Ohio History Journal

R. DOUGLAS HURT

 

Ohio Agriculture Since World War II

 

 

The atomic bombs which exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki

in August 1945 not only ended the Second World War, but they also

marked the beginning of a new age. Thereafter, life was never quite

the same as it had been prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In-

deed, fundamental change, spurred by wartime industrialization and

economic need, characterized American life after the war. The histo-

ry of Ohio agriculture since World War II is the story of rapid techno-

logical, scientific, and economic change. During the Second World

War, many farmers, reared in the agricultural depression of the 1920s

and 1930s, experienced the first prosperity they had ever known.

With expanded production and high wartime prices, farmers in-

creased their cash income from $2.3 to $9.2 billion between 1940 and

1945, and they used it to purchase more land and machinery and to

pay off debts and save. The war years for most Ohio farmers were a

time of "Milk and Honey."1

Peace, however, brought new fears. Ohio farmers worried that

high prices would collapse and that an agricultural depression, simi-

lar to the one which followed the First World War, would erode

their wartime gains. Consequently, they looked not only to the feder-

al government for protection but also to science and technology to

help increase productivity thereby offsetting any income losses from

a decline in postwar prices. By late 1945, Ohio farmers eagerly

bought new twine binders, self-propelled combines, corn pickers,

 

 

 

 

R. Douglas Hurt is Associate Director of The State Historical Society of Missouri.

 

*I have not converted monetary figures to constant dollars. Therefore, comparisons

must be made judiciously.

 

1. Gilbert C. Fite, American Farmers: The New Minority (Bloomington, 1981), 87;

Newsweek, October 21, 1946. In 1945 the farm price index reached 123 with the years

1935 to 1939 = 100. Between 1940 and 1950, tractors increased from 89,999 to 182,481.

Milking machines increased from 20,059 in 1945 to 39,436 in 1950. Corn pickers were not

counted in 1945 Census of Agriculture, but by 1950, these machines totaled 34,691.

Over that same period, combines increased from 19,545 to 40,315 and trucks increased

from 38,670 to 56,861 on the reporting farms.

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Ohio Agriculture                                          51

 

and tractors despite scarcity and high prices. The increase in tractors

corresponded with a decrease in the number of horses needed for

draft; acreage, heretofore used for forage, could be shifted to crops

for human consumption. As a result, by the end of 1945 nearly 2.5

million acres had been freed for other agricultural purposes. Similar-

ly, in the northwestern portion of the state, sugar beet growers were

beginning to use machines for planting and blocking, thereby reduc-

ing human labor by as much as 30 to 50 percent.²

In the months that followed the end of the war, Ohio farmers also

increasingly adopted electrification. By December 1945, electricity

had become a "utility" rather than a "luxury" on Ohio farms. Elec-

tricity no longer just powered conveniences such as vacuum sweep-

ers, refrigerators, and light bulbs. Now it helped boost profits from

the dairy barn to the feed lot to the hen house by powering milk

coolers, feed grinders, and heating systems. At the close of 1945,

Ohio had more electrified farms than any other state in the union.

By mid-1947, six out of seven Ohio farms had electricity or access

to it. Little more than a year later, 97.6 percent of Ohio farms had

electricity-21 percent above the national average.³

Science also brought change to the Ohio farm after the war. Agri-

culturists began using heavy applications of chemical fertilizer to

ameliorate the problem of soil depletion caused, in part, by extensive

wartime production. They also began applying newly developed in-

secticides, such as DDT. When demonstrated at the Agricultural

Experiment Station in Wooster, DDT caused the "sensation of the

day." Farmers hailed it as a "Miracle Worker" and a "cure-all" for

insect control. Certainly, DDT turned out to be the "atom bomb" of

insecticides-capable of killing flies, mosquitoes, fleas, Colorado po-

tato beetles, Japanese beetles, leaf hoppers, and other insects. Alleg-

edly, it was "neither poisonous to the animals nor irritating to the op-

erator." By 1947, an estimated 95 percent of the commercial fruit

growers used DDT. During the late 1940s, Ohio farmers also began

using the preemergent herbicide 2,4-D in their cornfields. In the

beet fields alone, the petrochemical industry estimated that chemi-

cal weed killers cost growers only $5 per acre compared to cultivation

costs of $40 per acre for hand labor. Chemical technology seemed a

heaven-sent blessing. Although some people questioned the effects

of chemical pesticides and herbicides on the public health, most

 

 

 

2. Fite, American Farmers, 88-89; Ohio Farmer, August 4 and 18 and November 3,

1945, November 16, 1946, April 19, 1947, March 6, 1948.

3. Ohio Farmer, December 1, 1945, July 5, 1947, November 6, 1948.

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52                                                      OHIO HISTORY

 

Ohio farmers believed the postwar chemical industry had ushered

in a "golden age."⁴

Still, problems remained. By May 1949, surplus production caused

Ohio farm prices to plummet 26 percent while the cost of living

dropped only 3.5 percent. With this sharp price decline without a

corresponding decrease in operating costs, Ohio farmers began to feel

the "cost-price squeeze." Little did they know that it would plague

them for the next forty years and force many of them from their

farms. At the same time prices were falling, consumers, who outnum-

bered farmers about five to one nationwide, began revolting against

high food prices. Many consumers felt that government price sup-

ports increased the cost of food. In addition, every plan which prom-

ised to solve the complex problem of low prices, surplus production,

and government subsidies, also threatened to change fundamentally

agricultural life in Ohio. Moreover, brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis,

and Newcastles diseases continued to threaten livestock and poultry

producers, and black stem rust still damaged wheat, oats, barley,

and rye crops.⁵

Still, few states could compete with Ohio's agricultural wealth and

diversity during the late 1940s. Ohio rated among the leading pro-

ducers of milk, meat, grain, and eggs, and also was a leading state in

specialty crop production, such as tomatoes and nursery trees and

plants. During that time, dairymen also began making greater use of

artificial insemination to improve their herds, and cash grain farmers

sought larger yields by planting corn and soybean hybrids. By 1950,

Ohio farmers annually produced more than 168 million bushels of

corn which made it the most important cash crop. Wheat, oats, bar-

ley, and rye remained other major crops with production for all four

totaling approximately 96 million bushels annually. Hog raising was

the most profitable agricultural enterprise with $140 million annual

sales. In 1950, cattle sales reached $95 million while sheep, valued at

$18.5 million, ranked Ohio third in production behind Texas and

California.⁶

 

 

4. Ibid., September 4 and December 15, 1945, February 2, March 3, and June 1,

1946, June 21 and August 16, 1947, June 19 and July 17, 1948, May 7 and June 4, 1949,

December 1, 1951; Thomas R. Dunlap, DDT: Scientists Citizens and Public Policy

(Princeton, 1981), 17.

5. Ohio Farmer, January 5, 1946, January 3 and 17 and February 21, 1948; Official

Report of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, January 1949-June 1950, 17, 27.

6. Ohio Farmer, May 18, 1946; January 18, 1947, February 5 and April 16, 1949;

Census of Agriculture: Ohio, 1959, 7, 10-11; Annual Report of the Ohio Department of

Agriculture, 1948, 25, 76. During the late 1940s, dairying was mostly a sideline for Ohio

farmers. Productivity remained low and farmers still did not give adequate attention to

breeding, feeding, and herd management. Moreover, herds with fewer than ten cows

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Ohio Agriculture                                                    53

 

While science and technology contributed to higher productivity,

they also dramatically changed the emphasis and number of Ohio

farms. During the late 1940s, for example, farmers became increasing-

ly specialized and mechanized. That is, they relied on fewer crops

and more technology. At the same time, specialization and techno-

logical change contributed to the continued decline of the farm pop-

ulation and of the number of farms. In 1940, 1,070,299 Ohioans lived

on 233,783 farms. By 1950 the farm population had dropped to

853,088 on 199,359 farms. Urban expansion and the growth of farms,

which increased from an average size of 93.7 acres in 1940 to 105.2 in

1950, caused the reduction in number while many farm families and

agricultural workers left for better paying jobs elsewhere.⁷

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 temporarily allevi-

ated the farm problems of overproduction and low prices. As the de-

mand for agricultural commodities increased rapidly, farm prices cor-

respondingly rose sharply. High wartime prices were protected by

government policy which ensured 90 percent of parity; that is, a re-

turn equal to that which others received for their labor. This stimu-

lated farmers to expand production. By 1953, surplus production,

however, drove farm prices 10 percent below 1951 levels. The newly-

elected Eisenhower administration was unable to resolve immediate-

ly the farm problem, and surplus production and low prices contin-

ued to plague farmers. Indeed, between 1951 and 1956, Ohio farmers

felt the cost-price squeeze as never before. Prices declined 23 percent

while the cost of living remained about the same. As a result, more

people left the farm. Between 1950 and 1954, 22,000, or approximately

12 percent, of Ohio's farm families left their land to seek a better life

elsewhere. During that same period, the number of farms declined

by 11 percent.8

 

 

 

did not justify mechanization. Even so, dairymen were beginning to make the adjust-

ments that would enable them to achieve greater efficiency, higher productivity, and

better marketing. Nevertheless, the number of dairy farms declined from 220,575 in

1945 to 199,359 in 1950. This decrease resulted from stricter regulations which in-

creased overhead and from the lure of higher paying jobs outside of agriculture. See

Ohio Farmer, February 21, 1948, and E. F. Baumer and R. H. Pollock, "Shifts in Milk

and Cream Production in Ohio," Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, Circular 24,

February 1954, 7, 17.

7. Census of Agriculture: Ohio, 1959, 3; John H. Sitterley, "Land Use in Ohio,

1900-1970: How and Why It Has Changed," Ohio Agricultural Research and Develop-

ment Center, Research Bulletin 1084, April 1976, 13, 88; Wade H. Andrews and Emily

M. Westerkamm, "Rural-Urban Population Change and Migration in Ohio 1940-1950,"

Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 737, November 1953, 17-39; Fite, Ameri-

can Farmers, 88.

8. Fite, American Farmers, 102, 106-07; Ohio Farmer, September 15, 1956; S. R.

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54                                                      OHIO HISTORY

 

While consumers and farmers complained about high food prices

and government policy, respectively, the Eisenhower administration

announced the Soil Bank Program in January 1956. Enacted in May,

this program called for acreage reductions on basic crops, such as

corn and wheat. The federal government would pay farmers to let

those acreages lie idle. The land could not be used for any form of

agricultural production. Weeds would grow and help conserve the

soil. With fewer acres in production, surpluses would diminish and

agricultural prices would rise. Moreover, the Soil Bank Program en-

couraged small farmers to leave agriculture and rent their lands to the

government, thereby removing entire farms from production. With

fewer people engaged in farming, government officials believed pro-

duction would decrease, and those who remained in agriculture

would diversify and become less reliant upon government price sup-

ports for their income.⁹

Ohio farmers were divided over the potential of the Soil Bank Pro-

gram to solve the farm problem. Most preferred to expand into for-

eign markets to reduce surpluses and to boost prices. While the state

Grange favored a commodity-by-commodity approach to prices and

production, the Farm Bureau hailed the Soil Bank Program as the

"best farm program to date for production adjustment." Soon, how-

ever, Ohio farmers realized the Soil Bank Program would not solve

the cost-price squeeze. Once again, they increased production to

make up for lost income from low prices and increased operating ex-

penses.10

While production remained high, prices were insufficient to enable

many Ohio farmers to maintain full-time operations. Increasingly,

farmers sought off-farm employment to make ends meet. Since many

Ohio farmers were "long on labor and short on land," farmers neces-

sarily worked away from the farm to support their families. Good

 

 

Schultz and E. F. Baumer, "Shifts in the Ohio Dairy Industry," Ohio Agricultural Ex-

periment Station, Circular 80, December 1959, 2.

9. Fite, American Farmers, 107-10.

10. Ohio Farmer, July 2, 1955, and December 21, 1957. By the end of the decade,

the Soil Bank Program had failed in Ohio. Only 4.3 percent of Ohio's cropland had

been removed from production under that program. Corn, wheat, and soybean pro-

duction by the program participants was 98 percent of nonparticipant farmers. The

most numerous participants were the part-time farmers, 48 percent of whom signed up

for the program. Thirty percent of the full-time farmers participated, while 22 percent

of the retired farmers opted for the program. Those who continued farming increased

production with heavier applications of fertilizer. Thus, more production resulted from

fewer acres. See Wallace Barr, et al., "Major Economic Impacts of the Conservation

Reserve on Ohio Agriculture and Rural Communities," Ohio Agricultural Experiment

Station, Bulletin 904, February 1962, 1, 4, 20.

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Ohio Agriculture                                          55

 

roads and better opportunities to make money off the farm enabled

them to gain additional income to pay debts and make improve-

ments. Moreover, farm women began taking outside jobs during the

1950s. In part, a host of home conveniences saved time, but more of-

ten their families needed the extra income. By the mid-1950s, about

37 percent of Ohio's agriculturists worked away from their farms for

one hundred days or more each year. Thus, by the late 1950s, part-

time farming no longer represented a period in which one worked in

outside employment to build the capital to begin full-time farming.

Off-the-farm employment, however, required farmers to make adjust-

ments, such as changing from time-intensive dairying to beef produc-

tion. 11

In spite of the necessity to seek off-the-farm employment, many

farmers remained on the land because they believed the "values of

rural living" were superior to those of an urban environment. The

family farm, like the church, the local school, and the Supreme

Court, remained a symbol of freedom and democracy, and Ohio

farmers strongly defended it. Throughout the 1950s, then, the Jeffer-

sonian tradition remained strong. Nevertheless, the reality of its con-

tinued validity was open to question. Indeed, agriculture in Ohio

could not escape the influence of science, technology, new manage-

ment practices, and government policy. By the 1950s, farming had

become more than a way of life; it was a business where only the

most efficient survived. The days of the small, poor farmer were

gone. Government policy in the form of loans, price supports, and

acreage cutbacks favored the larger farmers who could produce

more for less cost than the smaller landowners. During the 1950s,

many small farmers went bankrupt or quit.¹²

While commodity prices remained low, the cost of starting a farm

increased. By 1958, an individual needed an estimated $75,000 to be-

gin crop farming in northwestern Ohio. Dairy and hog producers in

the southwestern portion of the state required $45,000, while beef

producers in the southeast needed $50,000 to begin a viable busi-

ness. Along with increasing capital costs, the average size of the Ohio

farm grew from 105.2 acres in 1950 to 131.9 acres by 1960, a 25 percent

increase. 13

 

 

 

11. Ohio Farmer, March 3, 1956, and March 15, 1958.

12. Ibid., March 15, 1958; Fite, American Farmers, 130-31.

13. H. R. Moore and R. A. Bailey, "The Ohio Farm Real Estate Situation," Ohio

Agricultural Experiment Station, Circular 52, June 1958, 2; Census of Agriculture: Ohio,

1959, 3; Ohio Farmer, February 4, 1961; Sitterley, "Land Use in Ohio," 13.

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56                                                        OHIO HISTORY

 

With real estate prices increasing at an annual compounded rate of

7 percent, however, not all farmers could purchase more land. Those

who could afford to do so used more technology, hoping to expand

production and thereby to offset low prices and high capital invest-

ments. During the mid-1940s, for example, Ohio farmers baled 23

percent of the hay crop. Little more than a decade later, they baled

82 percent of it. The number of tractors, combines, and corn pickers

increased as well. Poultry farmers made other adjustments by inte-

grating; that is, by signing more contracts with processors. Although

tomato and sugar beet growers were accustomed to this business

method, it was relatively new to the poultry industry. Poultry produc-

ers, who signed contracts, had a guaranteed market and price. Most

poultry farmers who signed contracts were satisfied with the results,

particularly because contracts reduced the risk in their operations.

Contracts furthermore were collateral which enabled farmers to ac-

quire necessary capital and to expand production and increase effi-

ciency. Contract farming, however, had the potential of stimulating

overproduction. It also caused farmers to lose some independence,

because the buyer established all policy.14

By 1960 the number of Ohio farms had declined by more than

fifty-nine thousand since 1950. Dairy farmers were among those who

suffered the most. In the decade ending in 1958, more than five

thousand farmers stopped producing fluid milk. This 18 percent de-

cline was superseded only by a 40 percent drop, representing twenty-

one thousand farmers who stopped selling milk to the cheese, butter,

and condensed milk manufacturers. In short, small producers were

replaced by larger, more efficient operators. In addition, improved

breeding, feeding, and herd management meant that more milk

could be produced from fewer cows.15

 

 

14. Fite, American Farmers, 138; Ohio Farmer, January 17 and March 15, 1958, and

October 17, 1959; Census of Agriculture: Ohio, 1959, 7. Between 1950 and 1960 the

number of tractors on reporting farms increased from 182,481 to 242,752. Corn pickers

increased from 34,691 to 58,848, while combines increased from 40,315 to 57,060 dur-

ing that same period.

15. Shultz, "Shifts in the Ohio Dairy Industry," 7, 13, 17. Ohio farms declined

from 199,359 in 1950 to 140,353 by 1960. The greatest reductions occurred in urban, in-

dustrial, and mining areas. This decline, however, was due in part to a change in the

definition of farms by the Census Bureau between 1954 and 1959, but the resulting de-

crease from that change was only 7,017 farms. In 1950 dairy cows numbered 873,702,

but by 1960 only 640,687 head remained. By that time an estimated five thousand dai-

ry farmers were ceasing production annually. See Wade H. Andrews, "¹⁹⁶⁰ Changes in

Population and Agriculture in Ohio and Their Implications," Ohio Agricultural Experi-

ment Station, Circular 104, May 1961, 13, 15, 51; Sitterley, "Land Use in Ohio," 141;

and Ohio Farmer, February 21, 1959.

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Ohio Agriculture                                      57

In 1960, only 8 percent of Ohio's population were farmers. Three years later, only 6 percent remained. More and more agricultural land was lost to cultivation each year, due, in part, to urban expansion. In spite of the decline in farm population and cropland, however, Ohio's farmers became more productive than ever before. During the 1960s, they gave increasing attention to the specialized production of corn, soybeans, and milk. By mid-decade, Ohio led the nation in green- house vegetables by producing nearly 70 percent of the crops from approximately 60 percent of the greenhouse acreage in the United States. Ohio tomato production ranked second to California, and the nursery industry also remained an important specialty area. Although the acreage of cultivated crops decreased (with the exception of soy- beans), by 1965 cash receipts reached $441.9 million-up from $359.5 million in 1959. Soybeans, which expanded 40 percent in acreage, registered the largest gain in cash receipts, jumping from $75.6 to $115.1 million during that same period. Cash receipts from livestock and livestock products also rose from $581.2 to $671.5 million by 1965, due largely to the increased price of meat, for a 26 percent gain. Cash receipts for hogs also increased 21 percent from $138 million in

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58                                                         OHIO HISTORY

 

1959 to $166.4 million by mid-decade. Hybrid corn also enabled

farmers to harvest seventy-eight bushels per acre in 1963 and en-

sured consistently large corn crops.16

In spite of these gains, problems remained. More than half the

states surpassed Ohio in funding for agricultural research. Moreover,

Ohio farmers could not meet the state's food needs. Farm income

also remained below that of urban workers. In 1961, farmers earned

between $2,300 and $3,000 while factory workers averaged $4,600 an-

nually. While farm income remained low, the price of real estate in-

creased between 1960 and 1965 from an average price of $248 to $294

per acre. High operating costs also continued to erode the limited

profits of Ohio farmers.17

In response to these problems throughout the United States, the

federal government introduced the Feed Grain Program in 1961 to

help reduce surplus feed grains, improve farm income, and reduce

government expenses. The Feed Grain Program enabled farmers to

divert between 20 to 40 percent of their acreage, depending upon

farm size, from the production of corn, barley, and sorghum. In 1961,

61,206 farmers diverted 1,031,411 acres from feed production for an

average diversion of 16.9 acres per farm. The next year, 37 percent of

the eligible farmers diverted 868,600 acres from production for an av-

 

 

 

16. Biennial Report of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, 1960 to 1962, 9; "Seventy-

seventh Annual Report," Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 830, March

1959, 3; "Research and Development for Economic Growth," Ohio Agricultural Re-

search and Development Center, Bulletin 986, 1965, 1, 9; "Research and Development

Serving Ohio's Largest Industry," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Cen-

ter, Bulletin 995, 1966, 12, 14; Ohio Farmer, September 5, 1964; "Ohio Agricultural Sta-

tistics, 1960-1965," 8, 15, 23, 25, 27, 39, 43, 83-84. Ohio Agricultural Research and De-

velopment Center, Research Bulletin, 1019, October 1968, 8, 15, 83-84. In 1960 Ohio

ranked ninth in the combined production of crops and livestock. Moreover, 35 percent

of the labor force was associated with agriculture. In addition to the approximately

160,000 farmers in the state, 300,000 people worked on farms, 450,000 were engaged in

the processing and distribution of agricultural products, and another 300,000 pro-

duced and sold farm equipment. See, "Seventy-seventh Annual Report," 3 and Ohio

Farmer, March 19, 1960. As agricultural production expanded, demand and govern-

ment policy kept agricultural prices high. Between 1960 and 1965, the price index of all

commodities produced in Ohio rose from 228 to 246 with the period 1910-1914 = 100.

Between 1950 and 1960, Ohio's farm population declined from 853,088 to 519,366. See

Sitterley, "Land Use in Ohio," 14. Between 1960 and 1964, corn acreage decreased

from 3.3 million acres to 3 million acres. Acreage for oats decreased from 1.1 million

acres in 1959 to 606,000 acres in 1965. Winter wheat dropped from 1.4 million acres in

1960 to 1.2 million acres in 1965.

17. "Seventy-seventh Annual Report," 3; Ohio Farmer, September 3, 1961, "Ohio

Agricultural Statistics, 1960-1965," 13. By 1965, 89 percent of the broilers, 50 percent of

the beef, 35 percent of the turkeys, 30 percent of the eggs, and 15 percent of the pork

consumed in Ohio came from other states or abroad.

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Ohio Agriculture                                             59

 

erage of 15.1 acres per farm. Even so, they harvested 8 percent more

corn statewide than in 1961, primarily because they increased the ap-

plication of fertilizer, diverted their poorest lands, and planted con-

signed acres. Some nonparticipants also expanded corn production at

that time.18

Those who participated in the Feed Grain Program owned farms

which averaged 159 acres. Most participants preferred diversion.

Since they farmed more acres, they could afford to remove more

land from corn production. Although participants could not plant or

graze the diverted acres, they tended to shift production on their re-

maining acres to soybeans and wheat. Dairy farmers and livestock

producers, however, were reluctant to participate, because they were

interested in cheap feed grains. Reduction in productivity promised

only to increase the cost of grain and, thereby, their operating ex-

penses.19

The division of Ohio farmers over the Feed Grain Program indicat-

ed the basic problem facing American agriculture. No single group

represented the diverse needs of Ohio farmers. The interests of the

cash grain farmers were not those of dairymen or livestock produc-

ers. As a result, Ohio farmers remained divided over the solution to

the farm problem. Essentially, all farmers agreed that supply had to

be brought into balance with demand, and most believed that gov-

ernment policy had to be fashioned to achieve that balance while

keeping prices at an acceptable level to preserve the family farm. As a

whole, however, Ohio farmers did not believe that policies which

established marketing quotas or land diversion programs were in

their best interests. Rather, they favored a free market and argued

that net farm income would increase if the federal government would

terminate all farm programs. They held this belief in spite of econom-

ic studies which indicated that a free market would cause agricultur-

al prices to decline between 19 and 40 percent.²⁰

Similarly, the major farm organizations were divided over farm pol-

icy. The Ohio Farm Bureau favored lower price supports, less govern-

ment interference, acreage reduction, and loans to small farmers

through existing credit programs to help them gain other employ-

 

 

 

18. Robert J. Tompkin, et al., "Farmers' Responses to the Feed Grain Program in

the Ohio Corn Belt Area," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Bul-

letin 991, January 1967, 3-4, 7; Ohio Farmer, August 19, 1961.

19. Tompkin, "Farmers' Responses to the Feed Grain Program," 5, 19.

20. Lonnie L. Jones and John S. Bottum, "Ohio Farmers' Views on Farm Policy Is-

sues," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Circular 142, January

1966, 3, 5.

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60                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

ment and leave the farm. The Farm Bureau also supported expansion

of the Food for Peace Program, ostensibly to "provide for greater

national security and [to] make a substantial move toward world

peace," but in reality to achieve higher prices and to eliminate sur-

pluses. In addition, the Farm Bureau favored legislation to improve

the bargaining power of farmers and the elimination of tax laws

which enabled investments in agriculture for tax purposes only. In

contrast, the Farmers Union favored a commodity-by-commodity

approach to prices and production controls, 100 percent parity for

milk, the abolition of a two-price wheat program, reduction in federal

controls, legislation to protect small farmers from low prices, and the

prevention of non-farm corporations from engaging in agriculture. The

Farmers Union also supported legislation aimed at providing farmers

with the bargaining power that would create a "countervailing force"

to the economic power of corporate America. In contrast, the Grange

favored limiting government payments to $20,000 annually for any

farmer or corporation, the prohibition of tax shelters in agriculture for

non-farmers or non-farm corporations, expansion of foreign trade, per-

manent extension of the 1965 Food and Agriculture Act, parity in-

come, and producer-managed marketing programs. The National

Farmers Organization (NFO) called for a holding action to force a pol-

icy change. Ohio farmers, however, did not support this since most

had to sell to meet expenses and realized that if they participated

livestock still had to be fed and surpluses would remain for future

sale.21

While Ohio farmers collectively and alone debated farm programs

and problems, they continued to expand production. As corn acre-

age dropped from a high of 3.5 million acres in 1967 to 3 million acres

in 1969, corn yields reached eighty-seven bushels per acre at the end

of the decade, offsetting the decrease in planting. Soybean acreage

expanded 25 percent between 1965 and 1969 with sales, jumping from

$637 million to $775.4 million, accounting for 60 percent of the com-

modity income. In spite of these increases, harvested acreage for

corn and small grains continued to decline. Moreover, the number of

 

 

 

21. Ohio Farmer, October 6 and November 17, 1962, December 4, 1965, April 6 and

December 1968, and March 3, April 5, July 7, and December 1969. For a survey of the

history of the Ohio Farmers Union, see Roy Wortman, Progress and Parity: The Ohio

Farmers Union, 1910-1982 (N.P.; N.P., N.D.). For a personal recollection of the activi-

ties of the Ohio Farm Bureau, see N. W. Woods, "Sixty-five Years with Farm Coopera-

tives," Northwest Ohio Quarterly, 50 (Winter, 1978), 29-40; (Spring, 1978), 64-76; (Sum-

mer, 1978), 107-16; (Fall, 1978), 151-56; 51 (Winter, 1979), 22-32; (Summer, 1979), 103-12;

and (Fall, 1979), 135-46.

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Ohio Agriculture                                                 61

 

dairy cows and beef cattle decreased over the decade. The acreage

in farms also declined from 18.5 million acres in 1960 to 17.1 million

acres in 1970. Farm population also decreased from 519,366 to 370,946

during that period. By 1970, farmers represented only 3 percent of

the population. As the agricultural population declined, farm size in-

creased. The average 1960 farm of 131.9 acres had by 1970 grown to

153.7 acres. As the cost-price squeeze forced farmers to get bigger,

competition, together with price supports and high crop returns, in-

creased land prices. Buyers and sellers quickly assumed the land

was worth more than in the past. By 1969, the value of Ohio's farm-

land had increased to an average price of $341 per acre.²²

During the 1960s, farmers achieved increased production from

fewer acres with the application of new forms of science and technol-

ogy coupled with improved farm management practices. Hybridiza-

tion boosted crop production, while improved feeding and breeding

produced better livestock. Fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides,

together with better tillage methods and harvesting, helped as well.

These trends affected more than just those who lived on the farm.

They also touched the lives of those who worked on the farms. Mi-

grant workers, for example, felt the effect of technological change

during the decade. By 1969, more than 30,000 migrant workers en-

tered Ohio each year to harvest vegetable crops, especially tomatoes,

cucumbers, and sugar beets. Mechanical tomato, sugar beet, and cu-

cumber harvesters, however, threatened to displace many migrant

workers from the fields. Mechanization offered growers the opportu-

nity to lower harvesting costs and to eliminate their dependence on

outside labor. Not all growers had mechanized their harvests by the

end of the decade, but many anticipated mechanically harvesting

sugar beets and tomatoes in the future.²³

During the 1970s, Ohio agriculture continued to change rapidly be-

cause of new and improved applications of science and technology.

 

 

 

22. "Ohio Agricultural Statistics, 1965-1970," Ohio Agricultural Research and De-

velopment Center, Research Bulletin 1066, March 1974, 1-12, 67; 1969 Census of Agri-

culture: Ohio, 2; Sitterley, "Land Use in Ohio," 13-14; Ohio Farmer, April 16, 1966 and

April 5, 1969. Soybean acreage increased from 2,066,000 acres in 1965 to 2,570,000 acres

in 1970.

23. Ohio Farmer, July 4, 1964 and September 6, 1969; "New Wealth through Agri-

cultural Research and Development," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development

Center, Bulletin 1008, 1967, 3; James D. Howell, et al., "Migrant Farm Workers in

Northwestern Ohio," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Bulletin

1049, August 1971, 1, 22, 25; Wayne D. Rasmussen, "Advances in American Agricul-

ture: The Mechanical Tomato Harvester as a Case Study," Technology and Culture, 9

(October, 1968), 531-43.

• 12
 

62                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

Many farm enterprises now had greater capital investments than busi-

nesses in the towns and cities. The axiom of the decade became "get

bigger, get better or get out." Unable to control prices and unwilling

to organize and bargain collectively, Ohio farmers believed they had

no choice other than to increase production to lower unit costs and

thereby maintain a profitable business. Increased production, how-

ever, exacerbated the problems of surpluses and low prices. In-

creased efficiency in the long run offered no solution to the farm

problem. Indeed, contrary to other businesses, farmers were penal-

ized in the marketplace for their efficiency. While Ohio farmers com-

plained about the cost-price squeeze and government policy, some

got bigger and better, but thousands fled the farm for the more eco-

nomically secure life offered in urban America. Even so, about half of

those who stayed earned as much as 50 percent of their income from

off-the-farm employment.²⁴

At the dawn of a new decade, the farm problem seemed less se-

rious than in the past. During the early 1970s, exports increased.

Thanks to Soviet purchases, surpluses declined and prices in-

creased. The United States Department of Agriculture urged farmers

to plant from fence row to fence row to take advantage of favorable

economic conditions. Ohio farmers responded by clearing wood-

land, draining marshland, and plowing pasture lands. Soybean acre-

age increased 20 percent from 2.5 to 3.1 million acres between 1970

and 1975. Corn acreage likewise increased, from 3.2 to 3.6 million

acres, and harvests rose from seventy-nine to ninety-three bushels

per acre for a production increase of 70.4 million bushels. Ohio was

also the leading producer of soft, red winter wheat with 1.6 million

harvested acres in 1975, up from 925,000 acres in 1970. Although live-

stock numbers decreased 21 percent from 5.6 to 4.4 million head,

higher prices for livestock and livestock products increased the cash

receipts 45 percent from $778 million in 1970 to $1.1 billion in 1975.25

Inflation, caused by the Vietnam War, however, increased food

prices during the early 1970s. Consumers complained so vociferously

that in 1973 the federal government placed an embargo on soybeans

 

 

24. Fite, American Farmers, 176.

25. Dennis R. Henderson and Wallace Barr, "Ohio and the Food System: A Base

for Planning," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Research Circular

234, December 1977, 3; "Ohio Agricultural Statistics, 1970-1975," Ohio Agricultural

Research and Development Center, Research Bulletin 1106, November 1978, 7-29, 47.

Ohio Farmer, March 21, 1970. In 1970, Ohio ranked fourth in food processing. It led

the nation in the production of tomato juice and ranked second in the production of

catsup and potato chips; third in sauerkraut, salad dressing, and canned tomatoes;

fourth in gourmet foods; and sixth in pickles.

• 13
 

Ohio Agriculture                                            63

 

and cottonseed to reduce feed costs for livestock and poultry pro-

ducers. The government also froze beef prices. That policy angered

Ohio farmers. They felt betrayed by a government that on one hand

had urged them to expand production but which now denied them

the benefits of their labor. In July 1975, they became even more upset

when longshoremen, angry over food prices, refused to load grain

bound for the Soviet Union. The Ford administration responded to

this pressure by restricting exports still further.²⁶

Increased petroleum costs following the Arab-Israeli War in 1973,

together with restricted export markets, placed Ohio farmers in an in-

creasingly difficult financial position. By 1975, the export market ac-

counted for 28 percent of the Ohio farmers' cash receipts. Soybeans

and wheat alone produced three-fourths of Ohio's agricultural ex-

port income. Indeed, more than half of Ohio's wheat was exported

annually. But with markets interrupted and operating costs increas-

ing, Ohio farmers responded to the cost-price squeeze as they always

had-they increased production of corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, and

hay. They particularly emphasized the production of corn, wheat

and soybeans-crops which provided 47 percent of their cash re-

ceipts by 1975 and a total crop value of more than $2 billion by 1979.

With corn sales of more than $491 million in 1975, Ohio ranked sixth

in production and maintained one hundred bushel per acre crops for

the remainder of the decade. Ohio also ranked third in specialty

crops such as tomatoes, greenhouse vegetables, and nursery stock,

and fourth in soybean production with harvests averaging between

thirty-three and thirty-five bushels per acre during the latter half of

the decade and with sales of $905.8 million in 1979. The state ranked

seventh in dairy products, hog sales, and grape production; ninth in

apples; and tenth in tobacco and wheat. By 1975, productivity such

as this earned Ohio farmers $2.7 billion in cash receipts. Yet the

combination of increased operating costs and growing surpluses kept

prices low. As a result, in 1975 the $6,600 average net income of Ohio

farmers lagged behind the national average of $8,080. Gross farm in-

come in Ohio was $26,600 compared to $35,000 for farmers nation-

wide. Disposable income averaged only 90 percent of the non-farm

population, and Ohio farmers still earned approximately half of their

income from off-the-farm employment.27

 

 

26. Fite, American Farmers, 203-04, 225; Ohio Farmer, December 1971.

27. Henderson, "Ohio and the Food System," 11-13; "Ohio Agricultural Statistics,

1976-1979," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Research Bulletin

1139, October 1981, 7-29, 49; Ohio Farmer, December 1977. Wheat, oats, and hay acre-

age declined between 1976 and 1979, but record harvests kept production high. As

• 14
 

64                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

Ohio farmers continued to respond to this difficult financial situa-

tion by applying more mechanical and chemical technology as well as

new farming methods, such as "no till," to cut costs, conserve soil,

reduce labor, and increase production. Many attempted to expand

the size of their farms. The average Ohio farm increased from 153.7

acres in 1970 to 165 acres in 1975. By the end of the decade, the aver-

age had reached 170 acres. While individual Ohio farms got bigger,

their number declined from 118,000 in 1970 to 96,000 by 1979. The

statewide acreage also declined from 17,100,100 acres in 1970 to

16,300,000 acres by the end of the decade.²⁸

The expansion of farm size caused the price of agricultural land to

increase from an average of $399 per acre in 1970 to $706 by late 1975.

The best croplands, however, often brought more than $1,000 per

acre. At the end of the decade, the average price of farm real estate

had climbed to $1,483 per acre. The high cost of expansion meant

that farmers once again needed to increase productivity to offset low

prices and high investment costs. Yet, they were handicapped be-

cause farm size, even with the increases already noted, remained

small. By 1979, when Ohio farms averaged 170 acres, the national av-

erage was 429 acres. With less acreage to cultivate extensively, Ohio

farmers could not produce the volume of corn, wheat, and soybeans

needed to compete effectively with those across the nation. While

farmers who sold more than $40,000 of commodities annually could

adopt the technology that would enable them to reduce unit costs

and farm more acres, most Ohio farmers sold less than $40,000 annu-

ally.²⁹

In 1977, with the creation of the American Agriculture Movement,

Ohio farmers began to hear calls for a farm strike, during which time

they would neither buy nor sell. Using protest techniques which

they learned from their sons and daughters during the 1960s, they

began to demonstrate for higher prices while displaying signs which

 

 

 

farmers expanded their cash crops of corn and soybeans, they also reduced livestock

production. While cattle numbers declined by 24 percent between 1976 and 1979, cat-

tle producers decreased by 15 percent. Hog production remained variable with a

slight increase by the end of the decade.

28. Ohio Farmer, March 1, 1975 and October 1, 1977; Sitterley, "Land Use in

Ohio," 13; "Ohio Agricultural Statistics, 1970-1975," 85, 87; "Ohio Agricultural Statis-

tics, 1976-1979," 89. Since tomato harvesters only could cover a field once, growers

needed a maximum number of ripe tomatoes on the vines at picking time. In 1973 they

began spraying Ethrel, a chemical which speeds ripening, to achieve a uniformly ripe

crop at the proper time.

29. "Ohio Agriculture Statistics, 1970-1975," 87; "Ohio Agricultural Statistics,

1976-1979," 91; Henderson, "Ohio and the Food System," 1-14, 17.

• 15
 

Ohio Agriculture                                                 65

 

read--"Parity Not Charity" and "Crime doesn't pay. Neither does

farming." A new word-tractorcade-appeared in the language. Tele-

vision audiences watched as farmers paraded their heavy equipment

to gain support for increased parity prices. Although most Ohio farm-

ers did not identify with the American Agriculture Movement's goal

of 100 percent of parity price supports, they were sympathetic and

certainly were dissatisfied with the level of farm prices. While unwill-

ing to support a farm strike, they did hold their own tractorcades

early in 1978. In Columbus, more than one hundred tractors and

trucks paraded through the town and university. A delegation met

with Governor James A. Rhodes and asked him to call a special con-

ference of farm state governors and agricultural directors to discuss

the problem of low prices in order to submit proposals for change to

Congress. They also talked about cutting production by reducing

spring planting 50 percent unless they received parity prices. Most

Ohio farmers, however, could not or would not take that risk without

a guarantee of price increases. No one farmer could make an impact

acting alone, and Ohio farmers were too independent, too conserva-

tive, and too diverse in their needs to act collectively.³⁰

Instead of supporting the American Agriculture Movement, the ma-

jor Ohio farm organizations supported more traditional plans to in-

crease farm income. The Farm Bureau, for example, urged the federal

government to increase the sale of agricultural commodities through

Public Law 480, commonly known as the Food for Peace Program;

grant loans to developing nations through the Commodity Credit

Corporation; and seek the expansion of foreign markets. The Bureau

supported acreage reduction to help reduce surpluses and promoted

the use of grain for the production of industrial alcohol and gasohol

to reduce the supply of grain. The Farm Bureau also urged credit in-

stitutions to proceed slowly with foreclosures. The Farmers Union fa-

vored the expansion of international agreements that would improve

the marketing of agricultural commodities. The Grange supported

acreage reductions and higher crop loans. In contrast to these posi-

 

30. Fite, American Farmers, 209-17; Columbus Dispatch, February 23, 1978; Colum-

bus Citizen-Journal, February 23, 1978; Ohio Farmer, January 7, March 18, and April 4,

1978; Ted L. Napier et al., "Rural Life and Farmer Attitudes: An Ohio Survey," Ohio

Agricultural Research and Development Center, Research Bulletin 260, October 1980,

18-19. Robert Risher of Spencerville was the President of the Ohio chapter of the

American Agriculture Movement. Governor Rhodes commended the farmers for call-

ing attention to the "many serious problems facing Ohio farmers," and he gave them a

$250 check to help defray expenses. At an evening rally, John M. Stackhouse, Director

of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, told the participants that "anything less than

100 percent parity is disparity."

• 16
 

66                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

tions, the National Farmers Organization favored less government in-

fluence in agriculture. The NFO maintained that the wheat surplus

depressed prices of all farm commodities. To eliminate the wheat sur-

plus, the NFO urged farmers to use it as a feed grain. Once the sur-

plus had been eliminated, members argued, all cash grain and soy-

bean prices would increase. The NFO also urged its members to

participate fully in its marketing program, sought 90 percent of parity

on commodity loans, favored the release of government reserves only

in time of national emergency, and advocated a world floor price

agreement among the grain exporting nations, federal legislation

permitting farmers to form strong bargaining and marketing associa-

tions, and the prohibition of non-farm corporations from engaging in

agriculture.31

While Ohio farmers protested low prices, migrant workers in the

tomato fields, led by the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, went on

strike in September 1978. Although growers produced the fifth most

important cash crop in the state, with a cultivated acreage second

only to California, they argued that contracts with the processors

prevented them from raising wages. While tomatoes remained un-

picked, the growers anticipated additional mechanization to elimi-

nate their reliance upon seasonal-and increasingly organized-labor

at harvest time. In Putnam County, where 35 percent of the tomato

crop had been harvested mechanically in 1978, machines picked an

estimated 75 percent of the crop a year later. Between those two sea-

sons, the number of migrant labor camps declined from 68 to 34. At

that same time, Sandusky County reportedly showed a "tremendous

increase" in tomato harvesters. Mechanical pickers also doubled in

Ottawa County. Tomato harvesters did not entirely eliminate the

need for hand labor, because each machine required between ten

and fifteen workers for sorting clods and green tomatoes from the ripe

fruit. But, mechanical harvesting greatly reduced picking costs.

While hand labor could pick a ton of tomatoes for $20, mechanical

harvesters could do the same work for $3 or $4 per ton. Still, tomato

harvesters were expensive with some models costing $150,000 and, as

the decade ended, the tomato fields were not completely mecha-

nized.³²

By the late 1970s, other problems gave Ohio farmers cause for con-

cern. Brucellosis still threatened livestock. Soil erosion became more

evident with the loss of an estimated 66 million tons or 3.5 tons per

 

 

31. Ohio Farmer, October 15, 1977, and February 18, 1978.

32. Ibid., September 16, 1978, and August 4, 1979.

• 17
 

Ohio Agriculture                                                 67

 

acre annually. Urban sprawl continued to remove cropland from pro-

duction. Prices remained low and inflation increased expenses.

Equipment costs so escalated that many corn, soybean, and small

grain producers refused to purchase modern harvesting equipment;

instead they turned to custom cutters even when they could secure

financing to purchase the necessary equipment.³³

In spite of the problems of bad weather, periodic livestock and

crop disease, high costs, and low prices, Ohio farmers remained re-

markably productive. By the end of the decade, Ohio ranked elev-

enth in harvested cropland and thirteenth in cash receipts. The state

ranked second in the production of tomatoes, cigar tobacco, and

mushrooms; and third in popcorn, timothy seed, escarole/endive,

cucumbers for pickles, Swiss cheese, low fat and creamed cottage

cheese, cottage cheese curd, florist products, and vegetable and

flower bedding plants. Ohio was fourth in sweet corn, cabbage for

kraut, ice cream, greenhouse and nursery products; and fifth in bur-

ley tobacco and processing vegetables. By 1979 soybeans were the

largest cash crop while corn produced the greatest volume from the

most harvested acres. In that same year, the wheat harvest set a pro-

duction record of forty-eight bushels per acre. However, harvested

acreage and total production declined. Beef cows for breeding regis-

tered a 26 percent gain over the decade, but all other forms of live-

stock production declined as did the volume of livestock and poultry

products, with the exception of gains in egg and broiler production.

Increased operating costs encouraged farmers to purchase more land

to reduce unit costs and to increase income with greater production.

Competition for land and inflation in turn caused the price of farm-

land to rise precipitously. Land that had averaged about $400 per

acre in 1970 brought $1,516 per acre by 1979.³⁴

Ohio farmers remained convinced that farming provided a good

life. They believed the farm was the best place to raise their children

 

 

 

33. Ibid., October 21 and November 4, 1978; Napier, "Rural Life and Farmer Atti-

tudes," 21; E. T. Shaudys and Richard D. Duvick, "A Comparison of Custom Rates

Charged Landlords, Other Farmers, and Effective Ownership Use Costs," Ohio Agri-

cultural Research and Development Center, Research Circular 270, May 1982, 3-4. In

1978 farmers who owned combines earned an average of $1,705 for harvesting the

crops of those who did not have that equipment.

34. Biennium Report of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, 1977-1979, 1; "Ohio Ag-

ricultural Statistics, 1976-1979," 11, 15, 17; Ohio Farmer, November 21, 1970, and Sep-

tember 1, 1979; Dennis R. Henderson, "Ohio's Food and Farm System in Transition,"

Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Research Circular 273, Septem-

ber 1982, 14. In 1979 wheat production reached 63.3 million bushels; see "Ohio Agri-

cultural Statistics, 1980," Ohio Crop Reporting Service, May 1981, 2, 13.

• 18
 

68                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

and that it provided the foundation for a democratic government.

Most farmers, however, in spite of sentimental attachments and nos-

talgic views of farm life, regarded agriculture as a business. Yet, they

felt abandoned by those who formulated government policy when

strong pressure groups, such as environmentalists or consumers,

made demands that affected agriculture. Ohio farmers felt the loss of

political power that comes with minority status, and they contended

the federal government could improve agricultural conditions by ex-

panding foreign markets and by reducing its involvement in agricul-

ture. These contradictory desires were typical of farmers nationwide.

They wanted government aid if it would be advantageous but op-

posed it if that aid threatened to decrease their independence or po-

tential profits. Most Ohio farmers, however, believed economic con-

ditions could be improved if most of the middlemen were eliminated

from the food chain, thereby enabling farmers to market more di-

rectly while keeping food prices low for consumers. They also felt

that consumers and small businessmen potentially were their best al-

lies, while environmentalists, big business, organized labor, and the

urban poor represented threats to the agricultural community.³⁵

By the early 1980s, Ohio farmers harvested more than 11 million

acres or approximately 30 percent more than in 1970. This increase

was due in part to the creation of more cropland by clearing wood-

lands, draining swamps, and plowing pastures. While corn, soy-

beans, and wheat acreage increased, all other crop acreage declined.

Favorable weather, higher-than-average prices, and cheap and easy

access through the Great Lakes to the export markets were advanta-

geous to Ohio farmers. Exports accounted for more than a billion

dollars or 33 percent of the cash receipts for Ohio farmers. Feed

grains, wheat, flour, soybeans, meal, and oil were the most important

export commodities, accounting for 86 percent of the product value

exported from Ohio farms. Still, while cash receipts and net farm

income doubled between 1970 and 1980, average gross income of

$45,000 per Ohio farm was far below the national average of $64,000

per farm. Likewise, the 1979 net income of $8,020 for Ohio farmers

was far less than the national average of $13,280. With income lagging

behind the national average, Ohio farmers continued to seek off-the-

 

 

 

 

35. Napier, "Rural Life and Farmer Attitudes," 9-13, 21-22. The Ohio Farmers Un-

ion believed the best way to preserve the family farm was to prohibit the foreign own-

ership of land and non-farm corporations from engaging in agriculture; see Ohio Farm-

er, February 2, 1980.

• 19
 

Ohio Agriculture                                                69

 

farm employment and nearly half of their income came from outside

employment.36

While income remained low, Ohio farmers increased production to

maintain profits. In 1982, a 117 bushel per acre corn crop set a new

production record of 475 million bushels. Soybeans, oats, and wheat

remained important crops, and cash receipts totaled more than $3.6

billion for all commodities. Soybeans with 3.7 million acres and sales

of $806,966,000 was the most important cash crop, earning 22 percent

off the cash receipts. Corn, with more than 4 million harvested acres,

ranked second in cash receipts while dairy products were third,

hogs fourth, and cattle and calves fifth. Wheat ranked sixth while

greenhouse and nursery crops held seventh position. Poultry and

eggs were eighth while vegetables and hay ranked ninth and tenth,

respectively.³⁷

Despite record productivity, partially due to improvements

brought about through science and technology and good manage-

ment practices, the old problems remained. Ohio farmers competed

with others across the nation, and surplus production kept prices rel-

atively low. Foreign sales boosted prices, but when agreements were

terminated, as in January 1980 when the Carter administration re-

fused to sell grain to the Soviet Union in retaliation for that nation's

invasion of Afghanistan, Ohio farmers again felt betrayed. The cost-

price squeeze continued to erode profits, and farmers remained vul-

nerable to rapid price increases for oil, fuel, and petroleum-based

products. Farmers tried to counter by becoming increasingly special-

ized and efficient in cash grain production while at the same time

reducing operating costs. Those who could not afford to do so left

the farm. Soon more part-time farmers cultivated crops in Ohio than

full-time farmers. By 1982, full-time farmers numbered 43,174 while

part-time farmers totaled 43,760.38

By the mid-1980s, the farm economy in Ohio had improved slight-

ly. Ohio's farmers had a debt-to-asset ratio of 21 percent for the

lowest average among the nine states in the Corn Belt and Great

 

 

36. Henderson, "Ohio's Food and Farm System," 5, 13. In the decade ending in

1980, corn acreage increased 44 percent and wheat acreage 36 percent. Corn yields in-

creased 34 percent and soybean yields 21 percent. A wheat yield of 48.5 bushels per

acre exceeded the national average of 33.8 bushels per acre. In 1979, 48 percent of an

Ohio farm family's income came from non-farm employment.

37. "¹⁹⁸² Ohio Farm Income," Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Cen-

ter, Department Series E. S. 0. 1057, October 1983, 3, 5; "Ohio Agricultural Statistics,

1982," Ohio Crop Reporting Service, June 1983, 2, 4, 9, 11, 34.

38. 1982 Census of Agriculture: Ohio, pp. VIII, 9-10; Henderson, Ohio's Food and

Farm System," 11, 17.

• 20
 

70                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

Plains. Even so, prosperity was not yet in sight. The average price of

Ohio's farmland continued to decline, dropping 10 percent in 1985.

By the spring of 1986, farmland in Ohio averaged $1,013, down from

$1,126 per acre the year before and 45 percent lower than the all-time

high of $1,831 per acre in 1981. At that time, some of the best corn

land sold for $2,000 per acre. The precipitous decline sharply con-

trasted with the rapid increase in land values between 1973 and 1981

when prices climbed 264 percent. Many farmers who became "paper

millionaires" during the 1970s left farming or experienced severe fi-

nancial difficulties during the next decade when agricultural prices

fell at home because of over-production while a strong dollar hurt ag-

ricultural sales on the international market. Decreased incomes pre-

vented many farmers from meeting their obligations, and lower land

values reduced their borrowing power to maintain operations. As a

result, an estimated 9 percent of Ohio's family farmers experienced

"extreme" financial difficulties by the spring of 1986, and their pros-

pects for recovery were dismal at best. In addition, another 21 per-

cent of the state's family farmers had "serious" cash flow problems.

Consequently, more and more farmers were forced to take off-the-

farm employment in order to stay on the land. Indeed, part-time

farming became a way of life by the mid-1980s.³⁹

In retrospect, Ohio agriculture underwent rapid change after the

Second World War. Technology and science enabled farmers to be-

come more productive and efficient than ever before. In 1945, every

farmer produced enough food and fiber for 14.6 people. By 1982,

each farmer supplied seventy-eight people. Between 1945 and 1970,

the man-hours needed per acre of corn dropped from 19.2 to 5.2

while the man-hours required per acre of wheat decreased from 5.7

to 2.9. The average time-per-milk-cow also declined from 129 to 67.8

hours annually. Productivity per man-hour increased from an index

of 69 in 1945 to 102 by 1970. As productivity increased, only the most

efficient farmers were able to marshal the resources needed to main-

tain operation in an economy in which they did not control the prices

they received. After World War II, despite the rhetoric about the

value of farm life, thousands of young men and women fled the farm.

Their parents frequently encouraged them to go, and many parents

left as well. Government programs helped the large-scale farmers

stay, while the small-scale farmers often were unable to obtain the

sound financial support needed to remain on the farm. Price supports

 

 

39. Columbus Dispatch, February 20 and 22; March 3, 14 and 18; and April 3 and

24, 1986.

• 21
 

Ohio Agriculture                                                71

 

and other governmental programs, for example, enabled the large-

scale farmers to purchase more land and equipment and thereby

farm more extensively and efficiently.⁴⁰

Even so, the cost-price squeeze was the most important reason for

the declining number of Ohio farms since World War II. With farm

prices equal to 100 in 1977, farmers received an index price of 143 in

May 1982, but they paid a price of 153 for their expenses. In 1973,

for example, one bushel of corn purchased about ten gallons of diesel

fuel. A decade later, it bought only two gallons. Farm costs con-

tinued to increase and income to lag. In the absence of sufficient po-

litical power to force the federal government to provide cost-of-

production prices plus a profit, farmers viewed growth and cost

cutting as the only alternatives to leaving agriculture.41

Given these problems, one should not be surprised at the number

of people who left Ohio's farms since the end of the Second World

War. Rather, one should be amazed at the number who remained.

Yet, for many young Ohio farm men and women, the future remained

bleak. Entry into farming was never more difficult. Capital invest-

ments for machinery easily reached $250,000, while good cropland

commanded a thousand dollars per acre or more. As a result, Ohio

farms probably will continue to decline in number and farm size will

increase. By 1982, for example, farms in the state averaged 177 acres.

As Ohio approaches the twenty-first century, farmers also will need

larger amounts of capital and better management skills to remain in

business. No one can say, of course, what effects these trends will

have on Ohio farm life or the state's agricultural history.⁴²

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

40. Wayne D. Rasmussen, "The Mechanization of Agriculture," Scientific Ameri-

can, 247 (September, 1982), 77; Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial

Times to 1970, 498, 500; Ohio Farmer, September 20, 1980. The year 1967 equals an in-

dex of 100. By 1980 some Ohio farmers were using both passive and active solar power

to heat livestock buildings and to dry grain; see Ohio Farmer, March 1, 1980.

41. Agricultural Prices, May 28, 1982, 1; Columbus Citizen Journal, November 4,

1984; Fite, American Farmers, 239.

42. 1982 Census of Agriculture: Ohio, viii.

• 22