Ohio History Journal

HOWARD A. DeWITT

The "New" Harding and American

Foreign Policy: Warren G. Harding,

Hiram W. Johnson, and

Pragmatic Diplomacy

 

The historiographical rehabilitation of Warren G. Harding has

produced a revisionist portrait of a President with "moderate talent and

moderate views" who used "persuasion, compromise and conciliation"

to achieve a modicum of success in domestic and foreign affairs.¹

Although historians are divided over the extent and long-range

importance of Harding's accomplishments, there is an emerging

consensus that he possessed some positive political traits. Recent

scholarship has shown that the Harding Administration initiated

domestic and foreign policies which created a workable coalition for the

Republican party. Harding's confident, independent, and assertive

political style during the readjustment in American politics from 1921 to

1923 smoothed the way for "normalcy." A recent Harding biography

concluded that the Republican party's "broad-based, party unifying

approach to foreign affairs" was a key factor in his election to the

presidency.² As an active participant in foreign affairs, Harding also

used diplomatic issues to outmaneuver his isolationist critics. In

particular Harding prevented the sixteen irreconcilable United States

senators, who had blocked American entrance into the League of

Nations and thwarted ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, from

unduly influencing Republican foreign policy.

The relationship between Harding and the irreconcilable bloc

provides an excellent example of Harding's political leadership.

Historians have overemphasized the idea that the fragmented or

makeshift irreconcilable coalition disintegrated in the aftermath of the

Dr. DeWitt is Associate Professor of History at Ohlone College, Fremont, California.

 

1. Robert D. Accinelli, "Was There a 'New' Harding? Warren G. Harding and the

World Court Issue, 1920-1923," Ohio History, LXXXIV (Autumn 1975), 168-81; Robert

K. Murray, The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory and Practice in the

Harding-Coolidge Era (New York, 1973), 55.

2. Randolph C. Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, 1865-1920 (Columbus,

1970), 563.

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Pragmatic Diplomacy                                             97

 

Great War. What many scholars have failed to appreciate fully is that

Harding's political skills neutralized the progressive-isolationist wing of

the Grand Old Party. The standard interpretation of Harding as an

"amiable, easy-going man who had been pushed into office by machine

politics and the ambitions of his wife" is no longer a viable conception.

Yet many questions remain unresolved about the degree of Harding's

political sagacity.

To what degree did Harding mature as a political theorist? Did he alter

his previous attitudes and concepts of the President's role? Why did

Harding take an active interest in American foreign policy? An analysis

of his political relationship with Senator Hiram W. Johnson of California

indicates that Harding remained a conciliatory, compromising politician

who did not significantly expand the role of the President in foreign

affairs; nevertheless, Harding's skill as a practical politician aided the

smooth course of Republican foreign policy in the 1920s.

Despite Harding's revised image, there remains a great deal of

skepticism over his accomplishments. A recent poll reevaluating

presidential leadership continued to rank Harding among the lowest

executives in "prestige, in strength of action, in presidential activeness

and in accomplishments."³ This poll coincided with results taken in

similar surveys in 1948 and 1962.⁴ As Eric F. Goldman has shown, the

analytical disdain which American historians have reserved for Harding

is a difficult mold to penetrate.⁵ This is unfortunate, because Harding's

leadership in foreign affairs produced a "surprising cooperation on

foreign affairs" between Congress and the President.⁶

It was characteristic of Harding's personality to create a conciliatory

political atmosphere. His handling of the isolationist-minded Johnson

prevented the California senator from disrupting the course of

Republican foreign policy. In his political relationship with Johnson,

then, Harding demonstrated a conciliatory style which defused the

potential criticism of the isolationists.

But it was not an easy task to placate Johnson and his

obstructionist-minded colleagues. Consequently, Harding was forced to

develop three distinct approaches in his relationship with Johnson. Prior

 

3. Gary M. Maranell, "The Evaluation of Presidents: An Extension of the Schlesinger

Polls," Journal of American History, LVII (June 1970), 104-13.

4. Arthur M. Schlesinger, "The U.S. Presidents," Life, XXV (November 1, 1948), 47;

Idem, "Our Presidents: A Rating of 75 Historians," The New York Times Magazine, July

29, 1962, 12-13, 40-43.

5. Eric F. Goldman, "A Sort of Rehabilitation of Warren G. Harding," The New York

Times Magazine, March 26, 1972, 42. For comment on the recent Harding literature see

Burl Noggle, "The New Harding," Reviews in American History, I (March 1973), 126-31.

6. Murray, The Politics of Normalcy, 60.

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98                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

to the Republican convention Harding maintained a cordial personal

relationship with Johnson and lectured him on the necessity of party

unity. During the 1920 campaign Harding convinced a reluctant Johnson

to support the Republican ticket. It was essential to the Republican

coalition to conduct the campaign around a general party consensus on

foreign affairs. Thus, Johnson appeared to be an influential voice in

Republican policymaking in matters relating to foreign policy. Finally,

after his March 1921 inauguration, Harding systematically excluded

Johnson from Republican foreign policy. In essence, Harding's policies

were ones designed to create a consensus in national politics.⁷

The opposition of isolationist critics prompted Harding to exercise

caution in his dealings with Senator Johnson. Prior to the 1920

Republican convention, Harding continually appeared to solicit

Johnson's political advice. This was necessary due to Johnson's strong

support from that segment of American public opinion which applauded

his stand against membership in the League of Nations and ratification

of the Treaty of Versailles. As one of the best known isolationist critics

of Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy, Johnson was an important voice in

domestic politics. It was essential to Harding's candidacy that his views

on foreign affairs not clash with Johnson's.⁸

But it was difficult for Harding and Johnson not to bicker publicly

since there were serious differences between them. Harding believed,

for example, that mild internationalism was preferable to staunch

isolationism. In 1919 when Harding and Johnson served on the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, they compared ideas and attitudes on

foreign affairs. The result was a display of divergent beliefs. Johnson

made it clear that he opposed any form of international cooperation

while Harding urged "unofficial observers" in European politics.

Johnson believed that business interests and munitions makers had

helped to hasten American entry into the Great War, which resulted in

Johnson's advocacy of restrictions on American trade and close

regulation of foreign commerce. Harding, however, believed that

foreign trade was the cornerstone of America's free enterprise system

and he privately stated that a successful foreign policy must be tied to

the needs of the business community. In formal diplomatic relations

Johnson advocated a strong moral tone, coupled with inflexible and

well-defined positions. Harding urged flattery and flexibility in dealing

 

7. Howard A. DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American Foreign Policy, 1917-1941"

(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1972), Chapter 6.

8. David H. Jennings, "President Harding and International Organization," Ohio

History, LXXV (Spring-Summer 1966), 149-65.

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99

with European nations. These differences eventually led to political estrangement between Johnson and Harding. Equally important, however, was the United States Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty because it came less than a year before the Republican convention. This forced Harding to maintain a low-key approach to eventual world involvement.9 Harding made it evident that an "association of nations" appealed to him in an abstract sense, but he repeatedly disclaimed any internationalist tendencies.10 Harding's dilemma was to prevent the isolationist bloc from upsetting his 9. Ralph A. Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington, 1970), 92, 100-11, 119-27; Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933 (Lexington, 1971), 27-28. For Johnson's shifting attitudes on the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles see The Papers of Hiram W. Johnson, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter cited Johnson Papers). 10. Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920 (Nashville, 1969), 296, 313; Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis, 1969), 327-28. An asset in understanding the dangers of internationalist thought to domestic American politics is Roland N. Stromberg, Collective Security and American Foreign Policy, From the League of Nations to NATO (New York, 1963), 28-39.

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100                                                     OHIO HISTORY

 

presidential campaign. This would require deft handling of the complex

questions surrounding American foreign policy.

Harding realized that his first task was to bring the irreconcilables into

the party fold; Republican unity over foreign affairs was an absolute

necessity. Consequently, he perfected a technique to preempt

Johnson's influence in foreign policy. The Harding campaign force

contacted the press and asserted that Senator Johnson's advice was

being solicited on a matter relating to foreign policy. After a number of

well-publicized, ego-massaging letters, the Harding forces had created

the impression that Johnson was in the mainstream of their campaign

planning. It was a fine line for Harding's campaign directors to walk

between the isolationist-minded senators such as Johnson and the

generally middle-of-the-road attitudes of the Republican majority.¹¹

Perhaps the best example of Harding's success as a compromising,

conciliatory politician was shown when Johnson attempted to disrupt

the Republican campaign. On July 7, 1920, Johnson announced that

Harding was pursuing an anti-League of Nations campaign, and this was

the official position of the Republican party. As the Republicans were in

the process of nominating Harding, Johnson attempted to fasten an

isolationist tag upon his party. Harding, however, quickly countered

Johnson's ploy by asserting his commitment to international

cooperation. In his July 22, 1920, acceptance speech Harding spoke of

the necessity of facing world responsibilities, but he cautioned against

undue involvement in the affairs of other nations. This was a classic case

of Harding's ability to appease isolationists and internationalists alike.¹²

Johnson continued to be a troublesome factor in Republican politics

by charging that bankers and businessmen were unduly influencing the

direction of American foreign policy. He repeatedly charged that

bankers were preparing a campaign to alter postwar plans to collect war

debts and reparations. Since the business community was interested in

reopening prewar trade lines, Johnson argued, business interests

supported proposals to reduce or forgive war debts.¹³ Harding wrote

11. Wesley M. Bagby, The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and

Election of 1920 (Baltimore, 1962), 54-101; Downes, The Rise of Harding, 565-66; Andrew

Sinclair, The Available Man: The Life Behind the Masks of Warren Gamaliel Harding

(New York, 1965), 136-54.

12. Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York,

1957), 104-06, 112-15; Downes, The Rise of Harding, 406-26; Murray, The Harding Era,

3-42; Handwritten memorandum, n.d., Johnson Papers.

13. Howard A. DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and World War I: A Progressive in

Transition," Southern California Quarterly, LVI (Fall 1974), 295-305; Richard C. Lower,

"Hiram Johnson: The Making of An Irreconcilable," Pacific Historical Review, XLI

(November 1972), 505-26. The economic aspects of Johnson's politics are examined in

Howard A. DeWitt, "Hiram Johnson and Economic Opposition to Wilsonian Diplomacy:

A Note," The Pacific Historian, XIX (Spring 1975), 15-23.

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Pragmatic Diplomacy                                           101

 

Johnson that his concerns were false ones, and he suggested that

Johnson's opinions on foreign affairs would be valuable during the

campaign. This began a number of appeals to Johnson's vanity which

helped to maintain Republican unity.¹⁴

The differences between Harding and Johnson resulted, in part, from

differing concepts of business involvement in Republican politics.

Johnson interpreted every shift in Harding's position on foreign affairs

as an indication of banking and big business influences. It was not

surprising, then, that the Harding-Johnson relationship was a tenuous

one. Another reason for this strained relationship was that the two men

formed their opinions by different processes. Harding searched out a

wide range of concepts and ideas, and he phrased his foreign policy

statements to broaden public support for the Republican party. Johnson

tended to view foreign policy from a narrow, nationalistic, anti-big

business viewpoint, and his initial conception of an issue was one he

held for a lifetime. Johnson was typical of the skeptical Progressive who

believed that malevolent business interests exerted an unseen influence

upon Harding. Since 1917 Johnson's political arguments had not varied

on the dangers of big business upon foreign policy. Progressives

believed that war debts and reparations would not be collected due to

Wall Street interference, and they viewed Harding as sympathetic to big

business arguments supporting an internationalist foreign policy.¹⁵

For a year prior to the campaign, Republican strategists were

skeptical of Johnson's highly visible and well-defined isolationism. It

was obvious to Harding Republicans that Johnson was a potential

poltical liability, and they worked carefully around his political

strengths. Although Harding did not officially announce his candidacy

for the Republican nomination until mid-December 1919, his strategists

devoted two months prior to the formal candidacy perfecting plans to

prevent Johnson from disrupting the 1920 campaign.¹⁶

Harding cautioned his political advisers to attempt to exploit issues of

foreign policy during the campaign. He urged his strategists to analyze

carefully the sources of diplomatic friction between himself and

Johnson. For example, there were serious differences of opinion over

14. Warren G. Harding to Hiram W. Johnson, September 6, 1920, The Papers of Warren

G. Harding, The Ohio Historical Society (hereafter cited Harding Papers); Downes, The

Rise of Harding, 567; Murray, The Harding Era, 45-46.

15. Hiram W. Johnson to Raymond Robins, August 24, 1920, The Papers of Raymond

Robins, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (hereafter cited Robins Papers); Johnson to

William E. Borah, July 1, August 26, 1920, Johnson Papers; Adler, The Isolationist

Impulse, 173-74.

16. George H. Clark to Charles E. Hard, December 6, 1919, The Papers of Charles E.

Hard, The Ohio Historical Society (hereafter cited Hard Papers); Murray, The Harding

Era, 25-32.

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102                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

the utility of the League of Nations. Although they both spoke of the

League disparagingly, appearing to share a common opposition to it, the

two men differed on a number of significant points. Harding reasoned

that a nonpartisan national debate upon the League would bring many

factions who previously had opposed Wilsonian diplomacy into the

mainstream of Republican politics. Publicly, then, Harding cultivated

the image of a statesman attempting to bring the nation toward a

satisfactory solution to postwar peace plans. Harding's strategy was to

use a national forum to debate the pros and cons of future international

relations as a means of promoting his presidential candidacy.¹⁷

In contrast to Harding's carefully thought out and varied positions on

foreign affairs, Johnson continually stressed negative and esoteric

problems which conceivably might arise from Wilson's peace plans. In

particular Johnson was extremely critical of Article X of the League

Covenant; this provision pledged member nations to aid one another in

the event of a military, political, or economic crisis. This would commit

American troops, business resources, and governmental advisers,

Johnson argued, to all future world conflicts. The League debate was an

acrimonious one, and it intensified Johnson's allegation that the United

States would be intervening continually in European affairs. Because of

this viewpoint, Johnson campaigned extensively for the League's defeat

and rejection of the Versailles Treaty. Acceptance of Wilson's peace

plans, Johnson observed, would continue the dangerous wartime

precedents which threatened permanently to engulf American

diplomacy. 18

Recognizing the potential dangers of Johnson's stand, Harding

worked for changes in the Versailles Treaty which would bring broader

domestic support for peace. In 1919 Harding straddled the issue of

participation in the League of Nations, but he supported a peace treaty

which expressed a sympathy for international cooperation. ¹⁹ A series of

reservations to rewrite the unacceptable portions of the Treaty, Harding

 

17. Harding to W. T. Spegal, May 21, 1919, Harding to Frank S. Rea, June 19, 1919,

Harding Papers; Downes, The Rise of Harding, 315-28.

18. DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American Foreign Policy," Chapters 4-5; Arno J.

Mayer, "Historical Thought and American Foreign Policy in the Era of the First World

War," in Francis L. Loewenheim, The Historian and the Diplomat: The Role of History

and Historians in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1967), 73-90; J. Chal Vinson,

Referendum for Isolation: Defeat of Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant

(Athens, 1961), 110-20; Johnson to Archibald Johnson, April 1, 1919, Johnson Papers;

Hiram W. Johnson to Chester Rowell, April 9, 1919, The Papers of Chester Rowell,

Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter cited Rowell Papers).

19. W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore, 1933), 292-307;

Jennings, "President Harding and International Organization," 150-52; Robert J.

Maddox, William E. Borah andAmerican Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge, 1969), Chapter 3.

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Pragmatic Diplomacy                                            103

 

surmised, would erase the fractious divisions within the Republican

party over foreign affairs. Harding had shrewdly recognized that the

Treaty of Versailles was doomed to rejection by the United States

Senate. Consequently, he made positive statements about the necessity

of a well-defined foreign policy.²⁰

By the summer of 1919 Johnson's correspondence revealed that his

differences with Harding had reached the point of antagonism. To his

close personal friends Johnson predicted a dire future in foreign affairs.

Suspecting Harding's internationalism, Johnson warned Albert J.

Beveridge of Indiana that Harding was a "weak-kneed" politician who

"would put us in jail" by publicly supporting the League of Nations.²¹

As a result of his contact with Harding on the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, Johnson concluded that he favored an internationalist

foreign policy. Although the differences between the two men were not

evident to the public nor to most Republicans, there was serious concern

in party circles that Johnson might disrupt the upcoming campaign.²²

A number of Harding's Republican supporters maneuvered to bring

Johnson into the mainstream of party politics. Perhaps the best example

of Harding's supporters aiding his candidacy was shown in the inside

information that Alex P. Moore, editor of the Pittsburgh Leader,

provided the Harding campaign. Moore, who also had developed a

warm friendship with Johnson because of their common antipathy to the

League, worried that controversy would destroy the Republican party.

As a result Moore forwarded all of Johnson's letters to Harding's

strategists. Moore believed that the Republican party must avoid a

repetition of Johnson's snub of Charles Evans Hughes during the 1916

campaign. If Johnson displayed the same type of behavior toward

Harding, Moore theorized, it might mean the continuation of

Democratic party power. Moore envisioned himself as a neutralizing

figure between Harding and Johnson. In reality, however, the Moore

letters allowed Harding's campaign an inside view of Johnson's political

 

 

20. Warren G. Harding to Malcolm Jennings, September 12, 1919, The Papers of

Malcolm Jennings, The Ohio Historical Society (hereafter cited Jennings Papers); Harding

to Hard, October 3, 1919, Hard to Harding, September 27, 1919, Hard Papers; Downes,

The Rise of Harding, 327-28.

21. Johnson to Beveridge, June 18, 1919, Johnson Papers; John Braeman, Albert J.

Beveridge: American Nationalist (Chicago, 1971), passim.

22. DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American Foreign Policy," Chapter 5; Marshall

Stimson to Chester Rowell, October 11, 1919, Rowell Papers; Undated memorandums and

clippings, The Papers of Marshall Stimson, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino,

California; Franklin Hichborn to Hiram Johnson, October 25, 1919, The Papers of

Franklin Hichborn, John Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation, University of

California, Los Angeles.

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104                                                     OHIO HISTOR

thought. This was an undeniable asset in Harding's ability to maintai Republican unity.23 Another example of Harding's campaign tactics was his support from a wide range of Ohio politicians on foreign affairs. In mid-August 1919 he received an inordinate amount of publicity as a member of a smal group of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who discussed th peace with President Wilson.24 Immediately a number o isolationist-minded Ohio Republicans urged Harding to speak ou 23. Alex P. Moore to Harding, August 30, 1919, Harding Papers; Johnson to Moor November 3, 1919, Johnson Papers. For examples in Johnson's correspondence whic indicate that he hoped to use foreign affairs as a lever in the 1920 campaign, see Johnson t Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., November 8, 21, 1919, Johnson to Edgar A. Luce, November 14 1919, Johnson to John F. Neylan, November 24, 1919, Johnson to Theodore J. Roche November 28, 1919, Johnson to Archibald Johnson, January 24, 1920, Johnson Papers. 24. Downes, The Rise of Harding, 326-28; Jennings, "President Harding an International Organization," 150; Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreig Policy, 65. Essential to understanding the differences between Wilson and Republicans i domestic politics is Seward W. Livermore, Politics Is Adjourned: Woodrow Wilson an the War Congress, 1916-1918 (Middletown, 1966).

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Pragmatic Diplomacy                                                105

 

against the peace treaty. They pointed out that Harding's mail was

running three to one against the League of Nations.²⁵ But Harding

continued to straddle the issue. The ominous warnings that Johnson's

anti-League of Nations speeches were hurting Harding's bid for the

presidency failed to alter his strategy. Harding indignantly ruled out a

number of requests to deliver a few carefully selected addresses

denouncing the League of Nations. He reasoned that it was

inappropriate to debate the League question anywhere except the

Senate. To do otherwise, Harding lectured, would promote one's own

political ambitions. This obvious reference to Johnson's political tactics

made it clear that Harding would avoid any controversy with President

Wilson over foreign affairs. The image of a "statesman," Harding

suggested, was one that would lead to the presidency.²⁶

Harding's strategists continued to worry about Johnson's influence

upon the presidential election. Consequently, in January 1920,

negotiations began with potential Johnson delegates to the Republican

National Convention. Within a short period of time California

Republicans agreed to support Harding's nomination on the second

ballot. The ease with which Harding's strategists lined up the Johnson

supporters indicated that he was not a serious presidential candidate. At

this point Harding realized he could exclude Johnson from his

administration, but he continued to court Johnson's support to defuse

any controversy over foreign affairs.²⁷

The radicalism in foreign policy which Harding believed Johnson

possessed was an important factor in the continual conciliation of the

Johnson forces. The debate over American troops remaining in northern

Russia and Siberia after the war, for example, convinced Harding that

Johnson was too radical.²⁸ Harding speculated that Johnson "may

25. Frank Scobey to Harding, September 23,1919, Harding to Scobey, October 9,1919,

Harding Papers; Charles E. Hard to Harding, September 27, 1919, Hard Papers.

26. Harding to Hard, October 3, 1919, Hard Papers; Harding to Scobey, October 9,

1919, Harding Papers. William E. Borah of Idaho, one of Johnson's closest colleagues,

blanched at Hardings attempts to restrict the debate on foreign policy to the Senate. Borah

believed that Harding's attitude was much like Wilson's and he shuddered at the thought of

Harding conducting American foreign policy. There is irony in Borah's assertions that

public opinion would elect the presidential candidate with the clearest conception of

foreign affairs. See, for example, Borah to Frank Munsey, November 21,1919, The Papers

of William E. Borah, Library of Congress; Johnson to Borah, December 30,1919, Johnson

Papers.

27. George Clark to Hard, December 6, 1919, Hard Papers; Warren G. Harding to

Frank E. Scobey, January 20, 1920, The Papers of Frank E. Scobey, The Ohio Historical

Society (hereafter cited Scobey Papers); Downes, The Rise of Harding, 345-76.

28. Christopher Lasch, "American Intervention in Siberia: A Reinterpretation,"

Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII (June 1962), 205-23; Arno J. Mayer, Politics and

Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967), 331-35; Betty M. Unterberger,

America's Siberia Expedition, 1918-1920 (Durham, 1956), 135-48. For examples of

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106                                                      OHIO HISTORY

 

appeal to the Bolshevist sentiment of some of the wild and wooly

Western states and develop the following, but he will never cut much of

figure in the national convention."²⁹ But Harding realized thai

maintaining Johnson's political friendship was necessary to Republican

success. Consequently, he ignored many of Johnson's outrageous

statements on foreign policy. Prior to the Republican National

Convention, Harding reminded Johnson that their friendship was more

important than party politics.³⁰ Alex Moore reported that Harding had

courted Johnson's support with success, and he predicted success for

the Harding campaign.³¹

The story of the June 8-12, 1920, Republican nominating convention is

a familiar one. The old myth that Harding was nominated in a

smoke-filled room by party professionals has been destroyed by recent

scholarship.³² What caused this myth was the general chaos

surrounding the Republican convention. The large number of

candidates seeking the nomination, the diverse range of delegate

support, and the debate over the party's platform added to this

confusion. It was not surprising, then, that Harding's conciliatory,

patchwork political program appealed to a majority of Republicans. But

once Harding secured the 1920 Republican presidential nomination, new

problems arose. One perplexing situation was Johnson's refusal to

campaign actively for the ticket. He refused to campaign for Harding

until the party leadership granted him final approval on all matters

relating to foreign policy. Eventually Harding seemed to grant him this

request. Harding stated that he considered Johnson the official party

spokesman on foreign policy, but this proved to be a spurious honor.

Johnson seldom offered advice, and Harding rarely consulted him.³³

A few days after his acceptance speech before the Republican

 

Johnson's thoughts on the Russian question, see Johnson to Raymond Robins, March 5,

11, 14,16,28, April 3, 1919, Robins Papers; Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, March 22, April

7, June 7, 1919, Johnson to Meyer Lissner, April 11, 1919, Johnson Papers. These letters

display a highly liberal stance on the Russian question and they contain material useful in

assessing Harding's fears of Western radicalism.

29. Harding to Scobey, January 20, 1920, Scobey Papers.

30. Harding to Johnson, June 22, 1920, Harding Papers; Downes, The Rise of Harding,

364-66.

31. Moore to Harding, June 24,1920, Harding to Johnson, July 8,1920, Harding Papers.

32. Wesley M. Bagby, "The 'Smoke-Filled Room' and the Nomination of Warren G.

Harding," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLI (March 1955), 657-74; Downes, The

Rise of Harding, 406-26, 435-36; Donald R. McCoy, "Election of 1920," in Arthur M.

Schlesinger, Jr., et al., History ofAmerican Presidential Elections, 1789-1968 (New York,

1971), III, 2349-56; Murray, The Harding Era, 3-42; Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties: The

United States From Armistice to Normalcy (Urbana, 1974), 207-13.

33. Downes, The Rise of Harding, 435-36; DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American

Foreign Policy," 154.

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Pragmatic Diplomacy                                                107

 

National Convention, Harding assured Johnson that there would be no

internationalist thought in his campaign. Thus, Harding began an

innocuous but ego reenforcing correspondence with Johnson. He

maintained that Johnson's "stature" as a world political figure made it

imperative for him to campaign for Harding.³⁴ But he also lectured

Johnson on the necessity of broadening his views on American

diplomacy. Johnson refused and urged Harding to analyze realistically

the dangers of Article X of the League Covenant. It was obvious that an

impasse had been reached, and that neither man would alter his

position.³⁵

These differences prompted Johnson to inform his sons, Archibald

and Hiram, Jr., that he would not campaign for Harding.³⁶ But

Harding's constant references to Johnson's leadership and the high

quality of his theorizing upon foreign affairs brought Johnson into the

campaign. Equally important was Johnson's fear that his California

rival, Herbert C. Hoover, was occupying an increasingly prominent

position in the Harding campaign. Although he had defeated Hoover in

the May 1920 primary in California, Johnson never forgave him for

challenging his leadership. Considering the level of antagonism between

Johnson and Hoover, it was a masterly example of conciliatory politics

to see them both campaigning for Harding. The end result was to

minimize California political interference. In the process Johnson and

Hoover strained an already fragile relationship. The main issue between

them was Johnson's assertion that Harding's acceptance speech

doomed the future of the League of Nations. Hoover apologized to

Harding for Johnson's attempt to embarrass the Republican campaign

by casting it in an isolationist mold. "The uncorrected interpretation

placed by Senator Johnson upon the section of your acceptance speech

devoted to the League of Nations," Hoover wrote Harding, "has been

an overwhelming shock to the conscience of a great section of

 

34. Harding to Johnson, July 27, 1920, Johnson to A. D. Lasker, July 24, 1920, Johnson

to Meyer Lissner, July 30, 1920, Johnson Papers; Harding to Johnson, August 16, 1920,

Harding Papers.

35. Harding to Johnson, September 6, 1920, Johnson Papers. This letter is an example

of Harding's compromising, conciliatory political style. Harding wrote Johnson: "I do not

pretend to specifically point out exactly what I propose to do and think it practical to do,

because the big task of the present is to make it reasonably possible for our party to unite in

opposition to the surrender which threatened in the course pursued by the President."

Despite Harding's stilted prose, he made it clear to Johnson that he would not define his

positions on major issues, because he believed this would promote Republican disunity.

For earlier statements of this viewpoint see Harding to Johnson, August 16, 1920, Harding

Papers.

36. Johnson to boys, September 23, 1920, Johnson Papers. For Johnson's early

reactions to Harding's candidacy and nomination, see Johnson to George Norris, June 16,

1920, and Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, July 30, 1920, Johnson Papers.

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108                                                       OHIO HISTORY

 

Republicans."³⁷ Hoover and other California Republicans, however,

comforted Harding with predictions of Johnson's declining political

influence. California politics were plagued by a number of ethnic and

labor controversies which created disunity and strife among Johnson's

political supporters. These crises reflected the growing conservatism in

California politics, and they suggested a great deal of support for

Harding's policies. Harding cautiously refrained from remarking on

these problems. The result was to bring California into the Harding

campaign.38

Senator Johnson recognized Harding's increased strength, and he

was becoming increasingly concerned about Hoover's internationalist

influences upon Republican strategists. Consequently, Johnson entered

the campaign due to fears of Hoover rather than to help Harding's

candidacy. This fact was recognized readily by Harding, and he vowed

to exclude Johnson from the inner circles of his administration.³⁹

Although Johnson campaigned for Harding, he did so in a lackluster and

uninspiring manner.⁴⁰ The compromising, conciliatory tone of the

Harding campaign was the primary reason for Johnson's lack of

enthusiasm and he pressured Harding and his key strategists to take a

more positive stand on the significant issues.⁴¹ Harding refused

Johnson's demands and Raymond Robins was delegated to remind

Johnson that his political future rested upon the Republican campaign.

The strained tone of the 1920 presidential election indicated that

Johnson's future role would be an obstructionist one.42

Once elected, Harding faced the delicate task of minimizing

Johnson's negative influence upon the Republican party. In the interim

 

37. Hoover to Harding, August 2, 1920, Harding Papers; Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert

Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston, 1975), 74-77.

38. Alfred Holman to Harding, August 6, 1920, Hoover to Harding, August 3, 1920,

Harding to Hoover, August 7, 1920, Harding Papers; Richard D. Batman, "The Road to

the Presidency: Hoover, Johnson and the California Republican Party, 1920-1924,"

(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1965), Chapters 1-2; Gary Dean

Best, "The Hoover-For-President Boom of 1920," Mid-America, LIII (October 1971),

227-44; Howard A. DeWitt, Images of Ethnic and Radical Violence in California Politics,

1917-1930: A Survey (San Francisco, 1975), 48-73; John J. Fitzpatrick, "Psychoanalytic

Considerations of Hiram W. Johnson's Presidential Candidacy in 1920," Paper presented

to the Western History Association, Reno, Nevada, October 10, 1970.

39. Harding to Hoover, August 7, 1920, Harding Papers.

40. Johnson to McClatchy, July 30, 1920, Johnson Papers. For Johnson's reluctant

attitudes toward Harding, see Johnson Papers.

41. Johnson to Moore, August 31, 1920, Harding Papers; Johnson to Harold Ickes,

September 5, 1920, Harding to Johnson, September 6, 1920, Johnson Papers-

42. Johnson to Robins, January 9, 1921, Robins Papers; Moore to Harding, August 31,

1920, Johnson to Moore, August 31, 1920, Moore to George Christian. September 1, 1920,

Harding Papers; New York Times, September 21, 1920; Maddox, William E. Borah and

American Foreign Policy, 73-81.

• 13
 

Pragmatic Diplomacy                                        109

between the November election and the March 1921 inauguration, Harding continued to practice conciliatory politics by appearing to consult all aspects of party opinion. Harding announced that his cabinet would be made up of the "best minds" available to the Republican party. In reality, Harding consulted an isolationist and an internationalist for many cabinet positions. To avoid controversy Harding announced that his Secretary of State would be either Philander C. Knox, a Pennsylvania irreconcilable, or Charles Evans Hughes, the unsuccessful 1916 nominee and an internationalist. While historians have differed over Harding's motives, there is little doubt the President-elect benefitted from appearing to be open-minded.43 Harding's pre-inaugural compromises were evident when he arranged a special meeting with Johnson. In December 1920, Harding coyly suggested that he planned to support an "association of nations" to combat disruptive influences on world politics. If Johnson would support such an idea, Harding lectured, it might well bring him the Republican presidential nomination. Harding bluntly suggested that party regularity was the key to Johnson's future political successes. But Johnson informed Harding that the 1920 election was a mandate to remain outside of European and East Asian political affairs.44 43. Downes, The Rise of Harding, 568; DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American Foreign Policy," Chapter 6. For a viewpoint which offers an alternative view to Downes see Murray, The Politics of Normalcy, 24-25. 44. Moore to Harding, August 31, 1920, Johnson to Moore, August 31, 1920, Moore to Christian, September 1, 1920, Harding Papers; Johnson to boys, December 7, 1920, Johnson to George W. Jolly, December 16, 1920, Johnson to Frederic Landis, August 24, 1920, Johnson to Harold Ickes, September 5, 1920, Johnson Papers.

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110                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

In January 1921, Harding and Johnson met to discuss the future of

American foreign policy. Prior to their meeting, Johnson lamented

Harding's choice of Charles Evans Hughes as Secretary of State and

Herbert C. Hoover as Secretary of Commerce. These appointments

convinced Johnson that Harding planned an internationalist foreign

policy.⁴⁵ Consequently, the Johnson-Harding talk was an awkward

affair. Harding attempted to quiet Johnson's fears of "backing in" to the

League of Nations. He took great pains to reassure Johnson that

internationalism would not dominate Republican foreign policy.

Momentarily Harding's soothing arguments persuaded Johnson that the

League of Nations would not include the United States. "I have been

assured that he will never return to us the Versailles Treaty," Johnson

jubilantly wrote his son.⁴⁶ On the eve of Harding's inaugural address,

then, Johnson had mixed feelings over the explanations of the

President-elect's foreign policy.⁴⁷

In his inaugural address Harding dropped his compromising,

conciliatory tone, and he indicated a strong desire to participate in world

affairs. But Johnson ignored Harding's comments. Although he rejected

any notion to join the League of Nations, Harding made it clear that his

administration was ready to "associate ourselves with the nations of the

world. ..,"⁴⁸ For some reason Johnson did not perceive the shift in

Harding's attitudes. In fact Johnson was buoyed by Harding's speech.

"The inaugural address," Johnson wrote Sacramento Bee editor C. K.

McClatchy, "apparently took our position on the League of Nations."⁴⁹

Johnson failed to analyze correctly Harding's position. On April 12,

1921, in a special session of Congress, Harding stressed his hope for an

international disarmament conference and he talked of collecting war

debts. While continuing to disavow membership in the League, Harding

stated "we pledged our efforts in the direction of world political

cooperation and the pledge will be faithfully kept."⁵⁰ It is ironic that

Harding's interest in foreign affairs began to drift into domestic politics

after this speech and Hughes and Hoover began to take a more active

part in American diplomacy.

45. Handwritten memorandum, n.d., Johnson Papers; Robert K. Murray, "President

Harding and His Cabinet," Ohio History, LXXV (Spring-Summer 1966), 108-25.

46. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., January 6, 1921, Johnson Papers.

47. Johnson to Morgan Cooke, January 11, 1921, Johnson Papers; Carl Parrini, Heir to

Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (Pittsburgh, 1969), Chapter 6.

48. Jennings, "President Harding and International Organization," 152; Murray, The

Harding Era, 109-12; New York Times, March 5, 1921.

49. Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, March 9, 1921, Johnson Papers. For similar

comments see Johnson to Borah, July 27, 1921. Ibid.

50. President Warren G. Harding, "Messages of the President of the United States to

Congress, April 12, 1921," U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1921, I, xviii; Murray, The Politics of Normalcy, 46.

• 15
 

Pragmatic Diplomacy                                            111

 

The controversy over war debts and reparations in the Sixty-Seventh

Congress illustrated the degree to which the Harding Administration

developed a surprising cooperation from Congress. Initially, Congress

had adopted a policy making the collection of war debts virtually an

impossibility. Acting on figures supplied by Secretary of Commerce

Hoover, Harding persuaded Congress to adopt a debt repayment

schedule which realistically considered each nation's debt payments in

relationship to its postwar financial condition.⁵¹ These events frustrated

Johnson. In letters to close political friends he urged immediate

opposition to the Harding Administration. Momentarily he imagined

that the irreconcilable bloc might regain its former prestige and power.⁵²

Harding anticipated Johnson's criticism, and he initiated a program to

neutralize it. The President assured the nation that war debts would be

collected from the Allied powers. But Harding bypassed the Debt

Funding Bill of 1922 to make a special settlement with Great Britain.

Harding defended his lenient handling of the British debt situation as a

necessary compromise to guarantee smooth economic relations.⁵³

As Johnson's influence upon Republican foreign policy declined, his

charges of corruption intensified. He informed Raymond Robins, a

Wisconsin Progressive-Republican, that "hidden business interests"

guided Hughes' diplomacy.⁵⁴ Throughout the fall and winter of

1921-1922 Johnson alluded to the "cloud of Versailles" hanging over

American politics. By this Johnson meant that international cooperation

would result in British control of the seas and the Japanese overseeing

East Asian trade and politics. This would amount to what Johnson

labelled "consenting imperialism."⁵⁵

The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference increased

Johnson's fears of international involvement. The November 1921

through February 1922 conference prompted Johnson to intensify his

charges that the United States was on the verge of joining the League of

Nations. He based his conclusions on two negative aspects of the

Washington Conference. One was the close political cooperation which

would result from naval disarmament; the other was that the proposed

51. DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American Foreign Policy," Chapter 6; Murray,

The Harding Era, 361-64; Murray, The Politics of Normalcy, 59-60.

52. Hiram W. Johnson to Harold Ickes, March 12, 1921, The Papers of Harold Ickes,

Library of Congress; Johnson to Chester Rowell, April 16, 1921, Johnson to C. K.

McClatchy, April 16, 1921, Johnson Papers.

53. DeWitt, "Hiram W. Johnson and American Foreign Policy," 154-90; Murray, The

Harding Era, 362-64.

54. Johnson to Raymond Robins, July 21, 1921, Johnson Papers.

55. Johnson to boys, August 13, September 23, November 16, 1921, March 16, 1922,

Johnson Papers; Maddox, William E. Borah andAmerican Foreign Policy, 100-04; J. Chal

Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington

Conference, 1921-1922 (Athens, 1955), 115-39.

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112                                                      OHIO HISTORY

 

treaties would restrict traditional American business rights in world

trade.⁵⁶

While the Washington Disarmament Conference displayed an

unparalleled congressional-executive cooperation, the Harding

Administration feared that the Senate might not ratify the conference

agreements. But the Harding strategists worried needlessly because the

mood of public opinion supported the Washington Conference. The

Washington Herald, for example, attacked Johnson as an obstructionist

and suggested he reconsider his stand on foreign affairs.⁵⁷ This criticism

intensified Johnson's opposition to internationalism, and he informed

his sons that public opinion must be re-educated to the dangers of global

cooperation.⁵⁸ But Johnson failed to accomplish this goal.

The only issue Johnson capitalized upon during the Washington

Conference was the Four-Power Treaty. This agreement resulted from

secret talks which were in direct violation of the Conference mandate for

open discussion and negotiations. As a result Senator Johnson and three

isolationist-minded colleagues formed a loose coalition to expose the

dangers of internationalism. But the issue of a secretly negotiated treaty

failed to titillate the imagination of the general public.⁵⁹

The resurgent isolationist bloc was unable to provide effective

opposition to Harding's foreign policy. But William E. Borah of Idaho

and Johnson used the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a forum to

argue that the Four-Power Treaty tied the United States politically,

militarily, and economically to Japan in East Asia.⁶⁰ The central

argument of the Johnson-Borah bloc was that big business would profit

directly from the Washington Conference and the Four-Power Treaty.

But these charges were delivered in a vague and off-handed manner and

they lacked documentation. In this attempt to revive isolationist

sentiment, Johnson's arguments became increasingly strained and

56. Harding to Malcolm Jennings, January 6, 1922, Jennings Papers; Johnson to Frank

P. Doherty, March 16, 1922, Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, October 5, 1921, Johnson

Papers; Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, 152-54; Thomas H. Buckley, The United States

and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville, 1970), 32-34; L. Ethan Ellis,

Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933 (New Brunswick, 1968), 79-136; Jennings,

"President Harding and International Organization," 158-59; Maddox, William E. Borah

and American Foreign Policy, 97-109.

57. Washington Herald, November 13, 1921.

58. Johnson to boys, September 23, October 5, 1921, Johnson to C. K. McClatchy,

October 5, 1921, Johnson Papers.

59. J. Chal Vinson, "Military Force and American Policy, 1919-1939," Isolation and

Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy, ed.

Alexander DeConde (Durham, 1957), 67-71; Murray, The Harding Era, 153-55, 159-61;

Handwritten memorandum, n.d., Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, January 15,1922, Johnson

to John F. Neylan, January 4, 1922, Johnson Papers.

60. New York Times, January 5,1922,2; Robert J. Maddox, "William E. Borah and The

Crusade to Outlaw War," Historian, XXIX (February 1967), 200-20.

• 17
 

Pragmatic Diplomacy                                              113

 

illogical.61 He recognized the futility of his fight and complained that

"anything sugar coated or labelled with the sacred name of peace" was

impossible to defeat.⁶²

For the remainder of the Harding years Johnson occupied himself

with arguments and public statements against American participation in

postwar European politics.⁶³ He was particularly critical of the

increased use of "unofficial observers" in European political and

economic conferences. But as the controversial issues surrounding

American diplomacy receded, Johnson recognized the futility of

opposing President Harding.64 Senator Johnson's inability to criticize

Harding's foreign policy effectively was due in large measure to the

President's adroit manipulation of public attitudes and his pragmatic

politics. Harding was a compromising, conciliatory political figure, but

he did not expand the role of the President in foreign affairs.

It is evident from Harding's relationship with Johnson that he

continually pursued middle-of-the-road policies in foreign affairs.

Moreover, Harding's ability to defuse diplomatic controversy was

primarily the result of his correct reading of Johnson's personality.

Early in his campaign for the presidency Harding flattered Johnson into

supporting the Republican ticket publicly; however, cooperation

between Johnson and Harding was short-lived. As the Washington

Conference convened, differences over the direction of American

foreign policy brought Johnson and Harding into open conflict.⁶⁵

Throughout the remainder of the Harding years Johnson's public image

was one of an obstructionist to world peace. As Randolph Downes and

Robert K. Murray have shown, Harding's success in foreign affairs

resulted from a compromising and conciliatory approach to diplomatic

problems; one that considered all aspects of Republican thought.⁶⁶

Recently, Robert D. Accinelli has demonstrated that Harding "re-

mained a harmonizer, intent on quieting discord in his own party ... ."67

 

61. Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941, American Foreign Policy Between

The Wars (New York, 1965), 65-66; Buckley, The Washington Conference, 127-44;

Vinson, The Parchment Peace, 149-58; Johnson to Franklin Hichborn, January 17, 1922,

Johnson to Fremont Older, January 4, 1922, Johnson Papers.

62. Johnson to Archibald Johnson, January 15, 1922, Johnson Papers.

63. Hiram W. Johnson, "Why 'Irreconcilables' Keep Out of Europe," New York

Times, January 14, 1923, 9.

64. Johnson to boys, April 22, 1922, Johnson to Franklin Hichborn, May 6, 1922,

Johnson to J. R. Litzenberg, October 9, 1922, Johnson Papers.

65. Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., January 20, 1923, Johnson to C. K. McClatchy,

January 15, 1923, Johnson to Theodore J. Roche, February 9, 1923, Johnson Papers.

66. Downes, The Rise of Harding, 315-44, 562-98; Murray, The Harding Era, 127-69,

327-75.

67. Accinelli, "Was There a 'New' Harding?" 181.

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114                                                          OHIO HISTORY

 

This analysis is an apt description of his relationship with Senator

Johnson. As a result of this approach, Harding created a Republican

consensus in regard to American foreign policy and rendered Johnson's

criticism ineffective.⁶⁸ The primary historiographical problem in

evaluating Warren G. Harding, as Louis Potts has noted, is "that this

most conciliatory and amiable of men has been the target of extreme

criticism and the center of continual controversy."⁶⁹ By continuing to

use outdated stereotypes, historians have placed great emphasis upon

Alice Roosevelt Longworth's famous comment that Harding was "just a

slob" and have ignored his positive accomplishments.⁷⁰

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

68. Leroy Ashby, The Spearless Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive

Movement in the 1920s (Urbana, 1972), 25-26, 101-02; John M. Cooper, Jr.,

"Progressivism and American Foreign Policy: A Reconsideration," Mid-America, LI

(October 1969), 260-77; Thomas G. Paterson, "California Progressives and Foreign

Policy," California Historical Society Quarterly, XLVII (December 1968), 333-34.

Excellent examples of the consensus Harding created in California Republican circles are

contained in the letters of Mrs. Katherine Edson, a Los Angeles progressive Republican

who supported Herbert Hoover. See, for example, Katherine Edson to Chester Rowell,

September 17, 1920, The Papers of Katherine Edson, University of California, Los

Angeles, and Ralph Arnold to Stratford L. Morton, October 26, 1920, The Papers of Ralph

Arnold, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. In many respects Johnson

never fully regained his effectiveness as a critic of American foreign policy. For a brief

resurgence of Johnson's isolationist influence in the early 1930s, see Howard A. DeWitt,

"Hiram W. Johnson and Early New Deal Diplomacy, 1933-1934," California Historical

Quarterly, LVI (Fall 1974), 377-86.

69. Louis Potts, "Who Was Warren G. Harding?" Historian, XXXVI (August 1974),

644.

70. Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Years (New York, 1933), 203, 311-25. A

recent example of Harding's continuing compromising political tone at the time of his

death is Robert E. Ficken, "President Harding Visits Seattle," Pacific Northwest

Quarterly, LXVI (July 1975), 105-14.

• 19