Ohio History Journal

THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND OF THE

NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN*

 

by JOHN MILLER

Assistant Chief, Pacific Unit, Historical Division, Department of the Army

 

Behind nearly every military operation of the second World

War lay months of careful planning.     In the South Pacific, for

example, the preparations for the seizure of New Georgia, a battle

in which Ohio's 37th Division distinguished itself, occupied the

planning staffs of several army and navy headquarters for six

months. The fact that any military action requires a tremendous

amount of comprehensive and meticulous planning by land, air, and

sea forces is axiomatic to military men and well known to the in-

formed public. But the reasoning underlying the strategical plan-

ning of the past war is not always understood, although recent books

have thrown some light on this subject. It is my purpose to explain

some strategic decisions and thus show how the 37th Division's

operations in the faraway jungles of New Georgia and Bougain-

ville in the Northern Solomons campaign were related to the

strategic plan for the defeat of the Japanese.

Pending the release of the private papers of all Allied leaders,

our information on such subjects is somewhat lacking in personal

detail. But the documents in the department of the army, which

include the minutes, planning papers, and orders of the U. S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the U. S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff as

well as complete records of all army units and headquarters, are

more than adequate to establish accurately the broad framework of

the subject.

Immediately after the entrance of the United States into the

war, the chief political and military authorities of the United States

 

* This is the text of a paper read at the annual meeting of the Ohio Academy

of History at Columbus on April 8, 1949. The material was taken from The Northern

Solomons and the Reduction of Rabaul, a volume in the Pacific Series of The United

States Army in World War II, now being written by Dr. Miller. The editor is

indebted to the Historical Division, Department of the Army, for permission to pub-

lish the paper.

274

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NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN                 275

 

and Great Britain decided to pool the military power of their

nations. On the highest level, President Roosevelt and Prime

Minister Churchill cooperated closely. The United States Army,

Navy, and Air Forces were directed by the army chief of staff (Gen-

eral Marshall), the chief of naval operations and commander in

chief, U. S. Fleet (Admiral King), and the commanding general of

the army air forces (General Arnold). For strategic planning, these

officers, together with Admiral Leahy, functioned as a single or-

ganization-the joint chiefs of staff. The principle of unified com-

mand was applied to Allied forces. The army, navy, and air force

chiefs of the two countries merged themselves in the combined

chiefs of staff, a committee charged by President Roosevelt and

Mr. Churchill with the strategic direction of the war. In the field,

the highest commands were all Allied. The best known, of course,

were those led by General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean and

in Europe.

The most significant aspect of the relationships of president,

prime minister, and combined chiefs is not the fact that there were

disagreements and even prolonged arguments. What is significant

is the fact that the Allied leaders successfully resolved all their

differences. Probably never before in the history of warfare have

two proud, sovereign allies achieved so complete a fusion of forces,

materials, and war aims.

The United States and Britain decided to defeat Germany first

and then to defeat Japan. This basic decision which governed the

conduct of the war from 1941 through 1945 was made in December

1941, although its roots extend back to the prewar years. The

military resources of the Allies were not believed sufficient to defeat

Germany and Japan simultaneously. Recognizing that Germany,

rather than Japan, represented the greater threat to the Allies, the

United States and Great Britain agreed to defeat Germany first, then

concentrate on Japan. Shortly after this decision, the world was

divided into spheres of primary military responsibility. The U. S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed direction of the war in the Pacific,

subject to the broad authority of the president, prime minister, and

the combined chiefs.

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In the Pacific, Allied strategy was originally limited to con-

taining the Japanese with the forces then committed or allotted.

Within the framework of this decision, the United States had deter-

mined to hold the Hawaiian Islands and Midway. Plans for opera-

tions in the event that Japan attacked the United States had been

prepared before December 7, 1941. These plans had provided for

an advance across the Central Pacific to establish a line of com-

munications to the Philippines. This objective could not be attained

because of the damage which the Japanese inflicted on the U. S.

Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Philippines and the bases at

Wake and Guam were engulfed by the victorious Japanese offensives

of 1941 and 1942, which also resulted in the conquest of Malaya

and the Netherlands East Indies and placed Japan in a position to

threaten Australia and New Zealand.

The joint and combined chiefs of staff had early decided that

Australia and New Zealand would not be allowed to fall into enemy

hands. The two dominions were important to the Allies as sources

of supply, as essential units of the British Commonwealth, and as

future bases for offensive operations. The implications of this deci-

sion were clear. If Australia and New Zealand were to be held,

then the line of communications between them and the United

States would also have to be held. Troops to reinforce existing

Allied bases and to establish new bases along the line were sent

overseas. The 37th Division was dispatched to the Fijis, the Amer-

ical Division to New Caledonia. A navy and marine force defended

Samoa.

The speed and breadth of the Japanese offensive moves of 1941-

42 had made ineffective the first Allied command structures in the

Pacific and the Far East, and had won for the Japanese tremendous

gains at little cost. When, in January 1942, they overran a small

Australian garrison and captured Rabaul, a small town in New

Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago, they had gained a major

objective. Well situated with regard to the Japanese bases at Truk

and the Palaus, Rabaul possessed a magnificent harbor and sites

for several airfields. The New Guinea coast lies only 440 nautical

miles southwest of Rabaul, and Guadalcanal in the Solomons is

only 500 nautical miles to the southeast. Since bombers from

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NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN               277

 

Rabaul could easily attack both areas, the Japanese were ready for

a southward push toward the Allied line of communications. By

May 1942 they had completed the occupation of the islands in the

Bismarck Archipelago. They had pushed south to establish bases

on the north coast of New Guinea, built airfields in the northern

Solomons, and had seized Tulagi, seat of government of the British

Solomon Islands Protectorate. Their first setback came in the Coral

Sea in May 1942 when Allied air and naval units repulsed a

Japanese assault force. The objective of the Japanese had been the

capture of Port Moresby in New Guinea as part of a plan to cut

the line of communications.

To their sorrow, the Japanese then changed the direction of

their attack. Orders issued by Japanese Imperial General Head-

quarters directed the fleet to invade the Aleutians and capture Mid-

way in cooperation with the army. These attacks were to be

followed by invasions of New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa, and

finally by the capture of Port Moresby. Had these objectives been

attained, Australia would have been virtually cut off from the

United States.

Fortunately these efforts failed. Although the Japanese ob-

tained a foothold in the Aleutians, their main effort against Midway

ended in disaster. The U. S. Pacific Fleet sank four enemy aircraft

carriers and forced the invaders to withdraw.

After meeting defeat at Midway, the Japanese postponed their

plans to capture New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa by amphibi-

ous assault, but they continued to infiltrate to the south. One force

attempted to capture Port Moresby by crossing the towering Owen

Stanley Mountains of New Guinea, while a second group, in July,

began building an airfield at Lunga Point on the north coast of

Guadalcanal, just 560 nautical miles from the Allied outposts at

Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides and 800 miles from Noumea in

New Caledonia.

The joint chiefs were ready to counter this move. In March

1942, with the approval of the president and the Allied nations,

they had established two great Pacific commands--the Southwest Pa-

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278    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

cific Area and the Pacific Ocean Areas. The Southwest Pacific Area

was organized under command of General MacArthur. Admiral Nim-

itz was appointed to command the Pacific Ocean Areas, a vast ex-

panse of ocean and small islands that was divided into the North,

Central, and South Pacific areas. Nimitz was told to command the

North and Central Pacific areas directly, but to appoint a subordi-

nate as commander of the South Pacific Area. The missions of the

Pacific Ocean and Southwest Pacific area commanders, as defined by

the joint chiefs of staff on March 30, 1942, were almost identical.

MacArthur and Nimitz were ordered to hold the islands on the line

of communications and all bases essential for offensive movements,

and to prepare for major amphibious operations. The first offensives,

it was planned, would be delivered from the South and Southwest

Pacific areas.

The Japanese ship and plane losses at Midway had almost

restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific. General Marshall

and Admiral King decided to take immediate advantage of the

opportunity thus offered. Applying the principle that a counter-

offensive is the ultimate goal of all defensive operations, they

agreed to abandon the attitude of static defense and to defend the

Allied positions by an offensive move toward Rabaul. In war, an

offensive is the best means of defense. After some discussion of

command and the employment of forces, General Marshall and

Admiral King ordered a limited offensive designed to halt the

Japanese, seize the initiative, and thus protect the line of com-

munications to Australia. The offensive was divided into three tasks.

The first task, to be carried out by South Pacific forces, was the

capture of Tulagi and "adjacent positions," which meant Guadal-

canal. The second and third tasks, to be executed under General

MacArthur's command, included the seizure of the remainder of

the Solomons and of the northeast New Guinea coast, and finally,

the capture of Rabaul. Completion of the three tasks would secure

the line of communications from enemy threat. The joint chiefs

reserved to themselves the power of decision on the timing of opera-

tions, the composition of forces, and the passage of command from

South to Southwest Pacific Area. These orders were issued on

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NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN               279

 

July 2, a few days before it became known that the Japanese were

building an airfield on Guadalcanal.

Forces of the South Pacific moved to the attack almost im-

mediately. Supported by air and naval forces, the 1st Marine Divi-

sion landed on Tulagi and Guadalcanal on August 7 and seized the

airfield the next day. The Japanese reaction to the invasion was so

violent and resolute that the campaign did not end then, but dragged

on for six months. It was not until February 1943-after one more

marine division and two army divisions were committed to the

battle and six major naval engagements were fought--that Guadal-

canal was completely wrested from the enemy.

By the time the Guadalcanal campaign ended, General Mac-

Arthur had prepared a comprehensive plan, known as Elkton, for

the execution of the remaining tasks of the directive of July 2.

Elkton prescribed a two-pronged converging attack. Southwest

Pacific forces were to move along the northeast New Guinea coast

and attack Rabaul and adjacent positions from the west while South

Pacific units advanced through the Solomons to strike from the

east. The South Pacific commander, Admiral Halsey, was prepar-

ing plans to invade Bougainville. He and his staff officers and

subordinate commanders all agreed, however, that the advance to

Bougainville could not be undertaken until the Allies captured the

air bases in the New Georgia group which the Japanese had recently

completed. Inherent in all plans was the seizure or construction of

air bases along the routes of advance to provide continuous air cover

for ground and naval forces and make possible the effective

bombardment of Rabaul.

Besides preparing Elkton, General MacArthur was considering

a larger plan to cut the Japanese communications route to the

Indies by recapturing the Philippines. He hoped to advance west

along the north coast of New Guinea, then swing northwest through

the intermediate islands into the Philippines. The successful execu-

tion of this plan depended upon the capture, or at least the neu-

tralization, of Rabaul. Possession of that town would provide a

splendid naval and air base. Rabaul had first to be bombed into

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280    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

impotence to protect the advancing Allied forces from attack by

aircraft and warships.

The Elkton plan could not be carried out immediately, for there

was too wide a divergence between ends and means. Desiring to

move rapidly against Rabaul in one continuous movement, General

MacArthur wished to assemble all the necessary forces before start-

ing the advance. Elkton would require at least twenty-two and two-

thirds divisions and about twice as many planes as the 1,850 then

present. In both South and Southwest Pacific areas there were, in

January 1943, just fifteen and two-thirds trained army, marine, New

Zealand, and Australian divisions. Some were in action; others

were resting after months of arduous combat. General Marshall

and Admiral King did not then know all details of General Mac-

Arthur's plan, nor the number of troops and planes which Elkton

would employ.

It should be remembered that the operations against Rabaul

were defensive, strategically speaking. They did not represent an

attempt to defeat the Japanese nation, but rather to protect Aus-

tralia. By late 1942 the joint chiefs were considering general

strategic plans for the defeat of the Japanese. Any plans adopted

by the joint chiefs, of course, would have to conform to the allot-

ments of troops to various parts of the world authorized by the

combined chiefs.

In January 1943 President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and the

combined chiefs met at Casablanca in French Morocco to determine

the Allied strategic objectives for 1943. Several difficult questions

had to be settled, and Pacific strategy represented but one aspect of

the general problem. Most of the meetings of the ten-day con-

ference were occupied by discussions of possible courses of action

for 1943.

The Americans and British agreed on general objectives, but

their plans differed in several important respects. The joint chiefs

wished to "conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western

European Theater directly against Germany, employing maximum

forces elsewhere consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic

concept in other areas," and to aid the Soviet Union. In the Pacific,

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NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN               281

 

the joint chiefs desired to break the enemy's hold on positions which

threatened the Allied lines of communication. They hoped to

guarantee the security of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia,

and the lines of communication, to keep the initiative in the South

and Southwest Pacific areas, with the ultimate intention of using

Rabaul and nearby positions as bases, and to inflict heavy losses on

the Japanese. Considering that China had to be kept in the war to

pin down Japanese soldiers and to preserve for the Allies a number

of air bases from which to attack Japan, the joint chiefs recom-

mended that Burma be recaptured by the British. Recapture of

Burma would enable the Allies to send more supplies into China

to bolster Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Eager that the Burma opera-

tions be carried out, the joint chiefs offered to supply some of the

necessary ships and landing craft. Admiral King expressed the

hope that thirty percent of Allied military power could be deployed

against the Japanese instead of the fifteen percent which he esti-

mated was then being used.

The British chiefs of staff understandably shied away from

enlarging the scope of Allied action in the Pacific. With the Ger-

mans sitting right across the Channel from England, the British

stressed the importance of concentrating against Germany first.

While admitting the necessity for retaking Burma, they strongly

emphasized the importance of aiding the Soviet Union. The British

offered to "sign a bond" to deploy their entire strength against

Japan after the defeat of Germany, and suggested that the Japanese

should meanwhile be contained in the Pacific by limited offensives.

At the same time the British desired to extend the scope of Allied

operations in the Mediterranean.

General Marshall and Admiral King opposed what Marshall

called "interminable operations in the Mediterranean." They de-

sired to maintain "constant," "unremitting," or "continuous" pres-

sure against the Japanese to prevent them from digging in and

consolidating their gains. Admiral King, pointing out the strategic

importance of an advance across the Central Pacific to the Philip-

pines, raised the question of where to go after Rabaul was captured.

The British did not wish to make specific commitments for opera-

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282    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

tions beyond Rabaul, but suggested that the combined chiefs might

meet after its capture to decide the question.

On January 23, the last day of the Casablanca Conference, the

combined chiefs of staff had reached agreement on all questions,

and on that day presented their conclusions on strategic commit-

ments to the president and the prime minister. The United States

and Britain agreed to secure the sea communications in the Atlantic,

to move supplies to the Soviet Union, to take Sicily, to bomb Ger-

many heavily, and to continue to build up forces in Britain for an

invasion of the continent. To make sure that these undertakings

would not be jeopardized by the necessity for diverting any military

strength to prevent a disaster in the Pacific, "adequate forces" would

be maintained in the Pacific and Far East. The combined chiefs

agreed in principle that Burma should be recaptured. In the Pacific

the Allies were to maintain "constant pressure" on Japan with the

purpose of retaining the initiative and "attaining a position of readi-

ness" for a full-scale offensive once the unconditional surrender of

Germany was accepted. Specifically, the Allies intended to capture

Rabaul, make secure the Aleutians, and advance west through the

Gilberts and Marshalls toward Truk and the Marianas. These

Central Pacific advances would follow the capture of Rabaul, but

would not be undertaken if they jeopardized the operation for the

recapture of Burma. The combined chiefs agreed to meet again soon

to make final decisions about Burma.

In February, after the Americans returned from Casablanca,

General MacArthur asked permission to send a delegation from

his headquarters to Washington to explain the Elkton plan. The

joint chiefs accepted his proposal. Maj. Gen. Richard K. Suther-

land, MacArthur's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, Mac-

Arthur's air commander, and Brig. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin,

MacArthur's operations officer, flew to Washington, where they were

joined, on orders from the joint chiefs, by representatives of Admi-

ral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey. Beginning on March 12, the Pacific

delegates sat with the joint chiefs of staff and subordinate planning

committees in a series of meetings generally known as the Pacific

Military Conference. General Sutherland read the Elkton plan at

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NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN               283

 

the first meeting. It was immediately apparent that all the neces-

sary forces for Elkton could not be provided. It was possible to

effect some increases in the number of aircraft, but to give General

MacArthur everything he asked would have cut too deeply into the

bomber offensive against Germany. There were several trained divi-

sions available in the United States, but there were not enough

transports to ship them overseas in time, nor to supply them after

their arrival. Everyone at the conference was convinced of the

necessity for offensive operations, but it was recognized that the

operations would be limited by the available means. Admiral

Halsey's representatives, Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon of the army,

Brig. Gen. Dewitt Peck of the marine corps, and Capt. Miles Brown-

ing of the navy, endorsed the Elkton plan, but some of the navy

planners in Washington were dubious of its value. They believed it

would tie up too many ships and too many troops for too long a

time, and would not achieve decisive results. Washington planners

informed the Pacific representatives that only two or three more

divisions and a few more planes could be sent overseas. The Pacific

representatives were instructed to restudy Elkton in the light of

these facts and to decide what could be done with the forces

available.

The Joint Stategic Survey Committee, a body of senior army

and navy officers who advised the joint chiefs of staff on broad

strategic matters, had been studying the problem of Rabaul and its

relation to the Casablanca decisions even before the Pacific dele-

gates arrived. On February 13, the strategic survey committee had

advised the joint chiefs of staff that the recapture of Rabaul might

employ so much equipment, especially ships and landing craft, that

it might not be possible to begin the operation against Burma in

1943. The strategic survey committee recommended that the re-

capture of Rabaul be postponed, and that in 1943 the South and

Southwest Pacific areas carry out only the second task of the

directive of July 2, 1942--capture of the northern Solomons and

northeast New Guinea.

The Pacific Military Conference, after studying Elkton in the

light of the forces that would be on hand, reached exactly the same

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284    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

conclusions, and on March 20 made similar recommendations to

the joint chiefs.

The joint chiefs accepted these recommendations. On March

28 they canceled the directive of July 2, 1942, and substituted a

new one which ordered the seizure in 1943 of the northern Solomons

and the northeast coast of New Guinea. Supreme command was

given to General MacArthur; Admiral Halsey, whose forces would

be operating in General MacArthur's area, was given tactical com-

mand of the offensives in the Solomons subject to MacArthur's

general direction.

In consequence, forces of the South and Southwest Pacific

areas moved forward. New Georgia was invaded by South Pacific

troops during the last week in June 1943. At first progress was

slow. In mid-July, the 37th Division, most elements of which had

been held in area reserve, was thrown into the battle along with

elements of the 25th Division. The campaign then gathered speed.

The Japanese airfield at Munda Point fell on August 4, and Allied

troops followed up this success with the quick seizure of the remain-

ing islands in the New Georgia group.

The next move by the South Pacific forces in the northern

Solomons was the seizure of the Empress Augusta Bay region of

Bougainville in November 1943. That area was taken by the Allies

to provide a base within fighter-plane range of Rabaul, which the

joint chiefs decided not to capture but to neutralize by aerial

bombardment. The 37th Division landed on Bougainville in Novem-

ber 1943 and fought its way to positions behind which the American

airfields were constructed. In March of 1944 the Japanese 6th

Division came over the mountains of Bougainville to launch a heavy

counterattack with the intention of capturing the airfields and kill-

ing the defenders. But the soldiers of the 37th and the Americal

divisions, making good use of their time, had established strong

defensive positions. With characteristic determination, the Japanese

struck frequently, but the resolute stand of the 37th and its sister

division repulsed them. The Japanese 6th Division then retreated,

leaving nearly 10,000 of its dead in front of the Americans.

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NORTHERN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN              285

 

Allied land and carrier based aircraft had been pounding

Rabaul heavily during late 1943 and early 1944 until the enemy

could no longer use it as a fleet or air base. The reduction of

Rabaul marked the virtual attainment of the objectives assigned in

1942, and cleared the way for large scale offensive movements in

the Southwest Pacific. It was universally recognized that to defeat

Japan, it would first be necessary to cut her lines of communication

and thus isolate her from the oil of the Netherlands East Indies.

General MacArthur had been pressing the joint chiefs for approval

of his plan to return to the Philippines by way of New Guinea. In

March 1944, with Rabaul out of the way, the joint chiefs approved

MacArthur's plan, for possession of air and naval bases in the

Philippines would place the Allies squarely athwart the Japanese

line of communications to the Indies. Southwest Pacific forces then

began the drive along the northern coast of New Guinea which

culminated in the landing on Leyte in October 1944 and the re-

capture of Manila in Luzon by the 37th, 1st Cavalry, and 11th Air-

borne divisions in early 1945.

The reconquest of the Philippines, together with Admiral

Nimitz' achievements in the Central Pacific, placed the Allies in

position for the final blows-heavy aerial bombardments of Japan,

which were to have been followed by the invasion of the Japanese

homeland. Even while the 37th Division was fighting in the moun-

tain fastnesses of northern Luzon, the Allies were maturing plans--

plans made unnecessary by the Japanese surrender-to invade

Kyushu and Honshu.

The significance of the operations of the 37th Division in the

northern Solomons can thus be expressed in a series of relationships

almost as direct as those in the old saying about the nail, the shoe,

the horse, and the rider. To defeat Japan, it was necessary to cut

her off from the oil of the Indies. To cut her off, it was necessary

to retake the Philippines. Before MacArthur could begin his

advance, Rabaul had to be reduced by aerial bombardment. Thus

the Allies needed air bases within range of Rabaul. In the

Solomons, the 37th Division made its contribution to the defeat of

Japan by fighting gallantly to seize and defend two of these air

bases before moving on to the grim battles in the Philippines.

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