MARK PITCAVAGE
"Burthened in Defence of our Rights":
Opposition to Military Service in Ohio
During the War of 1812
The War of 1812 has long been famous as
a war to which substantial op-
position existed in the United States.
The nearness of the Congressional vote
over the declaration of war, the refusal
of several New England states to pro-
vide militia for the invasion of Canada,
and the Hartford Convention in 1814
are all notable examples of the degree
to which the nation divided over the is-
sue of war with Great Britain.
Unfortunately, these incidents have led
historians to concentrate on the po-
litical opposition to the War of 1812,
viewing it as the natural outgrowth of
the Federalist-Republican battles of the
early national period. Because
Federalists so vocally opposed the war,
they receive attention at the expense
of other groups, and New England, that
bastion of Federalism, receives atten-
tion at the expense of the rest of the
country. The danger of concentrating
solely on political issues is that the
effects of the war itself on American
communities-and thus public
opinion-might be overlooked.1
This article examines the opposition to
military service that arose in Ohio
during the course of the War of 1812,
the nature of that opposition, and its ef-
fects. Along with Kentucky and
Tennessee, Ohio (dominated by Jeffersonian
Republicans) was one of the western
states which cried out for war in 1811
and 1812, and whose citizens flocked to
the colors when war appeared immi-
nent. As the war dragged on, however,
Ohioans became less enthusiastic
Mark Pitcavage would like to thank Allan
R. Millett, Joan E. Cashin, Mark Grimsley, and
Virginia Boynton for their advice and
assistance in writing this article. Any errors are his own.
1. Of the standard scholarly histories
of the war, the two which provide most coverage of
opposition to the war are Donald R.
Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana,
Ill, 1989), and J. C. A. Stagg, Mr.
Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the
Early American Republic, 1783-1830, (Princeton, N.J., 1983). John K. Mahon, The War of
1812, (Gainesville, Fla, 1972), provides some information.
Recent specific studies of opposi-
tion include Edward Bryan,
"Patterns of Dissent: Vermont's Opposition to the War of 1812,"
Vermont History, 40 (Winter 1972), 10-27; Sarah M. Lemmon, "Dissent
in North Carolina
During the War of 1812," North
Carolina Historical Review, 49 (Spring 1972), 103-18: Myron
F. Wehtje, "Opposition in Virginia
to the War of 1812," Virginia Magazine of History, 78
(January 1970), 65-86; and Ellen P.
Hoffman, "Unnecessary, Unjustified and Ruinous: Anti-
war Rhetoric in Massachusetts Federalist
Newspapers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Massachusetts, 1984).
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights
143
about performing the military service
required to conduct the war. Opposition
to service in the militia took three
forms. The first substantial opposition
arose in communities along the frontier
that feared Indian attack and the con-
sequences of sending their men away from
their homes and families. The
second type of opposition came from
communities and individuals that felt
they were bearing a greater part of the
burden of the war than their neighbors.
The third type, arising only late in the
war, took the form of a general war-
weariness characterized by considerable
desertions and mass refusals to serve.
It was only in this last phase of
opposition that Federalist propaganda had any
discernible impact.2
The Exposed Frontier
The initial response on the part of
Ohioans to military service was largely
positive. Ohio Governor Return Jonathan
Meigs and Michigan Territorial
Governor William Hull, commissioned a
major general in the U.S. Army,
had few problems assembling 1,200 troops
in the spring and summer of 1812
to march to Detroit. Indeed, a larger
army could have been raised, but was not
2. As militia historian Jerry Cooper has
noted, until recently most scholars who have exam-
ined the militia have followed the lead
of nineteenth century Army officer Emory Upton,
whose The Military Policy of the
United States (Washington, D.C., 1904) condemned the role
played in wartime by militia or
volunteers. These studies tend to focus on wartime use of the
militia and federal mobilization
efforts, and emphasize the value of the Regular Army as op-
posed to the poor performance of militia
units; see Cooper, The Militia and the National Guard
in America Since Colonial Times: A
Research Guide (Westport, Conn, 1993),
13-17, 51-56.
While historians of colonial America
have examined the militia in a variety of social, religious,
economic, and ideological contexts,
those studying the militia of the early republic have gen-
erally followed Uptonian themes. Thus
Richard Kohn examines the failure of efforts to give
the federal government greater control
over the militia in Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of
the Military Establishment in America
(New York, 1975), 73-90, 128-38, and
Lawrence
Delbert Cress explains the same failure
as a result of republican ideology in Citizens in Arms:
The Army and the Militia in American
Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel
Hill, N.C., 1982),
passim. John K. Mahon, in his History
of the Militia and the National Guard (New York, 1983),
provides the most balanced overall
depiction of the militia, including information on the state
level, but in The American Militia:
Decade of Decision, 1789-1800 (Jacksonville, Fla., 1960),
even he concentrates on the issue of
greater federal control over the militia. More understand-
ing of the social background of the
militia is Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The
Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865 (New York, 1973), 177-260. A satisfactory recent
overview of the militia system is
Kenneth Otis McCreedy, "Palladium of Liberty: The
American Militia System, 1815-1861"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, 1991). Specific studies of the
militia in the period 1789-1815 are quite rare, but see
Martin K. Gordon, "The Militia of
the District of Columbia, 1790-1815" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, George Washington
University, 1975); Jean M. Flynn, "South Carolina's
Compliance with the Militia Act of
1792," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 69 (January,
1968), 26-43; John K. Mahon, "The
Citizen Soldier in National Defense, 1789-1815,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California at Los Angeles, 1950); and Mark
Pitcavage, "Ropes of Sand:
Territorial Militias, 1801-12," Journal of the Early Republic, 31
(Winter, 1993), 481-500.
144 OHIO HISTORY
because it could not be supplied.
Ohioans were not just being patriotic, they
were being practical: a war against the
British, many assumed, would in turn
reduce the pressures Indians placed on
white settlers.3
Settlers' fears of Indians also provided
the first significant opposition to
military service in Ohio in the summer
and fall of 1812. People living along
the ill-defined
"frontier"-which ran from southwest Ohio north by northeast
towards Lake Erie-viewed with alarm the
prospect of stripping the frontier
of men capable of bearing arms by
sending them to Canada. Not surpris-
ingly, they wanted the state and
national governments to provide more protec-
tion, rather than less. Benjamin
Mortimer, minister to a mixed community
of Indians and whites, observed to
Governor Meigs that while fear of Indians
was one of the excuses used by those who
would rather stay at home, "a still
greater number are in fact under much
anxiety on this head, and represent to
themselves, that if during their
absence, an Indian war should break out ...
their families would be in great danger
of their lives."4
Similar sentiments came from a group of
Richland County settlers, self-
described "young enterprising
people who have brought our helpless families
to the gloomy wild." These families
would be left defenseless by a calling-
up of the militia, "exposed to the
brutal disposition of the merciless savages."
While the settlers realized their
services were needed, they felt that "yet the
calls of our tender wives and infants
ring louder in our ears than the calls of
consulted authority." A second
petition from Richland County asked for arms
and for release from having to perform
military service outside the county.5
Some settlers believed their work in
taming the frontier was service enough
to the state. Others added economic
arguments against military service. One
group of petitioners, for example,
hoping for release from militia duty, noted
that they were the economic mainstays of
both their families and of the fron-
tier community-families would suffer and
crops would fail if they were
called away. This would result in
"very flourishing townships in this
county" becoming entirely depopulated,
and fertile fields returning to a howl-
ing wilderness. The Indian threat would
increase the exodus, because the set-
tlers called out to militia service
would take most firearms from the commu-
nity. With the remaining settlers
without arms or ammunition, the petition-
ers asked, "what safety or what
refuge they can have other than to take to their
heals [sic] and clear out as fast
as possible ...."6
3. See Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 193-200,
on the raising of Hull's army. For more infor-
mation on the effect that poor relations
with Native Americans had on Ohioans, see James E.
Pallet, The Indian Menace in the Old
Northwest, 1809-12, (Columbus, 1959), passim.
4. Benjamin Mortimer to Return J. Meigs,
August 8, 1812, Reel 1, Frames 436-440, Return J.
Meigs, Jr. Papers, Microfilm Edition,
Ohio Historical Society.
5. Citizens of Richland county to Return
J. Meigs, August 17, 1812, September 4, 1812, Reel
1, Frames 509-10, and Reel 2, Frames
33-34, Ibid.
6. Petition to Return J. Meigs, June 17,
1812 (damaged), Reel 1, Frame 330, Ibid. In gen-
Burthened in Defense of our Rights 145 |
|
The news of Hull's shameful surrender of Detroit on August 16, 1812, which reached Ohio some days later, only increased the clamor for protection of the frontier, as settlers envisioned a horde of savage Indians descending upon their communities. Governor Meigs ordered frontier militia generals to take defensive measures, while armed citizens rushed to the frontiers in what one newspaper described as a "spontaneous and rapid" movement. Militia generals not on the frontier itself ordered units held in readiness to march in case of emergency. One such general, John S. Gano, also argued that no militia units should be sent to join the army, so that the frontier could be protected. The surrender of General James Winchester's Northwestern Army to the British in January 1813 only increased the concern about Indian at- tacks.7
eral, spelling and grammar have not been altered in this article, although in one or two in- stances slight punctuation has been added to enhance comprehension. 7. Ohio Centinel, September 23, 1812; Major General John S. Gano to Major Samuel McHenry, September 16, 1812, in "Selections from the Gano Papers, 1,"Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 15 (January-June, 1920), 1-105. |
146 OHIO
HISTORY
The pressure to protect the frontier
eventually led Meigs to adopt a general
policy of exempting frontier settlements
from militia drafts by allowing mili-
tia officers to except them from filling
divisional quotas. Exactly when this
practice began is not clear. One militia
general in 1815 claimed that Meigs
issued a general order in 1812 to that
effect. However, a letter to Meigs in
April 1813 which complained that
residents of Piqua, Ohio, were drafted to
serve 35 miles away (leaving their own
settlement exposed), and called for the
governor to exempt from draft militia
companies bordering on the frontier,
suggests such a policy was not yet in
place. It is likely that the practice was
more informal than formal, although the
state legislature, in its revision of
the militia laws passed February 9,
1813, gave the governor authority to ex-
empt the militia from frontier
settlements from being called into service and
to make any further provisions thought
necessary for the defense of the fron-
tier.8
Through 1813 and 1814, most frontier
settlements were not called upon to
fill militia quotas for service away
from their communities, but Thomas
Worthington questioned the practice when
he became governor in late 1814.
Concerned about the defense of the
frontiers of Ohio (as well as Indiana and
Illinois), Worthington proposed to
Secretary of War James Monroe in
November 1814 a plan of defense arguing
for, among other things, the divi-
sion of frontier militia regiments into
six classes, each to serve as minutemen
(militia ready for immediate call-up)
for two months, to meet every week for
drill, but to be exempt from all other
militia duties. This measure, he argued,
Ohio had already substantially adopted.
Actually, the state had adopted no
such measures, though Worthington
desired them. In any event, the federal
government did not adopt the suggestions
before the war's end.9
In early 1815 Worthington ended the
policy of absolutely exempting fron-
tier militia units from duty outside
their settlements, because he believed the
exemption promoted a decay of the
militia in those areas. He could obtain
relatively little information about the
condition of the frontier militia, be-
8. Colonel John Moore to Thomas
Worthington, February 27, 1815, Reel 9, Frames 711-717,
Thomas Worthington Papers, Microfilm
Edition, OHS; John Johnston to Meigs, April 8, 1813,
Reel 3, Frames 325-326, RJM Papers, OHS;
Chapter 43, Section 39, "An Act for Disciplining
the Militia," February 9, 1813, Acts
Passed at the First Session of the Eleventh General
Assembly of the State of Ohio. Later complaints by Johnston indicate that the problem
existed-
at least near Piqua-through the end of
1814, and also give further evidence of the informality
of the practice. One militia general
drew an exemption line through his division's territory, ex-
empting all outside of it. However, the
officer's successor allowed no exemptions for militia
drafts. See Johnston to Othniel Looker,
May 12, 1814 and October 7, 1814, Reel 1, Frames 69-
71 and 229-231, Othniel Looker Papers,
Microfilm Edition, OHS.
9. Worthington to James Monroe, November
21, 1814, in Journal of the House of
Representatives of the State of Ohio,
Thirteenth General Assembly, 116-18;
Thomas
Worthington to Isaac Van Horn, February
4, 1815, Reel 1, Frame 23, Letters from the
Executive of Ohio, Executive Letterbooks Microfilm Edition (hereafter
abbreviated as LEO),
OHS.
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights 147
cause militia returns were infrequent at
this late stage of the conflict, and be-
cause those few returns available were
in the possession of his adjutant gen-
eral, who lived in Zanesville, a
considerable distance from the capital city of
Chillicothe. Worthington eventually sent
a subordinate around to the various
regiments to ascertain their condition
and the number of weapons they had,
with a view to reorganizing the frontier
defenses (and in February appointed a
new adjutant general).10
Worthington's plan was essentially the
one that he had suggested to
Monroe was already in operation: "I
think it probable, I shall exempt all the
Battalions, immediately on the frontier
. . . and organize them into minute
men, for their own immediate
defence." However, the news of peace took
away much of the necessity for such
actions. As a result, many frontier
communities successfully avoided most of
the militia duty with which other
parts of the states had to comply.1l
An Equal Burden
While frontier communities protested the
calling away of their men for mil-
itary service, people elsewhere in Ohio
protested that they were being called
upon to provide an unequal share of
military manpower. Like the settlers on
the frontier, these protesters were
generally in agreement about the justness of
the war, and represented themselves as
being willing to serve. But they cast
envious eyes at other communities whom
they felt were called upon less of-
ten for troops.
Because Ohio had for some time been on a
hostile frontier, where the pos-
sibility of military service was
considerable, its lawmakers had designed the
state's militia laws in such a way as to
spread the burden of such service as
equally as possible among the
population. Unlike many other states, Ohio's
militia laws dictated two methods of
military organization that both comple-
mented and contradicted each other. The
militia throughout the state were di-
vided into standard military units of
divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions,
and companies. But except for the
hypothetical case of a general invasion of
Ohio, in which the whole militia could
be called out to defend the state, the
divisions in practice existed as
administrative units. The second form of or-
ganization occurred at the company
level. According to law, militia captains
each divided their companies into eight
distinct groups or classes. When the
governor or high-ranking officers acting
on his orders ordered a militia draft,
10. Colonel John Moore to Thomas
Worthington, February 27, 1815, Reel 9, Frames 711-
717, Worthington Papers, OHS.
11. Thomas Worthington to John Johnston,
February 18, 1815, Reel 1, Frames 29-30, LEO,
OHS; Chapter 54, Section 43, "An
Act for Organizing and Disciplining the Militia," February
14, 1815, Acts Passed, Thirteenth
General Assembly.
148 OHIO HISTORY
the first class of each affected company
would be ordered into service. The
next tour of duty required would fall
upon members of the second class, and
so forth. The only exception to the
principle that every ablebodied man
would perform his share of the duty was
a provision that allowed men to pro-
cure substitutes for themselves.12
Not surprisingly, it proved impossible
in practice to insure an equitable dis-
tribution of military service, which
caused resentment among communities
that perceived others were not
performing their fair share. Conscientious ob-
jectors-primarily Quakers and
Shakers-formed the most visible target for
resentment. Many other states had long
since listed members of the two sects
among their standard exemptions to
military service, but Ohio had not done
so, although the 1809 militia law did
allow those "conscientiously scrupu-
lous" of bearing arms to avoid
service by purchasing a certificate for $3.50.
But the state legislature denied the
petition of Shakers from Warren County
who wanted to perform work on the
highways instead of doing military duty
in 1811. A legislative committee
reported that it would be "inauspicious" to
interfere with the militia system during
a time of crisis; that granting exemp-
tions to Shakers might cause Quakers,
Mennonites, and other denominations
to claim exemptions as well; and that,
perhaps most importantly, "even the
present applicants themselves in another
memorial . . . spurn the thought of
having any distinction made between them
and our other citizens."13
The outbreak of war increased the
determination among Ohioans that
Shakers and Quakers should do their fair
share. The 1809 provision for ex-
empting conscientious objectors for a
fee fell by the wayside in the revisions
to the militia laws over the winter of
1812-13. An amendment in the House
to exclude all conscientious objectors
from duty failed by a vote of forty-
seven to three. A committee on Quakers
the same day recommended no ex-
emptions, even partial, from militia
duty for the conscientiously scrupulous,
because it was "improper at the
present momentous crisis to lessen the effec-
tive force of the state." The
committee must have known, of course, that a
force of Quakers was hardly an effective
force (officers as early as August
1812 reported that Quakers would not
serve if called on to do so), but they
could not easily let some groups avoid
military service while others did their
duty. "The Quakers are flanking
about us, pleading for exceptions," com-
plained one lawmaker who wished that
Congress would take the problem of
exemptions out of the hands of the
states. The legislature held firm, however:
no conscientious objectors were excused
by law from duty or paying fines for
the remainder of the war.14
12. Chapter 1, Sections 30-40, "An
Act for Disciplining the Militia," February 14, 1809, Acts
Passed, Seventh General Assembly.
13. Ohio House Journal, Eleventh
General Assembly, January 11, 1812, 175.
14. Ohio House Journal, Eleventh
General Assembly, February 2, 1813, 224-29; Colonel
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights
149
After the initial outbreak of support
for the war, the burden of military ser-
vice was not borne very
enthusiastically. Although the officers of his de-
tachment were cheerful, wrote one
militia general to his superior in
September 1812, "the privates are
like all other militia, uneasy and many de-
sirous of returning home and it will be
with the greatest difficulty that they
can be induced satisfactorily to remain
in the service two weeks." A year
later, after American victories leading
to the recapture of Detroit in September
1813 and the Battle of the Thames in
October, respectively, a Zanesville,
Ohio, newspaper congratulated its
readers: "How cheering to the wife and
children of those militia now in
service, to know that the dangers of battle are
no longer to be dreaded: and to those
who fearful that another draft might
soon call them from their homes . . .
what a pleasing reflection that the ne-
cessity for militia will be daily
decreasing." Added to the dangers of battle, in
the minds of the militia, were the
hazards of camp life, the economic hard-
ships caused by leaving home, and the
long delays in getting paid for their
services (see below).15
Those communities protesting military
service on the grounds of being
asked to perform more than their share
took pains to demonstrate their patrio-
tism, the amount of service they had
performed, and their willingness to serve
in the future. Junior officers of one
regiment that had not filled its quota of
militia informed their divisional
commander in August 1812 that they had al-
ready volunteered one company, despite
the fact that most of the men had
families to provide for, and had that
very day volunteered a large number to go
on yet another expedition. In fact,
"in consequence of our turning out so
large a proportion . . . other regiments
have not been burthened in defence of
our rights as we have done." The
men were aware of the duty they owed their
"felow[sic] creatures and our
families and our own persons in exercising a
laudable zeal in defense of our country
. . . to sacrifice a full proportion of
time and property to the service of our
country. . ." However, they believed
"as a regiment" they had already
offered as much as circumstances permitted,
and so wanted relief from the latest
draft. A similar protest from another unit
in the same division stressed that the
militiamen had served their country and
beseeched their general to "grant
relief by appointing to us only our share of
John Hindman to Major General Elijah
Wadsworth, August 1, 1812, MSS 3133, War of 1812
Collection, Western Reserve Historical
Society; Duncan McArthur to Thomas Worthington,
January 20, 1813, Thomas Worthington
and the War of 1812: Vol. III of the Document
Transcriptions of the War of 1812 in
the Northwest, (Columbus, 1957), 151.
The refusal to ex-
empt Quakers may also have had roots in
the fact that those Quakers who were politically ac-
tive tended to be Federalists, because
of their opposition to the war; see William Cooper
Howells, Recollections of Life in
Ohio from 1813 to 1840 (Gainesville, Fla., 1963 [orig. pub.
1895]), 33-34.
15. Brigadier General Simon Perkins to
Major General Elijah Wadsworth, September 4,
1812, Elisha Whittlesey Papers,
container 71, folder 1, WRHS; Muskingum Messenger,
October 20, 1813.
150 OHIO HISTORY
the burdens ...."16
Such militia attitudes led to sharp
reactions against militia officers who
were deemed to have acted too
enthusiastically in calling out the militia.
James Kilbourne, the central Ohio
surveyor, manufacturer, and politician,
complained to Governor Meigs in 1812
about the "most ruinous and oppres-
sive system" operating in Franklin
and Delaware counties under General
Joseph Foos. Foos, said Kilbourne, had
called out the whole military force
(several hundred men) of both counties
on what proved to be a false alarm,
then kept that force in service. While
some units were later allowed to return,
two companies from Worthington were not,
though forty-five men had fami-
lies "with not a person beside
women and small children to do the smallest
chore of work," and others were
landless laborers whose families depended
upon their daily presence. Captain
Stephen Smith of Williamsburg,
Clermont County, had the unfortunate
audacity to volunteer the services of
his company to the state. According to
one observer, evidently a member of
the company, the men cheerfully made
preparations to march, thinking that a
general call on the militia had been
made, but then discovered that no com-
pany other than Smith's was to march.
"The men," reported the observer,
"being freeborn Americans and
jealous of their rights began to think that they
were some way imposed upon," then
reacted with anger upon discovering that
Smith had several times solicited
Governor Meigs for orders: "had not Smith
behaved in a humble manner he would not
have escaped without blows...."
The observer, after stressing the amount
of duty the local militia had will-
ingly performed, argued that the
opposition arose from a love of liberty and
an abhorrence of tyranny and foul play,
rather than disaffection from the gov-
ernment. "When an equal call of the
militia is made," he assured the gover-
nor, they would step forward with
willingness.l7
The zealousness with which Ohioans
guarded their sense of military fair
play eventually reached the higher
ranks, though whether from officers' sense
of equity or simply their desire not to
anger the people whom they com-
manded is hard to say. Brigadier General
George Kisling had to inform his
superior, John Gano, in early 1813 that
a colonel from his brigade refused an
order to provide a company of militia
from his regiment on the grounds "that
the order is oppressive in taking the
whole of the company from the one
Regiment," and that other units had
also been taken from that regiment.
(Kisling, also conscious of equalizing
burdens, noted that the population from
which that regiment was drawn was much
larger than his other regiment.)
Gano himself two days later, when
issuing general orders for detachments of
16. Petition to Elijah Wadsworth, August
28, 1812, Ibid; Petition to Elijah Wadsworth,
October 22, 1812, Container 71, Folder
3, Ibid.
17. James Kilbourne to Return J. Meigs,
1812 (only date), Reel 2, Frames 537-538, RJM pa-
pers, OHS; John Morris to Meigs,
September 8, 1812, Reel 2, Frames 86-87, Ibid.
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights 151
militia from his division, noted that,
because two brigades situated on the
frontier had been more exposed and
performed more duty, he would not call on
them for this detachment. This sort of
justification was necessary to preempt
protests from the other brigades, and to
demonstrate to the Fourth and Fifth
Brigades that their commanding general
would not force upon them an undue
burden. Gano, like other militia
officers, had to walk a tightwire between
military necessity and the outcry that
military hardships perceived as unfair
would raise. It is not surprising that
he felt "a militia office is truly an ardu-
ous, troublesome, expensive, and
unthankful one if strictly and properly at-
tended to."18
The idea of equalizing burdens extended
itself to economic issues as well, as
rich and poor suffered in differing
degrees because of the war. Taxes bore
down more harshly on those of fewer
means, and in addition, the wealthy
could avoid military duty by purchasing
substitutes, or by occupying posi-
tions that would exempt them from
service. Othniel Looker, acting governor
of the state in 1814, recognized the
"undue pressure" of the militia system on
the poor, but suggested that if the
burden were "judiciously apportioned," then
"the spirit of our citizens will be
equal to any emergency."19
Because so many citizens of means found
positions that let them avoid mil-
itary service, exemptions were the first
symbol of economic inequality to
come under fire. Before the war began,
Ohio exempted from military duty all
ministers of the Gospel, judges of the
supreme court, presidents of the courts
of common pleas, jailkeepers,
custom-house officials, postal workers, ferry-
men (on post roads), and those exempt by
federal law. The revisions to the
militia law debated by the Ohio
legislature over the winter of 1812-13 in-
cluded a proposal adding associate
judges, sheriffs, and clerks of court to the
list of exemptions. Defenders of this
measure argued that other states allowed
these exemptions, and that "the
poor man who may have suffered, is obliged
to sit down in silence, and wait the
return of [the armies] before he can have
that justice." Opponents replied
that "no man holding a lucrative office, such
as that of sheriff, or clerk . . . ought
ever to be exempt from military duty;
for if the office is worth holding, it
will furnish the means of procuring sub-
stitutes." The measure failed,
though so too did a simultaneous attempt to
remove the exemption for ministers of
the gospel. The next revision of the
militia laws, passed at the very end of
the war, actually saw most exemptions
removed from the list: only customs
officials, postal workers, and ferrymen
could avoid the prospect of serving in
the military or procuring a substitute.
18. Brigadier General George Kisling to
Major General John S. Gano, February 2, 1813,
"Selections from the Gano Papers
II," Quarterly Publications of the Historical and
Philosophical Society of Ohio , 15 (April-June, 1921), 25-80; Western Spy, February
13, 1813;
John S. Gano to Major Thomas B. Van
Home, January 17, 1813, "Selections from the Gano
Papers II."
19. Ohio House Journal, Thirteenth
General Assembly, 36-38.
152 OHIO HISTORY
Ohioans were determined that as many
people as possible bear their share of
the burden.20
However, equalizing the burden of the
war did not extend very far towards
making the financial burdens of militia
service more equitable, though there
were calls for such measures. As one
newspaper observed, while the rich and
poor received equal personal protection
from the militia, the poor also pro-
vided property protection for the
rich. The newspaper called for taxes on
wealth so that the poor would not
subsidize the wealthy in this way.21
In late 1814, Thomas Worthington,
recognizing that willingness to per-
form militia duty existed only in
proportion to the perception that the weight
of defense should rest equally on every
member of the community, tried to
convince the legislature to make the
system more fair. "Every man feels con-
solation and satisfaction under the
conviction that he does not bear an unequal
proportion of the public burdens. Such a
state of things will not fail to create
an attachment to the government and a
readiness to contribute to its defence
and support." Worthington observed,
however, that there were people able to
avoid much of the burden: the wealthy
could avoid personal services by pay-
ing a fine, while men without families
could absent themselves during drafts.
This threw the burden of support
"on others in moderate circumstances, un-
able to pay the fine, with large
families to maintain, whose sole dependence
for support is on the head of the
family, and what is worse, taken by such
evasions of the law from their homes,
when least expected and most unpre-
pared." The way the law operated,
Worthington argued, the greatest share of
personal service fell upon that part of
the community least able to bear it.22
Worthington wanted more severe
punishments for draft evaders, but he also
argued for using taxation as a way to
equalize the contributions that citizens
made towards the war. Under his plan,
all males eighteen and over in each
company district would pay an equal
share, but property "real and personal" in
the district would also be taxed
"in fair proportion with the other moiety."
The district would then use the money
raised to engage substitutes equal to
the number of men required, or (in the
event substitutes could not be ob-
tained) to pay the men drafted from the
district. The men could either keep
the money as compensation, or use it to
defray the cost of substitutes. Those
better off would thus help to subsidize
the military burdens of the poor.
20. For prewar exemptions, see Chapter
1, Section 2, "An Act for Disciplining the Militia,"
February 14, 1809, Acts Passed,
Seventh General Assembly. Changes to exemptions can be
found in Chapter 39, Section 29,
"An Act for Disciplining the Militia," February 9, 1813, Acts
Passed, Eleventh General Assembly, and Chapter 54, Section 30, "An Act for Organizing
and
Disciplining the Militia," February
14, 1815, Acts Passed, Thirteenth General Assembly.
21. Zanesville Express &
Republican Standard, February 17, 1813.
22. Muskingum Messenger, November
9, 1814 (reprinted from the Washington Gazette);
Governor's Message to Legislature,
December 21, 1814, in Ohio House Journal, Thirteenth
General Assembly, 104-05.
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights 153
Every man in the community would
contribute, each more or less according
to his means.23
This was too radical a scheme for the
legislature, which did not adopt it.
Legislators recognized the problems that
Worthington pointed out, but were
unwilling to adopt the sort of
progressive taxation for which the governor
called. The measure that the legislature
did adopt was one that affected far
fewer people. For "the purpose of
carrying into effect the provisions of this
act with equality and justice to all
descriptions of the militia," the revised
militia act prescribed that those
individuals who had heretofore been exempted
from militia duty because of physical
infirmity who owned a tract of land, a
house and lot in town, or were
proprietors of a store, would be listed on the
local company muster rolls, and would
have to pay equal shares, along with
all other militiamen, towards purchase
of a substitute (this system is de-
scribed in more detail below).24
This act would, to a certain extent,
help to equalize the burdens of military
service by making certain members of the
community who had not previ-
ously contributed to the public defense
bear their fair share. It did not, how-
ever, act to remedy the problems with
the militia system that Worthington
outlined. Community leaders were more
willing to exhort people to con-
tribute to the war and to exercise
charity towards neighbors in straitened cir-
cumstances than to advocate a new system
of taxation. Be kind to the fami-
lies whose men are in service, advised
one newspaper, because "it is a com-
mon cause, and the family of that man
who by lot has been called into the
service, ought no more to suffer than
those who have the means of living
well." But while many families did
receive aid from others in their commu-
nity, hardships could never be
altogether alleviated.25
A Land Weary of War
As the war dragged on with no end in
sight, spirits flagged considerably in
Ohio, and patriotic ardor lessened. As
early as February 1813 the Zanesville
Express lamented the reluctance of Ohioans to turn out for
defense: "The re-
port of a draft causes some to abscond,
while others obstinately refuse to enter
the ranks of war, and set the laws at
defiance-Where is the spirit of '76?
Where is the patriotism of 1812 ...
?" The patriotism had not disappeared
altogether, but the willingness to serve
in the militia had slowly ebbed away.
Tiresome service in garrisons and
frequent false alarms coupled with severe
lags in service pay led eventually to a
virtual disintegration of Ohio's militia,
23. Ibid, 105-06.
24. Chapter 54, Section 49, "An Act
for Organizing and Disciplining the Militia."
25. Muskingum Messenger, October
20, 1813.
154 OHIO HISTORY |
|
and provided Ohio Federalists, who used discontent with the militia system to oppose the war and Republicans, with political ammunition.26 While no one doubted the importance of serving in the militia if threats to Ohio were imminent, many disliked the most common forms of militia ser- vice, which usually consisted of garrison duty or responding to real or sup- posed British and Indian threats. "We have lately had afalse alarm which has given considerable trouble," General Duncan McArthur confessed to Thomas Worthington in 1813; "I have just returned from a ride of about 200 miles in consequence of it. And in course of my travels called many off from their harvest, who could illy spare the time." Those called off for false alarms- like the militia noted earlier who served under Joseph Foos--seldom took such occurrences lightly.27 The most important false alarms for the Ohio militia were the Fort Meigs incidents in 1813, the lasting consequences of which can be identified as the
26. Zanesville Express, February 17, 1813. 27. Duncan McArthur to Thomas Worthington, July 10, 1813, Reel 8, Frames 485-87, Worthington Papers, OHS. |
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights 155
turning point for people's willingness
to serve in the military. Fort Meigs, a
strong fort constructed in early 1813,
was situated on the Maumee Rapids in
northern Ohio, where its blockhouses and
batteries protected supply lines and
the surrounding country. In the spring
of that year, British general Henry
Procter and an army of over 2,000
regulars, militia, and Indians travelled
across Lake Erie to attack the fort,
defended by only about 550 men under
William Henry Harrison. Procter resorted
to siege warfare to take the fort,
beginning with an artillery bombardment
on May 1, 1813. An attempt by
Kentucky militia a few days later to
relieve the fort overran the British guns,
but a sharp counterattack by British and
Indians resulted in almost 50 percent
casualties (mostly prisoners) for the
1,200 Kentuckians. But Procter, whose
militia were unhappy and whose Indians
were leaving in large numbers, lifted
the siege on May 9 and returned to
Canada. In July he returned, this time
with some 5,000 troops, and tried
enticing the defenders of Meigs to leave
their fortifications, but with no
success. Procter withdrew his forces a second
time, this time for good, as the American
navy under Oliver Hazard Perry
soon achieved command of Lake Erie.28
Fort Meigs became a problem for the Ohio
militia because during the crisis
Governor Return J. Meigs had mobilized a
force of several thousand Ohio
militia to come to the relief of the
fort. Harrison, however, preferred instead
to rely on the Kentuckians to fight the
British. Once the British left,
Harrison met Meigs and his militia at
Lower Sandusky in mid-May. After
giving the troops an address praising
their patriotism in assembling to relieve
the fort, Harrison dismissed most of
them, keeping only a few Ohio militia.
Initially, Ohioans were simply proud of
the "zeal and alacrity" that their citi-
zens had shown in turning out so many
militia (estimates vary, but at least
2,000 actually marched) in so short a
period of time. "Such zeal, such
promptitude, such patriotism was never
surpassed in the annals of the world,"
gushed the Freeman's Chronicle in
late May. "All ages and ranks of citizens
flocked by one noble impulse
simultaneously to the standard of their country.
The aged veteran and the beardless
stripling, the farmer, the merchant and the
mechanic mingled indiscriminately in the
ranks.... We are confident that if
the fort had not relieved itself for
10 days longer, ten thousand men from
Ohio would have been on the march
towards it." Another newspaper noted in
mid-May that the "honorable display
of patriotism" was almost universal,
28. This account is largely drawn from
Alec R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest
(East Lansing, Mich., 1958), 173- 93,
201-08; Mahon, The War of 1812, 159-64; and Reginald
Horsman, The War of 1812 (New
York, 1969), 99-102. A contemporary author, Robert
Breckinridge McAfee, describes these
incidents in more detail in History of the Late War in the
Western Country (Lexington, Ky., 1816), Chapters VI-VIII. The Canadian
militia were un-
happy because they needed to return to
Canada to plant corn in order to feed their families
during the winter.
156 OHIO HISTORY
and party distinctions done away with.29
But the exultation at the initial relief
of Fort Meigs soon turned sour,
largely because the events of the next
few months, especially Procter's second
attempt to take the fort, caused what
amounted to more false alarms for the
militia. They once more mobilized to
defend against British invasion, but
never saw the enemy. As one officer
observed in July, "The militia were col-
lecting again to relieve Fort Meigs . .
. but the emergency must have been
great indeed to have roused the people
at this busy season of the year.
Numbers however convened until the glad
tidings were received that the Army
and the outposts were [safe]. You can
hardly imagine, Sir, how joyful was
the news, to the laboring people of the
state who are just beginning harvest.
To have been compelled to march at this
period must have ruined many fami-
lies, and left the crops
unattended." The Zanesville Express, which in May
had been so proud of how Ohioans of all
political stripes had responded to the
siege of Fort Meigs, three months later
was quite bitter that ". . the militia of
this state have once more been sent to chase
the wild goose. They are or-
dered to return home, except 2,000 ....
Such repeated calls upon the mili-
tia, and so much ado about nothing, is
calculated to damage the ardor of their
patriotism, and to lessen their
sensibility in behalf of their country. There
has been gross mismanagement
somewhere." Similarly, the Freeman's
Chronicle was no longer speaking proudly of militia call-ups:
". .. our
Farmers and Mechanics are as patriotic
and as willing to defend their rights as
any people under the sun-but they are
irritated and disgusted at being
marched and countermarched as they have
been during the last four or five
months, when no good has been effected
by all their sacrifices." To some,
militia service seemed even less useful
after the American victories at the
Thames River and on Lake Erie in the
fall of 1813, which seemed to remove
any immediate threats to Ohio.30
Militia alarms, real and false alike,
caused Ohioans considerable economic
hardships, especially as active periods
of campaigning usually coincided with
peak times of farming. Other
militia-related hardships included militia fines
and problems in paying those who served;
of the two, militia fines were less
of a problem, inasmuch as they applied
only to those who refused to perform
their required duty. But the fines were
resented, even though they allowed
those who paid to avoid serving. Eleven
people were fined a total of $157.00
(a considerable sum) in December 1812 in
Zanesville, and this was by no
means exceptional as fines for
individuals who refused to serve tours of duty
could reach sixty dollars or more. The
fines were made even more painful be
29. Freeman's Chronicle, May 28,
1813; Zanesville Express & Republican Standard, May
12, 1813.
30. Jesup N. Couch to Thomas
Worthington, July 5, 1813, in Thomas Worthington and the
War of 1812, 212; Zanesville Express, August 18, 1813; Freeman's
Chronicle, August 20, 1813.
Burthened in Defense of our Rights 157 |
cause they often were not applied uniformly across the state. Depending upon arbitrary enforcement by officers, militia companies might be fined heavily or not at all. Because of the lack of uniformity, in fact, Governor Meigs directed at least one militia general not to collect fines, an action which did little to enforce discipline or to stop the arbitrary imposition of penalties. The case of militiaman George Bright, an inhabitant of Lancaster, is instructive in this regard. Bright was fined $120 in February 1814 for not performing a tour of duty with the militia the previous winter. In his defense, he produced several witnesses who testified that he had been sick almost all that winter. However, when one of the members of his board of inquiry asked Bright whether he would have served had he been healthy, Bright equivocated, saying he did not know whether he would have, after which, in the words of the clerk, "the court decided that he may as well be fined." Militiamen far more |
158 OHIO
HISTORY
circumspect and intelligent than Bright
also found the imposition of militia
fines arbitrary.31
The most important cause of militia
disintegration in Ohio, though, was
the fact that Ohio militia more
frequently than not received pay for their ser-
vices only well after the fact, if at
all. Ohio, with very little money of its
own, depended upon the United States to
pay its militia for their services
when called up against Indians or the
British. Consequently, compensation
for militia duty meant a tortuous
process of delay and red tape leading all the
way to Washington, D.C., and back.
Indifferent record-keeping and military
exigency often created additional
problems. This knowledge that payment
would be slow in coming, if in fact it
came, made the economic hardships
that militia service often entailed all
the more threatening. How could the
head of a household take care of his
family if he were to go on a six-month
tour of militia duty but not receive pay
for an extended period of time?
The problem of nonpayment obviously
created difficulties for officers try-
ing to raise troops. One officer tried
to raise a company of militia in
Circleville in January 1813, but failed.
The men would not volunteer, he told
Meigs, because they had not been
remunerated for past services, "nor noticed
in any other way to distinguish them
from the men who sit quietly at home,
heedless of their country's call,
bettering their circumstances by the necessity
of the times." The problem worsened
as the war progressed. A year later, the
same officer addressed Thomas
Worthington: "The Militia draft will be very
oppressive at this time, and what makes
it more discouraging to them, is that
government have been very remiss in
paying those that have been out. There
is not a man in this Division, who will
turn out at all, but what has been out
at one time or another; and you know
that few of them have been paid. This
neglect on the part of the general
government have begun to lose the patrio-
tism of the citizens of Ohio."32
Worthington experienced the problem
firsthand when he became commander
in chief of Ohio's militia in late
1814. Discussing the problems of raising a
regiment of militia with his adjutant
general, Worthington noted that because
of the current state of militia
organization, as well as the militia law, it
31. The example of militia fines is from
the Zanesville Express & Republican Standard,
February 3, 1813. That it is not
atypical can be seen by inspecting surviving regimental record
books. For instance, the record book for
the Second Regiment, Fourth Brigade, Third Division
of Ohio Militia during the war contains
mostly fines of small amounts for lack of equipment or
not appearing at muster, but several
fines of $60 or more (often to be paid in monthly pay-
ments); see MSS 2396, Western Reserve
Historical Society. The Third Regiment, First
Brigade, Second Division of Ohio Militia
issued some very heavy fines; see the John Hayslip
Papers, MSS 2944, WRHS. For the Bright
case, see "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in [the]
Case of George Bright," February
18, 1815, George Bright Papers, VFM 2733, OHS.
32. James Denny to Return J. Meigs,
January 16, 1813, Reel 3, Frame 19, RJM Papers, OHS;
Denny to Thomas Worthington, February
12, 1814, Reel 9, Frame 44, Worthington Papers,
OHS.
Burthened in Defense of our
Rights 159
would be difficult to raise the desired
number of men. "Other causes will con-
tribute to this effect," he
observed, "and one principally I have much com-
plaint against because of the
non-payment of those who have already per-
formed service." We must, he added,
do the best we can.33
By the beginning of 1815 the militia in
Ohio had virtually collapsed. The
economic hardships, the fines, the lack
of pay, the repeated call-ups-all with
no end in sight-caused support for the
institution to drop to almost nothing.
The problems with the militia proved
fertile ground for Federalist propaganda,
which many Ohioans felt fueled the
problems in the first place.
Federalists, though few in number in
Ohio, tried to use dissatisfaction with
the militia system to their advantage.
One resident of Dayton, identifying
himself as "one of the
people," warned his fellow residents in late 1813 that a
recent meeting of a board of militia
officers that had produced a slate of candi-
dates for local office had been
infiltrated by Federalists, who tried to have
"federal proceedings" pass as
Republican ones. "Beware of snakes," the writer
declared, "something, is
busy to make you believe it will have the militia law
altered, or modified, or repealed-that
you will not have military duty to per-
form, or military fines to pay .... The
scheme is to do away the militia sys-
tem, and make you believe that taxes on
non-resident lands can . . . defray all
the expenses of the militia
system." Whether or not the individuals in ques-
tion actually were Federalists, or had
simply been labeled as such, is difficult
to say; what is important is that
Federalists, or someone in sympathy with
them, were associated with opposing the
militia system.34
The most notorious Ohio Federalist was
Charles Hammond, editor of the
Ohio Federalist, published in St. Clairsville in the eastern portion of
the
state. Hammond frequently used invective
and sarcasm in the pages of his
paper to oppose the war and the
Republican leadership running it. He also of-
ten protested the "harassing calls
on the militia." According to Isaac Van
Horn, the adjutant general, the efforts
of Hammond's paper and other
Federalists "nigh put down the
drafting of militia" in the region around
Zanesville and St. Clairsville in the
late summer of 1814. "There are in-
stances of whole companies refusing to join,"
he stated, and though fines had
been assessed, none had yet been
collected.35
Such circumstances were by no means
unusual in 1814. The Freeman's
Chronicle reported in March of that year that a recent draft of
1,400 militia
had not yet been half-filled. "A
most culpable remissness exists some-
where," the editor stated, but
could not pinpoint the source. Militia generals
33. Thomas Worthington to Isaac Van
Horn, December 19, 1814, LEO Reel 1, Frames 07-
08.
34. Ohio Centinel, October 4,
1813.
35. The Ohio Federalist, January
5, 1815; Isaac Van Horn to Othniel Looker, August 16,
1814, Reel 1, Frames 162-163, OL Papers,
OHS.
160 OHIO
HISTORY
frequently had to inform their superiors
that draft requirements could not be
met, and those who did turn out
increasingly were substitutes. "Every exer-
tion is used," confessed one
officer, "but the men refuse to march."36
Van Horn was quick to attribute blame
for the laxness in the militia to do-
mestic opposition. He had no doubt that
it would take a great deal of effort to
make Ohio's militia effective,
"seeing that a host of internal enemies to the
administration of the general government
are exerting themselves to parralise
and render the militia as contemptable,
and inefficient as possible." By late
1814, even his hometown Zanesville
Express, a paper that took pains to
stress that though it was a federal
newspaper it was not extreme, labeled the
state's inability to raise militia a
heinous dereliction of duty. "Proh pudor!
[For shame!]" the newspaper
exclaimed scornfully, "that Ohio the most war
loving state in the Union, except
Kentucky, should be so wanting in patrio-
tism!"37
By the tail end of 1814, the militia
system was in complete disarray. The
state government had no idea how many
weapons or men were in the frontier
areas, and across the state, especially
in its eastern portion, men refused to
serve. Indeed, many militia units
consisted almost entirely of substitutes
raised from fines collected from those
not serving. Discharge certificates,
proving that one had performed a tour of
duty, had become a medium of ex-
change, as militiamen sold them to
citizens who wanted to avoid duty. The
state was unable to comply with federal
requisitions of militia.38
Worthington proposed revisions to the
militia law, many explained above,
but to his irritation the legislature
took no action on most of them,
"nonwithstanding we are threatened
with destruction by both internal and ex-
ternal opposers and enemies." At
the same time, frustration with the militia
system caused Worthington and the state
legislature to consider alternative
means of furnishing a military force by
doing away with compulsory militia
service entirely and creating in its
place a state army of some 3,000 officers
and men for a period of two to three
years. Ohio would offer this body of
men to the United States in lieu of
militia drafts. Several other states had
considered creating state armies, most
notably Massachusetts, which passed a
bill establishing one (never actually
raised) largely in order to have a military
force free from federal control.
Worthington, on the other hand, had no
36. Freeman's Chronicle, March
11, 1814; Brigadier General J. Patterson to Elijah
Wadsworth, September 30, 1814, Elisha
Whittlesey Papers, Container 71, Folder 4, WRHS;
Brigadier General John Campbell to
Wadsworth, December 12, 1814, Ibid.
37. Isaac Van Horn to Othniel Looker,
May 11, 1814, Reel 1, Frames 62-64, OL Papers,
OHS; Zanesville Express, November
16, 1814. For another example of Van Horn's opinion of
the effect of political opposition, see
Van Horn to Looker, April 9, 1814, Reel 1, Frames 15-16,
OL Papers, OHS.
38. On discharge certificates, see
Duncan McArthur to Return J. Meigs, June 28, 1813, Reel
1, Frames 38-39, Duncan McArthur Papers,
Microfilm Edition, Ohio Historical Society.
McArthur claimed that such exchanges
occurred daily.
Burthened in Defense of our Rights 161 |
|
qualms about letting the general government use his state army; he simply wanted to establish an alternative to militia drafts.39 The legislature refused to create the corps of troops, causing another frustra- tion for Worthington, who admitted he had been "very desirous" of it. What the state government did do, however, was quite important: it fundamentally transformed the nature of the militia system, eliminating the idea of equal service. It openly admitted what had for some time become obvious, that the militia system had devolved into a system of purchasing substitutes. Under the revisions to the militia law passed by the Thirteenth General Assembly, militia captains called upon for men would divide their militia company into a number of classes, or groups, each of which would provide a single man. A class could draft one of its members, or, the more likely possibility, its members could together purchase a substitute. In essence, the legislature provided Worthington with his state army by another route. By doing away with the principle that every man should be required to perform military ser-
39. Worthington to Van Horn, February 4, 1815, LEO, Reel 1, Frame 23; Worthington to James Monroe, January 17, 1815, Ibid, Frames 17-19. |
162 OHIO HISTORY
vice the new laws changed the militia
system into a recruiting service. The
ideal of the
"citizen-soldiers" who would step forward to serve their country
was dropped in the face of the realities
of war.40
Conclusion
News that peace had finally been reached
between the United States and
Great Britain reached Ohio only a little
more than a week after the legislature
had passed the law altering the nature of
the militia system. As a result,
though concern for the frontier existed
for some time, most of the pressure on
the militia system evaporated. Later
revisions of the militia law established a
rather more traditional system.
Ohio's experiences with the militia
during the war, though, provide valu-
able insight into the relationship
between the military and society. In Ohio,
only after several years of war did
political opposition to it have an effect on
people's attitudes and actions. Rather,
it might be argued that it was the war
itself, with its perceived hardships and
the nation's lack of success at waging
it, that provided its own opposition.
Many served willingly, while other
communities and individuals by their
protests gave notice that they were will-
ing to serve as long as their service
was matched by that of their fellow citi-
zens. The state ultimately failed to
convince its citizens that the hardships
they endured were equitable. Under the
resulting pressure, the militia system
metamorphosed into something quite
different from the republican bulwark of
liberty it had originally symbolized,
because the people rejected their
"people's army."
40. Worthington to Monroe, February 20,
1815, Reel 1, Frames 32-33, LEO, OHS; Chapter
54, Sections 44-45, "An Act for
Organizing and Disciplining the Militia," Acts Passed,
Thirteenth General Assembly.
MARK PITCAVAGE
"Burthened in Defence of our Rights":
Opposition to Military Service in Ohio
During the War of 1812
The War of 1812 has long been famous as
a war to which substantial op-
position existed in the United States.
The nearness of the Congressional vote
over the declaration of war, the refusal
of several New England states to pro-
vide militia for the invasion of Canada,
and the Hartford Convention in 1814
are all notable examples of the degree
to which the nation divided over the is-
sue of war with Great Britain.
Unfortunately, these incidents have led
historians to concentrate on the po-
litical opposition to the War of 1812,
viewing it as the natural outgrowth of
the Federalist-Republican battles of the
early national period. Because
Federalists so vocally opposed the war,
they receive attention at the expense
of other groups, and New England, that
bastion of Federalism, receives atten-
tion at the expense of the rest of the
country. The danger of concentrating
solely on political issues is that the
effects of the war itself on American
communities-and thus public
opinion-might be overlooked.1
This article examines the opposition to
military service that arose in Ohio
during the course of the War of 1812,
the nature of that opposition, and its ef-
fects. Along with Kentucky and
Tennessee, Ohio (dominated by Jeffersonian
Republicans) was one of the western
states which cried out for war in 1811
and 1812, and whose citizens flocked to
the colors when war appeared immi-
nent. As the war dragged on, however,
Ohioans became less enthusiastic
Mark Pitcavage would like to thank Allan
R. Millett, Joan E. Cashin, Mark Grimsley, and
Virginia Boynton for their advice and
assistance in writing this article. Any errors are his own.
1. Of the standard scholarly histories
of the war, the two which provide most coverage of
opposition to the war are Donald R.
Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, (Urbana,
Ill, 1989), and J. C. A. Stagg, Mr.
Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the
Early American Republic, 1783-1830, (Princeton, N.J., 1983). John K. Mahon, The War of
1812, (Gainesville, Fla, 1972), provides some information.
Recent specific studies of opposi-
tion include Edward Bryan,
"Patterns of Dissent: Vermont's Opposition to the War of 1812,"
Vermont History, 40 (Winter 1972), 10-27; Sarah M. Lemmon, "Dissent
in North Carolina
During the War of 1812," North
Carolina Historical Review, 49 (Spring 1972), 103-18: Myron
F. Wehtje, "Opposition in Virginia
to the War of 1812," Virginia Magazine of History, 78
(January 1970), 65-86; and Ellen P.
Hoffman, "Unnecessary, Unjustified and Ruinous: Anti-
war Rhetoric in Massachusetts Federalist
Newspapers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Massachusetts, 1984).