DAVID A. NIEDRINGHAUS
Dress Rehearsal For World War I:
The Ohio National Guard
Mobilization of 1916
The Ohio National Guard, like the
National Guard of other states,
has a long history of service to its
citizens and to the United States. Its
heritage is rooted in the militia
system that has played such a vital role
in the nation's history. In times of
crisis-natural disasters, civil
disturbances, or wars and rebellions-it
has often been called upon to
serve until the crisis subsides and
either order or peace is restored.
However, the role of these local
organizations within the national
defense structure has gone through many
changes. Early militia units
provided local defense for the
community and belonged entirely to
state governments for use in civil or
military emergencies. States
seldom permitted their militia to serve
outside their own borders, and
the federal government had little
authority to compel them to do so. In
times of national crisis-the Civil War,
for instance-the federal
government relied on its regular
standing army and on newly-created
volunteer units that it used to bring
the Regular Army up to sufficient
strength. These volunteers normally
were untrained, and it took time to
train these units to where they could
fight effectively in wartime.1
In the ensuing years, Ohio's militia
and those of other states slowly
assumed a greater role in the national
defense. The Ohio militia evolved
into a part of the National Guard,
distinct from the old militia in that it
now had a clear dual responsibility to
both the state of Ohio and the
federal government. In state internal
matters, it still served the
Governor of Ohio in quelling civil
disturbances or providing assistance
to areas hit by natural disasters. Its
role in the nation's defense,
Captain David A. Niedringhaus recently
completed a three-year assignment as an
Assistant Professor of History at the
U.S. Military Academy, West Point. He received
his M.A. in history from The Ohio State
University in 1987 and is currently a student at
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
1. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski,
For the Common Defense: A Military
History of the United States of
America (New York, 1984), 165-67.
36 OHIO HISTORY
however, became that of a reserve force
that the President could call to
service when he needed additional
trained military forces beyond what
the Regular Army could provide.2
One of the key periods in the Ohio
National Guard's history
occurred during the Mexican border
crisis in 1916. National Guard
reform acts in 1903, 1908, and 1916 had
significantly altered the Ohio
National Guard's relationship with the
federal government. Those acts
increased federal funding to the
National Guard in return for a greater
commitment from the National Guard to
conform to War Department
directives. Officials hoped that the
improved mobilization system
would increase the ability of state
units to respond to federal calls for
troops. And for the first time, the
federal government now had the
authority to employ National Guard units
outside the United States
once they were "federalized,"
or inducted into federal service.3
The June 1916 mobilization was the first
test of the new system, and
it gave the Ohio National Guard an
opportunity to demonstrate how
well prepared it was to meet its new
responsibilities. This would prove
to be crucial, since the 1916
mobilization was only a portent of things
to come. A scant ten months later, in
April 1917, the Ohio National
Guard would receive yet another call to
mobilize, this time for
America's entry into World War I.
Setting the Stage for the 1916
Mobilization
In the summer of 1916, President Woodrow
Wilson faced a crisis
along the border between the United
States and Mexico. Growing
political turmoil in Mexico after a
revolution in 1910 made relations
between the two nations extremely tense.
Wilson's recognition of the
tenuous government of Venustiano
Carranza aggravated rival political
leaders. On March 9, 1916, tensions
reached a breaking point when one
of Carranza's rivals, Pancho Villa,
raided Columbus, New Mexico, in
retaliation for American support for
Carranza. Wilson responded to
this provocation by sending a force
under Brigadier General John J.
Pershing into Mexico to find and destroy
Villa's force and other bands
that appeared to threaten American
territory.4
On May 5, another raid occurred against
the Texas town of Glen
Springs. Four days later, Wilson
responded to a request by the U.S.
2. John K. Mahon, History of the
Militia and the National Guard (New York, 1983),
260-61.
3. Millett and Maslowski, Common
Defense, 312-13.
4. Thomas Paterson, American Foreign
Policy: A History (Lexington, Mass., 1983),
237.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 37
Army Southern Department Commander,
Major General Frederick
Funston, by calling up militia units
from Texas, New Mexico, and
Arizona to protect the border against
further raids. Border skirmishes
continued nonetheless. By mid-June,
Wilson determined that Ameri-
can military strength on the border was
insufficient and needed
bolstering. On June 18, 1916, he ordered
the mobilization of the
Organized Militia and the National Guard
of the remaining states for
service along the Mexican border.5
For the Ohio National Guard, as for
Guard units in other states, the
1916 call-up was the first mobilization
for federal service since the war
with Spain in 1898. The 1898
mobilization of state militias had
demonstrated significant flaws in the
entire American system for
wartime mobilization at both the state
and federal levels. The militia
system officially had changed little
since the Uniform Militia Act of
1792; in fact, that act remained on the
books for 111 years, until 1903.
It required states to maintain a
militia, with every citizen in theory
subject to enrollment and possible
militia service. Officers assigned as
militia captains were required to enroll
every able-bodied white male
citizen "residing within the bounds
of this company," and every
citizen subsequently had to provide his
own firearms and equipment.6
Modifying acts in 1795, 1798, and 1808
provided for a small degree of
federal financial support. In return for
this aid, states incurred an
obligation to support Presidential calls
for state governors to provide
milita in case of invasion or rebellion.7
Through the remainder of the 19th
century, Congress tacked on
minor amendments to the 1792 act, but
the law and the system did not
change radically. In actual practice,
volunteer companies became the
mainstay of local military
organizations. These units often went their
own way in establishing uniform and
equipment requirements. Even
with some reforms in the 1880s and
1890s, few National Guard
companies conducted serious military
training. Enthusiasm was often
high in such units, but these
organizations seldom were anything more
than social clubs.8 As a
solid basis for a standardized, integrated
reserve force for national emergencies,
they were far from adequate.
During the 1898 mobilization, the
McKinley administration tried to
enlarge the Regular Army by asking for
individual volunteers from the
National Guard to fill existing units
for the duration of the war.
5. Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood On
the Border (London, 1969), 289.
6. Eldridge Colby, The National Guard
of the United States: A Half-Century of
Progress (Manhattan, Kansas, 1977), 9-12.
7. Ibid., 11-12.
8. Ibid., 23.
38 OHIO HISTORY
However, at the same time McKinley
called for 125,000 Guardsmen,
most of whom decided they would rather
serve with existing or newly
formed units from their local area
rather than with a Regular Army
unit. Potential volunteers often
preferred to join National Guard units
because they only had to serve for the
duration of the war rather than
for the fixed enlistment terms required
by the Regular Army. Only a
second call for further volunteers
finally filled the Regular Army's
authorized strength.
The War Department now had to support
and train the state
volunteer regiments that flooded into
large, hastily organized federal
camps. Unprepared for the huge numbers
of new soldiers, the War
Department initially proved incapable of
logistically and medically
supporting the volunteer units. Disease
and chaos reigned for several
weeks. War Department officials reacted
to this situation quickly, but
the memory of sick, bored, untrained and
ill-prepared soldiers lingered
on as a symbol of the army's ineptitude
in mobilizing for the war with
Spain.9
At the same time, the experience showed
the Guard's potential as a
structure for training and equipping men
before they might be called
into federal wartime service. The
National Guard was not yet part of a
truly workable and responsive reserve
system. By law the Guard was
still basically a state-funded militia,
as established in the 1792 Uniform
Militia Act that remained in force. In
1899, though, the newly appoint-
ed Secretary of War, Elihu Root, began
to initiate reforms that
profoundly affected the Guard's role in
the nation's defense.10
Several important changes took place in
the eighteen-year period
between the 1898 experience and Wilson's
National Guard call-up in
1916. In 1903, Congress passed the Dick
Act as a direct response to
some of the severe problems experienced
during the 1898 mobilization.
Among other things, this act created a
Division of Militia Affairs within
the War Department that managed militia
and National Guard matters.
Also, federal subsidies to the Guard
increased dramatically. By 1906,
the federal government provided
$2,000,000 per year to arm state
militias, up from the $400,000 annual
subsidy it had provided earlier. In
return for the huge increase in federal
dollars, the Regular Army gained
increased control of National Guard
training and organization.11
A follow-up act in 1908 continued the
reform movement by giving the
federal government more discretion in
employing the Guard outside the
United States and for greater lengths of
service. Some restrictions
9. Millett and Maslowski, Common Defense, 272-73.
10. Mahon, History of the Militia, 138.
11. Ibid., 139-40.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 39 |
|
remained. The federal government had to keep the Guard intact in its original units rather than using it as a pool of individual replacements for Regular Army units. It also could keep the Guard units in its service only for the duration of the emergency.12 The Attorney General in 1912 declared parts of the 1908 act unconstitutional, questioning whether the federal government could employ the Guard outside the country after all. The 1916 National Defense Act confirmed Congress' intent to allow the Guard to serve outside the continental United States if necessary. It established a dual oath required for all Guardsmen that bound each man to serve the federal government once his unit was called into service.13 The changes initiated by the acts of 1903, 1908, and 1916 significantly increased the ability of the National Guard to equip itself and to mobilize quickly and efficiently for federal service.14 By 1916 the system appeared to be firmly in place and working smoothly. Ohio Guard units organized the same way Regular Army units did and made great strides in training during weekly drill periods and annual summer training encampments. When the mobilization call came in mid-1916, there seemed to be little reason to expect that the Ohio National Guard would have any significant problems.
12. Colby, National Guard, 33. 13. Ibid., 34. 14. Ibid., 34-36. |
40 OHIO HISTORY
Status of the Ohio National Guard in
1916
The Ohio National Guard in 1916
contained eight infantry regiments
and one separate infantry battalion, one
squadron of cavalry, one
battalion of field artillery, an
engineer battalion, a signal corps battal-
ion, and a medical department consisting
of three field hospitals and
two ambulance companies. It also had a
small contingent of officers
that served on the staff of the Adjutant
General, including the Inspector
General, the Judge Advocate General (for
legal affairs), the Quarter-
master detachment (for supply
administration), and the Ordnance
Department, which handled weapons and
ammunition matters.15 Three
of the infantry regiments-the Second,
the Third, and the Sixth-
belonged to the First Brigade, while
three more-the Fourth, the Fifth,
and the Eighth-belonged to the Second
Brigade. The First and
Seventh Infantry Regiments, along with
the Ninth Infantry Battalion
(black), remained unattached.16
The Ohio National Guard in 1916 centered
on local communities.
Company-sized units generally drew their
members from no more than
one or two counties, with the company
headquarters located in the
largest or most central small town in
the area. Regiments followed a
regional organization, with the larger
cities in Ohio serving as regimen-
tal headquarters. Thus, the First
Regiment, headquartered in Cincin-
nati, drew on the population of
southwest Ohio, the Fourth Regiment
(Columbus) consisted of companies in
central Ohio, and so forth. The
companies of the Fourth Regiment were
located in surrounding small
towns and county seats, including
London, Marion, Marysville, New-
ark, Delaware, Lancaster, and Washington
Court House. The remain-
ing regimental headquarters were located
in Lima, Dayton, Cleveland,
Toledo, Marietta, and Bucyrus, all among
the larger cities in Ohio in
1916.17 Most of these units maintained a
peacetime strength sufficient
to meet federal requirements and to deal
with internal state emergen-
cies such as natural disasters or civil
disturbances. In a mobilization for
federal service, however, units expanded
to a higher, wartime autho-
rized strength.18 Ohio
National Guard units relied on volunteers to fill
the difference between peacetime and
wartime strength levels in
existing units.
Despite the federal government's
involvement in directing what
kinds of units it wanted the Ohio Guard
to maintain, recruiting
15. "Report of the Chief of the
Militia Bureau," War Department, Annual Reports,
1916 (Washington, D.C., 1916), 1080-87.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 1132.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 41
remained very much a local process. If a
man wished to join the
National Guard during a period of
wartime mobilization, signing up
with an existing unit in or near his own
area was usually his only
option. Occasionally, he had a choice of
what kind of unit he could
enlist in. A volunteer in the Columbus
area, for example, might join B
or I companies of the Fourth Infantry,
Company B of the Signal
Battalion, or Troop B of the First
Cavalry Squadron. 9 Competition for
recruits was often spirited in the
larger towns. Local pride in small-
town communities meant that most
volunteers from outlying areas
chose to enlist with the one infantry
company in their area. Black
citizens were restricted to the Ninth
Infantry Battalion, which had
companies in Springfield, Columbus,
Dayton, and Cleveland.20
By 1916, Ohio National Guard units
reflected much progress as a
result of the reforms of the 1903 Dick
Act, although many problems
remained. The law specified that
National Guard units be organized
according to the regulations which
governed like units in the Regular
Army.21 The Ohio National
Guard's regulations, most recently updated
in 1912, established training
guidelines, equipment allocations, officer
selection criteria, and standards of
performance for its units to ensure
that those units would meet federal
standards. Most Guard officers
made obvious efforts to attain and
maintain standards dictated by the
federal government, but standards among
Ohio Guard units still varied
widely.
Guard and federal officers enforced some
of the standards more
rigorously than others. Article XV of
the Ohio regulations, for exam-
ple, directed that each company would
assemble for drill and instruc-
tion at least once each week, a
directive that many units found difficult
to comply with.22 Many of
those that did muster at the required
intervals fell short of actually
conducting meaningful training at those
drill periods. Federal inspecting
officers noted this fact in their negative
evaluations of several Guard units that
had reported meeting fifty times
each year. Often, the degree of interest
that a Guard unit showed in
complying with training regulations was
proportional to the level of
interest shown by the federal
government. Ohio Guard units complied
better with another regulation that
directed them to conduct an annual
19. Adjutant General, State of Ohio,
General Order 27 (1915), November 14, 1915.
Ohio Historical Society, State Archive
Series 30.
20. Ibid.
21. "Report of the Chief of the
Militia Bureau," War Department, Annual Reports,
1917 (Washington, D.C., 1917), 864.
22. Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Regulations
for the Ohio National Guard, 1912,
(Columbus, 1912) 99-100.
42 OHIO HISTORY
encampment for a period of eight to
fourteen days each year between
the 1st of May and the 1st of November.23
Most Ohio Guard units conducted their
annual encampment at Camp
Perry, the major Ohio Guard training
facility along Lake Erie in
northern Ohio. One reason for strict
compliance with this regulation
was that it was the primary means for
federal inspecting officers to
monitor the Ohio National Guard's
ability to meet federal standards.
Federal officers used the annual
training encampments to evaluate,
over a period of several weeks or
months, the training and performance
of virtually every unit within the Ohio
Guard as it rotated through. The
stakes were high, since the results of
these inspections directly affected
the funding Ohio could expect to get
from the federal government.24
The reports from federal officers went
to the Militia Bureau, which
published the overall results annually
in its report to the U.S. Army
Chief of Staff. Each company's results
appeared in the report; com-
panies could be rated satisfactory, they
could be placed on probation,
or, in the worst case, they might have
their federal recognition
withdrawn. To the War Department,
unrecognized units were merely
state militia, meaning that those units
were not entitled to receive
federal funds.25 The 1916
Militia Bureau report on the Ohio National
Guard showed thirteen infantry companies
placed on probation and
eleven having their federal recognition withdrawn.26
Between one-
fourth and one-third of Ohio National
Guard infantry companies
therefore were in serious trouble. The
usual reasons for such sanctions
were insufficient strength or
chronically low turnouts for instruction
and drill periods. While some units
struggled to meet minimum federal
proficiency expectations, others
achieved outstanding results consis-
tently, both in turnout and in training
results. Standards for uniformly
evaluating Guard units were firmly in
place in 1916, but the ability of
individual units to meet those standards
still varied considerably.
Along with statewide training standards,
the Ohio Guard had the
responsibility to equip its soldiers to
the same standards as Regular
Army soldiers. This was a big step
forward from 1898, when Guard
soldiers had to wait for long periods of
time to receive weapons that
were generally old and outdated.
However, most Ohio Guard units had
only enough equipment available to equip
their peacetime strength.27
During mobilization for federal service
and expansion to war strength,
23. Ibid.
24. War Department, Annual Reports, 1917,
864.
25. Ibid.
26. War Department, Annual Reports, 1916,
1080-87.
27. Ibid., 895-99.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 43
Guard units had to rely on the federal
government to provide the
weapons for any volunteers used to fill
the existing units.
The procedure for mobilizing Guard units
and inducting them into
federal service was straightforward. The
Ohio Guard regulations
required local company-sized units to
muster those soldiers already
assigned to them, conduct inventories of
property, and ensure that
their soldiers were physically and
medically fit for federal service.28 At
the same time, they began recruiting to
fill the gap between existing
strength and full authorized wartime
strength. Most units could expect
to accomplish this within two or three
days. At this point, unit
commanders and regimental quartermaster
officers arranged for trans-
portation to a state mobilization site.
The usual method, and most
convenient one, was to move troops by
rail.29
At the state mobilization site, federal
officers screened Guard
soldiers for medical and physical
fitness for federal service. Mean-
while, Guard units conducted training in
preparation for their antici-
pated duties. After a federal mustering
officer inducted the Guard into
the national service, Guard units fell
under the full control of the
federal government and the War
Department. The War Department
was responsible for moving the newly
inducted soldiers to federal
mobilization sites.30 In a broad sense,
the Ohio National Guard
mobilization of 1916 followed this process,
although numerous units
failed to comply fully with federal
directives and those of the Adjutant
General's office. This led to some
interesting results as the Ohio Guard
began to mobilize as quickly as possible
for federal service.
The Ohio National Guard Mobilizes
When President Wilson and Secretary of
War Newton D. Baker
issued their call for National Guard
units on June 18, 1916, Benson W.
Hough was Ohio's Adjutant General. In
1892, at the age of seventeen,
Hough had enlisted in the National Guard
and served during numerous
strike-breaking and natural disaster
relief assignments through 1897.
He was a student at Ohio State
University in 1898 and missed serving
in the war with Spain. After graduating
in 1899, he opened a law firm
in Delaware, Ohio, and soon established
a successful practice there. In
28. Regulations for the Ohio National Guard, 1912, 86-87.
29. Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Annual
Report of the Adjutant General, 1913,
292-93.
30. Cole C. Kingseed. "A Test of
Readiness: The Ohio National Guard and the
Mexican Border Mobilization,
1916-1917" (M.A. thesis, Ohio State University, 1980),
22.
44 OHIO HISTORY
1902, he received an officer's
commission in the Ohio Guard and soon
rose to command Company K of the Fourth
Ohio Infantry Regiment at
Delaware. In 1905, he was promoted to
major, and shortly thereafter he
was promoted to lieutenant colonel. By
1909, at the relatively young
age of 34, he commanded the Fourth Ohio.31
In 1915, Governor Frank Willis appointed
Hough to be the Adjutant
General of Ohio. Interestingly (and
perhaps not coincidentally), Willis
and Hough both were from Delaware
(Ohio).32 Hough served as
Adjutant General only briefly, resigning
his position almost immedi-
ately after the mobilization call so he
could reenlist as a private in his
old regiment, the Fourth Ohio. On July 8
he accepted his old
commission as the lieutenant colonel of
the regiment. He did, however,
stay on as the acting Adjutant General
through the mobilization period,
until September 6. By this time the Ohio
Guard had moved to the
Mexican border, and Hough had completed
his primary task as
Adjutant General. His Assistant Adjutant
General, Colonel Edward
Bryant, then replaced him.33 Hough
went on to compile a distinguished
record during World War I as the
commander of the Fourth Ohio,
which was redesignated the 166th
Infantry Regiment and fought as part
of the famous 42nd (Rainbow) Division in
northeastern France.34
Unlike the 1898 call-up, Secretary of
War Baker's mobilization
telegram to Governor Willis specified
precisely which units the federal
government wanted for service on the
Mexican border.35 This was
important, since it left no doubt that
this mobilization would rely
entirely on existing units as bases for
the recruitment of volunteers.
Baker's directive called the Ohio
Guard's two infantry brigades into
service, along with Ohio's one squadron
of cavalry, its battalion of field
artillery, its signal battalion, and its
ambulance companies and field
hospital units.36 The Second
and Seventh Infantry Regiments and the
Ninth Separate Infantry Battalion were
not called up for federal service
and went on to conduct their scheduled
summer training in 1916. The
Ninth Infantry Battalion, however,
played an important role in con-
structing the mobilization site during
the latter part of June.
After receiving the mobilization
instructions on the afternoon of June
18, Hough and his small staff
immediately went to work preparing and
31. Robert Cheseldine, Ohio in the
Rainbow (Columbus, 1924), 26-27.
32. Frank B. Willis Pamphlets, Ohio
Historical society, Box 276; and Cheseldine,
Ohio in the Rainbow, 26.
33. Adjutant General, State of Ohio,
Special Order 226, September 6, 1916.
34. Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow, 36-109.
35. Ohio General Statistics
(Springfield, Ohio, 1916), 249.
36. Ibid.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 45 |
|
issuing the necessary orders to mobilize the selected Ohio Guard units. At 4:00 A.M. on the 19th, the Governor's office released to the press the Adjutant General's General Order Number 12 of 1916, outlining initial instructions to the Ohio Guard for mobilization. In addition to detailing the units that had been called for federal service, Hough's order charged regimental and battalion commanders with the responsibility for feeding their enlisted men once they mustered. In addition, the order authorized a subsistence allowance of 75 cents per day for each man actually present. Commanders also had to provide bedding for their soldiers (most units used local armories when available) and forage and shoes for their horses. If suitable facilities for bunking soldiers were not available, commanders had the authority to allow enlisted men to sleep at home.37 General Order Number 12 devoted considerable attention to medical concerns. The directive admonished commanders to examine carefully
37. Frank B. Willis Papers, Ohio Historical Society, State Archive Series 325.5.17. |
46 OHIO HISTORY
their soldiers to detect any sign of
contagious diseases, especially
typhoid fever, measles, and mumps. The
order specified that if an
office of the Ohio National Guard
Medical Corps was unable to
conduct such inspections, commanders
were to have local health
officials and physicians make the
inspections. The order bluntly stated
that "no infected soldier will be
brought to the mobilization camp."
Equally important, the order directed
that "no recruit will be accepted
until he has been given a thorough
physical examination by a Medical
Officer and has been found to conform to
the physical standard
prescribed for the Regular Army."38
Hough's orders appeared clear
enough, but the Ohio Guard would run
into significant problems as a
result of inadequate compliance with
this directive.
Each regimental or separate battalion
commander assigned one
officer to be accountable for medical
property, another officer to
account for quartermaster property, and
a special accountability
officer who was responsible for any
ordnance, engineer, or signal
equipment within the command. In his
order, Hough reminded ac-
countable officers and local commanders
of the requirement during
mobilizations to inventory and inspect
all property belonging to the
state or the federal government which
the Ohio National Guard would
take into federal service. In addition,
the order directed that as soon as
a unit had been raised "to the
maximum practicable [strength] at its
home station," had at least reached
its prescribed peace minimum
strength, had conducted its property
inventories, and had made
suitable arrangements for "caring
for the armory and property to be
left behind," it should notify the
Adjutant General's office and await
further instructions.39
For most units, the "maximum
practicable" strength level was full
wartime strength, and the Ohio Guard
units selected for service on the
Mexican border sought to fill their
rolls to meet that level. The
peacetime strength of the mobilizing
Ohio Guard units was 7,295, little
more than half of the desired wartime
level of 13,541.40 Recruitment
began almost immediately throughout the
state, beginning from the
Governor's office. Willis' next press
release after the mobilization
order was a call to arms that appealed
to Ohio patriotism. He urged
Ohioans to enlist immediately "to
fill up every Ohio organization to its
war strength." Willis then released
a series of press statements
designed to stir up support for the
Mexican venture.41 His office
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. War Department, Annual Reports, 1916,
1132.
41. Ohio State Journal, June 20,
1916.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 47
printed letters from eight-year old boys
and seventy-six-year old men
volunteering for service. One old man
who claimed to have lived in
Mexico for thirty-five years urged
people to volunteer in order to "go
into Mexico and clean it up once and for
all," the implication being that
since he had lived in Mexico he knew the
importance of sending
American units down to fight in Mexico.
On June 26, Willis released for
the newspapers another letter from a
large group of Civil War veterans
that volunteered for service despite the
fact that "some of [us]
physically are a little shaky."42
While the appeals for volunteers based
on patriotism were nothing
new, the 1916 mobilization was different
from past efforts in one
important respect. When an interested
citizen and ex-officer of the
Austro-Hungarian army named M. Wall
wrote to the Governor re-
questing the authority to organized a
company of fellow Austro-
Hungarians, Willis politely acknowledge
receipt of the request and
referred the matter to General Hough. He
also advised Mr. Wall that if
he really wanted to serve his adopted
country, he ought to consider
instead enlisting in an existing unit.43
Clearly, volunteer units formed
by ambitious citizens desiring quick
commissions and immediate high
rank were a thing of the past by 1916.
Governor Willis was not the only one who
used the newspapers to
attract volunteers to fill existing
units. Local newspapers were perhaps
the primary recruiting tools for the
company commanders and their
recruiting officers to enlist new
members into their units. These papers
often were even more open and
enthusiastic than the Governor had
been about using patriotic ideals to
stir up enthusiasm and encourage
the young men in their towns to join the
local military unit. The June
29th Kenton Graphic News Republican (home
of I Company, 2nd Ohio
Infantry) had a headline proclaiming,
"Men, show your patriotism
now!" Other towns across Ohio had
newspapers that offered similar
sentiments.44
Ohio National Guard recruiting officers,
of course, encouraged and
supported this form of advertising. They
also worked with local mayors
and officials (more often than not they
might be personal friends or
acquaintances) to gain further help in
making Guard services appealing
to the local citizenry. Many communities
responded by organizing
social affairs and meetings to support
their local Guardsmen and to
influence others to join the Guard.
Recruiting officers also pointed out
42. Willis Papers, Series 325.5.17.
43. Ibid.
44. Kingseed, "A Test of
Readiness," 15.
48 OHIO HISTORY
the financial benefits of serving in the
Guard during federal service.
Second lieutenants earned $4.72 per day,
sergeants $1 a day, and
privates $.60 a day plus meals after
being mustered in, amounts that
were not insignificant in 1916.45
It is important to note that while many
Guard members looked
forward to federal service and to
deploying to the Mexican border,
others were far less enthusiastic. Every
regiment designated for
movement to the border had a few
officers who resigned their
commissions to avoid service or who
submitted resignations prior to
the order to mobilize. The reasons for
avoiding service varied. Some
apparently found Guard service
inconvenient for their personal busi-
ness interests, while others felt
distaste at having to serve so far away
in the hot climate of Texas, New Mexico,
and Mexico itself. It is
unclear as to what, if any, penalties
this small minority of Guardsmen
may have received; probably few
regiments wanted to retain such
unenthusiastic leaders by forcing them
to stay on. As a result, the
Special Orders that the Adjutant
General's office issued regularly were
full of names of new officers elected by
their units to fill the vacancies,
and listed the results of state review
boards that determined whether
they were suitable for commissioning.46
Equipment shortages also plagued the
Ohio National Guard mobili-
zation. The Chief of the Militia
Bureau's report to the Secretary of War
for 1916 noted that, as of June 18, the
Ohio National Guard was short
large quantities of field equipment in
numerous categories and thus
could not completely equip its minimum
authorized strength for
wartime service. The Ohio Guard was also
short some weapons,
including thirty-two pistols and 268
pistol magazines. Unlike several
other states, Ohio was not short of
rifles, a significant change from
1898.47
The blame for equipment shortages also
belonged to the War
Department, which had the responsibility
to provide the weapons,
equipment, and supplies to make up the
difference between normal
National Guard strength levels and the wartime level that the federal
government required. The War Department
too had difficulty in
adequately fulfilling its requirements
to arm and equip those soldiers
that the Ohio National Guard could not
equip. The major problem
appeared to be that one depot stored the
reserve equipment and
supplies for all of the National Guard
units in the country.48 The War
45. Ibid., 20.
46. Adjutant General, State of Ohio,
Special Orders (1916), State Archive Series 117.
47. War Department, Annual Reports, 1916,
1151.
48. Kingseed, "A Test of
Readiness," 11.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 49
Department was unable to appropriate
enough transportation to pro-
vide every state's Guard units with the
equipment that they needed. As
a result, most of the Ohio National
Guard's units were unable to fully
equip all of their soldiers until well
after they had been mustered into
federal service. Since the Ohio units
remained in Ohio at Camp Willis
(the mobilization site) for several
weeks after the muster, most did
manage to acquire the needed equipment
by the time they moved to the
federal mobilization site in late August
and early September of 1916.
The Camp Willis Mobilization Site
U.S. Army regulations of 1912 required
Division (or Department)
commanders having jurisdiction over
National Guard units to ensure
that mobilization camps within their
divisions were suitable. The
regulations also charged them with the
responsibility to correct any
deficiencies. The division commander
could direct state authorities to
prepare an adequate mobilization site.49
In Ohio's case, neither the
state administration nor the U.S. Army's
Central Department complied
with their responsibilities in
identifying and preparing such a site.
When the call to mobilize came on June
18, Ohio was almost
completely unprepared.
For the 1898 mobilization, Ohio National
Guard units had mobilized
near the Columbus suburb of Bexley.
After that mobilization, com-
plaints by citizens of that city ensured
that the site could not be used
for future mobilizations. In 1911, state
and federal officials selected
Camp Perry as a prospective mobilization
site.50 Camp Perry had
numerous drawbacks for that purpose,
however, along with its obvious
benefits. Located along Lake Erie in
northern Ohio, Camp Perry was
a long way from many Ohio National Guard
units, particularly the First
Ohio Infantry Regiment at Cincinnati and
the Seventh Ohio Regiment
at Marietta. Furthermore, though it had
good training facilities, Camp
Perry was not particularly suited for
handling huge numbers of
soldiers. Normally, one or two regiments
at the most trained there at
any one time.51 While the rail and
transportation network near Camp
Perry was capable or receiving and
supporting one or two regiments, it
was inadequate for handling the demands
that moving the entire Ohio
National Guard would place on it.
In 1914, Adjutant General George H. Wood
appointed a board of
officers to review the suitability of
Camp Perry as a mobilization site.
49. Adjutant General, State of Ohio, Annual
Report, 1913, 200.
50. Kingseed, "A Test of
Readiness," 11.
51. Ibid.
50 OHIO HISTORY
This board determined that Camp Perry
was not a good place to have
a mobilization camp, and it submitted a
recommendation to move the
site to a place near Columbus. Columbus
had enough land for a camp
and drill field, particularly in the
northwest which was still mainly
farmland. The area had good drainage,
and the transportation system
around Columbus could easily handle the
demands of moving a large
number of men into the area. Finally, it
was easily accessible from all
parts of the state because it was a
railroad hub and was centrally
located. The U.S. Army
Inspector-Instructor for Ohio, Major George
C. Saffarrans, apparently forwarded the
recommendations and the
reasons behind them to the Central
Department in May 1914.52
Unfortunately, nothing more seems to
have happened between May
1914 and June 1916 to prepare a site
that could receive and support the
Ohio National Guard. Thus, Ohio Guard
officials in 1916 were caught
completely off guard by not having made
critical decisions and
preparations for a mobilization site
before the urgent need for one
arose.
The failure by state and federal
officials to establish or prepare a
suitable site meant that Adjutant
General Hough had to make some
immediate and difficult decisions after
the mobilization order. The site
that Adjutant General Hough picked for
the Ohio National Guard's
mobilization in 1916 was slightly northwest
of Columbus, where the
suburb of Upper Arlington now lies. Two
Columbus real estate
developers-King Thompson and his brother
Ben-had recently bought
most of the sprawling Henry Miller farm
there (in the area between the
current Fifth and Lane avenues in Upper
Arlington). By 1916 they had
just begun to build homes on that land,
with twelve families living in the
new development. At this point, the area
was still unincorporated and
lacked a full system of drainage
culverts and sewer lines.53
Because of the lack of necessary support
facilities, Hough elected to
establish a semipermanent camp that
could house and support a large
number of troops for an extended period.
The influx of National
Guardsmen became a temporary
inconvenience for the residents, but
proved beneficial to the Thompson
brothers because of the additional
roads, sewers, culverts, and gas and
water lines that the Ohio Guard
emplaced and then abandoned when it
moved down to Texas. The
issue of who should fund the project was
not fully clarified. State
officials spent over $200,000 to build
the camp, believing that the
federal government would pay for the
cost of the Camp Willis
52. Ibid., 12.
53. Marjorie Sayers, ed., History of
Upper Arlington, (Columbus, 1977), 13.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 51 |
construction. The War Department, however, considered the camp far too elaborate for what is suspected would be a one-term mobilization site. It flatly refused to pay the full cost. Ultimately the state and the federal government shared the cost.54 The Thompson brothers, of course, were the big winners in the whole affair. The delays in constructing the camp and the facilities to support thousands of men would have a significant effect on Ohio's mobiliza- tion schedule. The delay caused Ohio to lag well behind other states in mustering its soldiers into federal service and deploying them to the border. Given the War Department's desire to get units to the border as soon as possible and the resulting urgency to mobilize quickly, Hough's decision earned him some criticism later from the Central Department commander for creating a long delay in assembling the Ohio National Guard. Hough named the site Camp Willis after the Governor, and initiated the construction he believed necessary to provide a livable and sanitary mobilization site. He directed his Chief Quartermaster, Colonel William H. Duffy, to stake out the camp, supervise the construction of latrines, roads, drainage systems, and water supply systems, arrange for garbage disposal, purchase forage, rations, and fuel, and to complete a
54. Kingseed, "A Test of Readiness," 10. |
52 OHIO HISTORY
host of other requirements. On the same
day, June 19, he notified the
mobilizing units that he expected to be
able to receive troops by the
23rd of June. Hough issued orders to
several other officers to assist
Duffy, and he detailed the Ninth
Infantry Battalion to provide the men
to do the actual construction. Colonel
Duffy also hired local workers
and used prisoners from the state
penitentiary in Columbus to speed up
the process. Camp Willis was completed
on June 27, nine days after the
initial mobilization notice.55 Colonel
Duffy and the men who worked
for him did a remarkable job in
constructing the camp so quickly, but
it was not fast enough to avoid a
lengthy delay in mobilizing the Ohio
Guard.
The construction of Camp Willis was the
major reason behind the
Ohio National Guard's failure to
mobilize as quickly as the War
Department expected. The Central
Department Commander's report
to the U.S. Army Adjutant General
severely criticized Hough for
selecting "an absolutely
unsuitable" site and for constructing facilities
"of no permanent value." The
report went on to state that federal
officials had tried to speed up the Ohio
Guard's mobilization, but
concluded that "it was impossible
to get state authorities to hasten
assembly."56 The
criticism was not entirely fair, since the Central
Department shared part of the blame for
not fulfilling its responsibili-
ties in monitoring state mobilization
sites as directed by the U.S.
Army's regulations.
Nevertheless, of the fourteen states
under the Central Department's
jurisdiction, Ohio was the last to
assemble. The states closest to Ohio
in tardiness-Iowa, Minnesota, and South
Dakota-assembled a full
four days earlier than Ohio, while
Missouri and Wisconsin had done so
nine days before Ohio finally completed
its assembly on July 2.57 Even
after the Ohio Guard began assembling
at Camp Willis, however,
further delays unfolded.
Mustering the Ohio National Guard
Into Federal Service
Once Guardsmen arrived at Camp Willis,
two other actions had to
occur before federal officials mustered
them in. The first was a medical
screening and physical examination,
while the other was the adminis-
tering of a dual oath of allegiance and
service which Congress had just
passed into law on June 3, 1916. The
mustering officer in charge of
supervising these tasks was U.S. Army
Major Robert W. Mearns.58
55. Columbus Evening Dispatch, June
28, 1916.
56. "Militia Bureau Report,"
1916, as cited in Kingseed, "A Test of Readiness," 26.
57. Ibid., 27.
58. Central Department, United States
Army, Special Order 50 (1916), June 20, 1916,
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 53
Ohio National Guard units generally did
not comply with Hough's
directive to conduct thorough physical
and medical screenings of their
soldiers and new recruits. Federal
medical screeners found that local
commanders allowed many Guardsmen to
enlist without physical
examinations, and that others had
enlisted even after local medical
examiners identified disqualifying
characteristics. The Ohio National
Guard's Surgeon General, Colonel Joseph
Hall, and his state medical
examiners embarrassed themselves by
clearing for service many
Guardsmen that federal examiners
rejected later. The final results of
the federal screenings showed that over
25 percent of the Ohio
Guardsmen were rejected for medical and
physical deficiencies, includ-
ing over 400 in the Eighth Regiment
alone.59 This too was the worst
showing within the Central Department,
where the average rejection
rate was still a disturbing 15.5
percent.60 Although it is possible that
Major Mearns imposed standards that may
have been higher than those
of mustering officers in other states,
it was nevertheless apparent that
Ohio's medical and physical screening
procedures were fundamentally
flawed.
The attrition of Guardsmen rejected for
medical reasons ensured that
when the Ohio National Guard did finally
muster into federal service,
it was far short of the wartime strength
level that state and federal
officials had expected. The huge number
of medical rejections sparked
a public outcry and grumblings from
those units that were hit the
hardest. Mearns' attitude, as he later
explained, was that he "would
rather take to the border 65 good, fit,
and able-bodied men than 100,
part of whom couldn't stand the
pace."61 The rigorous standards used
to evaluate the Ohio Guardsmen (and
those of other states as well)
clearly indicated that when the federal
government mobilized the
National Guard, it now expected the
states to provide first-rate soldiers
from the start.
A final delay in mustering occurred due
to confusion by many Guard
members over a dual oath that each had
to take before entering federal
service. The National Defense Act of
1916 established the requirement
that Guardsmen had to take a new oath of
allegiance to the United
States upon enlistment. Under the old
law, Guardsmen would take an
oath each time they mustered for federal
service, but that oath was
only in force for the duration of that
specific period of service. Once a
as cited in Kingseed, 32.
59. "Report of the Mustering in of
the National Guard in the Central Division," NG
File 370.01, National Archives of the
United States, as cited in Kingseed, 33.
60. Ibid.
61. Ohio State Journal, July 6,
1916.
54 OHIO HISTORY
Guardsman reverted back to state
control, his allegiance reverted back
to the state as well. Congress' intent
with the dual oath of 1916 was to
make it unnecessary to administer a new
oath of allegiance to Guard
members every time they mustered into
federal service. Also, under
the new act the federal government no
longer needed to be concerned
about a specific limit to the time a
Guardsman could stay in federal
service. 62
Unfortunately, many Ohio Guardsmen did
not fully understand the
law or the dual oath's purpose. Many
understood the "permanent
allegiance" aspect of the law to
mean that they would be permanently
obligated to serve in the Regular Army.
Actually, the oath only applied
to the remainder of their enlistment
term. Eventually, commanders
convinced reluctant soldiers that the
dual oath was not an indefinite
commitment to the U.S. Army, and the
oath controversy subsided. On
July 15, 1916, Mearns finally completed
the federalization of the Ohio
National Guard, four weeks after the
initial notification.63
Conclusion
The Ohio National Guard's 1916
mobilization and induction into
federal service saw some encouraging
successes and some even more
noticeable failures. The major
disappointment during the mobilization
was the embarrassing series of delays
that plagued the Ohio Guard
during the month it took to complete the
process of federalization. The
first serious delay arose from state and
federal officials' failures to
prepare a mobilization site. Federal
regulations clearly indicated the
importance of taking these actions, but
officials at all levels had done
little before President Wilson rather
suddenly issued his call to
federalize the National Guard.64 The
lack of a suitable mobilization
site, coupled with General Hough's
decision to begin construction at
Camp Willis after the notification
alert, delayed Ohio's mobilization by
about nine days.65 Another
embarrassment to the Ohio National Guard
occurred after units arrived at Camp
Willis and underwent medical
screening from federal mustering
officers. Federal and state guidelines
again clearly outlined the necessary
procedures and standards for
establishing physical fitness for
federal wartime service. General
Hough reiterated the major requirements
in his initial General Order
62. Millett and Maslowski, Common
Defense, 324-25.
63. Ohio State Journal, July 16,
1916.
64. Kingseed, 34-36.
65. Ibid., 26.
Dress Rehearsal For World War I 55
for mobilization.66 Local
commanders and recruiting officers and state
medical officers generally failed to
comply with those directives, or
failed to achieve the required
standards. As a result, federal screening
officers rejected over a quarter of the
Guardsmen that came to Camp
Willis.67
Problems in the federal supply system
and equipment shortages
caused other minor delays. In the
mobilization camp, another small
delay arose due to confusion among
Guardsmen as to what the dual
oath of allegiance actually meant. As a
result, they were reluctant to
take the oath until they were completely
satisfied that they were not
being tricked into joining the U.S.
Regular Army permanently.68
The procedures for mobilizing were far
better and clearer than they
had been in 1898. Yet, the Ohio
mobilization in 1916 certainly did not
go as smoothly or successfully as state
or federal officials had expected
or desired. The Ohio National Guard did
mobilize, but it did so behind
schedule and below minimum federal
standards. The reason for the
relatively poor performance was not that
the system was inherently
faulty, but because problems arose from
poor planning (no planned
mobilization site) or sloppily executed
directives (poor medical and
physical screening of prospective
Guardsmen). Perhaps the most
damning indictment of the Ohio Guard's
performance during the
mobilization and mustering stages was
that Ohio was the last state in
the entire Midwest Region (Central
Department) to mobilize and had
the highest percentage of Guardsmen
rejected as being physically unfit
for federal service.69 Other
states mobilized, mustered, and deployed
several weeks before the Ohio Guard was
able to do so.
Encouragingly, many of the problems that
plagued the 1916 mobili-
zation were solvable in time for the
next mobilization. The Ohio
National Guard now had a mobilization
site, and should Camp Willis
become unavailable in the future, Ohio
Guard officers now had a
clearer idea of the importance of
finding and building a new one
quickly. Having experienced the federal
medical screening process, the
Ohio National Guard's medical officers
could adjust their procedures
and standards accordingly.
Despite the setbacks, the 1916
mobilization had some successes as
well. Many communities showed great
support for their local Guard
units, which enhanced the mobilization
process. Hough's construction
66. Willis Papers, Series 325.5.17.
67. Kingseed, 33.
68. Ohio State Journal, July 16,
1916.
69. "Report of the Mustering in of
the National Guard of the Central Division," NG
File 370.01, National Archives of the
United States, as cited in Kingseed, 33.
56 OHIO HISTORY
of Camp Willis may have delayed the
mobilization, but it also ensured
that once the Guardsmen did arrive there
would be adequate facilities
to support them. Unlike 1898, the Ohio
Guard in 1916 had no serious
problems with disease. More importantly,
once Ohio units did get to
the Mexican border, most performed very
well.70 These factors erased
much of the bad taste from the
frustrating delays experienced during
the mobilization period. With these
encouraging successes comple-
menting the lessons learned from the
failures, the 1916 mobilization, in
the final analysis, proved to be a
valuable trial run for the bigger
mobilization that occurred less than a
year later when the United States
entered the First World War.
70. Kingseed, 79-80.
DAVID A. NIEDRINGHAUS
Dress Rehearsal For World War I:
The Ohio National Guard
Mobilization of 1916
The Ohio National Guard, like the
National Guard of other states,
has a long history of service to its
citizens and to the United States. Its
heritage is rooted in the militia
system that has played such a vital role
in the nation's history. In times of
crisis-natural disasters, civil
disturbances, or wars and rebellions-it
has often been called upon to
serve until the crisis subsides and
either order or peace is restored.
However, the role of these local
organizations within the national
defense structure has gone through many
changes. Early militia units
provided local defense for the
community and belonged entirely to
state governments for use in civil or
military emergencies. States
seldom permitted their militia to serve
outside their own borders, and
the federal government had little
authority to compel them to do so. In
times of national crisis-the Civil War,
for instance-the federal
government relied on its regular
standing army and on newly-created
volunteer units that it used to bring
the Regular Army up to sufficient
strength. These volunteers normally
were untrained, and it took time to
train these units to where they could
fight effectively in wartime.1
In the ensuing years, Ohio's militia
and those of other states slowly
assumed a greater role in the national
defense. The Ohio militia evolved
into a part of the National Guard,
distinct from the old militia in that it
now had a clear dual responsibility to
both the state of Ohio and the
federal government. In state internal
matters, it still served the
Governor of Ohio in quelling civil
disturbances or providing assistance
to areas hit by natural disasters. Its
role in the nation's defense,
Captain David A. Niedringhaus recently
completed a three-year assignment as an
Assistant Professor of History at the
U.S. Military Academy, West Point. He received
his M.A. in history from The Ohio State
University in 1987 and is currently a student at
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
1. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski,
For the Common Defense: A Military
History of the United States of
America (New York, 1984), 165-67.