Ohio History Journal

ROBERT EARNEST MILLER

 

War Within Walls: Camp Chase and

the Search for Administrative Reform

 

The historical literature about Civil War military prisons can be di-

vided into three major categories: prisoners' accounts, accounts of

the camp administrators, and subsequent historical analyses.¹ Inter-

est in how captives lived in these prisons, North and South, has nev-

er abated. The historian's desire to find out what prison life was real-

ly like, however, has been frustrated by the utter disparity between

the accounts of the prisoners and their keepers. That such a dispari-

ty exists should not be surprising, for there is seldom a consensus be-

tween the ruler and the ruled. In a prison environment the absence of

freedom often engenders bitter memories among its inmates regard-

less of the actual conditions. This sense of bitterness, which is con-

veyed in most contemporary diaries or journals of former prisoners, is

often accentuated in accounts written later in life.² The official rec-

 

 

 

Robert Earnest Miller is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Cincinnati.

 

1. For accounts of the prisoners' perspective of Camp Chase see: Joe Barbiere,

Scraps From The Prison Table (Doylestown, Pa., 1868), 80-250; W. H. Duff, Terrors and

Horrors of Prison Life or Six Months a Prisoner at Camp Chase (New Orleans, 1907),

10-25; John H. King, Three Hundred Days in a Yankee Prison: Reminiscences of War

Life Captivity (Atlanta, 1904), 4-86; and George C. Osborne, ed., "A Confederate Pris-

oner at Camp Chase-Letters and a Diary of Private James W. Anderson," Ohio State

Archeological and Historical Society Quarterly, 59 (December, 1950), 45-57. The ad-

ministrators' perspective of the northern and southern prison systems has been pre-

served in R. N. Scott, et al., ed., A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and

Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion, 135 vols. (Washington, D. C.,

1880-1901), 2d. ser., 1-8 (hereafter cited as War of the Rebellion). The second series is

devoted to the records and correspondence among prison administrators. Subsequent

historical analysis of Civil War military prisons has been largely confined to case stud-

ies of individual prisons. See Phillip R. Shriver and Donald J. Breen, Ohio's Military

Prisons During the Civil War, (Ohio Civil War Commission, 1964), 3-29; Gilbert F.

Dodds, Camp Chase: The Story of a Civil War Post, prepared for the Franklin County

Historical Society (circa. 1961), 1-5, available at the Ohio Historical Society (OHS);

and Edward Earl Roberts, "Camp Chase," (M. A. Thesis, Ohio State University,

1940), 1-56. One notable exception is the comprehensive and comparative study of the

northern and southern prisons in William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons: A Study of

War Psychology (Columbus, Ohio, 1930), 34-209.

2. This is particularly true in the accounts of King and Duff.

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34                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

ords, inspections, and correspondence between the local and federal

administrators of the northern prisons tend to suffer from similar

types of limitations and biases. Thus, only through a careful sifting of

the two perspectives can the historian develop a balanced view of

the living conditions in these military prisons. This essay is an at-

tempt to evaluate the conditions in one such prison, Camp Chase near

Columbus, Ohio.

One interpretation of prison life at institutions such as Camp Chase

was offered in William Hesseltine's classic study entitled Civil War

Prisons: A Study Of War Psychology. Hesseltine argued that living

conditions in the northern prisons steadily deteriorated throughout

the war. He attributed the poor treatment of southern prisoners to

a "war psychosis" which developed in the North. According to

Hesseltine, northern authorities became convinced, chiefly by news-

paper accounts, that Union prisoners were being deliberately mis-

treated and even starved to death. The northern authorities suppos-

edly retaliated against this perceived mistreatment by consciously, or

unconsciously, abusing their Confederate captives. During the cen-

tennial celebration of the Civil War, Phillip R. Shriver and Donald J.

Breen supported Hesseltine's argument. They suggested that north-

ern prisons reduced the Confederate prisoners' rations late in the war

in retaliation for the horrid conditions that existed at Andersonville,

Georgia.³

What happened at Camp Chase, however, does not conform to

that pattern, for prisoners' living conditions there generally improved

throughout the war. Although initially in a state of disorder, Camp

Chase eventually became one of the most ably administered camps

in the North. Without a doubt the early years at Camp Chase were

unsatisfactory, but poor provisions and unsanitary conditions at that

time reflected the general inexperience of the local prison administra-

tors rather than a conscious design to mistreat the prisoners. More-

over, this inexperience was exacerbated by an ongoing conflict

among local, state, and federal authorities during the early part of the

war. In his brief history of the camp Gilbert F. Dodds concluded-

and this author agrees-that by 1864 many of these shortcomings

had been corrected and Camp Chase had become one of the most

orderly and well-disciplined camps in the North.⁴ Dodds does not

explain, however, why it took over three years for the prison admin-

 

 

3. Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 173-209, and Shriver and Breen, Ohio's Military

Prisons, 5-6.

4. Dodds, Camp Chase, 1-4.

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War Within Walls                                            35

 

istrators to confront and deal effectively with the problems facing

them.

One way to understand the confusion that plagued the local ad-

ministrators at Camp Chase, particularly during the early years of the

war, is to examine the Union government's virtual unpreparedness to

deal with large numbers of prisoners. At the outbreak of war in April

1861 the Union government lacked a comprehensive plan for dealing

with prisoners of war. The ultimate responsibility of caring for Con-

federate prisoners rested on the shoulders of Secretary of War Simon

Cameron. By a precedent established during the War of 1812, how-

ever, that responsibility was in turn delegated to the Army's quarter-

master general, who was General M. C. Meigs.⁵

When the ground for Camp Chase was broken, at the direction of

General William S. Rosecrans on April 19, 1861, the camp was de-

signed primarily to serve as a training center for new recruits. During

the war the camp took on additional duties, serving also as a center

for paroled Union soldiers, a place to muster out soldiers who had

completed their terms of enlistment, and, of course, a prison for Con-

federate soldiers. Camp Chase, named after Treasury Secretary Sal-

mon P. Chase, was situated four miles west of Columbus, Ohio. It

was constructed on flat land, making it suitable for drilling recruits.

Early in the war, three adjoining prisons were constructed on its

grounds. The prisons, which occupied only a small part of the

camp's acreage, were surrounded by wooden fences about twelve

feet high. Two interior fences divided the prison area into three rec-

tangular enclosures, unequal in size.⁶

Throughout the summer of 1861 little effort was devoted to organ-

izing a cohesive system of military prisons in the North. Since both

the North and South lacked the facilities to house large amounts of

prisoners early in the war, alternatives to incarceration were devised.

Prisoner exchanges were facilitated and coordinated through mili-

tary Departmental commanders, while another common practice was

to parole prisoners almost as rapidly as they were captured. Not sur-

prisingly, then, the first Confederate prisoners to arrive at Camp

Chase, twenty-three men from the Twenty-third Virginia Cavalry

Regiment on July 5, 1861, stayed at the camp for only a few months.

 

 

 

5. Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, vol.

II (Cleveland, 1928), Appendix I, and Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 35-38.

6. Dodds, Camp Chase, 4, and War of the Rebellion, 2d ser., 5:195-208. Although

Camp Chase served a multipurpose role throughout the war, this study will deal only

with the camp as a military prison.

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36                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

They were paroled and sent home after agreeing not to bear arms

again for the duration of the war. This type of gentleman's agreement

proved to be both unenforceable and anachronistic as the numbers

of prisoners steadily increased. By the war's end the aggregate total

of prisoners of war for both the North and South was over 420,000.⁷

By the summer of 1861 the number of prisoners in the North began

to increase. General Meigs convinced Secretary of War Cameron to

create the position of commissary general of prisoners, and in October

1861 Lt. Colonel William Hoffman of the Eighth U.S. Infantry was se-

lected for the position. Ironically, Hoffman had been one of the first

Union soldiers to be captured by Confederate troops-in the unsuc-

cessful defense of a Federal arsenal in Texas in the early months of

the war. Because of his high rank, Hoffman had problems securing a

quick release from the Confederate authorities. After obtaining a

parole, however, he accepted his appointment and quickly went to

work. As commissary general of prisoners, Hoffman was charged

with organizing and supervising the military prisons in the North. His

immediate attempts to impose any kind of standardization over the

existing prisons in the North were frustrated by Secretary Cameron's

failure to notify Departmental commanders of Hoffman's appointment

as commissary general. These commanders frequently exercised their

own discretion in dealing with prisoners of war.⁸

Although Camp Chase remained primarily a center for recruit in-

struction throughout 1861, it was steadily accumulating a growing

number of military and civilian prisoners. Political dissidents and

southern sympathizers in Kentucky and what would soon become

West Virginia were frequently arrested and sent to either Camp

Chase or a federal post in Wheeling, [West] Virginia. The civilians,

unlike the soldiers, benefitted from no means of quick release. Their

stay tended to last much longer than the military prisoners.⁹

In December 1861, one such civilian prisoner, A. J. Morey, editor of

The Cythiana News (Cythiana, Kentucky), provided one of the ear-

liest (and bleakest) descriptions of the living conditions at Camp

Chase. The prison grounds contained "about half an acre of ground

inclosed by a plank wall nearly twenty-five feet high, with towers on

two sides." The prisoners lived in "two rows of board shanties with

five rooms (16 by 18 feet) in each. In these small rooms, each oc-

 

 

7. William H. Knauss, The Story of Camp Chase: A History of Confederate Prisons

and Cemetaries (Nashville and Dallas, 1906), 111, and Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons,

269-79.

8. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 3:156.

9. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:195-208.

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War Within Walls                                            37

 

cupied by about twenty-five men," Morey complained, "men of eve-

ry class and grade are huddled together and treated as felons."

Morey's critique of the prison environment was as thorough as it was

scathing. The shanties "leaked badly." Prisoners were poorly clad

and ill-fed. "The food furnished the prisoners with exception of the

bread was the most inferior kind and in insufficient quantities for the

sustenance of the famishing men. The pork was absolutely rotten."10

The slow development of a centralized federal structure in the

North's prison system helps to explain the intolerable dietary, sani-

tary, and housing conditions at Camp Chase. In the early months of

1862 two forces operating against Hoffman prevented him from quick-

ly establishing an efficient, hierarchical administrative system. First,

Departmental commanders continued to exercise jurisdiction over

prisoners captured in their areas and frequently ignored Hoffman's

directives regarding the treatment and disposition of prisoners. Sec-

ond, because no clear line of federal authority had yet been estab-

lished, particularly over some of the newer prisons, daily administra-

tion of them remained largely in the hands of local authorities.

It was not until the fall of Fort Donelson in February 1862 put 15,000

Confederate prisoners in Union hands that Hoffman decided to

make Camp Chase a permanent military prison. Over 3000 of them,

largely officers, were sent to Camp Chase, which helped justify the

change in the camp's status. Despite the change to a permanent mili-

tary prison, there was relatively little interaction between federal au-

thorities and the local camp administrators. One exception to this

occurred in late May 1862 when local authorities urgently requested

the presence of "regulars" to suppress the rising insubordination of

the prisoners. Colonel Granville Moody, the prison's commandant,

was convinced that an uprising was imminent because the prisoners

were openly defying the established rules. Colonel H. B. Carrington,

commander of the infantry regiment at Fort Thomas, just north of Co-

lumbus, responded to Moody's call for assistance. Carrington later

recalled that conditions at the prison were as dire as Moody had de-

scribed them. "Occupants of the different barracks would pelt sen-

tries with hunks of bread; jeer at them on the sentry platforms, step

across the clearly indicated 'dead line', sing aloud, and go from

building to building during sleep with undisguised contempt...."11

 

10. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 1:543-46.

11. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:448 and Colonel H. B. Carrington, "Official Re-

port of Colonel H. B. Carrington, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, to the Governor of Ohio,

June 1, 1862," Printed Materials Collection, OHS. Henry Beebe Carrington (1824-1912)

helped organize the state militia in Ohio in 1857. In May 1861, shortly after the war be-

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38                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

According to Carrington's June 1862 report, the mere presence of the

well-disciplined regular troops in their full-dress uniforms intimi-

dated the prisoners sufficiently to restore order.¹²

News of such problems coupled with complaints by citizens about

the absence of military authority at Camp Chase persuaded Colonel

Hoffman to send his aide, Captain H. M. Lazelle, to inspect the three

prisons at the camp. Lazelle's report of July 13, 1862, was filled with

disturbing revelations. In the absence of strong federal leaderhip lo-

cal political and military authorities had competed for control of the

prisons. Since the camp was originally formed as a training center for

the state militia, Ohio Governor David Tod considered himself the

supreme authority over it. Lazelle reported to Hoffman that Tod "pa-

roles the prisoners within the limits of the town [Columbus] and

gives instructions to Colonel Allison, the commanding officer, relating

to their control and discipline."¹³

Lazelle found Governor Tod anxious to expand his powers over the

prisons. Conversely, Colonel C. W. B. Allison, who had just replaced

Colonel Moody, was reluctant to exercise any authority without the

governor's permission. Lazelle commented with no small amount of

chagrin that the "commanding officer of the camp is uncertain and in

constant doubt as to whom he should go for instructions, which to-

gether with his ignorance of his duties quite over-powers him."¹⁴

The chaotic conditions at Camp Chase were, then, present in large

measure because the federal authorities had not yet established a

clear line of authority.

Lazelle described the administrative structure he found in July

1862. A noncommissioned officer at each prison was responsible for

nearly every administrative duty; these ranged from procuring food,

clothing, and necessary supplies for the prisoners, to maintaining a

clean and healthy environment, as well as order and discipline.

These men were the only symbols of authority other than the com-

manding officer. The tremendous scope of their responsibilities, in

Lazelle's estimation, prevented them from effectively performing any

one of them.15

 

 

gan, Colonel Carrington was put in command of the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry and was

in charge of the Regular Army in Ohio. In November 1862 he was promoted to Briga-

dier General. During the war, Carrington presided over a military tribunal that ex-

posed the activities of the Sons of Liberty (originally known as the Knights of the

Golden Circle), a secret society of southern sympathizers and Peace Democrats.

12. Carrington, "Official Report."

13. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:195-208.

14. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:206.

15. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:195-208.

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War Within Walls                                            39

Lazelle recommended that a more sophisticated administrative structure, one based on that of the Union army, be established for the prisons. A staff of officers would be assigned to work under the commanding officer. These officers were to have specific responsibil- ities: a quartermaster would attend to the physical repairs around the camp, a commissary would weigh and inspect the prisoners' provi- sions, and duty officers would see that the prison grounds were po- liced twice each day. Administrative reform of the prisons offered certain advantages. It helped to define the limits of Tod's authority and subsequently helped to reduce conflict between the governor and the commanding officers at Camp Chase. The federal authorities were also able to establish a better working relationship with the camp's administrators. With better communication between Colum- bus and Washington, a more efficient operation, one more responsive to the prisoners' needs, would result. By the summer of 1862, Colonel Hoffman was recognized as the supreme authority regarding Confed- erate prisoners. More than administrative reform was needed, how- ever, to solve the problems facing Camp Chase.16       16. Ibid.

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40                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Lazelle's detailed report to Colonel Hoffman in July 1862 de-

scribed other major problems facing Camp Chase. His inspection re-

vealed, among other things, the inadequacy of housing conditions in

the prisons. The barracks had been constructed in 1861 to meet the

immediate demands placed upon the prisons. The haste in which

the living quarters were built and the lack of standardization be-

tween them indicated a general disregard for any long-range plans

involving Camp Chase at that time.17

He made separate reports about each of the three prisons, begin-

ning with number three, the largest. At this time, nearly 1100 enlisted

men were held there. The men were divided into messes of eighteen

men, who were housed in small buildings, twenty feet by fourteen

feet, scattered across the prison grounds in clusters of six. Narrow al-

leys separated the clusters. Lazelle noticed that "all the quarters not

shingled leaked in the freest manner" and that even the barracks

with good roofs tended to leak through the sides because of "de-

fects" in the boards.18 His major concern about the barracks, how-

ever, was the lack of ventilation. This condition existed because the

foundations of the buildings rested directly on the ground. Water

gathered underneath the floorboards when it rained, where it re-

mained. For these reasons, Lazelle recommended that the floors of

all buildings be elevated at least six inches above the ground.¹⁹

These inadequate housing conditions were aggravated by the fact

that the prisoners were required to cook their meals in these small

buildings. Lazelle echoed the prisoners' complaints when he noted

that the men "are heated to an insufferable extent by the stove,

which in all weathers, drives the prisoners to the boiling sun or rain

to avoid the heat."²⁰ By demanding higher standards for the Con-

federate prisoners of war, Lazelle demonstrated that the Union army

could be its own worst critic.

Prison number two was much smaller. It contained about 250 pris-

oners. There were three long buildings in this prison, each one hun-

dred feet by fifteen and divided by cross partitions at eighteen-foot

intervals. Two of these barracks were, in Lazelle's estimation, "well

constructed." They had good shingled roofs and, most importantly,

their foundations were elevated. The third building, unfortunately,

had a flat leaky roof and was mired in the muddy ground. The third

prison, number one, housed about 150 Confederate officers in two

 

17. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:198-99, and Dodds, Camp Chase, 1-2.

18. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:198.

19. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:199.

20. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:198.

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War Within Walls                                                 41

 

buildings similar to those in prison number two. Both buildings were

in good repair and were raised off the ground. A small hospital encir-

cled by a tall fence was also in this prison.²¹

Like most visitors to the camp, Lazelle made note of the poor

drainage conditions and the threat that they posed to the health of

the prisoners. He reported that "a terrible stench everywhere pre-

vails, overpowering the nostrils and stomach of those not impermeat-

ed [sic] with it."²² The poor drainage conditions of all three prisons

posed a two-fold problem: the flat ground prevented the runoff of

both rain water and sewage. Governor Tod and Colonel Allison were

both convinced that this problem had only one solution. They im-

plored Lazelle to get Hoffman's authorization to relocate the camp,

but Lazelle turned a deaf ear to this suggestion. Although drainage

conditions were bad, he felt that they were correctable.²³

Lazelle directed the quartermaster of the camp to clean out the

main drain of the camp and have it covered with planks. He asserted

that "the free use of lime at all times in the privies" would help to re-

duce their stench. He also ordered the quartermaster to organize the

prisoners for "the digging of vaults [privies], whitewashing, draining,

grading and constructing roads and walks in each camp...." 24

Another problem facing the local administrators in July 1862 was

how to maintain a proper diet for the prisoners. In his report Lazelle

flatly stated that the provisions and supplies issued to the prisoners

were "inferior." The beef and pork were spoiled; the vegetables

were of the lowest quality. The poor quality of rations was directly re-

lated to the maladministration of the prisons. One of Lazelle's recom-

mendations for Colonel Allison was to appoint an officer to be respon-

sible for the commissary. This person would observe the weighing

and receiving of provisions sold to the prisons by contractors.²⁵ Ear-

ly efforts by the local administrators to provide clothing and blan-

kets for the prisoners were equally misguided. When Captain Lazelle

confronted Colonel Allison with the fact that many prisoners were in

rags, the latter responded that he intended to "make their [the pris-

oners'] friends clothe them."²⁶

 

 

21. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:198-99.

22. Ibid.

23. One of the natural side effects of the poor drainage at Camp Chase that left a

lasting impression on many who visited the camp was the muddy grounds. See War of

the Rebellion 2d, ser., 1:543-546, for an early (1861) description of these conditions. See

also The Daily Times (Cincinnati), March 3, 1862, which comments on mud "six inches

deep" and Osborne, ed., "A Confederate Prisoner," 51.

24. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:201.

25. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:202-03.

26. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:199.

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42                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Lazelle was initially sent to Camp Chase to investigate citizens'

complaints about the absence of military authority at the camp. Pa-

roled Confederate officers, it had been reported, were allowed to

stroll the streets of Columbus in full-dress uniform, frequenting the

most expensive restaurants and hotels. Lazelle did not seem alarmed

at these claims. Perhaps he was preoccupied with more pressing con-

ditions at Camp Chase.²⁷

When Lazelle arrived at Camp Chase in July 1862, he was horri-

fied at the complete absence of military discipline, in every sense of

the word. Not only had Governor Tod paroled several prisoners to

the city, he had also allowed prisoners to see their friends in regular-

ly scheduled "interviews." He had also arranged "for the benefit of

all curious people a regular line of omnibuses running daily from the

capitol to the quarters." Lazelle lamented that "the object seems to

be to make Camp Chase popular."²⁸

The carnival-like atmosphere soon disappeared. Security proce-

dures that fostered discipline and order were implemented. Prison-

ers were routinely searched on their initial entry into the prisons, and

officers and enlisted men were separated. Mail going in and out of the

prisons was inspected before delivery, and any objectionable refer-

ences were censored. Lazelle helped upgrade the level of security at

Camp Chase. He instructed the quartermaster to construct eight

"strong cells" next to the outer guardhouse to confine disobedient

and violent prisoners. He also ordered the quartermaster to complete

construction of sentry galleries along the tops of the outer fence; the

guard watch could then encircle all four sides of the prisons. During

the summer of 1862, Hoffman kept a watchful eye on Camp Chase,

making sure that proper security procedures were employed. He ad-

monished Allison when he learned that the latter had been offering

rewards for the capture of escaped prisoners. Hoffman believed that

such a policy encouraged guards to be careless in their duties so that

they could collect rewards.²⁹

Lazelle had fulfilled his duty of inspecting the prisons. He had re-

placed an inefficient system of administration with an hierarchically

structured organization that would be responsive to Colonel Hoffman

and General Meigs. By enhancing the military administration at

Camp Chase, the federal authorities hoped to diminish the power

that Governor Tod exercised over the prisons.

 

27. Knauss, The Story of Camp Chase, 232-35, and War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser.,

3:498-500.

28. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:197.

29. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 4:548.

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War Within Walls                                          43

 

More importantly, Lazelle made several recommendations to the

local prison officials to improve housing and sanitary, dietary, and se-

curity conditions. But Hoffman and Lazelle did not expect these

changes to occur overnight. Realistically, they expected progress to

be slow. Their feeling was predicated upon what they felt was an ab-

sence of leadership at Camp Chase. Both men knew that the best

and the brightest of the Union army's officers were not drawn to ad-

minister prison camps. In fact, the first commanding officers at Camp

Chase were not even soldiers. They were local amateurs masquerad-

ing in their assigned roles. Colonel Moody was a local Methodist

minister. His successor, Colonel Allison, was a lawyer, and in La-

zelle's opinion was "not in any degree a soldier; he is entirely without

experience and utterly ignorant of his duties and is surrounded by

the same class of people."³⁰

Lazelle returned to the camp in December 1862 for a follow-up in-

spection. During the interim, Colonel Allison had resigned his com-

mand. Before Lazelle could attend to his inspection, he was con-

fronted with the news that Major Peter Zinn, Allison's replacement,

was resigning on December 31. This rapid turnover of commanders

left young twenty-four year old Captain E. L. Webber in charge of the

prison.³¹

Lazelle's evaluation of the prisons was now surprisingly favorable.

He reported that the barracks were in "excellent condition, both as

regards to police and repair, with two or three exceptions in the roofs

of these buildings which I directed to be remedied." He found the

prison hospital "well supplied with wholesome food, cooking uten-

sils, fuel, medicine, and bedding." He was also impressed with the

extent of improvement in the quality of the prisoners' food. Lazelle

was probably gratified to see that some of his organizational sugges-

tions had become realities. Direct supervision of the receipt of food

by the commissary improved the quality of the provisions and elimi-

nated the corrupt practices of the contractors. Lazelle noted that

from "personal inspection and conversation with prisoners I am satis-

fied their food is wholesome and not in a single instance did I learn of

a complaint as to the quality and quantity of the food." Likewise, he

found "exceedingly few who were not sufficiently clothed." If they

had the means to do so, prisoners could supplement their normal ra-

tions; a sutler operated a stand in each prison, and sold a variety of

goods, mostly food items, including apples, potatoes, onions, cab-

 

 

30. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:197.

31. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:132.

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44                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

bages, parsnips, and turnips. Lazelle concluded that the sutlers' sup-

plies were "proper and suitable, both in variety and quality."³²

By December 1862 the number of prisoners at Camp Chase had

dipped to 293, all of whom were placed in prison number two. In the

nearly six months since Lazelle's previous visit, over thirteen hun-

dred prisoners had been exchanged. This exchange system, how-

ever, broke down in the spring of 1863, and was suspended until the

final months of the war when southern defeat was imminent. Conse-

quently, during the later years in the war, prisoners' internment was

lengthened and prison facilities in the North as well as the South

were taxed beyond their limits. Meanwhile, with a manageable num-

ber of prisoners, the amateur administrators had an opportunity to

organize the security of the prison. Sentinels on parapets that rested

on the twelve-foot-high fence stood guard over the prisoners. During

the night the four inside corners of the prison were lit by "ordinary

street lights, thus placing the whole prison at all times under the sur-

veillance of the guard," according to Lazelle, "insuring the complete

security of the prisoners."³³

For the most part, Lazelle was satisfied with the progress the pris-

on administrators had made. Real improvements could be seen in

the living quarters, health care, and the quality of provisions issued

to the prisoners. Lazelle indicated disappointment, however, that

the commanding officers had failed to regularly whitewash the bar-

racks. Also, some of the barracks had not yet been elevated. Most

importantly, the local authorities had failed to address the poor

drainage conditions. Lazelle's suggested measures of grading and

draining the grounds had not been consistently effected.³⁴

The prison population continued to decrease throughout the spring

of 1863. Prisoners were continuously being transferred north to John-

son's Island, on Lake Erie, and east to Forts Warren and Delaware, in

Massachusetts and Delaware respectively. In April 1863 over 500 Con-

federate prisoners were transferred to Fort Delaware, thus enabling

Captain Webber to provide separate accommodations in prison num-

ber three for three Tennessee women accused of spying.³⁵

Conditions at the prisons seemed to be gradually improving during

the spring of 1863. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, command-

 

 

32. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:133-35, 202-03, and Dodds, "Camp Chase," 3-4.

33. Randall, J. G. and Donald, David, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston,

1969), 333-39; Duff, Terrors and Horrors of Prison Life 11-12; and War of the Rebellion,

2d. ser., 5:135.

34. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:133.

35. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:247, 448.

• 12
 

War Within Walls                                            45

 

ing the Department of the Ohio, issued General Order No. 36 on

April 21. This order revoked the parole Governor Tod issued to sev-

eral Confederate officers who had been captured in the fall of Fort

Donelson.³⁶ Exactly at the time order was being restored to the pris-

ons, Colonel Hoffman ironically complained to Burnside about the

"great want of discipline" at Camp Chase. Hoffman's complaint was

ambiguous; he claimed that there was a need for "better discipline

and better control" but did not refer to any particular grievance. Nor

did he identify the source of his information. In the same note to

Burnside, Hoffman revealed his intention to transfer the remaining

prisoners at Camp Chase.³⁷

News of Hoffman's decision did not formally reach Camp Chase

until May 11, 1863. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and Hoffman

desired to convert the prisons into a temporary place of confinement

for military prisoners, with one of the smaller prisons to remain as a

holding center for political prisoners. Hoffman was confident that

prison number three, which had recently been closed, would never

open its gates again.³⁸ The reasons for this sudden decision to re-

duce the role of Camp Chase remain unclear, but the consequences of

the decision were clear. For a short time, from May to July 1863, the

federal authorities were undecided as to what role Camp Chase

would play during the remainder of the war, and during this brief pe-

riod very few improvements in its facilities occurred. Federal authori-

ties were reluctant to authorize expenditures for improving a prision

that might be of little value in the future.

In May, Brigadier General John Mason, commanding Union forces

near Columbus, was granted the authority to authorize release of all

deserters from the Confederate army to help facilitate a reduction of

prisoners at the camp.³⁹ Consequently, the prison population at Camp

Chase was reduced to 380 by the end of June 1863. During the

month of July, however, the camp received more than two thousand

prisoners.⁴⁰ Nearly half of these men had been under the command

of General John H. Morgan of Kentucky. During one of his raids,

Morgan was captured near New Lisbon, Ohio. He was sent to the

state penitentiary, but most of his soldiers were sent to Camp Chase.

 

 

 

36. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:504, 517.

37. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:593.

38. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:448.

39. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:593.

40. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 8:986-1003. By July 1862 most of the prisons in the

North had adopted a uniform system for reporting monthly prisoner rolls to Washing-

ton. These monthly reports offer useful comparative data among the northern prisons.

• 13
 

46                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Evidently, the reputation of the raiders preceded their arrival at

the camp; their presence "stirred up the camp beyond all calcula-

tions.^"41

Throughout the summer and fall of 1863 Hoffman continued to de-

pend on the reports of his inspectors to help shape his opinions

about the living conditions in the northern prisons. A. M. Clark, Act-

ing Medical Inspector for Prisoners of War, made a tour of the military

prisons in the fall. On his inspection of Camp Chase on October 31,

1863, Clark found the prisoners' health to be "tolerably good"-

only fifteen of the 2145 prisoners were patients in the hospital. Clark

found the prison structures to be in generally good physical condi-

tion but complained about an almost total lack of ventilation. He was

also disappointed with the current commanding officer, Colonel Wil-

liam Wallace of the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, who, like his prede-

cessors, had not seriously attempted to correct the prisons' "utterly

inefficient" sewage and drainage conditions. He attributed the pris-

ons' two prevalent diseases, pneumonia and diarrhea, to the poor

sanitary conditions.42

After another inspection of the prisons on January 7, 1864, Clark

suggested to Hoffman that the health conditions of the guards at

Camp Chase, members of the Eighty-eighth Ohio Volunteer Infan-

try, were not much better than those of the prisoners. Hoffman was

especially irritated that four cases of varioloid had recently broken

out among the guards, only to be met with virtual inaction by the

camp's acting medical officer. Clark said that "no measures had

been taken to prevent the spreading of the disease." He quickly or-

dered a sufficient supply of vaccine for the "immediate vaccination of

every person in or connected with the camp...."43

In January 1864 Hoffman was informed that four prisoners at Camp

Chase had been shot to death. He requested Colonel Wallace to in-

vestigate these shootings personally, and to submit detailed reports

to him regarding each incident. Instead, Wallace delegated the

chore to his second-in-command, Lt. Colonel A. H. Poten. Accord-

ing to Poten's reports, two of the shootings, one in September and the

other in November 1863, occurred because the prisoners refused to

stand away from the fence; after being warned to move, these men

were shot. This was a common security procedure among the military

 

 

41. Letter from Private John Lyndes, July 25, 1863, available at OHS.

42. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:479-80.

43. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:819. Varioloid was a mild strain of smallpox that

usually manifested itself in people who had been vaccinated or previously had small-

pox.

• 14
 

War Within Walls                                               47

prisons in the North. It was the other two shootings that concerned Hoffman. In both of these cases sentinels fired their guns into bar- racks when prisoners refused, after repeated warnings, to extinguish their light.44 Hoffman was not satisfied with Poten's explanations. He felt that they were "very unsatisfactory, being vague or general and without any evidence to support them."45 Poten's reports, moreover, con- tained an alarming tone. The case of Henry Hupman, of the Twentieth Virginia Cavalry, who was fatally wounded in his barracks demon- strated Hoffman's concerns. Poten reported that "as sad as this case may be, to wound a perhaps innocent man . . . it has proved to be a most excellent lesson, very much needed in prison-No. 1-as the rebel officers confined in that prison showed frequently before a dis- position to disobey the orders given them by our men on duty. They have since changed their mind."46 Hoffman was worried that secu- rity procedures had become too strict at Camp Chase, and he was concerned about the welfare of its prisoners. On January 29 he wrote Wallace again, ordering him to relieve Poten of his duties, pending further investigation of the necessity of the shootings. Hoffman was aware of mistreatment of Union soldiers in the southern prisons, and he was anxious to avoid duplicating such treatment in the North. In     44. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:1058. 45. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:892. 46. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:854.

• 15
 

48                                                 OHIO HISTORY

 

his letter to Wallace, Hoffman stated: "The rebels have outraged

every human and Christian feeling by shooting down their prisoners

without occasion and in cold blood, and it is hoped that Union sol-

diers will not bring reproach by following their barbarous exam-

ple."⁴⁷

What began as a simple request for information on Hoffman's part in

January escalated into a full-scale inquiry into the security procedures

of the prisons that dragged on until mid-March 1864. By that time,

Wallace had been relieved of command at Camp Chase. On March

17, Hoffman informed Secretary Stanton about the "gross neglect of

duty" on the part of Colonel Wallace. In two cases "where the senti-

nel had fired into the barracks in consequence of a light in the stove,

the circumstances were not such as to justify such harsh meas-

ures. ..."⁴⁸ Not surprisingly, one of the first actions taken by the

new commanding officer, Colonel William Pitt Richardson, was to is-

sue a list of standardized regulations for the sentinels at Camp Chase.

This list spelled out the duties and responsibilities of the sentinels

while on duty. It defined a chain of command and stated the justifia-

ble uses of firearms against prisoners.⁴⁹

Richardson had been severely wounded in his right shoulder at

Chancellorsville in May 1863 and was inactive until he was sent to

Camp Chase in early 1864. He greeted his new assignment as the pris-

ons' commandant with enthusiasm. As Wallace's successor, Rich-

ardson saw room for improvement in the administration of the pris-

ons. Richardson took steps to improve the health of the prisoners.

One prisoner, James W. Anderson, who arrived at Camp Chase in

April 1864, recalled that upon his arrival, he and the men he was

travelling with received the standard issue of clothing, "one blanket,

one change of underclothing, and clean shirts," and were ordered

by the provost marshal, Lieutenant S. L. Hammon, to wash them-

selves. The following day Hammon inspected the prisoners. One of

the men had not washed and was locked up in a small cell all day.

Personal hygiene was thus enforced daily, and the barracks were

swept to prevent the spread of vermin.⁵⁰

 

 

 

47. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:892-93.

48. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 6:1058.

49. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:1. Under these new regulations the guards' use

of firearms was restricted severely. In lesser violations, as in the previous case of Henry

Hupman, the guards were now required to call on the sergeant on duty before acting.

50. Osborne, ed., "A Confederate Prisoner at Camp Chase," 55. Richardson, a vet-

eran of the Mexican War, received his commission of Major of the Twenty-fifth Ohio

Volunteer Infantry when he helped raise two companies. Richardson was appointed

• 16
 

War Within Walls                                                  49

 

Colonel Richardson also improved the quality of the prisons' water

by having the wells deepened to fifteen feet. He did little initially,

however, to correct the camp's poor drainage and sewage problems.

Throughout the war the local authorities were convinced that only

one alternative existed: Camp Chase must be relocated to an area

with better natural drainage. Repeated efforts by the local authori-

ties to convince Hoffman of the absolute need to move the prisons

had failed. In the spring of 1864 Richardson tried a new tack and pe-

titioned Hoffman to move only one prison, number three, from the

east end of camp to the west where natural drainage was more suita-

ble. Hoffman, a cautious and thrifty administrator working within

the constraints of a tight budget, was reluctant to do so, as relocating

even one prison would be costly. Nevertheless, Hoffman had two dif-

ferent men investigate the feasibility of moving the prison at Camp

Chase. Neither report, the first in May 1864, the second in the fol-

lowing August, endorsed relocation. Both suggested that the drain-

age and sewage problems could be corrected at a minimum expense,

with the labor being performed by the prisoners.⁵¹

Despite efforts to professionalize the prison guards through in-

creased organization and standardized policies, Richardson was

forced to inform Hoffman of one of the most embarrassing escape at-

tempts in the history of Camp Chase.⁵² On July 4, 1864, several pris-

oners in prison number three rushed a seldom-used and poorly

guarded gate as a wagon was exiting from the prison. Twenty-one men

escaped but were recaptured almost immediately. One of the es-

capees, Private Ezekial A. Cloyd from Tennessee, was shot during

the attempt. His wound subsequently forced amputation of his arm

above the elbow. Hoffman, outraged, demanded that the guard be

increased each shift and that the sentinels be additionally armed

with revolvers. While this was a hard lesson for the 895 officers and

 

 

commander of the post early in 1864, and he remained in that position for the duration

of the conflict. In the fall of 1864 he was elected as the state's attorney general.

Richardson was rewarded for his efforts to improve the living conditions at Camp

Chase when in December he was promoted to Brevet Brigadier General. See White-

law Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals, and Soldiers, vol. 2 (Cincin-

nati, New York, 1868; reprint edition Columbus, 1893), 945-46.

51. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:51-52; 108-09 and 529-30.

52. Authorities conflict on the number of escape attempts by the prisoners. Knauss

referred to an attempt in 1861 but offered little information in The Story of Camp Chase,

111; King described two allegedly successful escapes that seem doubtful, if not unbe-

lievable, in Three Hundred Days in a Yankee Prison, 82; James Anderson described a

continual process of clandestine activity that was constantly foiled by informants.

Osborne, ed., "A Confederate Prisoner at Camp Chase," 48. All authors agree, how-

ever, on the attempt committed on July 4, 1864.

• 17
 

50                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

men of the Eighty-eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Richardson and

his men learned from their mistakes. No escape attempts of a compa-

rable magnitude were attempted during the remainder of the war.

More heavily armed guards, plus the construction of an outer fence

encircling the entire camp in the fall of 1864, frustrated most plans for

escape.53

Colonel Richardson supervised what he termed a "total rebuild-

ing of the camp and prisons" by the end of August 1864. Prior to that

period, it must have been disconcerting to members of the Sixteenth

and Twenty-fifth Louisiana Regiments Consolidated who were

marched into prison number two during this period of reconstruc-

tion. One of those men, W. H. Duff, recalled that "there were no

shelters of any kind only a few tents which were occupied by prison-

ers already there before we came.⁵⁴ The condition did not last long.

New barracks were constructed in prisons number two and three be-

fore the chill of winter arrived.⁵⁵

Two other prisoners, John H. King and James W. Anderson, who

arrived four months prior to Duff, witnessed the entire process of re-

construction. They were able to observe, if not appreciate, the tre-

mendous transformation in the physical conditions of the barracks.

King noted that although the quality of the structures had im-

proved, it was not long before they became overcrowded. The new

quarters were constructed just in time to accommodate the steady in-

flux of new prisoners who arrived in the fall of 1864. From the end of

July through October, the number of prisoners dramatically rose

from 1881 to 5458. 56

Anderson described his new living quarters in prison number

three as a small room, about twenty-four feet square, with a stove in

the middle. Bunk beds occupied about one-third of the floor space.

The overcrowded conditions in his barrack caused Anderson to

comment in his diary that "we are just about as thick as we can be to

'Stir with a Stick'." Anderson was transferred to prison number one

in December, where he remained until his release in February 1865.

The transfer proved to be advantageous. Prison number one retained

 

 

 

53. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:474; 584-85; and 591. See also Francis P. Weisen-

burger, Columbus During the Civil War (Ohio Civil War Commission, 1964), 16-20, who

argued that the outer fence was constructed around the camp to contain the Union sol-

diers' means of egress, not as a security measure aimed at the prisoners. This argument

is supported in War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:529.

54. Duff, Terrors and Horrors of Prison Life, 12.

55. Ibid., 14.

56. King, Three Hundred Days in a Yankee Prison, 179.

• 18
 

War Within Walls                                          51

 

its original structures but increased its acreage during the rebuilding

period in 1864.57

Improvements in the prisons' sanitary conditions in August 1864

were equally as significant as the reconstruction of the barracks.

The drainage and sewage problems that had plagued Camp Chase

throughout the war were finally resolved with the construction of a

large reservoir in prison number two. A prisoner's letter described

the new system: "Prison No. 2 had a large reservoir that contains sev-

eral hundred gallons which is filled each day and loosed to carry

away the filth that accumulates in a deep planked ditch thereby

keeping things quite clean."⁵⁸

During the same period in August 1864, efforts to grade and drain

the prison grounds were again renewed. During his stay at Camp

Chase, from August 1864 to February 1865, W. H. Duff remembered

that "the ground was at all times well drained."⁵⁹

The inspection officer of the camp, F. S. Parker, reported on Sep-

tember 3, 1864, that the efforts of Colonel Richardson helped to

change Camp Chase from a "detestable mud hole to a healthy well-

organized camp."⁶⁰ Without question, the elimination of stagnant

water and filth from the prison did much to improve the health con-

ditions of the prisoners. That these improvements were long overdue

cannot be denied. It took over three years to adopt Lazelle's sugges-

tions for improving the prisons' sanitary conditions. An unwillingness

among the local administrators to deal effectively with the drainage

problems, and their insistance of relocating the prisons, partly ex-

plains the delay. Also, Colonel Hoffman was reluctant to make any ex-

penditures late in the war unless absolutely necessary.

Richardson also supervised efforts to feed and clothe the prison-

ers properly. Two diametrically opposed viewpoints suggested that

neither the prisoners nor their keepers were satisfied with the prison-

ers' rations. B. R. Cowen, Adjutant General of Ohio, reported to

Stanton in August 1864 that "the sleek, fat, comfortable looking reb-

els were never better fed nor more comfortably situated." "This

may," he continued, "account for their resting so quietly under their

confinement." Cowen felt that the prisoners were being granted ex-

cessive indulgences. Many of the prisoners were receiving gifts of

food from friends, which Cowen felt was "an unpleasant contrast to

 

 

57. Osborne, ed., "A Confederate Prisoner at Camp Chase," 55.

58. Ibid.

59. Duff, Terrors and Horrors of Prison Life, 12.

60. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 5:135.

• 19
 

52                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

the treatment received by our soldiers now languishing in southern

prisons.^"61 Conversely, John H. King recalled in his memoirs during

the same period of the war that the administrators at Camp Chase

were actively and consciously involved in starving the Confederate

prisoners to death. "This starvation plan," King recalled, "brought

about the results which our barbarous enemies desired. The consti-

tutions of the helpless prisoners, however robust, were soon broken

down."⁶² If Cowen's views represented Hesseltine's "war psycho-

sis" of the North, King's remarks were imbued with a postwar psy-

chosis that infected much of the South. Both Cowen and King were

using the issue of the prisoners' rations to express their attitudes

about the war and the enemy.

James Anderson offered a more tenable description of the prison-

ers' rations. He described a typical meal: "At one time the fare con-

sisted of one-third of a pound of light bread, four ounces of beef,

beans, and soup." Anderson added that "though this was no feast,

it was enough to cultivate a good appetite." While this prisoner some-

times complained of hunger, he reasoned with himself that eating

more food in his present state of idleness would probably "breed

disease."63

During the late summer of 1864 the local administrators helped to

improve the general health of the prisoners by issuing a new set of

clothing to them. Even King, who was critical of almost every other

aspect of prison life, admitted that "as far as clothing, bedding, and

other apparel were concerned, we managed to get through the sum-

mer months without any real suffering.^"64

August 1864 clearly represented the pinnacle of administrative effi-

ciency at Camp Chase. Federal and local authorities were responding

to the needs of their prisoners, and reforms in housing and sanitary

condition, both long overdue, were finally enacted. Colonel Rich-

ardson stated with obvious pride and satisfaction that "the prison-

ers present a healthy appearance, being very much improved since

their arrival at this post, having comfortable clothing and good

healthy rations.^"65

The prison administrators, however, were unprepared to deal with

the thousands of new prisoners, many of whom arrived in tattered

rags. Problems in procurement hindered Richardson's efforts to

 

 

61. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:530.

62. King, Three Hundred Days in a Yankee Prison, 76.

63. Osborne, ed., "A Confederate Prisoner at Camp Chase," 49.

64. King, Three Hundred Days in a Yankee Prison, 74.

65. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:699.

• 20
 

War Within Walls                                              53

 

clothe these recent arrivals. In October he had to issue government

shoes, normally reserved for Union soldiers, to barefooted prisoners.

He complained to Hoffman in November that the supply of prisoners'

clothing was inadequate. Richardson's concern for the welfare of his

prisoners was admirable. Moreover, such humanitarian actions late in

the war totally contradict the notion of "war psychosis" as a guiding

force of prison administrators. Richardson's request for a better sup-

ply of clothing did not go unheeded. According to Anderson, during

the winter of 1864, he and all prisoners were issued "one blanket, one

change of underclothing, and a suit of common grey pants and coat."

He confided in his diary that he did not personally suffer from the

chilling winds because he had plenty of clothes, a fair share of blan-

kets, and comfortable quarters.⁶⁶ Anderson could have easily been

content to sit out the remainder of the war in relative comfort.

The gravest challenge facing Camp Chase's administrators in the

fall of 1864 was an outbreak of smallpox. Introduced into the prisons

in May of that year, it reached epidemic proportions by that fall.

Richardson's report to Hoffman, in October, revealed that "the

smallpox is prevailing in the prisons averaging ten cases per day." A

small building called the "pest house" was constructed outside of

the prison walls to quarantine the disease.⁶⁷ In early November

Richardson reluctantly reported that while "every precaution is

taken to prevent smallpox it is brought in by new arrivals and cannot

be guarded against.^"68 But in December he reported to Hoffman

that "the health of the prisoners is improving. Measures now adopt-

ed will soon eradicate smallpox."⁶⁹ Several improvements in sanitary

conditions, some with the aid of federal authorities and others inde-

pendent of it, helped attenuate the effects of the disease, and the

battle against smallpox ended in victory for the local administrators.

It also represented a private triumph for W. P. Richardson. Once de-

scribed as "intelligent but not very active in the discharge of his du-

ties" by Lt. Colonel John F. Marsh, a subordinate attached to the

Army's inspector-general's office, Richardson had proved worthy of

this challenge.⁷⁰

 

 

 

66. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:972, 1097, and Osborne, "A Confederate Prison-

er at Camp Chase," 49.

67. Duff, Terrors and Horrors of Prison Life, 19-20; King, Three Hundred Days in a

Yankee Prison, 86-90; Osborne, "A Confederate Prisoner at Camp Chase," 56; and War

of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:971-72.

68. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:1097.

69. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:1189.

70. War of the Rebellion, 2d. ser., 7:108-09

• 21
 

54                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

The war began to wind down during the winter of 1865, but the

prisoners remained restless. Tensions increased in January as the pris-

on population swelled to over 9000. Anderson wrote in his diary

about an incident in which forty or fifty prisoners "were fixed to

charge the guards and escape, but when the slightest demonstration

was made shots were fired." Anderson noted that one man was

severly wounded in the thigh and others lost all their money and

fine clothing as a result. Typically, prisoners caught trying to escape

lost any extra privileges they might have accumulated. When the in-

stigators could be discovered, they were removed from the prison

and placed in solitary confinement.71

By this late date in the war some prisoners began to turn their at-

tention to the day they would be released. The final entry of Ander-

son's diary, dated January 18, 1865, reflected his eagerness to return

home. "So I end My pilgrimage in these parts and go to [the] field of

a fairer clime.^"72 The first prisoners were not released as a unit,

however, until February 12, 1865. A parole exchange was arranged

between Union and Confederate authorities, initially only for non-

commissioned officers and enlisted men, but one for officers soon

followed. W. H. Duff and members of his regiment were among the

first 500 prisoners to be released. They left the camp "with glad

hearts."⁷³ John King was also released in February. To his "inex-

pressable joy," he was able to leave the "long detested prison that

for three hundred weary days had been my horrible lodging

place."⁷⁴

The overcrowded conditions that existed from January to March

1865 had a direct impact on the health of the prisoners. In January

the prisons contained over three times their recommended capacity.

In February the mortality rate of the prisoners peaked at over five

percent; in this one month alone 499 prisoners died. When the war

ended in April there were still over 5000 prisoners at the camp. These

remaining prisoners were slowly released throughout the spring. Fi-

nally, on July 5, 1865, the commanding officer at Camp Chase notified

the War Department that the last few Confederate prisoners had

been released.⁷⁵

It was by the fall of 1864 that Camp Chase, according to one histo-

rian, had become one of the most orderly and well-organized camps

 

 

71. Osborne, "A Confederate Prisoner at Camp Chase," 56.

72. Ibid., 57.

73. Duff, Terrors and Horrors of Prison Life, 23.

74. King, Three Hundred Days in a Yankee Prison, 96.

75. Dodds, "Camp Chase," 2.

• 22
 

War Within Walls                                          55

 

in the northern prison system.⁷⁶ The orderliness of the camp was a

reflection of the administrative efficiency that had developed at

both the local and federal levels. That developmental process was

complete by August 1864. A working partnership between the Office

of the Commissary-General of Prisoners and the local administrators

at Champ Chase emerged out of the maladministration and chaos of

the early months of the war. Together they were able to improve sev-

eral aspects of the prison environment. Necessary reforms in the pris-

oners' rations, housing, and sanitary conditions and the security of

the prison were implemented. That many of these reforms occurred

late in the wars suggests that living conditions actually improved,

rather than declined, as the war reached its final stages. Many of the

improvements also occurred while reports indicated that conditions

at Andersonville prison were worsening day-by-day.

Neither the conditions at Andersonville nor a "war psychosis" in-

terfered with the local or federal authorities commitment to improv-

ing the prison environment at Camp Chase. Three factors, however,

helped delay the rate of improvement in the living conditions at the

prisons. First, Colonel Hoffman failed to establish a clear line of au-

thority over the northern prisons until 1862 when, as a first step in ad-

ministrative reform, he sent Lazelle to Camp Chase to reorganize the

prisons' administrative structure in order to make it more responsive

to the needs of the prisoners. That this initial effort did not occur un-

til July 1862 helps explain the prisons' early chaos.

Second, the constant changes of command at Camp Chase also de-

layed the rate of improvement in the living conditions. Despite the

centralization of authority in northern prisons by mid-1862, the fre-

quent turnover of the prisons' commanding officers prevented an ef-

fective partnership between local and federal authorities. It was not

until March 1864, when Colonel Richardson became the permanent

commander of Camp Chase for the duration of the war, that long-

standing deficiencies in living conditions could be properly ad-

dressed. Under Richardsons's command, reforms encompassing

nearly every aspect of prison life were speedily enacted.

Third, fluctuations in the prison population led federal authorities,

from May through the end of July 1863, to believe that the northern

prisons should be consolidated. During this period Camp Chase's

worth was in question, and it was not clear whether the prisons

would remain. While the prisons' status remained in question, all at-

tempts by the federal authorities to improve the housing and sanitary

 

 

76. Ibid., 4.

• 23
 

56                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

conditions were delayed. By July 1863 Stanton and Hoffman read-

justed their estimates of the number of Confederate prisoners they

would have to accommodate, and any plans to consolidate the north-

ern prisons were shelved. But Hoffman continued to be reluctant to

authorize large expenditures for the prisons unless "absolutely neces-

sary." It was not until August 1864, for instance, that Hoffman author-

ized the reconstruction of the barracks. What cannot be emphasized

enough, however, is that improvements in prison conditions, no mat-

ter how gradual, eventually occurred.

While a "war psychosis" may have existed at some levels of the

Union army and government, it was anything but a guiding force in

the office of the commissary-general of prisoners. It is reasonable to

assume that Hoffman's policies for Camp Chase were not at great vari-

ance with those for the several other prisons in the North. The rec-

ord at Camp Chase, at least, suggests that relative progress in the

prisoners' conditions, rather than decline, occurred late in the war.

• 24