THE INDIAN AS A DIPLOMATIC FACTOR IN THE
HISTORY OF THE OLD NORTHWEST.1
PROF. ISAAC JOSLIN COX,
Department of American History,
University of Cincinnati
One merely asserts a truism when he
states that the North
American Indian is the predominant
factor in the early history
of the Northwest; and that in no other
field is this more appar-
ent than in its diplomacy. It is true
that one may well hesi-
tate to apply such a dignified title to
a policy often character-
ized by senseless deceit, audacious
theft, and other accompani-
ments of mere low intrigue; or to a
policy which if free from
these blemishes was still powerless to
assure essential justice to
the contracting parties; yet the fact
remains that in formal cere-
mony, in the extent of territory
involved, and in subsequent
results, many of the treaties with the
aborigines of this section
rank in importance with the significant
results of European
diplomacy.
In this Northwestern diplomacy we may
readily group the
important events into three distinctive
periods. The first is
distinguished as the period of
international complications between
England and France, with Spain as a
minor and largely neg-
ligible factor. The second period may be
described as a domes-
tic interlude between two international
movements, during which
the interests of the British Imperial
Government and its Red
Wards are involved with those of its
colonies, of private traders,
and of would-be colonizing companies.
Later in this same period
these latter interests play an important
part in the domestic
affairs of the newly liberated states
and of their embryo national
government. The creation by the latter
of a well defined area
-the "Territory Northwest of the
Ohio River"-closes the sec-
1In the preparation of this article the
writer has made extensive
use of an address delivered before the
Chicago Historical Society, which
is now for the first time printed.
542
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 543
ond period and ushers in the third,
which is characterized by the
struggle between the United States and
Great Britain for the
possession of the above territory. It is
this period that consti-
tutes the most important era of
Northwestern diplomacy and
comprises the major portion of this
paper.
The above division is adopted for the
sake of convenience in
grouping facts and in no sense implies
that the tendencies or
movements of one period do not reappear
in a later one, but
that their presence and influence give
greater emphasis to a cer-
tain epoch. For instance, the first
period may be said to end
with 1763, but French diplomacy and
intrigue continue as im-
portant secondary factors in the history
of the Northwest as well
as of the whole Mississippi Valley, for
the following half cen-
tury.2 On the other hand,
domestic questions ever play an im-
portant part, even when international
complications seem to con-
trol the situation, as is shown by the
effect in 1814 of Harrison's
Indian treaties upon the negotiations
about to commence at
Ghent.3 Yet, while no one set of influences is in absolute con-
trol at any one stage of our discussion,
convenience will lead to
the adoption of the above mentioned
divisions.
Let us proceed to a brief consideration
of the first of these
periods, the struggle between France and
England for the mas-
tery of the American continent. For the
present, other Euro-
pean nations may be disregarded. Spain,
long since content with
Florida and her Mexican vice-royalty, is
too remote from the
future Northwest Territory to be vitally
interested in its dis-
posal. The English have absorbed the
claims of the Dutch along
the Atlantic Coast and are beginning to
turn their attention to
the immediate interior, where French
influences are already
present. Between their outposts on the
Hudson and those of the
French in the valley of the St. Lawrence
lay the ever-present
Indian factor-this time personified in
the various Iroquois tribes.
2For
the best survey of the attitude of France towards the United
States in general and the Mississippi
Valley in particular, see the ar-
ticles of Professor F. J. Turner in the American
Historical Review, Vols.
III and X, and the collections of
documents in Ibid II and III, and in
the Reports of the American
Historical Association for 1897 and 1903.
3Cf. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol.
III, p. 43.
544 Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
This powerful confederacy not only
occupied the territory be-
tween the two European rivals, but
themselves exercised a sort
of indefinite suzerainty over other
Indians as far west as the
Mississippi. This rendered the aid of
these confederated tribes
doubly important to the nation that
desired to control the in-
terior. How to secure this aid was the
problem that for nearly
a century occupied the attention of the
more intelligent and
far-seeing of the British officials upon
this continent, and how
to neutralize their efforts the
perennial task of their French
rivals.
The hostile course of Champlain had
aroused among the
Iroquois an antipathy to the French
which his successors vainly
sought to remove. This antipathy was
reinforced by the greater
material resources of the English
colonists for carrying on the
fur trade, and this in turn early gave a
mercenary bias to the
struggle for the control of the
Northwest-a characteristic that
it retained to the end. By the close of
the seventeenth century,
however, the Iroquois began to profess a
desire to remain neutral
in the conflict. If this was their
sincere wish, they were des-
tined to be disappointed. From the days
of Governor Dongan,
who, by his attractive manner, secured
tokens of fealty to his
master, James, Duke of York, to the
Treaty of Lancaster, in
1744, we have a series of documents
showing the increasing
influence of the English over the
Iroquois. It is true that
many of the documents are of doubtful
origin or of hypothet-
ical value, but whatever their
character, they show that Eng-
land was slowly gaining over France, in
her race for territory
in the Northwest.
The rival claims of the nations were
first given a definite
diplomatic standing in the Treaty of
Utrecht in 1713. This
Treaty provided for a delimitation of
the claims of the Hud-
son's Bay Company and the French Colony
of Canada, and thus
indirectly had some bearing upon the
extreme northwestern limit
of this territory. Of more immediate
importance, however, was
the acknowledgment that the Iroquois
were subject to Eng-
lish rather than French control. The
Indians were not consulted
in the treaty, and the French later
refused to acknowledge the
full pretensions which the English
claimed by virtue of it, but,
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc.' 545
nevertheless, it constitutes a land mark
in American diplomacy
and especially in that of the Northwest.
In keeping with the above treaty, the
English authorities
later produced a series of documents,
purporting to be deeds to
territory lying on the northern and
southern shores of Lake Erie
and Lake Ontario. These deeds are of
more than doubtful valid-
ity-at least they may be attacked by
documents of similar char-
acter, expressing Iroquois allegiance to
the French King.4 There
is, however, no question regarding the fact of the most important
of the cessions of this character-that
of the Treaty of Lancas-
ter.5 In 1744, under the
influence of English, the Iroquois chiefs
acknowledged the validity of the Western
claims of Virginia,
based on her colonial charters, and thus
gave substance, if not
form, to the English claim to the Ohio
Valley. Virginia must
still make good her claim against her
sister colonies, and Great
Britain must assert their united claims
against encroaching
French pretensions. The latter phase of
the question was de-
cided by the Seven Years' War; the
former remained a dis-
turbing domestic factor, until it was
settled by a definite renuncia-
tion of state claims and the creation of
the Northwest Territory.
The struggle between England and France
for the control
of this territory became critical when
each reached out to pos-
sess the key to the Ohio Valley-the
junction of the Allegheny
and Monongahela Rivers. For a period of
eight decades, from
Marquette and Joliet to Celeron de
Bienville, French occupa-
tion had advanced by a series of slow
strides from the West
until all the available portages but
one, between the Great
Lakes and the Mississippi, were in their
possession. During the
same time the tide of English settlement
was approaching the
crest of the Alleghenies and threatening
to advance beyond.
Already English traders had attempted to
penetrate to the far
Northwest and had been checked by the
French establishments
on the Wabash and Detroit. Now a new
movement begins in
which fur trader and surveyor push
forward to extend the in-
4They are given for the most part in Documents
Relating to the
Colonial History of New York, Vol. V and IX, passim.
5Cf. Pennsylvania Colonial Records, IV,
698-937.
Vol. XVIII -35.
546
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
terests respectively of Pennsylvania and
of Virginia among the
Ohio Indians, and to inaugurate an
Anglo-American policy in
the Northwest. Once in contact with the
English pioneer, the
days of the Canadian Voyageur are
numbered and his uncertain
hold upon the great interior valley
quickly loosened. Even the
sturdy resistance of his Indian ally was
unavailing to prolong
his dominion.
The Treaty of Paris, of February loth,
1763, closed the first
period of Northwestern Diplomacy and
ushered in the second-
a quarter century primarily of domestic
policy, yet profoundly
influenced by international
complications which involved the
shifting of continental control and the
birth of a new nation on
this side of the Atlantic. The treaty
itself first brought into
being what was destined to be the future
western limit of
the Northwest Territory, for it made the
Mississippi a boundary
between the possessions of Spain and of
Great Britain upon the
American Continent.
The Colonial policy of the British
Government during the
years following the Treaty of Paris
tended to emphasize other
limits of the future Northwest
Territory. As a first step in this
policy we may mention the Royal
Proclamation of October 7,
1763. Although the line limiting the
original colonies as estab-
lished by this proclamation, lay some
distance to the eastward
of any part of its future area, yet the
emphasis placed by it upon
Indian relations is thoroughly
characteristic of later British pol-
icy in this same Northwest. This
proclamation paved the way
for the subsequent Indian treaties at
Ft. Stanwix (1768) and
Lochabor (1770), by which the northern
and southern Indians
agreed to a fairly definite line of
demarcation between the white
settlements and the lands reserved for
their own use. A portion
of this line from above Ft. Pitt to the
mouth of the Kanawha
River was recognized by both treaties,
while that of Ft. Stanwix
prolonged it to the mouth of the
Tennessee. Thus, what was
afterward to be the southeastern limit
of the Northwest Terri-
tory, received its first definition. The
policy both of the proc-
lamation and of the treaties was one
designed to protect the
rapidly advancing frontier by winning
the confidence of the In-
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 547
dians and assuring the latter of the
essential justice of the Bri-
tish government.6
That this policy did not involve a
repression of white set-
tlements, is shown by the fact that the
British authorities almost
immediately began to entertain proposals
looking to an occu-
pation of their western territory, and
particularly of that portion
between the mountains and the Ohio,
recently ceded by the
Indians. The most noteworthy of these
proposed new colonies
was that of Vandalia, in which Benjamin
Franklin was inter-
ested. The northern boundary of this
embryo government was
to be the Ohio from the western boundary
of Pennsylvania to a
point opposite the mouth of the Scioto.
Thus the proposed
cession emphasized the former river as
the line of separation
between the white man and the red. A
later land scheme, the
Transylvania Company, likewise proposed
the Ohio River, from
the Kentucky to the Cumberland, as its
northern limit. The out-
break of the Revolution alone prevented
the realization of these
schemes and an early delimitation of the
territory south of the
Ohio.7
Another movement on the part of the
British government
shows an approach to the same territory
from the opposite direc-
tion, and apparently from a different
motive. In reality, how-
ever, the purpose of the Quebec Act of
1774 does not differ
from that of the Proclamation of 1763
and the ensuing Indian
treaties, although the strife of the
Revolutionary period gave it
another interpretation. An examination
of the subject shows that
the British government was simply
continuing the policy of pro-
tecting its native wards and of
regulating trade with them. For
this and other administrative purposes
it was more convenient
to attach the territory east of the
Mississippi and north of the
Ohio to Quebec than to any other settled
government, and it was
so done in the above act.8
6Farrand, "The Indian Boundary
Line," in American Historical Re-
view, Vol. X, p. 782ff.
7Alden, New Governments West of the
Alleghenies, p. 20-28; 57.
8 Coffin, "Province of Quebec
and the Early American Revolution,"
p. 39ff.
548
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
By these various proclamations,
treaties, and enactments,
the British government emphasized the
Ohio as the line of sep-
aration between civilization and
savagery, although we must not
define our terms too closely on either
side of the line. To the
possible objection that these
transactions do not constitute diplo-
macy in its truest sense, we may affirm
that the various methods
by which rival land companies played
their parts against each
other and the Indian, both in England
and America, certainly
come under the definition of intrigue,
if not that of the more
honorable term, and conform to the
statement of our opening
paragraph.
With the outbreak of the Revolution, the
scene of interest
for the above plans is shifted to the
Thirteen Colonies, that
have now become independent states. With
the revival of their
claims to the western lands, the
operations of intriguing land
companies are transferred to the state
legislatures or to the Con-
tinental Congress, where they play a
minor part in the discus-
sions between the States Rights and
National parties. The inter-
ests of the various states are, however,
so conflicting as to lead to
a mutual renunciation of claims,
beginning with New York in
1780
and closing with Virginia in 1784, by
which the territory
northwest of the Ohio is finally
organized under the famous
ordinance of 1787. Upon this new
national basis there is the
opportunity for questions relating to
the Northwest again to
assume international importance, and we
enter upon the third
and most important period into which our
subject is divided.
Before proceeding to the details of this
third period, it may
be well to consider what the first two
periods have definitely
contributed to our subject. International treaty and Indian
negotiation, aided by a colonial land
policy, have definitely marked
out two boundaries of the future
Northwest Territory-the Mis-
sissippi on the west and the Ohio on the
southeast. In addi-
tion, British procedure has emphasized
the fact that this region
is to remain an Indian territory, and
British officials are unable
to appreciate a different policy, even
thirty years after it has
nominally passed out of their control.
This is the significant fact
in the History of the Northwest from
this time until after the
war of 1812.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 549
The first important contribution to the
third period of In-
dian diplomacy in the Northwest is a
memoir connected with
the name of Vergennes, the Minister of
State of Louis XVI of
France. This memoir was undoubtedly
composed before the
American alliance in 1778 and considered
the'probable action of
France in case the United States should
win its independence.
He favored the restriction of the new
states to the territory west
of the Alleghenies; France should enter
into the contest and
force from Great Britain the cession of
the western part of
Canada, which united to Louisiana, was
to form a new Colonial
empire for the French monarchy. It is
interesting to add that
he proposes to make of the greater part
of the region between
the Ohio, the Mississippi and the Lakes
an Indian reserve and
thus to continue the policy of Great
Britain as well as revert
to the original French system.9
The danger from this proposal, whether
rightly attributed to
Vergennes or not, is shown by the fact
that since 1763 England
had feared the presence of French and
Spanish emissaries in this
region, and that this fear became
pronounced during the early
years of the Revolution.10
Not only the Northwest, but Canada,
was threatened by these rovers among the
discontented Indians;
while to add to this fear, after the
outbreak of hostilities with
Spain in 1779, came the capture of the
lower Mississippi by
Galvez and the Spanish expedition from
St. Louis to Fort St.
Joseph on Lake Michigan, in the winter
of 1780-81, Spain was
becoming more than an interested
spectator of the disposal of
the territory between the Mississippi
and the Great Lakes, and
France more than a willing ally to serve
her purpose.
Whether Vergennes was or was not the
author of the
above memoir, it certainly is completely
in accord with the pur-
pose later revealed by his secretary,
Rayneval, to restrict the
western pretensions of the Americans, in
order to favor Spain.
While in Paris in 1782, during the
preliminary negotiations with
9 Cf. Turner in American Historical
Review, X, 250-52; A copy
of this memoir is in the King Collection
of the Historical and Philo-
sophical Society of Ohio.
10 Brymner, Report of the Canadian
Archives for 1890, p. 91ff; Ibid
for 1887.
550 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
Great Britain John Jay held some
interviews with d'Aranda,
the Spanish minister at the French
court, in the course of which
the latter had told him that the Spanish
government expected the
United States to be satisfied with a
boundary line running from
Western Georgia to the Ohio at the mouth
of the Kanawha,
thence around the western shores of Lake
Erie and Lake Huron,
enclosing Michigan, to the end of Lake
Superior. The Spanish
minister seemed surprised that Jay
insisted upon the Mississippi
as the boundary, and dwelt upon the fact
that the western
country belonged to the Indians. In
furtherance of the Spanish
policy, Rayneval, Vergennes' secretary,
later addressed to Jay
a memoir, in which he tried to show that
it was the policy of
the British Government from 1755 to 1763
not to consider
the territory beyond the mountains as
belonging to the original
colonies. Accordingly, he proposed that
the territory south of
the Ohio should remain an Indian
reservation under the joint
protection of Spain and the United
States; that the latter should
give up its demand for the navigation of
the Mississippi, and
that the status of the territory north
of the Ohio should be deter-
mined by negotiations with the court of
London. According to
his proposal, the powers of Europe were
to share the feast and
America to have the leavings.
The submission of this memoir and the
later secret visits
of Rayneval to London convinced Jay that
his fellow commis-
sioners had nothing to hope for from the
Courts of France. Re-
cent discussion of the conditions
surrounding the making of
this treaty. seem to show that Jay and
likewise John Adams,
were probably too suspicious of
Vergennes and Rayneval, and
that the French minister was probably
acting for the best in-
terests of his own country in supporting
the claims of Spain and
in endeavoring to bring hostilities to a
speedy close.11
When the United States commissioners had
once taken
matters in their own hands, the event
presaged a treaty in which
their interests were not to suffer, to
say the least. The spirit of
11 The best summary of the attitude of
France towards America in
1782-83 is to be found in McLaughlin's The
Confederation and the Con-
stitution, (Am. Nation Series X), where the authorities are given
with
a critical estimate of their value.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 551
conciliation which dictated the policy
of the British commis-
sioners at Paris finally resulted in a
northern and western
limit which embraced all territory that
the United States could
naturally expect to acquire. By their
instructions the American
representatives had been directed to
obtain a line running from
the point where the 45th
parallel crossed the St. Lawrence,
directly west to Lake Nipissing and
thence to the Mississippi.12
Such a line disregarded natural
features, and when the British
commissioners proposed as an alternative
the present line fol-
lowing the middle course of the Great
Lakes and finally termin-
ating in the Lake of the Woods, the
American commissioners
readily accepted the change.13 In
all probability the former line
would have been of more immediate
advantage, had the Amer-
icans been prepared to assume military
possession of the entire
area, for it would have meant the
absolute control of the two
lower lakes, together with the greater
part of Huron and of
Michigan, and thus it would have insured
the immediate enjoy-
ment of the fur trade. In the long run,
however, the resources
of the upper portion of Michigan and of
Wisconsin have estab-
lished the wisdom of the Americans in
accepting as they did,
the present northern boundary of our
section.
Apparently, the Northwest with its
natural boundaries-
the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Great
Lakes-was finally de-
limited, and this area, destined to be one
of the richest and
most populous sections of our Union,
awaited only the ordinance
of four years later to begin its
definite progress in civilization.
In reality, however, the limited
geographical knowledge of the
time had led to a serious omission in
the limits which was later
to trouble both contracting parties out
of all proportion to its
importance. By the terms of the treaty
the northern limit of
the United States was to continue due
west from the Lake of
the Woods until it reached the
Mississippi. As this river did
not extend so far north as the lake, the
boundary was an im-
possibility, so a gap was left in the
extreme northwestern limit
of the new nation and likewise of the
section shortly to become
12Secret Journals of Congress.
Foreign Affairs. Aug. 14, 1779.
13Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence
of the American Revolu-
tion, V, 851-853.
552 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
the Northwest Territory. To remedy this
mistake would have
seemed a matter of little difficulty,
but later negotiations compli-
cated this minor omission with the far
more important issues of
the Indian trade, the right to navigate
the Mississippi, and,
subsequently, the settlement of the
northern boundary of the
Louisiana Purchase, and thus postponed
for thirt-five years
the moment for a final diplomatic
settlement of the limits of the
Northwest Territory.
In the years following 1783 the
Northwest became not only
internationally important but Indian
relations monopolized almost
every point from which its affairs were
viewed. It is true that
other questions contributed to the
diplomacy and intrigue of
the period and a brief resume of these
will show their possible
interest for our subject.
In the year 1788 occurred the celebrated
Spanish Conspiracy,
which embraced several of the prominent
men of Kentucky.
The controlling motive for this incident
was the desire of the
Spanish authorities in Louisiana to
check the increasing tide of
American migration over the mountains.
The Canadian authori-
ties were also alive to the danger from
this Westward movement
and embarked in a counter attempt to
forestall their Spanish
rivals by sending a half pay officer to
observe this migration.
This officer, Conolly, reported that
some of the new colonists
settling at the mouth of the Muskingum
were inclined to favor
opening a clandestine trade with the
British at Detroit, and
even mentioned the name of General
Parsons of the Marietta
Company as one favoring such a
connection.14 Perhaps the British
officer desired to show the importance
of his work and magnified
some of the expressions he heard on his
tour; at any rate, we have
.no direct evidence that any such
connection was actually estab-
lished. It is possible that British
goods intended primarily for
the Indian trade may have ultimately
reached these new settle-
ments on the Ohio. We have evidence that
Canadian traders
wished this, but no indications that
their wishes were largely
realized. Of more immediate danger,
however, was the compli-
cated.plan of Citizen Gent in 1793, for
the invasion of Louisi-
14 Brymner, Report of the Canadian
Archives for 1890, p. 99ff.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 553
ana and the Floridas from the Ohio
Valley.15 This danger was
more immediate because of the fact that
French emissaries were
all through the region, while on the
northern bank of the Ohio
a colony of disgusted Frenchmen afforded
a nucleus for such a
movement. This same restive spirit of
filibustering intrigue
continued during the following decade.
The Blount conspiracy
awakened some echoes along the Ohio, but
attracted no tangible
assistance. The various questions
associated with the transfer
of Louisiana aroused in turn the
resentment or elation of the
growing communities now springing up on
its banks. The fa-
mous Burr conspiracy touched the borders
of the same terri-
tory, stirred up some officials to
unwonted activity, and involved
others, especially Senator John Smith of
Ohio, in political ruin.
This catalogue of events will show that
the Northwest had
its general share in the diplomatic
intrigue which existed in the
Mississippi Valley till after 1815. The
formal treaty of 1783
should have secured the peace and safety
of the Northwest Ter-
ritory; instead it merely reopened the
old diplomatic controversy
of the days of Louis XV, with the ever
present Indian as its
most important factor. It is true that
the question had a new
setting. The mother nation, England, was
now arrayed against
her recently freed daughter. The former
possessed a series of
posts along the Great Lakes, most of
them within limits that had
been acknowledged to belong to the
United States. The latter
was represented by the flourishing
colony of Kentucky, the
western extension of Pennsylvania and
Virginia proper, and
within five years had begun to fringe
with settlements the north-
ern bank of Ohio. Between these
straggling outposts lay the
Red Men-divided into two general
groups-the Six Nations,
largely beyond the limits of the
Northwest Territory, but ex-
tending into its northeastern portion,
and the western Algon-
quin tribes. Both of these groups were
largely under British
influence, but while the Iroquois were
inclined to neutrality the
western Indians were especially hostile
to the Americans, whose
widening frontier threatened the early
absorption of their hunt-
15 The details of this are attractively
sketched by Turner in the Am.
Hist. Review, X, 249 ff.
554 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
ing grounds. Beyond the Mississippi,
below the mouth of the
Missouri, were the weak outposts of
impotent Spain, fearing
for her great highway to the Mexican
mines, and ready, as the
history of the immediate past showed, to
strike a covert blow at
Great Britain or the United States,
could she by so acting, check
the advance of these dreaded neighbors.
In addition, there
existed the distinct menace that France
might ally her robust
force with Spain in another attempt to
dominate the Mississippi
Valley. These were the various elements
in the situation dur-
ing a decade and a half after 1783, yet
the essential factors
were the presence of the Indian and the
consequent economic
interest of Great Britain in the fur
trade. These furnished the
motives for retaining the posts thirteen
years, for insisting upon
commercial privileges with Indians
within the limits of the
United States, and for claiming the
right to navigate the Mis-
sissippi, long after her own explorers
had shown that Eng-
land was not. entitled to that
privilege. In a negative way the
fear of the savages, covertly supported
by British policy, acted
as a check upon American settlements
beyond the immediate
banks of the Ohio and gave currency to a
natural resentment
against Great Britain.
The three important diplomatic questions
between the United
States and Great Britain, that involved
the Northwest Terri-
tory are: first, the retention of the
military posts along the
southern border of the Great Lakes;
second, the Indian trade
within the limits of the United States;
and third, the gap in the
boundary line in the extreme northwest
which involved the Bri-
tish right to navigate the Mississippi
and the later northern
boundary of the Louisiana Purchase. We
will trace each of
these in turn until its final
settlement.
The retention of the frontier posts
along our northern
border constituted one of the most
weighty charges of the Amer-
icans against the British during this
critical period. The mo-
tive alleged by the British government,
some two years after
the ratification of the treaty, for the
failure to deliver these
posts was the fact that most of the
states of the American union
had passed laws interfering with loyalists
and with the col-
lection of British debts. This has been
very conclusively shown
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 555
by Professor McLaughlinl6 to
be an after thought. The real
motive was to secure the fur trade on
the American side of the
Great Lakes, and for thirteen years
Great Britain was success-
ful, but at a fearful future cost of
future distrust and national
aversion on the part of the United
States.
But more immediate results followed the
retention of these
posts. British officials must exercise a
civil jurisdiction over
contiguous settlements; they must
provision and arm the In-
dians in order to secure furs from them,
and this regalement
meant at least an indirect encouragement
of their hostilities against
the Americans, if nothing worse. Before
1788 the Americans had
made treaties with certain Indian tribes
by which they obtained
the grants of land occupied by the
settlements at the mouth of
the Muskingum, of the Scioto, and in the
Miami District.17 Other
Indians claimed that these cessions were
illegal, because made
by a minority of the contracting tribe
or obtained through fraud;
and the British agents openly or tacitly
supported them in
resisting the validity of these grants.
During the conferences
between the representatives of the
United States and these
Indians, which resulted in these
treaties, and in others held
before 1795, British representatives
assisted; sometimes through
direct American invitation and at other
times because the Indians
refused to attend unless they were also
present. While it is
probable that for the most part they
exercised a restraining
influence upon the savages, their very
presence did much
to neutralize their spoken counsel.
Their course immediately
before Wayne's campaign in 1794,
however, seems to have
been of a more hostile character. By the indiscreet words
of Lord Dorchester and the forward
course of Lieuten-
ant Governor Simcoe, in reoccupying a
post on the Maumee,
they did much to encourage the Indians
in hostilities against
the Americans, and led to later heated
diplomatic correspond-
ence at Philadelphia and in London.
Hammond, the British
Minister, and Randolph, the American
Secretary of State, were
not in a position to obtain much
satisfaction from their mutual
16 In Report of the Am. Hist. Ass'n for
1894, p. 413 ff.
17 These treaties are given in Am.
State Paper, Indian Affairs I,
pp. 1-12.
556 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
charges, for they depended upon biased
reports from Dor-
chester or from Wayne. The general
purport of this corre-
spondence in 1794 was, as the Americans
claimed, that England,
by taking a new position on the Maumee,
had violated the status
quo which they wished to be observed during Jay's
negotiation,
while the English claimed that the
advance from the Ohio, of
a hostile force under Wayne, was
likewise a violation of the
same status and their own movement was
simply the reoccupa-
tion of a post which had formerly been
under British control.
Fortunately, a more accommodating spirit
ruled at London, by
which Jay and Grenville were enabled to
come to a conclusion
which led to the abandonment of the
forts by the British.18 Thus
a prolific cause of misunderstanding and
confusion was re-
moved from the Northwest. It was now
possible for the Amer-
ican authorities to deal directly with
the Indians, who, no longer
aided by the moral (or perhaps immoral)
support of the British.
and disheartened by Wayne's victory at
Fallen Timbers, finally
signed in 1795, the Treaty of
Greenville, which brought a lull
in Indian hostilities in the Northwest.
Every treaty must in a measure be the
result of compro-
mise and this is illustrated in the case
of Jay's celebrated con-
vention by the clause regulating Indian
Trade. In withdrawing
her garrisons from our territory, Great
Britain did indeed ren-
der partial justice, but the concession
was only obtained by our
yielding something of national dignity
on this other important
question. Lord Grenville at first
suggested that British traders
should have free access to our Indians,
and that the latter
should communicate freely with the
British posts in Canada,
without even the payment of a transit
duty. This derogation
of sovereign rights and waiving of
revenue was too great a con-
cession and the conferees finally agreed
that such Indian trade
should be open to the subjects of both
countries upon the pay-
ment, at designated ports of entry, of
duties upon such articles
as remained permanently within the
foreign territory; but goods
in transit were not to pay even this
nominal charge. In fact,
16 For the diplomatic correspondence
dealing with his subject, con-
sult Am. State Papers, Foreign
Relations I, p. 447ff.
The Indian as a Diplomatic
Factor, Etc. 557
Lieutenant Pike, a decade later, found
that the greater part
of the goods introduced into the Lake
Superior region were
paying no duties whatever.l9
It is obvious that all the advantages of
this arrangement
rested with the British traders. For
thirteen years Great Britain
had controlled the available channels of
this trade, by retain-
ing the posts on the lakes, and now the
influence of her mer-
chants was practically supreme in the
greater part of the North-
west, and this was equally true of the
region above the Mis-
souri, which was soon to pass into our
hands. One result of
this condition of affairs was the ease
with which Great Britain
attracted Indian support during the war
of 1812, and gained con-
trol of the greater part of the present
states of Michigan and
Wisconsin. It was not till 1816 that
British fur traders, except
when serving as subordinates in American
companies, were ex-
cluded from this commerce. Two years
later in the Convention
of London, Mr. Rush and Mr. Gallatin
succeeded in avoiding a
renewal of the privilege of 1794.20 Thus
legal enactment and
formal treaty finally came to the
support of American sovereignty
in this respect, but the annals of
Governor Cass's administration
of Michigan territory show that the
British fur trade was still
a thorn in the flesh of the American
officials as late as the fourth
decade of the Nineteenth Century.21
A third phase of the Northwestern
diplomacy during this
period is concerned with the gap in the
boundary between the
Lake of the Woods and the Mississippi.
At first view it would
seem that this question is less
connected with the ever present
Indian problem than the others already
considered, but this is
more apparent than real. In the ensuing
discussions upon this
omission in the boundary, the British
representatives, contrary
to American claims and the obvious
intention of the second
and eighth articles of the Treaty of
1783, claimed that the sub-
ject was closely interwoven with that of
the navigation of the
Mississippi.22 This latter privilege
they (the British) valued
19 Cf. Coues, The Journals of Zebulon
Montgomery Pike, I, p. 265.
20Am. State Papers, For. Rel. IV, p. 406.
21 McLaughlin,
Lewis Cass. p. 112
ff.
22 Cf. Am. State
Papers, For. Rel. I, 491 ff.
558
Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
chiefly because of the facility it
afforded for carrying on their
fur trade, so this subject, as the
others, is one connected with
the ever recurrent Indian problem.
Hardly was the purport of the
Preliminary Treaty of No-
vember, 1782, known in Canada before
members of the recently
formed Northwest Fur Company were
petitioning the Canadian
officials to assist them in shutting out
possible American rivals
from the Superior region and beyond.
They hoped that the line
of the Lake of the Woods would not be
run as planned, for they
feared that this would close their route
to the posts beyond Lake
Superior. They spoke of a plan to
explore another water route
wholly within the British lines and
asked for a monopoly of such
line, if found, for a period of seven
years.23 Although Governor
Haldimand could not give them the
monopoly they asked for, he
was able to assure them that the forts
on the lakes would not be
delivered to the Americans at present
and that American com-
missioners would not soon be given an
opportunity to examine
British fur preserves, under pretext of
determining the course
of an uncertain boundary. The further development of this
phase of the question has already been
discussed in considering
the question of the posts and of Indian
trade.
Scarcely was the ink dry upon the copy
of Mitchell's map,
where the British and American
commissioners had traced with
heavy line the proposed boundary, before
the explorations of
Mackenzie and the observations of
Thompson showed that it was
an impossible limit.24 The
Mississippi did not extend northward
to the latitude of the Lake of the
Woods, so a due west line from
the latter would not strike it.
Accordingly, it formed one part
of Jay's mission to settle the matter of
the extreme northwest-
ern boundary.
Early in his correspondence with Lord
Grenville, the Eng-
lishman proposed to rectify the mistake
by drawing a line from
the western end of Lake Superior to the
eastern branch of the
Mississippi, or else one due north from
the mouth of the St.
Croix till it should strike a line
running from Lake Superior to
the Lake of the Woods. Jay objected to
these propositions, be-
23 Bymner Report of the Canadian
Archives for 1890, p. 48 ff.
24Am. State Papers, For. Aff. I, p 491 ff.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 559
cause they required a cession of
territory by the United States,
and also implied that the British right
to navigate the river rested
upon the fact that the boundary extended
to the Mississippi,
when his understanding of the
negotiations in 1782-and he was
one of the commissioners was that the navigation' was an
after-thought inserted because of the
British right in virtue of
the Treaty of 1763. Grenville believed
that Great Britain could
insist upon a direct line to the
Mississippi with as much justice
as the Americans upon one due west from
the Lake of the
Woods; nevertheless, he agreed to Jay's
proposition for a joint
survey of the Mississippi river from a
point a degree below the
Falls of St. Anthony to its source. This
joint survey was never
made.25
This limit became important again in 1802, when Madison
forwarded to Rufus King, our minister at
St. James, instructions
relating to the rectification of this as
well as of other points in
our northern boundary. Mr. King was
authorized to accept a
line running from the source of the
Mississippi nearest the Lake
of the Woods, thence following the shore
of the latter till it met
the line of 1783. Madison thoroughly
distrusted Great Britain
and believed that that power wished to
extend her pretensions
to include the territory between the
Mississippi and Missouri.26
It was then supposed that Spain had
transferred this region to
France, so about the same time
Livingston at Paris also advised
Mr. King to agitate the subject of the
gap in our boundaries,
but to come to some agreement in the
matter. Meanwhile he,
Livingston, would use the fact that King
was negotiating
with England as a sort of club to force
France to cede to the
United States the Louisiana Territory
above the Arkansas.27
Thus the minor omission of the Treaty of
1783 had expanded in
Livingston's mind till it included a
large share of the Mississippi
Valley; but his fanciful suggestion had
no direct bearing upon
the solution of the question.
In the instructions and correspondence
of this year the
25 Ibid, 503.
26Ibid, Am. State Papers, For. Rel.
II, 585.
27State Papers and Correspondence Bearing upon the Purchase of
the Territory of Louisiana, p. 20-50.
560 Ohio Arch. and Hist.
Society Publications.
American representatives seem to abandon
Jay's position regard-
ing the navigation of the Mississippi.
Mr. King's convention
finally adopted the liberal suggestion
of Madison, though in re-
verse order, and began the line at the
Northwest corner of the
Lake of the Woods, thence drawing it in
the most direct way to
the Mississippi.
Within three days after signing this
convention, King had
to report to Lord Hawkesbury an event
that had an important
bearing upon it. This was the news of
the cession of Louisiana
by France to the United States. The
Louisiana convention bore
a date twelve days previous to that
negotiated by King, and when
the two papers arrived on the western
shore of the Atlantic it
was questionable whether the former did
not nullify that part of
the latter relating to the Northern
boundary. The committee of
the Senate to whom this matter was
referred, took this view
and reported in favor of ratifying Mr.
King's convention, with
the exception of the Fifth Article,
relating to that limit.28 Sen-
ator Pickering of Massachusetts,
naturally sided with his friend,
Mr. King, and opposed the report of the
committee, delivered by
its chairman, the son of his enemy, John
Adams. Moreover, his
zeal led him into a controversy with
Jefferson over the northern
boundary of Louisiana and he charged the
President with a pol-
icy of duplicity in claiming more
territory in the north than
France had previously done.29 The
wishes of the President pre-
vailed over his lukewarm secretary, and
the policy of Adams ap-
pealed to the Senate. Thus the doubtful
article failed of ratifi-
cation, and in view of the danger of a
possible curtailment of the
Louisiana Purchase in this region, it
was well that it did.
In the spring of 1805, at Madrid, Monroe
and Charles Pinck-
ney stated that the United States
claimed the 49th parallel as the
northern boundary of Louisiana. In the
course of the same year,
General Wilkinson sent Lieutenant Z. M.
Pike to explore the
sources of the Mississippi and to assert
American sovereignty in
the vicinity against the encroachments
of British fur traders.
Pike discovered that the latter were
working on the assumption
28Am. State Papers, For. Rel. II, 584-591, J. Q. Adams, Memoirs I,
p. 267 ff.
29 See Jefferson Papers (MSS) 2d Series, Vol. 66, No. 36.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 561
that the northwestern gap was to be
closed by a line from the
Lake of the Woods to the source of the
Mississippi, at which
point the Louisiana boundary was to
begin. Had Mr. King's
convention been ratified this assumption
on their part might have
been maintained with the consequent loss
by the United States
of the upper part of the Red River
Valley and a considerable
fraction of Louisiana.30
In 1806 Monroe and William Pinckney
again took up the
subject, with a view to continue the
line to the Rocky Mountains,
and in their convention were successful
in establishing the Amer-
ican contention for the line of the 49th
parallel west of the
Lake of the Woods. The other features of
the convention were,
however, so unsatisfactory that
Jefferson did not even submit
their work to the Senate for its
ratification. Thus the gap in the
boundaries, with the accompanying
question of Mississippi navi-
gation and Louisiana boundary, remained
unsettled when the
War of 1812 broke out.
The city of Ghent, in the latter part of
1814, next became
the scene for discussing these important
points. At first, the
British commissioners not only reassumed
the position of their
government before 1807, but even
proposed that the line in ques-
tion should be drawn from Lake Superior
directly to the source
of the Mississippi. Their subjects were
also to have free access
to that river, together with the right
of navigating it to its mouth.
This proposition especially aroused the
ire of Henry Clay, who,
as the representative of the West, was
particularly impressed
with the growing importance of that
river in its development.
Unfortunately, he found his chief
opponent not on the opposing
commission but among his own colleagues,
in the person of John
Quincy Adams. The father of the latter
had secured in 1783,
the right to engage in the fisheries of
the Newfoundland coast,
and now the son was unwilling to abandon
his filial obligation
to preserve what his father had won, or
to fail in the support of
such a typical New England industry as
the cod fishery. For a
time, the question of separating these
two questions-the naviga-
tion and the fisheries-threatened to
disrupt the American con-
30 Coues, Journals of Z. M. Pike, I,
p. 265 ff.
Vol. XVIII - 36.
562 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
tingent and it needed all the tact of
Gallatin to avoid such a
result. Finally, the British
commissioners proposed to defer both
questions for future negotiation, and
although Clay stated openly
that it meant a bad treaty, while Adams
recorded his impressions
in his diary, they both signed the
convention.31 Three years
later Adams, as secretary of State, sent
to Albert Gallatin and
Richard Rush, the instructions to guide
them in the negotiation
which finally settled the question. By
the terms of the Conven-
tion of London, October 20, 1818, the Northern
boundary of the
United States, from the Lake of the
Woods to the Rocky Mount-
ains, was to be the 49th parallel, while
the rights to navigate
the Mississippi and to engage in Indian
trade within the limits
of the United States, was yielded by
Great Britain.22 In view
of the future peace of mind of the then
Secretary of State, one
is pleased to observe that the fisheries
also were not neglected
in this same convention. Thus a minor
error in limits which had
expended into a boundary and commercial
question of continental
magnitude, was happily corrected to the
manifest advantage of
both nations.
It remains to mention briefly, as the
final word in the Indian
diplomacy of the Old Northwest, certain
features connected with
the War of 1812. The broadside
fired into the Chesapeake by
the Leopard off the Capes of Virginia,
had aroused to unwel-
come activity the Canadian officials and
they began to prepare
for expected hostilities from the
American side. This prepara-
tion included invoking the customary
Indian assistance and among
the possible Indian allies we find the
significant names of Tecum-
seh and "The Prophet."
Meanwhile, in Michigan Governor Hull,
and in Indiana Governor Harrison, were
attempting to quiet the
minds of the Indians and to render them
neutral in the expected
crisis. Harrison had succeeded, in spite
of the repeated opposi-
tion of the British traders, and even
government officials, in
obtaining several valuable Indian
cessions in what is now In-
31The public correspondence is given in Am.
State Papers, For.
Rel. III.; for details relating to the American negotiators,
see H. Adams,
Life and Writings of Albert Gallatin,
and J. Q. Adams, Memoirs III.
32 American State Papers, For. Rel. IV, p. 395 ff.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 563
diana and Illinois.33 On the other side
the British authorities
were claiming that they had used every
effort to restrain the In-
dians and had even withheld from them
the means of carrying on
hostilities. We find some American
support of this claim in the
statement of Rufus Putnam to Timothy
Pickering that Harrison
purposely started the difficulty with
the Indians to lend color to the
charge of the American government that
they were stirred up by
the British.34 This statement cannot be accepted,
however, till
we know more of the personal motive that
dictated this letter.
In spite of charges and countercharges,
or possibly as a direct
result of them, the month of November,
1811, beheld on the
banks of the Tippecanoe the opening
event of the War of 1812
in the Northwest, and as usual the
Indian was the most im-
portant factor.
During the first few months of open
hostilities the ad-
vantages of the Indian alliance rested
wholly with Great
Britain. The presence of the savages
materially hastened the
surrender of Detroit, the abandonment of
Fort Dearborn and its
attendant massacre, the capture of Fort
McKay within the pres-
ent state of Wisconsin, the Raisin River
Massacre, and the ex-
tension of hostilities towards the Ohio.
With Perry's victory
on Lake Erie and Harrison's success on
the Thames, there came
a turn, however, and on July 16, 1814,
there occurred the signing
of a second Treaty of Greenville, by
which the majority of the
Indians within the Northwest accepted an
American alliance and
agreed to take up the hatchet against
their former companions in
arms.35 While this fact is
not greatly to the credit of the Ameri-
can government, it is in keeping with
the policy of Jefferson as
outlined in the instructions of the War
Department to the Gover-
nors and Indian agents of Louisiana, and
of Jackson in New
Orleans, who was enlisting the same sort
of support among the
33For a convenient summary of Harrison's Indian treaties see
the
monograph by Webster on Harrison's
Career as Governor of Indiana
Territory in the Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol.
IV, No. 3.
34 Calendar of Pickering Papers in Publications of the
Mass. Hist.
Society, Series VI, Vol. 8, p. 409.
35Am. State Papers, Ind. Affairs, Vol. II, p. 826 ff.
564 Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications.
savages along the Red River.36 Moreover,
the unofficial report of
Harrison's action influenced materially
the discussion at Ghent
concerning Indian relations.
It is at Ghent that we meet with the
last diplomatic attempt
to make of the Old Northwest an Indian
Reservation. At the
first meeting of the commissioners on
August 8, 1814, Mr.
Ghouldbourn, in behalf of his British
colleagues, states that a
sine qua non of the negotiations would be the inclusion of the
Indians in the proposed treaty. A little
later he and his com-
missioners showed what this proposed
inclusion meant. A cer-
tain part of the territory between the
Lakes and the Ohio was
to be made into an Indian buffer state,
with definite bounds,
under the joint guarantee of the United
States and Great Brit-
ain. The more radical London papers had
demanded that the
Ohio should form this line and that
Great Britain should resume
sovereignty over both sides of the
Lakes. The commissioners
stated, however, that they would accept
the line of the Treaty
of Greenville, or even some modification
of it. The hun-
dred thousand or more white inhabitants
beyond this line
would, in the language of the British
commissioners, "have to
shift for themselves." It did not
take the American commis-
sioners long to reject their proposition
to keep this territory an
Indian desert, or the accompanying
proposal that the Americans
must forbear to arm vessels on the Lakes
or erect fortifications
on its shores; and the British
commissioners speedily received in-
structions to abandon them after
Harrison's Treaty at Green-
ville.37 The proposition for
each side to retain its conquests was
equally rejected and in this the
Americans had the support of no
less a character than the great
Wellington himself. Other pro-
posals regarding Indian trade,
navigation of the Mississippi, and
the unadjusted boundary, were equally
unacceptable to both
groups of commissioners, so the treaty
finally provided for a mere
suspension of hostilities. In the near
future, as we have already
seen, these questions were settled in
keeping with the best inter-
ests of the Northwest.
36 Jefferson Papers, Series I, Vol. 10; also Indian Office,
Letter
Book B.
37 Adams, Memoirs III, p.
43.
The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor,
Etc. 565
In this summary of certain diplomatic
questions affecting
the Northwest, two general tendencies
are apparent. The one is
a desire on the part of certain
governing factors to keep the
region a wilderness for the purpose of
ease in control and for
the development of the Indian fur
trade-the other to open the
country to civilization as rapidly as
circumstances and pioneer
energy should warrant. It is with
sincere pride that one records
the fact that despite a few bungling
attempts, the efforts of the
American government from the first were
in keeping with the
second of these tendencies, and that in
the end their efforts
prevailed.
THE INDIAN AS A DIPLOMATIC FACTOR IN THE
HISTORY OF THE OLD NORTHWEST.1
PROF. ISAAC JOSLIN COX,
Department of American History,
University of Cincinnati
One merely asserts a truism when he
states that the North
American Indian is the predominant
factor in the early history
of the Northwest; and that in no other
field is this more appar-
ent than in its diplomacy. It is true
that one may well hesi-
tate to apply such a dignified title to
a policy often character-
ized by senseless deceit, audacious
theft, and other accompani-
ments of mere low intrigue; or to a
policy which if free from
these blemishes was still powerless to
assure essential justice to
the contracting parties; yet the fact
remains that in formal cere-
mony, in the extent of territory
involved, and in subsequent
results, many of the treaties with the
aborigines of this section
rank in importance with the significant
results of European
diplomacy.
In this Northwestern diplomacy we may
readily group the
important events into three distinctive
periods. The first is
distinguished as the period of
international complications between
England and France, with Spain as a
minor and largely neg-
ligible factor. The second period may be
described as a domes-
tic interlude between two international
movements, during which
the interests of the British Imperial
Government and its Red
Wards are involved with those of its
colonies, of private traders,
and of would-be colonizing companies.
Later in this same period
these latter interests play an important
part in the domestic
affairs of the newly liberated states
and of their embryo national
government. The creation by the latter
of a well defined area
-the "Territory Northwest of the
Ohio River"-closes the sec-
1In the preparation of this article the
writer has made extensive
use of an address delivered before the
Chicago Historical Society, which
is now for the first time printed.
542