JAMES W. GEARY
Clement L. Vallandigham Views
the Charleston Convention
The Democratic National Convention
which opened at Charleston,
South Carolina, on April 23, 1860,
provided the setting for one of the
most significant turning points in
American history. The delegates who
gathered at this southern city to
select a presidential candidate and a
platform failed in both efforts.
Radical southerners refused even to
consider a program of "popular
sovereignty" as defined by Stephen A.
Douglas, the first choice of most
northern delegates.1 Instead they
insisted on the rejection of Douglas
and a legislative policy which would
guarantee the protection of slavery in
the territories. Northern men,
particularly those from the Northwest,
demonstrated that they were
equally as adamant in their preference
for Douglas and in their desire to
confine decisions on the slavery issue
to the Supreme Court, not extend
them to Congress. Before the Convention
formally adjourned ten days
later, many southern delegates had
stormed from the proceedings in
angry protest. Some northern delegates,
tired of the irresolution
surrounding the Convention and
depressed over the high prices they had
to pay for lodging and meals, simply
left for home. Consequently, the
meeting became hopelessly deadlocked
over the question of whether
two-thirds of the total number of
delegates or only two-thirds of those
present would suffice to nominate a
candidate and vote on a platform.
By May 3, 1860, the remaining delegates
decided to adjourn and
reconvene at Baltimore on June 18,
1860.
The schism that had characterized the
Charleston meeting reappeared
at Baltimore. Although Douglas was
selected as the candidate,
Dr. Geary is an Assistant Professor of
Library Administration and is also the Archivist
for the American History Research Center
at Kent State. He wishes to express his
gratitude to Mr. David E. Estes, of the
Special Collections Division at Emory University,
for permission to publish this
manuscript.
1. "Popular" or "squatter
sovereignty" came into vogue during the debates on the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. In essence,
this doctrine provided that only the resident
voters of a territory had the authority
to determine the nature of their local institutions.
Hence, in adopting a constitution, these
individuals had the choice of either accepting or
rejecting slavery. For a discussion of Douglas' deep
commitment to this policy, see Robert
W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (New
York, 1973), 137-38, 698-99; and Allan Nevins,
The Emergence of Lincoln: Prologue to
Civil War, 1859-1861 (New York, 1950),
II, 209,
224, 225.
128 OHIO HISTORY |
|
southerners once again bolted to nominate then Vice-President John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, a man more congenial to their interests. Further division already had been added to this chaotic situation in May when a group of border state men and conservatives formed the Constitutional Union party with John Bell of Tennessee as their candidate. Eight days later, on May 18, 1860, Abraham Lincoln emerged as the nominee of the Republican party at Chicago.2 Among the many accounts of the Charleston Convention, one primary source has remained largely unnoticed by scholars.3 Written in the interim between Charleston and Baltimore, this description is particularly significant because it contains the eye-witness views of
2. For a discussion of these last three meetings, see Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 1948), 314-41. 3. For excellent descriptions of the Charleston Convention, see Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 749-59; Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 203-28; and Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 288-309. For a good primary account, see William B. Hesseltine, ed., Three Against Lincoln: Murat Halsted Reports the Caucuses of 1860 (Baton Rouge, 1960), 3-110. |
Charleston Convention
129
Clement L. Vallandigham, the secretary
of the ill-fated April meeting.4
Vallandigham, who became notorious
during the Civil War as a
leading "Copperhead," wrote
to his old friend Alexander Hamilton
Stephens, who did not attend the
Charleston debacle. The future
vice-president of the Confederacy, who
ironically was Douglas' first
choice as his running mate, had
withdrawn from political life the year
before.5 In writing this
lengthy letter to Stephens, perhaps
Vallandigham hoped to lure the
southerner from his self-imposed
retirement to lend assistance to the
Unionist cause in the South, or to
encourage him to use his influence with
southern delegates who might
vote for a compromise candidate, if not
for Douglas, at Baltimore.
Stephens at least favored the
"Little Giant" at this juncture, and would
stump for his election in the months
that followed.6
This letter is significant for a number
of reasons. It contributes yet
another manuscript to the comparatively
few extant Vallandigham
letters.7 Although it is
somewhat routine in its description of the events
at Charleston, it does contain new
information. Notably, Vallandigham
emphasized the importance of the
discontent that was engendered over
the question of whether New Jersey's
delegates could vote as a unit or as
individuals, a divisive issue that
historians have often underestimated.8
4. This manuscript is part of the
Alexander Hamilton Stephens Collection held by the
Special Collections Division of the
Robert W. Woodruff Library at Emory University. The
repository probably acquired this letter
in 1938, which explains its nonappearance in
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, ed., The
Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H.
Stephens, andHowell Cobb (1913; reprint ed., New York, 1970). In addition to the
letter of
June 4, 1860, there are at least three
other Vallandigham letters in this Stephens Collection
dated May 4, 1859, May 29, 1860, and May
18, 1866, as well as a letter from Stephens to
Vallandigham dated July 23, 1866. See
also James W. Geary, "Clement L. Vallandigham
Writes to John H. George, April 27,
1863: His Last Existing Letter before the Notorious
Arrest?", Historical New
Hampshire, XXX (1975), 12-19.
5. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 741;
Ulrich B. Phillips, "Alexander Hamilton
Stephens," in The Dictionary of
American Biography, ed. Dumas Malone (New York,
1935), IX, 571.
6. Phillips, "Stephens," 572.
See also Stephens' letters of June 17 and July 2, 1860,
Crawfordsville, Georgia, to J. Henly Smith, in which he
referred to his high regard for
Douglas. Phillips, Correspondence, 481-85.
7. Vallandigham's recent biographer located
only fifty letters despite several years of
diligent searching. See Frank L.
Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L.
Vallandigham & The Civil War (Lexington, 1970), 326.
8. On April 30, 1860, controversy arose
over whether New Jersey's delegates had to
abide by the "unit rule," an
issue resolved six days earlier, since the state convention had
only recommended, and not required, that
they vote as a bloc. When the Chair decided in
favor of the group vote, members
appealed the ruling, which was overturned. See
Hesseltine, Murat Halsted, 69,
for a brief discussion of this matter. Nevins, Johannsen,
and Nichols do not even mention this
dispute in their description of the Charleston
Convention, although Johannsen and Nichols refer to the
manner of New Jersey's
suggested voting in their treatment of
the various state conventions. See Johannsen,
Stephen A. Douglas, 739; and Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 279-80.
Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II,
225, merely notes that New Jersey was one of the
130 OHIO
HISTORY
He further contended that Douglas could
have received the nomination
up through Saturday, April 28, 1860.
Others have stressed April 24,
1860, as the day of no return because
the delegates, in a rare spirit of
unity, decided to choose a platform
first rather than a candidate.9
The letter further suggests that despite
outward appearances,
Douglas' failure to secure the
presidential nomination in April
apparently caused Vallandigham to waver
in his support of the "Little
Giant."10 For the sake
of expediency, the Ohioan revealed that he was
open to the possibility of having the
party select another candidate,
providing that person received Douglas'
blessing.11 He asserted that
"squatter sovereignty" was a
relatively unimportant issue in the
Northwest, the heartland of Douglas'
constituency.12 As he
placed the
blame for the rupture at Charleston,
Vallandigham's insensitivity to the
Douglasites' position became even more
apparent, for he was far less
critical of the southern
"fire-eaters" than of the "Little Giant's"
followers, who had no choice except to
abide by the wishes of their
leader. 13
Despite the problems which confronted the
Democrats,
Vallandigham nevertheless conveyed a
deep feeling of optimism at the
prospect of success in the coming
election, as he discussed various
options open to the party in the
following letter.
Washington, June 4, 1860
My Dear Sir:-
I thank you for yours of the 16th of May
& shall answer it in the same spirit of
delegations whose members could vote
individually, rather than as a unit, for the
Democratic nominee.
9. Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II,
213; and Hesseltine, Murat Halsted, 36. Nichols,
Disruption of American Democracy, 297-98, 300-02, believes that both of these days were
critical turning points.
10. Klement, Limits of Dissent, 18-37,
traces the emergence of Douglas' and
Vallandigham's relationship in the
decade before the Civil War. By the end of June, 1860,
Douglasites trusted Vallandigham to the
extent that they selected him to become the
Chairman of the National Democratic
Campaign Committee.
11. Douglas considered withdrawing his
name from the candidacy at Baltimore, but his
followers, particularly William
Richardson, fervently resisted this course. Johannsen,
Stephen A. Douglas, 769-71.
12. Not all northwestern Democrats
agreed with Vallandigham's opinion on this
fundamental principle. See John T.
Hubbell, "The Douglas Democrats and the Election of
1860," Mid-America, LV
(1973), 108-11, 130.
13. On either April 24 or April 25,
1860, Douglas sent a telegram to his supporters at
Charleston that prohibited them from
accepting a program which went beyond an
endorsement of the Cincinnati Platform
of 1856. He also restricted them to a policy which
acknowledged the Supreme Court as the
sole arbitrator on all questions arising from the
slavery issue in the territories.
Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 753.
Charleston Convention 131 |
|
candor in which it is written. Indeed I rejoice in having the chance of writing freely to one who will appreciate the freedom, on the present "State of the Union"; but regret that I cannot see you & have one good, long old fashioned talk face to face, for I cannot say half I desire to say, within the limits of a letter. The result at Charleston unfortunate as it was-I hope not disastrous-was scarcely unexpected to me-certainly not after I had observed for a few days the class of men assembled there & the course of proceedings. The body was made up of extreme men-at least the extremes had complete control of it. With a few exceptions there were but two classes there-they who were for Cesar or nobody, & they who were for any body but Cesar.14 With ordinary sagacity, prudence & good management it would have been comparatively easy to have nominated Douglas without a split. It could have been done at any time up to Saturday & every one expected it to be done. At first even a general endorsement of the Dred Scott Decision would have been sufficient: but our friends refused even that.15 They had come there to carry every thing by storm: they had come to attend, as they supposed, a mere ratification meeting; & every thing was done with a high hand. The change in rules as to the manner of voting gave us an unfair advantage & irritated our
14. Halsted also noted, "the Honorable Stephen A. Douglas was the pivot[al] individual of the Charleston Convention. Every delegate was [either] for or against him." Hesseltine, Murat Halsted, 3. 15. The Supreme Court on March 6, 1857, delivered a deadly blow to the principle of "popular sovereignty," in the Dred Scott Decision. This ruling prevented territorial residents from barring the establishment of slavery within their domain. For an excellent analysis of the impact of this case, see Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, I, 90-118. |
132 OHIO
HISTORY
opponents.16 Several other
similar movements increased the irritation & finally
the reversal of the Chair on the New Jersey case most
of all. The class of men put
forward too, made the matter still
worse. Richardson, Stuart, Payne,
Montgomery & others, all anti
Lecompton men, taking the lead.17 This looked
like forcing the old issue upon the
Convention & compelling men to take Douglas
in his capacity as anti-Lecompton Leader
& thus endorsing his course in that
fight at the expense of the great
majority of the party to whom he then stood
opposed. But in spite of all this he
could still have been nominated if our side had
been willing to concede something on the
Platform-retaining Non Intervention
& acknowledging Equality of Rights
in the Territories so long as they remain in
the territorial condition. The Dorr
letter & the Harper Article (melancholly [sic]
blunders they were) the South said
required the latter in the platform.18 I thought
so too & urged it earnestly as an
outsider-I was not a delegate. But with fat
stupidity our side refused every thing
& the disruption followed-a miserable
blunder & an act of party mutiny not
justified by any thing done or refused by the
Convention, & which precluding any
possible compromise, led at last to the
adjournment to Baltimore.
I have carefully observed the course of
events since & confess that I never was
so utterly in the dark as to the future.
I am anxious for the nomination of
Douglas. The deep feeling in his favor
in the West is unmistakeable. It amounts
to a popular furor & with the utter
absence of enthusiasm for Lincoln, Douglas'
positive popularity would enable him to
sweep all before him. But I see very
clearly that without an addition similar
to the "Tennessee Resolution", to the
Platform, his nomination by either two
thirds of the electoral votes or two thirds
of the votes cast, is simply impossible.19 Nor
would such a platform lose him a
single vote in the West. What we most
demand & really must have is Non-
Intervention. That & Douglas is what the people of
the West want. The question
16. On April 24, 1860, the convention
decided that delegates could vote individually for
the presidential nominee, unless their
state conventions had instructed them to the
contrary. This decision represented a
clear victory for the Douglasites since it allowed
thirty to forty pro-Douglas men to vote
for the "Little Giant." See Nichols, Disruption of
American Democracy, 297; and Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II,
212-13.
17. William A. Richardson of Illinois,
Charles E. Stuart of Michigan, Henry B. Payne of
Ohio, and William Montgomery of
Pennsylvania. The Lecompton Constitution
controversy of 1857-1858 centered on the
issue of whether Kansas would be admitted as a
free state or a slave state. During this
conflict, Douglas emerged as the leader of the
anti-Lecompton forces which opposed this
constitution because the dubious methods
used in its adoption had violated the
principle of "popular sovereignty."
18. During the summer of 1859, Douglas
wrote to J. B. Dorr, editor of the Dubuque,
Iowa, Express and Herald, that he
would accept the Democratic presidential nomination
only if the party endorsed "popular
sovereignty," and discarded other issues from the
platform to include the re-establishment
of the African slave trade and legislative
guarantees that slavery would be
protected in the territories. The following September,
Harper's Magazine published Douglas' article "The Dividing Line
Between Federal and
Local Authority: Popular Sovereignty in
the Territories." In this copyrighted essay,
Douglas provided historical and
constitutional precedents for his views. Both pieces
raised a furor among administration and
southern Democrats. For a thorough treatment of
their reaction, see Johannsen, Stephen
A. Douglas, 704-14.
19. On May 1, 1860, John R. Howard of
Tennessee introduced this proposal which
provided for a weak version of a federal
slave code for the territories. See Hesseltine,
Murat Halsted, 92-98, 105; Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 757-59.
Charleston Convention 133
of Territorial power is an abstraction:
it does not come "home to our business &
bosoms" as "Intervention"
would. Squatter Sovereignty is sheer nonsense
which many of the best & most
intelligent democrats of the West never did
endorse, & which the people would
abandon as soon as exposed. At all events
with Douglas they would not hesitate a
moment because of the platform. Still
without him, it would perhaps be better
to leave the platform unchanged.
And yet Douglas' friends are foolishly
& bitterly resisting the only means by
which, if at all, his nomination can be
secured. No man ever had such ill-advised
& impracticable supporters.20 Still
I have no doubt that the addition can &
probably will be made to the platform.
But can he be nominated then? If he
cannot then I apprehend that Lincoln's
chances for election will be vastly
improved, if not his election rendered
certain. But one thing could prevent
it-the nomination of some one with the
immediate & cordial approbation of
Douglas-a friend of his & one having
his confidence-in other words a
nomination made after his declination,
by his friends & almost at his instance
[sic]. Even then the odds would be against us, though we might
make a gallant
fight & win it too.
In view, therefore, of the many
embarrassments which upon every side
encompass us & the imminent danger
of Lincoln's election if Douglas should not
be nominated & in addition a
nomination hostile to him be made, it becomes a
very serious & solemn question
whether it is not really expedient that Douglas'
nomination should not be allowed at
Baltimore, & that the extremists of the
South present a candidate of their own upon
a platform of their own, & that thus
we prepare to throw the election into
the House as the best which can be done.
Douglas would not be injured in the free
states by the refusal of the ultraists of
the South to support him: it would
strengthen him. Lincoln could not be chosen
by the electoral colleges in that event,
nor could he be chosen by the House.21
I would that you were here. Your letter
is received most gratefully & cordially
in the West; & you are
unquestionably the second choice of our people.
Let me hear from you soon.
Most truly your friend
C. L. Vallandigham
Hon. A. H. Stephens
Crawfordsville,
Geo.
Lincoln dashed whatever hope existed of
casting the presidential
contest into the House when he was
elected on November 6, 1860, with
20. Throughout the course of the
Charleston Convention, Douglas remained in
Washington.
21. Some southern delegates also wanted
the election to be decided in Congress in the
belief that either John C. Breckinridge
or Robert M. T. Hunter could secure the
presidency. Hesseltine, Murat
Halsted, 36; and Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 211.
Stephens speculated that Breckinridge
would be the victor in this event, Phillips,
Correspondence, 485.
134 OHIO HISTORY
180 electoral votes.22 Alarmed
by the election of the first "black
Republican" President, many
southerners began to think seriously of
secession. On December 20, 1860, South
Carolina led the way in
withdrawing from the Union. Less than
four months later, the crisis
reached a climax when the Confederate
attack on Fort Sumter plunged
the nation into four long years of civil
war.
Throughout the conflict, Vallandigham
and Stephens evidently did
not correspond with each other.
Nevertheless, they pursued a common
policy of challenging acts of
questionable legality much to the
embarrassment of their respective
governments. Indeed, Stephens
proved as much of an annoyance to
Confederate President Jefferson
Davis as Vallandigham did to Lincoln.23
In the postwar years, each tried to
renew his political career in the
partisan climate of Reconstruction. Both
especially sought seats in the
United States Senate. Vallandigham
failed, however, even to receive
the endorsement of the
Democratic-dominated Ohio legislature in his
bid for this office. Despite this
slight, he remained politically active until
his untimely death in 1871.24
Stephens, successful in his quest for
the Senate in 1866, encountered
difficulty when that body refused to
seat him and other members from
the former Confederate states. After
this rebuke, he turned to writing
and publishing. By 1872, he entered
politics once again. Though
defeated in the Senate race of that
year, he did secure election to the
House of Representatives where he served
for the next decade. In 1882,
he became the governor of Georgia, but
died after only a few months in
office.25
22. See James G. Randall and David
Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2nd
ed. (Lexington, 1969), 133-34, for the
final tally of votes and the argument that Lincoln
would have won even had the Democratic
party remained united.
23. For a discussion of their activities
during the war, see James Z. Rabun, "Alexander
H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis," American
Historical Review, LVII (1953), 290-321;
and Klement, Limits of Dissent, 87-155,
173-89, passim.
24. Klement, Limits of Dissent, 304-13;
and William E. Smith, "Clement Laird
Vallandigham," The Dictionary of
American Biography, X, 145.
25. Phillips, "Stephens,"
574-75.
JAMES W. GEARY
Clement L. Vallandigham Views
the Charleston Convention
The Democratic National Convention
which opened at Charleston,
South Carolina, on April 23, 1860,
provided the setting for one of the
most significant turning points in
American history. The delegates who
gathered at this southern city to
select a presidential candidate and a
platform failed in both efforts.
Radical southerners refused even to
consider a program of "popular
sovereignty" as defined by Stephen A.
Douglas, the first choice of most
northern delegates.1 Instead they
insisted on the rejection of Douglas
and a legislative policy which would
guarantee the protection of slavery in
the territories. Northern men,
particularly those from the Northwest,
demonstrated that they were
equally as adamant in their preference
for Douglas and in their desire to
confine decisions on the slavery issue
to the Supreme Court, not extend
them to Congress. Before the Convention
formally adjourned ten days
later, many southern delegates had
stormed from the proceedings in
angry protest. Some northern delegates,
tired of the irresolution
surrounding the Convention and
depressed over the high prices they had
to pay for lodging and meals, simply
left for home. Consequently, the
meeting became hopelessly deadlocked
over the question of whether
two-thirds of the total number of
delegates or only two-thirds of those
present would suffice to nominate a
candidate and vote on a platform.
By May 3, 1860, the remaining delegates
decided to adjourn and
reconvene at Baltimore on June 18,
1860.
The schism that had characterized the
Charleston meeting reappeared
at Baltimore. Although Douglas was
selected as the candidate,
Dr. Geary is an Assistant Professor of
Library Administration and is also the Archivist
for the American History Research Center
at Kent State. He wishes to express his
gratitude to Mr. David E. Estes, of the
Special Collections Division at Emory University,
for permission to publish this
manuscript.
1. "Popular" or "squatter
sovereignty" came into vogue during the debates on the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. In essence,
this doctrine provided that only the resident
voters of a territory had the authority
to determine the nature of their local institutions.
Hence, in adopting a constitution, these
individuals had the choice of either accepting or
rejecting slavery. For a discussion of Douglas' deep
commitment to this policy, see Robert
W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (New
York, 1973), 137-38, 698-99; and Allan Nevins,
The Emergence of Lincoln: Prologue to
Civil War, 1859-1861 (New York, 1950),
II, 209,
224, 225.