MICHAEL J. ANDERSON
McCarthyism Before McCarthy:
Anti-Communism in Cincinnati
and the Nation During the
Election of 1944
The wave of intense anti-communist
sentiment that swept over the
United States in the years following the
Second World War, sometimes
called the "second red
scare,"1 had a great impact on American
society. Political debate came to be
dominated by the desire of both
major parties to appear tough on
"international communism." The
political Left, historically not a major
force in U.S. politics, was
weakened even further as labor unions,
universities, and government
were purged of those people believed to
be too closely associated with
communism. Finally, the behavior of
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
along with his popularity, helped to
reduce the level of politics to
personal attack and guilt by
association. Because this behavior was
tolerated, and even encouraged, by major
political leaders and the
press, civil liberties were badly
damaged.
For these reasons the second red scare
has received a good deal of
attention from historians. In textbooks
and general surveys anti-
communist sentiment is seen as growing
out of American anxiety over
foreign affairs after the war,
especially the growth of Soviet power and
influence and the rise of "Red
China." These accounts generally
concentrate on the period of about
1946-54 and identify the phenom-
enon with Senator Joseph McCarthy. In
discussing "McCarthyism"
both texts and more specialized
historical studies generally focus on
several specific aspects: the personal
crusade of the Wisconsin Sena-
Michael J. Anderson is a Ph.D. candidate
in history at the University of Cincinnati.
1. Here the term postwar red scare will
refer to the anticommunism occurring after
World War II. For information on the red
scare of 1919-20, see Robert K. Murray, Red
Scare: A Study in National Hysteria (Minneapolis, 1955).
6 OHIO HISTORY
tor, the hearings before the House
Committee on Un-American
Activities, espionage cases, and the
prosecution of suspected or actual
communists.2 This connection
between McCarthy and anti-communism
is perhaps best illustrated by the fact
that a recent study of anti-
communism and higher education is
subtitled "McCarthyism and the
Universities" even though the
author shows that "the largest single
purge of academic Communists in American
history" took place in
1941-42, long before McCarthy became
prominent.3 While most of the
works on anti-communism, including some
textbooks, acknowledge
earlier outbreaks of anti-communism,
these are generally seen as
separate from the hysteria that erupted
in the years following the
Second World War. Historians searching
for the origins of postwar
anti-communism have tended to
concentrate on the relationship be-
tween anti-communism and the
deterioration of Soviet-American rela-
tions. Works such as Richard Freeland's The
Truman Doctrine and the
Origins of McCarthyism (1973) generally attribute the rise of anti-
communist sentiment to the start of the
Cold War, and the emergence
of security and loyalty as important
issues in domestic politics.
Because of this focus on the link
between foreign policy and domestic
anti-communism, most of the studies of
"McCarthyism" place the
origins of the phenomenon no earlier
than 1945.4
2. See, for example, Mary Beth Norton,
et al., A People and a Nation (Boston,
1982), 851-56; Frank Freidel and Alan
Brinkley, America in the Twentieth Century (New
York, fifth edition, 1982), 379-86;
Arthur S. Link and William B. Catton, American
Epoch: A History of the United States
Since 1900, Vol. II (fifth edition),
(New York,
1980) 667-71. For more specialized
studies, see Richard M. Rovere, Senator Joe
McCarthy (Cleveland, 1959); Michael Paul Rogin, The
Intellectuals and McCarthy: The
Radical Specter (Cambridge, 1967). Also Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear:
Joseph R.
McCarthy and the Senate (Lexington, 1970). For studies of prosecutions, see
Michael
Belknap, Cold War Political Justice:
The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and
American Civil Liberties (Westport, Conn., 1977); David Caute, The Great
Fear:
Anti-Communist Purges Under Truman
and Eisenhower (New York 1978), and
Peter L.
Steinberg, The Great "Red
Menace": United States Prosecution of American Commu-
nists, 1947-1952 (Westport, Conn., 1984). On the House Committee, see
Walter
Goodman, The Committee: The
Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities (New York, 1964).
3. Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory
Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New
York, 1986).
4. In addition to Freeland, see Robert
Griffith and Athan Theoharis, The Specter:
Original Essays on the Cold War and
the Origins of McCarthyism (New York,
1974);
Alan Harper, The Politics of Loyalty:
The White House and the Communist Issue,
1946-1952 (Westport, Conn., 1969); and Athan Theoharis, Seeds
of Repression: Harry S.
Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism
(Chicago, 1971). Exceptions include
Earl
Lathan, The Communist Conspiracy in
Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy
(Cambridge, 1960); Seymour M. Lipset and
Earl Raub, The Politics of Unreason:
Right-wing Extremism in American,
1790-1970 (New York, 1970); and Ellen
W.
Schrecker, No Ivory Tower:
McCarthyism and the Universities (New York, 1986).
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 7
At the same time, however, a smaller
group of historians have
discussed the charges of communism made
by various Republicans
against the Democrats during Roosevelt's
bid for a fourth term in 1944.
Since a good general study of the 1944
election remains to be written,
however, references to anti-communist
rhetoric in the campaign appear
as sections of more general works on the
period or in article-length
treatments of the election. James
MacGregor Burns claims that as the
election drew close, Dewey sought to
narrow FDR's slim lead and
"gravitated more and more toward
communism as the issue."5 Anoth-
er writer argues that the "Republicans
went all out to capitalize on the
leftist issue," but that their
efforts merely "made many responsible
Republicans and Independents more
sympathetic to Roosevelt," while
Richard Polenberg concludes that
"in 1944, at a time when Soviet-
American relations were their most
cordial, communism was a highly
charged political issue."6
John Jeffries, in his study of wartime
politics and society in
Connecticut, demonstrates that
anti-communist rhetoric was wide-
spread in that state. After commenting
on the use of the issue in
Connecticut during the campaign,
Jeffries maintains that "The com-
munist issue figured prominently in the
Republicans' state and national
campaigns,"7 and that
the issue worried Democrats. Jeffries, however,
like the other writers, fails to chart
the development of the issue or to
explain fully how anti-communist
rhetoric was linked to other issues of
concern to the Republican party. A
closer look at how national and
state politics converged in the
anti-communism of heavily Republican
Cincinnati provides some insight into
how anti-communism grew and
developed in one locality.
I
The Republicans faced the prospect of
the 1944 election with some
amount of hope. Congressional elections
in 1942 saw the party perform
impressively all over the country.
Republicans gained forty-four seats
in the House and picked up nine in the
Senate. Bolstered by these
5. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt:
The Soldier of Freedom (New York, 1970).
528.
6. Leon Friedman, "The Election of
1944," in History of American Presidential
Elections 1789-1968, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Fred Israel eds. (New
York, 1971)
3017, 3035; Richard Polenberg, War
and Society: The United States, 1941-1945
(Philadelphia, 1972).
7. John W. Jeffries, Testing the
Roosevelt Coalition: Connecticut Society and
Politics in the Era of World War II (Knoxville, 1979), 187.
8 OHIO HISTORY
gains, Republicans united with
conservative Democrats in both houses
to oppose the administration. This
conservative coalition ended certain
New Deal programs, such as the National
Youth Administration, the
National Resources Planning Board, and
the president's power to
devaluate the currency. The opponents of
the President also cut the
budget of the Farm Security
Administration and passed the anti-labor
Smith-Connally Act.8 Having
been out of the White House since 1933,
the Republicans were eager to win in
1944, and somewhat hopeful. All
that remained was to pick a candidate
and a strategy.
A major problem, however, threatened to
undermine Republican
hopes. The party was split into rival
factions due to differences over
both foreign policy and attitudes toward
the New Deal. One group was
internationalist in outlook, usually
more liberal, and centered largely in
the East. This group had supported
Wendell Willkie for the nomination
in 1940 and generally shared his less
hostile view of some of the New
Deal. On the other hand, the Old Guard
of the party was isolationist,
very conservative, and strongest in the
midwest. This part of the party
was exemplified by one of its leaders,
Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.
He passionately opposed the New Deal in
the Senate and, before Pearl
Harbor, had been a supporter of America
First.9 Another faction of the
party centered around Governor Thomas E.
Dewey of New York.
Dewey's supporters generally were more
liberal on domestic issues
than the party's Old Guard, but balked
at Willkie's extreme interna-
tionalism and the fact that his
political base consisted largely of
"independents" whose main
loyalty was not to the party itself but
to Willkie.
On this last point Dewey's followers and
the Old Guard could agree.
Senator Taft disliked Willkie and
distrusted the internationalists in the
party. He had lost to Willkie in his bid
for the nomination in 1940, and
some hard feelings remained. A staunch
party man himself, Taft felt
that Willkie was not really interested
in helping the party win, and he
resented the way that party regulars had
been treated by Willkie
supporters. He complained in 1942 that
many Willkie people had no
"standing in the Republican
Party"10 and that Willkie had supported a
8. James T. Patterson, Mr.
Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston,
1972), 259-60; Richard E. Darilek, A
Loyal Opposition in Time of War: The Republican
Party and the Politics of Foreign
Policy From Pearl Harbor to Yalta (Westport,
Conn.,
1976), 53. Polenberg, 193.
9. Patterson, 242. See also Friedman,
3017-22, and Eugene H. Roseboom and Alfred
E. Eckes, Jr., A History of
Presidential Elections: From George Washington to Jimmy
Carter, 4th ed. (New York, 1979), 192-93.
10. Robert A. Taft to Hulbert Taft,
April 27, 1942. Robert Taft Papers, Cincinnati
Historical Society (CHS), (one folder).
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 9
"purge movement" against
certain Republican congressmen who
supported the Old Guard.11 Taft wanted
to prevent the nomination of
Willkie or some other internationalist
in 1944. He chose not to pursue
the nomination himself, however,
possibly because he felt that FDR
could not be beaten while the nation was
at war. Instead, he decided to
support Ohio's Governor John W. Bricker.
Although he had some
doubts about Bricker, Taft told
like-minded Republicans that the
governor could win. But, perhaps more
importantly to Taft, Bricker
was clearly the candidate of the party's
conservatives.12
Taft also had definite ideas about how
the campaign of 1944 should
be conducted. He realized that it would
be difficult to challenge FDR
in the middle of a popular war. Taft
claimed that the party could not
win merely by being "more warlike
than Roosevelt."13 Always the
skillful politician, Taft also wanted to
avoid widening the divisions
within the party by making the direction
of postwar foreign policy too
large an issue. Finally, his basic
conservatism led Taft to try to
suppress the more liberal elements of
the party and wage a strong
fight against the New Deal and the
administration's wartime domes-
tic policies.14 It was this
emphasis on domestic issues that would
lead Taft, and some of his followers in
Ohio, towards the issue of
communism.
For the Republicans, work on the
upcoming election began in
earnest in the late summer of 1943. A
meeting of the Republican
Postwar Advisory Council, which both
Taft and Bricker would attend,
was scheduled for September in Mackinac,
Michigan; Taft hoped to get
the council to take a strong stand on
domestic policy and downplay
differences on foreign policy. On
September 7, 1943, the council
adopted the Mackinac Declarations. The
foreign policy document
reflected a desire to avoid further
splitting the party while challenging
FDR during the war. It was short and
general, expressing a cautious
internationalism while avoiding any real
specifics.15
The domestic policy declaration, on the
other hand, attacked the
administration, using rhetoric that
played on wartime fears of fascism
while also stressing threats from the
left. It condemned excessive
spending and regulation, claiming that
these policies were severely
hurting small businessmen and farmers.
The declaration criticized
11. Robert A. Taft to Hulbert Taft,
December 18, 1942. Robert Taft Papers, CHS.
12. Patterson, 268-72.
13. Robert A.Taft to Hulbert Taft, April
27, 1942. Robert Taft Papers, CHS.
14. Patterson, 268-84. For a detailed
analysis of foreign policy and the Republicans,
see Richard E. Darilek, A Loyal
Opposition in Time of War.
15. Mackinac Foreign Policy
Declaration (Republican National Committee, 1943).
In John B. Hollister Papers, CHS, Box
38, Folder #1.
10 OHIO HISTORY
growing centralization and argued that
government should respect "the
independence of Congress and the
courts." New Deal policies were
seen as "instruments of
Fascism" that would "socialize all business,
agriculture, and the professions."
Republican rhetoric also focused on
labor. While warning that labor was
being reduced to "a class
conscious, vote shackled,
proletariat," the council maintained that the
"destiny of American labor is not
Fascist."16 Interestingly, there was
no specific mention of
"communism" in these 1943 documents.
The Mackinac Declarations pleased Taft.
He supported the sharp
attack on domestic economic policy and
the lack of specifics on foreign
policy. The Ohio senator also wanted
these documents to be the basis
for the party platform when the
convention rolled around. In January
1944 he got the declarations approved by
a resolution at a meeting of
the Republican National Committee,
saying that this would "head off
all other resolutions on questions of
policy, or at least lay the basis for
referring them to the Republican Postwar
Advisory Council for con-
sideration and report."17
II
For Taft's home city of Cincinnati the
election of 1944 promised to
attract a great deal of interest. The
city's two incumbent congressmen,
Charles Elston of the first district and
William Hess of the second, both
Republicans, had held their seats since
1938. The Republican governor
of Ohio, John Bricker of Columbus, who
had carried Cincinnati by a
margin of two to one in 1942, would run
for the Republican presidential
nomination, eventually winning the
second spot on the ticket.
Bricker's frequent speeches,
conservatism, and popularity in the
state increased his coverage in the
Cincinnati newspapers. Finally, the
mayor of the city, James G. Stewart,
another Republican, sought the
governorship in what promised to be a
tough fight. For the strongly
conservative Republicans of Cincinnati
much was at stake during 1944.
The Party had, however, some reason to
feel good about its position
in the city. Cincinnati had long been
the scene of a powerful Republican
organization of which the Taft family
was no small part. Despite some
local defections to the progressive
Charter Party,18 the city remained
16. Mackinac Domestic Policy
Declaration (Republican National Committee, 1943).
In John B. Hollister Papers, CHS, Box
38, Folder #1.
17. Robert A. Taft to John B. Hollister,
January 7, 1944. Hollister papers, CHS,
Box 38, Folder #1.
18. For the origins of Charter, see
Ralph A. Straetz, PR Politics in Cincinnati:
Thirty-Two Years of City Government
Through Proportional Representation (New
York,
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 11 |
|
conservative, and Elston, Hess, Stewart, and Bricker generally were within the Taft wing of the national party. The city's press also boosted Republican strength, as none of the city's major dailies were Demo- cratic. The Enquirer, a morning paper, listed itself as "democratic- independent"19 but endorsed the Republican ticket. The Scripps- Howard Post also would endorse the Republican ticket, as would its afternoon rival the Times Star, owned by a branch of the Taft family.20 The Cincinnati newspapers also gave a good deal of attention to the kinds of issues that Taft hoped his party would raise during the campaign. Both the Post and the Enquirer frequently carried the anti-New Deal views of such columnists as Louis Bromfield and Westbrook Pegler. Occasionally the papers ran their own editorials on
1958) xi-xvii. In Hamilton county, which contains Cincinnati, FDR won 123,109 (49.4%) to 118,804 (47.7%) in 1932. In 1936 he got 153,117 (54.6%) to 108,506 (38.7%), FDR lost the county in 1940, 148,907 to 154,733, and again in 1944, 144,470 to 154,960. From 1900 to 1944 the Republicans won the first and second congressional districts every election, with the exception of 1912 when the first went to the Democrats and 1936 when both did. Sources: E. E. Robinson, They Voted For Roosevelt: The Presidential Vote 1932-1944 (Stanford, 1947), and Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C., 1985). 19. N. W. Ayer and Sons Directory (Philadelphia, 1944), 707. 20. Cincinnati Post, October 5, 1944; Cincinnati Times Star, Nov. 6, 1944. |
12 OHIO HISTORY
the evils of excessive
"planning" and government economic interfer-
ence. The Enquirer even had its
own regular feature called "This New
Deal," attributed to
"Veritas," which regularly attacked, in sarcastic
fashion, the administration's economic
policies. Likewise, Times Star
editorials consistently criticized FDR
and his economic program.21 The
Cincinnati press, like the rest of the
nation' papers, reported regularly
on any changes involving wartime
economic regulation, and ration
tables were a daily feature in the Enquirer.
Clearly the readers of the
papers were made aware of the wartime
relationship between the
federal government and economic life.
There were also certain elements present
in Cincinnati which would
contribute to the rise of anti-communist
rhetoric. Hysterical anti-
radical or anti-leftist rhetoric had
existed long before 1944 in a number
of areas, and Cincinnati had had its
share of intolerant episodes. During
the First World War a mob kidnapped and
whipped Herbert Bigelow,
a prominent Socialist minister.22 In
1919 area veterans joined a crowd
that attacked the local headquarters of
the Socialist party, creating a
controversy that lasted well into the
summer of 1920.23
A similar atmosphere pervaded municipal
politics. Although only
two Communists ran for city council from
1925 to 1944, and each
received fewer than 500 votes, most
council elections brought charges
of some kind of radicalism, usually
communism. In 1929, for example,
some warned of "communists, the
fascists, the bolsheviks, the social-
ists, the anarchists and various other
groups spreading the doctrine that
political parties are a necessary
evil."24 Clearly, even in good times
some Cincinnatians expressed fear of a
largely nonexistent radicalism.
21. For example of columnists, see Enquirer,
Oct. 1, 1944, and Post, Oct. 4. For local
anti-New Deal editorials, see, for
example, Enquirer, Oct. 1, 1944. Veritas, for example,
on Oct. 6, 1944, after attacking Federal
spending, declared: "It is now perfectly plain to
the thoughtful citizen that control of
the individual follows federal handouts as surely as
night follows day." Veritas
appeared nearly every day (29 times in Oct. 1944). See also
the Times Star, June 28 and Oct.
10, 1944.
22. Paul L. Murphy, World War I and
the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United
States (New York, 1979), 164-65. See also Daniel R. Beaver, Herbert
Seely Bigelow, a
Buckeye Crusader (Cincinnati, 1957), 41-44, and Herbert Shapiro,
"The Herbert
Bigelow Case: A Test of Free Speech in
Wartime," Ohio History, 81 (Spring, 1972).
23. Cincinnati Enquirer, November
20, 1919. See also Nov. 26, and Dec. 11. Also
Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, November
19, 1919.
24. Quoted in Straetz, 201-02. A number
of communists did run for Congress in Ohio
during the period 1930-44 but generally
did poorly. For example, in the 1934 race for two
at large seats one Communist got 13,942
votes. Each of the winners in the race got over
one million. In addition, from
1928-1944, Communists regularly ran for governor and
secretary of state. Their best finishes
were in 1934 when they got 15,854 votes for
Governor and 14,395 for Secretary of
State out of a total vote of just over two million.
Sources: Guide to U.S. Elections, 778-79,
and Ohio Election Statistics: The General
Election 1944, 13-14.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 13
In addition, those who sought the repeal
of proportional represen-
tation (PR) in the city, established in
the 1912 charter as part of
progressive reform, argued that the
system made it possible for a small
radical group to gain control of the
nine-member city council. During a
1936 repeal campaign supporters of the
system were accused of
working with communists. Old Guard
Republicans smeared defenders
of PR as the
"Charter-Bigelow-Communist party." Another repeal
election in 1939 brought complaints
about "the support which the
Communists and every radical group
without exception are giving to
PR as a means of boring into the
democratic structure which we have
in this country." The generally
conservative assumption that certain
political arrangements were suspect led
one councilman to attack PR as
"the most un-American and
unpatriotic system ever inflicted on the
American people."25 Cincinnati's
experience with anti-radical political
rhetoric would make the city fertile
ground for negative campaigning
on the issue of communism in 1944.
III
In the winter of 1944 Old Guard
Republicans increasingly began to
attack both Roosevelt's domestic
policies and his political allies. An
early target was the Congress of
Industrial Organization's (CIO)
Political Action Committee (PAC),
created in July 1943. Chaired by
Sidney Hillman, the strongly
anti-communist leader of the Amalgam-
ated Clothing Workers, CIO-PAC was
intended to carry out "a broad
and intensive program of education for
the purpose of mobilizing the
five million members of CIO ... for
effective labor action on the
political front."26 CIO-PAC
supported the administration and a fourth
term for FDR. It organized a massive
campaign to get out the vote for
the Democratic ticket in 1944, raised
and spent more than half a million
dollars on "political
education," and mobilized tens of thousands of
campaign workers.27
25. All quotes in Straetz, 202-03.
26. Speech by Phillip Murray to the
Sixth Constitutional Convention of the CIO,
November 1-5, 1943. Reprinted in Joseph
Gaer, The First Round: The Story of the CIO
Political Action Committee (New York, 1944), 60; see also 49-53; William Leuchtenburg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963),
188-90; Max M.
Kampelman, The Communist Party Vs.
The CIO (New York, 1957), 22-23, and
Friedman, 3033-34. The Republicans also
tried to make an issue of the alleged statement
of FDR: "Clear it with
Sidney," reportedly made in reference to the choice of a VP
candidate. See Burns, 524.
27. Friedman, 3026-34. Nelson
Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home: The CIO in
World War II (New York, 1982), 171-77. Matthew Josephson, Sidney
Hillman: States-
14 OHIO HISTORY
Taft linked the CIO-PAC with communism
in the intensely partisan
debate over the issue of a Federal
absentee ballot for members of the
armed forces. Many Republicans feared
that making it easier for
servicemen to vote would result in more
votes for FDR, the commander-
in-chief. Thus they generally favored
retaining the current system of
state absentee ballots, which sometimes
were difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for those serving overseas to use.
The administration, supported
by the CIO, among others, strongly
favored the adoption of the new
ballot.
On January 26, during Senate debate on
the federal ballot, Taft
attacked the motives of the CIO. He
complained that soldier voting
was not a labor issue and that the true
concern of the CIO was a fourth
term for Roosevelt. Taft further charged
that the CIO was out to purge
Congress, using their "usual
propaganda-smear style." Finally the
Ohio Senator argued that "the Daily
Worker and the Communist group
are conducting this same kind of
propaganda that is being conducted by
the CIO."28
The next day Taft returned to the
attack. He cited articles from the
Daily Worker, the Southern Patriot, and a survey by American
Youth
for Democracy as examples of
"Communist Party" propaganda sup-
porting the administration's position.
Taft also claimed that the man
who ran the Southern Patriot, James
A. Dombrowski, was a "Com-
munist" who had asked FDR in a letter
to "defend the rights of the
Communist Party in the United
States." He concluded by repeating his
charge that "the propaganda which
has been conducted by the CIO is
also being conducted today by the
Communist Party."29 Thus, early in
1944, Taft attempted to discredit the
CIO and Roosevelt by linking their
position on the federal ballot bill with
that of the Communists.
Taft also continued, throughout the
winter and spring of 1944, to
attack Roosevelt's economic policies. He
often warned of fascism, and
at times simply attacked centralization,
but he increasingly included
references to the threat of leftist
totalitarianism. During remarks before
the Boston City Club the Senator
proclaimed that continued high
spending and debt would lead to a
"socialization of industry in the
United States." He further argued
that "a totalitarian state" would
result if the power of state and local
government was not restored. Taft
warned that the administration's
friendliness towards big business was
no comfort. He claimed that:
man of American Labor (New York, 1952), 587-635.
28. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, part 1, p. 716-18.
29. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, part 1, p. 782.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 15
the easiest road to socialism is through
the formation of large business units
which can be easily taken over by the
Government. The Communist, the
Socialist, even the New Dealer, has
shown at times a strange friendliness to the
biggest units of big business.30
On February 29, Taft expressed his hope
that debate over domestic
policy would not be overshadowed by
foreign affairs. Speaking to the
American Retail Federation he argued for
an end to bureaucratic
controls and said that "we should
not permit ourselves to be so
distracted by the war ... that we let
the planners concoct for us
post-war arrangements at home likely to
destroy the very freedom for
which we fight."31 In
March, Taft warned that FDR's potential
sixteen-year term and growing executive
power were a threat. He
claimed that "nothing is so
characteristic of a Totalitarian state today
as the uniting of the legislative and
executive functions in one man."32
Taft clearly kept his options open in
the winter and spring, attacking
the administration and its supporters as
Communist, Socialist, Fascist,
or simply totalitarian as he felt the
occasion warranted. This would
change, however, as the election drew
nearer.
The Senator also denounced as communist
leaning some of those
who worked to improve the conditions
facing American blacks. Taft
complained of "the left wing and
Communist newspapers ... whose
stirring up of those who have suffered
from intolerant attacks is doing
minority groups more harm than
good."33 In May, Taft was quoted in
an interview in the Baltimore Afro-American
as saying the NAACP had
"sold out to the New Deal" and
was a "Communist" organization.34
This kind of accusation, smearing
liberal activism as communist, would
become all too familiar in the postwar
scare.
Ohio's Governor Bricker, hot on the
trail of the Republican nomi-
nation, had to be more careful than
Taft. Party conservatives believed
that the war was being used by
"radical socialists in the government to
impose a totalitarian collectivism on
the United States."35 And some
conservatives agreed with one Bricker
correspondent that the governor
was the "logical Candidate" to
deliver the country from the "Com-
munistic Administration."36 But
Bricker, trying not to alienate party
30. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, part 8, p. A335.
31. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, part 8, p. A 1180.
32. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, part 8, p. A1258.
33. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, part 8, p. A1384-85.
34. Baltimore Afro-American, May
6, 1944. Also Cincinnati Sun (CIO weekly), May
19, 1944.
35. Stanley F. Morse to John W. Bricker
March 21, 1942, and attached papers.
Bricker Papers, Mss 340, Box 70,
Political File. Ohio Historical Society.
36. William Albrect to John W. Bricker
November 10, 1943, Bricker Papers, Mss 340,
16 OHIO HISTORY
liberals, was a little more restrained
than Taft on economic issues. In
a May 31 Pennsylvania speech Bricker
complained that the New Deal
was destroying free enterprise and that
unless the trend was reversed
the country would "be delivered
into the hands of the very type of
totalitarianism we defeated in the
war."37 On June 9, he warned that
the people must prevent the
"socialization of business, of labor and of
the professions" by voting
Republican.38 This relatively mild rhetoric
would soon be replaced by specific
charges of links between FDR
supporters and communism.
IV
June brought an escalation in
anti-communism, as some Republicans
and their supporters continued to try to
connect communism with the
CIO and the Democratic party. Events of
the recent past became the
material for this conspiracy theory.
Certain CIO unions had employed
communists as organizers throughout the
1930s, and by 1944 some
unions had strong pro-communist
sympathies.39 In addition, Republi-
can charges were triggered in part by
the events of May, 1944, when the
Communist leader, Earl Browder,
dissolved the American Communist
Party and replaced it with the Communist
Political Association, which
promptly came out in favor of a fourth
term for FDR.40 Republicans,
aided by anti-New Deal elements of the
press, harked back to
Roosevelt's 1942 pardon of Browder, who
had been convicted of
passport fraud in his travels to the
Soviet Union, as proof of a
conspiracy.
On June 17, an article entitled
"Communist Groups Listed As
Endorsing Democrats Over Own Party
Leaders" appeared in the
Enquirer. This nationally syndicated column by Frank Kent
claimed,
falsely, that communists had supported
the New Deal since its incep-
tion. It also maintained that:
the plain purpose of the Communists
today, working through the Congress of
Industrial Organization which they
thoroughly permeate ... is to "infiltrate"
the Democratic party and strengthen
themselves in the next Roosevelt
administration.
Box 21, Folder A-Am.
37. Cincinnati Enquirer, June 1,
1944.
38. Cincinnati Enquirer, June 10,
1944.
39. Leuchtenburg, 281-83.
40. Caute, The Great Fear, 186.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 17 |
|
After citing some statements from Browder and others, Kent wrote that "infiltration of the Democratic party has been a settled and consistent Communist policy for eight years." On the eve of the Republican National Convention, Louis Bromfield, a staunch conser- vative, wrote in his column that liberal Democrats were "finding themselves in bed with" the CIO and "the Communists."41 The GOP convention itself, June 26-28, in addition to nominating Thomas E. Dewey for president, provided an occasion for increasingly strident rhetoric, and Cincinnati's delegates got into the spirit of the event. The Republican Platform, presented to the convention by Taft, who was Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, followed the Mackinac Declarations closely. After criticizing centralization, regula- tion, and spending, it declared, "We have no need of either the communistic or fascist technique." The labor plank was even more specific, claiming that while the Republican party continued to work for "the betterment of labor's status" it rejected "the communistic and
41. Enquirer, June 17, 25, 1944. |
18 OHIO HISTORY
New Deal concept that a single group can
benefit while the general
economy suffers."42
Convention oratory further increased the
level of anti-communism.
Convention Chairman Joseph W. Martin,
Jr., of Massachusetts, com-
plained that recently the nation had
"seen the head of the Communist
political party in this country, Earl
Browder, merge his party with
Sidney Hillman's CIO Political Action
Committee." The goal of this
alliance, according to Martin, was a
fourth term and a Congress
"subservient to the will of those
organizations." Herbert Hoover,
during a speech with the theme
"freedom," complained that "the
Communists and fellow travelers are
spending vast sums to reelect this
regime." But it was Cincinnati's
Mayor, James Stewart, who offered to
the convention a formula that would
become a standard for Republi-
cans. In seconding the nomination of
Bricker for vice-president,
Stewart declared that the election of
the ticket would end "the
administration of Sidney Hillman, Earl
Browder and Franklin D.
Roosevelt."43 Republicans
would repeat variations on this theme
throughout the campaign, as if merely
saying the names together would
evoke in the voter's mind the image of a
dark conspiracy. This charge
was often bolstered by bringing up FDR's
alleged statement "clear it
with Sidney," reportedly made in
reference to the choice of Harry S.
Truman as his running mate.44
Taft kept up the pressure in September.
In a speech before the Ohio
Republican State Convention, he
forcefully linked charges of Commu-
nist domination of the CIO with the
administration. He claimed that
"the violent support given to
President Roosevelt by Sidney Hillman
and Earl Browder" showed the
direction of future FDR policy. Taft
complained that Hillman would
"predominate in the decision of all
business and economic policy" if
the president won. He went on to
attack centralization at the expense of
local government, economic
control by executive agencies, and
"the belief that we can spend
ourselves into prosperity." Taft
christened these the "Hillman-Browder
policy which threatens the freedom of
our people."45 Bricker, in a late
September speech in Baltimore, hammered
at the same theme when he
declared that there was "no middle
ground between the free republic
and Communism."46
42. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
Republican National Convention (Washington,
D.C., 1944), 138-41.
43. Ibid, 119, 159, 215.
44. Burns, 524.
45. Congressional Record, Vol.
90, Part II, p. A4162-63.
46. Clipping, Baltimore Sun, Bricker
Papers, Box 26, Folder A"44".
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 19
V
During the last five weeks of the
campaign Cincinnatians who read
the Enquirer and the Post were
exposed to a great deal of anti-
communist rhetoric. From October 1st
until the election, an item
dealing with some aspect of the
communist issue appeared nearly every
day in the Enquirer. The Post employed
similar coverage. During the
period Oct. 1-Nov. 7 more than 100 items
dealing with communism and
the election appeared in the two papers.
The Times Star ran more than
50 items in the same period, although
its stories were generally shorter
and displayed less prominently.47 While
the newspaper items varied
widely in specifics and length, the
majority dealt with the charge that
the communists, working through the CIO,
dominated the Democratic
party.
One source of these stories was coverage
of Bricker's national
campaign speeches. He spoke frequently,
and often his remarks
contained anti-communist rhetoric. In
Milwaukee, on October 6,
responding to Roosevelt's specific
repudiation of communist support,
Bricker argued that, "the New
Deal's tie-in with communists and the
domination by Sidney Hillman and the
P.A.C. is too well documented
in public and official records for
anyone to deny it." Although Bricker
did not specify what evidence there was,
he went on to assert that this
"Communistic domination" of
the New Deal began in 1933.48 He
continued his attack in a speech in Tacoma,
where he declared that
"the Communists and the radicals of
the Hillman-Browder crowd
have taken over the New Deal,"49
and one in Dallas on October 25 in
which he declared that FDR was a "
'front' of the Hillman-Browder
communists." 50
Likewise, Thomas E. Dewey's late
campaign flights of anti-
communist rhetoric received extensive
coverage in Cincinnati's pro-
Republican press. During a speech in
Boston he charged that FDR had
sold his party to the "highest
bidder" which was "the Political Action
Committee of Sidney Hillman and the
Communists of Earl Browder."51
The next day in Baltimore he charged
that the Democratic party had
47. For example, one of the few stories
to make the front page headlines besides the
war during 1944 in the Enquirer was
its Oct. 7 coverage of FDR's repudiation of
communist support. The Times Star devoted
an editorial comment to it on page six but
news coverage was buried on page 36.
(Oct. 6).
48. Cincinnati Post, Oct. 6,
1944.
49. Enquirer, Oct. 12, 1944.
50. Enquirer, Oct. 26, 1944. For
other Bricker speeches, see Oct. 5, 15, 19, 29.
51. Enquirer, Nov. 2, 1944.
20 OHIO HISTORY
been captured by "subversive forces
including New Dealers, members
of the Political Action Committee and
Communists."52
Some of Cincinnati's Republicans also
continued to use the commu-
nist issue. Leading the way was Senator
Robert Taft, who took his
anti-communism to the airwaves. During a
radio address on October
sixteenth, Taft charged that
"Communists control the CIO Political
Action Committee" and that if the
president were reelected they would
"control his policy."53 In
another radio talk he charged that Hillman
and Browder supported FDR because they
knew that "New Deal
policies will lead to a collapse of the
private enterprise system"; and,
he concluded, Roosevelt had been
nominated by "the Communists."54
Taft's wife Martha also got into the
act, declaring before a meeting of
Republican women in Columbus that the
Democratic National conven-
tion had been "communist
ridden."55
Cincinnati's mayor, James G. Stewart,
adapted the now familiar
smears to his gubernatorial contest with
the popular mayor of
Cleveland, Frank Lausche, a conservative
Democrat. Stewart added a
new name to the Republican litany of
villains when he asked state
voters not to allow their government to
become a "plaything of the
Roosevelt-Hillman-Browder-Lausche
machine." Lausche was, ac-
cording to Stewart, "a mere
cog" in this vast machine. Even during a
speech in Cleveland, Stewart smeared
Mayor Lausche as the candidate
of "Sidney Hillman, Earl Browder,
[and] President Roosevelt."56
Similarly, on October 6 he asked voters
to "save the national govern-
ment from the clutches of Sidney Hillman
and Earl Browder." During
a speech before a hometown crowd he
declared that the election
represented a clash between two
political philosophies: "that of
Jefferson and Hamilton against that of
Sidney Hillman and Earl
Browder." Two days before the
election Stewart warned in a radio
address that key positions in Washington
were filled "with New
Dealers, Socialists, Communists and all
their kind."57
Cincinnati Congressman William Hess,
usually restrained in his
rhetoric, drew upon the long-standing
American tradition of linking
52. Enquirer, Nov. 3, 1944. For more Dewey, see Nov. 5, Oct. 7, Oct.
26, and Oct.
21.
53. Enquirer, Oct. 17, 1944.
54. Enquirer, Oct. 24, 1944.
55. Enquirer, Oct. 7, 1944.
56. Enquirer, Oct. 13, 1944; second quote Oct. 17. Ironically, at the
same time
Bricker was trying to link Lausche with
the Communists, he also tried to make an issue
of Lausche's connection with anti-New
Deal former Governor Martin L. Davey.
57. Enquirer, Oct. 31, 1944;
second quote Nov. 5.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 21
radical beliefs to ethnic origins. In
late October he claimed that the
President was merely a "puppet of a
seeker of power," Sidney
Hillman. Hess charged that Hillman
"had studied the Bolshevik
methods of seizing power." This was
because, according to Hess,
Hillman
came from Russia where they play
politics for blood and have only profound
contempt for the effete Anglo-Saxon
tradition of debating political questions
with words instead of weapons.58
These politicians avoided linking the
communist issue to the Soviets
or to American foreign policy. The
Republicans hoped to avoid
highlighting differences within the
party over the direction of postwar
foreign policy, although there was some
discussion of foreign affairs
during the campaign.59 Taft
distrusted both the internationalism of
FDR and Stalin's motives,60 but,
as he noted privately, felt that
criticizing the President's foreign
policy would not bring political
success.61 He maintained
publically that "the parties are in substantial
accord on foreign policy" and that
FDR was ducking the "real issue"
of the New Deal.62 Dewey was
even more explicit. In a speech in
Boston on November 1, after accusing FDR
of selling out his party to
"Communists," he went on to
declare "In Russia a Communist is a
man who supports his government"
and insisted that "the question of
Communism in our country has nothing to
do with our allies."63
Mayor Stewart was also willing to do his
part to promote wartime
unity with the Soviets. His domestic
anti-communism had not prevent-
ed him from declaring June 22 as
"Russia Day" in Cincinnati. The
action honored "the magnificent
services that Russia has rendered in
her valiant war." Stewart expressed
hope that "our common efforts
may soon bring ... a lasting peace and
brotherhood for mankind."64
Likewise, the newspapers generally
portrayed Russia favorably in
stories about the war.65 This
fact did not, as we have seen, prevent the
Enquirer and Post from giving full coverage to the
anti-communist
rhetoric associated with domestic
politics.
58. Enquirer, Oct. 26, 1944.
59. Enquirer, Nov. 4, Oct. 2, 3,
9, 1944.
60. Congressional Record Vol. 90,
Part 9, pp. A1586, A2293, and Enquirer, June 19,
1944.
61. Robert A. Taft to Hulbert Taft April
27, 1942, Robert Taft Papers CHS.
62. Enquirer, Oct. 24, 1944.
63. Enquirer, Nov. 2, 1944.
64. Enquirer, June 20, 1944.
65. See for example: Enquirer, Oct.
5, June 3, and Post, Oct. 10, 1944.
22 OHIO HISTORY
Not content, however, with merely
reporting on domestic anti-
communism, the newspapers added their
own editorial comments to
the crescendo of anti-communism. The Enquirer,
for example, en-
dorsed Dewey on October 8 in a page-one
editorial titled "President's
Aims Communistic Dewey Says." The
paper went on to say that
Dewey's approach to the postwar economy
"is not communistic, no
dreamy head in the clouds
approach."66 Its regular commentator,
Veritas, in a variant on Emile Coue,
wrote: "Day by day in every way
Sidney Hillman and Earl Browder are
tightening their grip on the New
Deal." The Times Star also
mentioned communism in a number of
editorials and political cartoons, but
its endorsement of Dewey did not
make sensational use of the issue.67
Some Enquirer pieces managed to
say what the politicians would
not. Veritas, for example, asserted that
Stalin had made Browder his
"head propagandist in the United
States" and claimed that the aim of
the Communist Party was to "destroy
our constitutional form of
government and set up the Soviet
system." He went on to say that
Hillman had joined with Browder in an
"unholy alliance" and that the
PAC had "virtually taken over the
fourth-term campaign."68 Similarly,
conservative columnist Westbrook Pegler
directly linked the commu-
nist issue to the Soviet Union. In a
column on November 1, he
complained:
Sidney Hillman and the Political Action
Committee represent the Communist
conspiracy in the United States ... both
the Roosevelts have actively helped
union politicians of the CIO whose own
colleagues . . . never bother to deny
that they are Communists, enemies of the
United States and loyal only to
Russia.69
The Cincinnati Post, using a
series of special commentaries and its
own editorials, also tried to offer its
readers the cutting edge of
anti-communism. The paper ran a six-part
series on various aspects of
communist activities in the United
States by Frederick Woltman, a
Scripps-Howard feature writer and
anti-communist specialist. Editori-
als that accompanied, and recommended,
this series warned of the
"seriousness of the American
Communists' revolutionary intentions"70
and argued that "communists in
America ... want a Sovietized
America."71 Woltman
himself expressed concern that Roosevelt was
66. Enquirer, Oct. 8, 1944.
67. Enquirer, Oct. 18, 1944, and Times
Star, Nov. 6, Oct. 25, and Oct. 7, 1944.
68. Enquirer, Oct. 15, 1944.
69. Enquirer, Nov. 1, 1944.
70. Post, Oct. 17, 1944.
71. Post, Oct. 20, 1944.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 23
going easy on Communists, claiming,
falsely, that the president had
eliminated the "Communist
desk" at the Office of Naval Intelligence.72
The Post used ex-radicals to
level charges of an international
conspiracy. An editorial proclaimed that
guest columnist Max Eastman
"Knows the Communist Plan" and
emphasized his travel in Russia.
Eastman stressed that "You can't
back democracy and Communism"
and said there was
little reason why any man loyal to the
American Republic should employ a
Communist, or an accomplice of
Communists ... in any governmental
position, or in any position of power or
influence anywhere in the land.73
Another columnist heavily promoted by
the Post, William H.
Chamberlin, in an article entitled
"Red Peril," called the American
communists "A Foreign Fifth Column
... trying to swing a presiden-
tial election."74 These
types of charges, along with anti-communist
cartoons, gave lie to the paper's
promise to try to cover the communist
issue "without screech or
hysteria." The Times Star, alone of the three
major newspapers, generally failed to
link communism at home to
foreign policy or the Soviets.75
VI
Whether or not anti-communist rhetoric
involved foreign policy, the
charges of communism were used, almost
exclusively, by Republicans
and their sympathizers against the
Democrats and their allies. The
response by the Democrats, the CIO, and
their supporters is instruc-
tive. With the major Cincinnati
newspapers all supporting the Repub-
licans, what can properly be called the
Democratic response is a bit
more elusive. There was a response,
however, and it displayed certain
patterns that would emerge even stronger
in the postwar years.
In some ways the response of local
Democrats and their allies
followed the tone set by FDR. The
president tried to maintain that
communism simply was not a legitimate
issue. He denounced the
attacks of Republicans as simply
partisan politics, and late in the
campaign claimed Dewey was "talking
out of both sides of his mouth"
72. Post, Oct. 23, 1944. In
reality the Office of Naval Intelligence expanded its efforts
against communists and other
"threats" to domestic security at this time. See Jeffrey M.
Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S.
Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945 (Annapolis,
1983) pp. 71-85, 113-24, and 222-27.
73. Post, Oct. 25, 1944.
74. Post, Oct. 24, 1944.
75. Ibid. For a cartoon see Post, Oct.
25, 1944, and Times Star for Oct. 1944.
24 OHIO HISTORY
by charges of both communism and
monarchy.76 Likewise, a June 2
editorial in the local Catholic weekly,
the Telegraph-Register, com-
plained that Republicans always
organized to raise money, and went on
to dismiss charges of communism leveled
at the CIO by saying that
"we cannot but observe that the
[Republican] old guard 'doth protest
too much.' "77
The response of the Catholic paper reveals
something about the
complexity of anti-communist politics,
since back on February 18 the
same paper carried an editorial
asserting that "The Communist influ-
ences in our own country are destructive
of everything that is true and
generous and noble in Americanism."78
In addition, throughout the
winter and spring the Telegraph-Register
had published stories and
editorials dealing with communism, and
was especially vocal about
Soviet expansionism and suppression of
religious freedom.79 Yet when
Republicans began linking the CIO's
political efforts to communism,
the paper recognized, and rejected,
these charges as a partisan effort to
divide Democratic support over the issue
of communism.
The weekly paper published by the local
CIO, the Sun, was more
direct in hitting back at Republican
charges. It attacked Stewart's
charges as "mud-slinging"80
and claimed that the Republican National
Committee was a "smear mill."81 The Sun at one point endorsed
the
view that Republican charges were merely
"partisan animosity,"82 but
at other times compared the effort to
"Nazi Propaganda"83 and
claimed it was "the very trick
Hitler used ... to distract ... the
German people from the Evils of his own
regime."84
The Sun slung some mud of its
own, claiming that "Hitler-admiring
native Fascists are supporting Thomas E.
Dewey."85 It even used a
variation of the Republican formula in
talking about a "Gerald K.
Smith-Dewey-Bricker marriage."86
Finally, on November 3, in the last
pre-election issue, the Sun ran a
page-one headline story, complete
with photograph and reproduction of a
letter, that attempted to link
Senator Taft with native fascist Edward
J. Smythe, who was under
76. Friedman, 3093.
77. Cincinnati Telegraph-Register, June
2, 1944.
78. Cincinnati Telegraph-Register, February
18, 1944.
79. See Telegraph-Register, Feb.
25, March 31, and May 19, 1944.
80. Cincinnati Sun, July 7, 1944.
81. Sun, Sept. 8, 1944.
82. Sun, June 9, 1944.
83. Sun, Oct. 6, 1944.
84. Sun, Aug. 11, 1944.
85. Sun, Oct 6, 1944.
86. Sun, Aug. 18, 1944.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 25
indictment for sedition.87 Along
the same line was a pamphlet pub-
lished by the Ohio CIO Council in the
middle of Senator Taft's close
race for reelection which bore the bold
title "HE WANTED TO DO
BUSINESS WITH HITLER AND HIROHITO. THE
AMAZING
STORY OF SENATOR TAFT." The
pamphlet played upon a state-
ment Taft had made in Congress in May of
1940. Taft said that, if peace
were restored, he did not see why
"we could not trade as well with
Germany as with England."88 These
incidents show that the CIO could
dish out what it was getting. The Sun
also answered charges against
Hillman89 and defended the
legitimate right of the CIO to participate in
politics.90
More importantly, the local CIO followed
the lead of FDR by trying
to distance itself, and the Democratic
party, from the communists.
Roosevelt had, in 1940, defended the
right of Americans to advocate
"certain ideals of theoretical
Communism,"91 but on October 6, 1944,
as we have seen, he repudiated communist
support for his reelection.92
Late in the campaign he declared, in
response to Dewey's charges, that
"we want neither communism nor
monarchy."93
In a similar fashion the Sun claimed
in an editorial that the American
people wanted "neither fascism nor
communism." Therefore, accord-
ing to the Sun, it should not be
"held against Franklin D. Roosevelt
that the communists have declared for
him." The paper also main-
tained that communists always seek to
"attach themselves to the
movement representing the working
man" and argued that "Roosevelt
can hardly be expected to abandon his
espousal of the common man
because it attracts communist
support."94 In another editorial the Sun
even attempted to place the communists
closer to the critics of the
CIO. On October 20, it claimed that
Republican isolationists "saw
eye-to-eye with the native brand of
communists in those days after
87. Sun, Nov. 3, 1944. The letter
from Taft to Smythe that was reproduced in the
paper was rather routine and clearly
failed to support the kind of charges being made by
the Sun. The photograph, of a
Klan meeting, also seemed irrelevant to the charges made
and only added to the sensational nature
of the story.
88. Pamphlet, Ohio War History
Commission Records. Mss 852, Box 11, Item 26,
CHS.
89. Sun, May 26, Oct. 6, Oct. 13,
1944.
90. See for example Sun, June 9,
30, July 21, 1944.
91. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt (New York, 1941), 1940 Volume, 93.
92. Enquirer, Oct. 6, 1944, and Time,
43 (Oct. 16, 1944), 20.
93. Friedman, 3093. For FDR, see also
Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner:
Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1952), 203-12.
94. Sun, Oct. 6, 1944 p. 4, col.
1.
26 OHIO HISTORY
Roosevelt's quarantine speech in
1937." The Sun went on to dismiss
the current communist views as just
political expediency.95
In Cincinnati the local CIO newspaper
clearly refused to defend the
right of communists to participate in
politics; instead, it simply sought
to avoid guilt by association. There
appears to have been no one in
Cincinnati in 1944 willing to defend
publicly the right of communists to
support or vote for anyone they wanted
to. This foreshadowed labor's
course in the postwar period when old
alliances were forgotten in the
face of rising hysteria, and communists
were purged by both the unions
and their enemies. The corner had been
turned by 1944, as some
elements in the CIO abandoned their
former communist allies as
anti-communism increased.
Tracing the development of
anti-communism among the press and
politicians of Cincinnati suggests
certain conclusions. First, commu-
nism was a prominent issue in the
election of 1944, in both Cincinnati
and the country at large. It is also
clear that in Cincinnati a specific
combination of political figures and
local press coverage shaped the
final form that the issue took in that
city. While the effect of
anti-communism on the outcome of the
election cannot be known, it
seems important that Republicans used
anti-communism despite, or
because of, the fact that the
presidential race was seen as very close.96
Also, specific charges involving
communism were leveled by the
Republicans as a part of their regular
strategy at a point when victory
seemed possible. This differs
significantly in degree, if not in kind,
from the general murmurings about Roosevelt's
alleged radicalism that
were popular in some circles during the
1930s when FDR's popularity
was at its height. In this sense the
anti-communism of 1944 can be seen
as focusing a general feeling that
existed below the surface of American
politics.
95. Sun, Oct. 20, 1944 p. 4, col. 1.
96. See Enquirer, Nov.
3, 1944. Taft won reelection by a mere 17,740 votes (50.3%,
1,500,809 to 1,483,069). He carried
Hamilton County by 11,474 votes (149,226 to
137,752). The Dewey-Bricker ticket won
the State by only 11,530 votes (1,582,293 to
1,570,763). The Republicans carried
Hamilton county by 10,490 votes (51.8%, 154,960 to
144,470). In Cincinnati itself the
Republican ticket got only 50.3% and won by 1145 votes
(104,512 to 103,367). These results for
the national ticket do not differ significantly from
those in 1940, when, although they lost
the state, the Republicans received 51% of the
Hamilton County vote and won by 5826 (154,733
to 148,907). The Republican ticket
tallied 50.1%
of the Cincinnati vote and won by only 575 votes. Stewart lost in 1944 by
112,359 votes. He won Hamilton County
with 57.8% of the vote, by 46,331. He captured
57.4% of the Cincinnati vote and won by
30,199. Sources: Robinson, They Voted ...,
139-40, and Ohio Election Statistics (Volume
for 1940), 289-94, 1944 Volume, 14,
351-57.
McCarthyism Before McCarthy 27
As such, it shares similarities and
differences with the postwar
hysteria. Unlike later anti-communism
the outbreak in 1944 related
primarily to domestic issues.
Republicans feared the CIO's newfound
political organization and disliked
certain economic practices, such as
centralization, spending, and government
intervention, which charac-
terized the New Deal and accelerated
during the war. Therefore the
Republicans used these issues as lenses
to focus the general feelings of
anti-communism, which were strongest
among the party's conserva-
tive followers. The willingness of the
Taft wing of the party to avoid
splitting the party by its recognition
of the reality of the alliance with
Russia insured that anti-communism as
practiced by politicians would
tend to avoid foreign policy. This is
also why anti-communism was
often accompanied by anti-fascism. The
Republicans were still uncer-
tain about which rhetorical stand would
be more politically effective.
With the end of the war, anti-fascism
disappeared as an effective
alternative.
In some ways, however, the
anti-communism of 1944 contained
elements that were direct predecessors
of the postwar scare. Some
newspapers, seeking readers, and not
sharing the restraints of the
politicians, sought to exploit the
communism issue in a sensational
fashion by linking it to foreign policy.
This kind of anti-communism
seems to have been an attempt to pry
loose certain ethnic and religious
groups from the Roosevelt coalition.
Also, in 1944, just as during the
postwar period, the intensity of
anti-communist rhetoric varied accord-
ing to which newspapers one read.
Likewise, Taft's smearing of the
Civil Rights movement would become a
regular feature of the postwar
scare. It is also clear that by 1944
some elements of the CIO were
beginning to abandon their communist
components in the face of
rapidly intensifying anti-communist
feelings. Here we see the begin-
nings of a trend that would further
split the labor movement in the
postwar period,97 and perhaps
contribute to its decline since World
War II.
James Selcraig has argued that the
emergence of local postwar scares
in midwestern cities like Cincinnati was
the result of a "conservative
movement" that exploited local
conditions for political purposes.98
97. This in turn was part of a general
movement, in the 1930s and early 1940s, of many
liberals toward an anti-Soviet stance.
This produced, after the war, the so-called Cold
War liberals. See Les K. Adler and
Thomas G. Patterson. "Red Fascism: The Merger
of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the
American Image of Totalitarianism,
1930's-1950's," American
Historical Review, 75 (1970), 1046-64.
98. James Truett Selcraig, The Red
Scare in the Midwest, 1945-1955: A State and
Local Study (Ann Arbor, 1982), 67.
28 OHIO HISTORY
The examination of anti-communism in
1944 in Cincinnati bears out the
existence of a group of conservative
politicians who sought to exploit
local and national traditions of
anti-communism that long predated the
Cold War. However, in 1944, these people
were content to use
anti-communist rhetoric in connection
with national and state politics.
The emergence, or in the case of
Cincinnati the re-emergence, of
anti-communism connected with local
issues would come later. This in
turn suggests that it might be more
profitable to consider postwar
anti-communism as part of a larger
anti-radical process that has been a
constant in modern American history and
which resulted in the
destruction of a truly viable political
left in the United States. Only
more studies of anti-communism in 1944,
and anti-communist and
anti-radical movements in previous
decades, will show if this is in fact
a valuable model to use, and if the
situation in Cincinnati is in any way
representative of the country as a
whole. In any event, it seems clear
that the historiographical tradition
which speaks largely of a "postwar
red scare" and
"McCarthyism" should be reexamined.
MICHAEL J. ANDERSON
McCarthyism Before McCarthy:
Anti-Communism in Cincinnati
and the Nation During the
Election of 1944
The wave of intense anti-communist
sentiment that swept over the
United States in the years following the
Second World War, sometimes
called the "second red
scare,"1 had a great impact on American
society. Political debate came to be
dominated by the desire of both
major parties to appear tough on
"international communism." The
political Left, historically not a major
force in U.S. politics, was
weakened even further as labor unions,
universities, and government
were purged of those people believed to
be too closely associated with
communism. Finally, the behavior of
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
along with his popularity, helped to
reduce the level of politics to
personal attack and guilt by
association. Because this behavior was
tolerated, and even encouraged, by major
political leaders and the
press, civil liberties were badly
damaged.
For these reasons the second red scare
has received a good deal of
attention from historians. In textbooks
and general surveys anti-
communist sentiment is seen as growing
out of American anxiety over
foreign affairs after the war,
especially the growth of Soviet power and
influence and the rise of "Red
China." These accounts generally
concentrate on the period of about
1946-54 and identify the phenom-
enon with Senator Joseph McCarthy. In
discussing "McCarthyism"
both texts and more specialized
historical studies generally focus on
several specific aspects: the personal
crusade of the Wisconsin Sena-
Michael J. Anderson is a Ph.D. candidate
in history at the University of Cincinnati.
1. Here the term postwar red scare will
refer to the anticommunism occurring after
World War II. For information on the red
scare of 1919-20, see Robert K. Murray, Red
Scare: A Study in National Hysteria (Minneapolis, 1955).