Ohio History Journal

THOMAS T. SPENCER

 

Auxiliary and Non-Party Politics:

The 1936 Democratic Presidential

Campaign in Ohio

 

 

 

Presidential candidates and political observers have long viewed

Ohio as a key state. In the 1936 presidential election both parties

made an intense effort to capture the state's twenty-six electoral

votes. The Democrats were successful because of their candidate,

the popular incumbent Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their campaign

strategy, which was to go outside of the Democratic party to attract

voters who had a significant stake in the New Deal relief and recov-

ery programs; black Americans, farmers, laborers, women, and

ethnic groups. To attract these voters, the Democrats organized a

number of auxiliary and non-party committees that supplemented

the work of the Democratic party and sought support from indepen-

dents and voters of all parties who felt at ease supporting Roosevelt

but not the Democratic party. Among the committees organized

were Labor's Non-Partisan League, the Good Neighbor League, the

Roosevelt All-Party Agricultural Committee, and the Committee of

One.1

For the Democrats, Ohio was an ideal state in which to put their

campaign strategy to work because of the large number of workers,

black Americans, and farmers. Roosevelt had won by the narrow

margin of 74,016 votes in 1932, and Democrats expected an even

tougher battle in 1936.2 A report from Lorena Hickok, chief field

 

Thomas T. Spencer is Assistant Archivist at the Archives of the University of

Notre Dame.

 

 

1. Donald R. McCoy, "The Election of 1936," Crucial American Elections (Phil-

adelphia, 1973), 67-68. For an analysis of the role of auxiliary committees in the 1936

Democratic campaign, see Thomas T. Spencer, "Democratic Auxiliary and Non-Party

Groups in the Election of 1936" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of

Notre Dame, 1976).

2. Edgar Eugene Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt: The Presidential Vote, 1932-

1944 (Stanford, 1947), 139.

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Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                               115

 

investigator for the Works Progress Administration, in late 1935

indicated the political sitution in Ohio was "damned serious." She

believed the President had less than an even chance of carrying

Ohio. In August, 1936, in a Gallup poll the Republicans enjoyed a

slight edge in Ohio, and letters from several Democratic leaders in

Ohio to Democratic National Committee Chairman James A. Farley

indicated a hard fight lay ahead for the President. As late as Octo-

ber the Gallup poll still listed Ohio as a doubtful state.³ The Demo-

crats anticipated a struggle, and they were determined to wage an

all-out campaign to keep the state in the Roosevelt column.

The Democratic presidential campaign in Ohio began unofficially

in March, 1936, when President Roosevelt entered the state prim-

ary. This is usually a routine matter for an incumbent President,

and he is seldom challenged. In 1936, however, Colonel Henry

Breckinridge, a member of the American Liberty League, a wealthy

anti-New Deal organization, opposed Roosevelt in the presidential

preference primary. He charged Roosevelt with repudiation of

Democratic traditions and principles. Meanwhile, Roosevelt was

assured of Ohio's fifty-two votes at the Democratic National Con-

vention since voting for convention delegates was separate from the

preference primary in which the President was unopposed. In May,

moreover, the President easily defeated Breckinridge in the prim-

ary, 419,662 votes to 27,137, but the adverse publicity entailed in

Breckinridge's allegations worried Democratic leaders.⁴

Other political difficulties in Ohio worried Roosevelt's strategists.

Disagreement between Governor Martin Davey and the President

over the administration of relief programs in the state seriously

endangered party unity. Shortly after his election in 1934, Davey

had wasted little time implementing his belief that relief in Ohio

should be handled locally in the smaller cities. He charged that the

federal administration of relief in Ohio was "cruel, inhuman, and

wasteful." His dismissal of Charles Stillman, Federal Emergency

Relief Administrator in Ohio, because of patronage disputes added

 

 

 

3. Bernard Sternsher, "Depression and New Deal in Ohio: Lorena A. Hickok's

Reports to Harry Hopkins, 1934-1936," Ohio History, 86 (Autumn, 1977), 265; George

Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971 (New York, 1972), I, 32-33, 38;

for the opinions of several Ohio Congressmen, Senators and party leaders, see

Stephen M. Young to James A. Farley, August 11, 1936, Vic Donahey to James A.

Farley, July 20, 1936, William L. Fiesinger to James A. Farley, August 21, 1936,

Correspondence of James A. Farley, 1936, Box 1099, Ohio #1 folder, Democratic

National Committee Records, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

4. New York Times, March 1, 6, 14, and May 14, 1936.

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116                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

to the controversy and led to a major investigaiton by the Roosevelt

administration.⁵

In 1936, however, Davey faced a tough reelection campaign, and

in January of that year he visited the White House in an effort to

mend fences with the President. By late May, Davey publicly stated

that Ohio would be as thoroughly organized for the campaign as any

other state in the union.⁶ Despite the reconciliation, however, there

was concern about Davey at Roosevelt campaign headquarters.

Another incident that threatened to heighten dissension among

Ohio Democrats occurred in connection with the selection of dele-

gates to the Democratic National Convention. When Burr Gongwer,

former Democratic county chairman in Cuyahoga county, was not

included among the Roosevelt delegates to the convention, the

Cuyahoga County Democratic Women's Club threatened to boycott

a lecture by Mrs. Roosevelt in the county scheduled for March 12.

Some Democratic leaders thought that the county organization

might even oppose Roosevelt in the November elections. Although

only a small crowd turned out for Mrs. Roosevelt's lecture, Democra-

tic leaders, especially Senator Robert Bulkley and Representative

Martin Sweeney, were adamant in their opposition to the designa-

tion of Gongwer as a delegate because he had opposed Roosevelt at

the 1932 Democratic convention.⁷

In early summer, Democratic hopes for carrying Ohio looked even

more dim. When they held their national convention in Cleveland,

the Republicans served notice that they would make Ohio a battle-

ground. Added to this was the reported strength in the state of

certain third-party and radical organizations, including Reverend

Charles Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice and Dr. Fran-

cis Townsend's old-age pension movement which also held their

national conventions in Cleveland. Both of these movements prom-

ised radical means to help the poor and solve the problems of the

depression. Of greatest concern to the Democrats was the reputed

strength of William Lemke, candidate for President on the Union

Party ticket, whose main appeal was to the aged, farmers, and the

poverty stricken. It was estimated that because of his appeal to

these groups, Lemke's candidacy would detract more from

 

 

 

5. David J. Maurer, "Relief Problems and Politics in Ohio," in The New Deal, The

State and Local Levels, John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, eds.

(Columbus, 1975), 91-92.

6. New York Times, January 24, and May 30, 1936.

7. New York Times, March 11, 12, 1936.

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Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                         117

Roosevelt's strength than Landon's. All of these organizations wor- ried Democratic leaders in Ohio.8 In August, Democratic leaders from Ohio, headed by Senator Bulkley, visited Democratic national headquarters and privately admitted to Chairman James A. Farley that Roosevelt's prospects were not promising. They made note of factionalism within the par- ty, as well as Coughlin's strength in key areas of the state. They felt a "real fight" was necessary if Roosevelt were to have a chance, and they pledged themselves to wage an all out, harmonious effort.9 The Democrats quickly put their pledge into action. Although the official Democratic campaign in the state did not start until after Labor Day, the Labor Non-Partisan League began its efforts on behalf of Roosevelt in early August. The national Labor Non-     8. McCoy, "The Election of 1936," 62-65; William E. Leuchtenburg, "Election of 1936," A History of American Presidential Elections, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Fred Israel, eds., 4 volumes (New York, 1971), III, 2883-84; for the concern of the Democratic leaders in Ohio about Lemke, see Stephen M. Young to James A. Farley, August 11, 1936, William L. Fiesinger to James A. Farley, August 21, 1936, James M. Cox to James A. Farley, July 21, 1936, Farley Corres., 1936, Box 1099, Ohio #1 folder, DNCR, F.D.R. Library. 9. New York Times, August 21, 1936.

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118                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

Partisan League had been formally organized in April, 1936, to

support Roosevelt's bid for reelection and to counter third-party and

reactionary forces that threatened the New Deal social-legislation

program and the growth of organized labor. The League was found-

ed by John L. Lewis, United Mine Workers President, and Sidney

Hillman, head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. The League

had the support of a number of C.I.O. unions and some A.F.L. un-

ions. It also made an appeal to unorganized workers and members of

all classes and political faiths. The League undertook a number of

activities, including radio broadcasts, rallies, the publication of pro-

Roosevelt literature, and the establishment of state Labor Non-

Partisan Leagues. As early as mid-July the League announced it

would make a special effort in Ohio.¹⁰

The organization of the Ohio Labor Non-Partisan League began

in early August under the leadership of John Owens, president of

District six of the United Mine Workers of America. A state conven-

tion was held in late August to plan for what the League called "the

most smashing political effort ever made in the United States."11

The League made every effort to live up to this claim. It established

Labor Non-Partisan Leagues in thirty-seven counties and by elec-

tion day held 344 rallies throughout the state. In addition, the

League used seventy speakers in daily half-hour radio broadcasts in

the state's five largest cities and distributed voluminous amounts of

literature. The Labor Non-Partisan League of Cuyahoga county dis-

tributed 25,000 or more pro-Roosevelt pamphlets, while in Cincin-

nati it gave a special pamphlet entitled Why Workers Should Vote

for President Roosevelt to all precinct workers as a source book. 12

The efforts of the Labor Non-Partisan League proved to be effec-

tive. In mid-September, a Scripps-Howard newspaper poll indicated

that in the industrial cities of Cincinnati, Cleveland, Akron, Lan-

caster, Youngstown, Dayton, and Toledo, Roosevelt was leading

Landon by margins of fifteen to twenty percent, while in suburban

and rural areas the two were neck and neck. Political leaders attri-

 

10. Labor's Non-Partisan League, Labor's Non-Partisan League: Its Origin and

Growth (Washington, 1937), 3; Nation, April 15, 1936, 472; New York Times, April 2,

27, and May 12, 1936; Press Release of the Labor Non-Partisan League, October 19,

1936, Official File 2251, F.D.R. Library; New York Times, July 13, 16, 1936.

11. Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 4, 1936; John Owens and Irwin Shelter to

Officers and Members of All Central Labor Bodies and Local Unions, August 18,

1936, President's Personal File 3627, F.D.R. Library.

12. Delbert Arnold, "The C.I.O.'s Role in Politics, 1936-1948," (unpublished doctor-

al dissertation, University of Maryland, 1952), 34; The Advance, November 1936;

Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 17, 1936.

• 5
 

Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                              119

 

buted this urban support to the work of the Labor Non-Partisan

League.¹³ Many Republicans had felt the labor vote would divide

according to workers' party preferences, but the work of the League

had eliminated that possibility. Republicans had come to recognize

that the League was not just another subsidiary of the Democratic

National Committee but, rather, a powerful and influential orga-

nization that had the earmarks of an independent labor party. Re-

publican leaders also stated they had counted heavily on Father

Coughlin's cutting into Roosevelt's labor support, but the League

had prevented this. Not one Congressional candidate in Ohio who

was backed or endorsed by the Union Party had declared for Lemke.

Republican leaders attributed this lack of support for Lemke and

the overall pro-Roosevelt trend to the work of the League.¹⁴

In contrast to the efforts of the Labor Non-Partisan League, Re-

publican attempts to capture Ohio's labor vote were unsuccessful.

One unidentified political leader characterized the Republicans'

efforts as far from satisfactory. They approached the workers in-

directly, talking to union officials and employers but not to the men

in the factories. Employers seemed willing to give silent encourage-

ment to the organization of the labor vote, but they appeared unwill-

ing to take the initiative.15

Labor's Non-Partisan League was not the only Democratic auxili-

ary or non-party committee used in the Ohio campaign. The Good

Neighbor League was one of the most popular committees organized

by the Democrats. Formed in early 1936, the League was designed

to bring over to the Roosevelt side many liberals who usually did not

think in political terms, as well as idealistic voters of both parties

who believed their ideals could be realized through political action.¹⁶

Special appeals were made to attract social workers, businessmen,

clergymen, educators, and black Americans. The idea for the

League derived from President Roosevelt's State of the Union

address of January, 1936, in which he stated that a good neighbor

was a "neighbor who resolutely respects himself, and because he

does so, respects the rights of others ...."17

13. Robert S. Allen, "Key Labor Vote in Ohio Solidly Behind New Deal," New York

Post, September 22, 1936.

14. Ibid.

15. New York Times, August 16, 1936.

16. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge, Mass., 1960),

597; Silas Brent, "Apostle of the New Deal: The Faith and Works of Dr. Stanley

High," Nation's Business, November, 1936, 113.

17. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Annual Message to Congress," January 3, 1936,

Samuel Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13

Volumes (New York, 1938), V, 38.

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120                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Because Ohio was pivotal, the Good Neighbor League was quite

active throughout the state. One of the largest League rallies in the

entire country was held in Columbus in early October. Featured in

this gathering were Stanley High, director of the League, social

worker Estelle Sternberger, and Harold Ickes, Secretary of the In-

terior, who delivered the principal address. Ickes attacked Charles

Coughlin, William Lemke, and the Republicans, even going so far as

to label Coughlin a Fascist. He concluded by saying that those who

loved liberty and justice were lined up behind Roosevelt.¹⁸

In addition to sponsoring rallies and radio addresses, the League

conducted other activities in Ohio. In Hamilton County, for exam-

ple, a house-to-house campaign was undertaken by League mem-

bers supplied with pledge cards, and a showroom was secured where

projects done by local Public Works Administration workers were

displayed. In Cleveland, members of the Good Neighbor League

took part in a major symposium that featured Democratic, Republi-

can, and independent speakers, while in Columbus over 10,000 spe-

cial handbills were distributed at a League rally to help counter

Republican criticism of the Social Security Act. These leaflets called

upon teachers to support the President and the Social Security Act

by educating their students as to the humanitarian benefits of the

Act.¹⁹

One of the League's most vigorous appeals was made to the black

voter. The Good Neighbor League Colored Committee, part of the

overall Democratic drive to attract black Americans to Roosevelt,

was composed of a number of black ministers, educators, and profes-

sional people whose principal task was to convince Negro voters

that they had much to lose if Roosevelt were defeated. The Good

Neighbor League Colored Committee confined its activities to the

northeastern and midwestern states with heavy black populations.

It published and distributed propaganda and publicity material and

it conducted numerous rallies as well as Sunday afternoon civic

forums in Negro churches for the purpose of promoting Roosevelt's

reelection.²⁰

The Committee was especially active in Ohio. Two of its leaders

 

 

18. New York Times, October 10, 1936.

19. Clipping from Cincinnati Post, August 28, 1936, Scrapbook 29-12, Good Neigh-

bor League Records, F.D.R. Library; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 10, 1936; Hand-

bills of the Good Neighbor League Records, F.D.R. Library.

20. See Thomas T. Spencer, "The Good Neighbor League Colored Committee and

the 1936 Democratic Presidential Campaign," The Journal of Negro History, LXII

(Fall, 1978), 307-16.

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Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                              121

 

were from Ohio: D.O. Walker, President of Wilberforce University,

and Bishop Reverdy Ransom, also of Wilberforce University. Ran-

som urged black Americans to abandon their traditional Republican

attachment and back Roosevelt. He claimed that the key issues of

the campaign were financial, economic, and social matters that did

not hark back to Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction. Besides dis-

tributing literature and conducting activities in Negro churches,

the Committee arranged at least ten major rallies in Ohio, out of the

approximately twenty-five that it held in the northeastern states.

D.O. Walker's address presented ideas typical of those expressed at

these rallies. He lauded Roosevelt as an asset to the Negro race and

praised him for urging equality among men.²¹

The Colored Committee's efforts in Ohio appear to have been

helpful to the Roosevelt cause. In Cleveland, 62 percent of the black

vote went to Roosevelt, while black Americans in ward sixteen in

Cincinnati gave him 65.1 percent of their vote in 1936 as compared

to only 18.8 percent in 1932. This trend was also present in other

wards and precincts of the city. In Columbus, Negro wards gave the

President over 50 percent of their vote.²² Although much of

Roosevelt's success could be attributed to his personal popularity

and a favorable response to the New Deal program, the work of the

Colored Committee acquainted black voters with the New Deal and

informed them of what they had to lose if Roosevelt were not

reelected.

Other auxiliary committees contributed significantly to the

Democratic campaign in Ohio. The Roosevelt All-Party Agricul-

tural Committee conducted an intense drive to capture the farm vote.

Organized in fourteen midwestern states, the Committee was de-

signed to counter Republican criticsm of the New Deal farm pro-

gram, especially regarding the reciprocal trade agreements, and to

involve farmers in the Roosevelt campaign. The Committee spon-

sored numerous radio broadcasts, published pamphlets and litera-

ture, ran ads in newspapers and farm journals, and organized meet-

ings and rallies. The Ohio Committee headquarters were in Col-

 

 

 

21. Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Colored Committee of the Good

Neighbor League, September 2, 1936, Board of Directors-Colored Committee, GNLR,

F.D.R. Library; Pittsburgh Courier, September 19, 1936; Clipping, Toledo Blade,

October 15, 1936, Clipping Book #4, GNLR, F.D.R. Library.

22. Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote (New York, 1949), 19;

Ernest M. Collins, "Cincinnati Negroes and Presidential Politics," The Journal of

Negro History, XLI (April, 1956), 133; Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New

York, 1962), 496.

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122                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

umbus, and the head was Beverly O. Skinner. For major rallies the

Committee brought in nationally known speakers, including Sec-

retary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Assistant Secretary of

Agriculture M.L. Wilson. Wilson was especially popular among

Ohio farmers, and voting statistics for the counties in which he

worked indicate Roosevelt captured three counties he had lost in

1932 and greatly increased his plurality in three others. More im-

portantly, the total vote in these counties for Lemke, who was

thought to be a problem for the President, was only 606. The Com-

mittee also provided speakers for county meetings held in conjunc-

tion with the Grange and Farmers Union and spent over $9,000 on

the campaign among farmers.²³

Another active auxiliary committee was the Committee of One, a

large organization of Roosevelt supporters who signed pledge cards

to commit themselves to work as a Committee of One for the Presi-

dent. During the campaign the Committee of One enrolled over

25,000 members in Ohio.²⁴

The work of auxiliary and non-party committees supplemented

the campaign conducted by the Democratic National Committee.

The National Committee financed and controlled many of the aux-

iliary organizations and saw to it that the activities of the various

committees were coordinated with the overall Democratic cam-

paign. Like such pro-Roosevelt organizations as the Labor Non-

Partisan League and the Good Neighbor League, the regular Demo-

cratic organization stressed the benefits of the New Deal and the

necessity of keeping Roosevelt in office, while attacking his oppo-

nents and critics as wealthy monopolists bent on destroying pro-

grams designed to help workers and the average citizen. In Ohio, the

party's organization and efforts were quite apparent.

Especially prominent in Ohio was the work of the women's divi-

sion of the Democratic National Committee. In 1936 Democratic

 

 

23. For the overall activity of the Roosevelt All-Party Agricultural Committee, see

Thomas T. Spencer, "The Roosevelt All-Party Agricultural Committee and the 1936

Election," Annals of Iowa, XLV (Summer, 1979), 44-57; see, too, B.O. Skinner, to

M.L. Wilson, November 13, 1936, M.L. Wilson to B.O. Skinner, December 2, 1936, and

Milo Perkins to Robert Connell, October 10, 1936, Secretary of Agriculture Papers,

Record Group 16, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.; Charlot-

te Observer, October 16, 1936; William S. Bradley to Henry A. Wallace, December 5,

1936, Correspondence, Henry A. Wallace Papers, University of Iowa, Iowa City,

Iowa. This last letter contains an account of the receipts and disbursements of the

Agricultural Committee.

24. Committee of One Membership List, no date, Lists and Tabulations folder,

Committee of One Records, Emil Hurja Papers, F.D.R. Library.

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Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                               123

 

women were active throughout the country on an unprecedented

scale, and they were a significant force in the campaign. The

women's division of the Democratic headquarters in Ohio was

headed by Mildred Jaster. Under her leadership and with the help of

many others, the women's division engaged in a wide variety of

activities. It held rallies throughout the state that featured promi-

nent speakers, including Senator Hugo Black of Alabama and

Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor. Among the numerous pieces of

literature distributed, the most popular was a set of multicolored

leaflets known as the "Rainbow Fliers," which contained education-

al information on the benefits of the New Deal.²⁵

Women were active in nearly all counties down to the precinct

level. In Belmont county, for example, women initiated precinct

meetings to "bring neighbors together who have similar problems

and ideas." Discussions were held and literature distributed. Party

leaders felt this was an excellent way to educate women and keep

them informed, as well as provide an eventual working force of ten

to twelve women in each precinct. Enthusiasm was high as women

canvassed door to door distributing literature, marched into meet-

ings in informal parades, and traveled extensively throughout dis-

tricts gathering support for the President.²⁶

The party's organizational work and activities, to be sure, were

not confined to the women's division. County committees were busy

during the campaign in behalf of all Democratic candidates, espe-

cially the President. In early October the Roosevelt campaign in

Cuyahoga County officially began with the appointment of a 600-

member committee that included Democrats, Republicans, labor

leaders, foreign-language groups, women, and professional people.

This committee's sole responsibility was to deliver the county for

Roosevelt.²⁷

Speeches given by Democratic speakers in Ohio attest to the in-

tensity of the Democratic effort on Roosevelt's behalf. Like the aux-

 

 

25. Cora Corbett to Mary Dewson, October 26,1936, H.R. Crossin to Mary Dewson,

October 13, 1936, Box 129, Ohio-1936 Campaign by Counties folder, Women's Divi-

sion, DNCR, F.D.R. Library.

26. Cora Corbett to Mary Dewson, October 7, 1936, October 22, 1936, Ester F.

Pinsky to Mary Dewson, October 3, 1936, Mrs. Harriet B. Stuart to Mary W. Dewson,

November 2, 1936, Box 129, Ohio-1936 Campaign by Counties folder, Women's Divi-

sion, DNCR, F.D.R. Library; Mary Monesmith to James A. Farley, October 14, 1936,

Box 130, Ohio-1936 Campaign by Counties folder, and Katherine Kearney to Mary

Dewson, September 10, 1936, Box 131, Ohio-1936 Campaign by Counties folder, T-Z,

Women's Division, DNCR, F.D.R. Library.

27. Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 4, 1936.

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124                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

iliary committees, Democratic speakers not only sought to inform

voters of the Roosevelt program, but they were also hard hitting in

their criticism of the Republican party and its supporters. Senator

Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas delivered a speech for the President

in Canton, and castigated Landon's plan for balancing the budget.

Robinson stated that if businessmen in America waited for Gov-

ernor Landon to balance the budget, they would wait until the

morning of resurrection. In Dayton, former Presidential candidate

James Cox spoke for Roosevelt and praised him for saving the na-

tion in a time of great crisis. Cox scored Landon's criticism of Feder-

al relief and recovery policies that had done so much for the country

and asserted that with a Republican administration the country

would have leaderless government. Senator Hugo Black addressed a

Cleveland Democratic meeting and attacked the American Liberty

League, J.P. Morgan, the DuPonts, and William Randolph Hearst

as agents of the massing of the forces of privilege and wealth behind

the attack on Roosevelt.²⁸

Other Demcoratic speakers who appeared in Ohio during the cam-

paign included Attorney General Homer Cummings and President

Roosevelt. In mid-October Roosevelt delivered a brief"whistle stop"

address from the platform of his train in Cleveland. An estimated

25,000 to 30,000 turned out to hear him charge that New York

financial interests were using stockholders' money to pay for litera-

ture attacking his administration, even though no previous admi-

nistration had done so much to encourage business.²⁹ Ohio Democrat-

ic leaders were hopeful that Roosevelt would deliver a major

address in the state during the campaign, and this appeared to be a

strong possibility early in the summer when Roosevelt's chances

looked dim. By late summer, however, Roosevelt's prospects for car-

rying the state had improved and a proposed Presidential speech

was canceled.³⁰

One Democratic leader who was especially anxious that Roosevelt

visit Ohio was Governor Martin Davey. The Republicans launched

an intense drive to unseat Davey, and the Governor quickly recog-

nized that Roosevelt's assistance would be crucial in the gubernato-

rial contest. Roosevelt-Davey Clubs were formed in the state, and in

 

 

 

28. New York Times, October 10, 15, 1936; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 23,

1936.

29. Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 16, 17, 1936.

30. New York Times, May 30, and August 23, 1936; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Octo-

ber 7, 1936.

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Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                               125

 

early October Davey delivered a radio address in which he urged

Roosevelt's reelection and appealed for support from Roosevelt

Democrats. He passed over his past disagreements with Federal

officials on relief matters.³¹ There was tacit cooperation between the

Roosevelt and Davey forces, and Davey did make a late plea for

Roosevelt in an effort to help the President's candidacy, but mutual

assistance was minimal. It was apparent by election eve that, de-

spite Democratic worries that Roosevelt's chances in Ohio would be

hurt by his disagreements with Davey over relief, Davey was

actually riding on FDR's coattails.³²

By October, Democratic leaders were quite confident that

Roosevelt would carry the state in November. In mid-October Demo-

cratic National Committee Chairman James A. Farley predicted

publicly for the first time that Roosevelt would carry Ohio. Farley

said the situation in Ohio had improved more than in any other

state, and he attributed this partially to the support of labor and

black Americans.³³ In early October Labor Non-Partisan League

chairman George Berry also predicted Roosevelt would win in Ohio,

and on October 19 Senator Vic Donahey spoke on the radio in

Roosevelt's behalf. Donahey had not been active for Roosevelt, and

Democratic leaders saw the speech as an indication that the Senator

was certain Roosevelt would win. Donahey, incidentally, had never

been wrong about an election.³⁴

On election day voters across the country voted overwhelmingly

for Roosevelt. The President carried forty-six of the forty-eight

states and won 523 electoral votes to his opponent's eight; Landon

carried only the traditional Republican states of Maine and Ver-

mont. Roosevelt won 60 percent of the popular vote, a share of the

vote attained by only one previous Presidential candidate-Harding

in 1920-and his margin of victory in the popular vote was slightly

more than eleven million votes.³⁵

Roosevelt's support was centered in the urban-industrial areas. In

Ohio, the urban-industrial vote was especially prominent as voters

 

 

31. New York Times, May 30, 1936; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 7, 9, 1936.

32. Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 5, 1936.

33. New York Times, October 12, 1936; Lorena Hickok became more optimistic

about the President's chances in Ohio as early as May, 1936, and indicated strong

support for Roosevelt among worker and unemployed. See Sternsher, "Depression

and New Deal in Ohio," 270-71.

34. New York Times, October 7, 1936; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 20, 1936.

35. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of

United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), 682; Robinson, They

Voted for Roosevelt, 36,41.

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126                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

delivered Roosevelt a plurality of more than 600,000 votes. He car-

ried sixty-seven of the state's eight-eight counties. Thirteen of the

sixteen counties with a city of 50,000 or more population and at

least 10,000 people employed in manufacturing or mining exceeded

their anticipated support. In Mahoning County (Youngstown), for

example, 72 percent of the vote went to Roosevelt, compared to 45

percent in 1932. The 1936 election was a major turning point in

Ohio politics, as urban-industrial counties "moved decisively into

the Democratic camp."36

Roosevelt's popularity in Ohio was further demonstrated by the

results of the gubernatorial race. Martin Davey won reelection by a

plurality of 130,000 votes, far below the President's margin of

victory.³⁷ Roosevelt strategists had worried that previous disagree-

ments between Roosevelt and Davey would hurt the President's

chances in the state, but the results indicate Davey may have ben-

efitted from Roosevelt's landslide. Equally significant, third-party

candidates polled only 137,463 votes in the state, far below what

observers had felt was possible.³⁸

Roosevelt's convincing triumph in Ohio indicates that the fears of

Democratic leaders that he might lose the state were unwarranted.

The President's popularity was obviously greater than they first

thought it was, and the expected strength of William Lemke,

Charles Coughlin, and other New Deal critics in the state failed to

materialize. The results of the election, however, also indicate that

the intense campaign conducted by the Roosevelt auxiliary commit-

tees and the Democratic party was important to Roosevelt's success

in Ohio.

The Roosevelt auxiliary committees were especially important in

appealing to various voter groups. The Labor Non-Partisan

League's efforts to capture the labor vote for Roosevelt and the Good

Neighbor League Colored Committee's campaign among black

Americans were effective in view of the President's margin of vic-

tory in urban-industrial counties such as Cuyahoga, Lucas, and

Mahoning. Other auxiliary committees, such as the Roosevelt All-

 

 

36. For the urban composition of the Roosevelt vote, see Kristi Andersen, The

Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936 (Chicago, 1979), 30-33; see, too, Ber-

nard Sternsher, "The Emergence of the New Deal Party System: A Problem in His-

torical Analysis of Voter Behavior," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, VI (Sum-

mer, 1975), 139; Thomas D. Flinn, "Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics," The

Journal of Politics, 24 (August, 1962), 538.

37. Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 5, 1936.

38. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt, 139.

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Auxiliary & Non-Party Politics                               127

 

Party Agricultural Committee and the Committee of One, also con-

tributed to the successful Roosevelt campaign in Ohio.

The Democratic campaign helped counter criticism of the New

Deal and promoted Roosevelt's candidacy by distributing literature,

holding rallies, sponsoring radio broadcasts, canvassing voters, and

soliciting votes from all classes. The Democratic campaign appealed

to many different groups, including women, labor, black Americans,

and farmers who had a vital stake in the New deal. Especially the

efforts of the women's division of the Democratic National Commit-

tee contributed to Roosevelt's victory in Ohio. The women's division

was well organized down to the precinct level and conducted a vigor-

ous campaign on the President's behalf among women and all other

voter groups. Democratic county committees were, likewise, well

organized and brought a number of prominent figures into the state

to speak on Roosevelt's behalf.

Ohio was not the only midwestern state in which the Democrats

conducted vigorous campaigns. Auxiliary committees were also

established in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan, states with large

urban populations that polls showed to be borderline during the

campaign. In Michigan, the Good Neighbor League was credited

with doing excellent work among Republicans and independents,

while in Illinois the Labor Non-Partisan League waged an intensive

effort to corral the labor vote for Roosevelt.³⁹ Both Indiana and Illi-

nois had active All-Party Agricultural Committees and the Demo-

crats made a special effort to attract the black vote in Indiana,

Michigan, and Illinois. The Committe of One also had large mem-

berships in Michigan and Illinois.⁴⁰ Coupled with the efforts of the

regular Democratic organization, the Democratic auxiliary cam-

paigns were important factors in these states.

Election results in Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois were similar to

that of Ohio. Roosevelt carried Michigan by over 300,000 votes,

Indiana by nearly 240,000, and Illinois by over 700,000. Like Ohio,

Roosevelt's greatest pluralities in these states were in the urban

counties. In all three states Roosevelt increased his margin of vic-

 

 

39. Clara D. Van Auken to James A. Farley, October 26, 1936, Correspondence,

1936 Election, Box 452, Frank C. Walker Papers, University of Notre Dame Ar-

chives, Notre Dame, Indiana; The Advance, October, November, 1936.

40. Expenditures for the All-Party Agricultural Committee in Indiana and Illinois

can be found in the list of receipts and disbursements in the letter from William S.

Bradley to Henry A. Wallace, December 5, 1936, Correspondence, Henry A. Wallace

Papers; University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa; Committee of One Membership List, no

date, Lists and Tabulations folder, Committee of One Records, Hurja Papers, F.D.R.

Library.

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128                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

tory over that of 1932, although in all of these states he had enjoyed

a comfortable plurality in that earlier election. In Ohio, on the other

hand, Roosevelt had won by fewer than 100,000 votes in 1932, but

carried the state by more than 600,000 votes in 1936.41 Perhaps

Roosevelt could have won Ohio and other midwestern states without

the intense Democratic campaign, but it is unlikely his plurality

would have been as high.⁴² Although Democratic fears of losing

these midwestern states were obviously exaggerated, these states

contained 88 electoral votes and polls indicated a strong campaign

was needed. In any event, this campaign directed at black Amer-

icans, women, farmers, and workers assured Roosevelt of victory

and helped make these voter groups a vital part of the Democratic

coalition in future elections.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

41. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt, 81-89, 107-10, 139.

42. The percentage of counties in which a Democratic Presidential candidate re-

ceived a plurality was an all-time high (over 70 percent) and it far exceeded the

percentage of county offices won by the Democrats in 1936. This is further evidence

that Roosevelt probably would have carried Ohio without a strong Democratic cam-

paign. See, V.O. Key, Jr., "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," The

American Political Science Review, 47 (June, 1953), 526.

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