DANIEL NELSON
The Great Goodyear Strike of 1936
It was the "first" CIO strike,
a "stepping stone toward the automo-
bile industry," an affirmation of
the potentialities of the sit-down
strike, a case study of rank and file
militancy, and a "remarkable" ex-
ample of the effects of non-violent
agitation.' Its beginnings were ob-
scure, its consequences uncertain.
"The circumstances in which the
strike was carried on and the method
used" rather than the imme-
diate causes or results made it a
turning point in the labor history of
the 1930s.2 It was the great
Goodyear strike, which paralyzed Akron
for more than a month in February and
March, 1936.
Contemporary journalists and writers,
all CIO partisans, first called
attention to the importance of the
conflict. Edward Levinson and
Mary Heaton Vorse published brief
histories of the strike in 1937;
Ruth McKenny followed in 1939, Alfred W.
Jones in 1941, Rose Pe-
sotta and Harold S. Roberts in 1944.3
These works, building blocks
for more recent students of the
turbulent years, help explain the often
insubstantial foundations of their
studies.4 The Levinson and Vorse
Daniel Nelson is Professor of History at
The University of Akron. He is indebted to
Bernard Sternsher, Warren Van Tine and
Lorin Lee Cary for their critical reading of an
earlier draft of this essay.
1. John Brophy, A Miner's Life (Madison,
1964), 264; Edward Levinson, Labor On
the March (New York, 1956), 146; "Lewis Wins Akron
Victory," Business Week (March
28, 1936), 20; P. W. Chappell to H. L.
Kerwin, March 21, 1936; Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service Records, National
Archives RG 280, File 182/1010.
2. "The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. Strike," Monthly Labor Review, 42 (May,
1936), 288. The most recent and
comprehensive assessment of the labor history of the
1930s is Bernard Sternsher,
"Workers in the 1930's: Middle Range Questions and
Ethnocultures," Paper presented to
the 1982 meeting of the Organization of American
Historians, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
3. Levinson, Labor On the March, 143-46;
Mary Heaton Vorse, Labor's New Millions
(New York, 1938), 5-6; Ruth McKenny, Industrial
Valley (New York, 1939), 277-370;
Alfred W. Jones, Life, Liberty and
Property (Philadelphia, 1941), 101-07; Rose Pesotta,
Bread Upon the Waters (New York, 1944), 195-227; Harold S. Roberts, The
Rubber
Workers (New York, 1944), 147-51.
4. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge
to the AFL (Cambridge, 1960), Ch. 6; Irving
Bernstein, Turbulent Years (Boston,
1970), 592-97. James R. Green; The World of the
Worker (New York, 1980), 153.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 7 |
|
accounts are hopelessly flawed, inaccurate in virtually every detail. The McKenny book is more fiction than fact, worthless except for its description of the activities of the local Communist party, the one fea- ture of the conflict the author knew from firsthand experience. The Jones essay is highly speculative; the Roberts account is superficial. Pesotta's recollections, though accurate and valuable, are limited by her tangential role in the dispute. But factual errors and distortions are only part of the problem. With the possible exception of Jones, the early students of the Goodyear strike reflected the intellectual milieu of the 1930s. Whether liberal or radical, they brought to their work a set of assumptions that strongly colored their writing. The strike was a struggle between progress (the workers, represented by the United Rubber Workers) and reaction (the company). Because the union was "right," it "won" the strike and provided a powerful example for other workers. For decades no one questioned these judgments and assumptions.5 Essentially the strike is no more acces- sible than it was forty years ago.
5. The Goodyear historian attributed the strike to a small group of malcontents and CIO agitators. Hugh Allen, The House of Goodyear (Akron, 1949), 368-72. |
8 OHIO HISTORY
A reexamination of the Goodyear strike,
based in part on informa-
tion unavailable to the writers of the
late 1930s and early 1940s, sug-
gests a different view. The conflict was
indeed a precursor of the sit-
down era and a test of the CIO, as the
early historians of the strike
observed. But it bore few other
similarities to their schemata. Good-
year was hardly a reactionary employer
and the URW wore the man-
tle of progress badly. The principal
struggle featured hostile groups of
workers, not management and labor.
Though the URW was the ma-
jor beneficiary of the strike, few
knowledgeable union leaders would
have chosen it as an example for other
workers. And far from demon-
strating the strength of the CIO, the
Goodyear strike exposed the
limitations of the Lewis group. Not
least, the strike was a reminder of
the critical role of groups other than
managers and workers in the re-
sults of the struggles of the 1930s.
The major events of the Goodyear
conflict are not in dispute. Fol-
lowing many months of hostility between
the Rubber Workers locals
and the Akron manufacturers, a series of
brief sit-downs closed sev-
eral plants in January and early
February, 1936. The overriding issue
was the Goodyear decision to shift from
the six-hour day, which it
had adopted in 1930, to the conventional
eight-hour day and to dis-
charge redundant fourth-shift workers.
The last of the sit-downs, at
Goodyear Plant 2, led to a series of
meetings and ultimately to a spon-
taneous move to picket Goodyear on the
evening of February 17.
From that point the contest escalated
rapidly. The workers soon
picketed the entire Goodyear complex, halted
production, and idled
nearly 15,000 employees. URW Local 2
took up the cause of the
fourth-shift workers, transforming the
dispute into a full-scale con-
frontation between the URW and the
industry's most powerful em-
ployer. CIO leaders rushed aid to the
strikers. The company refused
to negotiate and obtained an injunction
that severely restricted the
pickets; the sheriff's effort to enforce
the injunction produced the
most famous incident of the strike, a
dramatic confrontation between
deputies and strikers on February 25.
Faced by 5000 club and gun-
wielding strikers, the law officers
retreated and the plant remained
shut. After February 25 the strike
became an endurance contest,
with federal and local government
representatives trying to foster ne-
gotiations. A breakthrough occurred in
mid-March when company
representatives prevailed upon union
leaders to accept a compromise
plan. At a ratification meeting on March
14, the workers rejected the
proposed settlement. Within hours former
mayor C. Nelson Sparks
announced the formation of a Law and
Order League to reopen
Goodyear. Unhappy with the prolonged
strike, most Akron citizens
Goodyear Strike of 1936 9
were even less pleased with the prospect
of a violent confrontation.
The League effort quickly aborted.
Negotiations resumed and the
company made additional concessions. On
March 21 the strikers ap-
proved an agreement that continued the
six-hour day and provided
formal grievance procedures for union
members. Akron unionists,
their CIO allies, and, it seemed,
industrial workers in Detroit, Flint,
and other cities viewed the settlement
as a unprecedented victory.
The Sit-Downs
To later observers the most distinctive
feature of the strike was its
beginning. In early 1936 the sit-down
was a novelty in American in-
dustry, a little-used expression of rank
and file protest.6 The Good-
year strike irrevocably changed that;
henceforth the sit-down would
be a hallmark of the militant behavior
associated with the rise of
mass production unionism and the CIO.
Like John L. Lewis, it be-
came a symbol of "labor on the
march." But it is essential to distin-
guish between the impact of the
sit-downs of January 28-February 18
on Goodyear workers and on outsiders.
Neither the sit-down as a
weapon nor the tactics of the successful
sit-down were new to the
former. The first sit-down in the rubber
industry had occurred at
the General Tire Company in June 1934;
the sit-down era in American
industry dated from that incident.7
In 1934 and 1935 rubber workers
avoided sit-downs because of lingering
hopes that negotiations or liti-
gation would result in conventional
bargaining procedures and be-
cause of union leaders' desires to avoid
strikes. By late 1935, howev-
er, many workers had become
disillusioned with the unions, and
sit-downs resumed, this time without
union sanction. There were two
in late 1935, both successful.8 They
were a modest prelude to the up-
heavals of 1936.
Four of the six sit-downs associated
with the beginning of the
Goodyear conflict were reminiscent of the
General Tire sit-down.9 At
Firestone on January 28, at Goodyear
Plant 2 on January 31, at Good-
rich on February 7, and at Goodyear
Plant 2 again on February 14,
6. For the background of the sit-downs,
see Daniel Nelson, ed. "The Beginning of
the Sit-Down Era: The Reminiscences of
Rex Murray," Labor History, 15 (Winter, 1974),
89-90.
7. Ibid., 91-96.
8. Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 8, 11, 1935.
9. This paragraph is based on Daniel
Nelson, "Origins of the Sit-Down Era: Worker
Militancy and Innovation in the Rubber
Industry, 1934-38," Labor History, 22 (Spring,
1982), 208-11.
10 OHIO HISTORY
tire builders, the handicraft workers
who assembled tire casings be-
fore vulcanization, instigated the
protests. Their actions were rela-
tively brief and non-violent. Though
unauthorized, they were trade
union protests for improved working
conditions; the tire builders
had no larger visions or goals.
Employers also reacted much the same
way as they had in 1934. They did not
attempt to expel the strikers.
Instead, they kept the plants open and
tried to reduce tensions. In-
deed, the Firestone personnel manager
inadvertently gave the tech-
nique a powerful boost when he agreed to
pay strikers half their
wages for the period they occupied the plant.
Executives and super-
visors apparently were more surprised
than frightened by the sit-
downs; at least until the Goodyear
strike, they did not grasp their
disruptive potential.
The other sit-downs, at Goodyear Plant 1
on February 17-18 and at
the Columbia Chemical Company in nearby
Barberton, Ohio, from
February 17 to February 22 are less
well-known, because they oc-
curred after the beginning of the
Goodyear strike, but no less impor-
tant. They introduced features of the
sit-down movement that would
become increasingly prominent in the
following months. Both inci-
dents involved workers who had not sat
down in the past and who
had no special grievances. They
dramatized the infectious character
of the sit-down movement. Like their
co-workers and neighbors, the
Goodyear and Columbia Chemical workers
sat down without union
authorization. At Goodyear Plant 1
several hundred tire builders sat
down when the Plant 2 workers began to
picket. On the evening of
February 18, 200-300 women tube workers
joined them. At Columbia
Chemical eight, then forty, then 460
workers, an entire shift, sat by
their machines. Like the rubber workers,
they succeeded in
resolving grievances. And they, too,
perplexed and antagonized com-
pany and union officials.10 Their
actions were irrefutable evidence
that the sit-down was not unique to the
rubber industry and that in-
dustrial employees required only the
briefest exposure to it to per-
ceive their latent power.
The other notable aspect of the Goodyear
Plant 1 and Columbia
Chemical sit-downs was the employers'
response. At General Tire
and at Firestone, Goodrich, and Goodyear
Plant 2 the plant manag-
ers had carefully avoided any
provocations that might lead to van-
dalism in the occupied buildings. For
various reasons they behaved
differently in the other two cases. When
the Plant 1 workers sat
10. See Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
18, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 18, 20, 22,
1936.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 11
down, Goodyear managers sealed off the
struck departments. They
maintained heat and power, but barred
access to the rest of the
plant. Unable to go to the cafeteria,
strikers lowered ropes to outside
pickets who attached packets of
sandwiches. Yet many of the work-
ers had no way to reach the outside
windows and thus went hungry.
For this reason, as well as the union
leaders' desire to reinforce the
elongated picket line, the Plant 1
strikers left the plant at midnight on
the 18th.11 The Columbia Chemical
managers hastily shut their
plant on February 18. They could not
turn off the heat because of
sub-zero tempratures, but otherwise they
isolated the strikers. For
the workers this approach presented
immediate problems. But after
some deliberations they decided that an
unpleasant existence in the
plant was superior to frigid picket
duty. To compensate they adopted
techniques that became famous in Flint
and elsewhere in 1937. Wives
"formed almost a continuous line .
. . carrying food and supplies to
their husbands" which they passed
through the windows.12 The
strikers slept on benches and amused
themselves with boxing
matches and other amateur
entertainments. This regimen continued
until a union-management agreement ended
the occupation five days
later.
The sit-downs of January 28-February 22
also foreshadowed much
of the subsequent history of the
Goodyear strike. They were protests
against the status quo, the Goodyear
management but also the organ-
izations, including the URW, that vied
for the workers' allegiance.
They created opportunities for the
Rubber Workers, but underlined
the need for new and more vigorous policies
if the union was to be
successful. The sit-downs marked the
beginning of a period of reas-
sessment and conflict among the workers
that often overshadowed
the better known struggle between
management and "labor."
The Non-Strikers
The Goodyear strike marked the beginning
of the decisive phase
in the evolution of formal workers'
organizations at Goodyear. The
first phase had occurred between 1910
and 1920 with the growth of
Goodyear and the rise of Paul W.
Litchfield as production superin-
tendent and later vice president for
manufacturing. Under Litchfield,
Goodyear installed an extensive array of
employee benefit programs,
11. Akron Times Press, Feb. 19,
1936.
12. Ibid., Feb. 20, 1936.
12 OHIO HISTORY
notably insurance, athletic, and stock
and home-ownership plans.13
A unique feature of the Goodyear effort
was the "flying squadron," a
select group of production workers who
were trained to perform any
task in the factory. Their assignment
was to prevent delays that
would curtail production in the
integrated complex.14 The capstone
of the Litchfield effort was the
Industrial Assembly, an elaborate
congressional-style company union formed
in 1919. The Industrial
Assembly was a "flying
squadron" of the rank and file, an institution-
al device for maintaining personal
contact with the workers, boosting
morale and productivity, and, when necessary,
resolving griev-
ances.15 Though the postwar
recession of 1920-21 decimated Good-
year and its labor force, the ensuing
reorganization enhanced
Litchfield's standing (he became
president in 1926), and preserved
the personnel program. The effects of
the depression of 1930-33 were
similar. Production, profits, and
employment opportunities declined,
but the personnel program remained
intact.
The NRA posed the first serious
challenge to the Goodyear pro-
grams. Workers from all the rubber plants
rushed to join the AFL
federal locals established in the summer
of 1933. The Goodyear lo-
cal's membership may have reached 7000.16 It offered an
alternative
to the Industrial Assembly, one
seemingly more attuned to the New
Deal era, and many former Assembly
leaders joined the new organi-
zation. They soon discovered that the
AFL union could do little
more than the company union. By late
1935, when relations between
the Rubber workers and the rubber
manufacturers reached crisis
proportions, the Goodyear local had less
than 500 members.17 On
the eve of the Goodyear strike, neither
organization represented
more than a small minority of Goodyear
workers. The Industrial As-
sembly seemed inadequate and the URW
unsuccessful.
The sit-downs inaugurated a period of
organizational innovation
second in magnitude and significance
only to the 1910s. Though the
13. See Paul W. Litchfield, Industrial
Voyage (New York, 1954), 120, 128-31, 183-86;
Allen, House of Goodyear, 166-75.
14. "Outline of the Goodyear Flying
Squadron Training Course," H. L. Matti to
Hugh Allen, Dec. 28, 1933, Goodyear
Archives, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company,
Akron, Ohio.
15. See Daniel Nelson, "The Company
Union Movement, A Reexamination," Busi-
ness History Review, LVI (Autumn, 1982), 335-57.
16. Compare John D. House, "Birth
of a Union," (microfilm, Ohio Historical Socie-
ty, 1981), 19, and "A History of
Goodyear," Unpublished MS, Goodyear Archives, 336.
Also see W. W. Thompson, "History
of the Labor Movement in Akron, Ohio," CI0 Pa-
pers, National and International,
Catholic University.
17. House, "Birth of a Union,"
34-38.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 13
sit-down technique was associated with
the Rubber Workers, most
Goodyear employees who sat down had no
formal ties with either
the URW or the Assembly.18 In
essence, they repudiated both
groups. Their actions created what in
effect were two new organiza-
tions: a militant, streamlined version
of the Industrial Assembly that
opposed the strike and a militant CIO
union that sustained it. The
ensuing conflict was, above all, a
struggle between these groups for
the allegiance of the Goodyear labor
force.
Initially the more promising of the new
organizations was that of
the non-strikers. By late 1935 the
Industrial Assembly was largely in-
operative. Its limited ability to cope
with the conditions of the 1930s,
exemplified by its inability to stop the
return to the eight-hour day,
had undermined its standing and
demoralized its leaders. A former
Assembly representative and 1936 URW
strike leader summarized its
plight when he recalled that it had gone
"as far as it could go."19
The Assembly continued to meet during
the crisis of February 14-17,
but few workers, and probably even fewer
of its leaders, believed
that it could successfuly cope with the
situation. P. W. Chappell, a
Labor Department mediator, reported that
its attempts to take credit
for minor concessions the company made
to the sit-down strikers "in-
flamed workers who felt [the] real
grievance . . . had not been ad-
justed."20 To most
observers the Assembly was a hopeless anachro-
nism. In fact, it lingered for a year
and a half until the Supreme Court
administered the coup de grace in
NLRB v Jones and Laughlin
(1937). But it was moribund, a shell
without substance.
The last Assembly meeting of the strike
period, on February 19,
coincided with the first meeting of the
"non-strikers." The initial im-
petus for the group remains a mystery.
Local 2 officials argued that
"foremen and supervisors,"
operating directly or indirectly at the
bidding of the management, were responsible.21
Several leaders of
the non-strikers were salaried
employees, and company executives
clearly favored the new organization,
but Lyle Carruthers, its head,
vehemently denied any company tie. A
veteran production worker,
Carruthers asserted the non-strikers
were "not connected with the
company in any way. Piece workers . . .
are running this entirely."22
18. Nelson, "Origins of the
Sit-Down Era," 211.
19. Interview with C. L. Skinner, April
23, 1976; Also see "Annual Report, Seven-
teenth Goodyear Industrial Assembly,
1935-1936," National Labor Relations Board Pa-
pers, National Archives RG 25, Box 1878,
No. 1578, cases 8-R-184, 8-C-378.
20. Chappell to Kerwin, Feb. 18, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
21. United Rubber Worker, I
(April, 1936), 2.
22. Akron Times Press, Feb. 22,
1936
14 OHIO HISTORY
John House, Local 2 president, probably
came closest to the truth
when he charged that a combination of
plant supervisors and Indus-
trial Assembly leaders had created the
non-strikers.23 Whatever the
exact circumstances of its birth, the
group had a substantial follow-
ing. Chappell asserted that 12,000
Goodyear employees, 80 percent of
the total, backed the non-strikers, but
his estimate lumped all neutral
and uncommitted workers in the anti-strike
camp.24 Non-striker
meetings typically attracted 3500 or
more enthusiasts and there were
many other sympathizers. No one doubted
that non-strikers sub-
stantially outnumbered strikers in the
early stages of the dispute.25 A
vote at any time during February 1936
probably would have given
the non-strikers an overwhelming
victory.
Contemporary accounts suggest that
non-strikers were typically
middle-aged, veteran employees who had
little to gain and much to
lose from the strike. Candidates in the
previous Industrial Assembly
election, who played leading roles in
the organization, were men in
their late 30s and early 40s.
Ninety-five percent had five or more
years of service; their ties to Goodyear
antedated the Depression.26
Non-strikers often boasted of their
superior experience, dedication
and loyalty. They were the heart of
Goodyear.27
Age and experience were not the only
characteristics that distin-
guished the non-strikers. Regardless of
their backgrounds, non-
strikers were men and women of
utilitarian views and middle-class
pretensions. Their overriding concern
was steady work at a high
wage. Their goals were largely
external-home ownership, material
comforts, and standing in the community.28
For years Goodyear had
satisfied these desires. When it failed
to do so in the early 1930s,
many of these individuals turned to the
union, but only briefly. By
late 1935 they had become disillusioned
with the URW. For long-
service workers the company's decision
to move from four six-hour
shifts, the work-sharing expedient of
the Depression years, to three
eight-hour shifts signified a return to
normality. Through the long
Depression period their earnings had
been severely reduced, in part
23. Akron Beacon Journal,Feb. 22,
1936.
24. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
25. Powers Hapgood reported to John L.
Lewis that the strikers had only a "hand
full [sic] of adherents." Quoted in
Melvyn Dubofsky, "Not so Turbulent Years: Another
Look at the American 1930's," Amerikastudien,
Vol. 24, (1979), 16.
26. Wingfoot Clan, 24 (Oct. 2,
1935), 3-7; 24 (March 27, 1935), 1, 3. Goodyear employ-
ees were overwhelmingly native-born.
Ethnic and racial distinctions were unimportant.
27. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
24, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 28, 1936.
28. This description is based on Daniel
Nelson, "The Leadership of the United
Rubber Workers, 1933-42," Detroit
in Perspective, 5 (Spring, 1981), 25.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 15
because of the six-hour day. By
eliminating fourth-shift men hired
during the expansion of 1935, the
company proposed to increase their
incomes by one-third or more. To protest
that change seemed irra-
tional, to strike against it
inconceivable. Non-strikers were captive to
their expectations. For the first two
weeks of the strike they, not the
union militants, posed the greatest
threat of violence.
The non-strikers made their presence
known quickly. On February
19 several hundred men jammed city hall,
demanding police protec-
tion for workers entering the plant.
When Mayor Lee D. Shroy and
Police Chief Frank Boss urged patience
and calm, they responded
with jeers and catcalls. If there was no
agreement in twenty-four
hours, their spokesman warned, they
would ask the Governor to call
out the National Guard. Many
non-strikers volunteered to serve as
special deputies.29 The group
then moved to a nearby high school
auditorium to elect representatives and
make plans. By that time
there were 1400 in the crowd. On
February 20 they returned to the
high school, angrier than ever.
"Throughout the meeting," a jour-
nalist reported, "leaders attempted
to quiet the rising resentment of
the crowd, insisting that violence was
unnecessary."30 As the crowd
grew, Carruthers and other non-striker
leaders decided to move the
meeting to the Akron Armory, a larger
facility. When National Guard
officials refused to open the Armory,
Carruthers lost control.
'Let's take it,' the workers shouted,
and a general rush began for the
doors. A cheering section of nearly 200
shouted derision at Mayor ...
Schroy and Sheriff Jim Flower.
Leaders brandished placards bearing such
sentiments as 'it's up to you to
protect us, Mr. Mayor.' 'We have the
right to work.' 'Down with mob rule'
and 'We work, you strike.'
A petition directed to both officials
and demanding protection for the
company and the non-strikers was
circlated in the crowd as it swept down
Mill Street.31
After breaking into the Armory, the
throng filled the 3,000-seat
building to overflowing and non-striker
leaders began an unruly se-
quel to the earlier meeting. Summoning
public officials for interroga-
tion, the non-strikers pressed for
immediate action. "'We demand
that you do your duty and see to it that
we are returned to our jobs,'
one man shouted. His assertion that 'if
you don't we will' was wildly
29. Akron Times Press, Feb. 20,
1936.
30. Ibid., Feb. 21, 1936
31. Ibid.
16 OHIO HISTORY
applauded."32 The mayor
and the sheriff demurred, however,
when the militants demanded to be
deputized.
For the next four days the non-strikers
reassembled daily at the
Armory to devise strategy and to
intimidate public officials. On Feb-
ruary 21 they perfected their
organization; Carruthers selected fifty
men, including ten captains, who
"will be ready to go help Sheriff
Flower or city police . . . and will
round up non-strikers when any un-
expected meeting is called.33 Later
he appointed three committees
that "separated the non-strikers
into mobile units."34 The non-
strikers also discussed credit
arrangements with local merchants. At
the end of the session they joined in
loud choruses of "Let Me Call
You Sweetheart," "I Want a
Girl," and other songs.35 On February
22 Carruthers counseled patience and
cautioned against any act that
might discredit the non-strikers. To his
relief, news of the injunction
against mass picketing arrived during
the meeting. The men ad-
journed in high spirits, believing that
local officials would now have
to aid them. Another overflow meeting on
February 23 disavowed
any intention of attacking the picket
line.36 Entertainment and group
singing replaced the fiery speeches of a
few days before. On Febru-
ary 24, the day before the sheriff was
to enforce the injunction,
Carruthers announced that no more mass
meetings were planned.
The men left the Armory with every
expectation of returning to their
jobs the next day.37
In the meantime, a second group of
non-strikers was organizing in a
somewhat different fashion. When pickets
closed the Goodyear
complex on February 18, between 600 and
1000 employees remained
in the factories. They included
President Litchfield and other top
officials, who stayed to dramatize their
contempt for the strikers, and
a large contingent of loyal production
workers. Soon they were
trapped. The pickets did not prevent
them from leaving, but they
could not abandon their posts without
appearing to surrender to the
strikers. After a week, Litchfield and
the executives left to direct the
strike resistance from a downtown hotel,
but most of the "captives"
remained for the duration of the dispute.
The company provided
cots, meals, mail and telephone service,
and paid them their regular
wages, but there were hardships. The
absence of barbers, beauti-
32. Ibid.
33. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
22, 1936.
34. Akron Times Press, Feb. 23,
1936.
35. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
22, 1936.
36. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1936
37. Chappell to Kerwin, Feb. 24, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 17
cians and liquor bothered some workers.
(Women workers were re-
ported to be near tears as they wondered
what to do about facials,
manicures, and hair waves.)38 Inactivity
was a universal affliction.
Since there was little or no work for
most of the inmates, athletic ac-
tivity, cards, and reading became their
preoccupations. On Sundays
they held impromptu religious services
under the direction of A. C.
Horrocks, head of Goodyear's eductional
programs. Altogether it
was a "hectic existence . . . but
not a difficult one to take."39 Like
their compatriots on the outside, they
were aggressive, unyielding,
and not a little self-righteous.
Horrocks captured their outlook in his
February 28 sermon:
We have built an industrial leadership
that is second to none, and.... it
stands out as a city built upon a hill.
We are going on to still greater things
because we have a well founded belief in
ourselves, in the people with
whom we work, in that coming of the
soul, often referred to as our Goodyear
spirit.. . 40
Despite their numbers, leadership and
commitment, the non-
strikers faced serious, ultimately
insurmountable obstacles. First and
most obvious was the problem of allegiance.
The non-strikers had
abandoned their fellow employees at a
critical juncture. In an era of
heightened class sensitivity, this was
no small matter. To many non-
strikers, the memory of the company's
pre-Depression record and
the union's erratic 1933-36 performance
was more than sufficient to al-
leviate any qualms about their actions.
To them, the strike was a des-
perate, irresponsible, and largely
leaderless gamble, not the heroic
struggle of the Levinson, McKenny, and
Pesotta accounts.41 But for
other non-strikers the problem of
allegiance was increasingly trouble-
some. Rubber Workers' officials,
unionists in other industries, news-
paper reporters and even, on occasion,
company spokesmen treated
the dispute as a labor-management
conflict. Obviously the non-
strikers were not managers. By the
latter stages of the dispute they
were less certain about their loyalties.
Probably few of them became
union supporters during the strike;
many, nevertheless, were weaned
38. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
22, 1936.
39. Ibid.
40. Akron Times Press, Feb. 24,
1936.
41. The more active non-strikers
continued to oppose the URW after the strike.
Operating though several small but
vigorous organizations, they were a constant irritant.
In an August 1937 NLRB election, 3193
Goodyear employees voted against the URW.
Akron Beacon Journal, August 25, 1937.
18 OHIO HISTORY
from their instinctive, pragmatic
identification with the Goodyear
management.
Second was the problem of leadership, a
more serious matter.
Who was in charge of the anti-strike
forces, non-strikers or company
executives? Initially the non-strikers
played the leading role. Thanks
to the Industrial Assembly, they counted
in their ranks most of the
Goodyear workers with leadership
experience. They organized with-
out difficulty and demonstrated their
political sophistication in deal-
ing with public officials. From February
19 to February 24 they were
the most important force in the strike;
thereafter their influence
waned. Like the Industrial Assembly
representatives, the non-
strikers were never wholly independent.
They had substantial re-
sources but nothing like those of the
executives. Gradually, perhaps
inevitably, they fell under the
company's sway. Litchfield's emer-
gence from the plant on February 25
symbolized this shift. Goodyear
executives tried to preserve the
non-strikers role, but without great
conviction or success. In the days after
the injunction fiasco, Car-
ruthers and his associates devoted most
of their energies to fruitless
appeals for state intervention. By early
March they were reduced to a
peripheral role in the conflict.
Finally, there was the problem of
morale. Having deferred to com-
pany officials, most non-strikers lost
interest in the day to day prog-
ress of the dispute, though not in the
outcome. Carruthers cautioned
against this possibility but was
powerless to avert it. When negotia-
tions broke down in mid-March, the
non-strikers tried to regain the
initiative, but were again thwarted. As
P. W. Chappell had surmised,
the strike was in essence a contest
between union members and non-
strikers. By mid-March the former had
triumphed; only the details
remained to be settled.
URW Militancy
The transformation of Local 2, and to a
lesser degree the URW,
was the critical development of the
strike period. The Local entered
the conflict with little support and
little prospect of success. It
emerged a larger and stronger
organization; more importantly, it ac-
quired the shared experiences and
leadership skills that sustained it
in the difficult years ahead. Before the
strike the union was only one
of several groups contending for the
employees' favor; afterward it
occupied an established niche, whatever
its actual strength or influ-
ence. By most measures the strike was a
modest union victory. By
this gauge it was an unquestioned
triumph. The conflict gave the lo-
Goodyear Strike of 1936 19
cal (and the international, which was
almost exclusively an Akron or-
ganization in 1936) a degree of
legitimacy in the eyes of Goodyear and
Akron workers that it had not enjoyed
before and had no immediate
prospect of acquiring.
By early 1936 Local 2 had declined to a
hard core of 500-600 dues-
paying members, men and women who in
many respects were indis-
tinguishable from the non-strikers. The
men were nearly all veteran
employees.42 John House, the
president, had worked at Goodyear
since 1925. Ralph Turner, the
vice-president, had started in 1919,
and Everett G. White, the
secretary-treasurer, in 1920. Other union
officials had similar backgrounds. They
also had had leadership op-
portunities: House had served in the
"flying squadron" and the In-
dustrial Assembly; Turner and Charles
Skinner, a prominent commit-
teeman, had been "speakers" of
the Assembly; Tracy Douglas,
another prominent committeeman, had been
the key figure in the
"senate" during and after
World War I. A few of these men also had
had trade union experience, as members
of the United Mine Workers
in particular.43 A profile of
rank and file union members would proba-
bly reveal considerably less seniority.
On the whole, however, Local
2, like the non-strikers, was an
organization of middle-aged individu-
als who had substantial experience and
responsibilities.
The distinguishing characteristic of
union activists, and probably
Local 2 members generally, was their
sensitivity to managerial au-
thoritarianism.44 In mass
production facilities like the Goodyear
complex, the quest for efficiency was
unrelenting and changes in work
techniques and assignments were continuous.
In return for their coop-
eration, workers received the highest
wages in American industry.45
Union activists shared the values,
ambitions, and aspirations of oth-
er workers, but were more alert to
issues of personal freedom. Their
recollections repeatedly emphasize this
point.46 In the 1920s, when
42. A committeeman's notebook listing
560 union members in a major department
indicates that 64 percent of the male
union members had ten years service and 88 per-
cent preceded the Depression. Only 13
percent of the female members had ten years
service; 40 percent had been employed
before 1930. NLRB Records, Box 347, case
8-C-378.
43. Nelson, "Leadership of the
United Rubber Workers," 24.
44. Ibid., 25. See also Dubofsky,
"'Not so Turbulent Years,'" 16-17; Robert H.
Zieger, "Memory Speaks:
Observations on Personal History and Working Class Cul-
ture," Maryland Historian, 8
(Fall, 1977), 2-9.
45. Federal Housing Administration,
"Akron, Ohio Housing Market Analysis,"
Nov. 1938, 109-10; Akron Beacon
Journal, July 13, 1937; U.S. Department of Labor,
"Wages in the Rubber Manufacturing
Industry, August, 1942," Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics Bulletin, No. 737 (Washington, D.C., 1943).
46. Nelson, "Leadership of the
United Rubber Workers," 25.
20 OHIO HISTORY
changes in production methods were most
rapid, they were quies-
cent, if unhappy. Many turned to the
Industrial Assembly, but the
Assembly, successful in many areas, was
powerless to deal with the
fundamental issue. By the 1930s these
individuals had become de-
termined opponents of the status quo in
the plant.
These attitudes were reflected in the
operation of Local 2. Union
activists did not risk their careers to
create a new dictatorship.
Leaders, they believed, should be
spokesmen rather than decision
makers. The men they selected were
articulate and personable; they
"spoke well." Many had high
school diplomas.47 They were also in-
different to personal gain. Only House
served the local through the
1930s, and none of the Local 2
executives sought or served in other
union offices. Their colleagues and
successors were men of similar
outlook. Local 2 became a rank and file
enterprise, committed to the
well-being and independence of the
individual.
The six-hour dispute added a new group
to the union ranks, the
low-seniority workers. These men were
younger and less experi-
enced; they had not worked at Goodyear
in the 1920s and were less
alert to the issue of managerial power,
except in the special way it af-
fected them. The joining of old and
young, veteran and novice,
proved a potent combination. It created
a strike organization, main-
tained the picket line, and rallied a
growing number of uncommitted
employees to the union cause. In the
course of the dispute the local's
ranks grew tenfold. By mid-March the
union had become a power in
Goodyear and in the industry.48
The creative tension that infused the
local union in early 1936 was
evident in many ways. It was
unmistakable at the tumultuous meeting
of February 17, when Local 2 leaders
condemned the management's
arbitrary behavior and sit-down
participants emphasized their eco-
nomic plight.49 It was
apparent a week later, when union sympathiz-
ers of all descriptions rallied to
thwart the sheriff's effort to disperse
the pickets.50 It reappeared
on numerous other occasions. On Febru-
ary 24 House, confronting a sheriff's
deputy, asserted in mock inno-
cence that he had "no
responsibility at all" for the presence of the
men or their actions. An unsuspecting
and literal-minded striker
47. House, "Birth of a Union";
Interview with John D. House, April 4, 1972; Inter-
view with Ralph Turner, May 10, 1976;
Interview with Charles L. Skinner, April 23, 1976.
48. Membership did not drop below 5000
again until the 1960s. Local 2 Member-
ship Records, Local 2 Papers, Akron,
Ohio.
49. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
18, 1936.
50. This statement is literally true.
House recalls the many characters who mobi-
lized on Market Street in "Birth of
a Union," 34-35.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 21
nodded his assent. We have no leader, he
told the officer. "We're
here as individuals."51
Chappell summarized the workers' position
when he reported that the "union
officials lacked control over their
men .... These workers, not all
organization-minded, had joined
the union merely as an aid in the fight
for their jobs [but] now that
they had the plant down and the
authorities on the run they had no
intention of surrendering any ground
gained."52 By late February
the alliance of committed veterans and
newcomers had bested the
non-strikers' organizations and won the
grudging respect of the man-
agement. The question that remained was
whether it could translate
the union's new power into an enhanced
role in the plant.
Two critical incidents illustrated the
union's situation. The first, on
February 28, was an outgrowth of a
strike settlement plan proposed
by Edward F. McGrady, the Assistant U.S.
Secretary of Labor. Af-
ter the sheriffs rebuff on February 25,
city officials, with the help of
the local Congressman, prevailed upon
Labor Secretary Frances Per-
kins to dispatch McGrady.53 McGrady
found Litchfield utterly un-
cooperative and prepared to leave.54
As a final gesture, however, he
proposed a compromise plan: an immediate
end to the strike, the
reinstatement of all strikers, and the
arbitration of differences be-
tween the company and the union.55 After
a day of consultation, the
union negotiators, including
International President S. H. Dalrymple
and Vice-President Thomas F. Burns,
accepted the plan. They be-
lieved that Litchfield would reject it
and had no expectation of an
immediate end to the strike. Their
action was a public relations ges-
ture.
At an impromptu meeting at the Local 2
hall that evening, Dalrym-
ple announced the committee's action and
called for a membership
ballot on the plan. As he explained the
arbitration proposal, there
were shouts of "No! No! No!"
He continued, only to be interrupted
again.56 A reporter described
the next moments:
51. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 25, 1936.
52. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
53. Akron Times Press, Feb. 26,
1936.
54. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 27, 28, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 27,
28, 1936;
"Transcript of Telephone
Conversation with Mr. Chappell," Feb. 28, 1936, FMCS File
182/1010. McGrady was perceived as a
pro-union demagogue. W. R. Murphy to J. W.
Thomas, Feb. 27, 1936, Firestone
Archives Firestone Tire and Rubber Company,
Akron, Ohio.
55. Akron Times Press, Feb. 28,
1936.
56. "There was an instant outburst
of indignation, everybody talking at once."
Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 201.
22 OHIO HISTORY
A storm of dissension rose powerfully
from every corner of the hall.... A
big man shoved forward and the crowd
surged after him.
'I'd like to know what the hell we
walked out that night to freeze for?' he
demanded. A great shout shook the hall.
Another rose: 'I don't see why it should
be necessary to go back to work
before the arbitration is ended.' he
said.
William Carney, a Plant 1 tire worker
who had emerged as a spokes-
man for the most militant of the union
newcomers, stepped forward to
shouts of "take the microphone,
Bill!"57 Carney opposed the Mc-
Grady plan and called for a postponement
of the vote. Burns sought
to defend the committee's action, only
to be shouted down.
'If that's all we are going to get, why
did we got out in the first place?' a
heated member shouted.
'We want a special meeting to discuss
the question. We don't want to vote
now,' voices from the floor cried out.
John House . . . said a few words for
the proposals. "Although I favor the
plan, remember it is your decision that
is final,' he said.
Then he took an informal vote on the
question of beginning balloting imme-
diately. It appeared to be defeated.
Another union official announced that
Powers Hapgood, one of the
corps of CIO advisors who were aiding
the URW leaders, would
speak for the committee's action.
The announcement did not pacify the
crowd.
A demand that William Carney . . . be
given the floor soon grew so loud
that instead of allowing Hapgood the
floor, a vote was taken to see which
would speak. When Carney won, Dalrymple
stepped from the inner office
and declared the meeting over.58
Realizing the problems their gesture had
caused, URW officials
immediately dropped the McGrady Plan.
The strike continued, its
leaders chastened and wary.
The second incident occurred a week
later and nearly eliminated
the gains of the previous two weeks. After
the sheriff's failure to
break the picket line, the non-strikers
had devoted their energies to
political intimidation. In frequent
communications with the governor,
sheriff, mayor, and city council, they
warned of reprisals if "law and
order" were not restored. Schroy
and the council members were
most vulnerable to this pressure.59
The non-strikers' minimal de-
57. Akron Times Press, Feb. 29,
1936.
58. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 29, 1936.
59. Akron Beacon Journal, March 3, 1936; Akron Times Press, March 4, 1936;
Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS
File 182/1010.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 23
mand was that the rude shelters the
pickets had erected at the plant
gates be removed. The mayor could hardly
deny this request; the
huts violated city ordinances and were
highly visible reminders of
the strikers' defiance of authority.
Schroy conferred with House and
C. M. O'Harrah, the Local 2 picket
captain, several times during the
week of March 2-6. They promised to
remove the shelters "as soon
as possible." In fact they did
nothing. O'Harrah probably did not
even inform the pickets of his promise
to remove the huts.60 By
March 6, Schroy's impatience was
exhausted. Believing his credibil-
ity and political future were at stake,
he ordered sanitation workers to
remove the huts. At 7 a.m. on Saturday,
March 7, five trucks and 56
workers accompanied by 75 police arrived
to dispose of the huts.
They destroyed four of the shanties
before the surprised and sleepy
pickets sounded the alarm.
Ed Heinke, a reporter for the Akron
Times Press and an eyewitness,
described the response:
Pickets poured out of the nearby union
headquarters. Hurry calls were sent
out for reinforcements...
A moment later, at the General [Tire]
plant . . . the word went down the
production line that trouble had
developed at Goodyear.
The men dropped their tools, shut the
presses and rushed from the
building ....
Union men in the Goodrich plant were
told to stand by. Men in the union
headquarters at Firestone rushed to the
scene....
Down over Newton Street hill machine
loads of strike sympathizers, with
hatless, coatless men hanging to the
running boards, raced toward the strike
scene. Picket reinforcements filled the
streets.... 61
Within minutes two or three thousand men
jammed the street, forc-
ing the police and sanitation men away
from the huts. In the scuffles
that ensued, two policemen were injured.
Outraged, Mayor Schroy
first ordered a renewed assault, then
hesitated when the police
warned that they would have to go back
shooting.62 Several hours
later he met House and O'Harah. Schroy
agreed to postpone any ac-
tion if the union acted immediately to
remove all huts from major
thoroughfares. The union leaders acceded
to his ultimatum and the
shanties disappeared. Henceforth,
pickets sat in cars near the gates
60. Adolph Germer Diary, March 6, 1936,
Adolph Germer Papers, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
61. Akron Times Press, March 7,
1936.
62. Brophy recalled a striker showing
him a gun and confiding, "We've passed the
word to the police that we'll give them
as good as they send." Brophy, A Miner's Life,
264.
24 OHIO HISTORY
and city officials made no effort to
interfere.63 By Sunday the crisis
had passed.
To many observers these incidents were
serious indictments of the
strike leaders. The union hall debacle
and the near riot of March 7
underlined the unionists'
"inexperience" and the precarious hold of
the union officers on their charges.
Chappell believed that only out-
side direction of the strike, perhaps
the participation of John L. Lew-
is himself, would avert disaster.64
Fortunately, he might have
added, experienced advisors were
available to provide the element
of professionalism that the URW officers
lacked. By late February
they had made the Goodyear contest the "first
CIO strike."
The CIO Role
The CIO role in the Goodyear strike was
one of the conflict's most
celebrated features. Supposedly it
inaugurated the labor alliance as a
militant organization, a successful
alternative to the AFL and an all
but irresistible force in American
industrial affairs.65 This was what
Lewis, John Brophy, his lieutenant, and
their representatives in Ak-
ron intended.66 In
retrospect, however, a somewhat different picture
emerges. Brophy hinted at this view when
he noted that "our people
found that one of their most demanding
jobs was to restrain the local
talent.. . ."67 Rather than
inciting the strikers to greater militancy,
as Levinson and other contemporary
analysts suggested (and as CIO
critics charged), or guiding the Rubber
Workers, as Chappell antic-
ipated, CIO representatives played
little direct role in the conduct of
the strike or the negotiations. Their
contributions fulfilled neither
the hopes nor the fears of the other
participants.
The Goodyear strike was an opportunity
for the CIO to outflank the
AFL and to establish the credibility of
the Lewis committee with in-
dustrial employees in other industries.
In the first of these endeavors
the CIO had an immense advantage; the
Rubber Workers had al-
ready opted for industrial unionism and
had aligned itself with Lew-
is. Following visits by Adolph Germer on
February 22-23 and by
63. Akron Times Press, March 7,
8, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 9, 1936.
64. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936;
"Long Distance Telephone Conversation
Between H. L. Kerwin and P. W. Chappell,
March 17, 1936," FMCS File 182/1010.
65. See Levinson, Labor On the March,
146-47.
66. Brophy, A Miner's Life, 263; Akron
Beacon Journal, Feb. 25, 26, 1936; CI0 Exec-
utive Committee Minutes, Dec. 9, 1935,
"Report by Director for Meeting of Feb. 21, 1936,
April 14, 1936," Katherine P.
Ellickson Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
67. Brophy, A Miner's Life, 263;
Lorin Lee Cary, "Institutionalized Conservatism in
the Early C.I.O.: Adolph Germer, A Case
Study." Labor History, 13 (Fall, 1972), 488-91.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 25
Brophy on February 23, the CIO threw all
its resources into the
Goodyear cause.68 Germer, who
returned on February 24, worked
behind the scenes with the strike
leaders; Powers Hapgood, who
arrived on February 26, served as the
principal CIO liaison with the
public; and Rose Pesotta of ILGWU, who
also arrived on February
26, maintained contacts with the
pickets. Brophy made three short
visits, Leo Krzycki of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers and Ben
Schafer of the Oil Workers remained for
longer periods, and envoys
from the Clothing Workers, Mine Workers,
and Auto Workers spoke
at rallies and meetings. The CIO also
contributed $3000 to the strike
fund. By contrast, the AFL role was
meager. Green contributed
$1000 and had agreed to a speaking
appearance when the strike
ended.69 Apart from
Akron-area functionaries who provided assis-
tance through the Central Labor Union,
the only AFL organizer to
appear was Coleman Claherty, Green's
former Akron representative.
Claherty toured the picket line one
Sunday afternoon. No strike
leader greeted him.
Although generally successful in working
with strike leaders, Ger-
mer and his colleagues had some difficulty
impressing the strikers
themselves. For all their ability and
good intentions, the CIO offi-
cials were outsiders, unfamiliar with
the industry and community.
They and their resources were welcome,
but on the strikers' terms.
The gulf between them and the strikers
was epitomized by their
physical isolation; they lived at the
Portage Hotel in downtown
Akron and spent their free moments in
each other's company. Their
late-night gatherings at the Portage bar
attracted reporters, curious
citizens, and company informants.70
It is not surprising that they
found Vice-President Burns, a Chicopee
Falls, Massachusetts-
resident also housed at the Portage, the
most accessible and cooper-
ative of the URW officials.
From the time of their arrival, the CIO
advisors handled the strik-
ers' press and public relations. In the
hectic early days of the strike,
Germer undertook this job with minimal
assistance. He wrote press
releases, met with reporters, and
coordinated the publicity work of
the other CIO representatives.
Presumably it was he who decided
that the strikers should rely on the
radio to communicate with sym-
pathizers and potential allies.
Dalrymple, Burns, Frank Grillo, the In-
68. Brophy, A Miner's Life, 263
69. United Rubber Worker, I
(April, 1936), 16.
70. Germer reports many such gatherings
in his diary. Also see Akron Beacon Jour-
nal, Feb. 28, 1936.
26 OHIO HISTORY
ternational secretary-treasurer, and
Local 2 officials made frequent
broadcasts; their statements, with only
two exceptions between Feb-
ruary 26 and March 10, were products of
Germer's facile pen.71
Thereafter, McAllister Coleman, a labor
journalist Germer brought
from New York to relieve the burden,
composed both press releases
and broadcast scripts. The climactic
episode in the union radio blitz
was a nine-and-a-half hour all-night
broadcast on March 16-17,
when union leaders feared a vigilante
attack on the picket line. Grillo
and Coleman coordinated the program,
which featured amateur
entertainment, recorded music, news from
the picket line, and pro-
strike editorials.72 Unionists
agreed that it was a remarkable
achievement.
The less imaginative Goodyear public
relations staff was hopelessly
outclassed. Masters of newspaper
advertising, they stumbled badly
when they sought to employ the new
technology of industrial con-
flict. Litchfield's broadcasts confused
rather than edified his listen-
ers, and those of other executives and
non-strikers lacked the profes-
sional quality of the union appeals.
Even union critics agreed that the
strikers won the battle of the air
waves.73 The only unpleasant note
for the CIO was personal rather than
professional. After his all-night
stint, Coleman began a five-day
alcoholic binge that ended his use-
fulness and ultimately led to his
dismissal.74
CIO representatives were equally
effective in public appearances.
Germer, Hapgood, Pesotta and others made
daily inspection tours of
the picket lines, often pausing for
impromptu rallies.75 They also par-
ticipated in countless meetings at the
union hall and in a series of
mass rallies at the Armory. Beginning on
March 3 the union spon-
sored daily programs in a theater near
the strike area. Pesotta re-
cruited amateur musical and theatrical
groups for these sessions and
led the strikers in labor songs and
parodies of popular tunes. Hap-
good specialized in inspirational talks
to the strikers, their families,
and allies. His dapper appearance,
measured tone, and educated air
confounded popular notions of the labor
agitator. Local journalists
devoted far more attention to him than
his role in the strike organiza-
71. Germer Diary, Feb. 26-March 10,
1936.
72. Akron Beacon Journal, March,
17, 1936; Akron Times Press, March 17, 1936.
73. Akron Beacon Journal, March 23,
1936; Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 221-22;
United Rubber Worker, I (April, 1936), 2.
74. Germer Diary, March 17-21, 1936.
75. Pesotta recalled that "we all
took turns speaking from the union sound truck. Au-
diences would gather quickly whenever
the truck stopped. The loud speaker never lost
its novelty for them." Pesotta, Bread
Upon the Waters, 206-07.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 27 |
|
tion warranted. Goodyear officials seemed to despise him more than the other CIO advisors, perhaps because of his bourgeois demeanor and disarming manner.76 After March 4 Germer devoted most of his time to the Goodyear negotiations. Aware of his outsider status, he proceeded cautiously. He was a "servant" or "first mate" to "Captain Dalrymple."77 His job was to counsel, not to dictate. Still, he found it difficult not to be- come more deeply involved. His assignment was to see that the strike did not end in disaster. Despite the union's gains since February 25, that possibility remained. And given the URW's leaders and their method of operating, it was likely to persist until an agreement was concluded. Fearful that a prolonged stalemate would work against the union, Germer increasingly pressured the strike leaders for a set- tlement, almost any settlement that would give the union a base at Goodyear.
76. Akron Times Press, March 10, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 10, 1936; L. A. Hurley to E. S. Cowdrick, July 23, 1936, U.S. Senate, "Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, 76 Cong., 1 Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1939). 16898. 77. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 28, 1936. |
28 OHIO HISTORY
Germer began to take a more active role
in early March. Secret talks
between March 4-7 produced the first
Goodyear concessions: an of-
fer to reinstate the strikers, retain
the six-hour day, and consult union
representatives before making policy
changes. The company also
agreed to reduce the number of
"flying squadron" members.78
However, in a March 9 radio broadcast
President Litchfield seemed
to suggest a different and less generous
settlement. Believing they
had been "double-crossed," the
union negotiators decided to make
their aims public.79 In a
broadcast on March 10 House asked for
clarification of the Goodyear proposals
and for action on the URW
demand for termination of financial
assistance to the Industrial As-
sembly.80 But when the
negotiators met on March 12, the Goodyear
representatives refused to consider
House's demands. They insisted
on a ratification vote.81
After considerable discussion and pressure
from Germer, the union negotiators
grudgingly agreed to present the
company's proposals to the strikers at
an Armory meeting on Satur-
day, March 14. As Germer reported to
Brophy, he "hoped [the] men
would accept [the] company's proposition
and then build up their
union."82
As Saturday approached there were
ominous signs of rank and file
discontent. To many strikers the
proposal seemed more like a back to
work order than a union victory. The
union negotiators, led by
House, made no attempt to hide their
feelings. On Thursday night
Germer, Krzycki, Schafer, and Burns
discussed the possibility of re-
jection, though Germer remained hopeful.
On Friday evening the
strike rally at the theater turned into
an anti-settlement protest led by
Carney.83 After that, even
Germer saw that there was little hope for
ratification.84
On Saturday morning the strike leaders
and Germer met to com-
plete their plans for the afternoon.
They decided that House would
open the meeting and call on George
Hull, a member of the negotiat-
ing committee, to read the Goodyear
proposal. When Hull finished,
House would ask Dalrymple to explain the
procedure for amending
the company plan and open the meeting to
discussion. They agreed
78. Chappell to Kerwin, March 12, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010; Germer Diary, March
4-9, 1936; Akron Times Press, March
8, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 9, 1936.
79. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936;
FMCS File 182/1010.
80. Akron Times Press, March 11,
1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 11, 1936.
81. Akron Times Press, March 12,
1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 12, 1936.
82. Germer Diary, March 13, 1936.
83. Akron Beacon Journal, March
14, 1936
84. Germer Diary, March 13, 1936.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 29
that there would be a secret ballot on
the amended Goodyear offer.
At that point W. H. Ricketts, a Local 2
activist, appeared. Ricketts
claimed to represent a group of pickets
and announced that he would
introduce a series of detailed
amendments. They were the work of
James Keller, the local Communist Party
leader, who had been meet-
ing with a handful of strikers.85 The
amendments included the de-
mands that the union negotiators had
raised on March 12 and that
the Goodyear representatives had refused
to consider. House and
other union executives expressed
sympathy toward the proposal.
Germer, however, was dismayed: "I
had already prepared a substi-
tute resolution without definite
instructions to [the] negotiating com-
mittee but this fellow [Ricketts] also
House preferred to tie the com-
mittee down to specific points. I told
them I thought it was poor
strategy but I couldn't get them to see
it."86
By 2:00 the Armory overflowed with 4000
or more strikers. Few at-
tempted to disguise their
dissatisfaction with the settlement. A news-
paperman who eluded the union guards
reported that it was "pretty
plain from the start that the crowd
wasn't going to accept the compa-
ny's peace plan."87 When
a malfunction of the public address sys-
tem delayed the start of the meeting,
House led the group in singing.
The refrain of a popular labor song,
"No, No, a Thousand Times
No," provided dissidents with a
theme.88 When House finally
stepped to the microphone to begin the
meeting, he was greeted by
chants of "No! No! No!"89
After a brief introductory statement,
House turned to Hull. The events of the
next few minutes eliminated
the last small hope of an immediate
settlement. Germer recalled:
[Hull] gave [a] brief but very
unsatisfactory explanation of what hap-
pened.... [He] did not read [the]
company proposition.... Then House
'explained' some more. Dalrymple got no
chance to read his statement.
After Ricket [sic] read his resolution
House took it upon himself to change
the program. He called Burns and
Dalrymple into a huddle at the table and
had Burns say 'the negotiating committee
accepts the resolution as part of its
report
. . .'
I walked upon the stage and told Burns
he blundered. He resented the
suggestion, so I went to the hotel in
disgust. I considered leaving.90
85. McKenny, Industrial Valley, 353-55;
Daily Worker, March 13, 14, 23, 1936. For a
candid assessment of the Communists'
limited role, see John Williamson, "Akron, A
New Chapter in American Labor
History," Communist, XV (May, 1936), 424-25.
86. Germer Diary, March 14, 1936.
87. Akron Times Press, March 15,
1936.
88. Akron Times Press, March 15,
1936; Interview with John D. House, April 1973;
Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 219.
89. Akron Times Press, March 14,
1936.
90. Germer Diary, March 14, 1936; Akron
Time Press, March 15, 1936.
30 OHIO HISTORY
House explained that the Ricketts
amendments meant a return to the
picket line, but no one spoke up for the
Goodyear plan. By a show of
hands Local 2 members adopted the
amended report. C. M. O'Har-
rah had the last word: "I'm telling
you right now," he exclaimed,
"this strike has just started.
We're going out to hold that picket
line.' "91
P. W. Chappell summarized the views of
Germer and the other
outsiders when he wrote that House
"allowed the meeting to get
away from him."92 House
would likely have replied that the meeting
was never his to control. What to
Chappell and Germer was poor
management was to URW leaders the rough
and tumble of a demo-
cratic union. Roberts Rules might be
observed in the breech, but
the principle of consensus was
maintained. On March 14 that meant
the strikers would continue to press
their demands. As Germer had
anticipated, their decision was costly.
Within hours former Akron
Mayor C. Nelson Sparks announced the
formation of the Law and
Order League. The strike was once more
in jeopardy.
Community Response
From the beginning of the Goodyear
strike the elements of an anti-
strike coalition were present in Akron.
Two of them, the Goodyear
management and the non-strikers, require
little additional comment.
Goodyear officials had consistently
opposed the URW since 1933;
they would continue to do so until 1941.
The non-strikers, their zeal
and possibly their numbers somewhat
diminished, were also deter-
mined opponents.93 A third
element was a substantial minority of lo-
cal citizens not directly involved in
the conflict. Farmers, profession-
als, and upper-income residents of all
backgrounds were deeply
suspicious of the URW and the strikers.94
In most cases their anxiety
did not arise from hostility to unions
or collective bargaining per se
but from fear of their possible
consequences. Anything that threat-
ened the prospect of economic recovery
became the object of their
enmity. For several years they viewed
the URW with misgivings. Aft-
er February 18 most of them probably saw
Local 2 as a threat.
Finally, there were local government
figures, pragmatic in outlook
91. Akron Times Press, March 15
1936.
92. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
93. See Roberts, Rubber Workers, for
post-strike activities.
94. Jones, Life, Liberty and
Property, 143-236. For a recent effort to cast such an align-
ment in broader, theoretical terms, see
Edward Greer, Big Steel (New York, 1979).
Goodyear Strike of 1936 31
sensitive to interest group pressures
and wary of any move that would
expose themselves to electoral
retaliation. The mayor, sheriff, prose-
cutor, and most of the thirteen
councilmen needed Rubber Workers'
votes to be elected and dared not appear
indifferent to the strikers'
interests. In addition, the mayor was
supposedly miffed at Goodyear
executives for not supporting his
election campaign in 1935.95 The
URW was by no means devoid of political
influence. Yet the strikers
were vulnerable on the critical economic
growth issue. The one point
on which company and union, pro-strike
and anti-strike forces,
agreed was the desirability of
expansion. Any threat to the city's fu-
ture prosperity would provoke a reaction
that cut across other lines.
Though the strikers subscribed to the
growth ideal like everyone
else, their actions invited criticism.
By closing the plant they reduced
spending and profits and increased
unemployment and uncertainty.
In the minds of many people this was
tantamount to opposing growth.
No politician could-or would-tolerate an
anti-growth movement.
As long as the strike lasted there was
danger that these groups
would coalesce into an anti-strike
movement. The sheriff's attempt to
implement the injunction had been a
close call for the strikers. Only
the prospect of violence had deterred
the mayor and governor.96
The police confrontation of March 7 also
might have served as an
anti-strike catalyst. The March 14 vote
created a new crisis, the most
serious of all. By that time it was
widely acknowledged that the inter-
ests of the community demanded an end to
the dispute, and to many
people rejection of the company's offer
was a rejection of the city as
well. Political neutrality became more
difficult.
In the meantime, anti-union activists
and Goodyear representatives
had formulated a plan to break the
strike. Non-strikers supposedly
originated it, while Litchfield and the
heads of other rubber compa-
nies provided financial support.97 Sheriff
Flower may have been in-
volved in the discussions, though he was
determined not to appear
as the leader of the effort. Schroy,
whose relations with Goodyear,
the non-strikers, and Flower had been
less than happy since the in-
junction confrontation, stoutly refused
any tie. The non-strikers then
turned to local businessmen.98 They
found a willing leader in former
Mayor Sparks, an outspoken community
booster who had headed a
"Citizens Committee" of
prominent businessmen during the first two
95.
Ibid., 107.
96. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb.
25, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 25, 1936.
97. U.S. Senate Hearings, 29,
51-52.
98. Germer Diary, March 12, 1936.
32 OHIO HISTORY
weeks of the strike.99 From
their discussions emerged the Law and
Order League. By March 14 Sparks was
ready to act. When word
came of the strikers' decision, Sparks
and his allies implemented
their plan. Goodyear issued a statement
withdrawing its concessions
and Sparks announced the formation of
the League. His objective,
he said, was to aid law enforcement
officials when the plant reo-
pened. If they refused to cooperate, the
League would act alone.100
Statements by Litchfield and Sparks on
Sunday, March 15, em-
phasized the economic growth issue. In
refusing Chappell's last min-
ute request for an interim agreement,
Litchfield maintained that he
could no longer reinstate the strikers
"because Goodyear has lost
business."
Akron's . . . abject surrender to the
defiant demands of a very small part of
its population is becoming so generally
known that it will be increasingly diffi-
cult for us to convince our customers
that they may depend upon us for an
uninterrupted supply of rubber products
so long as they are manufactured in
Akron. 101
Sparks was more specific in two radio
broadcasts. Germer, Hapgood,
and the other CIO advisors "have
come into our community with
the sole intent to either make Akron's
rubber industry 100 per cent
unionized, or wreck the industry. And
wreck the city in the ef-
fort!" 102
By Sunday night the "town's
excitement was bordering on pan-
ic."103 Sparks claimed
to have enrolled thousands of strike oppo-
nents, and the non-strikers promised
5200 vigilantes for anti-strike
duty. Union leaders, on the other hand,
promised to resist any at-
tack on the picket line. They assigned
Army veterans to serve as pick-
et captains and dispatched bodyguards to
protect URW and CIO
leaders. "The headquarters of both
sides were armed camps."104
Rumors were rife, but two critical
questions remained unanswered.
What would Schroy do and when would
Goodyear reopen the
plant?
The mayor's actions Sunday night and
Monday probably per-
suaded Goodyear officials not to open
the plant Monday or Tuesday.
99. Akron Times Press, Feb. 25,
1936.
100. Akron Beacon Journal, March
14, 1936.
101. Akron Beacon Journal, March
16, 1936. For confirmation of these charges, see
Garnet L. Patterson to Charles S. Fahy,
July 21, 1936, NLRB Records, case 8-C-33.
102. Akron Beacon Journal, March
16, 1936.
103. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
104. Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 220.
Goodyear Strike of 1936 33
After consulting the police, Schroy
opted for continued neutrality.
Convinced that any attempt to reopen the
plant would precipitate vio-
lence, the mayor concluded that the best
interests of the city de-
manded an end to the confrontation and a
negotiated settlement. In a
meeting with the sheriff and police
officers Monday morning he was
"firm" in rejecting assistance
to the anti-strike forces. " 'The officers
will be [at Goodyear] only to preserve
peace,' he declared. 'They will
not take sides with either group.'
"105
To Sheriff Flowers's pleas that
more officers were necessary (he had
sworn in Sparks as a special
deputy a few minutes earlier), Schroy
turned a deaf ear. Later that
day, when Flower proposed that they join
the League in asking Gov-
ernor Davey or, if necessary, President
Roosevelt, for troops, Schroy
again demurred. While promising to
consider any suggestion, he re-
fused to cooperate with Sparks.106 Without the mayor's support
Flower and Sparks were at least
temporarily stifled.
By Monday afternoon the anti-strike
leaders had lost the initia-
tive.107 Both Akron newspapers attacked Sparks and the League
in
outspoken editorials. "A pitched
battle," wrote the Beacon Journal,
"will give a black name to the
community, without a single benefit
accruing."108 In
response Sparks wavered, denying that his intention
was to do more than
"crystalize" public opinion.109 So shocked
were his recruits at this statement that
the League operations came to
a halt.110 Later that
afternoon Davey refused to intercede and Labor
Secretary Frances Perkins sent telegrams
to House and Litchfield
calling for renewed negotiations.111
By Monday evening the anti-
strike movement had floundered.
On Tuesday Goodyear officials indicated
a renewed interest in ne-
gotiations. Union-management conferences
began on Wednesday,
March 18. Federal mediators reported
that the union representatives
"have qui[e]ted down very much in
their attitude" and that the
company officials were in a
"conciliatory mood."112 Progress
was
rapid. By March 20 Goodyear had agreed
to maintain the six-hour
day and to recognize the union's
committees in handling grievances.
105. Akron Beacon Journal, March
16, 1936.
106. Ibid., March 17, 1936.
107. Chappell to Kerwin, March 26, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010.
108. Akron Beacon Journal, March
16, 1936.
109. Ibid., Feb. 17, 1936.
110.
Ibid.
111. Frances Perkins to Paul W. Litchfield,
March 16, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.
112. "Telephone Conversation,"
Chappell and Kerwin, March 19, 1936, FMCS File
182/1010.
34 OHIO HISTORY |
|
Litchfield refused to sign the document, but pledged to adhere to its provisions. URW leaders concluded that they would gain no more under any circumstances and called another Armory meeting for Sat- urday, March 21.113 The second ratification meeting was anticlimactic. The strikers' mood was buoyant, and no opposition emerged, save for a last minute effort by a small Trotskyist group.114 After minimal discussion Local 2 members voted with virtual unanimity to accept the agreement and return to work. The settlement reinstated the strikers and provided for regular consultations between plant executives and union leaders, retention of the four-shift, six-hour day in the tire and tube divi- sions, and a limit of forty-hours per week in other departments. It also curbed the seniority rights of "flying squadron" members and called for negotiations to settle remaining differences. "At first
113. Germer Diary, March 19, 20, 1936; Akron Times Press, March 18-20, 1936. 114. Williamson, "Akron," 420-21; Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 225-26; Art Preis, Labor's Giant Step. Twenty Years of the CIO (New York, 1964), 45-46. |
Goodyear Strike of 1936 35
glance," Chappell wrote, it
appeared that the union gained relatively
little. However, on reconsideration
"it will be seen that not only were
the main objectives of the strike
obtained but that the workers se-
cured additional benefits as
well."115
There was an ironic footnote to the
settlement. In the eighteen
months following the Goodyear strike,
Mayor Schroy and Governor
Davey, the men most responsible for an
outcome that could be con-
sidered favorable to the union, became
leaders of the anti-CIO back-
lash in Ohio and the nation. An
uninspiring administrator-cum-
politician, Schroy rebelled against the
sit-down in mid-1936,
mounted a determined anti-union
campaign, and won reelection in
1937 in one of the nation's first
referenda on labor militancy.116
Davey, a shrewder, more cynical, and
more ambitious officeholder,
tried to use anti-CIO sentiment as a
stepping-stone to national office.
By breaking the 1937 Little Steel strike
and waging a vociferous cam-
paign against labor radicals, he was
able to project himself, however
briefly, into the national spotlight and
into contention for the 1940
Democratic presidential nomination.117
In later years it became customary to
emphasize the role of militant
workers and to downplay the
contributions of public officials, espe-
cially the unappealing Mayor Schroy, in
the outcome. Davey's refusal
to intervene undoubtedly reflected his
desire to win union support in
the upcoming election; Schroy's actions
are more difficult to explain.
Personal and political antipathy to
Sparks and Flower, leaders of oth-
er Republican factions, may have played
a part in his behavior on
March 15-16. The apparent success of his
neutrality policy during the
injunction dispute may also have been a
factor. But the overriding
consideration was undoubtedly his
realization that the plant could
not be opened peacefully, and that
violence would be detrimental to
the city's reputation and future
prosperity. In the end, the economic
growth issue was decisive. It explains
why a businessman heading a
self-proclaimed "business"
administration saved the "first CIO
strike" from likely defeat. The
fact that the same consideration led
Schroy to adopt a position not unlike
Sparks (and Davey) in 1937 is
less important than the fact that he
enabled the Goodyear strike to
be recorded in union annals as a
triumph. Without a "successful"
115. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936,
FMCS File 182/1010; Pesotta, Bread Upon
the Waters, 224.
116. See Daniel Nelson, "The CIO At
Bay: Labor Militancy and Politics in Akron,
1936-38," Unpublished MS.
117. Ibid.; James L. Baughman,
"Classes and Company Towns: Legends of the 1937
Little Steel Strike," Ohio
History, 87 (Spring, 1978), 175-92.
36 OHIO HISTORY
conclusion it is unlikely the strike
would have received the attention
of Levinson, McKenny and other CIO
partisans. Presumably its "les-
sons" would have been forgotten and
the CIO thrust of 1936-37
would have taken a different course.
Germer obliquely acknowl-
edged the mayor's contribution when he
confided that the union
had been "skating on thin
ice."118 He was more explicit at the Ar-
mory meeting on March 21. After the
ratification vote his first step
was to offer thanks to the chief of
police. 119
The end of the Goodyear strike marked
the beginning of a period
of dramatic expansion and development
for unions in the manufactur-
ing sector, a period that the CIO
partisans of the late 1930s and 1940s
associated directly or indirectly with
the Goodyear conflict. The sit-
down technique, the spread of industrial
unionism, the growth of
CIO power and, above all, the image of a
union movement that was
"on the march," powerful,
undaunted, inexorable-all dated from
the Goodyear strike. But there was more.
The Goodyear strike pro-
vided not only a preview of "labor
on the march," but of workers,
union and non-union, reevaluating their
allegiances, of the technology
of mass movements, and of the
possibilities for cultivating and manip-
ulating public opinion. It was not the
Levinsons, McKennys, Vorses,
and Pesottas, but the stolid Monthly
Labor Review which best
grasped the significance of the Goodyear
strike. Neither the causes
nor results but "the circumstances
in which the strike was carried on
and the method used" gave the
conflict its claim to public attention.
118. Germer Diary, March 22, 1936.
119.
Ibid., March 21, 1936.
DANIEL NELSON
The Great Goodyear Strike of 1936
It was the "first" CIO strike,
a "stepping stone toward the automo-
bile industry," an affirmation of
the potentialities of the sit-down
strike, a case study of rank and file
militancy, and a "remarkable" ex-
ample of the effects of non-violent
agitation.' Its beginnings were ob-
scure, its consequences uncertain.
"The circumstances in which the
strike was carried on and the method
used" rather than the imme-
diate causes or results made it a
turning point in the labor history of
the 1930s.2 It was the great
Goodyear strike, which paralyzed Akron
for more than a month in February and
March, 1936.
Contemporary journalists and writers,
all CIO partisans, first called
attention to the importance of the
conflict. Edward Levinson and
Mary Heaton Vorse published brief
histories of the strike in 1937;
Ruth McKenny followed in 1939, Alfred W.
Jones in 1941, Rose Pe-
sotta and Harold S. Roberts in 1944.3
These works, building blocks
for more recent students of the
turbulent years, help explain the often
insubstantial foundations of their
studies.4 The Levinson and Vorse
Daniel Nelson is Professor of History at
The University of Akron. He is indebted to
Bernard Sternsher, Warren Van Tine and
Lorin Lee Cary for their critical reading of an
earlier draft of this essay.
1. John Brophy, A Miner's Life (Madison,
1964), 264; Edward Levinson, Labor On
the March (New York, 1956), 146; "Lewis Wins Akron
Victory," Business Week (March
28, 1936), 20; P. W. Chappell to H. L.
Kerwin, March 21, 1936; Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service Records, National
Archives RG 280, File 182/1010.
2. "The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. Strike," Monthly Labor Review, 42 (May,
1936), 288. The most recent and
comprehensive assessment of the labor history of the
1930s is Bernard Sternsher,
"Workers in the 1930's: Middle Range Questions and
Ethnocultures," Paper presented to
the 1982 meeting of the Organization of American
Historians, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
3. Levinson, Labor On the March, 143-46;
Mary Heaton Vorse, Labor's New Millions
(New York, 1938), 5-6; Ruth McKenny, Industrial
Valley (New York, 1939), 277-370;
Alfred W. Jones, Life, Liberty and
Property (Philadelphia, 1941), 101-07; Rose Pesotta,
Bread Upon the Waters (New York, 1944), 195-227; Harold S. Roberts, The
Rubber
Workers (New York, 1944), 147-51.
4. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge
to the AFL (Cambridge, 1960), Ch. 6; Irving
Bernstein, Turbulent Years (Boston,
1970), 592-97. James R. Green; The World of the
Worker (New York, 1980), 153.