Ohio History Journal

CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 259

Simon Cameron's request of April 15, 1861, for one regiment of

37 officers and 743 men from each of the states of Michigan,

Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, six each from Illinois and In-

diana, thirteen from Ohio, and sixteen from Pennsylvania came,

the West could respond with an enthusiasm equal to that of the

East but lacked an equal ability for hasty compliance.1

The West's response to the call indicated that each had addi-

tional problems peculiar to itself. Iowa's Governor Samuel Kirk-

wood and Wisconsin's Alexander Randall raised men in compara-

tively short order, but they had to join in the general clamor for

the national government to supply arms and uniforms.²In In-

diana Governor Oliver Morton was so badly in need of arms for

the troops which he raised that he went in person to the War De-

partment.³Michigan's Governor Austin Blair faced a treasury

which had been looted by the former treasurer--a situation which

forced him to raise $100,000 from Detroit bankers before he could

issue his call for volunteers.⁴In Ohio Governor William Dennison

found himself swamped with regiments, but he had no state officer

capable of an efficient handling of the situation.⁵Governor Rich-

ard Yates of Illinois wanted permission to requisition federal arms

and accouterments for his rapidly assembling volunteers.⁶

The greatest problem of the westerners, however, concerned

the potential strength of secessionist sentiment and arms in the

contiguous border states. Governors Claiborne Jackson in Mis-

souri and Beriah Magoffin in Kentucky were avowed secessionists,

1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union

and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Series 3, I, 68-69. Here-

after cited as O. R.

2 Ibid., Series 3, 1, 91, 102; S.H.M. Byers, Iowa in War Times (Des Moines,

1888), 45; Wisconsin State Journal, April 15, 23, 1861; Wisconsin Daily Patriot, April

16, 20, 1861; Wisconsin, Report of the Adjutant-General, 1861, 5, 8, 13.

3 William D. Foulke, Life of Oliver P. Morton (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1899),

1, 113-114; William B. Weeden, War Government, Federal and State, in Massachusetts,

New York, and Pennsylvania and Indiana, 1861-1865 (Boston, 1906), 145; Charles M.

Walker, Sketch of the Life, Character, and Public Services of Oliver P. Morton (In-

dianapolis, 1878), 51-53; W.H.H. Terrell, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion (In-

dianapolis, 1869), 3; O. R., Series 3, 1, 64.

4 Charles Moore, History of Michigan (4 vols., Chicago, 1915), 1, 416; John

Robertson, Michigan in the War (Lansing, 1880), 17-18; O.R., Series 3, 1, 88, 97.

5 Ibid., Series 3, 1, 77, 101-102; Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War (2 vols., Cin-

cinnati, 1868), 1, 28ff.

6 O. R., Series 3, 1, 81. In Pennsylvania Governor Curtin prodded his legisla-

ture for a law which would revamp the state's militia regulations. See James G.

Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (2 vols., Norwich, 1884), 1, 306-307; William H.

Egle, ed., Andrew Gregg Curtin: His Life and Services (Philadelphia, 1895), 41-42,

123, 212; Paul Angle, New Letters and Papers of Lincoln (Boston, 1930), 267; Apple-

ton's American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Years

1861-5 (5 vols., New York, 1864-70), 1, 564-570; New York Times, April 10, 1861.

260 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

and each refused to send his militia to Washington's aid. The

latter's refusal brought frightening visions to the citizens of Ohio,

Indiana, and Illinois.⁷

On the day on which Lincoln called for troops, an alarmed

Cincinnatian wrote Dennison that Magoffin and Breckinridge

would drive Kentucky out of the Union and that loyal men in

Kentucky would need help. Therefore, he continued, Ohio would

need 10,000 men to keep Kentucky from placing batteries on the

hills back of Newport and Covington. Men must not be sent

away from Cincinnati for there were many traitors there; Penn-

sylvania and New York would have to assume responsibility for

protecting the national capital. Another suggested that General

George B. McClellan, whom Dennison had appointed to com-

mand Ohio troops, take charge at Cincinnati. Still another wrote

Dennison that he had knowledge that arrangements had been

made to tear up the rails through Ohio and Indiana the moment

Kentucky declared for secession.⁸Citizens of southern Indiana

formed companies of home guards to protect their property.9

Hardly had the guns of Sumter ceased when alarmed Republicans

in southern Illinois demanded that Yates send troops and cannon

to protect Cairo and Shawneetown from seizure.10 The governors

took heed.

Governor Dennison was thoroughly alarmed. In desperation

he asked Cameron to send heavy guns from Pittsburgh, ordered

railroad presidents to hold back all shipments of contraband, in-

structed telegraph lines to let no communications regarding troop

movements pass through, and told Cincinnati's mayor to prevent

munitions, provisions, or contraband from passing through the

city.11

Dennison, however, had even greater interest and anxiety

concerning the western part of Virginia. On May 10, 1861, he

7 O.R., Series 3, I, 70, 82-83; Appleton's Cyclopaedia, I, 444.

8 Letters of Timothy C. Day, April 15; James Todd, April 16; J. W. Clark,

April 16; Richard Smith, April 25; and J. K. Harnfeld, May 1, 1861, to Dennison, in

Ohio Executive Records-Correspondence, Boxes 196-198, Ohio State Archaeological and

Historical Society Library, Columbus.

^{9 O}.R., Series 3, I, 102-103.

10 Letters of John Olney, April 15; C. M. Hawley, April 25, 1861, to Yates, in

Yates MSS., Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield.

11 O.R., Series 3, I, 101, 104; Letters from G. C. Davies, April 22; Rufus King,

April 29; M. B. Wright, April 29, 1861, to Dennison, and Dennison to Mayor George

Hatch, April 29, 1861, in Ohio Executive Records--Correspondence, Box 198.

CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 261

sent to McClellan a number of reasons why his troops should

cross the Ohio River and occupy Parkersburg and other towns

along the border. Although Dennison had already placed a bat-

tery opposite Parkersburg and wanted West Virginia included in

the Department of Ohio, McClellan, declaring that he saw nothing

to fear from that section of Virginia, advised delay of any

invasion.12

Five days later the New York Times reported that Dennison

and Pennsylvania's Governor Andrew Curtin had pledged their

entire support to protect the Union men of Virginia from that

state's eastern secessionists.13 On May 20 Virginia's John S.

Carlile, soon to enter the Senate from "loyal" Virginia, wired

Dennison that Virginia secession troops were moving to Grafton,

Charleston, and Wheeling. Dennison relayed the word to Mc-

Clellan, but the general still adhered to his original view concern-

ing western Virginia and did not move. Four days later, when

Cameron ordered him to do so, he made a point of getting specific

permission from Dennison to use Ohio troops before he entered

West Virginia to rescue the new state.14

To the west of Ohio, while Dennison intervened in Virginia,

Indiana's Governor Morton worried about Kentucky. Although

he had no important river city to guard, Morton reported to the

War Department that his people in southern Indiana who had

formed military companies in anticipation of marauders were

helpless without arms.l⁵Morton begged the federal government

for artillery to place on the banks of the Ohio. Meantime he sent

agents into Kentucky who assured him that Kentucky's Unionists

badly needed support.¹⁶

In Illinois Governor Yates had double worries. His state

faced slaveholding states on two sides, and the proximity of Ken-

tucky and Missouri made the strategic importance of Cairo pain-

fully obvious. Moreover, rumors from the democratic counties

12 Reid, Ohio, 1, 46-48.

13 New York Times, May 15, 1861. The paper also said that Yates and Morton

had made the same pledge to Union men of Kentucky and Missouri. On May 13 Den-

nison, in asking the state legislature for $30,000 for the relief of Unionists in Missouri,

said, "It is well known that the state authorities of Missouri are arrayed against the fed-

eral government." See also Columbus Crisis, May 13, 1861.

14 Reid, Ohio, 1, 48.

15 O.R., Series 3, 1, 102-103.

16 Terrell, Indiana, 212; Foulke, Morton, 1, 134-135; O.R., Series 3, 1, 125-126.

262 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

of the entire southern part of the state, commonly called "Egypt,"

filled the Illinois governor with dread.17

Illinois officials went into action. Governor Yates and United

States Senator Lyman Trumbull, together with the state treasurer,

the auditor, and the secretary of state, sent a joint letter to Lincoln

on the alarming situation in Missouri. They made two proposals:

arms in the St. Louis arsenal should be removed immediately to

Illinois, and a separate army of 20,000 men should be assembled

at Cairo. This, they said, would "save Missouri certainly, would

embarrass the Confederacy, and would protect Illinois."18

The Illinois communication, together with the saucy replies

which the War Department was getting from the southern gov-

ernors, drove Secretary Cameron to direct Yates to send a briga-

dier general and four extra regiments to Cairo, and two or three

more regiments to aid the garrison in the St. Louis arsenal. Yates

complied immediately.¹⁹In addition Cameron instructed General

Nathaniel Lyon, new commandant of the St. Louis arsenal, to

issue to Illinois troops 21,000 stands of arms, 110,000 cartridges,

and two field pieces. On April 25, therefore, Lyon permitted

Yates's men to carry secretly almost all of the contents of the St.

Louis arsenal to Alton and thence to Springfield.²⁰

The activities of the governors in raising troops, dispatching

them to Washington, and arousing the martial spirit of their

people contrasted sharply with the slowness, confusion, and in-

efficiency of the federal government. The governors raised men,

but the national government had no arms for them. The gov-

ernors organized their troops into regiments, but the army sent

no officers to muster them into service. The governors housed,

fed, and clothed the volunteers, and raised money on their per-

sonal security, but the national government was dilatory in taking

over the burden of their support. When burned bridges and

snipped wires through Baltimore cut Washington off from com-

munication, the governors on their own initiative handled the

17 Letters of C. H. Ray, April 16; T. S. Rodery, April 19; and others, May 2-9,

1861, to Yates, in Yates MSS.

18 O.R., Series 3, I, 80-81.

19 Ibid., Series 3, I, 93, 113; Chicago Times, April 20, 1861; Thomas M. Eddy,

The Patriotism of Illinois (2 vols., Chicago, 1865), I, 97-102; John A. McClernand MSS.,

Illinois State Historical Library.

20 O.R., Series 3, I, 116-117; John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln,

A History (10 vols., New York, 1890), IV, 193-195.

CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 263

problem of sending troops and assumed the task of dealing with

the border states.²¹

In a short time the governors became disgusted with the

administration's lack of coordination and its timidity. The state

executives, closer to the people than the federal officials, believed

that popular enthusiasm should be harnessed immediately for

victory. Hence Governor Dennison touched a responsive chord

when he invited all the governors west of New England to confer

in Cleveland on May 3.

To the conference came Dennison, Morton, Curtin, Randall,

and Blair to meet with the agents of Yates and New York's

Governor E. D. Morgan, both of whom were too busy to come

personally. The governors found themselves in thorough agree-

ment both in their criticisms of the government and in their plans

for action. They met General McClellan and were delighted with

him and with his talk of drastic measures against the rebels. The

governors agreed that they should vigorously instruct the Presi-

dent on the need for more men, more efficiency, more enthusiasm,

and a concrete plan of campaigns. They delegated Randall to

present their demands to Lincoln.

The spirit of the meeting was manifested in the evening

when Cleveland's citizens assembled before the governor's hotel

for an impromptu serenade. Cleveland's mayor introduced Gov-

ernor Dennison who--quite out of character--remarked that the

time for speaking had passed and the time for action had come.

Ohio, he announced, would march sternly off to put down treason.

Then Dennison introduced in succession, Curtin, Randall, and

Blair.

Each of the governors rose to the occasion. Governor Curtin

assured the crowd that a just God was above them who abhorred

wrong and upheld right, and that every man in Pennsylvania was

ready to take up arms for the national honor. "To arms!" he

cried, "The country of Washington shall defend the flag of Wash-

ington, and it shall wave on every fort, state, and capitol in the

land!"

21 O.R., Series 3, I, 106-107, 124; Henry G. Pearson, The Life of John Andrew,

Governor of Massachusetts 1861-1865 (2 vols., Boston, 1904), I, 200-208, 214-218;

George S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs (2 vols., New York,

1902), I, 284ff.; Fred A. Shannon, The Organzation and Administration of the Union

Army, 1861-1865 (2 vols., Cleveland, 1928), I, 53ff.

264 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

264 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Wisconsin's governor, with oratorical pyrotechnics, trans-

ported an army down the Mississippi and blazed a broad track

through the whole South from Montgomery to Charleston. Michi-

gan's Blair, not to be outdone in verbal fireworks, sent Michigan's

troops along and burned Charleston to the ground.

Thrilled to new heights of enthusiasm, the crowd called for

McClellan. But the young general knew better than to compete

with veteran orators. He adopted the becoming caution of a

military man, skillfully implied that he was a man of deeds, and

modestly left the impression that the time would soon come when

his acts would speak for him.²²

Away from the stimulus of an audience, the governors pri-

vately faced their problems. They dispatched peremptory mes-

sengers to Washington, and they authorized Randall to urge

"some more definite course of policy" upon Lincoln. "We are

prepared . . . ," Randall told the President, "to sustain you and

your administration in every measure, however extreme, for the

suppression of this untoward rebellion and for the punishment of

treason." The governors understood the government's difficulties,

"but now we wish to urge upon you the absolute necessity, since

Washington is safe, of giving more attention to the country im-

mediately contiguous to the line between the free and slave states."

Cairo and the Mississippi River were essential, Randall told

Lincoln, to the safety and the commerce of the northwest. This

meant that men and munitions would be needed. The north-

western states could raise 60,000 men in four weeks--"among

the swarming millions . . . there is but one pulse beating today"--

but they needed a better military organization, and a "military

head to which it can communicate its necessities without tedious

and mischievous delays." Unless the government took control--

the threat was pointed--there "will be war between border states,

which will lose sight, for the time, of the government." There

was widespread dissatisfaction with the federal government's

timidity, said Randall. The President must call more men, furnish

them arms, and give the nation a policy.²³

22 New York Times, May 16, 1861; E. B. Quiner, The Military History of Wis-

consin (Chicago, 1866), 64.

23 O.R., Series 3, I, 167-170; Egle, Curtin, 373-374; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln,

IV, 304ff.; New York Times, May 5, 10; Wisconsin State Journal, May 4, 6; Wiscon-

sin Daily Patriot, May 7, 14; Detroit Free Press, May 7, 1861.

CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 265

At the same moment that the governors met in Cleveland,

the Union Defense Committee of New York City reported to

Cameron on the number of volunteers who had answered Lincoln's

call to arms. The committee, which had more information than

the War Department, had figures from thirteen of the seventeen

northern governors. The governors had raised and had under

arms or in near prospect 63 regiments and a few batteries of

artillery. In addition these governors, who were belaboring the

Department with demands that it accept more troops, reported

that they had accepted or had available 38 more regiments.²⁴

Even the harassed and befuddled administration in Wash-

ington understood the implications of these events. A situation

in which an unofficial committee raised troops and reported to the

War Department, and in which the governors assumed authority,

negotiated with neighboring states, and instructed the commander-

in-chief on his policy was intolerable. Faced with the situation,

Lincoln assumed responsibility. On May 4 the War Department

issued a proclamation--dated the third--of the President calling

for forty regiments of volunteers, increasing the regular army by

eight regiments, and calling for 18,000 new sailors for the navy.

But there was a difference. These were no longer state

militia called for ninety days to protect the public property. These

were volunteers called to serve three years or for the duration of

the war and "subject to the laws and regulations governing the

army of the United States." Officers might be commissioned by

the governors, but the control and direction would be in the hands

of the President.²⁵

The call for three-year volunteers and the increase in the

regular army was Lincoln's subtle answer to the governors who

wanted more vigor in the conduct of the war. The call had two

effects: It kept the governors so busy raising troops that they

had no time for further consultations and planning, and it served

as assurance that Abraham Lincoln was capable of directing

the war.

24 O.R., Series 3, I, 148-149. The committee, a group of private citizens who

had been exerting extraordinary efforts toward getting the war effort organized, had

no answer from Illinois, Indiana, Delaware, or New Jersey.

25 O.R., Series 3, I, 145-146.

THE CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861

WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE

Professor of History, University of Wisconsin

and

HAZEL C. WOLF

Instructor in History, Manual Training High School

Peoria, Illinois

The outbreak of the Civil War found a nation completely

unprepared for the conflict. The federal government had neither

plans for conducting the war nor an organizational structure for

implementing the plans. In the first few weeks after Fort Sumter,

chaos mingled with confusion while the state governors raised

militia to meet Lincoln's call and faced local problems of which

the newly installed national administration had no understanding.

Within two weeks, however, as the governors of the states began

planning to take over the direction of the war, Abraham Lincoln

interposed in their arrangements and took the reins into his own

hands. The need for his act became apparent when the gover-

nors of western states assembled at Cleveland, Ohio, to formulate

instructions for the federal government.

When the war began the governors of the states west of the

Alleghenies found the task of organizing an all-out war effort

complicated by problems not so frequently encountered in the

older seaboard states. In general the western states had fewer

constitutional provisions for the rapid assembling of militia forces,

less concentrated populations, and transportation facilities totally

inadequate for the hasty dispatch of troops. In addition the West

was unable to assume financial responsibility for supporting many

regiments for long periods of time. When Secretary of War

258