JOHN OFFNER
President McKinley's Final Attempt to
Avoid War With Spain
By April 1, 1898, war between the United
States and Spain seemed
certain. Rebellious Republican
congressmen had forced President
William McKinley's diplomatic pace by
threatening to join Democrats
in declaring war, and were kept in line
only by promises that the pres-
ident would shortly turn over the Cuban
issue to Congress. McKinley
had informed the Spanish government of
his terms for a settlement,
and Madrid's March 31 response was
unsatisfactory. Although dip-
lomatic relations were not yet ruptured,
negotiations on both sides
were suspended, as McKinley prepared to
ask Congress to authorize
military intervention. During the first
ten days of April, however,
there was a final attempt to maintain
peace. By April 5 McKinley was
working with the Vatican, the Spanish
Queen Regent, Great Britain,
and the Cuban Junta to find a means to
calm the American public
and stave off congressional action. An
examination of McKinley's last
effort to keep the peace sheds light on
his Spanish diplomacy, his re-
lations with the Cuban Junta, and the
role of Congress in the crisis.1
John Offner is Professor of History at
Shippensburg University.
1. Because the McKinley administration
decided on April 1 to intervene militarily
in Cuba, historians have provided a
variety of explanations for the diplomatic events
which occurred during the following
ten-day period. Authors have usually explained
the initiatives of the Vatican, the
appeals of the European powers, and the last-minute
Spanish proclamation of a suspension of
hostilities as only tangentially associated with
McKinley's diplomacy. Philip Foner also
included the Cubans, but he did not see
them as playing a meaningful part. For
contemporary interpretations of this period, see:
Margaret Leech, In the Days of
McKinley (New York, 1959), 178-87; Ernest R. May, Im-
perial Democracy; The Emergence of
America as a Great Power (New York,
1961),
151-58; H. Wayne Morgan, America's
Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Over-
seas Expansion (New York, 1965), 54-60; Julius W. Pratt, "The
Coming War with
Spain," in Paola E. Coletta, ed., Threshold
to American Internationalism: Essays on the
Foreign Policies of William McKinley (New York, 1970), 56-62; Philip S. Foner, The
Spanish-Cuban-American War and the
Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, 2
vols. (New York, 1972), 1:254-61;
Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of Ameri-
can Foreign Relations, 1865-1900 (New York, 1976), 262-74; Lewis L. Gould, The Presi-
dency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980), 81-86; and David F. Trask, The
War with Spain in 1898 (New York, 1981), 40-52.
126 OHIO HISTORY
The initiative for a new attempt to keep
the peace came from Eu-
rope. In late March, while negotiations
between the United States
and Spain were at a crucial stage, Pope
Leo XIII requested Archbish-
op John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota,
to go to Washington, D.C., to
try to arrange arbitration of the U.S.S.
Maine incident and to prevent
the United States from intervening in
Cuba. Cardinal Rampolla, Vati-
can Secretary of State, informed Ireland
that the Pope would use his
influence in Madrid for peace. The
Vatican chose Ireland for this
important mission because he was the
most prominent Republican
Catholic leader.2 Coming from
Minnesota, Ireland was also known to
Cushman K. Davis, Republican Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, and having been
educated in France, Ireland was
a friend of Jules Cambon, France's
ambassador to the United States.
By the time Ireland got to the White
House on April 1, McKinley's
aides were already preparing a message
to Congress, tentatively
scheduled for delivery April 4,
requesting authority to use force.
Nevertheless, the president reviewed for
Ireland his peace propos-
als, which Spain had just rejected. He
said that Spain must either
sell Cuba for a large price or offer an
armistice to the Cubans. If
Madrid granted an armistice,
negotiations must follow between Spain
and the Cuban insurgents to bring peace;
and if direct talks failed,
Spain must accept McKinley as the final
arbiter, relying upon his
sense of justice and honor to end the
dispute. Failure by Spain to act,
McKinley concluded, would result in war
with the United States.3
Because the White House was under constant
press surveillance, it
was decided that in the future Ireland
would meet with an interme-
diary representing the McKinley
administration. Republican Senator
Stephen B. Elkins of West Virginia was
chosen as Ireland's contact,
and many of the following meetings took
place at his home.
Spain's handling of McKinley's initial
message relayed through the
Vatican further diminished prospects for
peace. Ireland's cable to
the Vatican stated that McKinley wished
"peace and help to obtain
it." Cardinal Rampolla passed this
to the Spanish government which
2. John T. Farrell, "Archbishop
Ireland and Manifest Destiny," Catholic Histori-
cal Review, 33 (October, 1947), 269-301. Farrell stated that
Ireland destroyed his corre-
spondence with the Vatican and other
papers relating to his mission to Washington.
The John Ireland Papers, Archdiocesan
Archives of St. Paul, Minnesota, however,
contain a complete set of telegrams
exchanged between Ireland and Cardinal Rampol-
la, as well as other documents, the most
important of which is a journal kept by Sena-
tor Stephen Elkins. These papers have
recently been microfilmed by the Minnesota
Historical Society. See also James H.
Moynihan, The Life of Archbishop John Ireland
(New York, 1953), 162-68.
3. Ireland to Rampolla, Washington,
April 1, 1898, Ireland Papers.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 127
publicly announced on April 3 that the
American president had peti-
tioned the Pope to request Spain to
provide an armistice in Cuba. Al-
though the Spanish ministry welcomed the
Pope's mediation, it
added the qualification that the United
States must agree to with-
draw its fleet from Cuban waters which
would signal that it was not
supporting the Cuban insurrection either
"voluntarily or involuntar-
ily."4 Madrid's public
posturing must have provided further evi-
dence to McKinley that the Spanish
government was neither serious
nor could be trusted.
Nevertheless, Ireland was building up
momentum for renewed
negotiations. In a busy round of Washington
calls, Ireland visit-
ed Chairman Davis and other senators,
Ambassador Cambon, and
Spanish Minister Luis Polo de Bernabe.
In every instance, Ireland
was greeted with pessimism, but the
outcome of all these talks was a
decision to place additional pressure on
the Madrid government to is-
sue an armistice. During the first
meeting between Ireland, Elkins and
the Spanish minister, Sunday morning,
April 3, Polo de Bernabe ob-
jected to all aspects of McKinley's
diplomatic program, but especial-
ly to the president's serving as an
arbiter between Spain and the Cu-
ban insurgents. At Polo de Bernabe's
insistance, Ireland and Elkins
dropped this point. The Spanish minister
then agreed to urge his
government to propose a six-month
armistice. Ireland promised to ask
Pope Leo XIII to make a similar appeal
to Madrid, and in a later meet-
ing Combon consented to have Paris also
request Spain to grant an ar-
mistice. In addition, Ireland counseled
the Vatican to urge Spain to
separate the U.S.S. Maine issue
from that of Cuba by offering third-
party binding arbitration and promising
complete satisfaction of all
legitimate costs. Having done this, the
Spanish government should
appeal to Washington in the name of
humanity to accept these con-
cessions.5
Initially, McKinley did not have much
hope for Ireland's efforts.
Elkins reported that the president
thought time had run out and
4. Stewart L. Woodford to McKinley,
Madrid, April 3, 1898, Department of State,
Foreign Relations, 1898 (Washington, D.C., 1901), 732; Ireland to John J.
Keane, St.
Paul, May 28, 1898, Denis J. O'Connell
Papers, Diocese Archives, Richmond, Va.
Ireland stated that after Rome
mishandled his first telegram, McKinley became more
cautious in his relations with Ireland.
5. Stephen B. Elkins Journal, April 3,
1898, Stephen B. Elkins Papers, West Virginia
University Library, Morgantown, W. Va.;
Luis Polo de Bernabe to Pio Gullon, Wash-
ington, April 4, 1898, Documentos
presentados a las cortes en la legislatura de 1898 por
el ministro de estado, 3 vols., (Madrid, 1898), 1:163; Cambon to Gabriel
Hanotaux,
Washington, April 4, 1898, Documents
diplomatiquesfrancais, 1871-1914, 41 vols., (Par-
is, 1929-59), ie serie (1898),
14:196-97.
128 OHIO HISTORY
Spain would neither respond to the
Vatican nor to the European pow-
ers. The president was
"fatigued" and not "much interested" in
Ireland's activities. When Elkins
informed McKinley during the eve-
ning of April 3 that the Pope had
requested the Spanish Queen Re-
gent, Maria Cristina, to grant an
armistice, the president responded
that the Cuban insurgents would refuse
it, and the war would contin-
ue. McKinley explained that John J.
McCook, a New York attorney
who was associated with the Cuban Junta
concerning a possible float
of Cuban bonds, had already assured him
that the Cubans would
reject an armistice. Elkins replied that
if the United States entered a
war as a result of Cuban intransigence,
it should annex the island,
and promised to meet McCook the next
day.6
On Monday morning, April 4, Elkins
repeated to McCook the
tough line which he had laid before
McKinley. He warned that
without an effective armistice, Congress
would declare war, and the
Cuban revolutionaries would bear the
consequences of American mil-
itary intervention. If the Cubans
rejected a Spanish armistice and a
costly war with Spain ensued, the United
States would annex Cuba,
Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands.
For the Cuban insurgents to
gain recognition of their provisional
government, they should choose
peace over war. McCook replied that the
Cubans only asked the
United States to recognize the
independence of Cuba and that they
would not accept a Spanish armistice. He
agreed, however, to relay
Elkins' warning to the Cuban leaders.7
On Monday evening, events for the first
time took a positive turn.
Cardinal Rampolla cabled Ireland that
the Queen Regent had con-
sented to the Pope's request and had
agreed to a "suspension of
arms." At the same time she wanted
the Pope to persuade McKinley
to withdraw the United States fleet from
Cuban waters, which
would facilitate Madrid's action by
helping to calm Spanish public
opinion.8
Ireland immediately took Rampolla's
message to Assistant Secre-
tary of State William R. Day, whom
McKinley had designated to
handle the Cuban issue. Following White
House discussions, Ire-
land replied to the Vatican that he had
obtained "all possible in-
formation," but warned Rampolla
that he could not speak for the
6. Elkins Journal, April 3, 1898, Elkins
Papers. Paul S. Holbo, "The Convergence of
Moods and the Cuban-Bond 'Conspiracy' of
1898," The Journal of American History,
55 (June, 1968), 63-66.
7. Ibid., April 4, 1898.
8. Rampolla to Ireland, Rome, April 4,
1898, Ireland Papers.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 129
president or the United States
government. Ireland explained that
McKinley had to be extremely careful in
his relations with Congress
which threatened the peace. He could not
at this time recall the
navy, since this would be certain to
irritate Congress. If Spain granted
an armistice, however, Washington then
could withdraw the ships
since they would not be needed. An
additional reason for transfer-
ring the fleet was exposure to yellow
fever. Ireland urged Spain to
trust the American government and to
issue an immediate and uncon-
ditional armistice. Moreover, Washington
would take steps to get the
Cuban insurgents to accept the armistice.
McKinley was preparing to
deliver his message to Congress on
Wednesday, April 6, and al-
though he would detail the continuing
conflict in Cuba and Spain's
failure to end it, he would not ask for
Cuban independence. The
president believed that Congress would
debate his message, which
would provide some additional time to
arrange a settlement. If Spain
proclaimed an armistice, McKinley
promised to inform Congress. In a
quick follow-up message to Rampolla,
Ireland added that the United
States Navy was stationed in Key West,
an American harbor, not Cu-
ban waters, and that Spain was
unreasonable in asking the American
government to recall naval ships from
its own ports.9
The next day, April 5, Stewart L.
Woodford, United States Minis-
ter to Madrid, asked McKinley if the
president would sustain the
Queen Regent by preventing
"hostile" congressional action if she ac-
ceded to the Pope's request to
"proclaim [an] immediate and uncon-
ditional suspension of
hostilities." Fighting would end as soon as the
Cuban insurgents accepted the armistice
which would last for six
months. The Queen's request did not
provide for McKinley to arbi-
trate differences at the end of the
six-month period, but it did fore-
see discussions between the Spanish
government and the Cuban in-
surgents to achieve "permanent and
honorable peace."10
McKinley's reply to the Queen Regent was
guarded. Appreciative
of her efforts to maintain peace, he
refused to "assume to influence
the action of the American
Congress" beyond transmitting the issue
to it the next day and recommending
"necessary and expedient" ac-
tions. If Spain offered an armistice, he
would inform Congress. 11
Having responded cautiously to Madrid,
McKinley began a major
effort to attempt to use the impending
armistice to prevent war. The
first sign that McKinley was taking new
steps came during the after-
9. Ireland to Rampolla, Washington,
April 5, 1898, Ibid.
10. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April
5, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 734-35.
11. Day to Woodford, Washington, April
5, 1898, Ibid., 735.
130 OHIO HISTORY
noon of April 5 when Assistant Secretary
Day met with British
Ambassador Julian Pauncefote to approve
the test of a joint note
which the six Great Powers (Great
Britain, Germany, France, Russia,
Austria-Hungary, and Italy) would
present to the president. The pos-
sibility of joint diplomatic action had
been considered for some time,
but some European nations were unwilling
to act unless the United
States government approved in advance.
Day now agreed to a joint
note and explained to Pauncefote that a
collective message from the
Great Powers would help to calm public
opinion. The note, which
Day edited, requested American
moderation, humanity, and contin-
uation of negotiations.12 Day
expected the European powers to pres-
ent it to McKinley on the next day,
April 6, but due to a delay in
getting authorization from St.
Petersburg, the diplomats actually read
their message to McKinley at noon on
April 7.
With the European powers concerting
their action, McKinley on
the evening of April 5 met with several
key cabinet advisers, includ-
ing Day, Attorney General John Griggs,
Secretary of the Navy John
Long, and Secretary of the Interior
Cornelius Bliss. To prepare them
for the renewal of negotiations with
Spain, he showed them
a telegram from Woodford, indicating
that the Queen Regent was
about to proclaim an immediate and
unconditional suspension of hos-
tilities.13
The next morning, April 6, McKinley
received a message from Fitz-
hugh Lee, United States consul general
in Havana, asking for a delay
until April 11 in submitting the
presidential message to Congress. Lee
cautioned that Americans in Cuba were in
danger and needed time
to leave the island. McKinley again
gathered several cabinet officers,
this time including Day, Griggs, Long,
and Russell Alger, Secretary of
War. After deciding to honor Lee's
request, McKinley sent for six key
congressional figures: Senators Davis,
Henry Cabot Lodge, and Wil-
liam Frye, all Republicans from the
Foreign Relations Committee,
and Nelson Dingley, Joseph Cannon, and
Robert Adams, all Repub-
lican House leaders. Surrounded by the
key cabinet and congres-
sional members, McKinley declared flatly
that he would hold his
message until April 11. There was no
hint that the president had any-
thing else in mind other than the safety
of American citizens. Since
Secretary Long argued against the delay,
reasoning that American
12. Julian Pauncefote to Lord Salisbury,
Washington, April 5, 1898, Foreign Office 5,
2365, Public Record Office, London.
13. John D. Long, Journal, April 5,
1898, John D. Long Papers, Massachusetts His-
torical Society, Boston.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 131 |
citizens would have ample time to leave the island while Congress debated the message, it appears that McKinley kept his cabinet members as much in the dark as the congressional leaders about the negotiations which were already in progress. The congressional delegation returned to Capitol Hill and secured the delay McKinley wanted. 14 At the same time that McKinley was dealing with the Queen Re- gent, the European Powers, his cabinet, and Congress, the president was placing pressure on the Cuban Junta. There is no record of the messages he sent, but from the sharp and angry reactions, one may infer what was said. In New York City, Horatio S. Rubens, legal rep- resentative of the Cuban Junta, called in newspaper reporters on April 5 and emotionally denounced "peace-at-any-price" "financial men" who proposed United States action without recognizing Cuban inde- pendence. The United States, he charged, would intervene in Cuba
14. Ibid., April 6, 1898; John L. Offner, "President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish-American War," (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1957), 327-28; George B. Cortelyou, Diary, April 6, 1898, George B. Cortelyou Papers, Library of Con- gress, Washington, D.C. |
132 OHIO HISTORY
and annex or sell the island, as well as
Puerto Rico and the Philip-
pines, to cover the costs of war with
Spain and an indemnity for the
Maine. In a highly charged scene, Rubens reminded the
reporters of
Cuba's sacrifices in blood and money.
Vowing that the Cuban people
would not be treated like cattle and
passed along as property with
the title of the island, he said Cubans
would rather be exterminated
fighting for independence than
"betrayed and sold like slaves." Cu-
bans would not cooperate, and Rubens
predicted that the American
people would not volunteer to fight for
such a program. The next af-
ternoon Rubens told reporters that the
McKinley administration was
attempting to get the Junta to give up
independence and to accept an
armistice to be followed by autonomy
under the Spanish flag. Mc-
Kinley, Rubens explained, would ask
Congress for power to intervene
in Cuba, but not to direct him to do so,
which would provide time
for Cuba to come to terms with Spain,
thus allowing Washington and
Madrid to keep the peace. Rubens warned
that the Cuban govern-
ment and army "would reject
absolutely intervention by the United
States unless it should be preceded by a
recognition of the inde-
pendence" of Cuba. If the United
States interfered without recogni-
tion, Rubens predicted, the United
States army sent to Cuba would
have to fight the Cuban army. Rubens
ended on a calmer note by
saying that he did not believe this
would happen, since the Ameri-
can people would not deprive the Cubans
of their independence
against their will.15
The Junta's representatives in
Washington were more cautious than
Rubens, since they did not want to
alienate congressional support.
Tomas Estrada Palma, Delegate of the
Cuban Revolutionary Party,
and Gonzalo de Quesada, charge
d'affaires of the Cuban gov-
ernment approved, Ruben's position, but
toned down the language.
Palma explained to reporters that since
the Cubans already were free
of Spanish control, all they wanted was
recognition of their inde-
pendence. They would resist any
"interference intended to compel
them to pay a new allegiance to the
sovereignty of Spain." Should
Spain grant an armistice, and if this
were coupled with an American
recognition of Cuban independence and
the Cuban Republic, Palma
believed that the Cubans would accept
it.16 In effect, it was up to the
American government to provide
conditions which would enable the
Spanish initiative to bring peace to
Cuba.
15. New York Times, April 5, 6, 1898; Horatio S. Rubens, Liberty: The
Story of Cuba
(New York, 1932), 332-38.
16. New York Times, April 7, 8,
1898.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 133
Cuban resistance to McKinley's plans
came at the same time that
his diplomatic representative in Spain
blundered, resulting in a delay
in Madrid. On the evening of April 6
Prime Minister Praxedes M.
Sagasta called his cabinet together to
approve the granting of a sus-
pension of hostilities. While the
cabinet was in session, Woodford
sent a note into the meeting demanding
action by midnight. He erro-
neously believed that McKinley had
already sent his message to
Congress. Woodford was trying to speed
up the Spanish process, but
instead his ultimatum placed the Spanish
ministry in an untenable
position. Meeting to honor the Pope's
appeal, it suddenly found that
if it proclaimed a suspension of
hostilities, it would appear to be sur-
rendering to an American ultimatum.
Angered, Sagasta's cabinet dis-
banded and haughtily declared that
Spain's policy remained un-
changed. Cardinal Rampolla characterized
Woodford's ultimatum as
an "unpardonable
indiscretion," and Ireland reported that further
Spanish delay produced "great
anxiety" in the White House. Cam-
bon speculated that if the Spanish
armistice and the European joint
note had coincided on April 7, that
McKinley could have prevented
war. In Madrid, Woodford tried to undo
the damage, and on April 7,
he withdrew his note from the record.17
Despite the delay, McKinley continued to
pressure the Cubans.
The president and Elkins met repeatedly
with McCook, who prom-
ised McKinley that he would do all he
could to influence the Cubans
to accept the armistice. Elkins
characterized these sessions as Mc-
Kinley placing "his hand upon
[McCook] gently and firmly ... to get
the insurgents to agree to the
armistice." Although McKinley
thought the Cubans would cooperate, he
refused to guarantee their
position to Madrid. Ireland was more
forthcoming, telling Rampolla
that Washington believed the
"insurgents [would] accept the armis-
tice."18
On April 9 the Papal Nuncio in Madrid
cabled Rampolla that Spain
had granted an armistice. When the news
reached the White House
that evening, McKinley was
"delighted." Both Elkins and McCook
went to the White House where they
discussed with McKinley the
"probabilities" of the Cubans
accepting it.19
17. Woodford to Day, Madrid, April 6, 7,
1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 743-44;
Rampolla to Ireland, Rome, April 8,
1898, and Ireland to Rampolla, Washington, April
7, 1898, Ireland Papers; Cambon to
Hanotaux, Washington, April 9, 1898, N. S. 21,
Espagne, Archives, Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres, Paris.
18. Elkins Journal, April 8, 1898,
Elkins Papers; Ireland to Rampolla, Washington,
April 9, 1898, Ireland Papers.
19. Elkins Journal, April 9, 1898,
Elkins Papers; Cambon to Hanotaux, Washington,
April 10, 1898, N. S. 21, Espagne,
Archives, Paris.
134 OHIO HISTORY
Easter Sunday, April 10, was a day of
intense administration activi-
ty. Throughout the entire day and even
after midnight McKinley met
with advisers in a last-minute attempt
to prevent war. Day was at the
White House early in the morning and was
the last person to leave
that night. McKinley met with his full
cabinet twice, once in the af-
ternoon and again in the evening, the
total time of the cabinet meet-
ings coming to nearly six hours. The
length of these meetings sug-
gests that the cabinet had difficulty
reaching a consensus on how to
treat the Spanish move and especially
what to recommend to Con-
gress.20
One of the problems that occurred during
the day was a Spanish
request for guidance on the terms to end
hostilities in Cuba. The
Spanish ministry had authorized General
Ramon Blanco in Havana
to make a proclamation but left the
details up to him. Blanco in turn
asked Polo de Bernabe for instructions
and if the United States gov-
ernment had any views which might guide
him. Blanco was prob-
ably puzzled about how to stop the
fighting and was seeking Amer-
ican assistance. Polo de Bernabe
presented this request in the
morning to Day, who replied that he had
no authority other than the
telegram sent to Madrid on March 29.
This asked for an armistice to
last until October 1, and if there was
no settlement, the president
would arbitrate. Angrily, Polo de
Bernabe replied that Spain had al-
ready rejected that procedure. After
Polo de Bernabe left the State
Department, Day immediately wrote a
memorandum of conversation
which he sent to the Spanish legation,
and showed to McKinley,
who approved his stand. Polo de Bernabe
later bitterly complained
to Elkins that the State Department
wanted every concession but did
nothing but disappoint Spain. He
characterized Day's position as "all
wrong, undiplomatic" and putting
him "in a wrong position before
his government." Elkins got Day to
withdraw his memorandum of
conversation, which calmed Polo de
Bernabe, but did nothing to an-
swer Blanco's request.21
During the rest of the day Polo de
Bernabe prepared a long mes-
sage which he gave to Day that evening.
In it he set forth all the posi-
tive steps Spain had taken to meet
United States demands culminat-
ing in the issuance of an immediate
suspension of hostilities. As for
the future, the Cubans could expect to
obtain "whatever changes
they may justly desire, within the
bounds of reason and of the na-
20. New York Times, April 11,
1898.
21. Day, Memorandum, April 10, 1898,
William R. Day Papers, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.; Elkins Journal, April
10, 1898, Elkins Papers.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 135
tional sovereignty."22 In
effect, Spain still clung to sovereignty over
Cuba and autonomy for the island.
At the same time that McKinley was
dealing with the Spanish
minister, he made a final attempt to get
the Cuban Junta to cooper-
ate. Rubens later explained that just
before McKinley's message went
to Congress, the president's emissary
told him that if the Cubans
agreed to the armistice, McKinley would
place a reference to Cuban
independence in his message. If they
refused, there would be no
mention of independence, and Rubens
rejected this half measure.
McCook reported to Elkins that the Junta
had decided to wait to see
what Congress would do, for it might
recognize Cuban independ-
ence as well as declare war on Spain. If
war came, the United States
would expel the Spanish and give Cuba
its independence. If Con-
gress took no action on McKinley's
message, McCook explained, the
Junta would then attempt to come to
terms with Madrid and was
considering paying Spain an indemnity of
up to $200 million to obtain
its independence.23 Thus, the
Cubans at this time would accept
nothing less than independence, while
Spain still provided only au-
tonomy.
The major question before McKinley's
cabinet was whether to ask
Congress for an additional delay in
order to determine what effect
Blanco's action would have on Cuban
events, an issue highlighted
by Woodford, who cabled McKinley
recommending continuation of
negotiations. Woodford believed the
Spanish government had gone
as far and as fast as it could and
predicted that if Spain were not
humiliated, it would provide before
August 1 a settlement either
through autonomy acceptable to the
insurgents, complete independ-
ence, or cession of the island to the
United States.24
McKinley's cabinet labored through the
afternoon and evening at-
tempting to reach consensus. First it
took up the draft message to
Congress which Day and Griggs had
authored and which had been
agreed upon earlier. This was reapproved
without any change of text.
The cabinet divided, however, over how
to treat Spain's ending of
hostilities. At one point McKinley's
cabinet decided to ask Congress
to delay action. McKinley then met with
a delegation of Republican
senators, among them Chairman Davis.
When the senators learned
that the president planned to request a
delay, they argued strenuous-
22. Polo de Bernabe to John Sherman,
Washington, April 10, 1898, Foreign Rela-
tions, 1898, 747-49.
23. Rubens, Liberty, 337-38;
Elkins Journal, April 11, 1898, Elkins Papers.
24. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April
10, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 747.
136 OHIO HISTORY
ly against it. They asserted that his
action would divide the Repub-
lican Party, and that failure to act now
would lead to a Republican
defeat in the coming November elections.
After a long discussion,
McKinley gave ground and modified his
message so that Congress
would have the responsibility of
deciding how to respond to the
Spanish armistice.25 The
president finally settled on these addition-
al words for his message to Congress:
"The Queen Regent of Spain
[has directed] General Blanco, in order
to prepare and facilitate
peace, to proclaim a suspension of
hostilities .... [which] will, I am
sure, have your just and careful
attention in the solemn deliberations
upon which you are about to enter."26
In essence, McKinley's at-
tempt to keep the peace had ended.
Unable to bring the Spanish
and Cubans together, he was unsuccessful
in convincing the congres-
sional leadership that he should
continue his efforts.
This day-to-day account shows that
during April McKinley made
a serious and coordinated effort to keep
the peace. When he came to
believe that the Queen Regent might
issue an armistice, he moved
quickly on a broad front to encourage
her. He tried to stop the fight-
ing in Cuba, which he thought would keep
Congress from declaring
war on Spain. It is remarkable that he
entrusted highly confidential
and potentially damaging messages to the
Vatican, particularly since
the Pope favored Spain, and Madrid used
his first message to em-
barrass him. Nevertheless, through the
Vatican backchannel, Mc-
Kinley dropped his demand for
presidential arbitration, gave assur-
ances about transferring the fleet,
promised not to recognize Cuban
independence, and volunteered to
pressure the Cuban Junta.
Although McKinley asked Spain to provide
an armistice, the Span-
ish government spoke of ending
hostilities, and eventually pro-
claimed a suspension of them. The
difference in wording between an
armistice and a suspension of
hostilities may be seen as a substantive
issue dividing the American and Spanish
governments.27 Madrid's
suspension suggested continued
non-recognition of the Cuban insur-
gents, while Washington's armistice
implied negotiation and agree-
ment with the rebels upon the terms of
ending the rebellion. Al-
though Spain announced as early as April
5 that it was considering
25. Cambon to Hanotaux, Washington,
April 11 and 12, 1898, N. S. 22, Espagne, Ar-
chives, Paris; Polo de Bernabe to
Gullon. Washington, April 10, 1898, Documentos
presentados de 1898, 1:171-72.
26. McKinley, Message to the Congress of
the United States, April 11, 1898, Foreign
Relations, 1898, 760.
27. Gould, The Presidency of William
McKinley, 83.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 137
ending hostilities and did not use
during the following days the
word armistice, American officials never
objected. Woodford, who
was closest to the Spanish, did not draw
any distinction between an
armistice and a suspension of
hostilities, and in his cables used the
terms synonymously. Day also made no
objection, and there was
none recorded from McKinley or his
cabinet officers. Rampolla also
used the term armistice to describe
Spain's suspension of hostilities,
and Ireland always referred to Spain's
action as an armistice. Since
American officials did not rebuke Madrid
for its proposal and even
welcomed the announcement when it came,
it appears that a differ-
ence of substance over Madrid's means of
terminating hostilities in
Cuba did not exist. After all, the
essential point for McKinley was to
stop the fighting in Cuba, which he
hoped would prevent a congres-
sional declaration of war; the
diplomatic realities and final arrang-
ements would follow in direct talks
between the Spanish and the Cu-
bans over the future of the island.
Having encouraged Spain to provide an
armistice, the president
became committed to seeing that Madrid's
action brought peace in
America, which was a more difficult
task. A major problem for Mc-
Kinley was trying to persuade the Cuban
insurgents to stop fighting.
From the start he realized that an
armistice would succeed only if
the Cubans accepted it, and that the
Cuban price for cooperation
was United States recognition of the
island's independence. Never-
theless, McKinley refused recognition
and chose instead to threaten
the Cuban leaders, a stance quite in
contrast to his sympathetic sup-
port of the Spanish Queen Regent.
Underlying McKinley's hard-line
was his conviction that the Cubans were
unfit to govern the island.
He believed the insurgents lacked a
government as defined by inter-
national practice and that they could
not restore order which was es-
sential to protect and promote American
interests. Moreover, he op-
posed placing United States armed forces
in the position of
intervening on the island as an ally of
Cuba or subject to Cuban sov-
ereignty.28 The president's
low opinion of the Cubans and his policy
of coercion rather than recognition
foreshadowed a troubled future
in Cuban-American relations.
McKinley delayed congressional action as
long as he could. He en-
couraged the Great Powers to present a
joint appeal to continue nego-
tiations in an effort to calm public
opinion. Due to Woodford's inept-
ness, the Spanish ministry postponed
suspending hostilities. By April
28. Ibid., 756-59.
138 OHIO HISTORY
10, even though the details were still
unknown, the Cuban insurgents
had rejected Madrid's initiative. As a
result McKinley gained little
support in Congress, and although the
president believed that Spain
should be given more time, he no longer
could prevent congressional
action. Actually, the struggle between
the president and Congress
over Cuban policy was rooted in the
constitutional system. Congress
had the power to declare war, and at
this turn in foreign affairs, it was
prepared to do it. By April 11 the
control of policy passed from
McKinley to Congress, and the Spanish
suspension of hostilities
made little difference.
Thus, McKinley's last attempts to
prevent war failed. Spain's initia-
tive did not come soon enough or go far
enough to win over either
Congress or the Cubans; and the former
asserted its constitutional
right to vote for war. It is ironical
that Spain gained international sym-
pathy and moral support for its actions,
while the president has been
criticized for going to war after Madrid
ordered a suspension of hos-
tilities in Cuba. After all, without
McKinley's efforts there would
have been no Spanish proclamation prior
to his message to Congress.
Moreover, he could have refused to work
with the Vatican or cut his
ties with Archbishop Ireland when the
Spanish cabinet on April 3
sought to embarrass him through his
association with the Pope. It
would have been easy on April 6 for
McKinley to have turned over
the Cuban issue to Congress and never
have had to worry about
Madrid's last-minute suspension of
hostilities. It is remarkable that
McKinley's strenuous attempts to keep
the peace, after many around
him had given up, resulted in lasting
criticism of his presidency.
JOHN OFFNER
President McKinley's Final Attempt to
Avoid War With Spain
By April 1, 1898, war between the United
States and Spain seemed
certain. Rebellious Republican
congressmen had forced President
William McKinley's diplomatic pace by
threatening to join Democrats
in declaring war, and were kept in line
only by promises that the pres-
ident would shortly turn over the Cuban
issue to Congress. McKinley
had informed the Spanish government of
his terms for a settlement,
and Madrid's March 31 response was
unsatisfactory. Although dip-
lomatic relations were not yet ruptured,
negotiations on both sides
were suspended, as McKinley prepared to
ask Congress to authorize
military intervention. During the first
ten days of April, however,
there was a final attempt to maintain
peace. By April 5 McKinley was
working with the Vatican, the Spanish
Queen Regent, Great Britain,
and the Cuban Junta to find a means to
calm the American public
and stave off congressional action. An
examination of McKinley's last
effort to keep the peace sheds light on
his Spanish diplomacy, his re-
lations with the Cuban Junta, and the
role of Congress in the crisis.1
John Offner is Professor of History at
Shippensburg University.
1. Because the McKinley administration
decided on April 1 to intervene militarily
in Cuba, historians have provided a
variety of explanations for the diplomatic events
which occurred during the following
ten-day period. Authors have usually explained
the initiatives of the Vatican, the
appeals of the European powers, and the last-minute
Spanish proclamation of a suspension of
hostilities as only tangentially associated with
McKinley's diplomacy. Philip Foner also
included the Cubans, but he did not see
them as playing a meaningful part. For
contemporary interpretations of this period, see:
Margaret Leech, In the Days of
McKinley (New York, 1959), 178-87; Ernest R. May, Im-
perial Democracy; The Emergence of
America as a Great Power (New York,
1961),
151-58; H. Wayne Morgan, America's
Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Over-
seas Expansion (New York, 1965), 54-60; Julius W. Pratt, "The
Coming War with
Spain," in Paola E. Coletta, ed., Threshold
to American Internationalism: Essays on the
Foreign Policies of William McKinley (New York, 1970), 56-62; Philip S. Foner, The
Spanish-Cuban-American War and the
Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, 2
vols. (New York, 1972), 1:254-61;
Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of Ameri-
can Foreign Relations, 1865-1900 (New York, 1976), 262-74; Lewis L. Gould, The Presi-
dency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980), 81-86; and David F. Trask, The
War with Spain in 1898 (New York, 1981), 40-52.