WILLIAM E. GIENAPP
Salmon P. Chase, Nativism,
and the Formation of the
Republican Party in Ohio
Accounts of the formation of the
Republican party traditionally
emphasize the political upheaval of
1854. In this year the party first
took shape in Michigan and Wisconsin,
and in several other states fu-
sion anti-Nebraska coalitions, which are
often viewed as proto-
Republican organizations, contested the
fall elections.1 Certainly the
momentous political events of that year
unleashed forces that eventu-
ally culminated in the formation of the
Republican party throughout
the North. Nonetheless, little was
accomplished toward estab-
lishing a permanent party organization,
and at the end of the year few
competent political observers believed
that Republicanism would ei-
ther gain a substantial following in the
free states or become a perma-
nent organization. The events of 1854
gave a boost to the Republican
movement, but the first significant
steps to organize the party in key
northern states occurred the following
year.
Political developments in Ohio in 1855
were particularly significant
in the Republican party's early history.
As the nation's third most
populous state, Ohio exercised
considerable power in national affairs,
and consequently its politics commanded
widespread attention.
Moreover, the drive to launch the party
established Salmon P.
Chase as head of the state organization,
a development which cata-
pulted him to the front ranks of the
Republican national leadership, a
position he occupied for the rest of his
life. Under Chase's guidance,
Ohio Republicans would take the lead to
organize a national party on
William E. Gienapp is Assistant
Professor of History at The University of Wyoming.
Professor Gienapp is grateful to the
Mabelle McLeod Lewis Memorial Fund, Stanford,
California, for financial support that allowed him to
complete much of the research for
this essay. The University of California, Berkeley, and
the University of Wyoming pro-
vided essential computer funds. Finally,
he would like to thank Stephen Maizlish for
many fruitful conversations concerning Ohio politics in
this period.
1. A good example of this emphasis is
Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (New
York, 8 vols., 1947-1971), v. 2, 316-46.
6 OHIO HISTORY
the same basis as prevailed in the
state. Ultimately, few leaders
would make as significant a contribution
to the creation of a national
Republican party.
Anti-slavery extensionism and
anti-southernism, revitalized by the
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in
May, and nativism, repre-
sented by the Know-Nothing order,
combined in 1854 in Ohio to
produce an unprecedented popular revolt
against the old parties.2 In
July various anti-Democratic elements,
including Whigs searching for
a new political home, Free-Soilers eager
to form a more powerful anti-
slavery organization, anti-Nebraska
Democrats angered by their
party's support of the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise, Germans
alienated from their traditional
Democratic allegiance, and Know-
Nothings just beginning to sense their
extraordinary power in the
state, all came together in Columbus to
form a temporary coalition to
meet the present crisis and to nominate
a People's state ticket.3
More a conglomeration of opposition
factions than a tightly knit po-
litical organization, the People's party
scored an astonishing triumph
in October. It swept the state with an
unprecedented majority of al-
most 70,000 votes and won every
congressional contest. The badly
battered Democrats managed to carry only
eleven counties in the en-
tire state.4 Exhilarated by
their triumph, opposition leaders immedi-
ately turned their attention to the 1855
state election when the gov-
ernorship would be at stake. In the
dizzying political atmosphere
that prevailed following the 1854
election, Salmon P. Chase, the most
prominent Free-Soiler in the state,
perceived a glittering opportunity
to recoup his fallen political fortunes
and at the same time realize a
long cherished dream of organizing a
powerful antislavery party.
The sincerity of Chase's hatred of
slavery is beyond challenge. He
had committed himself to the antislavery
movement in the 1830s
when it was not respectable; he had
braved anti-abolitionist mobs;
he had legally fought for black rights
in the face of deeply-rooted
racism; and he had diligently labored
since the early 1840s to pro-
mote political antislavery. As his
commitment to political activity
grew, however, so too did his ambition.
Among the handsomest of
2. Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War
Era: 1850-1873 (Columbus, 1944), 277-94.
3. For the 1854 People's movement, see
Stephen E. Maizlish, The Triumph of Sec-
tionalism: The Transformation of Ohio
Politics, 1844-1860 (Kent, Ohio,
1983). 188-93,
197-206. Maizlish's account is weakened
by a failure to perceive the critical role of the
Know-Nothings in the 1854 contest. For
the proceedings of the People's convention,
see the Ohio State Journal, July
14, 1854.
4. The returns are given in the Whig
Almanac, 1855. Democratic congressional cand-
idates fared even worse, winning only
six counties statewide.
Salmon P. Chase 7
American politicians, over six-feet tall
and of sturdy build, he was, in
the words of an Ohio political leader,
"as ambitious as Julius Cae-
sar." Chase was also unbearably
self-righteous and decidedly du-
plicitious in his political dealings-his
enemies called him "a political
vampire" and "a sort of moral
bull-bitch."5 Ceaselessly pontificating
about his disinterested commitment to
the antislavery cause, he dis-
played (like many politicians) an
increasing inability to distinguish
between his own political fortunes and
its advancement.
Chase was by this time a lame duck.
Elected to the Senate in 1849
as the result of a bargain between
Democrats and Free-Soilers, he
was due to retire the following March.
Never very popular in the
state, Chase craved public adoration,
and he found the possibility of
his election as governor particularly
attractive. As was his usual mode
of operation, he commenced actively
lining up support while denying
that he had any interest in the office.6
Despite his eagerness for the
governorship, Chase displayed
considerable ambivalence about the
Republican movement.7 He par-
ticularly feared that his adversaries
would control any fusion organi-
zation. Eventually, however, the Ohio
leader and his advisers con-
cluded that the drive to organize a
Republican party represented the
best chance to unite the opposition
under their guidance. Antislavery
Congressman Joshua R. Giddings was
especially prominent in pro-
moting this view. When some Free-Soilers
proposed beginning anew
in 1855 and holding a separate
convention, James M. Ashley, one of
5. Robert Warden, Private Life and
Public Services of Salmon P. Chase (Cincinnati,
1874), 329, 529; Albert G. Riddle to
Joshua R. Giddings, quoted in David H. Brad-
ford, "The Background and Formation
of the Republican Party in Ohio, 1844-
1861" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1947), 85; Roeliff
Brinkerhoff, Recollections of a
Lifetime (Cincinnati, 1900), 118; James Ford Rhodes,
History of the United Slates from the
Compromise of 1850 (New York, 7 vols.,
1892-
1906), v. 1, 449. Maizlish, Triumph
of Sectionalism, presents considerable evidence of
Chase's duplicity. See in particular his
discussion of Chase's election to the United
States Senate in 1849, 121-43, esp.
131-33, 138-39. Peter F. Walker, Moral Choices:
Memory, Desire, and Imagination in
Nineteenth-Century American Abolition (Baton
Rouge, 1978), 305-29, presents a
stimulating discussion of Chase's character and
thought.
6. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, November 11,
1854, Charles Sumner Papers, Harvard
University; Chase to Hamlin, January 22,
1855, Salmon P. Chase Papers, Library of
Congress; Chase to Oran Follett,
February 14, 1855, L. Belle Hamlin (ed.), "Selections
from the Follett Papers," Ohio
Historical and Philosophical Society Quarterly Publica-
tions, 13 (April-June, 1918), 64; R. P. L. Baber to John
Sherman, October 16, 1854,
Confidential, John Sherman Papers,
Library of Congress.
7. Chase to Julian, January 20, 1855,
Giddings-Julian Papers, Library of Congress;
Austin Willey to Chase, March 26, 1855,
Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Follett, January
1, May 4, 1855, "Follett
Papers," 61, 73.
8 OHIO HISTORY
Chase's most trusted lieutenants,
anxiously urged him to put an end
to it; instead, the Chase men should
continue to push fusion "upon
the same plan of last year." Ashley
was confident that the Free-
Soilers could dominate any such fusion
convention, and increasingly
Chase and his circle viewed the 1854
People's party as the spring-
board from which to launch a new
antislavery party. In the first
months of 1855, the notion that a
convention of the anti-Nebraska
forces would be called to organize the
Ohio Republican party crystal-
lized. By spring Chase, recognizing the
importance of Ohio acting in
concert with other states, was
energetically promoting the Republi-
can cause.8
The major obstacle confronting Chase's
blossoming gubernatorial
ambitions was the power of the Ohio
Know-Nothings. So called be-
cause members were instructed to respond
"I know nothing" if ques-
tioned about it, this secret nativist
society had been organized in
New York City in 1850.9
Membership was limited to native-born
males who had no connection with
Catholicism. With the slogan
"Americans should rule
America," it advocated checking the surg-
ing political power of Catholics and the
foreign-born by an extension
of the residency period for
naturalization to as long as twenty-one
years. In 1853 the Order embarked on an
ambitious national expan-
sion program, and the following year its
leaders decided to enter poli-
tics as the independent American
party.10
In general the Order was stronger in the
East, but Ohio was one
western state where it wielded great
power. By the summer of 1854,
despite only a brief existence in the
state, the Know-Nothings consti-
tuted a factor to be reckoned with
politically, and they played a cru-
cial role in the People's party victory
that fall.11 In the three months
8. Ashley to Chase, January 21, 1855,
Chase Papers, LC; Ashtabula Sentinel, Janu-
ary 15, May 24, 1855; Chase to [Joseph
R. Williams?], January 12, 1855, Chase Papers,
LC.
9. For the origins of the Know-Nothings,
see Charles Deshler to R. M. Guilford,
January 20, 1855 (copy), Charles Deshler Papers,
Rutgers University; New York Her-
ald, December
20, 1854; New York Tribune, May 29, 1855; and Thomas R. Whitney, A
Defense of the American Policy (New York, 1856), 280-85.
10. For the Know-Nothings' appeal, see
Michael F. Holt, "The Politics of Impa-
tience: The Origins of Know
Nothingism," Journal of American History, 60 (Septem-
ber, 1973), 309-31.
11. New York Times, October 20,
1854; G. W. Lewis to Cyrus Carpenter, October 1,
1854, Cyrus Carpenter Papers, State
Historical Society of Iowa; Sidney D. Maxwell, Di-
ary, January 10, 1855, Cincinnati
Historical Society. Attributing the 1854 results to
"Anti-Nebraska, Know-Nothings, and
a general disgust with the powers that be," fu-
ture president Rutherford B. Hayes
concluded: "How people do hate Catholics, and
what a happiness it was to thousands to
have a chance to show it in what seemed a
lawful and patriotic manner." Hayes
to Sardis Birchard, October 13, 1854, Charles
Salmon P. Chase
9
following the October election, the
American organization more than
doubled its membership in the state. In
January, 1855, the Order's
national secretary reported that there
were 830 councils in the state,
and a month later reliable sources
placed its strength at 120,000 vot-
ers.12 Membership still had
not peaked. By June, according to the
official report of Thomas Spooner,
president of the Order in Ohio,
there were 1,195 councils in the state
with an aggregate membership
of 130,000.13
Chase was cognizant of the
Know-Nothings' contribution to the
opposition's 1854 triumph. He also
believed that a majority of the Or-
der's members were sincerely
antislavery, and thus he hoped that
the cooperation which the People's party
had brought about be-
tween the nativists and other
anti-Democratic groups would continue.
In the wake of the Order's spectacular
growth, Know-Nothing
leaders, in contrast, increasingly spoke
of nominating an independent
ticket in 1855. Without question, by the
spring of 1855 a majority of
the 1854 anti-Nebraska voters had joined
the American party. "I am
very, very sorry that the K.N. trouble
has come upon us," a worried
Chase told Oran Follett, the editor of
the Ohio State Journal. "But
for this the sky of the future would be
clear." In an editorial directed
to the Chase men, the Cleveland Express,
a Know-Nothing organ,
concisely summarized the situation in
the state: "Why, gentlemen,
you can't select enough prominent
'Republicans' in Ohio to act as
delegates to the [state] convention,
without having in it a majority of
Know Nothings."14
Because he naturally wished to be the
candidate of a united oppo-
sition party, the former Ohio Senator
tried to carve a middle course
between repudiating the Know-Nothings
and joining the nativist Or-
der. He was chagrined when the Ohio
Columbian, the Free Demo-
cratic organ edited by E. S. Hamlin,
launched an attack on the
Know-Nothings after the 1854 election.
Although he contributed
heavily to the paper's finances and
exercised considerable personal
influence over Hamlin, Chase did not
strictly control the Columbian.
Nevertheless, it was widely regarded
throughout the state as his
Richard Williams (ed.), Diary and
Letters of Rutherford B. Haves (Columbus, 5 vols.,
1922), v. 1, 470.
12. Ohio Statesman, March 8, 1855;
Ohio Columbian, June 12, 1855; Deshler to H.
Crane, January 15, 1855 (copy),
Deshler Papers. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated,
citations to newspapers and manuscripts
are for the year 1855.
13. Spooner's report, dated June 3, is
given in the Cincinnati Commercial, June 8.
14. Chase to Follett, January 1,
"Follett Papers," 62; Cleveland Express, quoted in
Ohio Columbian, May 30.
10 OHIO HISTORY
personal organ, and therefore he was
anxious to disassociate himself
from its assaults on the Know-Nothings.
He tried to moderate its
course in order to promote harmony among
the opposition. In No-
vember he advised Hamlin not to say
anything against the nativist
Order: "Wait until it becomes
necessary & it may never become nec-
essary." Chase repeated this advice
several times during the follow-
ing weeks. "It seems to me you have
said enough agst the Kns, and
had better hold up," he wrote in
February. "My idea is fight no-
body who does not fight us." In
another letter, Chase endorsed
many of his correspondents' criticism of
the Columbian's repeated
denunciations of the Know-Nothings as
proslavery. He feared such
aspersions would weaken the influence of
antislavery men in the or-
ganization and "make the members of
the order less disposed than
they would be otherwise to cooperate
with outsiders on the Slavery
issue." Chase assured Follett that
the attacks on the Know-Nothings
by Hamlin and other associates did not
meet his approval. "My
opinion is that it is best to wait and
see, and not precipitate by cen-
sure in advance, a course which prudence
and conciliation may pre-
vent."15
In addition to urging Hamlin and others
to moderate their criti-
cism, Chase sought to devise a common
set of principles upon which
the two groups could unite. Noting that
the antislavery idea needed
to be kept "paramount," he
urged that "an earnest antislavery tone
should be maintained by our press &
that the fire [?] should be sus-
tained." Still, Chase was willing
to trim on nativism in order to pre-
serve the unity of the People's party.
"It would be better if you ad-
mitted that there was some ground for
the uprising of the people
against papal influences & organized
foreignism," he suggested to
Hamlin, "while you might condemn
the secret organization & indis-
criminate proscription on account of
origin or creed." He was particu-
larly anxious not to alienate the
foreign-born voters "who stood
shoulder to shoulder with us in the Anti
Nebraska struggle of last
fall."16 Chase
was not alone in seeking to conciliate the Know-
15. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, November 21,
1854, Private, February 9, January 22,
Chase to A. M. Gangewer, February 15,
Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Follett, January 1,
February 14, "Follett Papers,"
62, 64.
16. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, January 22, Chase
Papers, LC; Chase to Dr. John Paul,
December 27, 1854, Draft, Chase Papers,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania. In his let-
ter to Hamlin, Chase adopted the
transparent pose that he was merely relaying the
suggestions of friends. He was less
ingenuous in his letter to Dr. Paul, in which he as-
serted that in the activities of some
Catholics and foreigners "there has been some-
thing justly censurable & calculated
to provoke the hostility which has embodied it-
self in the Know Nothing
organization."
Salmon P. Chase
11
Nothings without endorsing proscription
of all immigrants. Senator
Benjamin F. Wade agreed that
"hostility to slavery" must be kept in
the political forefront, yet he told
William Schouler, the editor of the
Cincinnati Gazette, that
"every intelligent man knows full well that
our country has suffered much from the
too great influence of foreign-
ers, ignorant of our institutions &
that their power for evil ought to be
abridged . . "17
Not all pronounced antislavery men
shared Chase's willingness to
unite with the Know-Nothings. One of
Chase's correspondents, for
example, opposed "going into
partnership" with the Americans in
making nominations. The nativists could
support the ticket if they
wanted, "but let us have no
entangling alliances." Another Chase or-
ganizer regretted that the Know-Nothings
could not be met in an
open fight: "I think there should
eventually be no compromise with
them, until they abandon their
organization, and their bigoted
creed."18 The leading
voice against any union with the Know-
Nothings was Giddings' mouthpiece, the Ashtabula
Sentinel. "We
scorn the idea of a secret political
organization," read one editorial,
for it promoted "deception,"
"false dealing," "trickery and unfair-
ness." Terming nativism
"unjust, illiberal and un-American," the pa-
per announced, "We will never unite
with such a party, in any com-
pact whatever." It called for no
union at the fusion convention unless
the Know-Nothings abandoned their
organization and endorsed Re-
publican doctrines. A communication from
Giddings was equally
hard-nosed. Opposing any compromise, he
called for "a Republican
Convention, a Republican nomination,
without surrender, without
compromise." When Chase upbraided
Giddings for the tone of the
Sentinel, the Ohio congressman rejoined that it was imperative
that
they have a Republican convention that
did not recognize the exis-
tence of the Know-Nothings.19
Most Free-Soilers nevertheless rallied
behind Chase's candidacy.
By January 1, over six months before the
state convention, a number
17. Wade to Schouler, May 3,
Confidential, William Schouler Papers, Massachu-
setts Historical Society. Wade's brother
Edward, an even more zealous antislavery
man, though he criticized Know-Nothing
bigotry, embraced several nativist reforms,
including a church property law, a
literacy test for voting, and "requiring a real renun-
ciation of foreign allegiance." Edward Wade to Albert Riddle, January 18, Janes Col-
lection, Henry E. Huntington Library.
18. Aaron Pardee to Chase, May 17, W. H.
Nichol to Chase, July 7, Chase Papers,
LC; O. White to Oran Follett, May 3,
Chase Papers, HSP.
19. Ashtabula Sentinel, April 26,
May 10, 31, letter signed "G." [Giddings], May 17;
Giddings to Chase, May 1, Chase Papers, HSP. Also see
Giddings to Julian, May 30,
Giddings-Julian Papers.
12 OHIO HISTORY
of newspapers were actively promoting
his candidacy. The most
prominent were the Ohio Columbian and
the Toledo Blade. Gid-
dings, in contrast, initially criticized
the Chase boom; he argued that
there were a number of good men
available and did not want to see
the opposition splinter over the
question of men. By the end of Feb-
ruary, however, as Know-Nothing
hostility to Chase became mani-
fest, the veteran antislavery
congressman threw his support to the
former senator. Wade lent his influence
as well. Chase also had
strength among the Germans, whom he had
long courted and who
were frightened by nativism, and among
antislavery Whigs, particu-
larly on the Western Reserve. Backed by
this coalition, Chase was
by early spring the only serious
candidate of the antislavery forces.20
Other elements of the opposition,
however, were less than ecstatic
at the prospect of Chase heading the
anti-Democratic ticket. Almost
simultaneously with the beginning of the
Chase movement, a group
of opposition leaders promoted another
Free-Soiler, Jacob Brinker-
hoff, as a suitable alternative
candidate. A former Democratic con-
gressman, Brinkerhoff had played a
leading role in the original intro-
duction of the Wilmot Proviso. Whatever
the validity of his later
claim to have been the Proviso's real
author, he enjoyed a reputation
as a notable antislavery leader, and he
had been prominent in the
opposition to the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise.21
Although Brinkerhoff eventually became
popularly identified as
the Know-Nothing candidate, the initial
movement on his behalf be-
gan outside the Order. R. P. L. Baber,
an associate editor of the Ohio
State Journal, the old Whig organ, proposed the idea immediately
after the October 1854 election. He
secured an important ally in
Congressman-elect John Sherman, a
resident of Brinkerhoff's home-
town who, though not a member,
definitely sympathized with the
Order. Follett, while publicly neutral,
privately aided the Brinker-
hoff movement as well. Joseph Medill of
the Cleveland Leader also
extended support, though he was less
desirous of nominating
Brinkerhoff than he was of defeating
Chase, whose selection he be-
lieved would imperil the chances of
victory. Stressing the necessity of
cooperating with the Know-Nothings, he
warned Follett: "We must
20. Chase to [Joseph R. Williams?],
January 12, Chase Papers, LC; Giddings' corre-
spondence to Ashtabula Sentinel, February 1,
March 1; Bradford, "Background and
Formation of the Republican Party in Ohio," 144.
21. For Brinkerhoffs role in the
introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, see Eric Foner,
"The Wilmot Proviso
Revisited," Journal of American History, 56 (September, 1969),
262-65.
Salmon P. Chase
13
check the movement of the Chase clique
or they will get us into a
snarl."22
Despite such support, Brinkerhoffs
candidacy became closely
tied to Know-Nothingism. American
leaders actively pushed his can-
didacy within the Order, in part because
he was a member, and in
part because they recognized the
necessity that the candidate be
satisfactory to antislavery men. Early
in 1855, Congressman Lewis D.
Campbell, the most influential
Know-Nothing in the state, undertook
to marshall support for Brinkerhoff's
nomination, and a subsequent
secret meeting of Know-Nothing leaders
designated the former con-
gressman as the Order's choice.23 Thus,
long before a fusion conven-
tion had even been called, the struggle
for the gubernatorial nomina-
tion had narrowed to Chase and
Brinkerhoff.
The date of this convention became a
point of dispute between the
Chase men and the Know-Nothings. Fearful
of a separate Know-
Nothing nomination before the fusion
convention assembled, a num-
ber of Chase's supporters advocated that
the convention be held
early in the year. The Know-Nothings, on
the other hand, were anx-
ious to delay the convention as long as
possible. Campbell wanted it
held in August, which would give the
Order time to perfect its organ-
ization, recruit more members, and, if
it wanted, make separate nomi-
nations before the fusion meeting.24
Finally in May a majority of the
state committee appointed by the 1854
convention issued a call for a
Republican convention in Columbus on
July 13. The call was worded
to include all opposition elements. It
directed the "independent anti-
Nebraska voters of Ohio, who
participated in the glorious triumph of
last year, and such others as may
sympathize with them," to elect
delegates to a convention to nominate
candidates for governor and
the other state offices to be elected in
the fall.25 A few antislavery
men, who wanted a more exclusive
convention, were unhappy that
the Know-Nothings had been included in
the call, but its publica-
22. R. P. L. Baber to Sherman,
Confidential, October 16, 1854, May 5, June 28,
Sherman Papers; Ohio State Journal, May
10, 18; E. S. Hamlin to Chase, November 10,
1854, Chase Papers, HSP; Joseph Medill
to Follett, December 20, 1854, Confidential,
"Follett Papers," 77-78; J. H.
Coulter to Chase, May 27, Chase Papers, LC.
23. Campbell to Schouler, February 15,
Schouler Papers; Ohio Columbian, May 2,
9; Cincinnati Commercial, May 12.
24. Ashtabula Sentinel, January
18, 25; Chase to Follett, February 14, "Follett Pa-
pers," 65; Giddings to Chase, April
10, Chase Papers, HSP.
25. The call is in the Ohio State
Journal, May 28. It specified the ratio of representa-
tion for the counties and recommended
that delegates be elected in each county on
July 7. No doubt because some members of
the committee refused to sign the call,
only the committee chairman's (who was a
Know-Nothing) and the secretary's names
were affixed to the call.
14 OHIO HISTORY
tion signified the agreement of the
Free-Soilers, under Chase's lead,
to join the Know-Nothings in a fusion
convention.
Despite the appearance of this call,
neither side was unqualifiedly
committed to union. Although he agreed
to participate in this con-
vention, Giddings nonetheless asserted
that if the Know-Nothings
managed to control it, the antislavery
men should bolt. Other Free-
Soilers concurred in this strategy. One
of Chase's leading supporters
declared, "We had better have it
known informally to the Conven-
tion or the Members who compose it that
we will not abide its action
unless you are nominated."26 As
a guarantee that the convention
would act properly, several antislavery
men, including Ashley, urged
that a mass meeting also be called to
meet in Columbus on the same
day. If the fusion convention nominated
Chase, this mass meeting
could ratify his selection; if, on the
other hand, the Know-Nothings
controlled matters, then this meeting
could, in the words of one
Free-Soiler, "proceed at once to
an independent organization and ac-
tion." Ashley, who believed that a
mass meeting "can certainly do
no harm & may save us,"
actually preferred that it meet before July
13 and nominate Chase on the 1852
Free-Soil platform. This action
might "compell that Convention to
adopt our men and platform," he
commented, "and if not have our
friends either break up the Con-
vention or withdraw and Resolve to
sustain the Ticket" named by
the mass assembly.27
Several advocates of independent action
contended that a Repub-
lican ticket free of any Know-Nothing
taint would triumph in the fall.
Giddings, for example, argued that such
a move would ensure the
support of 30,000 foreign-born voters
who supported the anti-
Nebraska ticket the previous fall.
Others advanced the even more
far-fetched argument that the
Democratic nominee, William Medill,
who was not a strong Nebraska man,
would withdraw in Chase's fa-
vor if there were a separate
Know-Nothing ticket. The Sentinel pre-
dicted that less than half of the
members of the secret Order would
support a separate American ticket in
any event. Not misled by these
assessments, Chase knew that his best
chance for victory was as
head of a single opposition party and
so, while he was careful not to
pledge in advance to support the ticket
nominated on July 13, he
26. Letter signed "G."
[Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, May 17; Giddings to Chase,
May 1, J. H. Coulter to Chase, May 27,
Chase Papers, LC.
27. Ashley to Chase, May 29, June 16, P.
Bliss to Chase, June 6, Chase Papers, LC;
N. S. Townshend to Chase, June 9, Chase
Papers, HSP; Richard Mott to Giddings,
June 2, Joshua R. Giddings Papers, Ohio
Historical Society.
Salmon P. Chase 15 |
|
used his influence to block the plan of Ashley, Hamlin, and others to hold an antislavery convention prior to the Republican convention.28 Chase's support for cooperation with the Know-Nothings was more qualified than he acknowledged. To James Shepherd Pike, an associate editor of the New York Tribune, he specified certain condi- tions required for successful fusion: both sides had to be "fairly rep-
28. Ashtabula Sentinel, May 10, June 7; letter signed "G." [Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, May 17; J. H. Coulter to Chase, May 27, Ashley to Chase, May 29, Ralph Leete to Chase, June 18, Chase Papers, LC; Medina Gazette quoted in Ashtabula Sen- tinel, May 10; Toledo Blade, April 23, June 22. |
16 OHIO HISTORY
resented" on the ticket, the
platform had to oppose any more slave
states and slave territory, and the
ticket had to be "nominated by a
peoples Convention fairly
constituted." He was adamant that Know-
Nothing tenets not be made a test of
nomination; the bond of union
must be anti-Nebraska principles, not
nativism. Chase blithely an-
nounced that he was quite willing to
support Brinkerhoff-provided
that he strictly represented "pure
and simple . . . opposition to Slav-
ery extension & slavery
domination." If his triumph would be
viewed as the victory of an element
other than anti-Nebraska senti-
ment, then he could not support him,
Chase declared, secure in the
knowledge that these preconditions could
never be met.29 In es-
sence, Chase stipulated that any result
except his nomination would
be irrefutable evidence of unfair
dealing by the Know-Nothings, and
consequently the antislavery men would
not be bound to support the
ticket.
Chase's opponents perceived the
implications of these terms.
Brinkerhoff, for example, commented that
"the peculiar friends of
Mr. C. have about made up their minds to
'rule or ruin.'" Follett was
equally critical. He warned that the
position of the Free-Soilers, if
persisted in, ended all chance for
fusion, and he condemned the at-
titude of Chase's friends "that any
result contrary to their wishes
must be taken as the secret work
of the order: they object to secret
dictation, and fall into [the] mistake
of open dictation!" Angered by
the threat of the antislavery men to
bolt the convention if Chase were
not nominated, the exasperated Columbus
editor momentarily an-
nounced that he would no longer work for
fusion with "such imprac-
tical materials." The "course
of your friends is open," he repri-
manded Chase, "but it is not free
and fair."30
Chase supporters in turn denounced the
tactics of their opponents,
particularly the threatened nomination
of a Know-Nothing ticket
prior to the Republican convention,
which would end any chance for
a successful fusion. Chase alleged that
the Americans wanted "ex-
clusive selection of the ticket, leaving
to a peoples Convention no
function but that of ratification."
If the July 13 convention endorsed
a ticket already selected by the
Know-Nothings acting independent-
ly, the Republican party would have no
separate identity. With good
reason Chase feared that the Germans
would never support such a
29. Chase to James Shepherd Pike, March
22, James Shepherd Pike Papers, Uni-
versity of Maine; Chase to Campbell May 25, (copy),
June 2, Chase Papers, LC.
30. Brinkerhoff to Follett, May 21,
"Follett Papers," 75; Follett to Chase, May 2, Pri-
vate, Chase Papers, LC.
Salmon P. Chase
17
ticket even with the Republican label,
and a number of longtime po-
litical associates as well warned him
that they personally would never
swallow such a dose. One of Chase's
close advisers commented:
"The K.N.'s must not attempt
to forestal, or dictate to the rest of this
. . party. Such a move would be very
foolish, and fatal to their own
aims and objects."31
While Chase scotched plans for independent
action within the
Free-Soil ranks, he relied on Campbell
to prevent any similar move
by the Know-Nothings. The two men had
never been close personal-
ly. Chase's polished, unemotional, and
indirect approach contrasted
sharply with Campbell's blustering and
agitated manner; whereas
Chase sought to avoid confrontation,
Campbell's soaring vanity and
contentious temperament kept him
embroiled in never-ending feuds
and controversies.32 Both
realized, however, that at this juncture
each was in a position to render
valuable assistance to the other.
Since the fall of 1854, Campbell had
been running for Speaker of the
next House of Representatives, which
would assemble the coming
December. In this crisis Chase
skillfully exploited his fellow Ohio-
an's well-known national ambitions.
Subtly implying that Campbell's
assistance in promoting the Republican
movement in the state would
secure Free-Soil backing in the
Speakership contest, Chase urged
the nativist congressman to exert his
influence to prevent any separate
Know-Nothing nominations.33
Chase was particularly alarmed when word
leaked out that at a se-
cret meeting in the Cincinnati offices
of the Ohio & Mississippi Rail-
road, a group of Know-Nothing leaders
along with some outsiders
agreed on a ticket to be presented at
the July 13 convention. Late in
life Follett claimed that he, along with
Schouler of the Gazette and
George Benedict of the Cleveland Herald,
all of whom were actively
promoting union of the opposition,
attended this conference in an
unsuccessful attempt to prevent any
nominations. As part of the proc-
ess to select a state ticket, the
American State Executive Committee
had already instructed the local
councils to send their nominations
31. Chase to Pike, March 22, Pike
Papers; James T. Worthington to Chase, April 22,
W. H. Nichols to Chase, April 14, Chase
Papers, LC.
32. For Campbell's character, see the
Cincinnati Commercial, April 18, May 3; note
by Schouler, n.d., on the back of
Campbell to Schouler, July 6, 1852, Schouler Papers;
T. M. Tweed to Chase, October 25, Chase
Papers, LC. His career is sketched in
William E. Van Home, "Lewis D.
Campbell and the Know Nothings," Ohio History,
76 (Autumn, 1967), 202-21,
33. Chase to Campbell, May 29, June 2,
Chase to "Gentlemen," Draft, October 23,
Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Campbell,
November 8, Lewis D. Campbell Papers, Ohio
Historical Society.
18 OHIO HISTORY
for state candidates to the State
Council, which was to meet in Cleve-
land at the beginning of June.
Apparently one purpose in naming a
ticket at the Cincinnati meeting was to
influence the balloting in the
lodges, for nativist leaders
immediately transmitted this slate to local
officers. In publicizing the action of
the Executive Committee, the
Cleveland Leader predicted that
there would be "a grand smash-up
at Columbus" if the Know-Nothings
persisted in their schemes.34
Attention focused on the upcoming State
Council. One of Camp-
bell's correspondents, with an eye to
promoting harmony, pro-
nounced the call for the Cleveland
meeting "a great mistake" and
urged that it be revoked. In a rather
acrimonious correspondence,
Chase pressed Campbell hard to block
any nominations at Cleve-
land, and the latter finally agreed to
attend the State Council meeting
and work against any independent
action.35 After a long debate, the
State Council made no nominations and
resolved to go into the July
13 convention. The Know-Nothings did
not commit themselves to
support Chase, however, and the
Cincinnati Commercial contended
prior to the State Council meeting that
although no nominations
would be made, the secret ticket
selected earlier in Cincinnati would
be pushed by nativist delegates at the
July convention. The State
Council agreed to reassemble in August,
after the Republican ticket
had been named.36
The State Council also adopted a
platform. The Ohio American
platform contained several cardinal
nativist doctrines. It called for a
twenty-one-year residency requirement
for naturalization, the aboli-
tion of foreign military companies,
lauded the public school system,
and denounced all attempts to exclude
the Bible from the public
schools. At the same time it endorsed
"unlimited Freedom of Reli-
gion disconnected with politics-Hostility to ecclesiastical
influences
upon the affairs of Government,"
and equal rights for all foreign-born
who were thoroughly Americanized and
owed no temporal alle-
giance because of their religion to an
authority higher than the Con-
stitution, an obvious reference to
Catholicism. In a circular to the lo-
34. Chase to Follett, May 4,
"Follett Papers," 74; Follett, "The Coalition of 1855,"
Alfred E. Lee, History of the City of Columbus (New
York, 2 vols., 1892), v. 2, 431-33;
Joseph Medill to Follett, April 18,
"Follett Papers," 71; Cleveland Leader, quoted in
Cincinnati Commercial, May 12.
The ticket named by the Cincinnati meeting is given in
the Cincinnati Commercial, May
12.
35. B. Stanton to Campbell, May 14,
Campbell Papers; Chase to Campbell, May 29,
June 2, Campbell to Chase, May 28, 31,
June 15, Chase Papers, LC.
36. Campbell to Schouler, June 26,
(Private), Schouler Papers; letter signed "AN
AMERICAN," Ohio State Journal, October
5; William Gibson to Samuel Galloway,
April 23, Samuel Galloway Papers, Ohio
Historical Society.
Salmon P. Chase 19 |
|
cal councils before the State Council met, Spooner endorsed the propriety of allowing foreign-born Protestants to join the society. "It is not men of Foreign birth that we war against," the president of the Ohio Order claimed. "Our arms are, and should only be, directed against Foreignism and Romanism-those who should subvert our Institutions, and place our country under the yoke of Rome." The State Council did not adopt this change, although it urged its dele- gates to the National Council to work for this reform. Still, it was ap- parent that anti-Catholicism constituted the main thrust of the Or- der's appeal. The American organization also partially dropped its |
20 OHIO HISTORY
secrecy and substituted an honorary
obligation for its system of
oaths. One plank dealt with the slavery
issue. It declared slavery a
local and not a national institution,
opposed its extension into any ter-
ritory or the admission of any more
slave states, and demanded the
"immediate redress" of the
great wrongs of the repeal of the Missou-
ri Compromise and the election frauds in
Kansas. Despite the ambi-
guity of this last point, the
Know-Nothing platform endorsed the
propositions that Chase specified
earlier in discussing the grounds
for fusion.37
The Ohio State Journal was
delighted with the Know-Nothings'
action, which it hoped would end
"all jealousy and distrust" in the
opposition ranks. "We see no
barrier to a full and cordial union of all
the true anti-Nebraska friends of Reform
in Ohio. The skies are
bright." Giddings was likewise
optimistic following the Cleveland
meeting. In predicting that Chase would
be nominated, he declared,
"I think the K Ns will give us no
more trouble in this State."38
The Cleveland meeting was the critical
turning point in the drive to
unite the opposition in Ohio in a new
party. For several months be-
forehand, each side had attempted to
intimidate the other. Gid-
dings defended the defiant tone of the Sentinel
on the grounds that
if the Know-Nothings felt that they were
strong, they would make
separate nominations. One purpose of the
talk among the Chase fac-
tion of a bolt and a new convention was
to coerce the Know-Nothings
into adopting an acceptable course. This
strategy succeeded bril-
liantly. The Know-Nothings suffered a
failure of nerve. The question
remains why the American party's
leaders, who had been confident
and even arrogant earlier in the year,
abandoned their plan to dictate
the fusion ticket.39
Several factors were critical in the
Know-Nothings' decision at
Cleveland. Undoubtedly important was the
influence of Campbell,
whose personal aspirations led him to
oppose separate nominations.
He probably received valuable aid in his
efforts from Spooner, who,
though not a supporter of Chase, was
personally friendly with the
Free-Soil leader and was overly
susceptible to flattery. Before long,
37. The platform is given in the Ohio
State Journal, June 7, and the Cincinnati Com-
mercial, June 8. For Spooner's address before the State Council,
see the Commercial,
June 8.
38. Ohio State Journal, June 7; Giddings
to John Gorham Palfrey, June 29, John
Gorham Palfrey Papers, Harvard
University.
39. Giddings to Chase, April 10, Chase
Papers, HSP. Another Chase organizer de-
clared, "The course of ... many
Free Soilers for the last few weeks has intimidated
the K. Ns." J. H. Coulter to Chase,
May 27, Chase Papers, LC. Also see Galloway to
Campbell, June 23, Private, Campbell
Papers.
Salmon P. Chase
21
Spooner would become one of Chase's most
faithful adherents. As a
nativist and antislavery man, Spooner
anxiously wanted a united op-
position party established. Before the
State Council met, he warned
his fellow nativists that a split in the
anti-Democratic forces assured a
Democratic victory in the fall.40
But probably the most critical reason
for the change in attitude
among the Know-Nothings was the outcome
of the Cincinnati munici-
pal election in April. With
anti-Catholic feeling rampant in that com-
munity, the Know-Nothings easily
dominated the anti-Democratic
opposition in the Queen City. Confident
of their power, they nomi-
nated a disreputable ticket, headed by
James Taylor, the rabble-
rousing editor of the Cincinnati Times,
for the city election. Taylor's
nomination not only disgusted
conservatives in the city, his strident
and indiscriminate attacks on foreign
influence alienated Protestant
Germans who had cast opposition ballots
in 1854.41 The municipal
campaign, which was one of the most
bitter in the city's history, pit-
ted the foreign-born against militant
nativists and greatly exacer-
bated existing tensions. By election
day, feelings were at a fever
pitch. With imported nativist toughs
roaming the city, fighting even-
tually broke out in the German wards
between immigrants and
Know-Nothings. The violence continued
sporadically for three days,
and a Know-Nothing attempt the night
after the election to storm the
German section of the city left several
members of the mob dead. In
addition, Know-Nothings destroyed the
ballots in two heavily Ger-
man wards to prevent their being
tallied. With both sides claiming
victory and issuing threats, election
officials finally declared the
Democratic mayoral candidate victorious.42
Republican editor Jo-
seph Medill, long an advocate of using
the Catholic issue to gain the
support of Protestant immigrants, looked
on with dismay as Germans
were driven back into the arms of the
Democrats. He bluntly charac-
40. Letter signed "G."
[Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, June 21; Follett, "The Coali-
tion of 1855," 431. Medill claimed
that making "such a weak brother as Thos Spooner
at the head of the K.N. order is a
horrible political blunder." Joseph Medill to
Follett, April 18, Oran Follett Papers,
Cincinnati Historical Society.
41. Hayes to Sardis Birchard, April 8, Diary
and Letters of Rutherford B. Hayes, v.
1, 481-82; Gazette and Commercial,
quoted in the Cincinnati Enquirer, March 24;
Cincinnati Enquirer, March 27,
28, 29, 31; letters signed "Foreign Protestant" and
"German Protestant," in the Enquirer,
March 29, 31.
42. The riot is fully covered in the
Cincinnati Gazette, Commercial, and Enquirer,
April 3-6. Also see William Baughin,
"Bullets and Ballots: The Election Day Riots of
1855," Bulletin of the
Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 21 (October, 1963),
267-73.
22 OHIO HISTORY
terized the Cincinnati Know-Nothing
leaders as "knaves and ass-
es."43
The rioting was an even more serious
blow to the state American
party than Taylor's defeat. It made a
mockery of the party's image as
a reform party and discredited it with
a sizable segment of the pub-
lic. Campbell tried to minimize the
importance of the Cincinnati re-
sult, but its damage was obvious.
Know-Nothing leaders' confidence
in their ability to carry the state
without antislavery allies suddenly
evaporated. Giddings' informants
reported that the Order's state
leaders viewed the Cincinnati election
as a disaster to the nativist
cause, and that in its wake they had
abandoned the idea of making
separate nominations.44
Hard on the heels of the Cleveland
meeting came the National
Council in Philadelphia. When the
Council took up the question of a
national platform, an acrimonious
debate ensued between Southern-
ers and a group of northern antislavery
men. After eight days of futile
wrangling, the delegates adopted a
southern-inspired statement
which upheld the Kansas-Nebraska Act. A
majority of northern del-
egates, including a unanimous Ohio
delegation, voted against the
slavery plank. The next morning, these
northern delegates approved
an address condemning the action of the
National Council. Every
Ohio delegate signed the protest. Some
of those present openly
called for the formation of a new
party. In accord with this sentiment,
one of the seceding Ohio Americans sent
a telegram to an anti-
Democratic convention then assembled in
Cleveland which closed:
"May God eternally d- -n slavery
and Doughfaceism."45
The national schism further sapped the
Ohio Know-Nothings'
confidence, while simultaneously it
engendered a more favorable
attitude toward reaching agreement with
the antislavery forces.
Chase's optimism soared in the
aftermath of the Cleveland and
Philadelphia meetings. He told Pike
that "the political atmosphere
has cleared somewhat," and went on
to predict that Know-
Nothingism in Ohio would
"gracefully give itself up to die." Believ-
ing that victory was within his grasp,
the former Senator adopted a
conciliatory tone toward the
Know-Nothings. Most members were
43. Joseph Medill to Follett, April 18,
Follett Papers.
44. Campbell to Isaac Strohm, April 21,
Isaac Strohm Papers, Ohio Historical Socie-
ty; letter signed "G."
[Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, June 21; Ashtabula Sentinel,
June 7.
45. For the proceedings of the National
Council, see Samuel Bowles' reports in the
New York Tribune, June 6-16, and
his account published in the same paper, October
31.
Salmon P. Chase 23
"honest men . . . sincerely opposed
to slavery," he asserted, who
"adhere but slightly to their
order," especially since the adoption of
the Philadelphia platform. Chase was
certain that the platform of the
July 13 convention would not
"contain a squint towards Knism." By
the end of June, he predicted to James
Grimes that he would be
elected by a majority of at least
20,000.46
Nevertheless, the results of the
election of delegates in the first
week of July disquieted the
Free-Soilers. In spite of all the difficulties
the American party had recently
experienced, it displayed remarka-
ble strength in the voting for county
delegates. When the July 13 con-
vention assembled in Columbus, all sides
agreed that a majority of
the delegates were Know-Nothings.47
Any triumph by Chase and
the antislavery forces could be achieved
only with nativist votes.
Although the Free-Soilers did not
control a majority of the dele-
gates, the Chase forces had several
advantages. One was their un-
shakable commitment to Chase's
candidacy. Led by Giddings, anti-
slavery men argued that Chase's
nomination would make an "issue of
Slavery and freedom more distinctly the
question" in the upcoming
election than would any other choice. In
their eyes, Chase's selec-
tion would assure that antislavery was
the party's paramount princi-
ple. They refused to consider
suggestions that Chase and Brinker-
hoff both yield to another individual.
The Know-Nothings' resolve,
on the other hand, was weakened by the
defection of some of the
northern delegates to Chase and by the
eagerness of their leaders,
particularly Spooner and Campbell, to
promote harmony in the con-
vention.48
The composition of the Cincinnati
delegation also gave Chase's
prospects an unexpected boost.
Politicians were especially sensitive
to the situation in Hamilton County, the
state's most heavily popu-
lated county. The opposition was badly
factionalized in the county,
however, as divisions between the
Know-Nothings and Whigs on
the one hand, and Germans and old
Liberty party men on the other,
threatened to send rival delegations to
Columbus. After what Ruth-
erford B. Hayes described as some
"very squally times," negotia-
46. Chase to Pike, June 20, Pike Papers;
Chase to Grimes, June 27, Chase to [N.S.
Townshend?], June 21, Chase Papers, HSP;
C. K. Watson to Chase, June 25, Chase
Papers, LC.
47. Ohio State Journal, July 13,
14; R. B. Pullan, Origins of the Republican Party,
Ohio Historical Society; letter signed
"AN AMERICAN," Ohio State Journal, Octo-
ber 5; Address of Thomas Spooner, July
23, Cincinnati Commercial, July 24.
48. Ashtabula Sentinel, April 19;
Campbell to Schouler, May 22 (Strictly Confiden-
tial), Schouler Papers; Follett,
"The Coalition of 1855," 432-33; Spooner to Editor of
the Cincinnati Times, quoted in Ohio
State Journal, July 12.
24 OHIO HISTORY
tions among the various factions led to
acceptance of a single delega-
tion which represented a wide variety
of political viewpoints yet
was largely composed of moderates.
Chase had disproportionate
strength among these delegates, as
supporters of two local candidates
who were seeking nominations for lesser
state offices agreed to vote
for Chase in exchange for support in
these other races.49
The greatest advantage of the Chase
forces at Columbus, however,
was the determination of his more ultra
supporters to bolt if their fa-
vorite were rejected. To reinforce this
threat, the old Independent
Democrat State Central Committee, which
had been moribund since
1853, issued a call for a mass
convention on July 13 to ratify the nomi-
nations or take appropriate action. On
the day of the fusion Republi-
can convention, perhaps as many as 400
outsiders were present, ready
to give Chase an independent nomination
if he failed to receive the
Republican designation.50 Opposition
leaders, aware that Chase and
his followers had bolted parties
several times in the past, knew that
this was no idle threat.
As the date of the convention neared,
Columbus overflowed with
visitors. Giddings journeyed to the
capital several days early for con-
sultations, and Chase was also present
beforehand. In hotel rooms,
parlors, and on the streets men
exchanged opinions about the proba-
ble course of the convention. One
moment Chase's stock seemed up,
the next moment down. The Know-Nothing
delegates caucused sep-
arately Thursday night, but failed to
reach any agreement; those
from the southern counties, in
particular, voiced a strong desire that
Chase be defeated. By the time the
convention assembled, excite-
ment was intense.51
On Friday the thirteenth, at 10:30 in
the morning, the first Ohio
Republican state convention convened in
the Town Street Methodist
Church. The morning session was devoted
to the appointment of
49. Hayes to William H. Gibson, June 18,
23, 25 (copies), Hayes to Lucy Webb
Hayes, June 24, Rutherford B. Hayes
Papers, Hayes Memorial Library; Pullan, Origins
of the Republican Party; Chase to [?], June 23, Salmon P. Chase Papers,
Cincinnati His-
torical Society. Because Chase was a
resident of Cincinnati, overwhelming opposition
to his nomination among the Hamilton
County delegates would have hurt his chances.
50. Ashtabula Sentinel, June 28,
July 12; Giddings to Chase, May 1, Chase Papers,
HSP; R. P. L. Baber to Sherman, June 28,
Sherman Papers. Chase was secretly in-
volved in preparing plans for
independent action if the July 13 convention did not nom-
inate him. See J. H. Coulter to Chase,
June 1, Chase Papers, LC. The Ohio State Jour-
nal, June 29, censured this action by the antislavery
element as "calculated to repel
instead of inspiring confidence."
51. See Giddings' history in the Ashtabula
Sentinel, July 19, and the account of the
Cincinnati Commercial's reporter
(probably Murat Halstead), July 14. A number of
Know-Nothing delegates, especially from
the northern counties, were for Chase.
Salmon P. Chase
25
committees and listening to speeches.52
Behind the scenes, howev-
er, party managers frantically labored
to preserve the fragile spirit of
goodwill which existed on the convention
floor. Follett, in particular,
sought an acceptable compromise. Prior
to the convention, the Ohio
State Journal sounded the theme of "union, harmony, every thing
for the cause." Follett had been
lukewarm toward Chase's candida-
cy, but he realized that the
Free-Soilers were unbending. Believing
that Chase's rejection would precipitate
the nomination of a third
ticket and thus rupture the
anti-Democratic coalition and ensure de-
feat, the Columbus editor urged Brinkerhoff
to withdraw from the
gubernatorial contest and accept instead
the nomination for Supreme
Court judge. Several weeks earlier, the
idea of running for the judge-
ship had been broached to Chase, but the
antislavery leader had
flatly rejected the proposition.53 An
earlier attempt to get Brinkerhoff
to retire had also failed, but now, with
the battle at hand, he agreed
to Follett's proposal, declaring that he
was not rich enough to be
governor and that the judgeship was more
in line with his talents.
How sincere Brinkerhoff was in this
explanation is unclear, but he
probably recognized that his position
was untenable.54 A week
earlier, Michigan Governor Kinsley
Bingham concluded after an in-
terview that the former congressman expected
to be defeated at the
Columbus convention.55
Brinkerhoffs acceptance of Follett's
offer climaxed the sharp
struggle between the Americans and the
Free-Soilers for control of
the Republican party. With this
stumbling block eliminated, the pro-
ceedings were remarkably harmonious. The
Committee on Resolu-
tions reported a platform that opposed
the further extension of slav-
ery, came out against the admission of
any new slave states, and
condemned the violence in Kansas.
Another plank made a vague ref-
erence to states' rights and a section
on state issues called for re-
trenchment, a just taxation system, and
the election of legislators
from single districts. The platform
passed over nativism in complete
silence. Giddings was the only committee
member to criticize the res-
olutions. He labeled them "milk for
babes," but somewhat incon-
52. The convention proceedings are in
the Ohio State Journal, July 13, 14. Also see
the accounts cited in the previous note.
53. Ohio State Journal, July 12;
Edward Wade to Chase, April 14, Chase Papers,
HSP; James A. Briggs to Chase, May 5,
Pike Papers; letter from Campbell, dated Octo-
ber 1, in the Ohio State Journal, October
2.
54. C. K. Watson to Chase, June 25,
Chase Papers, LC; Follett, "The Coalition of
1855," 431-33; Brinkerhoff, Recollections
of a Lifetime, 92.
55. Bingham to Chase, July 7, Chase
Papers, LC.
26 OHIO HISTORY
gruously admitted that they might be
sufficient and called for their
adoption.56 Campbell spoke in
their favor, and the delegates unani-
mously approved them.
Once the platform had been adopted, the
anti-Chase forces made
one last attempt to prevent his
nomination by proposing that both
Chase and Brinkerhoff be withdrawn.
Chase's supporters shouted
their disapproval, and some threatened
to retire from the hall. Final-
ly the delegates laid the motion on the
table. At this point Campbell
withdrew Brinkerhoffs name as per
arrangement, and Chase was
nominated with 225 votes to 144 for two
last-minute stand-in candi-
dates. In a speech to the delegates
following his nomination, Chase
declared that "there is nothing
before the people but the vital ques-
tion of freedom versus slavery.
..." Know-Nothings received all of
the eight remaining positions on the
state ticket. Most prominent of
these nominees were Brinkerhoff, who was
unanimously selected for
Supreme Court judge, and Thomas Ford,
whose widely publicized
speech at the recent Philadelphia
convention in opposition to the ma-
jority platform helped him win the
nomination for lieutenant gover-
nor. When the nominations were
completed, Spooner urged support
for the entire ticket, and the
convention adjourned. Afterwards
Chase praised his fellow nominees, but
more perceptive was the
comment of one observer that other than
Chase the ticket was a
group of mediocrities and "very
weak."57
Predictably, reaction to the outcome of
the convention varied. The
Ashtabula Sentinel admitted that "the platform might have been
more strongly worded for our
taste," but it pronounced Chase's nom-
ination as "itself a platform that
will not be mistaken by the South."
Chase, too, professed pleasure and
minimized the importance that all
of his running mates were nativists.58
Moderates and old-line Whigs,
56. Giddings wanted stronger resolutions
condemning Pierce for the situation in
Kansas, presumably similar to the
resolutions he drafted which were adopted by a
Republican meeting in Ashtabula County.
Those resolutions declared that, if necessa-
ry, force should be used to defend the
free state men in Kansas, condemned Pierce's
treasonable failure to use the army to
provide such protection, and called on the free
states to protect Kansas emigrants. Ashtabula
Sentinel, June 14.
57. Chase to Kinsley S. Bingham, October
19 (copy), Chase Papers, HSP; William
B. Fairchild to Isaac Strohm, October
12, Isaac Strohm Papers, Cincinnati Historical
Society. One exception to this analysis
might be Brinkerhoff, who had political ability
though his legal attainments were modest.
58. Ashtabula Sentinel, July 19; Chase to Kinsley S. Bingham, October 19
(copy),
Chase Papers, HSP. Favorable comments in
the Ohio press on Chase's nomination are
given in the Ashtabula Sentinel, August
2. The conservative Cleveland Herald hesi-
tated for some time before endorsing
Chase. See Maizlish, Triumph of Sectionalism,
217.
Salmon P. Chase
27
on the other hand, were sorely
disappointed, for Chase was, in the
words of one, "an awfully bitter
pill." Admitting that it had hoped
to avert Chase's selection, the
Cincinnati Gazette frankly com-
mented, "Few of our public men
could have so many bitter preju-
dices to contend with."59
Nor were die-hard
Know-Nothings
pleased with the results. After the
convention adjourned, the Execu-
tive Council met in a room above the
office of the Ohio State Journal
until six in the morning considering a
motion to expel Spooner for not
resisting Chase's selection more
vigorously. The American president
claimed that he loyally supported
Brinkerhoff, but others accused
him of double-dealing. In the end, the
motion lost and Spooner, now
solidly in Chase's camp, remained the
president of the Order in
Ohio.60
Historians have traditionally cited
Chase's nomination as a great
victory over nativism.61 In one sense,
of course, it was. Chase was not
a member of the Order, and the
Know-Nothings had devoted con-
siderable energy during the past months
in a vain effort to prevent his
nomination. But the results of the
convention hardly represented an
unbroken defeat for the Americans. If
the Republican platform con-
tained no nativist planks, it raised
not even a whisper of condemna-
tion of the Know-Nothings either, and
the demands of German
leaders for an endorsement of the
existing naturalization laws were
completely ignored. Moreover, the
Republican and American state
platforms exhibited no significant
differences on the slavery issue. In-
deed, the most radical proposition in
the Republican platform-
opposition to the admission of any more
slave states-had previously
been endorsed by the American party in
Ohio. Nor did the call for
the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law,
long a key issue among Free
Soilers, find a place in the Republican
platform.62 In addition, the
convention paid no heed to the proposal
of some anti-Know-Nothing
leaders to place a foreigner on the
ticket, while the Americans gar-
59. William B. Fairchild to Isaac
Strohm, September 6, Strohm Papers, CinHS;
Cincinnati Gazette, July 14.
60. Pullan, Origins of the Republican
Party; Circular of Thomas Spooner, July 23, in
Ohio State Journal, July 25.
61. Eugene H. Roseboom, "Salmon P.
Chase and the Know Nothings," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, 25 (December, 1938), 349-50. This idea is also implicit
in
Maizlish's analysis, though he views
nativism as ultimately untenable in any event be-
cause of America's liberal tradition. Triumph
of Sectionalism, 214-17.
62. The doctrine of barring any more
slave states might be considered radical, al-
though it enjoyed considerable support
in the North and was becoming standard Re-
publican dogma in many states. The
address of the bolters at Philadelphia did not en-
dorse this principle, but the Ohio
American platform did.
28 OHIO HISTORY
nered eight out of nine nominations,
certainly a significant accom-
plishment.63 If Chase could
go before the electorate unhindered by
a nativist platform, he also was running
on a preponderately Know-
Nothing ticket. As the extensive
nativist participation at Columbus
dramatized, the Republican party in Ohio
rested on a substantial
Know-Nothing foundation.
Much the more numerous faction in the
new party, the Know-
Nothings were confident after the
convention that they would domi-
nate the Republican party. Time
revealed, however, how serious was
their miscalculation. Support for Chase
and the Republican platform
made it impossible for the Know-Nothings
to maintain their distinc-
tive political identity. At its August
meeting the State Council freed
individual members to decide how to
vote; with this decision it was
inevitable that most nativists would be
absorbed into the Republi-
can ranks.64 The intimidation tactics of
the Chase forces, who were
willing to see the Democrats triumph
rather than tolerate Know-
Nothing control of the Republican party,
reaped handsome divi-
dends. Failure to defy the Free-Soilers
doomed the American party
in Ohio to a rapid death. In the final
analysis, the Know-Nothing
leaders sacrificed the party's future
for entirely modest immediate
gains. Their ineptness contrasted
sharply with the brilliance of the
Chase managers, who, by a dazzling
mixture of conciliation and in-
timidation, forced the nativist majority
to abandon their organization
and accept the nomination of one of the
least popular politicians in the
state.
Not all conservatives, either inside or
outside the American Order,
were willing to acquiesce in Chase's
nomination. Discontent was espe-
cially strong in Cincinnati. The
frequently heard prediction before
the convention that Chase's selection
would produce a third ticket
was soon fulfilled. Anti-Chase
dissidents made overtures to J. Scott
Harrison, the Whig-Know-Nothing
congressman from Cincinnati, but
he had no interest in being a
third-party candidate; he contended
that this would only reelect Governor
Medill, the Democratic nomi-
nee. Eventually a small convention of
dissatisfied Whigs and Ameri-
cans nominated former Governor Allen
Trimble, who was over seven-
ty and obviously could not actively run.
The participants approved a
platform that denounced sectional
parties, called for restoration of
63. Letter signed, "JUSTICE," Ashtabula
Sentinel, May 10; Ashley to Chase, May
29, Chase Papers, LC; Richard Mott to
Giddings, June 2, Giddings Papers.
64. The proceedings of the State Council
are given in the Ohio State Journal, August
9.
Salmon P. Chase
29
the Missouri Compromise, upheld
unspecified American principles,
and endorsed reform of the state's
banking and tax systems. Al-
though the meeting designated itself
the American party in Ohio, in
truth it represented only a small
fraction of the Know-Nothings, and
furthermore many present were not even
affiliated with the Order. In
fact, Trimble himself had never been a
member of the Order.65 That
the intent of this group was solely to
defeat Chase was transparent as
the convention made no other
nominations. Thus, of the Republican
nominees only Chase faced a third-party
challenge. Gleeful Demo-
crats secretly funded the Trimble campaign.66
From the start Chase was the central
issue of the campaign. Sens-
ing Chase's vulnerability, Democrats
concentrated on his alleged
abolitionism and on nativist influence
in the Republican party. The
Republican standard-bearer found himself
damned from both
sides: Germans denounced his
association with Know-Nothings on
the state ticket, while ardent
nativists refused to support him be-
cause of his tempered opposition to
Know-Nothingism. With Trimble
now in the field and the charge that he
was a Know-Nothing widely
circulated among Germans, the contest
proved much more difficult
than Chase had originally anticipated.67
The center of the great dis-
affection against Chase was Cincinnati.
Here conservative business-
men fearful of Chase's radicalism,
Americans angry over what they
believed to be the sellout of the Order
in Columbus, and old-line
Whigs still indignant about the 1849
senatorial election unleashed
their hostility on the Republican
nominee.68 Assailed from all direc-
65. William B. Thrall to Strohm, July 8,
Strohm Papers, CinHS; Ohio State Journal,
August 9; J. Scott Harrison to Benjamin
Harrison, July 28, August 2, Benjamin Harrison
Papers, Library of Congress. For Whig
opposition to Chase, see William Johnson to A.
Banning Norton and others, August 18
(copy), Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of
Congress; Ohio State Journal, quoted
in Ashtabula Sentinel, August 2; T. G. Jones to
Ewing, July 28, R. P. L. Baber to Ewing,
August 16, Thomas Ewing Family Papers, Li-
brary of Congress; letter signed
"FEDERALIST," Cincinnati Commercial, July 27.
66. Newton Schleick to William Medill,
August 14, William Medill Papers, Library
of Congress; David Chambers to Allen
Trimble, September 26, Allen Trimble Papers,
Western Reserve Historical Society; Ashtabula
Sentinel, August 9; Ohio State Journal,
October 1. At the beginning of the year
a Democrat told Medill that things looked
bleak in the state, and "the only
hope we have, is in the bust up and division of the
incongruous mass which was united
against us last election." Matthews Martin to
Medill, January 10, William Medill
Papers.
67. Follett to Chase, September 9, Chase
Papers, LC; Herman Kreismann to Sum-
ner, September 18, Sumner Papers.
Republican strategists felt it necessary to publish a
letter from Chase declaring that he was
not a Know-Nothing. In this letter Chase also
denied that his fellow Republican
nominees were hostile to the foreign-born. See
Chase to Homer Goodwin, August 24,
Cincinnati Commercial, September 12.
68. Free Soilers held the balance of
power in the 1849 state legislature. After a
30 OHIO HISTORY
tions, Chase took to the stump and
waged a strenuous campaign,
delivering 57 major addresses in 49
counties. Although his lead-
ing theme was always Kansas, in
Cincinnati and other conservative
strongholds he was also careful to
identify himself with preservation
of the Union. He received loyal support
from Campbell, Ford,
Spooner, and other Know-Nothing
leaders. Campbell, in particular,
threw himself into the contest with
unusual vigor and labored to
keep the Know-Nothings and former Whigs
from voting for Trim-
ble.69
With Chase the symbol of the new
Republican party, the guberna-
torial election was unusually hard
fought. "Every School-house was
a hall for political discussion and
declamation, night after night and
indeed I might say every night, in this
and other Counties for weeks
prior to the election," one Ohio
voter reported. "Our court-house
and public halls and even the
Streets" became arenas for political
debate as "ordinary business and
the predilections of party yielded
to the behests of public duty." As
the campaign progressed and
summer faded into fall, Chase remained
confident. "Hamilton Coun-
ty is the only really dark spot,"
he informed Schouler. Reassured by
party strategists who minimized the
importance of Trimble's candi-
dacy, the Republican nominee held firm
to his earlier prediction that
his majority would be 40,000 votes.70
When the ballots were counted, the
entire Republican ticket had
triumphed. Chase's margin, however,
hardly equaled his expecta-
tions. Although he defeated his
Democratic opponent by 15,000
votes, he secured only a plurality as
Trimble polled over 24,000 votes.
In the remaining state contests in
which the Republican candidates
were also Know-Nothings, the margin of
victory was more substan-
tial. Ford, for example, won the
lieutenant governorship by a clear
majority of almost 36,000 votes.71
The Republican gubernatorial can-
drawn-out series of negotiations in
which Chase played a leading role, the Free-Soilers
agreed to give the Democrats control of
the legislature and block the Whigs' recent re-
apportionment plan in exchange for
Chase's election to the Senate and repeal of the
state's discriminatory black laws. To
indignant Whigs, this outcome smacked of a cor-
rupt bargain. See Maizlish, Triumph
of Sectionalism, 135-46.
69. Samuel Galloway to Chase, August 16,
Chase Papers, HSP; Ashtabula Sentinel,
July 26; Campbell to Chase, August 6,
Chase Papers, LC; Cincinnati Commercial, Oc-
tober 2; Chase to Pike, October 18, Pike
Papers.
70. Abel Rawson to William Penn Clarke,
October 18, William Penn Clarke Papers,
Iowa State Department of History; Chase
to Schouler, September 3, Schouler Papers;
Chase to E. S. Hamlin, August 27, Chase
Papers, LC.
71. The official vote was Chase, 141,641
(48.6 percent); Medill, 131,091 (43.4 per-
cent); and Trimble, 24,310 (8.1 percent).
In the lieutenant governor's race, Ford polled
169,439 votes (55.9 percent) to his
Democratic opponent's 133,485 votes (44.1 percent).
Salmon P. Chase 31
didate's weakness was most apparent in Hamilton County,
which
had been a cause of great Republican concern throughout
the cam-
paign. Trimble received over one-quarter of his entire
statewide tally
in this one county. In fact, Chase finished a distant
third there, with
only 19.4 percent of the popular vote. He received less
than half the
number of votes Winfield Scott polled in the county in
1852, and the
falloff was especially noteworthy compared to 1854,
when Hamilton
provided the largest anti-Nebraska majority in the
state. Chase's
abysmal showing in Cincinnati and its environs almost
cost him the
governorship.72
Chase was badly hurt by Trimble's candidacy, which
appealed
primarily to old-line Whigs and nativists who would not
support so
radical an antislavery man, yet voted for the rest of
the Republican
ticket. Although very few traditional Whigs defected to
the Democ-
racy even in the face of Chase's candidacy, his
weakness among
these voters was obvious. Substantially less than half
of those who
backed the Whig ticket in the 1852 state election, the
last such con-
test in which the Whig party mustered respectable
strength, voted
for Chase in 1855 (Table 1).73 He performed even
more poorly among
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
SUPREME COURT 1852
AND GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO
Party in 1855 (Governor)
Party in 1852 Not %
(Sup.
Court) Republican Democrat
Trimble Voting Electorate
Whig 14 0 7 11 33
Democrat 15 26 -4 -1 37
Free Soil 5 0 -1 2 6
Not Voting 1 5 3 15 25
% Electorate 35 31 6 28
N = 88.
Note: Rounding sometimes produces sums slightly
different from the mar-
ginals. For interpretive purposes, negative estimates
can be consid-
ered as essentially zero.
72. The official tally in Hamilton County was Chase
4,516 votes (19.4 percent); Me-
dill. 12,226 votes (52.5 percent); and Trimble, 6,538
votes (28.1 percent).
73. The tables presented in this essay are based on the
statistical procedure known
32 OHIO HISTORY
Scott voters in the 1852 presidential election, over
two-thirds of
whom either voted for Trimble or simply abstained
(Table 2). Even
conservatives who voted for Chase considered him a
bitter dose.
Chase's father-in-law, United States Supreme Court
Justice John
McLean, for example, revealed that he voted for the
Republican
nominee only "under protest."74 At
the same time, virtually all of
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
PRESIDENT 1852
AND GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO
Party in 1855 (Governor)
Party in 1852 Not %
(President)
Republican Democrat Trimble Voting Electorate
Whig 13 -1 9 18 38
Democrat 18 31 -4 -2 43
Free Soil 7 0 -1 2 8
Not Voting -3 1 2 11 11
% Electorate 35 31 6 28
N = 88.
Trimble's adherents supported Ford in the lieutenant
governor's race
(Table 3). For a minority of voters at least, the
election had devolved
into a personal referendum on Chase.
Chase's post-election analysis combined both accurate
and inac-
curate judgments. The Republican leader admitted that
he had "a
hard canvass." "Never was such an effort made
to kill off a man as to
kill off me," he complained to Grimes. The
Democrats combined
with the "proscriptive & proslavery Kns to
annihilate me, & I was fa-
as ecological regression. For discussions of this
technique, see E. Terrance Jones, "Ec-
ological Inference and Electoral Analysis," Journal
of Interdisciplinary History, 2 (Win-
ter, 1972), 249-62; J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological
Regression and the Analysis of Past
Politics," ibid., 4 (Autumn, 1973), 237-62;
and W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological Infer-
ence': The Use of Aggregate Data to Study
Individuals," American Political Science
Review, 63
(December, 1969), 1183-96. Ecological regression analysis requires that per-
centages be in terms of eligible voters rather than
votes cast. For the number of voters
in each county, I used the figures given in the
Auditor's Report for 1855 and 1863 and
extrapolated between end points. All statewide
estimates are at the county-level.
74. John McLean to John Teesdale, November 2, John
McLean Papers, Ohio His-
torical Society. Also see Sidney D. Maxwell, Diary, ca.
November 1.
Salmon P. Chase 33
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
GOVERNOR 1855
AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO
Party in 1855 Party in 1855 (Lieutenant Governor)
Party in 1855
(Governor)
Republican Democrat Not Voting % Electorate
Republican 36 -1 0 35
Democrat -1 32 0 31
Trimble 6 0 0 6
Not Voting 0 1 28 28
% Electorate 41 32 28
N = 88.
vored with a vigor & ferocity of detraction and
vituperation almost
without parallel." He believed that he lost
"on both sides-on the
American because not a member of the order & the
naturalized be-
cause connected with Kns on the ticket." On the
bright side, he
contended that he had received many Democratic votes.75
Cheered
by his narrow victory and conveniently overlooking his
earlier pre-
dictions of probable strength, Chase angrily criticized
the assertion
of the New York Tribune that a more suitable
candidate would have
scored a decisive victory. He boasted to Pike that
"no other man
could have carried the State at all under existing
circumstances."76
More detached observers, however, provided a rather
different as-
sessment. Immensely pleased by the result, Wade
nevertheless con-
ceded that "we were . . . forced into the canvass
with the most un-
popular candidate, probably, that could have been
started in Ohio
. . . because of prejudices growing out of old
conflicts."77
Chase's belief that he polled a number of Democratic
votes was
not without substance (Table 1). In fact, it appears
that a somewhat
larger proportion of 1854 Democratic voters supported
Chase than re-
turned to their party after joining the anti-Nebraska
revolt (Table 4).
75. Chase to Sumner, October 15, Sumner Papers; Chase
to [Grimes], October 17,
Chase Papers, HSP; Chase to E. L. Pierce, October 20,
Edward L. Pierce Papers,
Harvard University.
76. Chase to Pike, October 18, Pike Papers.
77. Benjamin F. Wade to Israel Washburn, Jr., October
13, Israel Washburn, Jr. Pa-
pers, Library of Congress.
34 OHIO HISTORY
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS 1854
AND GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO
Party in 1855 (Governor)
Party in 1854 Not %
(Public Works)
Republican Democrat Trimble Voting Electorate
Democrat 8 23 -3 -2 27
People's 22 5 7 10 45
Not Voting 4 3 2 21 29
% Electorate 35 31 6 28
N = 88.
Chase's difficulties stemmed instead from his weakness
among anti-
Nebraska voters. Only about half of the voters who
supported the
People's state ticket in 1854 backed Chase in 1855. The
return of some
Democrats to their traditional loyalty was expected in
Republican cir-
cles, yet fully one-sixth of the anti-Nebraska force
voted for Trimble
in preference to Chase, and an even larger group simply
sat out the
election. Bolstered by his Know-Nothing ties, Ford, in
contrast, gar-
nered over two-thirds of the anti-Nebraska vote, and an
even higher
proportion of earlier nonvoters (Table 5). Trimble's
strength came ex-
clusively from traditional nonvoters and former Whigs.
He won al-
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS 1854
AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO
Party in 1854
Party in 1855 (Lieutenant Governor)
Party in 1854
(Public Works)
Republican Democrat Not Voting % Electorate
Democrat 5 23 -2 27
People's 30 6 9 45
Not Voting 6 3 20 29
% Electorate 41 32 28
N = 88.
Salmon P. Chase
35
most no support from former Democrats
and Free-Soilers (Tables 1
and 4).
Chase won because he attracted unusual
support from traditional
abstainers, and because the Democratic
electoral base in the state,
badly shattered by events of the past
few years, continued to deteri-
orate. Chase's coalition contained
numerous voters from all three par-
ties. As would be expected, the
Free-Soil vote was cast solidly in his
favor. More surprising, however, was his
appeal among men who
voted Democratic in 1852. In fact, he
ran only slightly better among
1852 Whigs (Table 1). Perhaps no
development so clearly docu-
mented the devastating impact of nativism
and the slavery issue on
the Ohio Democracy as the loss of over
one-third of its traditional
loyalists to the Republican party. At
least some Democratic leaders
understood that nativism cut both ways,
and that this issue held
some antislavery Democrats, who
otherwise would have bolted,
within the party. "The Nebraska
question was the real rock of dan-
ger here," one Democrat contended
after the election, "and if we
had not had Know nothingism to fight,
[we] would have been beat-
en badly."78
It is difficult to estimate the degree
to which Chase owed his elec-
tion to Know-Nothing votes. Afterwards
Chase paid tribute to the
significant assistance of the liberal
Americans who fought "with us
like brothers." Some of Chase's
supporters, however, minimized the
contribution of the Know-Nothings to the
Republican triumph, an at-
titude which infuriated at least one
American leader who flatly con-
tended that the Order furnished the
votes that elected Chase.79
The only figures available on
Know-Nothing membership are for Oc-
tober 1854 and thus vastly underestimate
the Order's strength at the
time of the election.80 Nevertheless,
confining the analysis to those
counties where the Order was organized
in 1854, it appears that the
largest proportion of the American vote
went to Chase (Table 6). At
the same time, Trimble's vote
represented more than proscriptive na-
78. Jonathan M. Cornell to William
Medill, November 28, William Medill Papers.
79. Chase to [Grimes], October 17, Chase
Papers, HSP; Chase to Pike, October 18,
Pike Papers; W. C. Howells to Chase,
November 5, Chase Papers, LC; John Paul to
Chase, October 24, Chase Papers, HSP; O.
F. Fishback to Campbell, October 30,
Campbell Papers. For Campbell's support
of Chase, see Campbell to Dear Sir, August
10, quoted in Ashtabula Sentinel, August
30.
80. Know-Nothing membership in the state
more than doubled between October
1854 and the summer of 1855. Some of
this growth represented expansion into counties
which had no lodges in October 1854, and
are thus excluded from the analysis, but
an indeterminate proportion represented
additional expansion in counties included in
the analysis.
36 OHIO HISTORY
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
GOVERNOR 1855
AND KNOW-NOTHING MEMBERSHIP 1854: OHIO
Party in 1855 (Governor)
Not %
Membership 1854
Republican Democrat Trimble Voting Electorate
Know-Nothing
7 6 1 3
17
Non-Know-
Nothing 27 26 5 25 83
% Electorate 35 32 6 27
N = 41.
tivists, as a larger share of his vote came from men
who were not
Know-Nothings in 1854 (how many joined the Order
afterwards, of
course, is unknown). Not surprisingly, Ford ran better
among nativist
voters than did Chase (Table 7).
Contemporaries generally agreed that Chase, hindered by
his na-
tivist associates on the Republican ticket, failed to
win the foreign
vote. Cincinnati German leader Stephen Molitor, who
supported
Chase while repudiating the rest of the Republican
nominees, con-
tended that German-born voters generally opposed Chase
because
of the presence of Know-Nothings on the rest of the
ticket. He
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 1855
AND KNOW-NOTHING MEMBERSHIP 1854: OHIO
Party in 1855 (Lieutenant Governor)
Membership 1854
Republican Democrat Not Voting
% Electorate
Know-Nothing
9 6 3 17
Non-Know-
Nothing 32 27 24
83
% Electorate 41 32 27
N = 41.
Salmon P. Chase
37
pleaded for understanding: "that
they are anxious not to act treach-
erously against themselves, is I trust
not an unpardonable sin." Sev-
eral Chase managers, including Ashley in
Toledo, expressed disap-
pointment that the bulk of the foreign
vote in their locality went
against the Republicans.81 In
Cincinnati, which had the state's
largest concentration of Germans, the Enquirer
estimated that Chase
got no more than one-fifth of the German
vote. The four most heavily
German wards, which cast 2,085 votes for
the People's ticket in 1854,
gave Chase only 910 votes compared to
2,802 for Medill.82 An even
more dramatic example of the failure of
the Republican campaign to
overcome German suspicions of nativist
influence in the party was the
vote in the strongly German Fifth Ward
in Columbus, where Medill
routed Chase with 451 votes to 67
(Trimble polled a meager 20 votes).
Those Germans who voted for Chase were
probably overwhelmingly
non-Catholics. The Cleveland Leader asserted
that "the Roman
Catholics in Ohio, voted the Locofoco
[Democratic] ticket in an undi-
vided body," an assertion
unchallenged by other leading Republi-
can journals.83
Despite the narrow margin of Chase's
election, Ohio Republicans
were optimistic about the future. To
have carried the state in the
party's first campaign, and when saddled
with so unpopular a candi-
date, was a remarkable achievement. Giddings
believed that the
Know-Nothings' prestige was gone
"forever" and discounted Camp-
bell's statement that the Americans
would rally next year as a distinct
and independent party. Another Chase
supporter predicted that the
Trimble clique would divide hereafter,
some going into the ranks of
each of the two major parties. With
Republicanism now "on a solid
basis," Chase was certain that the
liberal Americans would remain
81. Molitor to Chase, February 25, 1856,
Ashley to Chase, October 21, J. Walkap to
Chase, November 8, Chase Papers, LC.
82. Regression estimates for Cincinnati
indicate that approximately 10 percent of the
German voters who went to the polls
voted for Chase; less than 1 percent voted for
Ford in the lieutenant governor's
contest. More striking still was the rate of non-voting
among Germans. An estimated 46 percent
did not participate, a rate that was signifi-
cantly higher than for Irish voters (28
percent) and British voters, who evidenced a
full turnout. An additional 1 percent of
the Germans who cast ballots for governor ab-
stained on the lieutenant governor's
race. These estimates are at the ward level. Ethni-
city figures are derived from the 1860
census sample compiled by Carl Abott for his
study, "Economic Thought and
Occupational Structure in Four Middle Western Cities
1850-1860," and made available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research, Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Neither he nor the Consortium bear any
responsibility for the interpretations
presented here.
83. Cincinnati Enquirer, n.d.,
quoted in Illinois State Register, June 25, 1856; Ohio
State Journal, October 13, 15; Cleveland Leader, quoted in Ashtabula
Sentinel, Octo-
ber 25, November 1.
38 OHIO HISTORY
within the Republican ranks, and he
anticipated additional Demo-
cratic defections as well. Henceforth
the party "shall be stronger
than ever."84 Chase and
his circle had risked their future power in
the state party in a bold bid for
control, and their audacity had been
rewarded. They had killed the American
party in Ohio by subsum-
ing it into the Republican movement.
Without question Chase's triumph was a
great Republican victory.
Elsewhere, and especially in the most
important northern states, the
1855 elections constituted an
inauspicious beginning for the sectional
party. Taken together, the meaning of
these fall elections was unmis-
takable: in order to be victorious,
Republicans had to reach some
agreement with the Know-Nothings that
would ensure cooperation
between the two groups, such as had
occurred in Ohio. Wherever
the Republicans openly challenged the
nativist Order, such as in
Massachusetts and New York, they met
defeat. Without a significant
influx of Know-Nothings into the party's
ranks, the idea of building a
Republican majority coalition in the
North was utterly futile.
In the face of the numerous setbacks the
Republican cause suf-
fered, Chase's election in Ohio, which
Governor Bingham of Michi-
gan termed "the only real Anti
Slavery victory that has been
achieved this fall," took on added
importance. Henry Wilson voiced
a similar viewpoint when he told Chase
after all the state contests
were concluded, "Your election is
the only bright spot in the political
sky of this autumn."85 The
Ohio result encouraged Republicans in
other states while it intensified
Chase's drive already under way to
establish a national Republican organization
on the so-called Ohio
plan-half Republican, half Know-Nothing.
In urging support for this
movement, Chase pointed to his election
as demonstrating the pos-
sibilities of such a fusion and stressed
that a Republican-Know-
Nothing coalition could carry a
presidential contest as early as
1856.86
Chase's hopes for a presidential
nomination were destined to be
84. Giddings to Chase, October 16, F. D.
Parish to Chase, November 5, Chase to
[Grimes], October 17, Chase Papers, HSP;
Sidney D. Maxwell, Diary, ca. November 1;
Chase to Gideon Welles, October 26,
Gideon Welles Papers, Library of Congress.
85. Kinsley S. Bingham to Chase,
November 16, Chase Papers, LC; Henry Wilson
to Chase, November 17, Chase Papers,
HSP. For similar evaluations, see Edward L.
Pierce to Chase, October 13, Thomas F.
Withrow to Chase, October 12, Chase Papers,
LC; Benjamin F. Butler to Chase,
November 12, Chase Papers, HSP.
86. Chase's correspondence at the
Library of Congress and the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania contains extensive evidence
of his efforts to promote a national Republi-
can organizing convention. Cf. Robert F.
Horowitz, "James M. Ashley and the Presi-
dential Election on 1856," Ohio
History, 83 (Winter, 1974), 4-16.
Salmon P. Chase 39
disappointed. Yet the relationship
between the resurgent nativist
crusade and Republicanism that evolved
in Ohio was of vital signifi-
cance for the party's future. In the
course of the next few years,
Chase's vision of the nature of the
Republican coalition would essen-
tially be realized. Without losing sight
of sectional issues, Republi-
cans throughout the decade overtly
appealed to nativists for support
and recognized former Americans in
making nominations and distrib-
uting patronage. By the time of
Lincoln's election in 1860, a substan-
tial majority of one-time Know-Nothings
had entered the Republican
ranks, and as a result the party won its
first national triumph. Chase's
victory in Ohio in 1855 blazed a trail
that ultimately led to the crea-
tion of a northern Republican majority.
WILLIAM E. GIENAPP
Salmon P. Chase, Nativism,
and the Formation of the
Republican Party in Ohio
Accounts of the formation of the
Republican party traditionally
emphasize the political upheaval of
1854. In this year the party first
took shape in Michigan and Wisconsin,
and in several other states fu-
sion anti-Nebraska coalitions, which are
often viewed as proto-
Republican organizations, contested the
fall elections.1 Certainly the
momentous political events of that year
unleashed forces that eventu-
ally culminated in the formation of the
Republican party throughout
the North. Nonetheless, little was
accomplished toward estab-
lishing a permanent party organization,
and at the end of the year few
competent political observers believed
that Republicanism would ei-
ther gain a substantial following in the
free states or become a perma-
nent organization. The events of 1854
gave a boost to the Republican
movement, but the first significant
steps to organize the party in key
northern states occurred the following
year.
Political developments in Ohio in 1855
were particularly significant
in the Republican party's early history.
As the nation's third most
populous state, Ohio exercised
considerable power in national affairs,
and consequently its politics commanded
widespread attention.
Moreover, the drive to launch the party
established Salmon P.
Chase as head of the state organization,
a development which cata-
pulted him to the front ranks of the
Republican national leadership, a
position he occupied for the rest of his
life. Under Chase's guidance,
Ohio Republicans would take the lead to
organize a national party on
William E. Gienapp is Assistant
Professor of History at The University of Wyoming.
Professor Gienapp is grateful to the
Mabelle McLeod Lewis Memorial Fund, Stanford,
California, for financial support that allowed him to
complete much of the research for
this essay. The University of California, Berkeley, and
the University of Wyoming pro-
vided essential computer funds. Finally,
he would like to thank Stephen Maizlish for
many fruitful conversations concerning Ohio politics in
this period.
1. A good example of this emphasis is
Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (New
York, 8 vols., 1947-1971), v. 2, 316-46.