Ohio History Journal

FORT MIAMIS: THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND

 

by RICHARD C. KNOPF

Historian, Anthony Wayne Parkway Board

 

The Paris peace treaty of 1783 which officially ended the war

between the kingdom of Great Britain and her rebellious American

colonies, and which established what were supposedly internationally

recognized boundary lines between British Canada and the newly

independent American states, was considered at the very beginning

by the British as but a tenuous piece of international diplomacy.

Britain felt confident in 1783 that, given time, the erring Atlantic

states would return to the fold.

Had not the British government felt pressures from British

America, it probably would have waited patiently for the expected

bid of the former colonies to return to British control and super-

vision. Complaints and angry cries of merchants, fur traders, and

the royal exchequer came almost as soon as the treaty provisions

were made known. These parties, interested in the profits de-

rived from the Canadian fur trade, immediately castigated the

the treaty-makers, and pointed out vehemently that this trade would

be greatly lost if British control were removed from the territory

north and west of the Ohio River. So strong were these pressures,

and so angry the protests, that on April 8, 1784, the very day

before George III proclaimed the treaty of peace ratified, an

order was issued from the office of the secretary of state for home

affairs to "hold the posts" within the agreed boundaries of the

new United States of America.1

It is not known whether the United States was aware of this

order at the time. Until the adoption of the new American con-

stitution in 1789, it made little difference to the American Re-

public, riven as it was with interstate strife and the bungling,

ineffective national government of the Confederation. Thus the

British maintained their posts within the borders of the United States,

and kept their administrative control over these areas and the

 

1 Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty (New York, 1923), 6.

146

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Fort Miamis: The International Background              147

 

Indians and traders who lived and worked there. As a matter of

fact, British power was constantly being strengthened both as a

result of and because of the growing fur trade. By 1790, seven

years following the agreements made at Paris, the annual fur trade

of British Canada was officially reported as worth £40,000 annually,

fully half of which business was carried on in the "countries to

the southward of the Great Lakes."² Furthermore, it was reported

that this trade had been barely tapped, and future operations

would accrue even greater wealth for fur traders, London en-

trepreneurs, and a tax-conscious exchequer.

By 1790 the Americans were moving westward into the new

Northwest Territory. As a result of the Ordinances of 1785 and

1787, this region was considered open to legal settlement. By the

same token, the American government had the obligation to pacify

the hostile Indians and to exert effective control over the area.

A firmly entrenched British Canadian administration was

not to be forced out by hot words and weak armies. Constantly

relying on the argument that loyalist losses had not been repaid by

the Americans as had (they said) been specified in the treaty of

peace,³ they maintained and strengthened their grip. British Indian

agents, operating in the country south of the Canadian border,

stirred the Indians into active resistance against the encroachments

of United States settlers and American armies. By 1793 two armies

had been defeated by the Indians, and American arms had been

humiliated. Indian aggressiveness, spurred on by the British,

increased.

Into this seemingly impossible situation Major General Anthony

Wayne was thrown. Chosen by Washington after much delibera-

tion and with some qualms, Wayne was sent to command the

 

2 Ibid.

3 The treaty specified only that congress "should recommend" to the states that

loyalists be reimbursed for their losses. This the congress had done, and thus had

observed the letter, if not the spirit of the treaty provision. It is true that many states

greeted such "recommendations" with derision, and refused to act on these claims.

There were cases of individual molestation for Toryism even to the point of lynching.

The strongest agitation against the loyal British subjects came from the southern

states, where such colonial leaders as Patrick Henry denounced the British crown and

decried the idea of reimbursement. Ibid., 100.

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148    Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

frontier army, first at Legionville (near Pittsburgh), and later at

Hobson's Choice (Cincinnati), and to bring victory to American

arms. Never a wholly popular officer with troops, his experience

along the southern border fighting Indian raiders, as well as his

Revolutionary exploits, helped to equip him to command, train,

and discipline a victorious force.

In spite of the series of American defeats, the choice of Anthony

Wayne as the commander of the newly formed Legion of the

United States worried the British administration in Canada. Re-

ports constantly came to them of the rigid discipline and methodical

training which Wayne was giving to his army. Something had to

be done to halt this threat. Even the Indian bravado and de-

termination did not convince the Canadian officials that Wayne's

would be but another disastrous campaign into the wilderness.

There had been successive attempts on the part of the United

States to make peace with the Indians, but all to no avail. The

British had been good "fathers" to the Indians and thus had

ensured their loyalty. Small bands had made agreements at Forts

McIntosh and Harmar, but never had the great bulk agreed to

United States encroachment. Even at the end of April 1793, as

Wayne was drilling his troops at Legionville, United States Peace

Commissioners set out to the northwestward to meet with the

Indian chieftains at the rapids of the Miami of the Lakes to make

another attempt at peaceful settlement of differences.

As originally scheduled, the meeting was to take place in the

month of June, but as late as July the commissioners were cooling

their heels, waiting for the Indians to ready themselves for the

peace talks. Small missions had met with the commissioners, but

time and again a complete meeting was delayed. One of the prin-

cipal excuses for the delay of the negotiations was the Indian

complaint that General Wayne was moving northward with seem-

ingly hostile intentions. Already, the Indians reported to the United

States negotiators that the commander of the Legion of the United

States had cut a road to a point six miles north of Fort Jefferson,

right into the heart of the Indian country. The peace commissioners

wrote in July 1793 asking Secretary of War Knox to order Wayne

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Fort Miamis: The International Background         149

to withdraw from these forward posts during the peace nego-

tiations.⁴

Some of Wayne's men felt that this peace mission would be a

success, and peace rumors flew about the post at Fort Washington.

It was felt that England would gain much more by having the

friendship of the United States, and would lose a great deal by

provoking a war. British involvement in Europe, at the moment,

and trade relationships between her and the United States would

make peace almost mandatory.5

However, as the summer drew to a close, the peace commissioners,

unlike observers at Fort Washington, gave up hope of a successful

conclusion to their mission and finally returned home. It seemed

as though the last ray of hope for peace had faded.

Meanwhile, the British, as well as the Indians, were becoming

increasingly apprehensive of the movements of Wayne's force. They

were particularly disturbed by the information brought by a de-

serter from the Legion of the United States who reported to

Colonel McKee, the British Indian agent at the rapids of the

Miami of the Lakes, that Wayne was encamped at Fort Greene

Ville with a force of 2,500 men, but would stay the winter there

because of a shortage of supplies. The deserter further told McKee

that Wayne had originally planned to winter near Detroit, and

that in addition to the regular run of firearms, was equipped with

twenty-two howitzers.⁶

From this report it seemed even more evident to the British

that Wayne's army was not only designed to combat the Indians

and to pacify them, but also ready to break the British hold in

Detroit, and perhaps even in Upper Canada. This was certainly

disturbing news to Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe, and

at this point he began to formulate plans for the defense of the

territory under his control (which included Detroit, Michilimackinac,

and the Maumee Valley).

4 Peace Commissioners to Secretary Knox, July 10, 1793, in American State Papers,

Indian Affairs (2 vols., Washington, 1832), I, 342 et seq.

5 William Eaton to Stephen Jacob, Fort Washington, June 24, 1793, in Ayer

Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois.

6 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John Graves

Simcoe (5 vols., Toronto, 1923-31), II, 108-109.

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By the end of 1793 Wayne had sent a detachment northward

from Fort Greene Ville to build and garrison Fort Recovery on

the site of General Arthur St. Clair's disastrous defeat. It is in-

teresting to note that even at the beginning of February 1794,

Lieutenant Colonel England, commandant at Detroit, while he

knew of the building of Fort Recovery, was not yet aware of the

exact location of Fort Greene Ville.⁷

Meanwhile, Thomas Jefferson, as secretary of state, was at-

tempting to settle the fine points of the Treaty of Paris of 1783.

Among other things, he reminded George Hammond, the British

minister to the United States, that the British garrisons "had not

been withdrawn with all convenient speed," as had been stipulated

in the treaty, but that the officers of those forts had actually under-

taken to exercise jurisdiction over those areas and peoples within

the vicinity of the forts.⁸ To these complaints Hammond was deaf.

He could hold his ground fairly well, as the Americans, too, had

not completely fulfilled the spirit of their obligations assumed

under this treaty.

By the beginning of the year 1794 the reports concerning Wayne's

legion were even less encouraging to the anxious British. The fort

at Greene Ville was reported to be the garrison of four thousand

men, two miles in circumference, with a daily guard of three

hundred men. Furthermore, Fort Recovery was said to have a

garrison of three hundred. The information continued that it was

said that "Wayne will drink of our waters early in the Spring."

One might well imagine the consternation of the British officials

over such a report as this.⁹

Lord Dorchester, governor of Canada, inadvertently also, was

making his officials in Upper Canada uneasy. One speech in par-

ticular had been upsetting to them as well as to the Americans.

In it he had informed the Indians that, in reality, there was no

border between the United States and Canada, and that they should

7 Ibid., 139. There was poor intelligence on both sides during this period. In

spite of the relatively large forces involved and the active movements of many in-

dividuals and parties, exact knowledge was difficult to obtain.

8 Jefferson to Hammond, December 15, 1793, in Writings of Thomas Jefferson

(9 vols., New York, 1853-55), IV, 94-97.

9 Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, February 3, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 141.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background                  151

 

not sell their lands to the American settlers in the border zone.

As a war between the two nations was inevitable, Dorchester

continued, the British would win these territories outright, and

any sales made by the Indians would not be recognized.¹⁰

There is no doubt but that this speech of Dorchester's was an

inflammatory one.11 However, when one realizes the extent to

which the commanders of some of the British forts had been

humiliated by the Americans, one can understand Dorchester's

attitude. In upper New York, in the Lake Champlain region,

Americans had informed the commander of the British garrison

there that British jurisdiction extended no farther than the range

of his guns. Dorchester feared that eventually the British would

be driven out of that region. Likewise, he felt that Wayne's tactics

in the regions around Detroit would be of a similar nature, and

therefore he directed Simcoe to fortify the Detroit-Miami region

as soon as possible.¹²

With Dorchester's sanction and encouragement, Simcoe redoubled

his efforts on the plans for Canadian defense against possible

invasion by the Americans. At least, officially, he called his plans

ones for defense. Of course, they were defensive, but the area to

10 Lord Dorchester (Sir Guy Carleton, 1st Baron Dorchester) had a keen, though

perhaps partial, interest in Canadian affairs. He had been with the military forces

in America from 1758 to 1762 (Seven Years' War, or French and Indian War);

acting governor and governor of Quebec from 1766 to 1770; commander of the

British forces in Canada from 1775 to 1777; commander-in-chief in America from

1782 to 1783; governor of Quebec from 1786 to 1791; and finally governor-general

of Canada in 1793. This wide acquaintance with American, and, more especially,

Canadian affairs put Dorchester in a strong position both in North America and in

Britain. Because of the lax handling of American colonial policy in London during

most of this period, the governor-general of Canada was virtual ruler and policy-

maker in his own territory. Though his policies were perhaps examined from time

to time by the home government, there is reason to believe that the London ministry

of home affairs (which nominally controlled colonial policy) either lent tacit

support or actually gave some direction to Dorchester's actions and statements.

11 By early spring, 1794, relations had reached such a critical point that Lord

Dorchester was probably justified in making his statement concerning an imminent

war between Great Britain and the United States. As a matter of fact, at the same

time that news was received of Dorchester's incendiary speech, a report also reached

Philadelphia concerning the capture of almost 300 American vessels engaged in

shipping materials from the French West Indies to France. While the temperature of

the war fever rose to white heat in some quarters of the United States, Hamilton and

his more serious-minded Federalists defeated the aggressive agitators and Francophiles

by sending the able John Jay to Britain to negotiate differences between the two

countries.

12 Dorchester to Simcoe, February 17, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 154.

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152     Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

be defended was not Canada alone (or, perhaps, even primarily

defense for Canada), but rather that area beyond the Canadian

borders in the Maumee Valley and Detroit which was still under

British control, in spite of its paper surrender in the Treaty of

Paris. So great was his urgency that he warned Henry Dundas, the

superintendent of Indian affairs, not to move troops out of Canada.13

Meanwhile, Dorchester's speech was beginning to have re-

percussions both within and without Canada. Canadian officials,

in private correspondence, deplored Dorchester's remarks concern-

ing a coming war with the United States. Simcoe, himself, wondered

how long the British would be able to retain the loyalty of the

Indians when they realized that the United States was intent upon

wresting the northwest posts from British hands.¹⁴

Fears continued to spread in Upper Canada. The regular soldiery

was not deemed sufficient to meet the onslaught of Wayne's force,

and Simcoe, finally in a moment of near desperation, recommended

the formation of an armed militia to be equipped and paid from

public funds.15

Fears, however, were concerned not only with the approach of

Wayne's forces, but also with the Indians' loyalty, which would be

necessary in order to retain the status quo. Constantly the United

States was sending out peace feelers to the Indians. Washington

had gone even so far as to advocate a system of non-profit trade

between the United States and the Indians, non-profit in the sense

that such trade would mean a fair exchange of goods. This definitely

was stealing the British thunder. The Delawares, in particular,

seemed interested in the peaceful settlement of their differences

with the United States.¹⁶

Fear seemed to be the keynote of the whole policy of Simcoe in

Upper Canada. His outlook was almost completely pessimistic. In

the middle of March 1794 he wrote to Lord Dorchester that, while

13 Simcoe to Dundas, February 23, 1794, ibid., 157-163.

14 Simcoe to Dundas, no date, ibid., 164-165.

15 Ibid. Some of the fur trading companies had offered their services as militiamen

earlier.

16 Simcoe to Dundas, March 2, 1794, ibid., 169-170. This might possibly have

been due to the influence of Heckewelder and the Moravians, who had exerted a great

deal of peaceful, pro-American influence over the Delawares.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background             153

 

he would do everything possible to keep Wayne out of the Maumee

Valley and away from Detroit, he felt that there were insufficient

forces in Upper Canada and the bordering regions to defeat him

if he really was intent upon an invasion of that region. The question

of the loyalty of the subjects of the king in Detroit itself was

doubtful, and a concentration of troops in that area would only

mean the weakening of the border defenses elsewhere.17

The threat of American boldness during this period not only

was being felt in Canada, but was also having its effect along the

Mississippi south of the mouth of the Ohio. Day by day, as settlers

in western Kentucky, western Tennessee, and the lands bordering

the Ohio cried for free access to the open sea, the Spanish feared

for their position of control over the Mississippi Valley. Sensing

that their position was similar to, and, in a way, dependent upon

the British control of the northwest, the Spanish asked Simcoe for

help and an alliance of the British and Spanish forces in the New

World.18 The lieutenant governor replied that he could not help

them materially, as he was concentrating all his forces against a

possible attack by Wayne. However, Baron de Carondelet's letter

was sent forward to Lord Dorchester for further study.19

The great hope of the British to stave off the impending American

attack was the support of the Indians. Always the British had tried

to hold their loyalty, and for the most part, had been kind and

generous to them. Nevertheless, it became more and more necessary

to insure Indian support. Indian agents told the Indians that war

was inevitable between Great Britain and the United States and

that the only motivating factor in the American imperialism was

their greed for land. No doubt, to the Indians, this was an effective

argument. Again and again at peace conferences, the talks had

always reached an impasse when the Americans, after proffering all

17 Simcoe to Dorchester, March 14, 1794, ibid., 179-180.

18 In Europe there was in effect an Anglo-Spanish alliance against the French.

However, by 1794 it looked as if the Spanish were about to make a separate peace

(which they did later). Also, by the Treaty of Peace of 1783 free use of the

Mississippi had been approved by both the United States and Great Britain. It is

doubtful if the British would have made any great gains by an alliance of forces

with Spain in the New World.

19 Simcoe to de Carondelet, April 11, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 200-201. Baron

de Carondelet was the governor of Louisiana, successor to Miro.

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154     Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

sorts of kindness and giving all kinds of promises of Indian in-

dependence, began speaking of moving their boundaries farther

to the west.²⁰

Yet, the urging of the Indian agents to the Indians to maintain

their allegiance to their "Father," the king of England, was not

considered enough. There had to be visible evidence of Canadian

intent to keep the Americans away from the Maumee Valley and

Detroit. The Indians had to see that their British "brothers" were

supporting them, were in alliance with them against the Americans.

Thus, by the end of April 1794, Lieutenant Governor Simcoe had

already gone up the Maumee River, had selected a site for a fort

to ward off Wayne's blows from Detroit, and had set men to

work on its construction. Together with his plan to fortify certain

islands in Lake Erie, this venture had been reported to Dorchester.21

In spite of Canadian fears, there is no evidence that the British

were ready to ally themselves with the Spanish in the New World

as Baron de Carondelet had suggested. Undaunted by the British

lack of interest in his proposition, the Spanish governor of Louisiana

did send Indian envoys to the Indian councils in the Maumee Valley.

These envoys promised their Indian brothers of the northwest that

they would aid in any action against the Long Knives.²² A failure

of American arms in the Northwest Territory would materially

aid the Spanish in the retention of their control of the Mississippi

Valley.

By the middle of May 1794 the news of Lord Dorchester's war-

mongering speech to the Indians had reached Philadelphia, and

Edmund Randolph, Jefferson's successor as secretary of state, wrote

a caustic note to the British minister, George Hammond, asking

for an explanation. Randolph warned that the United States, in

its drive against the hostile Indians, could not be expected to

make a fine distinction between the Indians and the British, who

were encroaching upon American soil.²³ Hammond        answered

20 John Butler to Joseph Chew, April 27, 1794, ibid., 218.

21 Simcoe to Dorchester, April 29, 1794, ibid., 220-221. Simcoe was also intent

upon the fortifying of Presque Isle.

22 Record of a Council, May 7, 1794, ibid., 231-232.

23 Randolph to Hammond, May 20, 1794, ibid., 238-240.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background          155

Randolph's charges with countercharges. He did not deny the

speech of Lord Dorchester, but reminded Randolph that he could

have nothing to do with the affair, as he represented the king of

England, not the royal Canadian governor. As to the charge that

Dorchester had already sent men to build a fort on the Miami of

the Lakes, Hammond said that he had no knowledge that such a

post was being erected, but "even admitting your information

to be accurate, much will depend on the place on which you assert

that the fort is intended to be erected, and whether it be for the

purpose of protecting subjects of his Majesty's residing in the

districts dependent on the Fort of Detroit, or preventing that

fortress from being strained by the approach of the American

army."24

This letter pointed up two factors which were to be salient features

of British policy in Canada down through the Jay Treaty of 1794.

In the first place, it would seem to indicate that British policy

toward Canada was not made or directed with any vigor from

London, but rather was left to the discretion of the colonial

governor of Canada, Lord Dorchester. Secondly, and of primary

importance to the Wayne campaign and the building of Fort Miamis,

it was felt necessary by the British Canadian administration and the

British minister in Philadelphia that the British build a fortress

within the limits of the United States as established by the Treaty

of Paris of 1783 if that fortification was designed as a protection

for Upper Canada.²⁵ As one peruses many of the letters which

were exchanged by the administrators of Canada, one finds that the

motivating factor behind all of this military preparation was a

defensive and protective one for the status quo, that is, British re-

tention of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and the Maumee Valley, and

thus protection of the lucrative British trade in this legally and

essentially non-Canadian area. In other words, one can feel very

sure that allusions to "Upper Canada" refer not only to that area

within the Canadian boundaries, but also, and of more importance,

24 Hammond to Randolph, May 22, 1794, ibid., 240-241.

25 Actually one may feel sure that the term "Upper Canada" referred to that

area administered by the governor of Upper Canada, not to a geographical location.

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156     Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

to those areas which were beyond the legal control but which were

under the actual administration of Upper Canada.

Randolph's rebuttal to Hammond's assertion of the right to

build a British fort at the rapids of the Maumee was a powerful

one. He pointed out clearly that the entire Maumee River, in-

cluding the rapids, was within the American boundaries. He

informed Hammond that the status quo was to apply strictly until

difficulties between the two countries were worked out.²⁶ Hammond

had insisted on the idea of status quo earlier, though it would appear

that his idea differed from Randolph's in that it meant the main-

tenance of British control over this territory. Thus if the building of a

fort was justified to keep this control, Hammond did not feel the

erection of such a post would in any way damage the basic premise.

According to American intelligence, the British themselves

seemed ready to fight Wayne's force if it moved northward into

the Maumee Valley-Detroit area. Nevertheless, even at the end

of May 1794, such action was not at all certain on the British

side, and the Indians who asked for armed help and support against

the Legion of the United States got only evasive replies.²⁷ In spite

of the American impression, the Canadian administration was well

aware that an active conflict between Canadian garrisons and the

United States Legion might well set off a general British-American

war. To initiate such a struggle was beyond the responsibility or

authorized power of the Canadian government. Only official sanction

from London could overcome this impasse, and while the British

officials in Canada prepared as if it were assured, it never came.

With or without active, armed British support, the Indians began

collecting and by the middle of June it was reported that 2,000

Indians were around Wayne. Simcoe himself was favorable to a

plan to aid and support the Indians, though he realized that to do

so was to exceed his authority, and he did not wish to take the

responsibility for an open breach between the United States and

 

26 Randolph to Hammond, June 2, 1794, in American State Papers, Foreign Affairs,

I, 464-466.

27 Speech from the Western Indians to the British, May 24, 1794, in Simcoe Papers,

II, 247.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background               157

Great Britain. Open support of the Indians promised to aid in

creating such a breach. Thus he shifted the responsibility to

Dorchester and asked that the governor-general authorize supplies

to the Indians. The most he could do directly was to express his

hope to McKee that the Indians would collect in sufficient number

to defeat Wayne. The lieutenant governor carefully avoided a dis-

cussion of Indian supply and support.²⁸ He did, however, instruct

McKee to keep all but the regular traders from going farther into

the Indian country than Fort Miamis. Simcoe was well aware that

among some of the traders, particularly those of French extraction,

there was questionable loyalty to His Majesty. If these were allowed

to penetrate beyond the limits of effective British control, they

might possibly arouse the Indians against the British.²⁹

The Indians were also attempting to get British and French-

Canadian support against Wayne. At the Indian council of war

held in the middle of June 1794 it was resolved by that council

that the British and French-Canadian traders who depended upon

the Indians for their livelihood should join with the Indians in

the defense of their country and common interests. While this did

not have the official sanction of the British government in Canada,

it certainly was in accord with their desires and wishes.³⁰

At the same time, in England, John Jay, the American special

representative to the British government, was going forward with

his negotiations to settle international differences between the

United States and Great Britain. For the most part, these delibera-

ions revolved around points of conflict arising from the Treaty of

 

28 This is not to say that the British gave no support to the Indians. For a long

time, British officials had been in the habit of dispersing "presents" to their red

brethren. See Treaty of Fort Harmar Discussions, in Draper Manuscripts, State

Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, vol. 23U (microfilm in Ohio

State Archaeological and Historical Society, Columbus). In Vol. XXIX, Part 2,

No. 46, of the Wayne Papers belonging to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania,

is a sworn statement made by William Wells, who attended the Indian council at

the Miami rapids in the summer of 1793, in which it is noted that McKee, at least,

promised all necessary aid in the way of arms, ammunition, provisions, and clothing.

Even at these meetings great quantities of supplies were given to the Indians.

29 Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 266-267; Simcoe

to McKee, ibid., 268.

30 Ernest Cruickshank, "Diary of an Officer in the Indian Country in 1794,"

American Historical Magazine, III (1908), 639-643.

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158     Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

Peace, 1783, and from varying interpretations of the rights of

neutral traders. Jay seemed immediately cognizant of the fact that

the British did not want to add any more enemies to the growing

list of nations hostile to her. The weakening of the British alliance

with Spain in 1794 had meant the loss of a powerful and valuable

ally against France. Still, Britain was not yet willing to make com-

plete concessions to the Americans. After receiving information

from the Anglophile American secretary of the treasury, Alexander

Hamilton, to the effect that the United States would not go to war

under any circumstances, Britain was not prone to take a humble

position before the American representative. Though Jay was not

at first aware of Hamilton's representations to the British, he did

feel that the relations between the two countries should be of as

even temper as possible during the negotiations. He therefore

wrote to Washington asking that no hostile actions be taken in

the western country. He also expressed the thought that the British

would probably surrender the posts along the border in the treaty

which was forthcoming. In another letter to Edmund Randolph he

expressed the same sentiments. Acts of an "irritating nature," he

was confident, would not aid in his discussions with the British.31

Meanwhile, the Canadian government continued and progressed

with their plans to secure "Upper Canada." At Fort Miamis progress

was slow, and after nearly three months the fort was still not

complete enough to receive the six-pounders designated for its

protection. Discontent among the workers and the fevers of the

wilderness had taken their toll.³²

Simcoe, perhaps rationalizing his actions in this area of the

Maumee Valley, finally claimed the area for the British by stating

that it had not been included in the cession of the treaty of 1783.

How much of this was rationalization, how much honest belief,

and how much of it was designed to influence the loyalty of the

Indians is a matter for conjecture. Under any circumstances his

claims could have any of a wide variety of effects. Certainly such

 

31 Jay to Washington, June 23, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 290-291; Jay to

Randolph, June 23, 1794, ibid., 291.

32 England to Simcoe, June 25, 1794, ibid., 294.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background                 159

a statement justified his action even if it was not justified by the

treaty.³³

One thing was evident to both the government and the British

traders in the area: if the Americans did get actual possession

and control of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and the Maumee Valley,

most of the British fur trade would suffer, as it was centered in

that area. No matter what the settlement might be, there was a

general opinion that the Indians should not be apprised of any

decisions of the British to yield up their posts to the Americans

until such time as that was an accomplished fact. By doing this, the

British traders could be assured of a continuing trade until such

transfer was actually made, and the Canadian administration would

continue to have Indian support in the case that hostilities should

break out between the United States and Britain. Thus while the

British were building up their forces, while there was a genuine

fear of an invasion by the United States of this territory administered

by Upper Canada, there was still an undercurrent of concilation,

and a hope for peaceful settlement of disputes. As a matter of

fact, it seemed more than a hope; it seemed as if the British had

already read the handwriting on the wall.³⁴

Simcoe was not alone in his fear of a defeat of British arms in

case of a struggle with the Americans. McKee, at the rapids, con-

stantly urged that supplies be sent for the use of the Indians,

and that arms and ammunition be furnished to them. Without

these, McKee was confident, the Indians would be severely beaten.³⁵

In July 1794, with Wayne's legion poised at Greene Ville and

 

33 Simcoe to Dundas, July 5, 1794, ibid., 303-305. Probably Simcoe did not know

or chose not to recognize the treaty of 1783. Certainly, if he considered a treaty

to be a contract between the two nations, the Americans had not lived completely

up to their part of the bargain. In such a case, he could, with some justification,

rationalize that the treaty was null and void. Thus, the building of Fort Miamis,

and the general arming of that area under the administration of Upper Canada,

would not be an infringement upon United States sovereignty.

34 Observations of Isaac Todd and Simon McTavish, Representatives of Trading

Houses Interested in Canada-British Trade, July 1794, ibid., 310-311. The Jay

negotiations going on in Britain at the time probably added hope for peaceful settle-

ment of difficulties, and, as will be seen later, directives actually were issued from

London to the Canadian administration to cease new incursions into American

territory and hold only to the status quo.

35 McKee to England, July 10, 1794, ibid., 315. See footnote 28.

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160     Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

ready to strike northward into the heart of the Indian Confederacy,

Lord Dorchester tried to halt the American threat. In a formal

protest to Wayne he said:

 

I am commanded to declare that during the inexecution of the Treaty of

Peace Between Great Britain and the United States and until the existing

differences respecting it shall be mutually and finally adjusted, the taking

possession of any part of the Indian Territory, either for the purpose of

War or Sovereignty, is held to be a direct violation of His Britannic Majesty's

Rights, as they unquestionably existed before the Treaty, and has an

immediate tendency to interrupt and in its progress to destroy that good

understanding which has hitherto subsisted between His Britannic Majesty

and the United States of America. I therefore desire you to desist from

any such Aggressions.³⁶

There is little doubt that historically, and perhaps even legally,

Dorchester had a valid point. Certainly the treaty of 1783 had

not been fully executed. It is doubtful, however, whether he was

standing on firm ground when he actually forbade the American

forces to enter the territory in question. Under any circumstances,

a show of British arms would be necessary if there was to be any

warlike action, and the governor of Canada would have to back

up his protest with more than the mere force of words if it were

to have any effect.

In Europe John Jay continued his efforts to negotiate a settle-

ment of British-American differences. As a result of some of these

talks, Lord Grenville³⁷ wrote to George Hammond, saying that

Jay had assured him that the United States would not attack any

British posts within American lands as granted in 1783 which had

been held by His Majesty since that time. He further said that the

status quo should prevail and that in case any measures of en-

croachment had been taken by either side, they should immediately

cease.³⁸

36 Lord Dorchester's Protest, ibid., 318-319.

37 Lord William Grenville was foreign secretary during this period of the negotia-

tions with the Americans. The second son of Lord George Grenville, William Wyndam

Grenville was created a peer in 1791. William Grenville held his post in the Pitt

ministry from 1792 until its fall over the Catholic controversy in 1801.

38 Grenville to Hammond, July 17, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 321-322.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background            161

This statement meant, as was later explained, two things: (1)

that Fort Miamis was subject to attack, as it was not extant in

1783; and (2) that Wayne's legion, as long as it moved only against

the Indians, was not considered to be an encroachment. On this

latter statement there may be some dispute. However, Jay's letter

to Washington reveals that the American envoy had informed

Grenville of Wayne's plans, and had warned that Fort Miamis might

be attacked. Grenville must have been aware of this when he sent

orders to Dorchester through the Duke of Portland³⁹ to retain

the status quo, meaning that there should be no shifting of boundaries

or erecting of posts not already existing.⁴⁰

Simcoe himself, in answer to charges that the British were

supplying the Indians, denied such charges, and said that the

British were not associated with the Indians against Wayne. He

did express a fear that Wayne's designs were not wholly directed

against the Indians. He pointed out that the legion was advancing,

not toward the Miami villages, but toward Detroit. Simcoe ad-

mitted, though still denying that he supplied or associated with

them, that the British encouraged the Indians to unite in their own

defense with contingent advantages both to the Indians and to

the British.41

From other letters exchanged during the course of Wayne's

campaign and from Simcoe's attitude, one has to feel that he was

probably telling the truth, as none of the administrators of Upper

Canada every actually promised military aid to the Indians, even

in spite of McKee's urging. Colonel England, the commander at

Detroit, certainly was apprenhensive of stirring up trouble when

ne wrote to Simcoe on July 22, 1794:

I ever apprehended the Americans would be extremely jealous of our

establishing a post on the Miamis, and that it would expedite the rupture;

39 The Duke of Portland (William Henry Cavendish Bentinck) was home secretary

from 1794 to 1801. At that time the administration of colonial affairs was carried

on by the home office.

40 Portland to Dorchester, July 15, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 322-323; Jay to

Washington, July 21, 1794, ibid., 332-333.

41 Simcoe to Hammond July 18, 1794, ibid., 323-325; Simcoe to Hammond, July

1794, ibid., 328-331.

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162      Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

I should not be surprised if the Ministry mentioned their disapprobations

of it to Lord Dorchester, as I don't believe they wish to provoke a war

with the United States, and God knows, this Country is by no means in a

situation to commence hostilities.⁴²

Colonel England's approach to the Indians, when they came

to beg for support, though, was somewhat different. In a speech

to the Indian chieftains on August 6, 1794, he said that the British

would hold to their promises, that Fort Miamis was there for their

protection. He further emphasized that British soldiers could not

march against the Americans without orders from higher authority.

(He might have added that he did not think that such orders would

be forthcoming.)⁴³

One might ask, just what were the British "promises"? Whatever

they were, it is evident from England's speech that they did not

include armed support by British troops, and, one would judge

from the urgent requests of McKee, that they also did not include

all-out aid and provisions of one type or another. For the most part,

one must conclude that the "promises" fell into that general, and

at that time nebulous, category of protection. There was not even

a full guarantee of this.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Wayne sent out further offers of peace;⁴⁵ the Indians

met to debate war and peace, and decided, finally, for war.⁴⁶ As

far as Wayne's terms were concerned, the Indians made no definite

reply. They only hoped that he would stop to give them time "to

think over his proposition." However, Miller, Wayne's envoy to

the Indians, did return with the news that the British would "hold

their ground" and that they had asked how many cannon Wayne

had with his forces. Wayne, of course, was interested in the in-

formation concerning the British post, but he would not halt his

force. Naturally he did not divulge the fact that he had not suffi-

cient artillery to dislodge the British from their post.⁴⁷

42 England to Simcoe, July 22, 1794, ibid., 333-334.

43 England's Speech to the Indians, August 6, 1794, ibid., 360.

44 McKee to England, August 10, 1794, ibid., 365.

45 "Wayne's Terms of Friendship," in Western Annals (Pittsburgh, 1857), 404-405.

46 "Speech of Turkey Foot at Grand Rapids," Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XX

(1948), 42.

47 Unidentified manuscript diary, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana,

entries of August 16 and 22, 1794.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background             163

 

On the British side, the word still seemed to be one of "watchful

waiting." Simcoe spoke of a possible "attack" upon the Miamis

post, and felt that the Indians should know that if such attack was

made, it would be to Wayne's own detriment. In other words, it

would seem that the British would enter the fracas only if Wayne

attacked one of their garrisons.⁴⁸

Unfortunately, in many respects, Wayne's scouts, who had ap-

proached within two miles of Fort Miamis, felt, from what they

had seen and heard, that both the Indians and the British were

fleeing.⁴⁹ Somewhat moved, no doubt, by this information, Wayne

continued his march forward, unaware of the attack which was

to occur the following morning. The British had not fled, in spite

of the fact that the fort was still incomplete.⁵⁰

The story of the battle at the fallen timber is too often told

to be repeated here. Wayne's report of the battle to Secretary of

War Knox, though, is worth noting, as he reported that the enemy

consisted of the "Indians, and Canadian militia, and volunteers."51

Subsequent facts seem to indicate that such non-Indian elements

as were present were there without the official sanction of the

Canadian government. The Indians fled to Fort Miamis only to

find the gates closed to them.52

The following day, Wayne, having surveyed the British post,

reported that it was too strong to be forced, and thus his army

must move back to Grand Glaize.53 The move was not made before

a series of notes passed between Wayne, who was afraid to storm

the fort, and Campbell, the British commander, who was afraid

that he would. These notes, together with the letters of Campbell

concerning the battle, show vividly the bravado with which the two

commanders, both fearing each other, acted. Wayne's decision

48 Simcoe to England, August 17, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 386.

49 Unidentified manuscript diary, Indiana Historical Society, entry of August 19,

1794.

50 Simcoe to England, August 19, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 392-393.

51 Wayne to Knox, August 28, 1794, in Wayne Papers, Historical Society of

Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (microfilm in Ohio State Archaeological and Historical

Society, Columbus).

52 "Narrative of the Battle of Fallen Timbers As Told by Chief Kin-jo-i-no,"

Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XX (1948), 46-48.

53 Unindentified manuscript diary, Indiana Historical Society, entry for August 21,

1794.

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164      Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

not to besiege the post also might have been due, in some part at

least, to the report of a deserter that the post was equipped with

4 nine-pounders, 6 howitzers, and 4 six-pounders, as well as four

companies of the 24th Regiment, and thirty-five of the Queen's

Rangers.⁵⁴ This was no small force for such a fortification, and

under such circumstances and with such fire power, it could cer-

tainly hold out longer than Wayne's scanty provisions.

On the other hand, Major Campbell, the commander of the

post, worried and fearful, wrote to Colonel England at Detroit,

saying, "I sincerely hope the Governor himself may soon arrive

and take all the responsibility upon him."⁵⁵ Certainly Campbell

must have been glad to see Wayne's army finally move out from

under his ramparts without a shot fired and without an attempt

made to assail his garrison. The reports to Simcoe of Wayne's

preparing to take Fort Miamis proved to be false alarms, and thus

the Indians were allowed to retreat without pursuit to a point six

miles beyond the post, which had not really protected them at all.⁵6

Wayne was content with a moral victory over the British and

pointed out in his congratulatory general order of August 23, 1794:

The Indians to all appearances have totally Abandoned their settlements

quite to the Mouth of the River, and their Villages and corn Fields being

consumed and destroyed in every direction, even under the influence of the

Guns of Fort Miami. Facts which must produce a conviction to the Minds

of the Savages that the British had neither the Power nor inclination to

afford them that Protection they had been Taught to expect; That on the

Contrary a Numberous Garrison well supplied with Artillery have been

 

54 Ibid., entry for August 21, 1794. This report was generally correct. Earlier

letters and orders recorded the numbers and types of armament to be sent to Fort

Miamis. Generally, they coincide with those herein reported.

Whether or not Wayne was willing to risk the diplomatic consequences, one

cannot definitely tell. That he was cognizant of the effect such a seizure might have,

cannot be denied, for he certainly was aware of the tense situation between Britain

and the United States and of the Jay negotiations. However, Wayne's comment re-

ported by his officers was that the fort was too strong to take.

55 Campbell to England, August 21, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 398.

56 Duggan to Chew, August 22 and 23, 1794, in Michigan Pioneer and Historical

Society Collections, XII (1888), 122-123. Some units of Wayne's force did follow

the retreating Indians down the river, but there is no evidence that any conflict

continued beyond Fort Miamis.

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Fort Miamis: The International Background           165

 

compelled to remain tacit spectators of the General Conflagration round

them, and their flag displayed to the Disgrace of the British, and to the

Honour of the American Arms.⁵⁷

Following Wayne's encounter with the Indians, the British began

to feel their losses. These had nothing to do with posts or an attack

by the United States Legion upon the fort at Detroit, but were

primarily losses of trade, which was the lifeblood of the area ad-

ministered by Upper Canada, and of Indian loyalty. McKee was

trying to keep the Indians in the area, but he was to be sent to

Lower Canada, and it was reported that the Indians were planning

to move to the southern and western parts of the country. The result

of such action, of course, would mean the end of British domination

of the fur trade, with consequent losses of revenue by the imperial

treasury, and severe curtailment of the activities of merchant and

trading companies with home offices in England. Though these latter

groups had exerted pressure earlier and had succeeded in British

retention, de facto, of the Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Maumee

Valley areas, nothing they could do at this point through political

pressure at home or abroad could convince the Indians that they

should return to a position of allegiance to the British.⁵⁸

Some efforts were made in October to regain Indian favor and

to hold the area. A detachment was sent to Swan Creek on the

tenth of that month to build a blockhouse under McKee's direction,

but this action was too late to save British influence in the area.⁵⁹

The Indians finally left the British camp, disappointed and dis-

gusted over their treatment, and made a treaty, the Treaty of

Greene Ville, with Wayne. The Jay Treaty, accomplished in London

and ratified by the Americans only after a fiery debate in the senate,

meant the end of Fort Miamis as a British garrison. It was sur-

rendered to Wayne on August 7, 1796,60 though Colonel Hamtramck

had established an American garrison there as early as July 11,

 

57 "Wayne's Orderly Books," ibid., XXXIV (1905), 547.

58 Chew to Thomas Coppis, September 22, 1794, ibid., XII, 145.

59 Simcoe to England, October 10, 1794, ibid., 148.

60 F. Clever Bald, "Fort Miamis, Outpost of Empire," Northwest Ohio Quarterly,

XVI (1944), 102.

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166     Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly

 

1796. By 1800 it had been dropped from the official post list of

the War Department.61

The story of Fort Miamis points up two salient features of British

colonial policy in the decade from 1784 to 1794. In the first place

indications seem to confirm the fact that where domestic matters

were concerned, the colonial officials had almost complete authority.

The conduct of colonial affairs in Canada was thus centered in

Dorchester and his administration. His pronouncements effectively

made the policy of the colony. In this particular case he considered

the lands north and west of the Ohio River as part of his colonial

domain. The illegality of the British position in this region not-

withstanding, the fact remained that Canadian officials administered

the territory and British agents dealt skillfully with the problems

of Indian relations and trade which was the principal concern there.

In the second place, the change in the London government's

attitude toward the United States cannot escape notice. From a

policy of downright deception and actual non-cooperation in April

1784, the home government found itself compromising this position

in 1794. In spite of the attitude of the Dorchester administration,

the territory in question was an international, not a domestic,

problem. Pressures of world affairs far outweighed the pressure

of London entrepreneurs and colonial traders. The European

ferment following the French Revolution placed American colonial

problems in a place of second rate significance. Also, a new and

strong central government in the United States promised to be less

submissive to British humiliations than had its predecessor.

Thus Fort Miamis is not only the symbol of the last stand of

British antagonism to the expansion of her former colonies into

the northwest, but, for the new west at least, was a pawn moved

in response to considerations of world politics. The international

chess game reached even onto the American frontier!

 

61 Ibid., 106.

• 21