ERIC J. CARDINAL
The Ohio Democracy and the
Crisis of Disunion, 1860-1861
One of the least understood political
groups in American history
has been the northern Democratic party
during the Civil War. Their
contemporary Republican foes vilified
them as traitors, and
subsequent historians have for the most
part agreed with that
verdict.1 Political
partisanship, ideological conflicts, and wartime
passions account for the original
animus; it is less clear why scholars
have tended to follow so closely the
Republican lead. The primary
reason for the continuing bad
reputation of the wartime Democrats is
that they, nearly as much as the
confederates themselves, "lost" the
war and thus the legitimacy of their
position. The war destroyed their
hopes for the preservation of "the
Union as it was and the
Mr. Cardinal is a Teaching Fellow at
Kent State University where he is in the final
stages of work on his dissertation, a
project being advised by Professor Frank L.
Byrne.
1. See for example Curtis H. Morrow, Politico-Military
Secret Societies of the
Northwest, 1860-1865 (Worcester, MA, 1929); Leonard Kenworthy, The Tall
Sycamore of the Wabash: Daniel Wolsey
Voorhees (Boston, 1936); Wood Gray,
The Hidden Civil War: The Story of
the Copperheads (New York, 1942);
George F.
Milton, Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth
Column (New York, 1942); Christopher
Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats:
The Grand Erosion of Conservative
Tradition (Cranbury, NJ, 1975); F. L. Grayson, "Lambdin P.
Milligan-A Knight of
the Golden Circle," Indiana
Magazine of History, XL (1947), 379-91; Frank C.
Arena, "Southern Sympathizers in
Iowa During the Civil War Period," Annals of Iowa,
XXX (1951), 486-538; Bethania M. Smith,
"Civil War Subversives," Journal of
the Illinois State Historical
Society, XLV (1952), 220-40; Robert S.
Harper, "The
Ohio Press in the Civil War," Civil
War History, III (1957), 221-52, which are studies
embracing, in whole or in part, this
general conception. This is not an exhaustive list,
nor does it fully indicate the
pervasiveness of this view of the northern Democracy. For
example, Norman A. Graebner et al., A
History of the American People (New York,
1975), 423; and Keith I. Polakoff et
al., Generations of Americans: A History of the
United States (New
York, 1976), 366 are two recently-published texts that reflect this
view.
For lucid critiques of the interpretive
literature concerning the northern Democrats,
see Richard O. Curry, "The Union as
it Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of
the 'Copperheads,' " Civil War
History, XIII (1967), 25-39; and Robert H. Abzug,
"The Copperheads: Historical
Approaches to Civil War Dissent in the Midwest,"
Indiana Magazine of History, LXVI (1970), 40-55. For balanced views of the
"Copperheads" which tend to
revise the traditional picture see Frank L. Klement, The
Copperheads of the Middle West (Chicago, 1960); and Idem, The Limits of
Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War (Lexington, 1970), in addition
20 OHIO HISTORY
Constitution as it is" just as
surely as it did southern independence.
While historians have long noted, and
for the most part hailed, the
modernizing tendencies of the war,2
Democratic aspirations always
required an American Union that was
politically static. Essentially
Jeffersonian in outlook, they harkened
back to a lost past, to a
decentralized, agrarian, pre-industrial
America. As Clement L.
Vallandigham, the most notorious of the
"Peace Democrats," put it
in the early days of the war, the role
of the Democratic party was to
save the country from destruction,
"to restore the Union, the
Federal Union as it was forty years
ago."3 The dilemma of the
Democrats was that the Civil War
intensified processes already at
work transforming the Federal Union they
cherished into the
centralized nation they feared.
Similarly, the apotheosis of Abraham
Lincoln has helped further to
discredit the Democrats. The
"Lincoln theme"-stressing the
development of Lincoln as chief
executive, as war leader, as
emancipator, as humanitarian-has been a
compelling one for
historians. The number of historical
works whose titles begin with the
words "Lincoln and . .
." attests to this. Lincoln's wartime political
opponents have suffered by contrast.
Further, the racism inherent in the
Democratic ideology has made it
morally unattractive to modern scholars.
The Democratic view of a
static American political order
necessarily entailed, whether explicitly
or implicitly, a defense of slavery.
Even those Democrats who were
opposed to the institution were willing
to perpetuate it in order to
avert, and later to end, civil war.
Americans of the latter twentieth
century must consider the implications
of such views and recognize
that the Democrats themselves did not.
Yet they were, after all, men
to his numerous articles; Van M. Davis,
"Individualism on Trial: The Ideology of the
Northern Democracy During the Civil War
and Reconstruction" (Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Virginia, 1972); James A.
Rawley, The Politics of Union: Northern
Politics During the Civil War (Hinsdale, IL, 1974); and Leonard P. Curry,
"Congressiona
Democrats, 1861-1863," Civil War
History, XII (1966), 213-29.
2. See for example Woodrow Wilson's
classic celebration of the nationalizing effects
of the war in Division and Reunion,
1829-1889 (New York, 1893), especially 273-75
298-99. For more recent expressions see
William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the Wa
Governors (New York, 1948); and Idem, Lincoln's Plan for
Reconstruction (Chicago
1960); Allan Nevins, The Warfor the
Union: The Organized War, 1863-1864 (New York
1971); and Idem, From Organized War
to Victory, 1864-1865 (New York, 1971); Harold M
Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The
Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the
Constitution (New York, 1973); and Rawley, The Politics of Union.
For an analysis of thi
view in American historiography of the
Civil War period, see Thomas J. Pressly, Amer
cans Interpret Their Civil War (Princeton, 1962).
3. Clement L. Vallandigham to Alexander
S. Boys, August 13, 1861, The Papers o
Alexander S. Boys, Ohio Historical
Society.
Ohio Democracy 21
of their times, and racism was not
confined to the ranks of the
Democracy in the mid-nineteenth century.4
Certainly at a time when
Lincoln himself treated blacks as
"only his stepchildren,"5 the
Democrats were not outside the American
mainstream with their
white supremacist beliefs.
A first step in considering the wartime
Democrats more
dispassionately is a careful examination
of their course during the
secession crisis and the opening months
of hostilities. The factors that
have tended to discredit the wartime
Democrats have also obscured a
little appreciated fact: as the
shattering events which accompanied the
election of Lincoln pushed the United
States over the precipice of
sectional bitterness into civil war, the
northern Democracy-more
than any other political group-stood
unwaveringly for the
preservation of the Union.6 Southern
leaders generally advocated
secession and Republicans faced the
crisis initially with seeming
ambivalence-some counseled peaceful
dissolution, others armed
coercion, and still others separation
and coercion in almost the same
breath. Northern Democrats, however,
stressed one
theme-resolution of the crisis through
an equitable compromise.
They recognized neither the right of
secession nor that of coercion, and
this remained the heart of their problem
throughout the war.
Moreover, northern Democrats first
articulated positions concerning
secession and civil war during this
early period which, with few
modifications, they maintained
throughout the conflict.
Since the national political parties in
the mid-nineteenth century
4. See Leon F. Litwack, North of
Slavery (Chicago, 191); Eugene H. Berwanger,
The Frontier Against Slavery: Western
AntiNegro Prejudice and the Slavery
Extension Controversy (Urbana, 1967); Jacque Voegeli, "The Northwest and
the
Race Issue, 1861-1862," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, L (1963), 235-51; and
Eric Foner, "Politics and
Prejudice: The Free Soil Party and the Negro, 1849-1852,"
Journal of Negro History, L (1965), 235-56.
5. Don E. Fehrenbacher, "Only His
Stepchildren: Lincoln and the Negro," Civil
War History, XX (1974), 293-310.
6. The Constitutional Union men,
supporters of John Bell and Edward Everett, were
also undeniably for the preservation of
the Union by compromise. But their strength as
a party after the defeat of 1860 was
negligible and they increasingly identified their
course with the northern Democrats.
Democrats clearly took the lead in advocating
compromise measures, even those
originally proposed by non-Democrats such as
Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden. In
so doing, Democrats hoped to induce the
Constitutional Unionists Americans,
old-line Whigs, and all other conservative men to
act with them under the Democratic
banner. It was clear to Republican observers that
the Democracy was to be the
institutional rallying point of all such conservatives. See
Simeon Nash to John Sherman, December 3,
1860; F. D. Parish to Sherman, February
2, 1861, The Papers of John Sherman,
Library of Congress. In addition, see Portsmouth
The Union and the Times, November 1860-April 1861, passim.
22 OHIO
HISTORY
were the respective state parties in the
aggregate, it is useful to
examine the political events during this
period at the state level.
Because of its leadership position
within the Old Northwest and its
later notoriety as a
"Copperhead" stronghold, Ohio may be used as a
case in point.7 The
presidential campaign of 1860 had proven to be a
divisive one for the Ohio Democracy,
even as it had for the party
nationally. The great majority of
Democrats in the Northwest
supported the candidacy of the Little
Giant of Illinois, Stephen A.
Douglas. Indeed, "the feeling in
his favor in the West is un-
mistakable," wrote Vallandigham.
"It amounts to a popular furor ...."8
Despite this broad base of popular
support, a number of
prominent Ohio Democrats, who had broken
with Douglas when he
split with the Buchanan Administration
over the Lecompton issue in
1858, threw their support in 1860 to the
candidacy of John C.
Breckinridge. Though Breckinridge
support remained negligible
among the mass of Ohio Democrats, the
divisive campaign shattered
the unity of the party.9 Thus,
with the election of Lincoln and the
march of the southern states out of the
Union, Ohio Democratic
leaders sought not only a solution to
the national crisis but also to
heal their own intra-party wounds and
insure political survival.10 The
recent rift within the party
particularly worried them. "If the
7. Ohio was the home base of many of the
most noted "Copperheads" during the
Civil War: Archibald MacGregor, Samuel
Medary, Edson B. Olds, William Allen,
Allen G. Thurman, Alexander Long, George
Pendleton, and Clement L. Vallandigham.
The Ohio gubernatorial campaign of 1863
pitted the exiled Vallandigham against Union
party nominee John Brough; for an
analyis of this critical election see Eugene
Roseboom, "Southern Ohio and the
Union in 1863," Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XXXIX (1952), 29-44.
8. Vallandigham to Alexander H.
Stephens, June 4, 1860, Vallandigham File,
Western Reserve Historical Society,
photocopy, original is in The Papers of Alexander
H. Stephens, Emory University.
9. See Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption
of American Democracy (New York,
1948), 213-14, for the background for
this split in Ohio. At the height of the 1860
canvass, Archibald MacGregor of Canton
estimated that only eight Democratic journals
in Ohio supported Breckinridge. In
addition to his own Canton Stark County
Democrat, MacGregor cited the Cleveland National Democrat, the
Cadiz Sentinel,
the Carrolton Democrat, the Warren
Democrat, the St. Clairsville Gazette, the
Steubenville Union, and the Newark Advocate. Canton Stark County
Democrat,
July 24, 1860. In contrast, the Columbus
Ohio State Journal estimated that 80 papers
in the state supported Douglas; Columbus
Ohio State Journal, July 23, 1860. At the
election itself, Breckinridge ran fourth
in the state, receiving 11,403 votes, compared to
231,809 for Lincoln, 192,421 for
Douglas, and 12,194 for Bell. Joseph P. Smith, History
of the Republican Party in Ohio (Chicago, 1898), I, 128-29.
10. For a discussion of these
developments throughout the North see John T.
Hubbell, "Politics as Usual: The
Northern Democracy and Party Survival, 1860-1861,"
Illinois Quarterly, XXXVI (1973), 22-35. For a slightly different view, see
Robert W.
Johannsen, "The Douglas Democracy
and the Crisis of Disunion," Civil WarHistory,
IX (1963), 229-47.
Ohio Democracy
23
Democratic party were united as in
former days my hopes for a
settlement of all the troubles would be
anchored within the Vail," wrote
state Representative William Parr.
"But as we are divided I fear
trouble. "11 With remarkable
unanimity, however, Ohio Democratic
spokesmen sought to solve the crisis by
conciliation while
demonstrating themselves to be the true
Union men. Thus they created a
common ground upon which most Ohio
Democrats could stand.
The key to the Democratic response was
compromise, which they
saw as the only means by which to
preserve the Federal Union as it
was then constituted. "All
[Democrats] seem willing to risk an[d]
sacrifise [sic] everything for the Union," wrote state
Representative
George Converse early in the crisis.
Democrats believed that either
unchecked secession or a coercive civil
war to prevent dissolution
ultimately would spell the permanent
destruction of the Union. Only
in a compromise settlement that
reasonable men of all sections could
approve did they see hope for the
country's salvation. Accordingly,
the Democratic press of the state
immediately began to call for
compromise measures as soon as it became
evident that secession
and disunion were not merely idle
southern threats. As one Franklin
County Democrat explained, "the
Democrats are all in favor of an
honorable conciliation of the trouble,
so as to preserve the Union,
allowing the South all her
Constitutional rights, and withholding
nothing from the North that legitimately
belongs to her by virtue of the
Constitution." William B. Woods, a
state Representative, confirmed
that this was the dominant impulse among
his colleagues: "There is a
universal sentiment among the Democrats
here in favor of any
measures which will bring peace to the
country and save the
confederacy."12
At the same time, Democrats disavowed
any responsibility for the
crisis. Southerners were rebelling
specifically at the election of a
Republican President. All Democrats
could, therefore, rightly say of
the difficulties, "This is not my
work!", as party leader Allen G.
Thurman emphasized at a party convention
in January 1861.
11. William Parr to Samuel S. Cox,
January 10, 1861, The Papers of Samuel S. Cox,
Brown University Library.
12. George Converse to Samuel S. Cox,
January 2, 1861, Ibid.; John Bobo to Cox,
January 14, 1861, Ibid.; William B. Woods to
Cox, January 12, 1861, Ibid. See also
Cincinnati Enquirer, December 8, 9, 11, 1860, January 9, 1861; Cleveland
Plain
Dealer, December 20, 1860, January 2, 1861; Columbus Ohio
Statesman, December 20,
21, 29, 1860, January 2, 3, 1861; Canton
Stark County Democrat, November 21, 1860;
Celina Western Standard, January
10, 1861; Georgetown Southern Ohio Argus,
December 5, 1860, January 9, 1861; Newark
Advocate,January 4, 18, 25,1861; Ravenna
Portage Sentinel, December 19, 1860; Wooster Wayne County Democrat, December
13,
January 3, 17, 1861, for early editorial
expressions favoring compromise measures.
24 OHIO HISTORY
Democrats not only denied their own
culpability, they quickly placed
blame squarely upon other shoulders. As
a correspondent of state
Representative James Gamble put it:
"A momentous question is now
to be decided by the conservative men of
the Union, and that
is:-Shall their liberties be frittered
away by a corrupt faction in the
North and another in the South?"
Similarly, the powerful Cincinnati
Enquirer remarked that
the opponents of a compromise settlement
of our national difficulties at the
present time consist of two classes-the
Disunionists per se at the South, who
are for breaking up the Confederacy at
any rate, and a class of politicians at
the North who oppose it because it will
run athwart of their peculiar political
views, by which they obtained power and
office.13
Thus Democrats tarred both northern
Republicans and southern
fire-eaters with the same brush of
disunionism. At the same time, by
advocating conciliation, they hoped to
attract to their standard the
conservative masses of the country who
occupied a middle ground
that was essentially antagonistic to the
two radical extremes.
Although Ohio Democrats condemned both
southern radicals and
northern Republicans, they clearly
reserved their most bitter
vituperation for the latter. This was a
crucial point, for when
Democrats continued in a similar vein
after the war began,
Republicans immediately branded such
criticisms as treason.
Democrats generally portrayed secession
as a censurable, but
understandable, response to Republican
antislavery aggression.14
"The Black Republican traitors
& disunionists have done the work,"
wrote Vallandigham; "the
Republicans will not compromise .. ."
Similarly, the Canton Stark County
Democrat placed the cause of
the crisis "at Northern doors-at
Republican hearths." The
Republican party was "avowedly the
unrelenting and bitter enemy
of the South"; now that the Republicans had won control of the
government, the South was rebelling.
"Is it to be wondered at?" the
Democrat queried.15
Several factors accounted for the
special antipathy Democrats held
for Republicans. Partisanship, of
course, was one source of their
bitterness. More importantly, most
Democrats considered antislavery
agitation, and not the existence of the
institution itself, to be
13. Thurman quoted in Columbus Crisis,
February 8, 1861; William Sample to James
Gamble, quoted in bid., February
28, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, December 28, 1860.
14. See Cincinnati Enquirer, January
9, 1861.
15. Vallandigham to Dr. J. A. Walters,
January 9, 1861, Vallandigham File; Canton
Stark County Democrat, January 9, 1861. For similar expressions see Cincinnati
Enquirer, December 14, 1860; Columbus Crisis, January 31,
1862; Columbus Ohio
Statesman, December 27, 1860; Circleville Watchman, December
28, 1860.
Ohio Democracy 25
responsible for the country's current
difficulties. The Republican
party, as the political agent of that
agitation, bore the brunt of
Democratic wrath. Democrats flatly
denied the Republican premise
that slave labor and free labor were
incompatible. The two systems
were "not necessarily
antagonistical" in the American system,
commented the Cincinnati Enquirer, "but
for political purposes
efforts have been made to make them
so." One Ohio Democrat
believed that "if the [slavery]
question had not been muddled with
and wantonly made a cause of quarrel, if
we had continued to live as
we formerly did, without making the
question an engine of politics,
we might have lived for one century
longer in a state of perfect
concord." Another charged the
Republicans were "impressed with a
fanaticism of a dangerous moral and
religious sentiment" against
slavery, and wrongly "believe they
are commissioned by a higher law
to carry out the dogmas of their
revolutionary faction."16 Quite
simply, most Democrats did not see
African slavery as an appalling
moral wrong; did not wish it to be
abolished; and wanted agitation
over it to cease. To those Democrats who
viewed the Constitution
with near-mystical reverence, there was
no "higher" law; advocacy
of such a thought was tantamount to
treason.
Exacerbating Democratic fears in this
regard was the talk of
peaceful dissolution that filled the
pages of the Columbus Ohio State
Journal, the Cincinnati Commercial, and other powerful
Republican
organs during the secession winter.17
Such expressions confirmed the
Democratic belief that Republicans, as
much as southern
secessionists, were radical
disunionists. "The whole Republican press
of Ohio will be out in full chorus for
the dissolution of the Union and
the formation of a Northern and Southern
Confederacy," predicted
the Columbus Ohio Statesman, the
voice of the Democracy at the
state capital. "That is what the
[Republican] leaders have been
secretly driving at, their wishes and
desires for dissolution being as
strong as those of Rhett, Yancey, and
Co." The Cleveland Plain
Dealer concurred. Commenting in March 1861 on the early
inactivity
of the Lincoln Administration, this
powerful voice of the Douglas
Democracy observed that "we have no
doubt the administration
16. Cincinnati Enquirer, January
2, 1861; Frederick Grimke to Alexander S. Boys,
April 20, 1861, Boys Papers; John A.
Trimble to Stephen A. Douglas, January 2, 1861,
The Papers of John A. Trimble, Ohio
Historical Society. Also, Columbus Crisis,
January 31, 1861; Canton Stark County
Democrat, January 16, 1861.
17. Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War
Era, 1850-1873, vol. IV of The History of
the State of Ohio, ed. Carl Wittke (Columbus, 1944), 373-74, outlines this
Republican
position. See Columbus Ohio State
Journal, November 13, 17, 28, 1860; Cincinnati
Commercial, January 31, February 1, 1861.
26 OHIO HISTORY
policy is this,-Divide the Republic with
as little fighting as
possible. The President and his advisors are Sectional men . . .
they
cannot become National now ..." The administration was carrying
out this policy, the Plain Dealer believed,
in order to maintain itself
in office: "Look to this Black
Republican party for an attempt to
establish two Republics, relinquishing
all power in the one with the
vain hope of perpetually ruling the
other." Likewise, the Ravenna
Portage Sentinel complained that the Republicans "will not
compromise, and rather than yield they
are GOING TO GIVE THE
UNION UP. . . . This is the end which
fanaticism and sectionalism
have wrought for a great
Republic."l8
But while Democrats were disturbed by
the Republican discussion
of dissolution, they found the prospect
of armed coercion to prevent
dissolution no more to their liking. As
the crisis wore on, Republicans
increasingly spoke of the need to employ
coercive measures to keep
the seceding states within the Union.
Democrats at once expressed
their revulsion at such Republican
rhetoric "breathing little else than
vengeance, misery and hopes of bloodshed
. . ." and denounced
Republican policies that were destined
"to drench our country in
fratricidal blood," and "to
plunge the whole nation in a heep [sic] of
ruins." Democrats feared coercion
inevitably would destroy the
delicate fabric of what they held to be
a voluntary union of sovereign
states. Coercion might maintain the
Union in name, but it could only
destroy its spirit. Democrats generally
condemned the Republican
party for being, as Samuel Medary
declared in his Columbus Crisis,
"resolved on revolution and vengeance."19
The Democratic answer to the national
crisis and the perils of
Republicanism was conciliation.
"Moderation is the true policy of the
Northern western Democracy in my humble
judgement," wrote state
Representative William Parr.20 Epitomizing
Democratic efforts in this
regard was the party convention that met
in Columbus on January 23,
1861, to consider the national
difficulties. The assembled delegates
formally declared themselves to be in
favor of any compromise
measure that might be found
acceptable-the proposals of John J.
Crittenden, those of Douglas,
resolutions of representatives of the
18. Columbus Ohio Statesman, February
2, 1861; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March
20, 27, 1861; Ravenna Portage
Sentinel, April 3, 1861. Robert Barnwell Rhett of
South Carolina and William Lowndes
Yancey of Alabama were perhaps the most
extreme of the southern disunionists.
19. A. O. Larason to Samuel S. Cox,
February 5, 1861, Cox Papers; William Bell to
Cox, February 16, 1861, Ibid.; John
Bobo to Cox, January 14, 1861, Ibid.; Columbus
Crisis, January 31, 1861.
20. William Parr to Samuel S. Cox,
January 10, 1861, Cox Papers.
Ohio Democracy 27
border states, "or any other
settlement of our affairs honorable to us
all, which can be effected by
conciliation and compromise, and
mutual concessions of all concerned to
secure the safety and
perpetuity of the Union."
Specifically, they called upon the Ohio
legislature to pass resolutions
requesting a national convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution
that would guarantee the
rights of slaveholders, and upon the
people of the North to give up
such aggravations to the South as
personal liberty laws. In the
clearest of terms, they delcared such
laws to be "nullification," and
therefore no less censurable than
secession: "When the people of the
North shall have fulfilled their duties
to the Constitution and the
South-then, and not until then, will it
be proper for them to take into
consideration the question of the right
and propriety of coercion."21
These boldly stated views served to
foster Republican charges that
the Ohio Democracy was plainly in
sympathy with the South. Many
Ohio Republicans would have agreed with
influential editor William
T. Coggeshall, who tersely noted:
"Dem. State Conven-
tion-Compromised with secession."22
More serious from the
point of view of party harmony,
however, was the danger that some
Ohio Democrats, particularly those who
had been angered by
southern intransigence at Charleston,
would reject the conciliatory
tone assumed by the Columbus delegates.
Indeed, one Douglas paper
from the Western Reserve, the Ravenna Portage
Sentinel, was
outraged at the tenor of the
resolutions:
The South can secede from the
Charleston and Baltimore conventions; they
can prevent the choice of 1,300,000
freemen, and give the election to one who
has no sympathy with their institutions;
. . . declare themselves out of the
Union ... seize the forts ... fire upon
vessels bearing the flag of the Union ...
and more, and yet the Democratic State
Convention of Ohio says in
substance that the North has been the
cause of the trouble .... Out upon all
such Democratic resolutions!
Most Democrats, however, did not appear
to share these
objections. In fact, the Douglas press,
which might be assumed to
have been most frustrated at southern
efforts to defeat their man,
overwhelmingly favored the action of
the convention. The resolutions
had "the ring of the true
metal," commented the Cincinnati
Enquirer, and would be "endorsed by every Democrat and
national
21. The Ohio Platforms of the
Republican and Democratic Parties, 1855 to 1881,
Inclusive (n.p., 1881), 15.
22. William T. Coggeshall Diary entry,
January 23, 1861, The Papers of William T.
Coggeshall, Ohio Historical Society. See
also Columbus Ohio State Journal, January 24,
1861; and Medina Gazette, January
27, 1861.
28 OHIO HISTORY |
|
man in Ohio." The Wooster Wayne County Democrat termed the resolutions "just what they should be; bold, dignified and conciliatory.... Nothing more appropriate could have been said."23 The spirit of compromise and the hope for a peaceable solution to the national troubles struck a responsive chord with most Ohio Democrats. Thus, while the convention did draw criticism, it succeeded in uniting most Ohio Democrats upon a common ground. Throughout the state they earnestly and unceasingly pushed for the adoption of effective compromise measures, as their almost universal support for the Crittenden proposals, the most widely known of the plans, indicated. The Crittenden Plan was "so practicable and so just," one Highland County Democrat wrote, that it "presents itself at once to every calm, reflective and dispassionate mind" as "the remedy" for the crisis. A correspondent of Congressman Samuel S. Cox urged, "For God's Sake, have our folks hold on to the
23. Ravenna Portage Sentinel, January 30, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, January 25, 1861; Wooster Wayne County Democrat, January 31, 1861. See also Columbus Ohio Statesman, January 24, 1861; and Georgetown Southern Ohio Argus, February 6, 1861. In addition, although they did not include specific remarks of praise, other Douglas papers placed the resolutions in their editorial columns, indicating an adherence to the principles stated therein: Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 24, 1861; Celina Western Standard, January 31, 1861. |
Ohio Democracy 29
Crittenden proposition."24
But Democratic advocacy of compromise
was not confined to talk;
they also worked actively for a
conciliatory solution. When the
second session of the Fifty-Fourth Ohio
General Assembly convened
in early January 1861, the Democratic
members quickly went on
record in favor of compromise measures.
Although the Democrats
were a decided minority in both houses,
they were more united in
purpose than their Republican opponents
and often were able to
divide them.25 Democrats in
both houses met in caucus soon after
their arrival at the capital and agreed
to endorse the compromise plan
that had been proposed by a committee of
senators and
representatives from the border states.26 In
addition, individual
Democrats in the Ohio House offered
thirteen separate resolutions in
response to the national crisis, all of
which were conciliatory in
tone.27 In contrast,
individual Republican members also offered
thirteen resolutions dealing with the
crisis, each expressing the
24. John A. Trimble to Stephen A.
Douglas, January 2, 1861, Trimble Papers; Joseph
Burns to Samuel S. Cox, January 8, 1861,
Cox Papers; Columbus Crisis, January 31,
1861. See also Cincinnati Enquirer, February
21, March 28, 1861; Canton Stark
County Democrat, February 13, 1861; Celina Western Standard, January
24, 1861;
The Crittenden Plan called for a
series of Constitutional amendments which provided
for the re-institution of the Missouri
Compromise line of 36° 30' and its extension
across the country; the admission to
statehood of any qualified territory with or without
slavery as its Constitution should
provide; and the guarantee that no further
amendment ot the Constitution should
ever be made allowing Congress to touch
slavery in the states.
25. The Republicans held a 58-46
majority in the House, and a 25-10 majority in the
Senate. Columbus Ohio State Journal, October
27, 1859. The Democrats as a group
were much more cohesive in their actions
than the Republicans. In thirteen key roll-call
votes in the House at this session that
dealt with the national crisis, the Democrats had
an "index of cohesion" for
each of the thirteen votes of 100%, 100%, 98%, 92%, 87%,
100%, 95%, 100%, 83%, 100%, 100%, 100%,
100%. In the same thirteen roll calls, the
Republicans' "index of
cohesion" for each of the votes was 49%, 37%, 13%, 47%,
19%, 17%, 72%, 69%, 80%, 14%, 4%, 96%,
100%. An index of cohesion merely
indicates the degree of solidarity that
exists among members of a certain party.
26. The Border State Proposals," as
they came to be called, were similar to the
Crittenden measures. They provided for the repeal of all personal liberty
laws, coupled
with an amendment of the Fugitive Slave
Law to prevent kidnapping; the prohibition of
interference with the interstate slave
trade, coupled with a permanent ban on the
re-opening of the African slave trade;
the re-institution of the Missouri Compromise
line and its extension to the Pacific;
the admission to statehood of any qualified
territory with or without slavery as its
Constitution should provide; and an amendment
to the Constitution prohibiting Congress
from touching slavery within the several
states. Ohio, General Assembly, House of
Representatives, Ohio House Journal, 54th
General Assembly, January 8, 1861, 12.
27. Two resolutions called for Ohio to
send commissioners to confer with the Border
State representatives; one denounced
coercion in general terms; one enjoined the Ohio
militia from making any military
preparations unless and until Kentucky's did so; two
denounced all personal liberty laws; and
seven called for a national convention to meet
to consider means to guarantee the
rights of slaveholders through Constitutional
30 OHIO HISTORY
general Republican unwillingness to
compromise with the South.28
Democrats hoped that their unity would
enable them to control the
actions of the legislature.
Specifically, they wished to pass a law
preventing Negro immigration into Ohio,
another making it illegal to
aid fugitive slaves, and other
legislation and resolutions unmistakably
conciliatory in tone. Such measures
might in fact have little practical
effect, but they would serve to
demonstrate to southerners, as
Representative George Converse put it,
that "a terrible reaction is
going on in Ohio." They failed,
however, to effect decisive positive
action. "Our movements here are
tardy & stupid-Everything looks
blue or black," lamented Senator
George W. Holmes midway through
the session. "Let our prayers be
delivered from the curse of
Republican rule and domination."29
Despite the absence of dramatic
accomplishment, by uniting with
Republican conservatives the Democrats
were able to check the
actions of the radicals. The general
tone of legislative action remained
conciliatory. Due largely to Democratic
pressure, the legislature
provided for Ohio to send commissioners
to the Washington Peace
Conference. Late in the session
Democrats won passage of a
resolution calling for a national
convention of the states. Still later,
the legislature passed the Corwin
Amendment.30 The Washington
Conference, however, was a dismal
failure. Two months of debate
were required to secure passage of the
resolution calling for a national
convention, and the Corwin Amendment was
approved only after
hostilities had commenced.
The legislative record in regard to
compromise was thus a mixed
amendments; of these, two specifically
endorsed the Crittenden proposals. Ibid.,
January 7, 8, 11, 14, 17, 21, 24, 1861,
pp. 5-6, 12, 13, 32, 45-46, 64-65, 66, 77-78.
28. One resolution demanded no extension
of slavery into the territories, one called
in general terms for the preservation of
the Union; one suggested that all further
resolutions dealing with the secession
crisis be referred to committee without
discussion; one condemned all compromise
proposals then under consideration; two
opposed any amendments to the
Constitution to guarantee slavery; two repudiated
secession; two called for Ohio to be
militarily prepared; and three called for the
enforcement of all the Federal laws. Ibid.,
January 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 1861, pp. 5, 10,
11, 28, 30, 32-33, 35, 37, 72-73.
29. George Converse to Samuel S. Cox,
January 9, 1861, and George W. Holmes to
Cox, February 27, 1861, Cox Papers.
30. The Corwin Amendment, the
result of the work of the House of Representatives
Committee of Thirty-three, chaired by
Ohio Republican Thomas Corwin, provided that
"no amendment shall ever be made to
the Constitution which will authorize or give to
Congress power to abolish or interfere,
within any State, with the domestic institutions
thereof, including that of persons held
to labor or service by the laws of said State."
Ohio and Maryland were the only two
states to ratify the amendment. See R. Alton
Lee, "The Corwin Amendment in the
Secession Crisis," Ohio Historical Quarterly,
LXX (1961), 1-26.
Ohio Democracy 31
one, but most Democratic members
regarded the session as a
complete failure. But their failure did
not diminish the sincerity of
their effort. In debate over various
specific issues, Democrats spoke
in general terms which encompassed the
entire question of sectional
bitterness and secession and which
clearly illustrated the basic tenets
of the Democratic ideology:
conservatism, constitutionalism, racism,
and especially an overwhelming desire
for compromise. When
Representative Joseph Jonas discussed
at length the merits of a bill to
prohibit giving aid to fugitives from
servitude, he concluded his
remarks by speaking to the larger issue.
"We are also discussing a
compromise by which we can harmonize
with our Southern brethren,
and more especially with the Border
States . . .," he told his
colleagues. "If we remain
obstinate and uncompromising, as sure as
we now stand here the Border Slave
States will also secede, and civil
war will prevail in all its
enormities." The rights of the slaves or the
morality of the institution of slavery
were of little concern to
Democrats such as Jonas when weighed
against the spectre of
dissolution of the Union. "The
Democracy of the North and West are
opposed to slavery, but we respect the
rights of the South," he
concluded. "Are we to ruin our
glorious republic for an inferior
race?"31 Likewise,
Representative W. C. Moore, speaking for
passage of the same bill, discussed
fully the entire slavery question.
Although "in common with my
Democratic brethren of the North"
Moore was "opposed to
slavery," he argued that southern
slaveholders needed a "positive
guarantee" against the "false
philanthropy" of the
"anti-slavery sentiment of the north," which
had led some deluded northerners to
steal slaves from their
"comfortable home" and to
throw them "on society here." Moore
denounced "sacrificing the high
destinies of the Anglo Saxon race
upon this continent" in order to
"gratify an unnatural sympathy for
the slave."32 Democratic members
in general bridled at Republican
"abolitionism, mingled with
coercionism," as Representative Henry
L. Dickey put it. "Gentlemen, you
must come down from your higher
law, you must humble yourselves before
the Constitution and laws of
our common country and beg their
pardon....."33
Such rhetoric demonstrated Democratic
desire for conciliation, but
it did little else. Certainly it was
powerless to stay the course of
31. Quoted in Columbus Crisis, March
20, 1861.
32. Quoted in Columbus Ohio
Statesman, March 1, 1861.
33. Henry L. Dickey, "Freedom is
Always Within the Union: Despotism Follows
its Downfall," Speech of Hon.
Henry L. Dickey on the Duty of Ohio in the Present
Crisis (Columbus, 1861), 15,16.
32 OHIO HISTORY
events. As the legislators wrangled, the
nation edged closer to open
hostilities. With the firing upon Fort
Sumter, the Democrats' worst
dread, civil war, with its concomitant
threats to the tenets of the
Democratic orthodoxy, was at hand.
Nevertheless, Ohio Democrats
reacted to the outbreak of war with
ready support of Lincoln's call for
troops; the use of armed force by the
South had roused their martial
ardor. The South's overt act had made
the issue a clear one: the war
was to be waged to restore the Union and
defend the government.
"Devotion to the National flag is
the religion of the hour," wrote the
Cleveland Plain Dealer. Even Samuel Medary, soon to be one of
the most bitter "Copperhead"
critics of the administration, pledged
his allegiance to the war effort.
"We can offer our old friends [of the
South] no encouragement now," he
wrote shortly after the fall of Fort
Sumter. "We must now have every
star retained on our old and glorious
flag.... 34
But Democrats quickly made it clear that
they supported the war
effort expressly to restore the Federal
Union; not to abolish slavery.
They stressed that the conflict must not
be allowed to become, as the
Columbus Ohio Statesman put it,
"a war of invasion, subjugation
and desolation." From the outset
Democrats feared that radical
Republicans would attempt to transform
the war into an abolitionist
crusade. Equally important, many
Democrats feared that the
Republicans would attempt to use wartime
conditions to abrogate the
traditional civil rights that they held
sacred. "The great problem to
work out now," observed Medary,
"is whether we can pass through
the ordeal and retain our individual
freedom." Similarly, while the
Cincinnati Enquirer declared unequivocally that "the UNION MUST
BE SUSTAINED," it also warned,
"let us not forget that we are to
preserve the Constitution also,
and maintain the laws inviolate, for what
would the Union be worth without the
Constitution and the laws?"
Consequently, Democrats kept a sharp eye
on the conduct of the
administration from the beginning of
hostilities. Only weeks into the
war, for example, William Parr bitterly
complained that Lincoln, by his
"unconstitutional acts," was
making himself "the perfect Monarch."35
34. Cleveland Plain Dealer, April
24, 1861; Columbus Crisis, April 25, 1861. Fo
similar Democratic expressions see
Celina Western Standard, April 18, 1861
Georgetown Southern Ohio Argus, April
21, 1861; Newark Advocate, April 19, 1861
A correspondent of John Sherman noted
the Democratic ardor, writing shortly after the
outbreak of hostilities, "There are
no parties in Ohio-all are for the Union and fol
sustaining the Government-In fact I am
not certain but that the Democracy are not thl
most enthusiastic in favor of sustaining
the Administration" (S. E. Brown to Sherman
May 1. 1861, Sherman Papers).
35. Columbus Ohio Statesman, May
3, 1861; Columbus Crisis, April 25, 1861
Cincinnati Enquirer, May 1, 1861; William Parr to Samuel S. Cox, July 9,
1861, Co:
Ohio Democracy 33
Democratic support for the war at its
outset, then, may be
characterized as willing, but
conditional. In their assiduity to maintain
the forms of free government in wartime
lay the seeds for their
subsequent bitter conflicts with Lincoln
and his party. While it was
clear that Ohio Democrats would fight
for the preservation of the
Union-as the enlistment rolls
attested-it was equally clear that most
of them still preferred to achieve that
result by conciliation rather
than conquest. Not surprisingly, given
these factors, most Ohio
Democrats believed that their party was
the one best capable of
bringing a peaceful end to the strife.
Even before the outbreak of war,
Democrats pinned their hopes for
sectional settlement upon their
success at the polls. Convinced that a
powerful reaction against the
fruits of the Republican victory was
already at work in the North,
Democrats were quick to read significant
results into even the most
inconsequential local elections. The
Canton Stark County Democrat
enthused that the Democratic triumph in
that city's elections in early
April was "a glorious victory for
the friends of our undivided
American Union. . . . Whenever the
country is in danger, safety is
sought and found in the conservative and
safe counsels of the
Democratic party." Similarly, the Cleveland
Plain Dealer and the
Cincinnati Enquirer both hailed Democratic municipal victories in
Ohio's two largest cities as the onset
of a "Great Union movement"
and evidence that "the ball of
revolution [has] commenced here"
against the evils of dissolution under
Republicanism.36
Although such victories created
momentary exuberance and good
editorial copy for Democratic
journalists, the will of the people in
regard to the national crisis was best
gauged in the fall election when
the new state administration was to be
chosen. But it was during the
campaign of 1861 that the Ohio Democracy
began once again to
founder on the rocks of internal
divisiveness. At issue was the Union
party movement which first surfaced
during the summer of 1861. In
June the Republican central committee
called upon all Ohioans
"without reference to"
previous party affiliations, to join
together-under Republican auspices-to
present a united political
front in order to demonstrate to the
South northern solidarity. The
majority of the Democratic press and the
leadership of the state party
opposed the movement, seeing in it a
political maneuver by the
Papers. See also Celina Western
Standard, May 9, 1861; Gerogetown Southern Ohio
Argus, July 3,
1861; Newark Advocate, April 19, 1861.
36. Canton Stark County Democrat, April
3, 1861; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April
10, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, April
2, 1861. Republicans objected bitterly to the
Democrats "thrusting national
politics into ... city affairs" (Cincinnati Commercial,
March 19, 1861).
34 OHIO HISTORY
Republicans to lay party claim to the
spirit of patriotism and devotion
to country to attract Democratic
votes-particularly in Democratic
districts-in order to gain electoral
victory. The Dayton Empire, the
powerful voice of Vallandigham in
southwestern Ohio, complained
bitterly that
it was all right enough for the
Republicans to make party nominations in
[Thomas] Corwin's and [John] Sherman's
districts because the Republicans
have a majority in these Districts, but
for the Democrats to insist on
preserving their organization, is all
wrong. It is worse, it is "Treasonable" in
their eyes. The truth is these
[Republican] journals fear the result of the
election.37
Accordingly, the Democratic state
committee summarily rejected
the Republican call, and instead
proceeded with plans to hold its own
convention in Columbus in August. At the
same time, however, a
relatively small but significant number
of Democrats decided that in
good conscience they must support the
war effort by a show of
political solidarity. "Let us for
once go out of party harness," the
Cleveland Plain Dealer urged, "while we give to our glorious but
endangered country our every thought and
energy." The great and
overriding question presented by the
rebellion, wrote one Ohio
Democrat to his congressman, was
"whether we now have, and shall
have to all future time, a government?
or whether we are to be broken
by the power of Southern traitors."
Enough Ohio Democrats shared
these concerns to insure a muddled and
divisive campaign.38
But the great mass of Ohio Democrats,
along with the regular party
leadership, believed they could best
serve the cause of the Union
from within the party. Indeed, given the
Democratic belief that
Republicans as well as secessionists
were responsible for the conflict,
any other course would have been most
surprising. "I am firm of the
opinion that the only policy for the
Democratic party to pursue is to
preserve its organization intact [and]
nominate a thorough Democratic
ticket of tried and true men,"
wrote one Ohio Democratic planner. "I
am unable to see what some of our men
expect to gain by [a] Union
ticket. We have always been Union men
since the organization of our
party. .. ." In a similar vein,
Samuel Medary declared that Ohio
Democrats would have "nothing to
do" with any cooperative effort
with Republicans but would instead
"have a Union Ticket made up
37. Dayton Empire, July 13, 1861.
See also Cincinnati Enquirer, July 7, 1861;
Columbus Ohio Statesman, July 27,
1861; Celina Western Standard, June 23, 1861;
Georgetown Southern Ohio Argus, July
3, 1861; Newark Advocate, July 5, 1861, for
similar views.
38. Cleveland Plain Dealer, June
5, 1861; Uriah Heath to Samuel S. Cox, July 13,
1861, Cox Papers.
Ohio Democracy 35 |
|
of all sound, honest, reliable Democrats and nothing else." The Cincinnati Enquirer announced that "Democrats cannot have any cordial political union with Republicans" because the Lincoln Administration had already "usurped powers, violated personal rights of citizens, and trampled upon some of the dearest privileges guaranteed by the Constitution." Vallandigham urged the "maintainance [sic] of the organization & integrity of the Democratic party" to provide "an ancient & still admirable machinery" with which "to safe [sic] the Constitution & public & private liberty" and "restore the Union...."39 Thus when Democratic delegates convened at Columbus in August 1861 to rechristen themselves the "Democratic-Union" party, nominate a ticket, and formulate a platform, they did not believe they were guilty of unseemly partisanship. Rather, they felt they were following the surest course to a peaceable restoration of the Union.
39. B. F. Potts to Samuel S. Cox, June 30, 1861, Cox Papers; Columbus Crisis, June 20, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, July 7, 1861; Clement L. Vallandigham to Alexander S. Boys, August 13, 1861, Boys Papers. |
36 OHIO HISTORY
They nominated Hugh J. Jewett, a Douglas
Democrat and an
unwavering Union man, for governor. In
their platform they
emphasized once again the need for
compromise and conciliation to
end the conflict and bring the seceded
states back into the Union.
Stressing familiar Democratic points,
they labeled the war "the
natural offspring of misguided
sectionalism, engendered by fanatical
agitators, North as well as South."
They vowed their support to the
war effort, but again stressed that its
aims must remain "to defend
and maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution, and to preserve the
Union with all the dignity, equality and
rights of the several States,
unimpaired." Further, they renewed
their call for a national
convention "for the purpose of
settling our present difficulties and
restoring and preserving the
Union." It is significant that Democratic
advocacy of peace and reunion by
compromise during the summer of
1861 was not adopted after the war had
begun, but rather was a
reiteration of a position they had taken
at the outset of the crisis.40
Clearly, such beliefs were becoming
increasingly tenuous with
significant numbers of the Democracy as
the war continued. The
Cleveland Plain Dealer, for example, questioned the efficacy of
continued attempts at conciliation by
asking:
Shall we propose terms of peace to armed
traitors or dictate terms of peace to
disarmed traitors? With the overawed
loyal people of the South we have
neither opportunity nor occasion to
treat. Our business is with armed traitors
who steadily declare they want no terms
and will accept no terms of Union,
even if they were handed blank paper
with permission to write the terms from
which there should be no appeal.41
Further complicating the situation was
the fact that the Union party
movement of 1861 was, at least
nominally, just that. Three of the
seven nominees on the Union state ticket
were Democrats, including
gubernatorial candidate David Tod. Tod
had been the chairman of the
Baltimore convention which had nominated
Douglas in June 1860,
and had supported the various compromise
proposals prior to the
outbreak of the war. At the state Union
convention in Columbus in
early September, the Republican leaders
who had initiated the
movement consciously sought to insure
that the proceedings would be
"harmonious," in the term of
Republican editor William T.
Coggeshall. They chose a conservative,
veteran Whig, Thomas Ewing,
to chair the convention, and his address
keynoted the Union effort to
attract Democratic support. "The
Ship of State is among breakers
40. The Ohio Platforms of the
Republican and Democratic Parties, 15-16.
41. Cleveland Plain Dealer, September
11, 1861.
Ohio Democracy 37
now," Ewing told the delegates.
"I do not propose to inquire what
Lincoln has done or what Buchanan has
done; let all that pass. Let all
past differences among us be laid aside;
our duty is to save the
country." Implicit in Ewing's
remarks was the assertion that only the
Union party was capable of that task.
The delegates then endorsed
the Crittenden Resolutions, recently
passed by Congress, which
declared in part that the war was not to
be waged for the purpose of
"conquest or subjugation," nor
to interfere with the "rights or
established institutions" of any of
the states, but rather was to
"maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution"; once this object was
attained, "the war ought to end.'42
Because Tod was nominated and the
Crittenden Resolutions
embodied the views of most Democrats
concerning the conduct of the
war, a muddied campaign was insured.
Further, in many respects the
Union campaign took on aspects of a
great eulogy for the recently
deceased Douglas. Republican newspapers
which had vilified the
Little Giant now published with warm
praise exerpts from his last
speeches supporting the war effort. The
issue was so clouded that
Democratic voters could leave their
regular party and still vote for
one of their own, Tod, a champion of
their dead leader Douglas, and
for a platform that largely echoed that
of the Democracy. At one
point before the Union convention, the Cleveland
Plain Dealer, the
most powerful Democratic organ to join
the movement, was able to
endorse the nominations of the regular.
Democratic convention. On
the other hand, the Cincinnati
Enquirer, a staunch foe of the Union
party, remarked shortly before the election
that "the candidates upon
both sides occupy the same position as
regards the vigorous
prosecution of the war, all being in
favor of it, so that on that question
there is no choice."43
Because of this similarity in tickets
and platforms, and because of
the abiding attention most northerners
gave to military operations, the
canvass itself was an unusually
desultory one. Although acrimony on
both sides existed, the usual campaign
furor was absent. "Thus far
there has been a remarkable degree of
public indifference concerning
this election," observed the Cincinnati
Commercial only a week
before election day. While Unionists
anticipated a victory, there were
by no means sure of it. Similarly, while
Democrats spoke hopefully of
42. Proceedings of the Great Union
Convention of Ohio (Cleveland, 1861), 17-19,
20-24, and passim; William T.
Coggeshall Diary entry, September 5, 1861, Coggeshall
Papers; Ewing quoted in Smith, Republican
Party in Ohio, I, 138; Crittenden
Resolutions quoted in Cincinnati Commercial, July
29, 1861.
43. Cleveland Plain Dealer, August
14, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, October 4,
1861.
38 OHIO HISTORY
a triumph, they professed to be ready to
accept defeat with
equanimity.44
Ultimately, the Union ticket swept to
victory. Tod defeated Jewett
by a majority of 55,223 votes, running
well ahead of the total obtained
in 1859 by William Dennison, the
Republican winner in the previous
gubernatorial contest. Although Tod
increased Dennison's majorities
in heavily Republican areas, it was
clear the truly decisive factor was
the crossover vote in areas previously
controlled by the Democracy.
Tod carried sixty-two of Ohio's
eighty-eight counties, or 70 percent;
in 1859 Dennison had carried forty-eight
counties, or just over half.
Jewett's total was nearly twenty
thousand less than that of the
Democratic standard bearer of 1859.
Similarly, Democratic votes
helped to win for the Unionists an
overwhelming majority in the state
legislature. In addition, of the
Unionist totals of sixty-six
Representatives and twenty-six Senators,
thirty-two and five,
respectively, were Union Democrats.45
Clearly, Tod's appeal and that
of the entire Union campaign had been
focused to attract Democratic
support. It had been overwhelmingly
successful. But for this very
reason, Democrats who had opposed the
Union movement could
view the election results and feel far
from discouraged. Some believed
the party had had what amounted to two
tickets in the field. The
Cincinnati Enquirer claimed the results indicated the first signs of a
"political revolution" in
Ohio. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, an
advocate of the Union party, remarked
that the victory had been as
much a Democratic triumph as a
Republican one. Moreover, while it
was true that a significant number of
Democrats had voted the Union
ticket, the regular Democracy clearly
remained the political home of
the great majority of the party's rank
and file. Democrats throughout
Ohio believed, at least in terms of
grass roots support, that the
Democracy was the state's dominant
party.46
The split in the Ohio Democracy during
the campaign of 1861, only
indicated the deeper rift that was to
develop between the "War
Democrats" and the regular party.
The "War Democrats," who
remained a decided minority, generally
were to support the Union
party and the Lincoln Administration in
its conduct of the war for the
duration of the conflict. The regular
Democrats, by far the majority of
44. Cincinnati Commercial, October 1, 1861. Feeling approximately the same
public pulse, the Cincinnati Enquirer
remarked shortly thereafter that "very little
interest is manifested by the people in
the election ..." (Cincinnati Enquirer, October
6, 1861).
45. Smith, Republican Party in Ohio, I,
95, 140.
46. Cincinnati Enquirer, November
15, 1861; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 16,
1861.
Ohio Democracy 39 |
|
the prewar party, continued to support the war for the restoration of the Union, but bridled at what they believed to be usurpations by the Lincoln Administration in the prosecution of the war. The President's emancipation policy, inaugurated in 1862, was particularly repugnant to them. Peaceful sectional compromise remained central to their program. Condemned as "Peace Democrats" or "Copperheads" by their political rivals, these Democrats continued throughout the war to preach the same basic doctrines that they had adopted immediately following the election of Lincoln. Their condemnation of all extremists, and their advocacy of conciliatory measures to preserve the Union, had been during the secession winter both a patriotic embodiment of Democratic ideology and an effective political strategy. However, it became increasingly anachronistic as the conflict wore on. "The Union as it was, the Constitution as it is" was an epigrammatic summary of the Democratic hopes and, in 1861, one that seemingly had a fair chance of accomplishment. But as the war ground on and became ever more massive in its effects, the saying became little more than an empty political slogan. All this should not obscure the fact that northern Democrats conceived of themselves as the true men of the Union, the true |
40 OHIO HISTORY
defenders of political liberty, and the
guardians of the American
system of government. Within the limited
framework of their own
ideology, moreover, they were correct.
Certainly the Republicans
bore little allegiance to the Union
"as it was," nor, as events were to
show, to the Constitution "as it
is." The most rabid critics of the war
could agree, clear of conscience, with
the sentiments of
Vallandigham, who wrote less than a year
prior to his arrest for
treason: "We are the loyal men: we
are the Union men."47 That there
was even a modicum of truth in this
declaration has seldom been
recognized. Yet the Democrats were
fiercely loyal; loyal to an older,
federalized American Union that was
passing from the scene forever,
unable to withstand the irresistable and
irreversable forces of
modernization and the exigencies of a
massive civil war.
47. Clement L. Vallandigham to Dr. J. A.
Walters, June 15, 1862, Vallandigham File.
ERIC J. CARDINAL
The Ohio Democracy and the
Crisis of Disunion, 1860-1861
One of the least understood political
groups in American history
has been the northern Democratic party
during the Civil War. Their
contemporary Republican foes vilified
them as traitors, and
subsequent historians have for the most
part agreed with that
verdict.1 Political
partisanship, ideological conflicts, and wartime
passions account for the original
animus; it is less clear why scholars
have tended to follow so closely the
Republican lead. The primary
reason for the continuing bad
reputation of the wartime Democrats is
that they, nearly as much as the
confederates themselves, "lost" the
war and thus the legitimacy of their
position. The war destroyed their
hopes for the preservation of "the
Union as it was and the
Mr. Cardinal is a Teaching Fellow at
Kent State University where he is in the final
stages of work on his dissertation, a
project being advised by Professor Frank L.
Byrne.
1. See for example Curtis H. Morrow, Politico-Military
Secret Societies of the
Northwest, 1860-1865 (Worcester, MA, 1929); Leonard Kenworthy, The Tall
Sycamore of the Wabash: Daniel Wolsey
Voorhees (Boston, 1936); Wood Gray,
The Hidden Civil War: The Story of
the Copperheads (New York, 1942);
George F.
Milton, Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth
Column (New York, 1942); Christopher
Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats:
The Grand Erosion of Conservative
Tradition (Cranbury, NJ, 1975); F. L. Grayson, "Lambdin P.
Milligan-A Knight of
the Golden Circle," Indiana
Magazine of History, XL (1947), 379-91; Frank C.
Arena, "Southern Sympathizers in
Iowa During the Civil War Period," Annals of Iowa,
XXX (1951), 486-538; Bethania M. Smith,
"Civil War Subversives," Journal of
the Illinois State Historical
Society, XLV (1952), 220-40; Robert S.
Harper, "The
Ohio Press in the Civil War," Civil
War History, III (1957), 221-52, which are studies
embracing, in whole or in part, this
general conception. This is not an exhaustive list,
nor does it fully indicate the
pervasiveness of this view of the northern Democracy. For
example, Norman A. Graebner et al., A
History of the American People (New York,
1975), 423; and Keith I. Polakoff et
al., Generations of Americans: A History of the
United States (New
York, 1976), 366 are two recently-published texts that reflect this
view.
For lucid critiques of the interpretive
literature concerning the northern Democrats,
see Richard O. Curry, "The Union as
it Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of
the 'Copperheads,' " Civil War
History, XIII (1967), 25-39; and Robert H. Abzug,
"The Copperheads: Historical
Approaches to Civil War Dissent in the Midwest,"
Indiana Magazine of History, LXVI (1970), 40-55. For balanced views of the
"Copperheads" which tend to
revise the traditional picture see Frank L. Klement, The
Copperheads of the Middle West (Chicago, 1960); and Idem, The Limits of
Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War (Lexington, 1970), in addition