GENERAL WILLIAM HULL AND HIS CRITICS
By M. M. QUAIFE
The Detroit campaign of 1812 lasted, in
all, but little over
two months (June 10-August 16); a
century and a quarter has
passed since its conclusion, during
which General William Hull's
countrymen have continued to load upon
him the heavy measure
of condemnation which was meted out to
him by his contemporary
associates and critics. This attitude has been perpetuated by
three generations of historians most of
whom have repeated the
chorus of contemporary condemnation.1 In
the writer's opinion
it is quite time to re-examine the
verdict which blasted Hull's
reputation and condemned him to a
shameful death. The recent
article of Prof. C. H. Cramer2 reflects, in a
general way, the
current condemnation of Hull's
leadership. This offering is in-
tended as a commentary upon Cramer's
presentation, in part, but
in a larger sense upon the entire body
of criticism of Hull,
whether voiced by Cramer or not.
That Hull was no military genius is, of
course, painfully
obvious; equally obvious is it that
there were no leaders of
Napoleonic character in the American
army in 1812. Had there
been, their talent would have been
wasted for lack of the public
spirit and governmental organization
essential to the successful
waging of military campaigns. Hull failed, in part because of
his own defective leadership; but in
larger part because of con-
ditions over which he had no control,
and which his contemporary
1 It
is somewhat noteworthy that Michigan historians, who might be presumed
to know the facts as well as any, have
been disposed on the whole to extenuate
Hull's failure. Among exemplars of this
attitude may be noted Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, Clarence Monroe Burton and
George B. Catlin. The Dictionary of American
Biography (New York, 1928-1937) article on Hull, the most recent
expression of
American historical scholarship on the
subject, after stating that Hull was found
guilty of cowardice and neglect of duty,
observes that "these charges would hardly
be sustained today." The author
adds that "his surrender without a battle was a
blow to American morale from which it
took nearly two years to recover." To the
present writer this statement seems
wholly without foundation.
2 C. H. Cramer, "Duncan McArthur:
the Military Phase," Ohio State Archaeo-
logical and Historical Society Quarterly
(Columbus), XLVI (1937), 128-47.
(168)
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 169
critics were equally impotent to cope
with. This is not an attempt
to relieve Hull of the measure of
condemnation to which he is
justly liable but merely to indicate the
extent to which he has
been made a scapegoat for America's
shortcomings in the War
of 1812.
The more important criticisms which
Cramer's article in-
vites are two in number: Lack of
familiarity with the geography
of the Detroit River area, leading to
confused, or even unintel-
ligible, statements, and too ready
acceptance of contemporary
reports at their authors' own valuation,
without subjecting them
to the test of critical examination.
The geographical confusion is shared by
Cramer with a dis-
tinguished predecessor in the historical
field, for Francis Parkman
never understood his directions at
Detroit, although Robert
"Believe-it-or-not" Ripley
does. From Lake St. Clair to Sand-
wich (well below the Detroit of 1812) the river flows
from east
to west, instead of from north to south,
with the result that
Canada is here south of the United
States. Indeed, a century or
so ago present-day Windsor was called
South Detroit. At Sand-
wich the river turns southward in its
further course to Lake
Erie (14 or 15 miles distant). Confusion
over these simple
facts serves to render certain of
Cramer's statements unintelligible.
For example (p. 131),
"McArthur commanded the detachment
which successfully decoyed the enemy
south of the town," after
which he "hurried north . . . to
join the main American force."
The Pied Piper decoyed the rats of
Hamelin into the river, and
General Duncan McArthur must have done
as much for the
British army if he followed these
directions. Today, the vehicu-
lar tunnel runs south from
Detroit to Windsor, and north from
Windsor to Detroit. Obviously, McArthur
did not follow its
course; instead, he marched westward
from Detroit, along the
river bank, and having performed his
feint, returned eastward
through the town to rejoin the main
army, which crossed the
river at Belle Isle, landing in modern
Walkerville (more recently
incorporated in Greater Windsor).
A more significant geographical error is
evidenced on page
170 OHIO ARCHEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY |
|
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 171
133, in dealing with Hull's final effort
to restore his line of com-
munication with distant Ohio. Apart from confusing
Captain
Henry Brush of Chillicothe with Major
Elijah Brush of Detroit,
commander of the Michigan Territorial
Militia, Cramer confuses
the operation he seeks to describe. Captain Henry Brush had
come northward (over the trail opened by
Hull) as far as Mon-
roe, bringing cattle and other supplies
for Hull's army. From
the Maumee to Detroit, the road skirted
the lakeshore and (farther
north) the river bank, passing through
the present down-river
suburbs of Trenton, Wyandotte, Ecorse,
and River Rouge. About
midway between Monroe and Detroit and
directly across the
river lies Amherstburg (frequently
called Malden), since 1796
the British military and administrative
center at the west end of
Lake Erie. The British and Indians knew
their local geography,
and early in August they put an
effective check upon Hull's
invasion of Canada by crossing the river
from Amherstburg to
Brownstown and occupying the roadway at
that point. By this
simple operation they effected the
complete isolation of Hull's
army from its government, and its base
of supplies in Ohio.
Until the road should be cleared and the
communication restored,
the army was a veritable "lost
battalion," and to this objective
Hull promptly bent his further
energies. Two efforts to open
the road to Monroe led to two battles
(Brownstown on August
5 and Monguagon on August 9) and two
complete failures.
Even before the issue of the second
effort, Hull withdrew the
army from Canada to Detroit, in the
night of August 7 and the
following morning. Following Monguagon,
General Isaac Brock
arrived at Amherstburg from Niagara, and
Hull, late on August
14, dispatched Colonels Lewis Cass and
McArthur, two of the
three militia colonels, with
approximately one-fourth of his entire
army, on a third effort to contact
Captain Brush.
The ancient Indian trail from Detroit to
Fort St. Joseph ran
westward through Dearborn, Wayne, and
Ypsilanti, and at dif-
ferent times has been known as the Road
to St. Joseph, the
Sauk Trail, the Chicago Road, and U. S.
Highway No. 112.
Ypsilanti is on the Huron River, which
empties into Lake Erie
172
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
near Rockwood, a dozen miles north of
Monroe, and almost thirty
miles southwest of Detroit. It is also
eight or ten miles below
Brownstown, where the enemy lay athwart
the direct road from
Monroe to Detroit. Since two efforts to
drive him from it had
failed, it was now proposed to
circumvent him by sending Cass
and McArthur by the inland trail to
Ypsilanti, to which point
Captain Brush would proceed from Monroe;
from Ypsilanti, the
covering force would escort Brush, with
his supplies, back to
Detroit.
Although the trail to Ypsilanti had been
familiar to Detroiters
for more than a century, Cass and
McArthur made sad work of
following it, and even sadder work of
supplying an intelligible
report of their movements. To follow
Cramer, however, they
were sent out to relieve Captain Brush,
who had been "bottled
up" at Monroe. The term is
inaccurate, since nothing restrained
his freedom of movement save the
knowledge that if he moved
forward to Brownstown he would there
encounter the British.
"After advancing twenty-four
miles" Cass and McArthur found
themselves in a marsh and short of food,
and they now learned
of Hull's surrender to Brock. "With
the enemy in front and
famine in the rear," McArthur
(presumably, also, his associate,
Cass) was in a difficult situation. In
this dilemma manna de-
scended from heaven in the form of a
large ox, which the soldiers
joyfully barbecued. While thus engaged,
two British officers
appeared, with the articles of Hull's
capitulation. McArthur
thereupon surrendered to them,
"since a retreat to Fort Wayne"
(the nearest place where supplies could
be found) was out of
the question.
Professor Cramer's confusion is
sufficiently obvious; excuse
for it is found in the fact that the
reports he is following are
either purposely misleading or amazingly
careless of the truth.
The real movements of Cass and McArthur
on the critical fif-
teenth and sixteenth of August cannot
certainly be determined,
but Clarence Monroe Burton, whose
knowledge of Detroit local
history has never been excelled, has
arrived at an approximate
exposition of them. The detachment left
Detroit about sunset
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 173
on the fourteenth, intent on contacting
Brush at Ypsilanti. If it
advanced twenty-four miles, it was far
beyond any possible inter-
ference from Brock on the sixteenth.
Instead, Burton shows3
that camp was made the first night
barely two miles from the
fort. On the fifteenth the detachment
advanced "slowly" until
evening, when the leaders (having
encountered no enemy) decided
to return to Detroit, and marching much
of the night, encamped
on the ground occupied the night
before. The morning of the
sixteenth, when Brock was crossing from
Sandwich to Spring
Wells, and the cannonading from Windsor
was proceeding, they
were within sight of the Detroit
stockade, but made no effort to
inform Hull of their presence or to
interfere with Brock, despite
the fact that a messenger had come from
Hull the night before,
expressly ordering them to return. Instead, they retreated to
the Rouge (perhaps three or four miles)
and were here engaged
roasting their ox while the surrender of
Detroit was taking place.
Enough, perhaps, has been said to
suggest that such criticism
of Hull as proceeds from the mouths of
Cass and McArthur
should be examined with care before
credence is given to it. It
is proposed here, however, to take a
somewhat wider view of
the campaign, and in its course to
examine more generally the
charges leveled against Hull. His first
and greatest mistake--the
one from which all later consequences
flowed--was his initial
decision to accept command of the army,
since as he had cor-
rectly pointed out to the Government,
Detroit was untenable by
any force which lacked naval command of
the lakes. The Gov-
ernment did nothing to achieve this
command, yet Hull foolishly
yielded to its persuasion that he assume
charge of the army de-
signed to hold Michigan and conquer
western Canada. The force
that was raised was primarily an
assemblage of adult males, rather
than an army. It consisted of the Fourth
U. S. Infantry, about
300 strong, and three regiments of Ohio
militia, 1,200 in all,
raised in the frontier fashion and
officered by local politicians,
who were about as innocent of military
skill as they were of a
knowledge of Sanscrit. Although the war
was popular in Ohio,
3 Clarence Monroe Burton, City of Detroit, Michigan,
1701-1922 (Chicago, 1922),
11, 1009-11.
174
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
neither privates nor officers had any
remote conception of disci-
pline, or any notion of submitting to
it.4 Before the
departure of
the army from Urbana a portion of the
militia defied their com-
mander, and were cowed into submission
only by Hull's firmness
in using his one regular regiment to
subdue them.
At the moment of invading Canada a
similar revolt occurred.
Hull had planned to cross the river in
the night of July 10, but
his project was defeated by some unruly
soldiers, who in defiance
of orders "kept constantly firing
off their pieces." Although the
militia were duly exhorted by their
officers "in the catching lan-
guage of sincerity" concerning the
necessity of invading Canada,
and the resultant glory to be gained
therefrom, a considerable
fraction of the army refused to leave
American soil.5 Exhibi-
tions of similar insubordination at
Niagara and elsewhere are
matters of common knowledge. Not so well
known, perhaps, is
the fact that General William Henry
Harrison, the most popular
leader the Northwest produced in the
war, was wholly unable in
1812 to control his soldiers. Upon the news of the Indian
siege
of Fort Wayne, the Ohioans swarmed to
the colors in such num-
bers that "every road to the
frontiers was crowded with un-
solicited volunteers."6 Their
zeal merely led to the consumption
of the supplies accumulated by Hull's
orders for the use of his
own army, for within ten days they
deserted the army en masse,
with Fort Wayne still unrelieved and
unseen, and not all the
eloquence employed by Harrison could
restrain them. Unlike
4 Professor Theodore Calvin Pease's
graphic characterization (Centennial History
of Illinois, II, 160-61) of the Illinois soldiers assembled to fight
Chief Black Hawk
in 1832 might well have been penned to
describe the Ohio soldiers of 1812. At
Stillman's River in 1832, 340 militiamen
were put to utter rout by Black Hawk
with only forty warriors. At Brownstown, on August 5, 1812, Major Thomas B.
Van Horn's 200 Ohioans were driven in
similar rout by Tecumseh with twenty-five
warriors. The numerical ratio is
identical in each instance--eight militiamen to one
Indian. At Brownstown six officers were
slain--one-third the total deaths suffered
by Van Horn. Hull supplies the reason:
The militia "ran away at the first fire and
left their officers to be
massacred." Report of the Trial of Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull
(New York, 1814), 66. The "Ohio
Volunteer," James Foster, was able to find
satisfaction in their nimble footwork,
observing: "Fortunately for Major Vanhorne,
a small portion of his detachment which
behaved in a rather cowardly manner, by
precipitantly retreating, prevented a
party of British and Indians, who were detached
for that purpose, from cutting off his
retreat." See his The Capitulation (Chillicothe,
1812), 56.
5 Hull puts the number at 180. Other
statements vary, but it is clear that the
true figure was distressingly large.
6 Moses Dawson, Narrative...of the
Civil and Military Services of Major Gen-
eral William Henry Harrison (Cincinnati, 1824), 288.
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 175
Hull at Urbana, Harrison made no effort,
other than oratorical,
to control them.7
Not only was the army a stranger to
soldierly discipline, but
it was well-nigh criminally lacking in
ordinary material equipment.
The revolt at Urbana was occasioned by
the neglect to pay for
the clothing that had been promised. On
reaching Cincinnati,
on his way to join the army, Hull had
learned that the powder
supply was dangerously inadequate, and
the very guns supplied
the soldiers were in such deporable
condition that he was forced
to organize a company of artificers and
procure a traveling forge
with which to repair them while the
army was maching north-
ward to meet the enemy.
As for food, there was plenty in
southern Ohio, but the
problem of transporting it to feed the
army was one of appalling
dimensions. There was no road through
the Indian country
from Urbana northward, and permission
must first be gained
from the red men before Hull could even
begin cutting one.8
With 300 regulars and 1200 militia as
his army, Hull was ex-
pected to cut a road through the
northern Ohio wilderness; build
and garrison blockhouses to guard it;
maintain his 200-mile line
of communications, open all the way to
Indian or British attack,
and from Maumee Rapids onward to naval
attack, against which
he was helpless; to invade Canada,
despite the presence of British
armed vessels, and conquer it as far as
Niagara, at the opposite
end of Lake Erie.
He cut the road and brought his army to
Detroit, all things
7 McArthur's methods of enforcing
discipline were similar to Harrison's. Illus-
trative, is his conduct at a critical
moment in the Detroit campaign which affords
a unique addition to the literature of
military science. After the battle of Mon-
guagon on August 9, McArthur was sent
from Detroit with 100 men to bring in
the wounded. He was returning with them
in boats up the river, when his valiant
militiamen spied the British ship Hunter
across the river, which is here two or
more miles wide. Although the Hunter was
paying no attention to the boats, and
evidently had not seen them, the
militiamen immediately abandoned their helpless
charges and rushed madly for the protecting
forest. McArthur followed them and
not only stayed their flight, but
induced them to return to their post of duty. How
he accomplished it is thus related by
Foster, his admiring fellow-Ohioan: "He had
on board of his boat a cask, which
contained a few gallons of whiskey, with which
he told the men to fill their canteens
and invited them to drink freely; he related
to them the anecdote of an Indian, who
finding himself descending with rapidity to
the falls of Niagara, seized his bottle
of rum and drunk the contents ere he had
reached the dreadful precipice. In
this manner, the Col. encouraged his
men, and
without difficulty they reembarked."
8 Not until several years later was it
possible for one to journey from Detroit
to the adjoining United
States without trespassing on Indian territory.
176 OHIO
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
considered an extremely creditable feat.
From Detroit on July
12 he crossed the river unopposed, thanks to the operation
which
Cramer has described, and advanced a few
miles in the direction
of Amherstburg. Here the campaign
boggled down, and the
invasion ended, four weeks later, in the
withdrawal of the army
to Detroit. Although the commander of a
beaten army wastes
his time apologizing for his failure,
the historian may properly
examine the causes of it. Hull himself
gave several reasons for
his failure; among others, Henry
Dearborn's armistice which left
the British farther east free to
transfer their forces to Detroit;
the fall of Mackinac and the approach of
the "northern hordes"
of savages, avid to pillage and
massacre; the inability to maintain
his communication with Ohio, on which
the further existence of
his army depended. He did not mention,
of course, the cause
which his critics vociferously
emphasized, his own lack of bolder,
more aggressive leadership.
Ignoring, for the moment, both defense
and hostile criticisms,
the two compelling causes of Hull's
failure, before which all
other details pale to insignificance
are: he had been given a task
ludicrously beyond the possibility to
perform with the resources
at his command; and there was not a
responsible officer in his
army (the three Ohio colonels not
excepted) who possessed
enough military skill or knowledge to
lead it against the enemy.
The latter point is treated first. From
Hull's headquarters
in Windsor (still standing) to the River
Canard, the farthest
advance of the American force, is ten or
a dozen miles. From
July 12 to the night of August 7, Hull
maintained his head-
quarters at Windsor, meanwhile sending
out detachments of
troops repeatedly toward Malden. The
country is as level as a
table-top, and there were no defenses of
any kind, except Fort
Maiden itself. The Ohio political
colonels, Cass and McArthur,
led these expeditions (McArthur for
several days commanded
the entire army in Canada) and at the
Canard were within four
miles of Fort Malden. What (save their
own incompetence)
prevented them from going on and taking
the place? Let any
reader peruse the recital of James
Foster, a soldier under McAr-
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 177 thur, or the journal of another soldier, and future governor, of Ohio, Robert Lucas, of these wearisome days, and conclude if he can that any of the Ohio militia officers were any better |
qualified to lead the army, or more eager to face the enemy, than the general they derided and conspired to overthrow. So far as Cass and McArthur (perhaps Hull's most influential critics) are concerned, their crowning demonstration of incapacity for ag- gressive leadership was afforded on their joint final expedition |
178 OHIO
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
of August 14 to 16. Ordered to Ypsilanti
to meet and convoy
Captain Brush, they abandoned the
mission, although unopposed;
returning to the vicinity of the town,
they calmly disregarded
Hull's order to rejoin him; with the
bombardment going on and
Brock crossing to the attack, they went
off in another direction
to the Rouge, where no enemy was, to
regale themselves upon
an unfortunate ox. Unlike brave Rowland
and Captain Brush
at Monroe, they neither fought nor made
any effort to escape.
If either Ohio colonel performed the
legendary act, discussed
by Cramer on page 134, of breaking his
sword in disgust over
the surrender, he had ample cause for
doing so; but a greater
degree of candor would have fixed the
object of his disgust nearer
home than the person of Hull.
It remains to note the regular army
lieutenant colonel, James
Miller, of subsequent text-book fame.
The regimental flag he lost
at Detroit is still preserved in London
as a military trophy. He dif-
fered from the Ohio colonels in at least
one important respect, for
when he found the enemy in sight he
possessed the will to fight.
Yet he failed as completely of attaining
the objective set him as did
all of Hull's other officers. To
Monguagon on August 9 he led
600 men, one-half of them his own (and
Hull's only) regular
regiment. He fought a good battle and
drove the enemy in flight
from the field of action. Instead,
however, of reaping the fruits
of victory by proceeding on to contact
Captain Brush at Monroe,
he halted in his tracks and presently
returned to Detroit. With
one-third to one-half the entire army,
and on the American side
of the river, he failed to open the line
to Monroe. His reasons?
--lack of provisions, personal illness,
the necessity of caring for
his wounded, and the difficult state of
the roads by reason of
recent rains. That these were not
compelling, is not denied. But
the pot, at least, should not call the
kettle black. If Miller,
entrusted with more than one-third of
the army, could not ad-
vance the twenty miles from Brownstown
to Monroe, even after
clearing the enemy from the way; if
McArthur and Cass, given
repeated opportunities, could not march
from the Canard to
Maiden, four miles away; or, unopposed,
the thirty miles from
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 179
Detroit to Ypsilanti, when directly
ordered to do so; they, at
least, should not be too clamant in
condemning Hull for not
conquering all western Canada and
marching through hostile
country 250 miles to Niagara.
Let the activities of some of his
contemporaries who were
not condemned to death, but instead were
loaded with political
favors by their appreciative countrymen,
now be noted. After
his triumph of August 16, Brock left
Colonel Henry Procter
with a garrison of 250 men to hold
Detroit, while he himself
hurried eastward to glory and death at
Niagara. For over a year
Procter's single 41st Regiment, aided by
the Indian allies and
such Canadian militia as could be
mustered, held Detroit and the
Lake Erie front, despite every effort of
the Americans, with
vastly larger forces than Hull had
commanded, to dislodge them.
Twice during 1813 he carried the war to
the Maumee, where
Harrison maintained possession of Fort
Meigs only by desperate
efforts. For over a year, Harrison did not venture to send a
soldier north of the Maumee, although
the immediate objective
of all his operations was the recovery
of Detroit. In January,
1813, General James Winchester ventured
as far north as Monroe,
only to have his army entirely destroyed
by Procter; and Har-
rison, without awaiting the news of
Winchester's fate, made in-
decent haste to disclaim all military
and moral responsibility for
his venture. With marching and
counter-marching, the establish-
ment of bases and the later burning of
them in panic,9 the year
was filled with futile and in large part
aimless gestures in the
direction of Detroit; the operations as
a whole amounted to a
demonstration on a larger scale of that
inability to lead an army
9 Rev. Alfred Brunson was a soldier in
Harrison's army at Fort Seneca, at the
time of Procter's advance upon Fort
Stephenson. He relates that on hearing reports
of Procter's advance with "5000
regulars and 6000 Indians [the actual army may
have been one-tenth these numbers]"
Harrison hastily ordered Major George Croghan
to burn Fort Stephenson and join his
army at Fort Seneca, where Harrison himself
was in readiness to burn everything,
"provisions, stores, tents," and beat an instant
retreat. The order to Croghan
miscarried; he did not join Harrison the next morning,
and the latter must either hold his
ground at Fort Seneca or abandon Croghan's
little force to (as believed) certain
destruction. In this dilemma a "Council of
War" was held, to decide which
course to pursue. When Harrison asked for Cass's
opinion, the latter sagely observed that
it would be better not to retreat "till we
see something to retreat from," and
so the army remained, "to meet the enemy at
our breastworks... despite the odds in
numbers." Comment upon the state of mind
of the general, to whom the recovery of
the Northwest had been committed, seems
needless.
180
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
in the face of the enemy which had been
so painfully illustrated
by Hull, McArthur, and Cass between
Windsor and Amherst-
burg in the summer weeks of 1812. The one success
in a year
of campaigning was won by a twenty-one
year old boy, Major
George Croghan, at Fort Stephenson; and
for this brilliant
minor affair, Harrison could claim no
credit. After Oliver
Hazard Perry's victory of September 10
had given the Americans
that naval control of the lakes which
Hull two years before had
urged upon the Government as essential
to American success in
the Northwest, Harrison, strengthened by
fresh levies of a dozen
regiments from Kentucky, ventured for
the first time to advance
upon Detroit; for the British, the game
was up, and Procter's
little army promptly fled eastward, to
be overtaken and destroyed
in a despairing rear-guard action at the
Thames on October 5.
He who would know the shameful story of
the northwestern oper-
ations from Detroit in 1812 to the Thames in
1813 may find it
succinctly stated in Emory Upton's Military
Policy of the United
States, from which the following quotation is taken:
The cost of dispersing the 800 British
regulars, who from first to last
had made prisoners of Hull's army at
Detroit, let loose the northwestern
Indians, defeated and captured
Winchester's command at Frenchtown, be-
sieged the Northwestern Army at Fort
Meigs, and twice invaded Ohio . . .
teaches a lesson well worth the
attention of any statesman or financier.
Not counting the hastily organized and
half-filled regiments of regulars,
sent to the West, the records of the
Adjutant-General's Office show that
about 50,000 militia were called out in
1812 and 1813, from the states of
Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia, for service against
Procter's command.10
If to save Ohio from conquest, and to
recover Detroit from
the grasp of the valiant British 41st
Regiment, required a year
of time, the service of 50,000 militia,
uncounted levies of regulars,
and a navy triumphant on Lake Erie, why
should Hull have
been pilloried for his failure to do far
more than this in a
few weeks, with 300 regulars, perhaps
1500 militia, and no navy
whatever? The answer rests largely in
the realm of psychology.
A certain faction of the American public
had stampeded the
Administration into declaring war
against Great Britain. The
measures taken for conquering the most
militant nation on earth
10 Emory Upton, Military Policy of the
United States (Washington, 1917), 111.
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 181
were largely confined to the field of
oratory. In the West, where
alone the war was genuinely popular, it
was fondly anticipated
that Canada would fall into our hands
like an over-ripe apple.
Henry Clay, Kentucky's peerless orator,
voiced the general ex-
pectation when he affirmed that Kentucky
alone would conquer
Canada in a few weeks time. In such an
atmosphere of child-
like innocence, Hull's army of 300
soldiers and 1200 Ohio citi-
zens began the romp from Urbana which
was to continue to
Niagara, or even to Montreal. The
disillusionment produced by
Hull's surrender was exceedingly
painful. To blame others for
one's own stupidity and short-comings is
easy and ever popular.
A scapegoat must be found to appease the
angry multitude and
clear the skirts of the fatuous
politicians at Washington and the
make-believe soldiers of Ohio, and Hull
was offered up on the
altar of his country's folly. In three
years of warfare the Gov-
ernment enlisted 500,000 soldiers, as
many as the entire popula-
tion of Canada, and the end saw Canada
unconquered, the Capitol
and presidential residence in flames,
the country invaded and
within a hair's breadth of dismemberment
and national ruin.
It was Hull's peculiar misfortune to be
the first to reveal the
depths of the Nation's folly, and to
attract the cyclone of its
wrath. If he failed totally, or even
shamefully, it was not for
such blunderers as McArthur, of whom
even Professor Cramer's
friendly pen does not make much of a
military hero, to cast the
first stone. His final conclusion is
that "since McArthur never led
a large army in a vital campaign, the
story of what he might have
done remains within the realm of
conjecture." Possibly so. At
any rate, it is known he was proficient
at capturing an unguarded
flock of sheep, and an expert at writing
letters of resignation; the
measure of his statesmanship is
suggested by the fact that as late
as February, 1815, he had no conception
that the war had been
won, and was deliberately advising his
Government to depopulate
Detroit and make of western Canada and
Michigan Territory an
uninhabited desert.11
The nature of Hull's failure is better
disclosed by certain
11 Duncan McArthur to James Monroe,
Secretary of War, February 6, 1815.
182 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
general remarks of William Wood, Canada's historian of the
war, in comparing the opposing forces
of the two hostile nations,
than by all the accusations of his
contemporary critics:
"An armed mob must be very big
indeed before it has the
slightest chance against a small but
disciplined army." And "The
Americans [in the war] had more than
four times as many men.
The British had more than four times as
much discipline and
training."12
12 William Wood, The War with
the United States (Toronto, 1915), 20-22.
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL AND HIS CRITICS
By M. M. QUAIFE
The Detroit campaign of 1812 lasted, in
all, but little over
two months (June 10-August 16); a
century and a quarter has
passed since its conclusion, during
which General William Hull's
countrymen have continued to load upon
him the heavy measure
of condemnation which was meted out to
him by his contemporary
associates and critics. This attitude has been perpetuated by
three generations of historians most of
whom have repeated the
chorus of contemporary condemnation.1 In
the writer's opinion
it is quite time to re-examine the
verdict which blasted Hull's
reputation and condemned him to a
shameful death. The recent
article of Prof. C. H. Cramer2 reflects, in a
general way, the
current condemnation of Hull's
leadership. This offering is in-
tended as a commentary upon Cramer's
presentation, in part, but
in a larger sense upon the entire body
of criticism of Hull,
whether voiced by Cramer or not.
That Hull was no military genius is, of
course, painfully
obvious; equally obvious is it that
there were no leaders of
Napoleonic character in the American
army in 1812. Had there
been, their talent would have been
wasted for lack of the public
spirit and governmental organization
essential to the successful
waging of military campaigns. Hull failed, in part because of
his own defective leadership; but in
larger part because of con-
ditions over which he had no control,
and which his contemporary
1 It
is somewhat noteworthy that Michigan historians, who might be presumed
to know the facts as well as any, have
been disposed on the whole to extenuate
Hull's failure. Among exemplars of this
attitude may be noted Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, Clarence Monroe Burton and
George B. Catlin. The Dictionary of American
Biography (New York, 1928-1937) article on Hull, the most recent
expression of
American historical scholarship on the
subject, after stating that Hull was found
guilty of cowardice and neglect of duty,
observes that "these charges would hardly
be sustained today." The author
adds that "his surrender without a battle was a
blow to American morale from which it
took nearly two years to recover." To the
present writer this statement seems
wholly without foundation.
2 C. H. Cramer, "Duncan McArthur:
the Military Phase," Ohio State Archaeo-
logical and Historical Society Quarterly
(Columbus), XLVI (1937), 128-47.
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