HAL W. BOCHIN
Tom Corwin's Speech Against
the Mexican War: Courageous
But Misunderstood
On May 12, 1846, by votes of 174 to 14
in the House and 40 to 2 in
the Senate, Congress granted President
James K. Polk's request for
permission to enroll 50,000 volunteers
in a war begun "by the act of
the Republic of Mexico."1 Despite
the overwhelmingly favorable
vote, opposition to the war formed
quickly, especially among Whig
abolitionists in New England who viewed
the war as a southern plot
to increase slave-holding territory.
Together with conservative
Whigs and anti-Administration Democrats
who disputed the
alleged causes of the conflict and
feared its possible consequences,
they condemned the war through
resolutions, editorials, and
speeches. Perhaps the loudest voices of
protest echoed in the House
of Representatives where Joshua R.
Giddings of Ohio's Western Re-
serve and thirteen Whig colleagues, the
"immortal fourteen," re-
fused to vote for the men and supplies
requested by the president.
Giddings' forces, however, at first
lacked a dependable ally in the
Senate and thus they responded
enthusiastically when, on February
11, 1847, Thomas Corwin, the junior
senator from Ohio, joined the
antiwar movement with a vigorous
denunciation of the ongoing con-
flict with Mexico.2
Hal W. Bochin is Professor of Speech
Communication at California State University-
Fresno.
1. Whigs in the House voting against the
bill were John Quincy Adams, George
Ashmun, Joseph Grinnell, Charles Hudson,
and Daniel King of Massachusetts; Hen-
ry Cranston of Rhode Island; Erastus
Culver of New York; Luther Severance of
Maine; John Strahan of Pennsylvania; and
Columbus Delano, Joseph Root, Daniel
Tilden, Joseph Vance, and Joshua
Giddings of Ohio. Whig Senators opposed to the
measure were Thomas Clayton of Delaware
and John Davis of Massachusetts. Con-
gressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 795-804.
2. John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War (Madison,
1973), 30-36, 80; Born October 6,
1795, in Bradford County, Pennsylvania,
Joshua Reed Giddings was admitted to the
Ohio Bar in February, 1821. He served
one term in the Ohio legislature before being
34 OHIO HISTORY
First elected to Congress in 1830,
Corwin served five terms in the
House before being elected governor of
Ohio in 1840. Defeated for
reelection in 1842, he practiced law
until taking a seat in the United
States Senate on March 4, 1845. Corwin's
vote for the volunteer bill
and his public silence on the war issue
seemed to place him with the
conservative majority of his party.
Although these Whigs would
vote with their radical colleagues that
the war was " ... unneces-
sarily and unconstitutionally begun by
the President of the United
States," they voted for the supply
bills necessary to wage it.3 News-
paper editor John Defrees of Indianapolis
explained this strategy in
a "confidential" letter:
"So long as the war lasts, our flag, and those
who uphold it must be sustained, while
at the same time, those who
placed that flag where it is,
must be denounced ..." The Terre
Haute Wabash Express condemned
the war, but added: "For the
soldiers' sake we should give the
President and his Cabinet almost
anything they wish, and hold them to a
strict accountability before
their masters - the people."4
Corwin, however, could not support such
a position. Although he
"differed from all the leading
Whigs in the Senate, and saw plainly
that they all were, to some extent,
bound to turn, if they could, the
current of public opinion against
me," Corwin used the debate on
the Three Million Bill as the scene for
making his position on the
war known.5 Speaking in opposition to
President Polk's request for
three million dollars "to bring the
existing war with Mexico to a
speedy and honorable conclusion,"
Corwin revealed the "motives
and reasons" which impelled him to
occupy a "painfully embarras-
sing" position.6 His
address became one of the most highly publi-
cized and least understood speeches in
the history of the Senate.
elected to Congress in 1838 from Ohio's
twentieth district, the Western Reserve,
which he represented for twenty
consecutive years. Biographical Directory of the
American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), 999. Giddings often refer-
red to his group as the "immortal
fourteen"; See, Giddings to J. Addison Giddings,
May 30, 1846, and January 13, 1848,
Joshua R. Giddings MSS, Ohio Historical
Society.
3. Born in Bourbon County, Kentucky,
July 29, 1794, Thomas Corwin gained
admittance to the bar and began practice
in Lebanon, Ohio, in 1817. He served in the
Ohio House of Representatives in 1821,
1823, and 1824; See, Biographical Directory,
787. For the resolution, see Congressional
Globe, 30th Congress, 1st Session, 94-95.
4. John Defrees to Daniel Pratt, April
17, 1847, Daniel Pratt MSS, Indiana State
Historical Society; Terre Haute Wabash
Express, April 7, 1847.
5. See Corwin's letter to the Lafayette Journal
reprinted in the Niles' Register,
May 22, 1847. Morrow believed that
Corwin had tried to get Daniel Webster and
John Crittenden to support his position
on supplies, but failed. Josiah Morrow (ed.),
Life and Speeches of Thomas Corwin (Cincinnati, 1896), 48.
6. Congressional Globe, 29th
Congress, 2nd Session, 382. These and subsequent
Tom Corwin's Speech 35
When Washington learned that the
"Wagon Boy," who had gained
a national reputation as an eloquent
speaker during the presiden-
tial campaigns of 1840 and 1844, was
ready to discuss the war,
members of the House, visitors to the
city, and housewives quickly
filled the small Senate chamber. In
violation of the rules of the
Senate, women were allowed on the floor:
"There was not courage
sufficient with Senators or the
presiding officer to say no to the
earnest entreaties made." As Corwin
began to speak, one observer
noticed that "a tremor came over
him." Another reporter believed
Corwin "was embarrassed
somewhat" because public expectations
were so high.7 For two and
one-half hours, Corwin persuaded, en-
thralled, and entertained his audience;
but the full meaning of what
he said escaped many auditors for some
months. Many who listened
to Corwin heard exactly what they wanted
to hear.
Relying primarily on historical fact,
Corwin attempted to prove
that Polk had unconstitutionally begun
the war on Mexican terri-
tory, that such war violated moral
principles, and that the national
interest required an immediate
withdrawal of American forces from
Mexico. After offering as his major
premise the principle of interna-
tional law that "a revolutionary
government can claim no jurisdic-
tion anywhere when it has not defined
and exercised its power with
the sword," Corwin presented the
circumstances surrounding the
outbreak of hostilities and two
statements from prominent author-
ities to support his minor premise that
because Texas had never
exercised such power in the territories
disputed with Mexico, the
land was Mexican. First, he noted some
significant omissions in the
report of General Zachary Taylor's advance
into the territory:
What did your general find there? What
did he write home? Do you hear of
any trial by jury on the east bank of
the Rio Grande - of Anglo-Saxons
making cotton there with their negroes?
No, you hear of Mexicans residing
peacefully there, but fleeing from their
cotton fields at the approach of your
army - no slaves; for it had been a
decree of the Mexican Government,
years ago, that no slaves should exist
there.
Later he quoted directly from a letter
by an unnamed officer in
Taylor's command who, while stationed
between the Nueces River
and the Rio Grande, believed himself to
be "right in the enemy's
country" and who described the inhabitants of the areas as "leaving
quotations from the speech are taken
from the Congressional Globe (Appendix), 29th
Congress, 2nd Session, 211-18 (hereafter
cited "Speech").
7. Cleveland Herald, February 16,
1847; Cleveland True Democrat, February 17,
1847; Ashtabula Sentinel, February
22, 1847.
36 OHIO HISTORY
their homes" in the face of the advancing American army.8 Corwin's
claim that those who lived in the region
did not consider themselves
to be Texans seems to be a reasonable
one, although the soldier he
quoted was not the best judge of the
technical question of national
sovereignty.
To buttress his case, Corwin cited
statements made by Senator
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri and
Governor Silas Wright of New
York, both of whom had declared prior to
the annexation of Texas in
1845 that the land in question belonged
to Mexico. Corwin
apparently reasoned that citing these
Democratic spokesmen might
make his argument more appealing to
Democratic listeners and
probably to audiences which were
nonpartisan. Finally, and prob-
ably most persuasively, Corwin argued
that a Mexican officer in a
customhouse in the territory
"collected taxes of all who traded there,
and paid these duties into the Mexican
Treasury."9 Thus, if Corwin's
major premise were accepted and his
major premise given by one or
more of the circumstances he noted or by
the people he cited, his
conclusion became inescapable: Texas had
not exercised sovereignty
over the area and hostilities had begun
on Mexican soil. Although
other speakers had offered the same
arguments previously, the Cin-
cinnati Atlas, a Whig journal,
found this section of the speech
"powerfully eloquent and
startling."10
Corwin had less success denouncing
Polk's activities which led to
the fighting as unconstitutional. He
contended that the Constitu-
tion placed the war-making power in
Congress. The president's duty
was "to execute, not to make
the law." Corwin contended that "the
President alone, without the advice or
consent of Congress, had, by a
bold usurpation, made war on a
neighboring republic ... [and] you
shall search the records and the
archives of both Houses of Congress
in vain for any detail of its causes,
any resolve of Congress that war
shall be waged."11
Corwin's own actions, however, cast
doubt on the validity of his
statement. When a war bill appropriating
$10 million and authoriz-
ing the president to call out fifty
thousand volunteers was presented
to Congress, a preamble declaring that
"by the act of the Republic of
Mexico a state of war exists between
that Government and the
8. "Speech," 214-15.
9. Ibid., 215.
10. Cincinnati Atlas, quoted in
Terre Haute Wabash Express, February 24, 1847.
Similar arguments can be found in the
May 12, 1846, speech of Joshua Giddings and
the May 14, 1846, speech of Garrett Davis, in Congressional
Globe (Appendix), 29th
Congress, 1st Session 641-45, 916-20.
11. "Speech," 212.
Tom Corwin's Speech 37 |
|
Government of the United States" had been added in lieu of a formal declaration of war. Attempts in the Senate first to strike out the preamble and then to separate it from the authorization failed, and thus senators were forced either to accept the president's interpreta- tion of what had happened along the Rio Grande or to vote against the money and troops necessary to support Taylor's outnumbered army. Corwin did not speak on the issue and voted for the bill, although John Crittenden of Kentucky showed his displeasure by voting "ay, except the preamble" and three other senators abstained.12 The president had naturally considered support for the bill to mean congressional acceptance of the war and its causes as expressed in his war message. Corwin, however, disagreed. He pointed out that even John C. Calhoun, a Democrat, "and therefore, as we may suppose, acquainted with his [Polk's] motive for his war with Mexico was compelled to say the other day in debate, that up to that hour the causes of this war were left to conjecture." As the Senate well knew, however, this argument rested on flimsy ground for Calhoun's knowledge of Polk's motives was as limited as Cor- win's and Calhoun had in fact opposed the war from its inception.13
12. Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 804. 13. Satisfied with the annexation of Texas, Calhoun feared that a successful con- flict with Mexico would lead to an undesirable clash between North and South over slavery in the conquered territories; See, Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun (Boston, 1950), 440-44; "Speech," 212. |
38 OHIO HISTORY
Undaunted, Corwin assumed that if he
could show that the true
cause of the war had not been announced,
he would in turn prove
that Congress had not actually supported
the war. He would later
explain his own vote in compliance with
the president's request for
supplies to wage the war by declaring
that he had voted for the first
war measures in order to save Taylor's
army, but when he realized
that Polk desired to take territory from
Mexico, he reversed his
position and spoke out against the war.14
Although relying heavily on historical
justification, Corwin also
based his arguments on moral principles.
He claimed that a just
nation did not seek glory in wartime
exploits against a weaker
neighbor, nor did it wage war for
economic gain: "Who ever heard,
since Christianity was propagated
amongst men of a nation taxing
its people, inlisting [sic] its young
men, and marching off two
thousand miles to fight people merely to
be paid for it in money."15
Corwin did not discuss the war's
possible effect on the slavery
issue in terms of moral principles;
instead, he saw it as a question of
national expediency. He argued against
the annexation of any Mex-
ican territory for, "if further
acquisition of territory is to be the
result... then I scarcely know which
should be suffered, eternal war
with Mexico, or the hazards of internal
commotion at home." He
pointed out that opposition to the
further extension of slavery was
"a deeply-rooted determination with
men of all parties in what we
call the non-slaveholding States."
But, he noted, Southerners in-
sisted on the right of slavery to
expand. Thus the problem: "Should
we prosecute this war another moment, or
expend one dollar in the
purchase or conquest of a single acre of
Mexican land, the North and
the South are brought into collision on
a point where neither will
yield." To put the situation into a
metaphor reminiscent of Jonathan
Edwards: "We stand this day on the
crumbling brink of that gulf
["the bottomless gulf of civil
strife"] - we see its bloody eddies
wheeling and boiling before us - shall
we not pause before it is too
late?"16
Corwin added a second pragmatic reason
for ending the conflict
when he objected to the great
expenditures needed to support the
war effort: "Had this money of the
people been expended in making
a railroad from your northern lakes to
the Pacific . . . you would
have made a highway for the world
between Asia and Europe."
14. Congressional Globe, 29th
Congress, 2nd Sessions, 543-44.
15. "Speech," 215-16.
16. Ibid., 218.
Tom Corwin's Speech 39
Corwin long believed that commercial
progress was delayed because
"our Democracy prefers to pay money
for blowing out brains rather
than for blowing up and getting round
rocks."17
In addition, to the arguments based on
history, the Constitution,
morality, and expediency, emotional
appeals appeared throughout
Corwin's speech. One of the most
persuasive described the tragic
consequences of war on innocent people.
He pictured the Battle of
Monterey and revealed:
... a lovely Mexican girl, who, with the
benevolence of an angel in her
bosom, and the robust courage of a hero
in her heart, was busily engaged,
during the bloody conflict - amid the
crash of falling houses, the groans of
the dying, and the wild shriek of battle
- in carrying water to slake the
burning thirst of the wounded of either
host. While bending over a wounded
American soldier, a cannon ball struck
her, and blew her to atoms! Sir, I do
not charge my brave, generous-hearted
countrymen who fought that fight,
with this. No, no. We who sent them - we
who know that scenes like this
... are the inevitable attendants on war
- we are accountable for this ...
Corwin did not state how he had obtained
his information, but the
Democratic press managed to find
witnesses who provided a contra-
dictory version of the death of the same
girl: "The returned volun-
teers from this city declare [her] from 'actual
observation' to have
been a female robber, plundering the
bodies of the dead and dying
when the musketball struck her."18
Corwin reached the emotional climax of
the speech when he
attempted to answer the pro-war argument
of Senator Lewis Cass of
Michigan that America needed room to
expand. He declared in
words which captured the imagination of
the public: "If I were a
Mexican, I would tell you, 'Have you not
room in your own country
to bury your dead men? If you come into
mine, we will greet you
with bloody hands, and welcome you to
hospitable graves!' " Friends
and enemies remembered Corwin's words;
and, more than a year
after his speech, the Lebanon Thought
and Eagle announced the
appearance of that "most excellent
and worthy Senator Tom Corwin
of 'hospitable graves' memory."19
Children, their hands stained red
with berry juice, repeated Corwin's
famous sentence to their
playmates.20
17. Ibid.; Thomas Corwin to
William Greene, June 16, 1846. in L. B. Hamilton
(ed.), "Selections from the William
Greene Papers," Quarterly Publication of the
Historical and Philosophical Society
of Ohio, XVIII (1918), 15 (hereafter
referred to as
the "Greene Papers").
18. "Speech," 217; Dayton Western
Empire, September 23, 1847.
19. "Speech," 217; Lebanon Thought
and Eagle, October 6, 1848.
20. Morrow, Life and Speeches, 85-86.
40 OHIO HISTORY
Just as he had relied on history to
delineate the problem facing
the country, Corwin utilized history to justify his
solution. He
wanted to "call home our armies and
bring them at once within our
own acknowledged limits." Congress
had only to exercise its control
of military expenditures: "While
the President, under the penalty of
death, can command your officers to
proceed, I can tell them to come
back, or the President can supply them
as he may." As Joshua
Giddings had done earlier, Corwin
offered English precedents to
support his ideas: " ... in
England, since 1688, it has not been in the
power of a British sovereign to do that
which in your boasted repub-
lic, an American president, under what
you call Democracy, has
done - make war without consent of the
legislative power. In Eng-
land, supplies are at once refused if
Parliament does not approve the
objects of the war."21 With
these few words Corwin moved far ahead
of most of the Whig party. Courageously
he demanded consistency of
word and action. If the war deserved
condemnation, so also did the
activities which prolonged it. If troops
should not have been commit-
ted in the first place, they should be
withdrawn immediately. Only
sixteen Whigs (fourteen in the House and
two in the Senate) had
taken such a position at the start of
the war, and only acknowledged
radicals like Giddings and his friends
had espoused voting against
war measures as the best position for
the party. Most Whig leaders
preferred the proven popularity and
political safety of supporting
the troops while condemning the war.22
In spite of the outcry he
knew would arise, Corwin wanted to stop
the war and he offered the
Senate the only option available to do
so - the withholding of
military funds.
Corwin seasoned his logical and
emotional appeals with large
pinches of sarcasm and humor. To
heighten his description of the
president's "unconstitutional"
activities, he treated Polk as royalty.
References to him included: "royal
will," "His Majesty," and "com-
mands which we have received from the
throne." Senators Lewis
Cass and Ambrose Sevier felt the lash of
Corwin's tongue in a de-
scription of a hypothetical victory
march through Mexico City:
... in grand procession through the
halls of the Montezumas! The Senator
from Michigan [Mr. Cass], red with the
blood of recent slaughter, the gory
spear of Achilles in his hand, and the
hoarse clarion of war in his mouth,
21. "Speech," 215; Giddings'
House speech of December 15, 1846, in Joshua R.
Giddings, Speeches in Congress (New
York, 1968), 265-88.
22. Caleb B. Smith of Indiana is a good
example; see Hal W. Bochin, "Caleb B.
Smith's Opposition to the Mexican
War," Indiana Magazine of History, LXIX (June
1973), 95-114.
Tom Corwin's Speech 41
blowing a blast 'so loud and deep' that
the sleeping echoes of the lofty
cordilleras start from their caverns and
return the sound, till every ear from
Panama to Santa Fe is deafened with the
roar. By his side, with 'modest
mien and downcast look,' comes the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Sevier],
covered from head to foot with a
gorgeous robe, glittering and embossed
with three millions of shining gold ....
Corwin did not use humor merely to add
interest to his speech; he
also made it function as support for his
position. He could not be-
lieve that America's destiny required
her to annex California: "We
ought to have the Bay of San Francisco.
Why? Because it is the best
harbor on the Pacific! It has been my
fortune, Mr. President, to have
practised a good deal in criminal courts
in the course of my life, but I
have never yet heard of a thief,
arraigned for stealing a horse plead
that it was the best horse he could find
in the country!"23 Corwin
entertained his listeners so well that
reporters found it difficult to
take notes:
. . . [A]s he began to warm up into
earnestness, the flashes of wit became
more and more frequent and brilliant,
the arrows of ironies and sarcasm
flew faster and faster, burst after
burst of laughter succeeded each other in
rapid succession, and in perfect
despair, he [the reporter] threw down his
pen and joined in with the multitude
present. . and indulged in the luxury
of listening and not unfrequently
laughter.24
Encased in classical and historical
allusions, Corwin's moral
argument became lost in the controversy
that his speech engen-
dered. Many listeners remembered only those
arguments which
they wanted to hear. The Democratic
press, for example, heard
treason. The Cincinnati Daily
Enquirer thought that most Whigs
would "utterly condemn and scorn
sentiments so unpatriotic - anti-
American - so disgraceful to the people
and State of Ohio." A
correspondent of the Cleveland Plain
Dealer accused Corwin of "de-
faming the fair fame of his country; in
withholding supplies for the
prosecution of the war, and in giving
aid and succor to the enemy!"
Some newspapers even argued that
Corwin's words offered en-
couragement to the Mexicans to continue
fighting. The editor of the
Cleveland Plain Dealer agreed
with the Pittsburgh Post which pre-
dicted: "As soon as Mr. Corwin's
speech reaches Mexico, it will be
read and greatly admired by the
plunderers and murderers of our
citizens, and it will give them the
comfortable assurance that their
23. "Speech," 216-17.
24. Pittsburgh Gazette, quoted in
Cleveland True Democrat, February 19, 1847.
42 OHIO HISTORY
cause has talented advocates in this
country."25 Others felt that
speeches such as Corwin's would hurt
peace negotiations. In line
with this sentiment, a group of citizens
in Hamilton County passed
a resolution that "all efforts to
cripple and embarrass the Adminis-
tration in conducting the war to a
successful termination [are] . . .
unpatriotic and deserving of the
severest condemnation."26
When reports of Corwin's address reached
Mexico, the American
occupation forces reacted emotionally. A
company of Ohio volun-
teers stationed near Monterey burned his
effigy. The Monterey
(Mexico) Pioneer felt that Ohio's
fighting men would ". . . pass the
sentence of political damnation upon the
man who could so vilify
their character as soldiers and as
Americans."27 The soldiers may
not have been aware of that portion of
Corwin's speech in which he
said ". .. I can yield to the brave
soldier, whose trade is war, and
whose duty is obedience, the highest
need of praise for his courage,
his enterprise and perpetual endurance
of the fatigues and horrors
of war." Moreover, three weeks
earlier Corwin had supported a
bonus of a land grant for volunteers and
he claimed on another
occasion that he had voted for the
original war appropriation only
because he felt it was necessary to
rescue Taylor's army from prob-
able extermination.28 On
Corwin's behalf, the Ohio Repository (Can-
ton) laid the blame for the effigy
burning at the feet of a soldier
named Theodore Gibbons, "as arrant
a knave as ever existed." Gib-
bons, who had twice been dismissed from
his company, was char-
acterized by the paper as "a thief,
a vagabond, and a scoundrel."
With tongue in cheek, the Cleveland True
Democrat noted: "Mr.
Corwin will probably feel very bad when
he hears that a member of
those who are engaged in robbing and
murdering the Mexicans,
burned him in effigy . . . such sort of gentry have crucified better
men than Mr. Corwin, before these
times."29 When one Democratic
editor told his readers that Corwin had
defamed the soldiers and
accused him of saying, "Neither
helpless infancy, decrepit old age,
nor female loveliness, can arrest them
in gratification of their brut-
al passions," Horace Greeley
attacked him as a "Scoundrel" and
25. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, February
16, 1847; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March
3, 1847.
26. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, February
25, 1847.
27. Ohio Repository (Canton),
cited in Ohio State Journal (Columbus), August 3,
1847; Monterey Pioneer, cited in North
American (Mexico City), November 30, 1847.
28. "Speech," 213; Congressional
Globe, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, 207, 543-44.
29. Ohio Repository (Canton), in Ohio
State Journal (Columbus), August 3, 1847;
Cleveland True Democrat, June 9,
1847.
Tom Corwin's Speech 43
suggested that if he "did not know
that Mr. Corwin never said any-
thing of the kind," he was
"unfit to conduct a paper."30
Whigs who supported the war echoed
Democratic criticism of Cor-
win's speech. Speaking to a
Crawfordsville, Indiana, audience, Colo-
nel Henry S. Lane, former Whig
congressman and presidential elec-
tor, denounced the speech as ". . .
an emanation of a master mind,
but the eloquent language in which it is
clothed cannot conceal its
damning treason." James Watson
Webb, editor of the New York
Courier and Enquirer, noted that although he was "delighted to
bestow the highest praise on the manner
of the speech, the sub-
stance of it, was such as excited in the
breasts of nine-tenths of the
Whigs who heard it, feelings of regret,
disappointment, and vexa-
tion." Webb suggested that a
"more thorough anti-war . . . anti-
American speech ... cannot be
imagined."31
Many Whig leaders, especially
conservative ones, misjudged the
effect Corwin's speech would have on his
popularity. Before he deliv-
ered his great address, Corwin had been
considered an influential
senator, but few outside Ohio thought of
him as presidential
timber.32 In the spring of
1846, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John
McLean's followers had feared that
Corwin would support General
Winfield Scott and thus hurt McLean's
chances for the 1848 pres-
idential nomination by lessening his
strength in his native Ohio.33
By October, 1846, some Ohio Whigs
thought Corwin might try for
the nomination himself, but considered
his chances poor unless he
could ". . . gain a reputation of
something more than a mere stump
orator . . ." McLean's friends
tried by "dry argument and sweet
persuasion" to convince Corwin that
his time for presidency "hath
not, as yet arrived."34 They
wanted Corwin to put himself out of the
race, and they felt his criticism of the
war had done just that. One
admirer wrote McLean: "The game is
over with him." His speech
"has laid him aside for this
campaign," claimed another.35 Indiana's
Thomas Dowling explained the position of
the regular Whigs: "The
rank and file of Mr. Corwin's supporters
are not to be found here,
30. Columbus Ohio State Journal, October
25, 1847, and November 20, 1847.
31. Cleveland Plain Dealer, September
22, 1847, and March 3, 1847.
32. Edgar A. Holt, Party Politics in
Ohio, 1840-1850 (Columbus, 1931), 269-70. See
also Norman Graebner, "Thomas
Corwin and the Election of 1848: A Study of Con-
servative Politics," Journal of
Southern History, XVII (1951), 162.
33. William Miner to John McLean, April
24, 1846, John McLean MSS, Library of
Congress.
34. Miner to McLean, October 11, 1846,
and J. B. Mower to McLean, February 13,
1847, in McLean MSS, Library of
Congress.
35. James E. Harvey to McLean, March 10,
1847, and Mower to McLean, February
19, 1847, in McLean MSS, Library of
Congress.
44 OHIO HISTORY
except with the ultra anti-war men
.... No man despises the cause of
the war more than I do, or more
thoroughly laments its existence,
but I could not and would not trail the
flag of my country in the dirt
by withholding the means of sustaining
it." In a confidential letter
to Logansport attorney Daniel Pratt,
newspaper editor John Defrees
of Indianapolis discussed the practical
political problem presented
by Corwin's speech: "The war
question is a rather dangerous one to
handle. It requires much prudence in its
management. Corwin's
speech on that subject was pure
unadulterated Christianity, but,
unfortunately, that has very
little to do in determining elections."36
If Corwin's speech alienated him from
conservative members of
the Whig party, it nevertheless
attracted a large number of party
admirers. Antislavery Whigs had long
been searching for influen-
tial support. In September 1846, Columbus
Delano, Ohio congress-
man from Knox County, had seen
indications that Corwin would
join the "fourteen" in
opposition to the war. Charles Francis Adams,
founder of the Boston Whig and
supporter of Giddings' antiwar posi-
tion, knew the "timid feeling"
which prevented many Whigs from
speaking out against the war but hoped
that Corwin would agree to
head Giddings' delegation. Only a week
before Corwin's speech, Gid-
dings had predicted: "If Tom comes
out he will make a noise. He has
been trying his hand a little for some
time and if he doesn't use up
Cass, I shall call myself no
prophet."37 So eagerly did these Whigs
desire Corwin's support, they too
misunderstood his position. The
Ashtabula Sentinel, Giddings'
voice in the Western Reserve, de-
scribed the speech as "liberty's
first germ in the Senate, the first
onslaught made upon the wide-mouthed and
all-devouring spirit of
slavery." The Cleveland True
Democrat exalted "that our Whig
Senator should throw himself among the
advocates of right and
raise his clarion voice in favor of the
oppressed and wronged .... "38
At the cost of a week's news ".. .
every Whig print from the Intel-
ligencer down to the Cleveland Herald . ." and even
some Democra-
tic journals printed the long speech in
its entirety. Public feelings
could be satisfied in no other way. The
Conneaut Reporter requested
its readers to lend their papers to
their Democratic neighbor, "that
36. Thomas Dowling to McLean, August 17,
1847, McLean MSS, Library of Con-
gress; John D. Defrees to Daniel Pratt,
April 17, 1847, Daniel Pratt MSS, Indiana
State Library.
37. Columbus Delano to Joshua R.
Giddings, September 26, 1846, Charles F.
Adams to Giddings, December 30, 1846,
and Giddings to J. Addison Giddings, Febru-
ary 7, 1847, in Giddings MSS, Ohio
Historical Society.
38. Ashtabula Sentinel, March 15,
1847; Cleveland True Democrat, February 17,
1847.
Tom Corwin's Speech 45
he too may learn into whose hands the
reigns of Government have
unhappily fallen."39 When
Democrats claimed Corwin's speech
would ruin the Whig party, the Wabash
Express asked: "Why don't
they print it, or send it in pamphlet
form to every citizen in the
Union?" The Indiana State
Journal summarized the situation:
"Thomas Corwin, of Ohio, is
denounced by the Locofoco press as a
'Mexican' - 'traitor' - and every other
odious epithet known to the
English language .... Traitor Corwin may
some day be President of
the United States."40
The antiwar Whigs rightly felt that
Corwin's speech had made
their position a respectable one and
that it would attract popular
support. Omitting its obvious bias, the
Democratic Plain Dealer cor-
rectly assessed what had happened:
"Tom has a little out-Corwined
Giddings. He has not only assumed
Giddings' ground, but as a Sena-
tor from the noble and patriotic state
of Ohio, given character to his
treason. How many Giddings' men, alias
Abbey Kelleyites, could be
found in the country before Corwin
endorsed his position? Aye, not a
corporal's guard."41 Giddings
found himself inundated with letters
praising Corwin's effort and seeking
more information about him.42
Horace Greeley announced that Corwin was
his first choice for the
presidency, but he denied the widely
circulated rumor that he had
helped Corwin write his speech. Greeley
proposed to supply the
world with copies of the speech at $1.00
per hundred.43
Antislavery newspapers vied for the
honor of being first to nomin-
ate Corwin for president. The Sentinel
wishfully suggested that "the
early nomination of Mr. Corwin by the
people may save the ne-
cessity of a national
convention."44 Corwin's popularity reached its
highest levels in New England, in the
eastern part of Indiana, and
throughout Ohio, especially in the Miami
River Valley and in the
Western Reserve. In central Indiana,
". . . they play on both strings
39. Cleveland Plain Dealer, March
10, 1847. See also Columbus Ohio State Jour-
nal, October 25, 1847; Ashtabula Sentinel, March 15,
1847; Conneaut Reporter,
March 11, 1847.
40. Terre Haute Wabash Express, April
7, 1847; Indianapolis Indiana State Jour-
nal, quoted in Ashtabula Sentinel, August 23, 1847.
41. Joshua Giddings to J. Addison
Giddings, February 22, 1847, Giddings MSS,
Ohio Historical Society; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, March 24, 1847.
42. Joshua Giddings to J. Addison
Giddings, February 21, 1847, Giddings MSS,
Ohio Historical Society.
43. Cleveland Plain Dealer, March
10, 1847; Horace Greeley to Joshua Giddings,
May 5, 1847, Giddings MSS, Ohio
Historical Society; Cleveland True Democrat,
March 10, 1847; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, February 24, 1847.
44. The honor was conceded to the St.
Louis New Era by the Ashtabula Sentinel,
April 19, 1847.
46 OHIO HISTORY
- praise Corwin, but hurrah for
Taylor."45 Several papers through-
out the country offered an incongruous
ticket: Taylor for president
and Corwin for vice president.46
Corwin's increased popularity showed
itself in the resolutions
passed by numerous Whig conventions
throughout the West. A res-
olution passed by the Portage County,
Ohio, Whigs praised Corwin
and attacked Zachary Taylor at the same
time: "Resolved, That if in
a candidate for the Presidency personal
bravery is to be considered a
requisite, we prefer true heroism which
dares to lift its voice in
defense of the right, to the courage
which manifests itself in fighting
for the wrong." The resolution also
declared: ". . . the eloquent and
fearless opposition of the Hon. Thomas
Corwin in the Senate of the
United States to the present Mexican War
demands of a higher
admiration than any feat of arms against
the citizens of a neighbor-
ing republic."47
Abolitionists based their support for
Corwin on the false assump-
tion that anyone who criticized the war
and who refused to supply
the president with men and equipment
opposed slavery as strongly
as they did. They accepted his strong
criticism of the war; they
disregarded his remarks on the dangers
involved in the slavery
question. Only Charles Francis Adams
noted that the closing sec-
tion of Corwin's speech indicated that
he had not yet decided to join
the ranks of those opposed to the
extension of slavery.48 Corwin's
choice of language had shown clearly
that he felt himself a con-
cerned observer rather than a
participant in the battle between
North and South over slavery in the
territories. Speaking of the
opposition to the further extension of
slavery, he referred to "men of
all parties in what we call the
non-slaveholding states," "their lan-
guage," and "their
determination." He studiously avoided aligning
himself with this faction. In fact, he
suggested that northern men
might be moved by "prejudice,
passion, hypocrisy, or fanaticism" as
well as by more noble motives. He made
no attempt to present a
northern rationale for opposition. While
Giddings and other radical
Whigs opposed the war because it might
lead to an extension of
slavery and an accompanying increase in
southern influence, Cor-
win opposed it because he wanted
"to close forever the approaches of
45. Indianapolis Indiana Sentinel, July
22, 1847.
46. Cincinnati National Press, May
5, 1847.
47. Columbus Ohio State Journal, September
27, 1847. For other counties, Ibid.,
October 5, 1847.
48. Charles F. Adams to Joshua Giddings,
May 19, 1847, Giddings MSS, Ohio
Historical Society.
Tom Corwin's Speech 47 |
|
48 OHIO HISTORY
internal feud." He wanted to avoid
a question which might lead to
"internal commotion."49 Giddings
and his friends eagerly discussed
the slavery controversy; Corwin
repeatedly stated in his speech that
he opposed such discussions.
As his political support grew, Corwin
adopted a three-fold
strategy about the presidency. First, he
decided not to seek the office
and privately made this decision known
to his close friends and
political allies.50 Second,
because he believed that a unified Whig
party offered the nation its only hope
of survival, he concluded he
should "do nothing which may tend
to alienate the feelings of the
leading men of that [Whig] party towards
each other."51 Since he
feared that fellow Ohioan John McLean
would think he was
"attempting to supplant him,"
Corwin refused an invitation to
address the Whig party of Cincinnati.52
He also declined invitations
to appear at rallies in Buffalo and
Boston lest his visit "rouse a
strong moral feeling against the war,
and thus to some extent, pro-
duce an Anti-Taylor party there."53
He dreaded disunity in the party
"quite as much as dismemberment of
the States."54 Third, Corwin
decided to reject the notion of a public
disavowal of the groups sup-
porting him for the presidency. William
Bebb and other Whig lead-
ers in Ohio had convinced him that he
"represented a certain princi-
ple touching on the Mexican War,"
and that those who agreed with
him would be able to take "no
concerted stand" if he withdrew from
the race. If he seemed to be a
candidate, however, other presidential
aspirants, seeing a group supporting
Corwin's position, might ". . .
come over more readily to those views in
order to gain strength."55
Thus Corwin believed that his ideas had
a stronger chance of accept-
ance if he appeared to be a presidential
candidate.
At first Corwin's strategy succeeded. He
attracted an enthusiastic
response to his July 5, 1847, speech at
the Chicago River and Harbor
Convention where he called for
westerners of both parties to unite in
favor of internal improvements.56 Although
he spent most of August
at home in Lebanon, Ohio, doing legal
work so that he could provide
49. "Speech," 218.
50. Corwin to William Greene, June 7,
1847, and December 24, 1847, "Greene
Papers," 21, 25-27. Corwin to Giddings, October
21, 1847, Giddings MSS, Ohio His-
torical Society.
51. Corwin to William Greene, July 25,
1847, "Greene Papers," 22.
52. Ibid., March 30, 1847, 18.
53. Ibid., September 3, 1847,
23-24.
54. Ibid., July 25, 1847, 22.
55. Corwin optimistically explained this
strategy to Greene in his letter of June 7,
1847, but rejected it January 24, 1848.
See "Greene Papers," 21, 25-26.
Tom Corwin's Speech 49
for his family, he kept in contact with
political leaders across the
country.57 On August 23 the
state's most prominent Whigs arrived
in Lebanon for a large political rally
at which ex-Governor Jere-
miah Morrow presided. Governor William
Bebb and Thomas
Stevenson, editor of the Cincinnati Atlas,
spoke to an enthusiastic
audience. Corwin's address, however,
highlighted the meeting.
Stevenson, who had never heard Corwin
before, declared that his
speech was "the noblest, whether
considered with reference to the
matter or manner, or both," that he
had "ever heard from mortal
lips."58
For the next few weeks Corwin discussed
the war at rallies
throughout southwestern Ohio at which he
campaigned for Robert
Schenck's reelection to Congress. More
than 2,000 Whigs cheered
Corwin, Schenck, and Stevenson at
Wilmington, but Corwin's polit-
ical influence had reached its zenith.59
On September 18, 1847, Tom
Corwin lost his abolitionist support for
the presidency. In a speech
delivered at Carthage, Ohio, he provided
evidence that he was not
the antislavery candidate that the
radical Whigs had desired when
he criticized those abolitionists who
had not supported Henry Clay
in the election of 1844 and implied that
by failing to aid Clay, who
was opposed to the annexation of Texas,
abolitionists had made the
war inevitable. Corwin lost even more
supporters by deploring the
growing "agitation" over the
attempt by Representative David Wil-
mot of Pennsylvania and other northern
Democrats and Whigs to
prohibit slavery in any territory to be
acquired from Mexico by
purchase or conquest; he labeled the
Wilmot Proviso a "dangerous
question."60 Hoping to
avoid a conflict between North and South, he
advocated the position suggested by
Thomas Ewing - no new terri-
tory should be admitted to the Union.
Although many of his critics
ignored it, Corwin added the stipulation
that if any territory should
be acquired from Mexico by either force
or treaty, the proviso should
be extended to it.61
Corwin's abolitionist support declined
sharply. Salmon P. Chase
wrote that Corwin's attack on the
abolitionists in his speech at
56. Baltimore Niles' Weekly Register,
July 31, 1847.
57. See, for example, Corwin to Joshua
Giddings, August 18, 1847. Joshua Gid-
dings MSS, Library of Congress.
58. Cincinnati Atlas, cited in Niles'
Register, September 18, 1847.
59. Columbus Ohio State Journal, September
14, 1847.
60. Cincinnati Gazette, cited in
Columbus Ohio State Journal, September 23, 1847;
Charles Sumner to Joshua Giddings,
November 1, 1847, Giddings MSS, Ohio Histor-
ical Society.
61. Cincinnati Atlas, cited in
Columbus Ohio State Journal, September 28, 1847;
Holt, Party Politics, 266.
50 OHIO HISTORY
Carthage had "pleased the
proslavery people, hereabouts, more
than his censure of the war offended
them."62 Charles Sumner re-
ported to Giddings that Whigs in New
England were "much
disheartened" by what Corwin had
said since, apparently, he was
with them ". . . against the war,
but not against slavery." Sumner,
who had grown personally attached to
Corwin, now reluctantly
turned from him, unable to understand
why the courage Corwin had
shown in criticizing the war did not
impel him to act against
slavery.63 The True
Democrat announced that Corwin's eagerness to
avoid discussion of the slavery question
offered sufficient reason for
it to refuse to support him for the
presidency and removed his name
from the head of its editorial columns.64
Corwin did not expect to convince
Giddings of the correctness of
his position, but he nevertheless wrote
him that the Proviso could
never be passed in the Senate and that a
"no territory" stand would
find much greater public support than an
attempt to prohibit slav-
ery in any acquired territories. Corwin
added that he did not care
what Giddings' "liberty
friends" thought of him.65 Sometime later
Corwin revealed his true feelings about
the abolitionists to Caleb
Smith: "I fear them. The leaders
within my knowledge are either
utterly selfish, or impracticably
fanatical ...."66
In spite of the stir he had created,
Corwin continued his tour on
Schenck's behalf, speaking to 2,500
supporters at Dayton on
September 29. Clement L. Vallandingham,
editor of the Western
Empire, described the speech as "but a dilation of Mr.
C.'s great
effort in the Senate" and attacked
Corwin's assertion that the
Founding Fathers had not tried to bring
Canada into the Union.
Vallandingham pointed out the
difficulties faced by anyone who
questioned Corwin's historical
allusions: "Having no history of Tyre
before us, nor yet any of the 'official
dispatches' of the Babylonian
Monarch, we cannot say how far Mr.
Corwin erred in his glowing
narrative of the siege of that ancient
and renowned city."67
Corwin's criticism of the war played an
important role in the
October, 1847, election of the Ohio
state legislature. As one Demo-
62. Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner,
September 22, 1847, Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for 1902, II, 122 (hereafter cited "Chase Papers").
63. Sumner to Giddings, October 1, 1847,
and Sumner to Giddings, November 1,
1847, in Giddings MSS, Ohio Historical
Society.
64. Cleveland True Democrat, October
5, 21, 1847.
65. Corwin to Giddings, October 12,
1847, Giddings MSS, Ohio Historical Society.
66. Corwin to Caleb B. Smith, May 10,
1848, Caleb B. Smith MSS, Library of
Congress.
67. Dayton Western Empire, October
7, 1847.
Tom Corwin's Speech 51
cratic editor warned, ". . the
election on Tuesday next, is to be
converted by the Whig leaders, if it
results unfavorably to the demo-
cracy, into a glorification of Mr.
Corwin and his war views."68 In
Cincinnati a host of boys thrust copies
of Corwin's Senate speech
into the hands of evey passerby, hoping
that they would read and
support his views.69 Both political
parties found something to cheer
about in the election results. The Whigs
captured both houses of the
state legislature, but Democratic
candidates totaled 1,563 more
votes.70
Although Corwin requested that his name
not be offered for the
presidency if it would "produce
discord," a group led by R. McBrat-
ney, editor of the Xenia Torch-Light,
nevertheless attempted to per-
suade the Ohio Whig Convention, meeting
in Columbus on January
19, 1848, to nominate him. Friends of
Clay, Taylor, and McLean
united, however, to prevent the
convention from making any pres-
idential nomination.71 By a
margin of one vote the assembled Whigs
issued a strong resolution giving their
"heartfelt approval" to Cor-
win's conduct and praising him
"especially in the fearless stand he
has taken in the Senate of the United
States against the Mexican
War."72 The ratification
of a treaty of peace with Mexico in March,
however, dashed any remaining hopes of
Corwin's followers. Corwin
had first lost the support of his
party's abolitionists, then he had lost
the nomination of his state party, and
finally with the conclusion of
the war he lost his issue. As Charles
Francis Adams had astutely
observed: "Corwin does not have a
firm standing ground. He is
against the war which is not in its
nature a permanent evil and he
hesitates about slavery, which is."73
Corwin, however, remained a popular
figure, and friends of other
Whig candidates sought his blessing.
Caleb B. Smith, an early sup-
porter of Justice John McLean, thought
that the differences between
the supporters of Corwin and McLean in
Ohio could be easily settled
and that Corwin would support McLean
"with great cordiality."74
Smith's analysis proved to be overly
optimistic, for Corwin kept the
political situation in Ohio confused by
issuing conflicting state-
68. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, October
9, 1847.
69. Ibid., October 11, 1847.
70. Ibid., November 3, 1847.
71. John Teesdale to John McLean,
January 17, 1848, McLean MSS, Library of
Congress; Holt, Party Politics, 288.
72. Cleveland Herald, January 24,
1848; Holt, Party Politics, 288.
73. Charles F. Adams to Joshua Giddings,
November 2, 1847, Giddings MSS, Ohio
Historical Society.
74. Caleb B. Smith to Allen Hamilton,
March 26, 1848, Allen Hamilton MSS,
Indiana State Library.
52 OHIO HISTORY
ments about whom he supported. In
December, 1847, he had de-
clared that he preferred Clay as his
first choice, McLean as his
second, and then had added that he also
held a high opinion of
General Winfield Scott. By April, 1848,
however, Corwin was
quoted as saying that General Taylor
should be the nominee of the
Whig Convention. This statement shocked
Smith, who had been told
by Corwin a few days earlier that the
fight for the nomination would
be between McLean and Scott.75 In
May, Corwin reportedly urged
the Ohio delegation to vote for Clay
first, Webster second, and final-
ly, if no civilian could be found, to go
for Scott. "Frustrated friends"
of Corwin added to the confusion by
continuing to urge him as the
"only available candidate."76
Thus the Ohio delegation to the
national Whig convention arrived in
Philadelphia on June 5, 1848,
unpledged on everything except the
defeat of Taylor. Seeing the
great support for Taylor in the rest of
the country and deciding that
only another military man had a chance
to defeat him, the Ohio
delegates gave most of their votes to
Scott. McLean's backers were
extremely disappointed, and after
Taylor's nomination they com-
plained that had Ohio supported McLean
instead of Scott, McLean
would have captured the nomination.77
Much to the dismay of his former
abolitionist followers, Corwin,
always loyal to the Whig party,
"bent the knee and received the
yoke" and campaigned in Ohio for
Taylor. In the Western Reserve,
where many Whigs repudiated Taylor's
nomination and supported
the newly formed Free Soil party ticket
headed by Martin Van
Buren, Corwin faced an uncustomarily
cool reception: as one obser-
ver put it, "Never before had we
seen the people of old Ashtabula
county wait for a formal proposition to
cheer this gifted and elo-
quent son of our gallant State."
Salmon Chase informed Charles
Sumner that Corwin had "lost
entirely the confidence of the sincere
and earnest antislavery men of the
state."78 Attempting to reassure
those antislavery Whigs to whom Chase
referred, Corwin repeated-
75. Corwin to William Greene, December
24, 1847, "Greene Papers," 25; John
McLean to Caleb Smith, April 26, 1848,
Caleb Smith MSS, Library of Congress;
Smith to McLean, May 1, 1848, McLean
MSS, Library of Congress.
76. Holt, Party Politics, 304-05;
Elisha Whittlesey to James A. Briggs, February
18, 1848, Elisha Whittlesey MSS, Western
Reserve Historical Society.
77. Holt, Party Politics, 305,
312. Holt contends that despite Corwin's repeated
refusal to be a candidate, he hoped to
so confuse the political situation in Ohio that he
would receive the nomination of a third
party. Ibid., 313; Caleb Smith to McLean,
June 13, 1848, Smith MSS, Library of
Congress.
78. Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner,
June 20, 1848, "Chase Papers," 137-38;
Ashtabula Sentinel, September 16,
1848; Chase to Charles Sumner, November 27,
1848, "Chase Papers," 142.
Tom Corwin's Speech 53
ly argued that General Taylor would not
veto the Wilmot proviso
should it become law. Despite his
attempts to minimize Whig losses
to the Free Soil party, Corwin could not
prevent the defections
which enabled Democratic candidate Lewis
Cass to carry the state.79
During the 1850s, the angry dialogue
between North and South
over new issues drove the Mexican War
from the American political
consciousness, and the bloody struggle
which Corwin had foretold
came ever closer to reality. After
leaving the Senate in 1851 to
become President Millard Fillmore's
Secretary of the Treasury, Cor-
win returned to Congress as a
representative in 1859. By that time
nominally a Republican, Corwin, like
Henry Clay and Daniel Webs-
ter, felt that armed conflict could be
avoided only if the North and
South were willing to compromise on the
issue of slavery in the
territories. Although his actions
estranged him from those Republi-
cans who felt that compromise would
destroy their party, Corwin
nevertheless chaired the House Committee
of Thirty-three which
unsuccessfully sought a constitutional
solution to the crisis facing
the nation.80 Corwin's final role in
government came in March, 1861,
when newly inaugurated President Abraham
Lincoln, seeking a
minister to Mexico whom that government
would trust, appointed
Corwin, who served with distinction.81
Thomas Corwin delivered what was at the
same time the most
highly praised and most frequently
reviled speech against the Mex-
ican War. Logical in content but
emotional in tone, Corwin's address
invited misinterpretation by Whig and
Democrat alike. Abolition-
ists, desperately searching for
prestigious support, mistakenly
assumed the speech meant Corwin would
act against the establish-
ment of slavery in the territories while
Democrats, looking for
treason, claimed they had found it in
Corwin's remarks. But in fact
Corwin spoke for his country's welfare
at the risk of his own political
career. Believing that only a united
Whig party could save the Un-
ion, Corwin attempted to bring party
members to a consensus; in-
stead, however, he alienated and
confused his political allies. The
fact that Corwin had offered a strong
moral argument against the
war quickly became lost in the myriad
partisan comments which his
79. Joseph Vance to John C. Crittenden,
September 21, 1848, John C. Crittenden
MSS, Library of Congress; Salmon P.
Chase to Charles Sumner, November 27, 1848,
"Chase Papers," 142; Holt, Party
Politics, 349. See also, Graebner, "Thomas Corwin
and the Election of 1848," 162-79.
80. Norman A. Graebner, "Thomas
Corwin and the Sectional Crisis," Ohio His-
tory, 86 (Autumn 1977), 229-47.
81. For an account of Corwin's mission,
see J. Jeffery Auer, "Lincoln's Minister to
Mexico," Ohio Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly, LIX (April 1950), 115-28.
54 OHIO HISTORY
speech engendered. That Corwin had
courageously adopted a posi-
tion more consistent than that of his
party went practically un-
noticed. Nevertheless, the editor of the
Ohio State Journal was prob-
ably correct when he found in Corwin's
speech the basis of true
eloquence: ". . . an earnest and
impassioned advocacy of what he
believed to be RIGHT against all odds and the face of all
opposition."82
82. Columbus Ohio State Journal, May
27, 1847.
HAL W. BOCHIN
Tom Corwin's Speech Against
the Mexican War: Courageous
But Misunderstood
On May 12, 1846, by votes of 174 to 14
in the House and 40 to 2 in
the Senate, Congress granted President
James K. Polk's request for
permission to enroll 50,000 volunteers
in a war begun "by the act of
the Republic of Mexico."1 Despite
the overwhelmingly favorable
vote, opposition to the war formed
quickly, especially among Whig
abolitionists in New England who viewed
the war as a southern plot
to increase slave-holding territory.
Together with conservative
Whigs and anti-Administration Democrats
who disputed the
alleged causes of the conflict and
feared its possible consequences,
they condemned the war through
resolutions, editorials, and
speeches. Perhaps the loudest voices of
protest echoed in the House
of Representatives where Joshua R.
Giddings of Ohio's Western Re-
serve and thirteen Whig colleagues, the
"immortal fourteen," re-
fused to vote for the men and supplies
requested by the president.
Giddings' forces, however, at first
lacked a dependable ally in the
Senate and thus they responded
enthusiastically when, on February
11, 1847, Thomas Corwin, the junior
senator from Ohio, joined the
antiwar movement with a vigorous
denunciation of the ongoing con-
flict with Mexico.2
Hal W. Bochin is Professor of Speech
Communication at California State University-
Fresno.
1. Whigs in the House voting against the
bill were John Quincy Adams, George
Ashmun, Joseph Grinnell, Charles Hudson,
and Daniel King of Massachusetts; Hen-
ry Cranston of Rhode Island; Erastus
Culver of New York; Luther Severance of
Maine; John Strahan of Pennsylvania; and
Columbus Delano, Joseph Root, Daniel
Tilden, Joseph Vance, and Joshua
Giddings of Ohio. Whig Senators opposed to the
measure were Thomas Clayton of Delaware
and John Davis of Massachusetts. Con-
gressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 795-804.
2. John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War (Madison,
1973), 30-36, 80; Born October 6,
1795, in Bradford County, Pennsylvania,
Joshua Reed Giddings was admitted to the
Ohio Bar in February, 1821. He served
one term in the Ohio legislature before being