Ohio History Journal

MARK V. KWASNY

 

A Test for the Ohio National Guard:

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884

 

Riots have been a part of our history since the colonial days. Crowds

clashing with civil and military authorities, violence in the streets, and

the deaths of citizens at the hands of law enforcement agencies-these

are not unknown in the history of the United States. The Cincinnati

Riot, March 28-30, 1884, contained all of these elements. For three

days citizens, police, and soldiers of the Ohio National Guard (ONG)

fought in the streets of Cincinnati, leaving more than forty people dead

and well over one hundred injured. This riot was remarkable, though

not unique, for the intense anger and hostility exhibited by the crowd,

and the willingness of the police and militia to meet these emotions

with all necessary force.

The Cincinnati Riot was a severe test for both the ONG and the

entire state command system, from the governor down to the regimen-

tal commanders. National Guard organizations were relatively new

then, having replaced the state militia units which had died out after the

Civil War. The 1877 Railroad Strike impressed upon the states the need

for an effective internal police force, and in that same year some states

began to hold summer camps for their Guard units. Ohio held its first

in 1879.1 The riot in 1884 challenged how much the ONG had improved

during these five years.

Domestic disturbances such as riots have always posed a severe

problem for civilian and military authorities. Civilian leaders often wait

too long before calling for military assistance, usually because of an

unwillingness to admit they have lost control of the situation, as well as

from a desire to avoid the costs involved. At the same time, military

leaders are hesitant to involve themselves in civilian affairs, preferring

 

 

 

 

Mark V. Kwasny is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The Ohio State University.

 

1. Robin Higham, ed., Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil

Disturbances (Lawrence, Kansas, 1969), p. 27; William H. Riker, Soldiers of the State

(New York, 1979), pp. 51, 56; John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National

Guard (New York, 1983), p. 113.

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24                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

to be summoned by civilian authorities before moving.² This tendency

to hesitate was a potential danger during the hectic days in March 1884.

The civilian and military leaders of Ohio had to pass such a test posed

by the Cincinnati Riot.

George Hoadly was governor of Ohio and commander-in-chief of the

ONG during this crisis. He was not, however, an experienced politi-

cian or military commander. Born in New York and raised in Cleve-

land, by 1847 he was an aspiring young lawyer in Cincinnati. He

married into a prominent Cincinnati family, the Burnets, and held the

position of Judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati during the Civil

War. In 1883, during his gubernatorial campaign, he needed the

support of the ethnic German vote, of which Cincinnati had a large

proportion.³ Thus when the riot began in March 1884, the commander

of Ohio's military force had little political and no military experience,

while he had strong ties with Cincinnati society and its German

population.

The governor received important help from his staff during the crisis.

Adjutant General Ebenezer Finley, Brigadier General Michael Ryan,

Quarter Master General and Commissary General of the ONG, and

Colonels J. W. Harper, Samuel Courtwright, and S. H. Church, all

aides-de-camp of the governor, were in Cincinnati at various times

throughout the riot.⁴ Their actions helped determine how well the ONG

reacted to this test.

The ONG at this time consisted of eleven regiments, one battalion,

and two independent companies of infantry, and seven batteries of

artillery. These units were scattered throughout the state. Ohio had no

larger units of organization, though Finley had previously advised a

reorganization. He believed that the brigading of the regiments would

enable the officers to train with larger field commands, which would

better prepare them for any emergency that called for more than the

local militia. As of March the 4829 officers and enlisted men of the

ONG drilled only with their regiment, company, or battery.⁵

The number of drills and level of training of these units varied

widely. Attendance at unit drills was poor, with less than one-half of

 

2. Higham, Bayonets, pp. 6-7.

3. Mary G. Roberts, "The Governorship of George Hoadly, Governor of the State

of Ohio, 1883-1885" (M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1952), pp. 1-3, 6.

4. E. B. Finley, Adj. Gen., Annual Report of the Adjutant-General, to the Governor

of the State of Ohio, for the Year 1884 (Columbus, 1885), pp. 4, 7. This source cited

hereafter as AR 1884.

5. "Consolidated Report of Strength of the Ohio National Guard for the Quarter

ending March 31, 1884," and "Annual Report of Militia in the State of Ohio, Nov. 15,

1884," Ohio, Adjutant General, Ohio National Guard, Administration, Morning, Quar-

terly, and Annual Reports, 1881-1890, 1898, 1907, 1911, ser. 2531, box 17, 1884, Ohio

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The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                                      25

 

the members usually participating. Also, the Guardsmen in general

were not veterans of the Civil War, and their only experience in the

field came from occasional strikes and riots.⁶ Thus, the ONG in March

1884 consisted of scattered regiments and batteries of soldiers with

little training and experience. Cincinnati provided a real test for this

military force.

The test came when the situation in Cincinnati pushed the citizens

too far. The problem centered around political leaders John R. McLean

and Tom C. Campbell, who together controlled Cincinnati politics.

Campbell, a criminal lawyer, also had a reputation for manipulating

juries and the law to suit his clients. Under this corrupt system, crimes

increased while convictions became scarce. As one newspaper, the

Cincinnati Enquirer, wrote, Cincinnati was a "COLLEGE OF MUR-

DER."⁷ Tension mounted as one gruesome murder followed another.

In March, twenty-three men accused or convicted of murder were in

the county jail. Some had been in jail for months without a trial.

Thomas J. Stephens, the mayor, was allegedly involved with McLean

in the control of city politics. This corruption rested on a voting system

that the politicians manipulated. As one historian of the time described

it, the elections were for sale.⁸ Cincinnati citizens, therefore, were

angry with their government and their criminal justice system, and by

March 1884 they were close to action.

The final transgression occurred in mid-March when William Berner

beat his employer to death. The people followed his trial closely and on

March 22, the final day of the trial, a large crowd filled the courtroom.

When the jury handed down a verdict of manslaughter, the judge called

it "a damned outrage," while the crowd hissed and threatened to hang

the jury.⁹ The fact that Campbell was Berner's defense attorney did not

ease the situation. Thursday, March 27, the newspapers printed an

announcement calling for a meeting of citizens on Friday to condemn

the verdict, citing disgust at the "fixed" juries of this and many other

 

 

 

Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. This source cited hereafter as MQAR.

6. "Consolidated Report, March 31, 1884," MQAR, box 17; J. S. Tunison, The

Cincinnati Riot: Its Causes and Results (Cincinnati, 1886), p. 68.

7. Carl Wittke, ed., The History of the State of Ohio, 6 vols. (Columbus, 1943), vol.

5: Ohio Comes of Age, 1873-1900, by Philip D. Jordan, pp. 193, 197; Rev. Charles F.

Goss, Cincinnati: The Queen City, 1788-1912, 4 vols. (Chicago, 1912), I, 256; Cincinnati

Enquirer, 9 March 1884, quoted in Iola H. Silberstein, Cincinnati Then and Now

(Cincinnati, 1982), p. 126.

8. History of Cincinnati and Hamilton County, Ohio; Their Past and Present

(Cincinnati, 1894), p. 367; Henry C. Wright, Bossism in Cincinnati (Cincinnati, 1905),

p. 17; Tunison, Riot, p. 22.

9. Cincinnati Enquirer, 23 and 25 March 1884.

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26                                       OHIO HISTORY

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The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                                     27

 

cases. According to the Volksfreund, "Judge Lynch would soon be

honored in Cincinnati."¹⁰

The meeting occurred as scheduled Friday evening, March 28, in the

Music Hall. Attended by "solid men" of the city, it was the largest

indoor meeting in Cincinnati history to that date, with the hall holding

about 8000 people. The leaders of the meeting, trying to keep the

people calm, proposed resolutions condemning the verdict and the

court system. Despite their efforts, however, the speeches stirred the

people and the crowd began shouting suggestions to hang Berner. The

presiding chairman decided to end the meeting around 9:30 P.M.11

As the people left the hall, a shout sounded: "To the jail! Come on!

Follow me, and hang Berner!" With about 200 men leading the way,

much of the crowd moved toward the jail. The Enquirer caught the

mood: "At LAST The People Are Aroused." According to the best

estimates, thousands actually went to the jail.¹²

County Sheriff Morton Hawkins had been expecting trouble that

night and had thirteen deputy sheriffs with him at the jail. A veteran of

the Civil War who had risen from private to company commander, he

reacted well to the situation. When he received word of the crowd's

size, temper, and movements, he rang the riot alarm to signal the police

around the city. He and his men then waited inside the jail. Though

criticized later for ringing the riot alarm because it attracted more

people to the scene, he had no choice. In the days before radios and

cars, he had no other way to call the police force to the jail. The crowd,

however, did swell, filling Sycamore Street in front of the

jail. At 10:00 P.M. the situation reached the first crisis point. (See map,

page 26.)13

Attacking the street level entrance to the jailer's residence, the

leaders of the crowd broke through the door. People then poured

through the residence and up into the cells in search of Berner. Berner,

however, had been sent to the Columbus Penitentiary earlier in the

 

 

 

10. Cincinnati News-Journal, 27 March 1884; Enquirer, 27 March 1884; Cincinnati

Commercial-Gazette, 27 March 1884; Cincinnati Volksfreund, 25 March 1884, quoted in

Zane L. Miller, Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era (New

York, 1968), p. 60; Tunison, Riot, pp. 10-11; Laird Kleine, "Anatomy of a Riot,"

Bulletin of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 20 (October, 1922), 235.

11. AR 1884, pp. 62-3; Enquirer, 29 March 1884.

12. AR 1884, p. 63; Enquirer, 29 March 1884; News-Journal, 29 March 1884.

13. G. M. Roe, Our Police. A History of the Cincinnati Police Force, from the

Earliest Period until the Present Day (Cincinnati, 1890), pp. 55-6; News-Journal, 29

March 1884; AR 1884, p. 63; Map in The Great Cincinnati Riots! Being the only correct

history of that most Lamentable outbreak in Ohio's Greatest City, Because of the

Villainous Verdict of the Berner jury (Philadelphia, 1884), p. 9.

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28                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

day, and the crowd did not bother the other prisoners in the cells.

Hawkins and his deputies, pleading and shoving, persuaded the people

to leave the cells after about thirty minutes. At this point the police

wagons from around the city began to arrive. The crowd on the streets

turned the first one back, but then Chief of Police Reilly's wagon

arrived, driving up Sycamore to the jail door. At this point a member

of the crowd fired the first shot, and rioters nearer the jail fired several

more. A seventeen-year-old boy fell, hit in the head. A thrown stone

knocked a policeman unconscious. With the front of the jail blocked by

the crowd, Reilly led his men to the Courthouse entrance on Main

Street and entered the jail through the tunnel that connected the two

buildings. The police and deputies then cleared the jail. Throughout

this initial violence, the police never drew their guns.¹⁴

The worst was not over. The gathering in the Music Hall-and the

majority of the people who first went to the jail-had been a mixture of

wealthy, middle-class, and working citizens who wanted justice. After

Hawkins and the police cleared the jail, a change occurred in the

crowd, a change that many noticed. The "solid men" gave way to

people who were only interested in destroying and looting, and the

crowd "now degenerated into a communistic mania to burn and

pillage," according to Adjutant General Finley. This mob renewed the

assault on the jail, directing its attacks against the main jail entrance

several feet below street level, while others used a plank set over the

stairwell to crawl across to the windows at street level. Breaking into

both levels, the rioters found iron doors barring their passage to the

inside of the jail, so they began to hammer at these doors.15

Around 11:00 P.M., with the doors about to break, Hawkins sent a

call for help to the local 1st Regiment of the ONG, which had two

companies on guard duty at the armory. Colonel C. B. Hunt, regiment

commander, left Captain John Desmond and five men on guard, while

he led fewer than forty soldiers immediately to the jail. He also sent

men to assemble the rest of the regiment. Arriving at the scene of the

riot, he led the Guardsmen into the Courthouse and through the

tunnel. 16

The situation in the jail, meanwhile, became critical during these

minutes before Hunt's arrival. Using sledgehammers, the mob broke

down the doors and flooded into the jail where Hawkins and Reilly had

 

 

 

14. News-Journal, 29 March 1884; AR 1884, pp. 63-4; Enquirer, 29 March 1884.

15. Great Riots!, p. 11; News-Journal, 30 March 1884; AR 1884, p. 64, and report of

Col. Church, p. 224; Enquirer, 29-30 March 1884.

16. News-Journal, 29 March 1884; AR 1884, p. 64, and report of Col. Hunt, p. 224.

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The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                               29

 

their men stationed with clubs. Hawkins refused to allow his men to

draw their revolvers, even though the rioters were wielding bricks,

stones, and pistols. Then the gas went out, and the building went black.

There was a pause. The gas came back on, and the attack renewed. It

was at this point that the ONG arrived.17

Hunt sent his men through the tunnel two abreast because of its

narrow width. As they neared the jail side, several rioters fired their

pistols and hit four soldiers. Hawkins then ordered the Guard to fire

over the crowd's heads. The mob hesitated at this fire, and the police

took advantage of the pause to push them back. Ignoring the warnings

to stay back, the mob made a second rush on the police and soldiers.

The Guardsmen fired four shots and killed the crowd's leader. The

police and militia were then able to clear the jail for the second time.¹⁸

This fight occurred around midnight. Inside the jail were about 100

militia and police. Outside, only about 400 people were actually near

the jail, though hundreds of others were still on the streets, and this

mob was still not ready to quit. After firing their pistols and yelling for

about thirty minutes, the rioters decided to set fire to the jail by pouring

oil down the stairs to the main entrance and trying to light it. Hunt

quickly ordered a detachment of soldiers out the door. They went out

and fired into the crowd. Under fire from the mob but reinforced from

inside, the Guardsmen then advanced to the railing at the top of the

stairwell and ordered the crowd back. The warnings ignored, the

soldiers fired again into the mob, hitting three rioters and one police

officer who was standing by a wagon in the street. The crowd wounded

three Guardsmen during this encounter. Then police and militia

together then went out and cleared Sycamore, North Court, and South

Court Streets, which they held until morning.¹⁹

Elsewhere, the looting spread. Looters broke into the armory of the

Grand Army of the Republic and into B. Kittredge and Co.'s gun shop,

where they found many guns but no ammunition. Desmond and his

guard prevented a possible attack on the ONG armory. Meanwhile, the

composition of the crowd continued to change. The looters now were

mostly boys under sixteen and men without jobs, a dramatic change

from the "solid men" at 9:30 P.M. Finally, between three and four in

the morning, the crowd began to disperse. Four were dead, all

townspeople, with several militia and police and an unknown number

 

 

17. Tunison, Riot, p. 62; Enquirer, 29 March 1884.

18. Reports of Col. Hunt and Surgeon Jones in AR 1884, pp. 224, 227-28;

Commercial-Gazette, 30 March 1884.

19. News-Journal, 29 March 1884; Report of Col. Hunt in AR 1884, pp. 224-25;

Enquirer, 29 March 1884.

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30                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

of citizens hurt.²⁰ It had been a costly Friday night, but Hawkins and

Hunt had done a good job of protecting the jail and prisoners and

preventing any major destruction.

The individual soldiers, too, had done a good job, following orders

and firing only on command. The soldiers felt justified in their actions.

In later interviews, one Guardsman said he had fired on Friday evening

and would again. Another said this was the most dangerous mob he had

ever seen. Not all of the Guard, however, felt this way. One soldier

described how he shot into the air because he and many others in the

regiment sympathized with the crowd. As this was a local regiment,

many of the men probably did have such sympathies. The regiment,

though, did its duty. The soldiers did not use unnecessary force and

used their guns only when commanded by Hawkins or Hunt to do so.

For inexperienced soldiers, in a cramped tunnel with shouts, screams,

and shots ahead, their performance was excellent.²¹

When Saturday dawned, the men inside the jail did not fool

themselves. They knew the riot was far from over. Hawkins therefore

called for more reinforcements early that morning. At 9:00 A.M.

Captain Frank Joyce, commander of the ONG battery in Cincinnati,

received an order from Hawkins to come to the jail. Joyce reported for

duty at noon with only about twenty men and no cannons. He

dismantled the guns and left them behind with a three-man guard

because he had no ammunition for the guns. His men instead armed

themselves with rifles and served for now as infantry. By 10:00 A.M.

those of the 1st Regiment that would ever show during the riot had

reported for duty. Altogether only 117 out of a total of 525 soldiers and

officers served. With these men and Joyce's few, Hawkins now had

almost 200 deputies, police, and militia to face a possible renewal of

fighting.²²

The poor turnout of the Guard Saturday morning was due to two

factors. Saturday's newspaper accounts of the riot the previous night

"terrorized" the men, according to Hunt, convincing them to stay

home. The Enquirer even admitted on Sunday that certain newspaper

accounts had demoralized the members of the Guard. The second

factor was the underlying sympathy many Guardsmen had for the

people and their cause for discontent. Six of Joyce's men "absolutely

 

 

20. Tunison, Riot, p. 86; John A. Johnson, On The Roof of Europe; Behind the

Guardsman's Rifle (Covington, Ky., 1920), pp. 75-76; Enquirer, 29 March 1884; Report

of Col. Hunt in AR 1884, p. 225.

21. Enquirer, 30 March 1884; Tunison, Riot, p. 84.

22. Reports of Col. Hunt and Capt. Joyce in AR 1884, pp. 225, 237-38; "Consolidated

Report, March 31, 1884," MQAR, box 17; News-Journal, 29 March 1884.

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The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                               31

 

refused to turn out or give any excuse, save that they did not propose

to guard and protect murderers and thieves."²³ The problems with

using local militia units to fight fellow citizens became apparant in

Cincinnati.

The defenders of the jail, meanwhile, prepared their defenses as well

as possible. Hawkins took overall command, while Hunt commanded

the Guard and Reilly controlled the police. They then held a conference

with the other officers and staff members of the Guard to decide how

best to prepare for the coming night. Hunt suggested concentrating

their small force to defend the jail. The other leaders agreed that they

had too few men to defend the Courthouse. They therefore ordered the

creation of three barricades around the jail: one at the corner of South

Court and Sycamore, another at North Court and Sycamore, and the

third at East Court and the canal basin. They stationed about twenty-

five men at each. Desmond commanded the reserve inside the jail. (See

map, page 33). Some police helped guard the barricades while others

roamed the city, ready to move on command.²⁴

The morning conference also led to a second measure for defense: a

request for more aid from the ONG. Around 11:00 A.M. Saturday,

Hawkins sent his first request to Adjutant General Finley for more

men. As Hawkins wired, "Great danger apprehended to-night."

Colonel J. W. Harper, a member of Hoadly's staff who was in

Cincinnati, wired the same message to the governor. Just before noon

Hawkins asked Finley to send the 14th (Columbus) and 4th (Dayton)

Regiments because he expected "deadly work to-night."²⁵

Governor Hoadly was reluctant to commit more of the Guard so

quickly. He explained his dilemma that afternoon: "I shall keep the

men under arms until the danger is past, but am anxious to avoid

unnecessary expense to the State, and unnecessary excitement. I don't

wish to stampede the State for nothing, nor to fail to have the men on

hand if necessary." He also wanted to avoid endangering his political

support in Cincinnati by acting too rashly. In order to gauge the mood

of the civilian leaders of the city, he asked for advice from leading

citizens, such as Henry C. Urner, on whether the situation warranted

the mobilization of the ONG. Meanwhile, he ordered the 4th and 14th

Regiments and a Springfield, Ohio, battery to prepare to move at a

 

 

23. Enquirer, 30 March 1884; Reports of Col. Hunt and Capt. Joyce in AR 1884,

pp. 225, 238.

24. Enquirer, 30 March and 3 April 1884; AR 1884, p. 65, and reports of Brig. Gen.

Ryan and Col. Hunt, pp. 221, 225; Roe, Our Police, p. 69.

25. Hawkins to Finley, 11:01 and 11:55, Harper to Hoadly, 11:16, 29 March 1884,

telegrams, in AR 1884, pp. 147-48.

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32                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

moment's notice. All of this occurred within one hour after Hawkins'

request. Hawkins quickly asked Hoadly to send the regiments at

once.²⁶

So far, all was going well from Hawkins' viewpoint. Then compli-

cations arose. Around 1:30 P.M. Hoadly received telegrams, one of

which was from Brigadier General Michael Ryan in Cincinnati, that

said the riot had ended and no militia would be needed. Unsatisfied,

Hoadly asked for more opinions. He believed this pause to ask advice

would not delay the sending of the Guard, if that proved necessary,

because the troops were not ready to leave. If, on the other hand, the

reports were right and the riot were over, Hoadly wanted Hawkins to

withdraw his request. Hawkins, however, reconfirmed his request for

"all the military" possible.²⁷

It was now past 2:00 P.M., more than two hours after Hawkins' initial

request. The militia force was ready to move, but Hoadly continued to

hesitate because the advice from the citizens of Cincinnati continued to

be unanimously against sending the ONG. Hawkins, Hunt, and Harp-

er, however, all agreed that the soldiers were necessary. At 3:00 P.M.

Hoadly asked Ryan to consult with the sheriff. Around 4:00 P.M.,

civilian advice began to change. Urner and Ryan did finally consult

with Hawkins and they withdrew their objections. With everyone now

in agreement in Cincinnati, Hoadly hesitated no longer. By 5:00 P.M.,

the battery and the two regiments had orders to move to Cincinnati.²⁸

Five hours after Hawkins' first request for two regiments, those

regiments received orders to move to the city. As Hoadly said, the first

two hours probably did not matter because the units were not yet ready

to move. The additional three hours of delay are harder to justify.

Hoadly did need concrete knowledge that the Guard was necessary.

He also wanted agreement from the leaders of Cincinnati, his home

town and political base. The fastest way to get advice was to consult as

many trusted people as possible, both military and civilian. As long as

there was disagreement, he had some reason to hesitate. From that

standpoint, it is understandable that he hesitated until he received

unanimous agreement on the necessity of sending the ONG.

 

 

 

26. Hawkins to Finley, 11:55, to Hoadly, 1:20, Hoadly to Urner, 11:55, to Mott,

12:04, to Sintz, 12:40, to Hawkins, 12:47, to Ryan, 3:00, 29 March 1884, telegrams, in

ibid., pp. 147-48, 151.

27. Ryan to Hoadly, 1:29, John Bell to Hoadly, 1:30, Hoadly to Urner, 1:45, to Ryan,

1:55, to Bell, 1:55, Hawkins to Hoadly, 2:10, 29 March 1884, telegrams, in ibid., p. 149.

28. Finley to Mott, 2:25 and 4:46, Urner to Hoadly, 2:26 and 2:49, Hoadly to Ryan,

3:00, to Hawkins, 5:00, Urner and Ryan to Hoadly, 4:41, 29 March 1884, telegrams, in

ibid., pp. 150-52.

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The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                            33

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34                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

Although understandable, his hesitation still was not justified. The

advice he sought was not worth the delay. Ryan, Urner, and the other

citizens he asked had not witnessed the riot and had not yet been to the

jail. They were all against the use of more troops until they went to the

jail, saw the results of the fight, and talked with Hawkins and Hunt.

They then decided Hawkins was right.²⁹ Meanwhile, the commanders

who were on the spot knew the situation and urged the immediate

dispatch of the units requested. As commander-in-chief, Hoadly

should have analyzed better the merits of the different opinions.

The delay notwithstanding, Hoadly decided to send the Guard. At

6:00 P.M. the 14th Regiment left Columbus. The 4th Regiment left

Dayton at 6:30 P.M., and the Springfield battery joined them en route.

Hoadly told Hawkins to expect the reinforcements in Cincinnati at 9:00

P.M. In addition to these units, Hoadly had a Cleveland battery and

three additional infantry companies prepared to move if necessary.³⁰

Altogether, the equivalent of two and one-half regiments and two

batteries, over 1200 men on paper, had been mobilized. Once Hoadly

decided his course of action, he moved with determination.

Cincinnati was fortunate that he did act because Hawkins proved

correct. The riot had not ended. Hawkins and Hunt did not expect

problems until evening, though, since Saturday was a workday.

Unfortunately for them, Saturday was also a payday, and they feared

that many workers would get drunk and contribute to the problems. As

evening approached, the groups around the barricades increased. Just

after dark the crowd swelled and filled Main Street from the canal to

Ninth Street, and also extended west past Clay. More people filled the

streets around the three barricades. It was a clear, cold night, and as

the defenders feared, the crowd contained many intoxicated men. The

situation grew ominous as the troops repulsed a few initial pushes

against the barricades. The defenders inside the perimenter could

only wait and hope that the promised reinforcements would arrive by

9:00 P.M.³¹

Between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M., some rioters began throwing stones and

shooting revolvers and shotguns at the Courthouse windows, while

others started bonfires in the streets. The defenders ignored these

provocations, and the crowd grew bolder. Finally, several rioters

 

 

29. Ibid., p. 66.

30. Hoadly to Hawkins, 6:15 and 7:00, to Harper, 7:26, 29 March 1884, telegrams, in

ibid., pp. 153-55, and reports of Col. Freeman and Capt. Smithnight, pp. 231, 259.

31. Kleine, "Anatomy," p. 241; Johnson, On the Roof, pp. 77, 85; Commercial-

Gazette, 30 March 1884; News-Journal, 30 March 1884; AR 1884, p. 67; Great Riots!, p.

19.

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The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                              35

broke into the Treasurer's office in the Courthouse and set it on fire. The fire quickly spread to the other offices. At the same time other rioters tried to move east on North and South Court Streets toward the jail, but the troops at the barricades cleared the streets with gunfire. The mob retreated and charged again, shouting "Burn the town!" and "Kill the S-n of B-s!"32 These rioters were no longer trying to give justice a little help. They wanted revenge for Friday's wounded and slain. The fire in the Courthouse continued to spread as the mob prevented the firemen from working. Hawkins therefore ordered Desmond and the reserve through the tunnel to the Courthouse to protect and assist the firemen. When the soldiers emerged outside, a rioter shot Desmond in the head. Desmond fell dead, the only fatality of the ONG during the riot. After a second shot wounded another soldier, the troops retired back inside. The firemen also retreated.33 The Courthouse continued to burn through the night. Hawkins failed to save the Courthouse through no fault of his own. During the attack on the Courthouse, the troops around the jail had to     32. AR 1884, p. 67; Enquirer, 30 March 1884. 33. AR 1884, p. 67, and report of Col. Hunt, p. 226.

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36                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

repulse several attacks against the barricades and down North and

South Court Streets. Hawkins committed his only reserve, but it had to

retire after its leader fell. He also had sent deputies to meet and hurry

the reinforcements to the jail, but the reinforcements were late.³⁴ He

could have done nothing else.

The expected reinforcements were indeed late. The 4th Regiment,

commanded by Colonel Frank B. Mott, arrived in the city by 9:30 P.M.

The battery accompanying the 4th arrived later. By 9:45 P.M. the

regiment was at Ninth and Walnut, only three squares from the jail,

when it halted. The mob mingled with the soldiers, hurling taunts and

insults at them. Finally, the regiment retreated to the train depot. The

regiment's 300 men never made it to the scene of action Saturday

night.³⁵

The reasons for the 4th's failure provide a good example of the

problems National Guard units faced when confronted by hostile

citizens. First, no staff officer met Mott at the depot, though a deputy

apparently did. Guided by the deputy, the regiment made it to Ninth

and Walnut where it halted because both Mott and the deputy wanted

further orders from Hawkins. The deputy went to find Hawkins but did

not return, so Mott decided to return to the depot and attempt to

contact the sheriff by phone. Surrounded by a threatening mob, Mott's

indecision did not inspire the soldiers. Inexperienced, just called from

home, and not having eaten since noon, many in the 4th could not have

been disappointed by the decision to retire.³⁶ Mott and the 4th did,

however, fail to do their duty, which the noise from the Courthouse

square should have made clear.

The 4th's retreat left Hawkins in a perilous situation. The fire had

roused the mob to fever pitch, and the repulse of the 4th only increased

the rioters' boldness. The rioters continued the fight around the

barricades and on North and South Court Streets.³⁷ No estimates of

the crowd's number were given, but it probably reached its peak

around this time. Hawkins could only defend the perimeter and await

the arrival of reinforcements.

The violence continued to spread beyond the immediate vicinity of

the jail and Courthouse. At one point, a group of rioters left the

 

 

34. Harper to Hoadly, 9:51, 29 March 1884, telegram, in ibid., p. 155, and report of

Col. Hunt, p. 225.

35. Ibid., p. 66; Enquirer, 30 March 1884.

36. Court of Inquiry, in AR 1884, p. 298; Enquirer, 30-31 March 1884, including an

interview with Mott on 30 March; Commercial-Gazette, 3 April 1884, including inter-

views with a captain and several privates of the 4th Regiment.

37. Johnson, On the Roof, p. 88; Tunison, Riot, p. 88.

• 14
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                              37

 

Courthouse and moved south on Main to William Powell and Co.'s gun

shop. Several store clerks, armed with rifles, warned the approaching

crowd to leave. The mob advanced anyway until the clerks shot two

men dead and three wounded.³⁸ The mob then apparently decided that

Powell's gun shop was not worth the price.

The Courthouse was burning and the fighting was spreading when,

between 10:30 and 11:00 P.M., the 14th Regiment, commanded by

Colonel George D. Freeman, arrived in Cincinnati. A deputy sheriff

and Quarter Master Ryan met the new arrivals with written orders to

proceed immediately to the jail. Hawkins planned to avoid the confu-

sion the 4th had suffered. Freeman, though, would not have allowed

such a failure to occur. He was a seven-year veteran of the ONG, and

had commanded the regiment in two previous crises. He and his

regiment were well prepared.³⁹

The 14th arrived with a Gatling gun and four extra companies, in all

about 425 men. At the depot Freeman told his men to stand firm and to

fire only on command. After receiving twenty rounds of ammunition

each, the men began the march to the jail. On the way the crowds of

people insulted them, threw stones, and fired pistols, but the soldiers

"remained cool and declined to be provoked into making retort."

Freeman's command reached the perimeter near the jail without

serious incident, and Freeman reported to Hawkins. Hawkins told him

to send the Gatling gun to the Court Street barricade, and then to clear

the streets around the Courthouse. Freeman sent two companies to

support the Gatling gun, and then divided the rest of his force into two

groups. One group marched past the barricade at Sycamore and North

Court and moved up North Court to Main. This detachment pushed the

crowd in front of it at bayonet point north on Mair and out over the

canal. (See map, page 39.) They then began to erect a barricade near

the bridge.⁴⁰

The second group moved up Ninth to Main. Freeman left three

companies at the intersection of Ninth and Main to hold back the

crowds south and west of the crossroads, while he sent one company

north on Main toward Court Street. As this company neared South

Court Street, the mob began to resist, throwing stones and firing

revolvers. An additional company from the crossroads moved to the

 

 

 

38. Enquirer, 30 March 1884.

39. AR 1884, pp. 68, 127, and reports of Col. Church and Col. Freeman, pp. 222, 231;

Enquirer, 30-31 March 1884; News-Journal, 31 March 1884.

40. AR 1884, p. 68, and Church to Hoadly, 11:41, 29 March 1884, telegram, p. 156,

and reports of Col. Freeman and Maj. Harper, pp. 231, 264.

• 15
 

38                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

support of the first company, but the rioters continued to press

forward. Finally Freeman brought a third company forward to support

the detachment, and he and several officers warned the crowd to retire.

They instead advanced. Freeman ordered the first platoon to fire, and

the mob fell back to Court Street, their leader dead and several rioters

wounded. The detachment pushed to Court Street and then west on

Court to Clay, where it held back the crowd. Main was now clear from

the canal to Ninth, and Freeman reported to Hawkins that the firemen

could return to fight the fire at the Courthouse.⁴¹

Rioters hiding near the Market House a block west of Court and Clay

continued to fire on the militia. A platoon of soldiers finally returned

the fire after the rioters had wounded ten soldiers. The troops then

gathered materials and constructed a barricade. The units at Main and

Ninth also built a barricade, at which point all streets leading to the jail

and Courthouse had defenses.⁴² For the moment, the heavy fighting on

the perimeter subsided.

The importance of Hoadly's hesitation to commit the Guard can now

be seen. The "fatal delay," as Hunt called it, was three hours longer

than necessary. The 4th arrived in Cincinnati around 9:30 P.M. Three

hours earlier the rioting had not begun, and the 4th probably could have

reached the jail without incident. With the addition of this regiment's

300 men, Hawkins could have defended the Courthouse. The 14th

arrived around 11:00 P.M. At 8:00 P.M. the rioting had just begun. At the

height of the crisis, this force cleared the block around the Courthouse.

Had it been available earlier, perhaps the fighting around the jail and

Courthouse could have been cut short. When Hoadly sent these two

regiments, he wired Hawkins orders not to move them from the depots

"unless absolutely necessary."⁴³ Instead, Hoadly could have placed

these units in Cincinnati by 8:00 P.M. under similar restrictions, and

then they would have been available at the beginning of the action.

Events, however, could not be changed, and the battle around the

Courthouse had now raged for hours. Surprisingly, the rioters still had

not had enough. The saloons were busy, and more drunken men and

looters were joining the crowds. Meanwhile, the violence and looting

continued to spread throughout the city. Around midnight thieves

broke into T. and A. Pickering's store, but nearby police reacted

quickly and caught many of the criminals inside. A little before 3:00

 

 

41. Ibid., p. 69, and reports of Col. Church and Col. Freeman, pp. 223, 231-32.

42. Ibid., p. 69, and report of Col. Freeman, p. 232.

43. Hoadly to Hawkins, 5:00 and 6:15, 29 March 1884, telegrams, in ibid., pp. 152-53,

and report of Col. Hunt, p. 225.

• 16
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                              39

• 17
 

40                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

A.M. rioters broke into the Music Hall and found Joyce's dismantled

guns. They reassembled the guns (Joyce doubted the guns could have

been fired) and began hauling them toward the jail. The Hammond

Street Police Station warned Hawkins, who immediately sent three

companies of the 14th, the Gatling gun, and a company of police to stop

this group. The police, not encumbered with a hand-drawn Gatling gun,

moved faster, met the rioters pulling the cannons, and captured the

guns and several of the rioters. They brought the cannons to safety

within the perimeter.⁴⁴

The fighting around the barricades continued to rage. The rioters at

the Market House launched several unsuccessful attacks on the

Court-Clay barricade, after which they contented themselves with

sniping at the soldiers from under cover. A Commercial-Gazette

reporter tried to enter the barricade at Sycamore and Ninth but police,

hiding near the walls of the buildings outside the perimeter, warned him

to stop. They told him an earlier group had ignored a similar warning

and had continued to advance. The reporter could see the dead bodies

in the street. Finally, a little after 3:00 A.M., the fighting began to

subside.⁴⁵

Throughout the battle, the 4th Regiment and the Springfield artillery

remained at their respective depots. The 4th, after its retreat, did not

venture forth again. The battery, however, never left its depot. Captain

George Sintz, the battery commander, arrived in the city at 11:00 P.M.

with two guns and thirty-one men. No guides met them, and they could

not contact Hawkins at the jail or Mott with the 4th. They had no

horses to move their guns (horses were supposed to be supplied at the

depot), so Sintz placed his guns in a defensive posture. He then went

to the 4th to ask the officers if they would escort his battery to the jail,

but they refused.⁴⁶ Neither the regiment nor the battery participated

further in Saturday night's battle.

Governor Hoadly remained in Columbus throughout the night,

performing the duties of a commander-in-chief. He spent the entire

night in a railroad company's office with a wire for his own use. He

kept in constant communication with his aides in Cincinnati, with the

commanders of regiments and batteries around the state, and with the

men in charge of the railroads. He did not go to bed until almost five in

the morning, long after the firing had ceased in Cincinnati.⁴⁷

 

 

44. Commercial-Gazette. 30 March 1884; Enquirer, 30 March 1884; Reports of Col.

Freeman and Capt. Joyce in AR 1884, pp. 232, 238.

45. AR 1884, p. 69, and report of Col. Freeman, pp. 232-33; Commercial-Gazette, 30

March 1884.

46. Report of Capt. Sintz in AR 1884, p. 257.

47. News-Journal, 31 March 1884.

• 18
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                                41

 

Hoadly's decision to stay in Columbus rather than to go to Cincinnati

was wise. Had he gone to Cincinnati, he would have been out of touch

with everyone while on the train, and his headquarters would have

been in transit, making communication with it difficult. He then would

have had to get inside the perimeter to consult with the commanders,

possibly losing contact with the outside. He had able men on the scene

who could command the tactical movements and who had had some

experience, and he had more important duties to perform. By concen-

trating on the mobilization of the ONG, he was able to coordinate the

necessary movements, trains, and logistics. Thus, Hoadly was correct

to remain in Columbus at a central headquarters.

His actions during the night prepared the way for the amassing of

almost 2000 troops, as well as the necessary ammunition and equip-

ment, in Cincinnati by the end of Sunday. He based his moves on

information received from his aides throughout the night. Harper and

Colonel S. H. Church, who had arrived in Cincinnati with the 14th

Regiment, both wired the governor several times, informing him of the

destruction, deaths, and injuries, and of the failure of the 4th. By

midnight, Hoadly realized that the 4th and 14th Regiments were not

enough. Wiring Harper that he would stay at the wire "all night, if

necessary," he began to mobilize the rest of the ONG.⁴⁸

Between 12:30 and 5:00 A.M. Hoadly accomplished a great deal. He

ordered five regiments to assemble their commands, and asked local

railway companies to prepare special trains. Warned by Church that

the troops in Cincinnati were low on ammunition, Hoadly prepared two

different shipments of ammunition, totaling 50,000 rounds, along with

the necessary escorts, to move to Cincinnati. He sent Adjutant General

Finley to Cincinnati to take command of the ONG in the field, while

Hoadly tried to coordinate the arrival of new units with escorts at the

depots. He ordered the 4th to move to the jail, but that regiment

ignored the order. Throughout this mobilization, he ignored costs:

ONG officers were to "spare no expense" and use whatever trains

were necessary, as the state "Will pay bills."⁴⁹ By the time Hoadly

went to bed Sunday morning, he had the entire ONG and 50,000 rounds

of ammunition on the move or preparing to move.

 

 

 

48. Harper to Hoadly, 9:51, 11:06, and 12:00, Church to Hoadly, 11:41, Hoadly to

Harper, no time, 29 March 1884, telegrams, in AR 1884, pp. 155-56.

49. Hoadly to Orland Smith, 12:30 and 2:00, to Harper, 12:30 and 12:35, to Entrekin,

12:35, to Pocock, 12:55, 2:10, 3:20, and 4:10, to Williamson, 1:00, to Church, 2:30, 3:45,

and 3:55, to Hetrick, 3:00, Harper to Hoadly, 1:40, Church to Hoadly, 2:06 and 2:21,

F. Green to J. E. Rose, 4:41, 30 March 1884, telegrams, in ibid., pp. 157-61, 163-64, and

report of Col. Picard, p. 239.

• 19
 

42                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

As the sun rose on Sunday morning, the ruins of the Courthouse

must have been a reminder to all within the perimeter that they were in

the middle of a city gone berserk. At 9:45 A.M. Finley arrived at this

scene of destruction and took command of the state troops. Finding the

soldiers exhausted and without food, he arranged for as many meals as

possible. He also found that the principal commanders in Cincinnati

expected more trouble that night. He agreed and wired Hoadly of this

fear. The mayor, Thomas Stephens, made his first appearance that

morning, having been ill with pneumonia. He called for a meeting of

citizens and published a list of 100 names of the people he thought

should attend. By 9:45 A.M., Hoadly was also up and at work again.⁵⁰

He learned quickly that the trouble in Cincinnati had not ended.

The mayor's conference met before noon with twenty-five to thirty

"leading citizens" in attendance. As a result of the conference, the

mayor closed all the saloons until Monday, and he asked Hoadly for all

available ONG. He also called for the citizens of the city to emerge and

join a special police force to help stop the riot.⁵1 After a two-day

absence, the civil government was back on the job. The civil authori-

ties were finally helping the police and military regain control of the

city.

The mobilization and deployment of the ONG continued without a

pause on Sunday. At 6:30 A.M. Colonel Frederick J. Picard arrived in

Cincinnati with twenty-seven men and 20,000 rounds of ammunition.

He knew the soldiers at the Courthouse needed the supplies badly, so

when the 4th disobeyed an order to escort Picard to the jail, he decided

to march with only his one company. Three blocks from the jail a

crowd formed between him and the perimeter. Using bayonets,

Picard's men continued their advance, twice losing and recapturing the

precious ammunition wagon. They finally reached the barricade in

front of the Courthouse and entered the perimeter. Several of Picard's

men had injuries from thrown stones.⁵²

Finley set up military headquarters in the City Buildings about one

mile west of the defensive perimeter. He then began preparations to

meet the expected reinforcements as they arrived throughout the day.

He also ordered Sintz's battery and the 4th Regiment to the jail.

Around noon, Mott, commanding 115 men of the 4th, arrived at Sintz's

 

 

 

50. Finley to Hoadly, 9:45 and 10:58, Hoadly to Finley, 9:45, 30 March 1884,

telegrams, in ibid., pp. 165-67; Great Riots!, p. 24; Enquirer, 31 March 1884.

51. Finley to Hoadly, 12:08, 30 March 1884, telegram, in AR 1884, p. 168; Enquirer,

30-31 March 1884.

52. Reports of Col. Freeman and Col. Picard in AR 1884, pp. 233, 239-40.

• 20
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                              43

depot. The rest of the regiment had gone home during the morning. Horses were delivered, and together the battery and regiment marched to the jail, arriving by 2:15 P.M. During the afternoon, Finley, with Hoadly's permission, ordered a Cleveland battery to Cincinnati, and he sent a newly arrived regiment to the City Buildings as a reserve. Freeman remained in command at the jail.53 Hoadly continued to work from Columbus. Between noon and 1:30 P.M. he ordered the rest of the ONG to move to Cincinnati as soon as possible, while he communicated with the railroads to arrange special trains for the men to use. He also prepared to send more supplies and ammunition to the infantry and artillery and even considered declaring martial law, though he refrained from this as the civil authorities were     53. News-Journal, 31 March 1884; AR 1884, pp. 66-67, and Hoadly to Finley, 12:35, Finley to Hoadly, 2:16 and 6:51, 30 March 1884, telegrams, pp. 169-70, 173, 183, and reports of Col. Freeman, Col. Entrekin, Capt. Sintz, and Capt. Smithnight, pp. 233, 249, 257-59; Enquirer, 31 March 1884.

• 21
 

44                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

beginning to take charge. Hoadly was in command of the situation, and

by 6:00 P.M. he had the entire state force in motion.⁵⁴

The command arrangement in Cincinnati between civil and military

authorities was also working well. Finley announced to the soldiers

that he would take orders from the mayor and that the ONG was in

Cincinnati to support the civil authorities. Mayor Stephens, with

Finley's support, asked the mayors of Newport and Covington to block

the bridges from their towns into Cincinnati to prevent more people

from entering and joining the mob. Stephens and Finley also stationed

squads of police to defend important buildings such as Kittredge's and

Powell's gun shops.⁵⁵ The coordination between the city officials, the

police, and the state troops was a major advantage for the defenders of

the law.

The soldiers already in Cincinnati spent an uncomfortable Sunday,

though Quartermaster Ryan tried to feed them as well as possible. He

had a hospital and two hotels provide plenty of coffee while he used the

jail's kitchen and a local establishment to prepare meals. The men,

however, got little sleep as they remained on constant duty patrolling

the streets and manning the barricades. Some members of the 1st had

not slept since Friday afternoon, and the troops who had arrived

Saturday had not slept since their arrival. In addition, the weather was

still cold, and the soldiers had few overcoats.⁵⁶ Altogether, it was a

miserable, uncomfortable day for the soldiers and police on duty that

Sunday.

Cincinnati was fortunate to have these Guardsmen and police on

hand. Throughout the day the crowds increased and tension mounted

as rioters threatened the soldiers, and police arrested some rioters near

the barricades. Finley reported a few "disturbances" and the death of

one citizen, but no major fighting erupted during the day. Many in the

crowd, however, had armed themselves from the guns looted from the

stores the previous two nights. Finley expected trouble that night.⁵⁷

 

54. Hoadly to C. E. Henderson, 11:06, to Williamson, 12:00, to McMaken, 12:15, to

Hetrick, 1:00, to Finley, 12:55 and 5:35, to Thorp, 1:03, to Norton, 1:10, to R. Shurtleff,

1:15, to Harper, 1:24, to C. C. Waite, 1:30, to Pocock, 2:00, to R. Smith and B.

Eggleston, 4:50, R. Smith and B. Eggleston to Hoadly, 3:50, 30 March 1884, telegrams,

in AR 1884, pp. 168-72, 177, 180-81.

55. Finley to Hoadly, 4:12 and 5:06, 30 March 1884, telegrams, in ibid., pp. 178-79,

181, and Gen. Order no. 1, 30 March 1884, p. 208; Enquirer, 31 March 1884;

News-Journal, 31 March 1884.

56. Enquirer, 31 March 1884; Ryan to Hoadly, 10:41, 30 March 1884, telegram, in AR

1884, p. 188, and report of Col. Hunt, p. 226; Commercial-Gazette, 31 March 1884;

News-Journal, 1 April 1884.

57. AR 1884, p. 70, and Finley to Hoadly, 4:12, 30 March 1884, telegram, p. 178, and

report of Col. Freeman, p. 233.

• 22
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                               45

 

A new regiment, escorting the ammunition and artillery supplies,

arrived in Cincinnati at 7:00 P.M. As of this time Finley's force was

formidable. He had units from six different regiments and one battalion

of infantry, and two artillery batteries, a total of approximately 1100

soldiers, six cannons, and one Gatling gun. He positioned his men

throughout the town in cooperation with the mayor, stationing about

700 men inside the perimeter and 400 in reserve in the City Buildings.

One company went to the Hammond Street Station to cooperate with

the police, while small detachments garrisoned the Music Hall, ar-

mory, and gas works.⁵⁸

At 8:00 P.M. Hawkins ordered Freeman to send three companies to

guard the powder stored in Clifton Heights, north of the city. Accord-

ing to reports, a crowd of 2000 was threatening to attack. The troops

drew sixty rounds each and, with a deputy sheriff as guide, marched to

Clifton. Their arrival stopped the impending attack, but the soldiers

remained on guard until midnight when local police took over the duty.

The soldiers returned to the jail later that night.⁵⁹

Despite the presence of such a strong force of armed soldiers in the

city, the riot resumed Sunday night. By now Hawkins, Finley, and

Hoadly must have been wondering what it would take to stop the

violence. No one could have predicted the determination and perse-

verance of the mob in the face of such a formidable force. This mob had

been stirred to a fighting spirit and had not yet vented its full wrath.

The violence in town began around 8:30 P.M. when a group of 150

rioters left the crowd near the jail and moved several blocks away,

where they began to push streetcars off the tracks. Thirty minutes later

they moved to Power Hall behind the Music Hall, where they found the

disassembled parts of a cannon. The police warned Finley, who then

had Colonel Samuel Courtwright, another one of the governor's aides

on duty in Cincinnati, dispatch two companies of about seventy-five

men from the reserve. These troops quickly marched to the scene. As

they deployed in front of the halls, the crowd scattered, leaving behind

the cannon and three men whom the police arrested. There were no

casualties. The soldiers, joined by fifteen police from a nearby station,

guarded the halls throughout the night. At the same time, another

company went to strengthen the guard at the gas works. Other police,

meanwhile, were busy with thieves who were looting some pawn-

shops.⁶⁰

 

58. Gen. Order no. 1, 30 March 1884, in ibid., p. 208, and reports of Col. Entrekin and

Col. Pocock, pp. 249-50, 261; Commercial-Gazette, 31 March and 1 April 1884.

59. Report of Col. Picard in AR 1884, p. 240.

60. Enquirer, 31 March 1884; Finley to Hoadly, 10:40, 30 March 1884, telegram, in

• 23
 

46                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

The fighting increased between 10:00 and 11:00 P.M. when rioters

near the Market House began shooting at the soldiers behind the

Court-Clay barricade. Officers warned the rioters to stop, but they

continued to fire. The soldiers then fired twenty rounds from the

Gatling gun, inflicting several wounds and scattering the crowd. For

the next couple of hours the Market House crowd fired only a few

random shots, to which the troops did not respond; they were under

orders not to fire individually, only on command. Meanwhile, Finley

received word of shots near one of the train depots. He sent one

company and some police to the scene to stop that fight.⁶¹

Reinforcements began to arrive in the city at midnight. One battery

and the equivalent of three companies arrived with 30,000 more rounds

of ammunition. These units reported to Finley at headquarters in the

City Buildings. At 1:00 A.M. a river steamer dropped off two companies

from the river towns, and at 2:30 A.M. the 3rd Regiment arrived.

Lieutenant Colonel James E. Shellenberger, temporarily in command

of the 3rd, ordered his advance guard to fire only single shots if they

met resistance between the depot and the City Buildings. The 3rd

joined the growing reserve.⁶²

Even the United States Army became involved in the increasingly

serious state of affairs in Cincinnati. As early as 5:30 P.M. on Sunday,

Hoadly had informed Finley that he was free to requisition artillery

ammunition from the U. S. Army's Newport Barracks. According to

the Enquirer, some ammunition was sent to Cincinnati.⁶³ The riot had

grown to proportions no one could have imagined Friday.

The final outbreak of fighting occurred at 1:00 A.M., again near the

barricade at Court and Clay. As a large crowd prepared to advance on

the barricade, Hawkins, Hunt, and other officers stationed themselves

at Court and Main to command the situation. The rioters fired over fifty

shots, but the Guard did not respond. Finally, with a shout to "clean

out those blue coats," the mob charged the barricade. When they had

closed to a short distance, Freeman ordered two volleys, by company,

in rapid succession. The crowd retreated, leaving behind several

wounded. This was the last extensive firing as the streets slowly

became quiet.⁶⁴

 

AR 1884, p. 188, and report of Col. Entrekin, p. 250; Tunison, Riot, p. 92.

61. Finley to Hoadly, 11:35, 30 March 1884, telegram, in AR 1884, pp. 188-89, and

report of Col. Freeman, pp. 233-34.

62. Reports of Col. Entrekin, Lt. Col. Shellenberger, Capt. Smithnight, and Maj.

Harper, in ibid., pp. 250, 255, 260, 264-65; Enquirer, 31 March 1884.

63. News-Journal, 31 March 1884; Enquirer, 31 March 1884; Hoadly to Finley, 5:30,

30 March 1884, telegram, in AR 1884, p. 181.

64. Report of Col. Freeman in AR 1884, p. 234.

• 24
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                                       47

 

Finley telephoned Hoadly at 3:00 A.M. to say that he had enough men

for the moment. Hoadly then tried to contact the regiments still on the

move, wiring: "War probably over." Three regiments already en route

could not be stopped, but he was able to contact and halt a fourth.⁶⁵

The people of Cincinnati awoke Monday morning to quiet streets. At

7:00 A.M. Freeman had his men unload their weapons. During the

morning reinforcements reported to the jail, which enabled Freeman to

relieve the men who had been without sleep since Saturday. Almost

800 more men arrived in the city by noon, completing the deployment

of the ONG in Cincinnati. The force deployed as of Monday totaled

approximately 2500 soldiers, ten cannons, and one Gatling gun from

ten regiments and one battalion of infantry, and three batteries. Only

one regiment of the ONG was not on hand.⁶⁶

The city seemed quiet but Finley took no chances. He kept his forces

in place around the city: about 900 men at the Music Hall; 1070 men,

six cannons, and one Gatling gun at the jail; and over 400 men, four

cannons, and one police Gatling gun at the City Buildings. He had two

companies support the police at the Hammond Street Station, and one

company at the gas works. He also sent two companies to the Plum

Street Station, and one to Fountain Square. These preparations,

however, did not receive a test, and the men spent a quiet night in their

positions. In fact, Freeman's men kept their guns unloaded through the

night. The governor put it best: "war over."⁶⁷

Finley immediately began relieving units on Tuesday. The first to

leave were those that had arrived first, including the 4th and 14th

Regiments. As the soldiers left, the civilians prepared to take over. The

mayor's committee began swearing in the special police force to

augment the existing force.⁶⁸

 

 

 

65. Finley to Hoadly, 3:00 a.m., telephone call, Hoadly to Hetrick, 5:00 a.m., Finley

to Hoadly, 5:05 a.m., telegrams, 31 March 1884, in George Hoadly Papers, 1847-1886,

MSS. 314, box 1, folder 3, March 1884, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio,

hereafter cited as GHP; Hoadly to Finley, 5:43, 31 March 1884, telegram, in AR 1884,

p. 191.

66. Norton to Hoadly, 1:54, Hetrick to Hoadly, 8:30, Hoadly to Thorp, 10:45, 31

March 1884, telegrams, in AR 1884, pp. 190-91, 193, and reports of Col. Freeman, Col.

Picard, Col. Norton, Col. Pocock, and Maj. Harper, pp. 234, 240, 243-44, 262, 265.

67. Hoadly to A. L. Conger, 11:51, 31 March 1884, telegram, in ibid., p. 194, and Gen

Order no. 6, 31 March 1884, pp. 209-10, and reports of Col. Norton, Col. Entrekin, Lt.

Col. Shellenberger, Col. Pocock, Maj. Harper, and Col Hetrick, pp. 244, 250, 256, 262,

265-66; News-Journal, 1 April 1884; Commercial-Gazette, 1 April 1884.

68. Finley to Hoadly, 4:20, 31 March 1884, telegram, in AR 1884, p. 196, and Spec.

Orders nos. 7-9, 1 April 1884, p. 212, and report of Col. Freeman, p. 234; News-Journal,

1 April 1884.

• 25
 

48                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

Wednesday the demobilization continued, though Hoadly and Finley

decided not to empty the city entirely. Hawkins, Mayor Stephens, and

the mayor's committee of citizens all requested that Hoadly leave a

regiment in the city a few days longer, possibly until Tuesday, April 8,

the day after the spring elections. Finley ordered one regiment to stay

until that Tuesday, and upon Hoadly's advice, he ordered a second

regiment to remain until Thursday, April 3, just to be safe. In addition,

forty-one men of the 1st Regiment would remain at the armory until

April 17.69

The rest of the soldiers left Wednesday, as did Finley. Ryan stayed

throughout the whole period, supplying coats, blankets, and food to the

soldiers. Finally, at 8:00 A.M. Tuesday, April 8, the day after Cincinnati's

spring elections and eleven days after the riot had begun, the last unit

of the ONG left Cincinnati.⁷⁰ As the soldiers left, the police replaced

them on the streets. They allowed no one near the jail or Courthouse

without a pass until Thursday, when the barricades came down. Main

Street finally reopened. Police, however, continued to guard the

area.71

The best estimate of the total casualties during the riot is forty-five

dead and at least 139 wounded. Guard casualties were approximately

forty wounded and two dead. The fatalities were Desmond on Saturday,

and Private Israel Getz, who apparently died by accident Tuesday,

April 1.72 The number of militia casualties indicates the ferocity and

deadly intent of the rioters, while the deaths among non-soldiers shows

the Guard's willingness to defend itself.

Troubles began over a sham verdict of manslaughter. Two weeks

later almost 200 men were dead or wounded and the Courthouse was

destroyed. What were the results of this display of hostility? For

Cincinnati there seemed to be few. Monday, April 7, the people voted

in an election that changed nothing. The political machine still con-

trolled the election and the same politicians won. McLean was not

ousted until the next year. One gain, however, was that Tom Campbell

fled the city soon after the riot. Crime continued to increase while the

 

69. Finley to Hoadly, 5:50, 1 April, and 11:44, 2 April 1884, telegrams, in AR 1884,

pp. 201, 205, and report of Col. Hunt, p. 226; Urner to Hoadly, 2 April, Executive

Committee to Hoadly, 2 April 1884, GHP, box 1, folder 4, April 1884.

70. Finley to Hoadly, 12:02, 2 April, Ryan to Hoadly, 10:36 and 12:10, 3 April,

Church to Hoadly, 4:04, 8 April 1884, telegrams, in AR 1884, pp. 205-07, and Spec.

Orders nos. 13-39, 1-2 April 1884 (for details of the departures of the various units), pp.

213-220.

71. Enquirer, 2-4 April 1884.

72. Ibid., 6 April 1884; Commercial-Gazette, 2 April 1884; Gen. Order no. 8, 2 April

1884, in AR 1884, p. 210, and reports of Col. Freeman, Lt. Shepherd, Surgeon Guerin,

and Surgeon Hough, pp. 234-36, 241.

• 26
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                                     49

 

people's indifference grew. Capital punishment, though, also increased.

New laws were passed regulating criminal trials. Thus there was some

gain in the legal justice system which had, after all, been the spark that

had started the explosion. Cincinnati, however, was not free from

violence. Six months later, during the fall elections, more riots erupted,

though that time the ONG did not have to intervene.⁷³ Cincinnati paid

a heavy price for these few gains.

The local authorities deserve some mention. Hawkins did an excel-

lent job as commander of the military until Finley arrived. Though in

command when the Courthouse burned, he could not defend every-

thing with his weak force. He accepted the personal thanks of the

governor and, in 1890, he received further recognition when he became

the Adjutant General of the ONG. The police also were faithful to their

duty, serving side by side with the soldiers throughout the crisis. They

deserved the praise they received from the newspapers and authori-

ties.⁷⁴ The mayor's absence during the first two days of rioting marred

his performance. On Sunday, however, he began to reestablish civilian

control, rallying the citizens and coordinating, through Finley, the use

of the militia and police. His actions during those days deserve credit.

The experience in Cincinnati disturbed the ONG. Hunt feared that

the hostility of the rioters would have an adverse effect on the 1st

Regiment, and he was right. Hunt resigned in June, and the Lieutenant

Colonel, Major, and Chaplain of the 1st all resigned before the end of

the year. Joyce's battery suffered a similar fate as its three ranking

officers all resigned by the end of September. The 4th Regiment,

meanwhile, faced a Court of Inquiry, which relieved Mott of command.

The Court ruled that the 4th had failed to do its duty, and found Mott

guilty of incompetence and disobedience of orders. Rather than face a

court-martial, Mott "Resigned for the good of the service" in July. On

May 31, 1884, the headquarters of the 4th disbanded, as did three of its

companies. The other companies formed the nucleus of a new regi-

ment.⁷⁵

 

73. Wright, Bossism, p. 23;Tunison, Riot, pp. 72-74; Wittke, History of Ohio, V, 198;

History of Cincinnati, 1894, p. 371; Johnson,On the Roof, p. 94; Gary P. Kocolowski,

"Expanding Police Services in Late-Nineteenth-Century Cincinnati," The Cincinnati

Historical Society Bulletin, 31 (Summer 1973), 117.

74. Hawkins to Hoadly, 2 April 1884, in GHP, box 1, folder 4; D. F. Pancoast, Adj.

Gen., Report of the Adjutant General of Ohio to the Governor of the State of Ohio for

the Year 1946 (Columbus, 1947), p. 19.

75. Enquirer, 3 April 1884; Ohio, Adjutant General, Ohio National Guard, Adminis-

tration, Commissioned Officers' roster, by Company, 1875-1917, ser. 73, 1884, Ohio

Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, pp. 433, 505-10, 736; Regimental Rosters, 1863,

1870-1904, ser. 162, 1st Regiment, 1884, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio; Court

of Inquiry, in AR 1884, pp. 297-302.

• 27
 

50                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

Other organizational matters also received attention. In April,

Hoadly and Finley implemented Finley's suggestion to brigade the

regiments to increase large-unit drills and to help ease future mobili-

zations. Hoadly had Finley study the advisability of attaching a Gatling

gun to each regiment. As Hoadly explained, "Gatling-guns seem to

extinguish a mob quicker than any other weapon."⁷⁶ The crowd facing

the Court-Clay barricade Sunday night probably would have agreed.

Overall, Finley and Hoadly planned to gain from the experience in

Cincinnati.

The Cincinnati riot did, in the end, provide testimony to the

efficiency and skill of the state command system and the ONG. The

governor received many messages of congratulations, including one

from Mayor Stephens' executive committee which thanked Hoadly for

the prompt concentration of a force large enough to stop the violence.

The Cleveland Leader wrote: "This was the Governor's first experi-

ence in military affairs. He is cool in all his movements, and is

undoubtedly competent for any emergency." Hoadly coordinated the

movements of all the units, maintained the logistical support, and kept

abreast of the situation in Cincinnati. In short, he ably performed the

functions of a commander in chief. His hesitation on Saturday delayed

the arrival of the Guard Saturday night, which left the Courthouse open

to destruction. In light of Sunday's continued violence, however, his

hesitation did not materially lengthen the riot.⁷⁷

The number of soldiers in Cincinnati did not seem to impress the

rioters. They fought the police and a few Guardsmen Friday night, they

battled over 500 Guardsmen Saturday, and finally on Sunday they

fought over 1100 soldiers. With 2500 soldiers in Cincinnati on Monday,

the violence ceased. Hoadly, however, was justifiably reluctant on

Saturday to send almost one-half the entire ONG after one night's

rioting. He sent over 700 men on Saturday, and without definite

knowledge that more were needed, Hoadly could not justify a further

mobilization. When he received such knowledge late Saturday night,

he immediately began a full mobilization. His decision to commit the

ONG in stages was the best possible, given the circumstances of the

moment.

The ONG in general earned the praise it received. Finley cooperated

with the civil authorities, subordinated the ONG to the mayor, and

several times Sunday coordinated the movement of the military with

 

76. AR 1884, pp. 25-26, and Hoadly to Finley, 10:00. 1 April 1884, telegram, p. 198.

77. Executive Committee to Hoadly, 2 April, Urner to Hoadly, 2[6] April 1884, in

GHP, box 1, folder 4; Cleveland Leader, 31 March 1884, quoted in Roberts, "George

Hoadly," p. 28.

• 28
 

The Cincinnati Riot of 1884                               51

 

those of the police. His dispositions on Sunday met all emergencies. As

of Monday he read the situation correctly and pulled out quickly but

not prematurely. The governor's staff also provided essential assis-

tance by sending information and coordinating logistics in Cincinnati.

The soldiers themselves performed admirably. They received praise

from Hoadly, the newspapers of Cincinnati, and Finley, who wrote,

"Soldiers of the Regular Army could not have done better." Called to

service unexpectedly, these men entered a confused and dangerous

situation but stayed under control, obeying orders and avoiding

unnecessary use of force. Finley summed this restraint in his report:

"Repeated assaults by the mob were repelled by the troops, with as

little injury as possible." Freeman and the 14th Regiment justifiably

received special recognition from the governor. Finley praised both the

14th and 1st Regiments, reporting that they "were admirably handled,

and exhibited cool behavior and splendid discipline, unsurpassed by

veterans of long service." The people of Ohio showed their approval of

the entire ONG through their State Senators and Representatives, who

made large appropriations for the losses and injuries, and for the

continuance of the ONG.⁷⁸

Thus events in Cincinnati proved that the ONG was an efficient

military force capable of dealing with unexpected state emergencies.

The modernization of the ONG since 1877 proved sufficient. The

command system from governor to regimental commander responded

to the crisis, and the soldiers did their duty with restraint and

efficiency. The ONG passed the test faced in the Cincinnati Riot of

1884.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

78. Enquirer, 4 April 1884; AR 1884, pp. 69-72, and Hoadly to Freeman, 12:12,

1 April 1884, telegram, p. 199, and Gen. Order no. 9, 2 April 1884, p. 211.

• 29