WILLIAM D. JENKINS
Robert Bulkley:
Progressive Profile
Twenty years ago American historians
characterized progressivism as a
political movement whose reform impulse
was rooted in the "status
anxieties" of its predominately
middle-class membership. Since then, a
generation of historians has effectively
challenged the simplicity of that
hypothesis and replaced it with the
notion that progressivism was more
diffuse in nature. No longer viewed then
as a movement cohesive in
philosophy and homogeneous in
membership, progressivism has become
merely a term used to describe a series
of widely divergent reform ideas,
some radical and quasi-socialist, others
mildly reformist or even conserva-
tive, that Americans adopted as an
alternative to unfettered capitalism.'
Bernard Sternsher has recently offered
historians a useful tool in
analyzing the complexities of
progressivism. Avoiding the error of those
who labeled all political philosophies
to the left of laissez-faire as "progres-
sive" (or of those like Gabriel
Kolko who characterize all to the right of
socialism as "conservative"),
Sternsher has constructed a political typology
that accounts for the variety of
political philosophies housed within the
capitalistic system. To the left of
laissez-faire are the antitrust advocates,
such as Louis Brandeis, who sought
government intervention only to
restrict the size and power of business.
In the center are the neo-
mercantilists, defined as those favoring
government intervention to pro-
mote the general welfare. Within
neo-mercantilism Sternsher distinguished
between right-of-center proponents of
the trickle down theory and left-of-
center advocates of social welfare
legislation. Located further to the left,
just before socialism, was the
philosophy of "concentration and control,"
which Sternsher described as planned
capitalism involving the combined
efforts of government, business and
labor.
With such a spectrum in mind, it becomes
easier to understand the
results of Otis Graham's study of 105
progressives who lived to see the New
Deal. The shotgun application of the
term, progressive, guaranteed the
inclusion of reformers within that
so-called movement who would react in
William D. Jenkins is Associate
Professor of History at Youngstown State University.
I. See PeterG. Filene,"An Obituary
for the Progressive Movement," Ar'vri(can
Quarterly.
XXII (Spring 1970), and John Buenker, Urban
Liberalism andi Progre.ssive Reflrm (New
York. 1973) for a thorough discussion of
recent historiography.
58 OHIO HISTORY
a multitude of ways to the vastly
stepped-up program of government
intervention initiated by the New Deal.:
Of course a political typology based on
government economic policy has
its limitations as a tool for analysis.
It does not take into account attitudes
toward race and minorities, an area in
which many progressives proved to
be conservative and clannish. Moreover,
it overlooks the issue of scientific
management and efficiency, which Samuel
Hays and Samuel Haber have
cited as a major goal of progressives,
and which supposedly operated in a
system free of class divisions and
unrelated to economic and social inter-
ests.
Although historians have failed to find
an easy characterization to
describe progressivism as a whole, there
are clearly those individuals who
fall within the broad mainstream of the
movement. Such was Cleveland
Democratic Congressman Robert J.
Bulkley, who won election to the
House in the Democratic sweep of 1910.
His incisive intellect, moderate
politics and high social standing
brought him easy access to the inner circle
of legislative power during the four
years he served in the lower chamber.
Bulkley's responsibilities there made
him an expert on banking and he
helped frame two of the most important
pieces of progressive legislation-
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the
Federal Farm Loan Act which
passed in 1916. An examination of his
work in the House offers much
insight into the complexity of
progressivism itself and into the multifaceted
politics of a "typical"
progressive congressman.
Born in 1880 into a family that had
become wealthy by speculating in
Cleveland's real estate market, Bulkley
held a secure place among the city's
social and economic elite. After
graduating from the private, upper-class
University School. Bulkley attended
Harvard College. where he met
Franklin Roosevelt. and Harvard Law
School from which he graduated in
1906. When Bulkley returned to Cleveland
from Cambridge, he entered the
practice of law and took up residence on
"millionaire's row," an area
around East Twenty-first and Euclid
avenues. As befitting a member of the
social elite, Bulkley was continually
listed in Cleveland's Blue Book.'
While Bulkley's family was traditionally
Democratic. his identification
with the general goals of progressivism
and the more liberal wing of the
2. For an explanation of the political
spectrum see Bernard Sternsher." 'he Middle Way."
7iTe Ni
I)Deal. !)otriries\ and ID)em('ra', cd. Bernard Sternsher(Boston. 1966). 171-80: Otis
I. Grahamr An ln /orru fr Re/i'r.'- 17w Old
/Progreu.si'es and the ,ea L)Deal(New York.
1967),
187-212.
3. Obituary of ('harles H.
HulkIcy, ('Clevlanl Plain Dealer. December 20. 1895: Flrlo
McKendree A\ery. A listorrl o ('Clveland and itl
Env'irons (Chicago. 1918). 405. 499-500:
Transcript ol'Robert .. Bulklev's
Record, Harvard University Archives: Undated biographi-
cal paper. I he I'apers of Robert .1.
BulkIcy, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland,
Ohio. I he Bulkley Papers are cr\
thorough for his career as a representative but rather sparse
lor his term as a senator, I
hus. this paper is confined to Bulklec's work as a representative.
Robert Bulklet 59
Democratic party most likely began at
Harvard.4 Despite the conservative
politics of president Charles W. Eliot,
Harvard's turn-of-the-century
faculty held beliefs widely divergent in
their political and philosophical
basis. Bulklev has left no evaluation of
the impact of Harvard on his
development, but his courses and
instructors probably helped to form his
progressive conscience.' His economic courses,
for instance, included the
following: Problems of Public Ownership:
Questions of Public or Private
Ownership of Street Railways, Gas and
Electric Lighting Plants; and
Money, Banking and International
Payments. In conjunction with these
economic courses, Bulklev took a
philosophy course entitled the Ethics of
Social Questions, which examined
problems of the inner city.6 According
to historian Allen F. Davis, such a
course "often inspired young men and
women 'to do something' for suffering
humanity."7 By the time he left
Harvard, Bulkley felt prepared to take
positions on the pressing social and
economic problems of the day.
Bulkley returned to Cleveland in 1906
where Progressive Mayor Tom
Johnson was to have a profound impact on
his social ideology. A
convert to the single tax theories of
Henry George, Johnson favored the
sort of gas and water socialism
advocated by many municipal reformers.
H is reform program included
reassessment of business property, municipal
ownership of the street railway, and
politics based upon "principle rather
than patronage."x While not
converted to all of Johnson's theories, Bulkley
idolized the Mayor and would later
praise his ideals as "so high that we
used to talk about building our city on
a hill and Cleveland came to be
known as the best governed municipality
in America."9 In 1910 Johnson
used his influence to assure Bulkley's
selection as the Democratic party's
congressional candidate in the
Twenty-first District, a wealthy and tradi-
tionally Republican stronghold."'
Bulkley chose an opportune time to begin
a political career. In the
4. Charles Bulkley and his
brother-in-law. Liberty Holden. purchased the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, a pro-Democratic newspaper. See the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, December 20. 1895;
Cleveland leader, October 26, 1910.
5. Henry May, The End of American
Innocence (New York. 1959), 56-62.
6. Transcript of Bulkley's Record,
Harvard University Archives.
7. Allen F. Davis, Spearhead.s br Reform (New York, 1967), 38.
8. Hoyt Landon Warner, Progressivism
in Ohio, 1897-1917(Columbus, 1964), 54-79, 87-
105; Tom Johnson, MY Storl (New
York, 1911), forward.
9. Bulkley speech, ca. 1930, Bulkley
Papers. Although Bulkley favored better tax valuation
of property, nowhere in his papers did
he indicate approval of the single tax. Bulklev agreed
with Johnson's theories about municipal
ownership of natural monopolies, but he was
reluctant to have the government
undertake ownership of telephone and telegraph lines until
it had proved its capacity for efficient
operation. See letter to S. S. Stillwell, October I I, 1910.
Bulkley Papers.
10. Undated article from the Plain
Dealer and Bulkley speech, ca. 1930, Bulkley Papers.
For a description of the upper class and
their attitudes toward the reform of Tom Johnson, see
Frederic C. Howe, The Conlessions of a Reformer. (Chicago, 1967), Chapters 10-14.
60 OH10 HISTORY
fourteen years that
the Republicans had dominated the White House and
the Congress the cost
of living had risen 45 percent." At the time of the
election Cleveland
was experiencing a 7-percent increase in local prices
over the previous
year, which caused Cleveland newspapers to devote
much space to a
discussion of the problem, and a variety of local clubs and
organizations to hold
meetings designed to combat inflation. One such
organization, the
Superintendents and Foremens Club. even began a
national meat
boycott.'' The outcry forced local politicians to respond to
the issue. In the
early months of 1910 the Cleveland City Council estab-
lished a five-man
committee headed by Daniel Morgan, a local Republican
lawyer. which issued
a report on rising costs never acted on by Council.3
Primed with campaign
material sent by the Democratic National
Committee, Bulkley
took full advantage of the growing alarm Clevelanders
felt about the issue.
While Republicans blamed inflation on the increased
supply of gold.
Bulkley reiterated Democrats charges that high tariffs.
beginning with the
Dingley Tariff of 1897. had permitted trusts and other
large combinations to
avoid foreign competition and raise prices to unjust
levels. Ihe
Republicans were particularly
embarrassed by this issue
because their 1908
platform promised downward revision of the tariff
schedule, but the
Payne-Aldrich Tarifflogrolled through Congress the next
year actually raised
some customs duties. Bulkley's Republican opponent,
lJames Cassidy. a
former railway clerk and party stalwart, had voted for the
new law.'4
Although a reduction
in the tariff would probably not have actually
reduced prewar
inflation, which was a world-wide phenomenon, Bulkley
and other Democrats
used the issue to effectively attack Republican
legislative hypocrisy
and as a weapon to criticize the large trusts that often
I . I he Bureau ot
Labor Statistics (see Bulletin 149. May 1. 1914, and Bulletin
269. July
1920) kept figures
for those years based on the prices of 256 commodities. Reader's Guide lists
the following number
of articles on the cost of living: 1900-1904 22; 1905 13: 1906 11:
1907 17:1908
16:1909 30: 1910 86:1911-25; 1912-68: 191349: 1914-1918 55.
For state and
congressional investigations see "The Cost of Living," Survre, XXII (February
12, 1910), 691-92; G.
Stickley,"American Boast," The Craftsman, XXVII (March,
1910), 629;
"Lodge Cost of
Living Committee," Journal of Political Economy, XVIII (October,
1910),
637-38. For consumer
rebellion see B. W. Holt. "Too Much Gold." Everlhodr's Moag,:ine,
XXII (April, 1910),
476; "Making War on the Middleman and the Cost of Living," Current
Literature. .II (March 1912),
289-92; J. M. Oskison. "The Cooperative Cost of living,"
(ollier's Weekl,. XI.VIII (January 27, 1912). 19.
12. Thomas F.
Campbell, "Daniel E. Morgan: The Good Citizen in Politics" Ph.D.
dissertation, Case
Western Reserve University, 1965, 31-34. This section is not included in the
published work.
13. Cleveland ltader. January 5.
1910: Campbell. "Morgan". 31-34.
14. Flyer from
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks. November 5. 1910: speech of James H.
Cassidy. October 25,
1910: and letter of James H. Cassidy to WachterundlAnzeiger.
October
22, 1910,
Bulkley Papers.
Robert Bulkler 61
profited from the tarif on manufactured
goods.'5 In the 1910 elections the
Democrats gained control of the House
and picked up nine seats in the
Senate, five short of a majority. The
new Speaker of the House. Oscar
Underwood, placed Bulkley on three
committees: Banking and Currency,
the Committee on Patents, and the
Committee on Expenditures in the War
Department. As befitting a freshman
congressman, his contributions to the
62nd Congress were not significant, but
the work he did do and his voting
record are important indications of the
nature of his progressivism.
In the area of regulation and control of
business, a vital indicator of
progressive sentiment, Bulkley agreed
with the New Freedom principles
advocated by Louis Brandeis and Woodrow
Wilson. A devotee of Adam
Smith, Brandeis suspected big business
of accomplishing concentration
through violations of the principles of
fair competition. Thus, Bulkley
supported antitrust legislation as a
means of restoring competition and
reducing industrial concentration. He
also viewed the protective tariff in
Brandeisian terms as a device used by
business to avoid foreign competi-
tion and advised some southerners, who
complained to him that the
freelisting of sugar might damage their
economic interests, either to use
more efficient methods or switch to
another business.''
While Bulkley believed in restriction of
the growth and power of big
business, he was not concerned about the
growth of labor unions. Indeed
he even recommended that workers join
unions and contended that "the
public good is still in more danger from
corporations than from labor
unions."' In response to
a questionnaire sent from local labor organiza-
tions during the 1910 campaign, Bulkley
also supported an eight-hour day,
a federal law making the employer liable
for all casualties, prohibition of
child labor, limitations on the use of
the injunction, and compulsory
insurance against unemployment, illness,
accidents, invalidism. old age
15. Letter from James 1.. I.loyd.
August 24, 1910: undated Bulklev speech on tariff:
Bulkley's speech given at Hill's Hall.
October 19. 1910: and two letters to Newton I). Baker.
May 28 and June 13. 1910.
Bulkley Papers.
16. Letter from Joseph Diamond, May 18,
191 1, and letter to R. E. Hills. June 15, 1912.
Bulkley Papers. Bulklcy worked with
Louis Brandeis in the controversy over resale price
maintenance. RI'M would have kept
chainstores from offering bargains toattract customers.
Amid charges that chain stores
compensated by raising prices of other products, Bulkle and
Brandeis considered discount prices to
bean unfair form of competition. In his 1914 primary
campaign Bulkley solicited and received
(albeit too late) the support of Brandeis. letter to.l.
I.evden White, April 8. 1914: letter from John Hill.
secretary to l.ouis Brandeis. August I I.
1914: and letter to .ouis
Brandeis. August 17. 1914. Bulkley Papers. In his 1912 campaign
Bulklcv attacked the Newv
Nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt: Cl(e'\('kltn Plain i)e'tIr.
Nocembcr er 1912 and Cl(/cclhnd Prc.s.s. Nosember
4, 1912. -or Bulkley's views on the tariff
see letter to .. (i. Sholle. )ccember
16, 1912: letter to Master Building Company. April 18.
1913: letter to N. .1. Rich and Co.,
April 26. 1913: and letter to S. Remthat, April 28. 1913.
Bulkley Papers.
17. Itter to Henry Souther.
November 16. 1914. Bulkley Papers.
62 OH10 IHISTORY
and death. His voting record in Congress
did not deviate from this
pattern.'
Thus. Bulkley ranged beyond the type
ofprogressivism concerned solely
about the restoration of competition and
the operation of Adam Smith's
laws of political economy. His support
of federal legislation to correct
working conditions and provide for
compulsory insurance placed Bulkley
in the camp of liberal progressives,
such as members of the National
Consumers League and the settlement
workers, led by Jane Addams. who
supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912.
Although Bulkley belonged to
neither of these groups, his support for
social welfare legislation proposed
by them. including the establishment of
the Children's Bureau and a child
labor law, indicated his sympathy for
their cause and foreshadowed his
support for the New Deal as a senator
from Ohio. In terms of the political
spectrum, Bulklev was a slightly
left-of-center neo-mercantilist willing to
use the state as a protector of the
poor, the laborer and the child.
In terms of the issue of race and
minorities, Bulklev's record was mixed.
but more liberal than many other
progressives.'" Bulkley staunchly op-
posed the literacy test as a means of
excluding undesirable immigrants. as
well as bills to ban interracial
marriages and establish Jim
Crow on
streetcars in Washington, D.C.'" On
the other hand. he made no public
comment on the introduction of
segregatory practices within the Wilson
Administration and opposed a federal
amendment to grant suffrage to
women.'l When judged by the attitudes of
that time. Bulkley rated as a
liberal on racial matters, but rather
conservative in regard to women.
After gaining reelection in 1912.
Bulkley had the opportunity to work on
two significant pieces of progressive
legislation, the Federal Reserve Act
18. IPamphlet Irom 1914 conigressional
campaign: clipping from Collier'\ t Week( detailing
Bulklek-'s \oting
record: letter to S. S. Stillwell. October I1. 1910: letter to
I/ie Hlarpoon,
Octoher 24. 1910: and letter to Raislway
Union. October 27. 1919. Bulkley Papers. Bulkley
\ot.d lor or klmin's compcnsation,
railroad cmplovces. linitation of the use of the
injunc-
tion. permission for jurI trials in cases
involving indirect contempt. the establishment of
a
D)epartment of I.abor. an eight-hour day
for postal clerks and government workers, and the
I aFollette Seimens 1ill.
19. Richard Hofstadter. The Age of
Reform (New York. 1955). 178-86: George Mowry.
7ITe l-ir of' Theodore Roovsevelt a ti he Birth o' Mlodern America (New York. 1958).
92-94:
Aileen Kraditor. The lheas of the 4Wotman Suflerage
Movement, 1890-1920 (Garden City.
1971). 105-71: James II.
Timberlake. Prohibition and the Progressive Mloviemen (Cam-
bridge. 1966). 114-24.
20. On immigration restriction see
Bulklev'sletters toA A. Benesch, February
17. 1913. to
F. I). Busser. December
21. 1912. and to Millard Widlar. January 7.
1914. Bulkley Papers.
For Bulklev's position on the bills
relating to racial issues see his letters to Alex Martin.
February I. 1915. and to
Mary Farrer. January 12. 1915, Ibiil.
21. In a letter to
the Re\. Charles Bundy. September 18.
1913. Bulkley asked lor proof of
segregatorv practices in spite of e
idence axailable in magazine and news articles. On woman
suffrage see his letter to
tlarrict l'aylor ipton, July 13. 1914. and
to Elizabeth Todd Billings.
Julv 2. 1913.
Bulkle! Papers. Bulkley did admit the possibility of his
support for a state
amendment, if the
women wanted it.
Robert Bulklei
63
and the Federal Farm loan Act, both of
which came before the Banking
and Currency Committee. In 1912 Woodrow
Wilson and the Democratic
party had committed themselves to
updating the nation's banking structure
in both areas. In the case of the
Federal Reserve Act, Carter Glass,
chairman of the Banking and Currency
Committee, noted that Bulkley's
"interest in the subject was so
unmistakeablc and his grasp of the problem
so thorough that I did not hesitate to
confide to him one of the most
intricate and difficult features
(reserve section) of the bill."-- In September
1913. Bulkley spoke to Congress for
several hours on the reserve section. a
presentation that was well received and
earned him the congratulations of
William G. McAdoo and Newton D. Baker.
While the bill was in the
Senate Finance Committee during the
fall, Bulkley traveled around the
country with Carter Glass in order to
convince businessmen and bankers of
the value of the Federal Reserve Act.
Highlights of the trip included
speeches before the Illinois
Manufacturing Association, the Pittsburgh
Board of Trade, and the American Academy
of Political and Social
Science. Later in December, the Senate
and House conferees called Bulkley
in for consultation on the reserve
section, which he persuaded them to keep
nearly intact." Glass summed up
Bulkley's contributions in the following
statement: "While Bulkley and I
differed in committee as to certain details
of the currency bill, from the moment
the bill was reported to the House he
was a tower of strength to the
administration and won high praise from the
friends of the measure."'4
Banking reform had originated within the
banking community in an
effort to solve two major problems. an
inelastic currency and an inadequate
reserve system. Because the National
Bank Act of 1864 had made the issue
of currency dependent on the purchase of
bonds, the nation's money
supply tended to contract and expand at
inappropriate times and thus
remain unresponsive to the needs of the
economy. Moreover, because of
the lack of a reliable system
guaranteeing the transfer of reserves among
banks, perfectly sound banks faced
potential bankruptcy in times of stress.
Banks often added to their problems by
depositing part of their reserves in
the big New York banks which in turn
invested these reserves on the often
volatile stock market. In addition, the
piling up of reserves in New York
generated neo-populist fears about the
control New York banks might
exert over the finances of the nation.2
22. (C'l'elanit l Plain Dealer. September
29. 1913. Allen's Column.
23.
\c York,, Time.s, October 15. 1913: Carter (Glass. .4lventure in
Constructivr e F-inance
Ncn York. 1927). 176-78; letters from William G. McAdoo and
Newton D. Baker. September
15. 1913. Bulklev Papers.
24. (levelaicl Plali Dealer. September
29. 1913. Allen's Column.
25. E. W. Kemmerer and Donald I..
Kemmerer. T77 4 AC ol/the Fetleral Reserve
Si'.t[em
(New
York. 1950). 1 1-23: H. Parker Willis. The
IFeileral Re.erve S.strem (New York.
1923).
64 OHIO
HISTORY
Bulkley was enthusiastic about the
Federal Reserve Act because he felt
that it offered solutions to all these
problems. Rediscounting by central
reserve banks permitted member banks to
exchange liquid assets (commer-
cial and industrial credit) for federal
reserve notes. a process which could
enable the currency supply to expand or
contract dependent upon the rate
of interest (rediscount rate) charged by
the central reserve bank. Each of
the district banks also accepted part of
the reserves of member banks as a
deposit, which could then be used to
support a bank experiencing excessive
demand on its deposits. Finally, the
creation of twelve central reserve
banks and the provision that deposited
reserves could not earn interest
ended the piling up of reserves in New
York.'"
Bulkley's support for these provisions
rested on his belief that they
provided for a stronger banking system
based on efficient operating
principles. Bulkley's exposure to these
principles probably came at Har-
vard. but he also received assistance
from H. Parker Willis. an appointee of
Glass to aid Bulkley on the reserve
section. Editor of the Journal of
(Commerce and holder of a doctorate from the University of
Chicago in
economics, Willis would later write The
Federal Reserve System, in which
he praised its use of
"scientific" banking principles.: Thus. Bulkley
accepted scientific management as a
necessary part of banking reform. In
doing so. he displayed a characteristic
progressive quality. as noted in the
works of Samuel Haber and Samuel Hays.:s
According to other historians, however,
the most important issue in
judging the extent of progressive
commitment was that of government
control. Arthur l.ink, for example,
considered Wilson a progressive
because he forced Carter Glass to accept
government control of banking. as
well as government issue of federal
reserve notes. and because Wilson
excluded bankers from appointing
representatives to the Federal Reserve
Board.;' Other historians, such as
Gabriel Kolko, have contended that the
final form of the Federal Reserve Act
guaranteed the dominance of New
York bankers over the nation's finances
and thus represented a "triumph of
conservatism."'"
The differences between these two interpretations oc-
curred because Link judged reformers by
their intentions, while Kolko
240 41: .ames
I.. Laughlin. The Federal Reserve Ac.: Its Origins and
Problems (New York,
1933),44-100.
26. ('ongiessio,)nal Re(orl. 63rd
Congress, Ist session. September 12. 1913). 47774785.
27. Gabriel Kolko. 7t'h 7iiunmplh f o nservatismr . A Reinterpretation of Aimerrican
Hlistor, 19 ()-/9 ' ((Chicago.
1967). 217-28: Willis, Reserve System, 1-40.
2X. Samuel P1. Hlays. Conservalion and the Gospel fEffi/ciency: The
Progressive (on.ser-
vation MIovemoenl, 1890-19I2 ((ambridge. 1959) and Samuel Haber, Efficienc( and Up/lit:
.S, ienli/i Mtlin7agr,'imelr in the Progr essiv, e
I-' Ir (Chicago. 1964).
29. Arthur l ink. ilsn I ol. ol2, lrdem.. 'lic .VNei freedom
(Princeton, 1956).
21 1-13.
30. Kolko, Triumnph of Cons
ervaltism. 249-54.
Robert Bulkler 65 |
|
based his judgment on the failure of progressive legislation to regulate business. Obviously, the question of how to achieve a just economic and social order has divided historians, such as Hays, Link and Kolko, almost as much as it has reformers. Samuel Hays interprets American history as "progressive" insofar as it advances through the acceptance of rational and technological principles, an acceptance he seemingly views as pre- determined and unrelated to class divisions. Other historians, such as Link, view class divisions as a prime tool for analysis of American history. Suspicious of concentrations of wealth and power, they praise reformer's efforts to regulate business, while admitting the imperfections of that regulation. Socialists, such as Kolko. do not believe, however, that the capitalist structure is capable of controlling the wealthy and their systems of exploitation. Kolko contends further that reforms based on scientific management mask the reality of continuing American devotion to political capitalism. This article will not attempt to resolve these issues, based as they are on competing value systems, but rather will describe how Robert Bulkley wrestled with the same problems and what conclusions he reached. Bulkley shared with other progressives a concern about the concentra- tion of wealth and financial power, but he was not prepared to espouse socialistic solutions to that problem. He did, however, draw from his |
66 OHIO
HISTORY
association with Tom Johnson in viewing
banking as a public utility.
Johnson had advocated public ownership
of utilities. but Bulkley held back
on government ownership, other than in
the area of natural monopolies.
because he doubted that the government
could run other forms of business
efficiently. In the Federal Reserve Act
Bulkley supported an admixture of
public and private control and ownership,
a half-way acceptance of
Johnson's beliefs."
Even with such a mixture Bulkley still
faced the problem of potential
domination of the Federal Reserve System
by financial elements. Because
of his Brandeisian fears of the
concentration of financial power, Bulkley
fought to reduce the powers of the
Federal Reserve Board, in particular its
right to veto the rediscount rates set
by each district. In July 1913 he offered
several amendments in committee to
achieve such a reduction, but neither
passed. On July 25, he carried his
objections to the House floor and even
cited Woodrow Wilson's book, The New
Freedom, as support for his
objections to granting excessive powers
to a government commission, but
again gained no concessions. His
solution represented a conservative
attempt to limit power through
decentralization, while still leaving control
of the system in the hands of bankers
organized at the district level.'2
Bulkley's advocacy of decentralization
and of government control
placed him within the mainstream of
progressive thought. A major
problem, however, for progressives who
advocated government regulation
was the question of membership on
regulatory boards. Once Wilson had
established government control as a
prerequisite for his acceptance of any
banking bill, bankers sought to secure
the appointment of at least three
members of the Federal Reserve Board.
but Wilson rejected such a
proposal because he believed that
bankers could not administer the system
impartially." Ironically, the final
bill did permit presidential appointment
of bankers, but only if they severed
banking connections while on the board
and for a period of two years
thereafter, the hope being that such provisions
would guarantee banker independence.4 Presidential
power to appoint
31. (hi(ago ,\es., October 21.
1913: Cleveland Plain Dealer. June 25. 1913. Allen's
Column. Bulkley agreed with Johnson's
theories about municipal ownership of natural
monopolies, but he wsas reluctant to
hase the government undertake ownership of telephone
and telegraph lines until it had proved
its capacity for efficient operation: see letter to S. S.
Stillwell. October I , 1910, Bulkley
Papers.
32. C(lvceland I eader. July 25. 1913: Cleveland Plain Dealer. July 30, 1913: letter to A. L..
<(rucey. Jul 16. 1913. Bulkley
Papers. One of Bulkley's amendments would have eliminated
the power ot the Board to suspend
reserve requirements for thirty days and for an undeter-
mined number of fifteen-day periods
thereafter. Bulkley also preferred that the central banks
set the rediscount rate for each region,
but the final bill gave the Board a veto over the
individual region's rates. Bulkley
accepted this provision because he believed the Board would
not often veto a rate.
33. l.ink. Newr Freedom.n 206-13.
34. Pittshurgh )isipatch. November 16. 1913.
Robert Bulklev
67
bankers, albeit ones who had temporarily
severed their banking connec-
tions, created the possibility of the
regulated controlling the regulatory
board.
Bulkley confronted a distressing
personal dilemma in resolving this
question. On the one hand, he was
suspicious of potential banker domina-
tion of the new system, but he also
questioned, along with John Farnwell,
President of the National Citizens
League for the Promotion of a Sound
Banking System, the capabilities of
political appointees, who might possess
independence from financial
self-interest, but who also probably lacked
sufficient knowledge to operate the
system in a scientific and efficient
fashion. Bulkley solved his dilemma by
accepting Wilson's position that no
banker would serve on the Board without
severing his financial connec-
tions.5 Obviously, such a
resolution did not guarantee banker independ-
ence, but it did provide for the
appointment of individuals with the
specialized knowledge to make such
decisions.
In the final analysis, Bulkley had
overlooked his concern regarding
banker domination of the Federal Reserve
Board because of his belief in
scientific management and his confidence
in experts. Since the proper
operation of the new system relied on
the application of "scientific" princi-
ples of bank management, Bulkley was not
adverse to having bankers or
banking experts on the board. Most
likely, Bulkley would have favored the
appointment of someone like H. Parker
Willis, whom Bulkley considered
capable of applying banking principles
for the benefit of the economy,
rather than a special interest group.
Thus, Bulkley was a neo-mercantilist,
who sought the proper and impartial operation
of the nation's banking
system through a bureaucracy subject to
the control of experts. Bulkley's
attitudes compared closely to the
progressive belief in bureaucratic
management that Robert Wiebe has
described in his work, The Search for
Order. As suggested by Wiebe, however, the Federal Reserve Act
did not
provide a final solution to the problem
of achieving impartial public
regulation.3
Bulkley's expertise in banking matters
brought him increasing recogni-
tion from Glass and Wilson and eventually
increasing responsibilities.
After deciding to exclude long-term
rural credits from the Federal Reserve
Act, President Wilson promised separate
consideration of a rural credits
bill. In compliance with this promise,
Carter Glass appointed a Subcom-
mittee on Rural Credits with Bulkley as
chairman, the high point of his
career as a representative.:7
35. Willis. Re**erv\c
Ss\.iem. 620: Glass. Ad\ventur.e 1
12-14: letter from John V. Farnwell.
.luly 9, 1913. Bulklev IPapers. Bulklcy
did not want direct representation of hankers because he
felt that the people had \crv
little control over them. but the people did have democratic
control oecr politicians who would
appoint the new board.
36. Robert Wiehe. 71he Scarchl /i)r Or'r (Ncw
York 1967). 221-23.
37. ('levelanl Plain I)oeler. Autust 14 and
September 29. 1913. Allen's Column.
68 OHIO HIISTORY
Debate over rural credit extended back
into the nineteenth century.
Farmer agitation over interest charges
had led to studies proving that
farmers did pay higher rates than
commercial interests, with differences
being the greatest in more unsettled
districts and in the South where the
exploitative crop lien system was in
operation. 8 At least one
historian,
Harold Faulkner, has concluded that
"the existence of high interest rates
was not the result of a deep dyed plot of bankers to gouge the
long-suffering
farmer. It was the normal functioning of
an economy seeking to obtain the
highest rates for services rendered, and
the result of a banking system
inadequate to meet the needs of the
nation."'9 Some of the inadequacies
included state laws involving
inefficient and costly searches to prove title,
and mortgages that lasted only five
years, and on which total payment of
interest was required before reduction
of the principal. Most farmers could
not pay off the heavy investment
involved in land purchase within such a
short period, which necessitated renewal
of the mortgage at additional
401
expense.
The rapid inflation of food costs after
1900 generated a new-found
concern with farm problems. An overall
increase of 42 percent in food
prices between the years 1897 and 1914
received much attention in
numerous magazine articles concerning
the cost of living, the principal ex-
planation being that food production had
not kept pace with an expanding
urban population. In 1908 Theodore
Roosevelt appointed a Country Life
Commission, which recommended federal
aid in the solution of farm
problems, including rural credit. The
Commission's report blamed the
nation's declining farm population for
the increasing price of foods and
sought to make farm life more attractive
as a means of reversing that
trend.41
When Bulkley began work on the
Subcommittee. he had available the
reports of two commissions (the American
Commission, appointed by the
American Banking Association and the
Southern Commercial Congress,
and the U.S. Commission, appointed by
the Senate), which had traveled
38. U.S.. Congress. House of
Representatives. Banking and Currency Committee. Itear-
ings Before the Suhcommilttee on Rural Credits. 63rd
Congress. 2nd session(December 13-14,
1913).
39. Harold U. Faulkner. Dec line ol lais.sez-Faire (Nesw York. 1951),
360.
4(.
Banking Committee, Hearings.
41. .lames C. Malin. "Background of
the First Bills to Establish a Bureau of Markets. 1911-
12." Agricultural History, VI
(July, 1932), 1 11-29. See the Reader's Guide for the many articles
relating food prices to the cost of
living. I wo representative examples are: Harvey Wiley.
"Back to the Farm." Century
Magazine, LXXXIII (February, 1912), 623-39; Arland Weeks,
"The Question of Agricultural
Population," Popular Science, LXXXIV (March, 1914), 251-
56. See also "Theodore Roosevelt's
Country .ife Comtmission." Agricultural History.
XXXIV (October, 1960), 163-65.
Robert Bulklev
69
abroad to study European systems of
rural credit. The Committees
discovered that Germany had a
centuries-old system of long-term rural
credit, in which cooperatives composed
of farmers loaned themselves
money, obtained from a central bank in
exchange for their mortgages and
repaid by amortization. The central bank
acquired its money through the
sale of debentures (bonds based on real
estate).
The study of the two commissions
resulted in the recommendation of the
Fletcher Bill to Congress, named after
Senator Duncan Fletcher from
Florida, who had served as president of
both commissions. Although this
bill adopted the use of debentures and amortization,
it differed from
German practice by eliminating the
central bank and permitting privately
owned banks, along with farmer
cooperatives, to issue their own deben-
tures under federal supervision. The
Commissions included privately
owned banks because they believed that
American farmers were too
individualistic to join the
cooperatives, but this inclusion alienated farm
groups, such as the National Grange and
the Farmers U nion, because they
considered private bankers too
profit-oriented to provide fair interest rates
for farmers. They proposed instead a
bill introduced by Ellsworth
Bathrick, which provided for direct
government loans to the farmer at
3 /2 percent
interest.4
Although President Wilson favored the
Fletcher Bill, the new Joint
Subcommittee on Rural Credits, under the
co-chairmanship of Bulkley
and Senator Henry Hollis from New
Hampshire, drew up its own bill.43 On
the basis of farmer objections and the
success of farmer cooperatives in
Europe, the Hollis-Bulkley Bill dropped
the sections of the Fletcher Bill
that permitted the participation of
private banking. Another major feature
of the new bill was the provision for
twelve central banks (initially it was to
be controlled by the Federal Reserve
Board), because it was believed that
twelve central banks would offer better
marketability for debentures. To
guarantee that the system would begin as
soon as possible, the Joint
Subcommittee provided for government purchase
of any unsold stock of
the central banks and unsold debentures.
It was hoped that government aid
would bolster public confidence,
especially in the debentures that had to
compete with federal, state and
municipal bonds of established value.
42. James W. Flynt, "Duncan Upshaw
Fletcher: Florida's Reluctant Progressive" Ph. D.
dissertation, Florida State University,
1965, 125-36, 146-47; "The Fletcher-Moss Bill from
the Investor's Viewpoint," Bulkley
Papers; "Financing the Farm." and "The Farmer and
Finance," of the Papers of Myron T.
Herrick, Western Reserve Historical Society: U.S..
Congress. House of Representatives,
Banking and Currency Committee, Interpretation of
H R 12585. A Bill to Estahlish Farm
Land Banks, Document 679, 63rd
Congress. 2nd session
(January 29. 1914).
43. l.ink. New Freedom. 261-64: New
York Times. January 29, 1914; undated Bulkley
paper on rural credits. Bulklev Papers.
70 OHIO HISTORY
Bulkley predicted that the public would
buy all the stock and debentures
because of the confidence generated by
government backing.44
Woodrow Wilson opposed the bill because
he continued to espouse the
classical liberal belief that government
should not aid special interest
groups.4' Bulkley disagreed
strongly with Wilson and attacked his vision of
the self-reliant, independent farmer, whose
character was threatened by
government aid. According to Bulkley.
modern society was interdependent
and in need of various forms of
government aid to bolster weak areas of the
economy.4' When
Wilson, Carter Glass. and David H ouston, the Secretary
of Agriculture, worked to delay and
defeat the H ollis-Bulkley Bill. Bulkley
argued that the Wilson Administration
was inconsistent in application of
its philosophy on government aid and
pointed to Wilson's support of a
federal subsidy to merchant shipping and
support for federal aid to rural
roads as proof of his point. For Bulkley
the debate over the employment of
government aid was over; the only
questions that remained were how and
when.4
Bulkley's how did not include
direct aid as provided in the Bathrick Bill.
H is rejection of this bill did not
represent a philosophical objection to that
form of government aid. so much as a
belief in the application of
"scientific" banking
principles. With H. Parker Willis serving again as his
assistant. Bulkley constructed a system
that checked closely on the
character of the borrower; based loans
on the farmer's main source of
capital, his land; offered long-term
mortgages with amortization as the
plan of repayment; and provided for
central banks,.which represented a
large enough area so that failure of one
cooperative would not endanger the
marketability of debentures or affect
interest rates adversely.4" In Bulkley's
mind the Bathrick Bill failed to provide
for such measures, and thus did not
represent a responsible system of rural
credits.
44. Article sent by Bulklev
to Arthur Browncll of the Philadelphia Pthlic l[edger. undated
BIulkley
paper on rural credits, and letter to Richard Knott, December 26, 1914. Bulkley
Iapers: (,,tgrstn-.vssititl[ Ru(r
(rdl, 63rd Congrcss,3rd session (December 19. 1913). 4015-13.
45. .etter to Carter (lass, May 12.
1914. The Papers ol Woodrow Wilson. Manuscript
D)ixision, library of Congress.
46. ('levelanul .ealer. IDecember
20. 1914.
47. .en York 7li'.s, May
13. 1914: undated (ilassspeecch ca. spring
1914. the papers of
Carter (ilass. linicrsity of
Virginia: letter from Carter (ilass. May 4. 1914, Ihe Papers of
William (i. McAdoo. Manuscript I)iision.
Library of Congress: Ui.S.. Department of
Agriculture. Report frolni
the Secretarl (o Agriculure, 1913. 24-27:
Cleveland Leader
I)ecember 14. 1914. Houston called Bulkley to conference
after conference to change his
mind. but Houston's professorial air and
patronizing attitude alienated Bulkley and probably
added to his intransigcance.
48. ( oilgres.sionaol Re(ordl. 63rd
Congress. 3rd session (December 19. 1913). 405-13. The
Subcommittee also rejected the Bathrick
Bill becatuse of fears that it was unconstitutional and
because 3 1 2 percent interest axas not
considered adequate either as compensation for the
work involxed or as coverage ol the
risk. tl ndatcd Bulklcy paper on rural credits. Bulklex
Papers.
Robert Bulklev 71
Obviously, Bulkley was rather moderate
regarding the form of govern-
ment aid, a position that reflected his
pro-capitalist leanings. Yet, he agreed
with the contention of farmers that
bankers were too profit-oriented to
provide cheap rural credit and that
farmer cooperatives constituted the
only acceptable form of organization.49
He was able to agree because of his
neo-mercantilistic philosophy of government.
An urban dweller concerned
about the contribution that food prices
made to increased costs, Bulkley
contended that American overemphasis on
urban life and consequent
overcrowding of cities had caused
inflation, and he expressed the hope that
federal legislation might lower food
costs by encouraging independent
ownership and reversing rural-urban
drift.5° Bulkley's objection to the
inclusion of bankers in the credit
structure was a direct result of his fear that
the interests of bankers might conflict
with the interest of farmers and of
urban dwellers, both of whom were
intended to be the primary beneficiaries
of a rural credit system.
The Hollis-Bulkley bill represented for
Bulkley a neo-mercantilistic
effort to bolster agriculture and the
national economy, and no more. He
envisioned the bill not as a rejection
of private property, but rather as an
attempt to strengthen and to expand that
system. Moreover, his bill would
not have helped agricultural workers or
tenant farmers that much-it
limited a loan to 50 percent of the
value of the land-and thus was not
directed at changing the social
structure.5 In the final analysis, Bulkley's
bill was a rather moderate form of
government intervention.
After an election defeat in the August
1914 primary, Bulkley left
Congress without having convinced Wilson
of the value of the Hollis-
Bulkley Bill. Eventually, Wilson did
permit the passage of a revised bill in
1916 with provisions for non-mandatory
government aid and a structure
composed of private banks, cooperatives
and twelve central banks. The
final form of the bill did not please
Bulkley, but he was in no position to
affect its provisions.>5
Overall, Bulkley's performance in the
63rd Congress was a strong one.
49. ('Cnrgre,'.\.ional Record. 63rd
Congress. 3rd session (1915), 5009.
5). letter to B. F. Bournc, February4,
1914. Bulkley Papers: Cleveland leader, November
9. 1913. According to a Plain l)ealcr report Washington officials cited Bulkley's urban
background and the stake of the cities
in solution of the rural credit problem as the main
reasons for his
appointment. (leveland Plain Dealer, October 5, 1913.
51. (Cogrc^sioeil Record, 63rd
Congress. 3rd session (December 19. 1913), 405- 13 I.ink.
Is il/sAo. Vol. IV: hI1dm.. (Cunlt.ion. 345-50.
52. l.ink. (otil/ision. 345-50:
Robert Bulkley. "The Federal Farm l.oan Act." Journal of
Political Economyr XXIV (February, 1917), 132-36, 141-47. In this article
Bulkley praised the
linal hill. but also xoiced strong
objections to private banks as too large to know about the
character of the borrowers, vet too
small to market the debentures securely. He also
contended that pri ate banks w ould
increase land values undulv because ofthe profit motive.
In regard to non-mandatorx government
aid. Bulkley expressed the feat that six million
dollars deposited hb
the Treasurv might not be enough to cover the cost of capital and
debentures combined.
72 OO10 HISTORY
His contributions to the Federal Reserve
Act had brought him recognition
among the Democratic leadership, and the
chairmanship of the important
Subcommittee on Rural Credits. Within
two terms as a representative,
Bulkley had become a recognized expert
in the area of banking and
currency and an important member of that
committee, but the gods of the
elective process suddenly reversed his
fortunes.
Bulkley's opponent in the August primary
was an unusually strong one,
Robert Crosser, whose followers claimed
Tom Johnson would have
supported, were he alive. A colorful
street-corner campaigner, Crosser
successfully employed progressive
rhetoric against Bulkley by portraying
himself as a man of the people fighting
against the Democratic bosses, who
supported Bulkley. The Cleveland
Press, a supporter of Crosser, typified
him as a self-made man who had arisen
from the coal mines, and Bulkley
as a member of Cleveland's social elite,
separated by his status from the
common people. An accomplished
legislator but an ineffective cam-
paigner. Bulkley was unable to counter
the image projected by Crosser. It
was ironic that a man with such a
progressive record should have had
progressive rhetoric used against him so
well. Bulkley took his defeat
seriously and swore never to run again
for office, a promise he kept until
1930 when his desire to end prohibition
roused him to run for and win a
senate seat.'
As a representative. Bulkley had
constructed a record impossible to
characterize with one label. Definitely
not a radical nor a social activist,
Bulkley adopted a classical liberal
stance in regard to antitrust and tariff
legislation, a mercantilist position
toward banking and rural credit. and a
liberal attitude on questions of social
welfare. In concern for better
working conditions, support for
compulsory insurance, and acceptance of
the new immigrants. his record
paralleled that of new stock urban liberals.
studied by .ohn Buenker in (,rban
Liberalism and Progressive Reform,54
while his advocacy of scientific
management and the utilization of experts
mirrored the middle-class progressive
attitudes toward bureaucracy des-
cribed by Robert Wiebe. In a sense
Bulkley was a multi-faceted progres-
sive, similar in diversity of opinion to
the movement itself, a moderate man
who had grown beyond the confines of his
upper-class, Anglo-Saxon
upbringing and who would be very
comfortable with the multifaceted
programs of Franklin Roosevelt and the
New Deal.
53. In the Bulkley Papers see lctters
from W. B. Gongwer. January II. 1913. from ewton
1). Baker. March 20 and July27. 1913.
and from John. . Adams. October I 1. 1914. aswellas a
letter to Anthony Patton. November 19,
1913. Sec also the Clevelarnd Ptre for .uly 13,
18, 23.
24, and August 1. 1914, and the ('cvelanil Plain Dealer for July 27. 1914.
54. Buenker, Urbhan Liberalim. 231.
Buenker labels Bulkley a new stock urban liberal. but
the Plain I)eal'r obituary
for his father, Charles Bulklev, December 20. 1895. claimed that
Peter Bulklcy
of New England was an ancestor of the Cleveland Bulkley's.
WILLIAM D. JENKINS
Robert Bulkley:
Progressive Profile
Twenty years ago American historians
characterized progressivism as a
political movement whose reform impulse
was rooted in the "status
anxieties" of its predominately
middle-class membership. Since then, a
generation of historians has effectively
challenged the simplicity of that
hypothesis and replaced it with the
notion that progressivism was more
diffuse in nature. No longer viewed then
as a movement cohesive in
philosophy and homogeneous in
membership, progressivism has become
merely a term used to describe a series
of widely divergent reform ideas,
some radical and quasi-socialist, others
mildly reformist or even conserva-
tive, that Americans adopted as an
alternative to unfettered capitalism.'
Bernard Sternsher has recently offered
historians a useful tool in
analyzing the complexities of
progressivism. Avoiding the error of those
who labeled all political philosophies
to the left of laissez-faire as "progres-
sive" (or of those like Gabriel
Kolko who characterize all to the right of
socialism as "conservative"),
Sternsher has constructed a political typology
that accounts for the variety of
political philosophies housed within the
capitalistic system. To the left of
laissez-faire are the antitrust advocates,
such as Louis Brandeis, who sought
government intervention only to
restrict the size and power of business.
In the center are the neo-
mercantilists, defined as those favoring
government intervention to pro-
mote the general welfare. Within
neo-mercantilism Sternsher distinguished
between right-of-center proponents of
the trickle down theory and left-of-
center advocates of social welfare
legislation. Located further to the left,
just before socialism, was the
philosophy of "concentration and control,"
which Sternsher described as planned
capitalism involving the combined
efforts of government, business and
labor.
With such a spectrum in mind, it becomes
easier to understand the
results of Otis Graham's study of 105
progressives who lived to see the New
Deal. The shotgun application of the
term, progressive, guaranteed the
inclusion of reformers within that
so-called movement who would react in
William D. Jenkins is Associate
Professor of History at Youngstown State University.
I. See PeterG. Filene,"An Obituary
for the Progressive Movement," Ar'vri(can
Quarterly.
XXII (Spring 1970), and John Buenker, Urban
Liberalism andi Progre.ssive Reflrm (New
York. 1973) for a thorough discussion of
recent historiography.