Europe as "a stimulus to war" and
prompted Secretary Hull to complain that
the embargo jeopardized American
peace and security.
Alarmed by the state of affairs,
Roosevelt urged Pittman's Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to reconsider the
neutrality question and even threatened to delay
congressional adjournment until
munitions sales were sanctioned to European na-
tions.29 Administration
advocates, though, fared no better in the Upper Chamber.
Several leading noninterventionists
conferred in early July, determined that at least
thirty-four members opposed selling
munitions to belligerents, and vowed to cam-
paign intensively for postponement of
neutrality revision "by every honorable and
legitimate means" including
filibuster. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on July 11, after shrewd
behind-the-scenes maneuvering by isolationist Democrat
Bennett Clark of Missouri, narrowly
(12-11) approved a motion to delay consid-
eration of all neutrality legislation
until 1940. Roosevelt still advocated immediate
action and summoned congressional leaders
to another White House conference on
July 18. According to Vorys, the
conference showed that Roosevelt had wanted a
chance to make "another of his
sabre-rattling speeches." A confrontation between
Secretary Hull and isolationist Borah of
Idaho broke up the meeting and doomed
any chances for revising the neutrality
laws. Congress, unaware that Germany was
26. Vorys to Mrs. Doris Foster, July 11,
1939, Vorys to Carl A. Norman, July 12, 1939, Vorys to S. P.
Bush, July 22, 1939, Box 4, Vorys
Papers.
27. Vorys to Bush, July 22, 1939, Vorys
to Hume, July 18, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.
28. Vorys to Bush, July 22, 1939, Vorys
to Foster, July 11, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers; Cordell Hull, The
Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I, 637-638; Herbert Feis, The Road
to Pearl Harbor (Prince-
ton, 1950), 23.
29. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His
Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (New York, 1950), II, 900-901; Hull,
Memoirs, I, 646-649.
John M. Vorys
113
preparing to attack Poland, adjourned
within three weeks.30
In the 1939 session of Congress, Vorys
contributed substantially to the demise of
the arms embargo repeal forces. An
advocate of federal concentration on Far East-
ern problems, he lobbied extensively for
his arms embargo amendment in the For-
eign Affairs Committee, carried his
struggle to the House floor, made two important
floor speeches, and astonished some
colleagues by securing approval of his con-
troversial amendment. Historians may
debate whether Vorys or Fish played the
more dominant role in the fight for the
noninterventionists, but the neutrality
struggle definitely had brought a new
face to the forefront.
In the final analysis, Vorys left a
mixed record on the neutrality issue. Even
though he had been a member of Congress
for only a few months, the Ohio Re-
publican exhibited unusual leadership
throughout the conflict with the adminis-
tration, displaying an uncanny ability
to rally bipartisan support behind the nonin-
terventionist cause. He also correctly
warned about the gravity of the Far Eastern
situation and recognized more than most
Representatives the dangers posed both by
Japanese expansion and by American
insistence upon sending arms to aggressors.
Although fulfilling the wishes of many
Americans desiring to keep the United States
out of a European foreign war, Vorys
incorrectly assumed more popular backing for
nonintervention than actually existed on
this extremely controversial issue.31 While
invoking the consequences of World War I
as motivation for avoiding future Ameri-
can commitments to Europe, he also
underestimated the nature of the German
threat to Western Europe and the United
States.32 With Vorys and other isolation-
ists carrying the day in Congress, the
United States nearly waited too long before
sending military supplies to Western
European nations. As subsequent events
showed, Hitler was planning to attack
the Low Countries, France, and Great Britain
at the same time he was reassuring a
gullible world that his intentions were
peaceful.
30. Clyde Reed to William Allen White,
July 13, 1939, Box 222, William Allen White Papers, Library
of Congress; "34 in a Lair," Time,
July 17, 1939, p. 13; "Neutrality Bill," Newsweek, July
17, 1939, pp.
17-18; Divine, Illusion, 277-278.
Clark persuaded two conservative Democratic members, Walter
George of Georgia and Guy Gillette of
Iowa, the night before to vote for postponement of the neutrality
question. See T.R.B.,
"Politics at the Water's Edge," New Republic, August 2, 1939,
p. 360. For the July
18 White House conference, see Joseph
Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper (New York,
1940), 43-44 and especially Warren
Austin Memorandum, July 19, 1939, Folder 10, Box 20, Warren Aus-
tin Papers, University of Vermont
Library. For the reaction of Vorys to the conference, see Vorys to
Bush, July 22, 1939, Box 4, Vorys
Papers.
31. One large group that favored repeal
of the arms embargo and was against the Vorys amendment
was the Franklin County League of Women
Voters. See Vorys to Mrs. Wilson Hoge, July 11, 1939 for
the Congressman's reprimand to the group
and his statement: "I derive considerable comfort from the
fact that my own views, which I reached
after months of hearings, study and discussion, are in accord
with the mass of ordinary Americans and
also the overwhelming majority of experts on international
law." Box 4, Vorys Papers.
32. Samples of Vorys' statements
indicating that he underestimated Hitler's threat to Europe appear in
a letter written on July 22, 1939 to S.
P. Bush: "I don't think that an arms embargo would have any sub-
stantial military effect on the situation in Europe. I
think the insistence for its repeal is for diplomatic
and political effect.... Europe is
apparently settling down to a solution of her problems without war ... I
believe that America can contribute more
to world peace by threatening to stay out of Europe than by
threatening to go in ... I think that
instead of attempting to arm victims of aggression we ought to stop
arming aggressors .. ." Box 4, Vorys Papers.
DAVID L. PORTER
Ohio Representative John M. Vorys
and the Arms Embargo in
1939
During the last few years, Congress
increasingly has favored a reduction in Ameri-
can commitments to foreign nations. This
action has reversed a long-standing pol-
icy of globalism stemming from World War
II. Congress probably has not wit-
nessed such widespread
noninterventionist sentiments since shortly before World
War II, when the legislative branch
refused to repeal the arms embargo or permit
munitions sales to belligerent nations.
Numerous historians have analyzed the con-
troversial attempt to repeal the arms
embargo at the regular 1939 session, but have
devoted surprisingly little space to the
significant role of freshman Republican John
M. Vorys of Ohio in leading a determined
movement to cling to the bastions of non-
interventionism.' This study
investigates the crucial role played by this Ohio Con-
gressman in preventing Congress from
removing the arms embargo before the out-
break of World War II.
Vorys, a member of a prominent Ohio
family, rose quickly in the world of poli-
tics. The second of four sons, he was
born June 16, 1896, in Lancaster and began
his education in the public schools
there. His father, Arthur, who practiced law and
served as city solicitor of that upper
Hocking Valley industrial center, later joined
the law firm of Sater, Seymour and Pease
in Columbus. Arthur also served as a
State Superintendent of Insurance and as
a Republican national committeeman.
After the family had moved to the
capital city, young Vorys graduated in 1914 from
East High School and entered Yale
University. Following the outbreak of World
War I, he enlisted in the Naval Reserve
Flying Corps, saw action overseas as a
fighter pilot, and rose to the rank of
Second Lieutenant. Returning to Yale to earn
a B. A. degree in 1919, he taught the
next year in Changsha, China, and spent 1921
and 1922 as an assistant secretary for
the American delegation at the Washington
Naval Disarmament Conference. Vorys
received a law degree in 1923 from Ohio
State University and joined his father's
firm. He then began dabbling in politics,
serving in 1923-24 as a representative
from Franklin County in the Ohio General
Assembly and sitting the next two years
for the Tenth District in the Ohio senate.
An aviation enthusiast and author of an
article on airplane supervision, he was ap-
1. The most comprehensive work on
neutrality revision is Robert Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality
(Chicago, 1962).
Mr. Porter is Assistant Professor of
History, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.