Ohio History Journal

FREDERICK J. BLUE

Friends of Freedom: Lincoln,

Chase, and Wartime Racial Policy

 

 

 

Historians have long differed over what motivated Abraham Lincoln to is-

sue the Emancipation Proclamation. They have also disagreed over what

place the President believed blacks should occupy after emancipation. In fail-

ing to reach a consensus on what led Lincoln to the most important decision

of his administration they have debated over what factors and persons may

have influenced him.¹ Among those individuals who had the strongest influ-

ence on the President's racial policies was Salmon P. Chase.

Until recent years most common in assessing Lincoln's motives has been

the thesis that the President was a pragmatic politician who simply did what

was necessary without a deep commitment to equality. Within this approach

there has been a broad spectrum of opinions. Richard Hofstadter was among

the most critical when he suggested that the President's Proclamation fol-

lowed the lead that Congress had taken already in the Second Confiscation

Act and that "it did not in fact free any slaves."² Implicit in this argument is

the suggestion that Lincoln acted primarily in response to political pressure.

Others have come close to the Hofstadter position. Richard Current has

viewed the Proclamation essentially as a delaying tactic through which the

President outsmarted his abolitionist critics who demanded more immediate

and sweeping action by pronouncing a policy characterized by the limits it

put on emancipation. The Proclamation, says Current, was the result of

wartime expediency.³ V. Jacque Voegeli has demonstrated the extreme pres-

sure Lincoln was under in the North. Radicals could be assuaged by a limited

emancipation policy while conservatives might acquiesce if the policy was

restricted to areas behind Confederate lines and could be justified solely a s a

 

 

Frederick J. Blue is Professor of History at Youngstown State University.

 

 

1. We need not consider the opposing popular images of Lincoln described by Stephen B.

Oates as the frontier hero, martyr-saint, and Great Emancipator versus the bigoted white

racist. Historians can almost unanimously dismiss the latter view as over-simplification and the

former as extreme adulation. See Oates, Abraham Lincoln: The Man Behind the Myths (New

York, 1984).

2. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made it (New

York, 1948), 132.

3. Richard N. Current, "The Friend of Freedom," in The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New

York, 1958), 215-36.

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86                                                       OHIO HISTORY

 

military necessity. In Voegeli's view the pressure from conservatives was

more significant, with the Congressional elections of 1862 showing just how

vulnerable the President and his party were to the attacks of those who wanted

slavery left unchallenged.⁴

Other historians who have agreed that Lincoln was a pragmatist stressing

military needs nonetheless claim that he recognized the full implications of

his act. James A. Rawley, in labeling the Proclamation "a turning point in

the history of abolition in America," has also suggested that the President can

be more accurately described as the Great Nationalist rather than the Great

Emancipator. For Lincoln, says Rawley, saving the nation was the ultimate

goal and freeing the slaves the means to that end. Rawley, among others, has

stressed the importance of emancipation as a means to provide badly needed

troops for the flagging Union war effort and the corresponding necessity of

depriving the Confederacy of slave assistance.⁵ The latter point is empha-

sized in Dudley Cornish's study, The Sable Arm. Similarly, Louis Gerteis

has argued that federal policy toward the freedmen as directed by Lincoln was

aimed primarily at mobilizing black laborers and soldiers, but failed to chal-

lenge the subordination of southern blacks in Union-controlled areas.⁶

Black scholars John Hope Franklin and Benjamin Quarles have recognized

both the pressures Lincoln faced and his ultimate commitment to freedom.

Franklin argues that the Proclamation was a military measure "first and fore-

most," but was also one that the President saw as an act of justice, one of

moral and humanitarian significance.⁷ For Quarles, military necessity was

the key factor, yet he maintains that Lincoln's views of blacks changed dra-

matically during the war. Lincoln recognized, says Quarles, his Proclamation

as "one of the most far-reaching pronouncements ever issued."⁸

In recent years an increasing number of scholars have endorsed the tradi-

tional belief that Lincoln had acted out of a sense of racial justice and had al-

ways been an abolitionist at heart, who, with his election in 1860, finally

found his chance to act. In this view, political considerations affected only

the timing of his decision for freedom. LaWanda Cox, Stephen Oates, and

James McPherson have viewed Lincoln as more of a new-school abolitionist.

To Cox, the President was motivated far more by moral principle than politi-

cal expediency. The President's messages revealed a fervor for emancipation

 

 

4. V. Jacque Voegeli, Free But Not Equal: The Midwest and the Negro During the Civil

War (Chicago, 1967), esp. 36-79.

5. James A. Rawley, "The Emancipation Proclamation," in Turning Points of the Civil War

(Lincoln, 1966), 119-43; Rawley, The Politics of Union: Northern Politics During the Civil War

(Lincoln, 1974), 79-80.

6. Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New

York, 1956), passim; Louis Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward

Southern Blacks, 1861-1865 (Westport, 1973), passim, esp. 3-7.

7. John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation (Garden City, 1963), 126, 138.

8. Benjamin Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro (New York, 1962), 135-52.

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Friends of Freedom                                                     87

 

and moved "toward an active commitment to equality."⁹ Similarly, Oates

agrees that the Proclamation went further than anything Congress had done; it

was "the most revolutionary measure ever to come from an American presi-

dent to that time." The President, says Oates, continued his efforts by sup-

porting ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment which removed all limita-

tions on emancipation. To McPherson, Lincoln's proclamation "announced a

revolutionary new war aim-the overthrow of slavery by force of arms," one

which the President reached only reluctantly. Once embraced, he pursued

what was "by far the most revolutionary dimension of the emancipation pol-

icy," the enlisting of black men to fight for their freedom.¹⁰

Thus the debate continues and revolves around the central question: What

moved the President-elect from a conservative emphasis on limited federal au-

thority in 1860 to the critical decisions of 1862 and 1863? Lincoln's silence

on who and what factors influenced him makes the historian's task more dif-

ficult in reaching definite conclusions. Pivotal to any answer is understand-

ing the role played by the President's advisers such as his rival and sometime

friend Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. Before the Civil War, Chase had

consistently been well ahead of Lincoln in the efforts to end slavery. An

early member of the Liberty party and a founder of the Free Soil party, Chase

had advocated the divorce of the central government from responsibility for

preserving slavery. While stopping short of outright abolition instituted by

federal action, he nevertheless helped lead the new Republican party toward its

strong containment policy in the mid 1850s. Chase's stance was in part a

device to advance his own political career. His election as Ohio governor in

1855 was above all a means to achieve a Republican presidential nomination

in either 1856 or 1860. Still, he possessed a commitment to antislavery

shared by few others throughout the 1840s and 1850s.¹¹

The first direct contact between Lincoln and Chase had come during the

summer of 1858 when the Ohio governor came to Illinois to campaign for

Lincoln in the latter's efforts to unseat Senator Stephen A. Douglas. Chase's

visit was especially appreciated by Lincoln, for as he put it, Chase "gave us

sympathy in 1858 when scarcely any other distinguished man did."¹² Yet it

 

9. LaWanda Cox, Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership

(Columbia, 1987), esp. 3-43.

10. Stephen B. Oates, "Lincoln's Journey to Emancipation," in Our Fiery Trial: Abraham

Lincoln, John Brown and the Civil War Era (Amherst, 1979), 61-85; James McPherson,

Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York, 1990), 34-35.

11. For Chase's antislavery philosophy with its emphasis on the denationalization of slavery

see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party

Before the Civil War (New York, 1970), 73-102. For a study of Chase's wartime efforts

against slavery see Louis S. Gerteis, "Salmon P. Chase, Radicalism and the Politics of

Emancipation, 1861-1864," Journal of American History, 60 (June, 1973), 42-62. For his

overall career see Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase: A Life in Politics (Kent, 1987).

12. Lincoln to Samuel Galloway, July 28, March 24, 1860, Roy P. Basler, (ed.), The

Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, 1953), 3:394-95, 4:33-34.

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88                                                     OHIO HISTORY

 

was clear early in their relationship that the Ohioan was more radical ideolog-

ically on the slave issue than Lincoln. When, in 1859, at Chase's insistence

the Ohio Republican platform called for repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act of

1850, Lincoln urged him not to propose such a plank in the national party

platform in 1860 because if it were adopted "the cause of Republicanism in

Illinois would be hopeless." Moreover, Lincoln pointed out, Congress was

authorized by the Constitution to enact such a law. Chase had earlier argued

that Republicans must oppose the act "because it is universally harsh and se-

vere and almost absolutely useless as a practical matter of reclamation."¹3

Thus even before Lincoln assumed the Presidency the two had disagreed on

party strategy and ideology.

Lincoln's nomination in May, 1860, while denying Chase his long-sought

goal, did not preclude the Ohioan's strong support of his party's candidate.

Again, as in 1858, he campaigned extensively for the Illinoisan. In July,

1860, with an eye on a position in a Lincoln cabinet, yet with obvious sin-

cerity, he told a friend: "Mr. Lincoln has my hearty and cordial support and

his administration will have it likewise." At this point the two men agreed

that the federal government could not interfere with slavery in states where it

was legal. He assured Ohio and Kentucky audiences that a Lincoln adminis-

tration would bring no interference with slavery because his party opposed

"hostile aggression upon the Constitutional rights of any state."¹⁴ Chase

was overjoyed with Lincoln's election. In congratulating the winner, he

noted: "The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years is ac-

complished in the overthrow of the Slave Power." The way was "now clear

for the establishment of the policy of Freedom on safe and firm ground." Yet

as he reminded Lincoln, "the lead is now yours. The responsibility is

vast."¹⁵

With Chase's appointment to be Treasury Secretary, the two men main-

tained a supportive, cordial relationship at first, and for a time Chase appeared

to be the model of moderation on slave-related issues. He even defended the

President against those who demanded immediate abolition. As he explained

later: "Until long after Sumter I clung to my old ideas of non-interference

with slavery within state limits." While he did not question that the

government might destroy slavery in time of war, "I only doubted the ex-

 

 

 

 

13. Lincoln to Chase, June 9, 1859, Chase to Lincoln, June 13, 1859, Lincoln Papers,

Library of Congress (hereafter cited as LC); Lincoln to Chase, June 20, 1859, in Basler (ed.),

Collected Works, 3:386.

14. Chase to James Briggs, July 14, 1860, Chase Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania

(hereafter cited as HSP); Ohio State Journal, (Columbus), June 18, Nov. 15, 1860.

15. Chase to Lincoln, Nov. 7, 1860, in Robert B. Warden, An Account of the Private Life

and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase (Cincinnati, 1874), 364.

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Friends of Freedom                                                     89

 

pediency of the exercise."¹⁶ At the same time, Lincoln was aware of the

danger of precipitous action against slavery and that the inclusion of Chase in

his cabinet was not universally popular. A Pennsylvania supporter told him

that Chase's appointment was "an outrage" because those who had voted for

Lincoln had not supposed "they were voting for an Abolitionist."

Throughout the war the President would have to walk a narrow line between

those opposed to abolition and those demanding it. No such restraints would

confine Chase. Friends like Congressman James M. Ashley were soon urg-

ing him to do what he could "to bring about the emancipation of every

slave."¹⁷ With the two men holding different agendas, it remained to be seen

whether Chase could influence the President to move toward an abolition po-

sition.

Chase restrained himself through the remainder of 1861, believing that the

President was gradually coming to his views. When Lincoln rescinded the

order of John C. Fremont freeing slaves of rebels in his Missouri command,

Chase endorsed the President, albeit reluctantly. This was despite strong

support of Fremont from many of Chase's correspondents. Privately he had

urged the President to sustain Fremont's action, but publicly he remained

loyal. As he reminded a Kentucky friend, the Administration had no "desire

to convert this war for the Union . . . into a war upon any State institution."

Still, he could not resist adding that he could not imagine that a civil war

could continue much longer "without harm to slavery."¹⁸

A similar step in the spring of 1862 by General David Hunter in freeing

slaves in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina brought the first open signs of

disagreement between Lincoln and Chase. Within Hunter's command Union

armies had earlier taken control of the Port Royal-Sea Islands area of South

Carolina. When the Treasury assumed responsibility over slaves there,

Chase's direct involvement in the issue was guaranteed. In his move against

slavery, Hunter had been motivated by military need and intended to enlist

those emancipated, a policy Chase heartily endorsed. The Secretary therefore

urged Lincoln to recognize that Hunter's order was a military measure de-

 

 

 

16. Chase to Benjamin F. Butler, June 24, 1862, in Jacob W. Schuckers, The Life and Public

Services of Salmon Portland Chase (New York, 1874), 375-76.

17. Anonymous to Lincoln, Jan. 16, 1861, in David C. Mearns, The Lincoln Papers: The

Story of the Collection With Selections to July 4, 1861 (Garden City, 1948), 405; Ashley to

Chase, May 4, 1861, Chase Papers, LC.

18. I. M. Ganson to Chase, Sep. 17, 1861, J. M. McCullough to Chase, Sep. 17, 1861, Chase

Papers, LC; George Hoadly to Chase, Sep. 18, 1861, Richard Smith to Chase, Nov. 7, 1861, in

Edward G. Bourne et. al., (eds.) "Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase," in The

Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1902, Vol. 2 (Washington, 1903), 503-

05, 508-09; Edward Bates, Oct. 22, 1861, in Howard K. Beale, (ed.), The Diary of Edward

Bates, 1859-1866, in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1930,

Vol. 4 (Washington, 1933), 198; Chase to Green Adams, Sep. 5, 1861, in Schuckers, Chase,

428-29.

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90                                                     OHIO HISTORY

 

signed to meet the need for troops. He argued that it should be allowed "to

stand upon the responsibility of the commanding general who made it."¹⁹

In rescinding Hunter's order, Lincoln emphasized that decisions affecting

slaves were his alone. He tersely informed Chase that "no commanding gen-

eral shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me."

He affirmed that declaring slaves free was a question which "I reserve to my-

self, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of comman-

ders in the field."²⁰ The President was not yet ready to make the move that

many in his party were seeking. Fearing the loss of border slave state loyalty

and the alienation of much moderate and conservative northern public opin-

ion, he would not let a general or a cabinet secretary force his hand. For

Chase, the President's action was deeply disappointing. He told Horace

Greeley that nothing "had so sorely tried" him as "the nullifying of Hunter's

proclamation." Still, Hunter had moved emancipation one step closer, Chase

believed, and he rejoiced that some progress had been made. He told Greeley

to "be thankful for skim milk when one cant get cream."²¹

Despite the setback, Chase did not relent in his efforts to secure emancipa-

tion through the actions of generals in the field. By early 1862, he had con-

cluded that this was the best way to free the slaves. He pointed out to

Lincoln that emancipation by federal action could be justified on the grounds

of military necessity, and that the commanders in the field were in the best

position to recognize the need for black troop support. They alone should be

allowed "to organize and arm the slaves."²²

While attempting to persuade Lincoln to adopt this approach, he quietly

urged at least one general to do so without presidential authorization. In cor-

respondence with General Benjamin F. Butler, the commander in

Union-occupied New Orleans, he encouraged the efforts to free slaves and en-

list them in his army, because not to do so was to contribute to "the contin-

ued subjugation of nearly four million loyal people."²³ Especially after

Congress authorized the seizure of slaves of those in rebellion and their use in

a military capacity, was he convinced of the need for generals to act.

Although Butler consistently refused to develop an emancipation policy in

Louisiana, Chase learned that he had begun to form a black regiment. The

Secretary urged him to pursue such efforts without worrying "whether the re-

cruit was a slave or not." In early August, he reminded Major General John

 

 

19. Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 15, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC; Chase to Lincoln, May 16, 1862, in

Warden, Chase, 433-34; Chase to Horace Greeley, May 21, 1862, Chase Papers, HSP.

20. Lincoln to Chase, May 17, 1862, Lincoln, Proclamation, May 19, 1862, in Basler (ed.),

Collected Works, 5:219, 222-23.

21. Chase to Greeley, May 21, 1862, Chase Papers, HSP.

22. Chase, Diary, July 22, 1862, in David Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil

War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1954), 99.

23. Chase to Butler, June 24, 1862, in Schuckers, Chase, 375-76.

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Friends of Freedom                                                     91

 

Pope, commander of the Army of Virginia, "that no man loyal to the Union

can be a slave."²⁴ But even as Chase continued these efforts Lincoln had

concluded to move against slavery with a presidential proclamation.

Lincoln never explained what moved him to inform his cabinet on July 22,

1862, that he was prepared to use his authority as commander-in-chief to

emancipate slaves in rebel states behind Confederate lines. Chase's efforts

and arguments appear to have been among the more important influences. By

then the Port Royal experiment under Treasury Department direction was well

under way. Initiated in late 1861 at a time when there was little support for

it from the cabinet or president, Chase nevertheless had achieved his goal of

emancipation in a small experimental area.²⁵ In February, 1862, Lincoln had

authorized Chase to direct Boston abolitionist Edward Pierce to take the

necessary steps "in regard to Port Royal contraband as may seem judicious."

Although direction of the effort was soon given to the War Department and

although the program never proceeded as smoothly as Chase and Pierce had

hoped, what the Secretary referred to as a "social experiment" in emancipation

and land distribution did bring significant changes in the lives of the blacks

affected. Chase knew that by then Lincoln was considering a general emanci-

pation policy and thus to allow it at Port Royal might accelerate the whole

process. Chase complained that what had been achieved had occurred "not

withstanding the sneers of some of the members of the Cabinet"; yet the

President could not help but be influenced by its impact.²⁶

The pressure from radical leaders of the Republican party had also affected

Lincoln. Frederick Douglass urged immediate emancipation and Secretary of

War Edwin M. Stanton had moved toward Chase's position. Several mem-

bers of the Senate, especially Charles Sumner, had the ear of the President

and they had endorsed immediate emancipation.²⁷ They, along with Chase,

argued that foreign, especially British, neutrality could be assured by a strike

against slavery. Chase had suggested that had Lincoln upheld General

Hunter's order his action would have been approved "by more than

 

 

24. Butler to Chase, Oct. 22, 1862, Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Butler, Sep. 23, 1862, Jesse

A. Marshall (ed.), Private and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler During

the Period of the Civil War, 5 vols. (Norwood, Mass., 1917), 2:324; Chase to Pope, Aug. 1,

1862, in Schuckers, Chase, 378-79.

25. For Chase's and the Treasury Department's role see Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal For

Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment (Indianapolis, 1964), passim.

26. Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 15, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC; Chase to Pierce, Aug. 2, 1862,

Chase Papers, HSP.

27. Douglass's influence is best outlined in Benjamin Quarles, Frederick Douglass

(Washington, 1948), 186-202 and David W. Blight, Frederick Douglass' Civil War: Keeping

Faith in Jubilee (Baton Rouge, 1989), passim. For Stanton's position see Benjamin P. Thomas

and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York,

1962), 230-50. Sumner's friendship with and influence on Lincoln is dealt with in David

Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York, 1970), passim.

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92                                                        OHIO HISTORY

 

nine-tenths of the people."²⁸ While Lincoln knew this to be an exaggeration

and while he had constantly to consider the opinions of those adverse to

emancipation, the feelings of Chase and other similar Republicans did have

the desired effect.

In cabinet discussions during the summer of 1862 Chase had endorsed a

presidential proclamation even as he noted his preference for emancipation be-

ing initiated by generals in the field. He had told Robert Dale Owen that he

was so convinced of the need for action that "I am comparatively indifferent

as to the mode." Having heard cabinet views on a proclamation in July, by

early fall Lincoln was ready to make his position public. Thus on September

22, he informed the members of his decision. To this Chase responded that

while the Proclamation did not "mark out exactly the course I should myself

prefer" he was "ready to take it just as it is written and to stand by it with all

my heart."²⁹

Still, there were parts of the President's policy that Chase did not like but

was unable to change. The Secretary could not move the President to revoke

the policy of exempting parts of Confederate states behind Union lines from

inclusion in the emancipation plan. Chase even prepared a draft to remove

the exceptions, but to no avail. He had also sought to have emancipation go

into effect immediately rather than delaying it until the beginning of 1863.

Again Lincoln rejected the suggestion.³⁰

Even before Lincoln's emancipation announcement, Chase had begun com-

plaining privately that his advice was rarely listened to by the President and

that Lincoln infrequently consulted the cabinet as a group. The latter com-

plaint bears some merit, for the President frequently preferred to consult with

the individual secretary directly responsible for a particular policy rather than

the group as a whole. Just prior to the issuance of the Preliminary

Proclamation Chase told Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan that there

was "no cabinet except in name." Although they did meet "now and then ...

no reports are made, no regular discussions held." By then Chase's differ-

ences with Lincoln over other issues had intensified to the point where the

Secretary was beginning to question his own usefulness in the cabinet. Still,

as federal emancipation began the Secretary was satisfied that in that area of

policy-making his influence was still substantial. It appeared to Chase that

the President was "approaching the same conclusions" as his.³¹

 

 

28. Chase to Lincoln, May 16, 1862, in Warden, Chase, 433-34.

29. Chase to Owen, Sep. 20, 1862, in Schuckers, Chase, 379; Chase, Diary, Sep. 22, 1862,

in Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet, 150-52.

30. Chase, Diary, July 22, Sep. 22, 1862, Aug. 29, 1863, in Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's

Cabinet, 99, 150-52, 178-79.

31. Chase to Chandler, Sep. 20, 1862, Chase to James Hamilton, July 15, 1862, Chase

Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society; Chase to John Sherman, Sep. 20, 1862, Sherman Papers,

LC; Chase to George Denison, Sep. 8, 1862, Chase Papers, HSP.

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Friends of Freedom                                        93

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94                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

Chase had a further opportunity to forward the emancipation process when

the western counties of Virginia sought separate statehood. The region had

been part of the seceded state and because it was Union controlled had been

exempted from Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation. In December, 1862,

Congress approved the request for West Virginia statehood, and the President

asked his cabinet for written opinions on the bill's constitutionality and ex-

pediency. The constitutional question involved the requirement that a new

state could not be created from within an existing one without that state's

concurrence. The cabinet was divided on the issue with Chase siding with

Stanton and Secretary of State William H. Seward in favor of admission. He

took the highly debatable position that the legislature in Wheeling was "the

only legal and constitutional government," for in a case of insurrection

"where a large body of the people remain faithful," it "must be taken to con-

stitute the State." Most important, the proposed state had agreed to the grad-

ual abolition of slavery, a critical factor in his argument that admission was

expedient. When Lincoln gave his reluctant consent to the bill on December

31, Chase could rejoice that he had been instrumental in expanding the eman-

cipation process to an area not originally included.³²

When the cabinet considered the final wording of Lincoln's Proclamation,

Chase tried again to remove some of the exemptions from those areas to be

affected. He argued strenuously to include all of Louisiana and Virginia rather

than exempting those areas originally behind Union lines. Again he stressed

the military assistance freedmen could provide, saying that the fastest way to

end the war was with the assistance of loyal southerners "of whatever com-

plexion." Pointing to black enlistments already occurring in Louisiana and

South Carolina, he noted that military reasons justified expanding emancipa-

tion's coverage. Moreover, said the Secretary, in much of the excluded area,

the rebels "are yet in substantial control."³³ Try as he might, however, on

this point he made little headway in persuading the President to his point of

view.

Lincoln remained convinced that the military necessity argument would not

hold up constitutionally in Union-occupied areas of the Confederacy. A year

later the President again explained his unwillingness to accept Chase's rea-

soning. "The exemptions," he said, were made "because the military neces-

sity did not apply to the exempted localities. Nor does that necessity apply

to them now any more than it did then." Again he pointed out the danger of

losing the support of loyal border areas which had not yet accepted emancipa-

tion. The loyalty of such states as Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri re-

 

 

32. Lincoln to Cabinet, Dec. 23, 1862, in Basler (ed.), Collected Works, 5:17, 17n.: Chase to

Sumner, n.d., Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Lincoln, Dec. 29, 1862, in Schuckers, Chase, 459-61.

33. Chase to Lincoln, Dec. 31, 1862, in Schuckers, Chase, 461-63; Chase to Lincoln, Nov.

25, 1863, Lincoln Papers, LC.

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Friends of Freedom                                                  95

 

mained critical to the President's military and political strategy, and he dared

not take a precipitous action which might force them to join the Confederacy.

Asked Lincoln, would not such action alienate Union supporters? "Would it

not lose us the elections, and with them the very cause we seek to ad-

vance?"³⁴ There were thus clear limits to how far the President would bend

in the face of Chase's moral arguments.

The Secretary did have some input in the final wording of the Proclamation

agreed to in the cabinet in late December. The concluding paragraph was in

part Chase's doing. At his suggestion the Proclamation was described as "an

act of justice, warrantable by the Constitution upon military necessity" and

invoking "the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of

Almighty God."³⁵ More importantly, the document urged the recruitment of

freedmen into Union armies, thus expanding upon the policy already approved

in limited areas of the Confederacy. Progress had been slow toward this goal,

but with Lincoln's official endorsement the recruiting efforts would soon be

systematized and would bring more positive results. Chase, who had argued

for such a policy for several months, was satisfied that his voice had been

heard by the President. On the issue of black troops Chase appears to have

had more influence than on emancipation itself. Now he rejoiced that blacks

would "be called into the conflict, not as cattle . . . but as men." He also

urged that they be used in all varieties of military effort, for in this way,

"from a burden they will become a support."³⁶

Chase and Lincoln had thus reached an accommodation satisfactory to both

on racial issues. There had been many critical factors in Lincoln's decision,

but among them was the constant pressure from the Treasury Secretary.

Chase later assured Horace Greeley that the President had moved "slowly but

yet advances." Said the Secretary, "when one thinks of the short time, and

immense distance, in the matter of personal Freedom, between the 1st of

March 1861 and the 1st of October 1863 the progressives cannot be dissatis-

fied with results." Chase believed that he was at least in part responsible for

Lincoln's advance.³⁷ Long before this the differences between the two on

political issues had intensified, but in this most crucial area, Chase's influ-

ence had prevailed to a remarkable degree.

The remaining months of the war were for Chase both encouraging and

disheartening. Relations with Lincoln deteriorated until the President finally

 

34. Lincoln to Chase, Sep. 2, 1863, in Basler (ed.), Collected Works, 6:428-29.

35. Chase to Lincoln, Dec. 31, 1862, in Schuckers, Chase, 461-63; Gideon Welles, Diary,

Dec. 28, 1862, in Howard K. Beale, (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy

Under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. (New York, 1960), 1:209; James B. Richardson, (ed.), A

Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 vols. (New York, 1897), 7:3358-

60.

36. Chase to New York City Loyal National League, Apr. 9, 1863, Lincoln Papers, LC; See

also Albert B. Hart, Salmon P. Chase (Boston, 1899), 291-92.

37. Chase to Greeley, Oct. 9, 1863, Chase Papers, HSP.

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96                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

accepted his resignation in June, 1864. By then, the abortive efforts of Chase

and his supporters to deny Lincoln renomination had been exposed. Lincoln

had long tolerated Chase's political machinations, feeling that his advice on

racial and financial matters was essential and that he was less of a political

threat to him in the cabinet than outside it. Chase, blinded by his own polit-

ical ambitions, had failed to understand Lincoln's strategy and instead was

convinced that he was indispensable to the Administration. Yet even in these

months of Chase's declining influence on and usefulness to the President, his

input on issues related to slaves and freedmen was heard and respected by

Lincoln.

Although Chase made no headway in convincing Lincoln to expand the

Proclamation to the exempted areas, in another aspect of emancipation policy

the two men did come to an agreement. During the one-hundred day period

between the Preliminary and final Proclamation Lincoln had urged cabinet en-

dorsement of his colonization proposal and of a Constitutional amendment

which would have included compensation and gradual emancipation. Chase

had consistently opposed these limitations and had helped to convince

Lincoln that because there was "no probability" that such an amendment

could win approval, its rejection would further weaken the Administration.³⁸

As the war continued to take its bloody toll and as the loyal border states re-

mained unwilling to consider his emancipation proposals, the President fi-

nally abandoned his colonization efforts and endorsed an amendment freeing

all slaves immediately. In 1864, he even insisted that the Republican plat-

form endorse such a proposal and in the fall he interpreted his reelection as a

mandate to complete the emancipation process. While still in the cabinet

Chase had endorsed the proposed amendment since the offending compensa-

tion and gradual features had been removed. He exclaimed to Gerrit Smith

that such a revision "would be an era in the world's history." As Lincoln

pushed ahead in the winter of 1864-65 to pressure the House into approving

the amendment, newly appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice Chase could

only marvel when, after House approval on January 13, 1865, the President

pronounced it a "great moral victory.^"39

Long before House approval Chase had been urging the President to move

on another front of racial justice, the granting of black suffrage. Shortly be-

fore leaving office he had complained to Horace Greeley that blacks "may

fight but must not vote, may use bullets but not ballots."⁴⁰ His degree of

success toward this goal is the subject of another study, but there can be little

doubt that he had played an important role in moving the President from a

conservative to advanced position on racial issues in general and the emanci-

 

38. Chase to Lincoln, Nov. 28, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.

39. Chase to Smith, Mar. 2, 1864, in Schuckers, Chase, 399-400; Lincoln, Response to

Serenade, Feb. 1, 1865, in Basler, (ed.), Collected Works, 8:254-55.

40. Chase to Greeley, Mar. 4, 1864, Chase Papers, HSP.

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Friends of Freedom                                             97

 

pation policy in particular. The President's hesitation throughout had not

been so much a resistance to racial equality as it was his recognition of the

political realities. Those historians who emphasize Lincoln's recognition of

the moral implications of his policies are more accurate than those who have

stressed his expediency. Chase, on the other hand, was more willing to take

political risks to achieve his goals. He revealed a fuller moral commitment

to equality than the President but a poorer understanding of the political rami-

fications.

On resigning as Treasury Secretary, Chase summed up his frustrations with

Lincoln: "He was slow and reluctant in coming to the conclusion that all

loyal men in rebel states ought to be free and should be organized for armed

defense of themselves and the Union."⁴¹ Yet a month after his reelection the

President appointed Chase Chief Justice. Many factors contributed to the

President's decision, among them being "Mr. C's ability" and his "soundness

on the general issues of the war." As Lincoln explained to a friend, "We have

stood together in the time of trial."⁴² Equally important, the President could

expect that the new Chief Justice would provide judicial approval of the many

changes that the Civil War had brought. Chief among those changes was

emancipation. It had surely occurred to Lincoln that a court challenge of the

constitutionality of his Proclamation might jeopardize what had become a

central part of his wartime strategy. What better way to assure its approval

than to make the man who had urged him so strongly to free the slaves the

head of the court which might have to rule on its legality.

Throughout the war Chase's constant pressure on Lincoln had helped push

the reluctant President in a direction which he may not at first have wanted to

go. Unfortunately, due to Lincoln's silence on the issue, speculation will

always swirl around the question of Lincoln's motives and influences. Surely

there were many other factors in his decision for emancipation and black

troop recruitment, but without Chase's urging from within the cabinet the

President's policy would undoubtedly have emerged more slowly and in a

more modified form. Still, there were differences. To Chase the war had al-

ways been a means to his goal of emancipation, whereas to Lincoln emanci-

pation and the use of black troops had initially been the means to a restora-

tion of the Union. To the degree that Lincoln modified those views during

the war, Salmon P. Chase can rightfully claim at least some of the credit.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

41. Chase to Frank Howe, July 8, 1864, Chase Papers, HSP.

42. Lincoln to Augustus Frank, in David Hughes, "Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice" (Ph.D.

dissertation, Princeton Univ., 1963), 53-54.

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