THE MIDDLE WEST AND THE COMING
OF WORLD WAR I*
by ARTHUR S. LINK
Associate Professor of History,
Northwestern University
It is difficult to avoid elaborating
the obvious in describing the
general attitude of the leaders and
people of the Middle West
toward the European War, from its
outbreak until the intervention
of the United States in 1917. Nourished
as they had been upon a
tradition of the uniqueness of American
democratic virtue and
upon the concept of the degeneracy of
Europe, midwesterners were
certain that the war was the natural
consequence of imperialism,
militarism, commercial greed, and
dynastic feuds. The sentiments
of revulsion evoked by these
traditional beliefs were heightened,
moreover, by the admonitions of a
generation of progressives and
social gospel preachers, who had
convinced a significant part of the
thoughtful population that wars were
inherently evil in principle
and were made, in practice, by
munitions-makers, international
bankers, and scheming diplomats.
Before February or March of 1917 the
people of the Middle West
saw no reason why they should alter
these basic attitudes. For the
most part, they continued to live in a
happy and apathetic fool's
paradise, serene in the conviction that
their country had no vital
stake in the outcome of the struggle in
Europe. On the whole, this
was also the general attitude of the
entire country--of editors,
politicians, preachers, and public
leaders of every stripe. It was
an attitude shared and voiced on many
occasions by President
Wilson, who gave little evidence before
April 1917 of perceiving
the significance of the war for the
vital interests of the United
States.
There were a few spokesmen who realized
how important was
America's stake in the war, but they
did not reside in the Middle
*This and the following article by
Jeannette P. Nichols were originally given as
papers in a joint session on "The
Middle West and the Coming of the Two World
Wars" at the forty-fifth annual
meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Asso-
ciation held at Chicago, April 17-19, 1952.
109
110
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
West--or in the South. The mass of
people of those two great
sections were profoundly pacifistic in
sentiments. An overwhelming
majority of them opposed any measures
that might even remotely
lead to war. They expressed these
sentiments through channels
that the rank and file usually employ,
and their political spokesmen
faithfully reiterated them. To
encompass a complex set of attitudes
in one generalization, one might say
that midwesterners and their
leaders regarded neutrality as the
safest and wisest rule of faith
and conduct, as the surest means of
safeguarding the interests of
the country.
It is relatively easy to establish the
pattern of midwestern
attitudes toward the war. Evidence
gathered from manuscript
collections, newspapers and
periodicals, and public documents
indicates that the pattern just set up
is on the whole accurate. But
it is a different proposition to
attempt to measure the effect of
midwestern sentiments upon the policies
of the Wilson adminis-
tration. Yet that influence was at all
times pervasive and on several
critical occasions it was decisive.
Moreover, it was an important
factor in the formulation of British
policies toward the United
States. So obviously one does not
detract from the significance of
midwestern influence by admitting that
it is impossible to measure
that influence fully.
During the first six months of the war
middlewestern opinion
followed the national pattern of apathy
or self-congratulation.
To be sure, there was a lively debate
among the newspapers and
public spokesmen about the causes and
merits of the war. German-
Americans, a powerful element in the
section, condemned Bryan
and the state department for alleged
favoritism to the Allies and
defended the German cause. By the end
of the period of restrained
maritime warfare the general causes of
the war had been thoroughly
discussed and probably a majority of
the midwesterners had formed
a mild bias in favor of the Allies.
Even so, midwestern opinion was
apathetic. In the South there was
bitter hostility to Great Britain.
because the British blockade had ruined
the cotton producers. Or
the other hand, there were no important
coalitions of anti-British
sentiment in the Middle West, except in
Montana, where the
The Middle West and the Coming of
World War I 111
copper interests had been hard hit by
the blockade, and except
among the German- and Irish-Americans.
The farmers of the region,
even by the end of 1914, were enjoying
the inflationary effects of
Allied purchases, while industry and
trade were recovering from
the depression of 1913-14. Wilson's
policy of strict neutrality-
of neutrality "in thought as well
as in deed"-therefore harmonized
perfectly with midwestern interests.
The period from February to about
October 1915 witnessed the
first phase of the strenuous efforts of
Great Britain and Germany
to control the Atlantic sea lanes in
the interest of their military
policies. From the beginning of the war
Wilson and Bryan had
acquiesced in the British maritime
measures, which under traditional
legal concepts were illegal, while
reserving American rights by
verbal protests. This policy of
conforming realistically to the then
existing configurations of military and
naval power met with
widespread approval in the Middle West,
except among the
German-American element. The
development which upset the
existing power structure and compelled
a reexamination of Wilson's
Course was the German challenge to the
British system, embodied
in the so-called war zone decree of
February 4, 1915. Hereafter it
would be impossible for the United
States to continue to acquiesce
In the British blockade without
seriously impairing friendly re-
ations with Germany.
Wilson's reply of February 10, 1915, to
the German threat was
explicit, but it defended only the
rights of American ships on the
?eas, and passengers on them. The
German government soon
racked down from its threat to destroy
American ships. Wilson
then proposed a compromise involving
the relaxation of the British
2nd German blockades, but the British
saw no reason why they
should enervate their economic warfare
to help the United States
?reserve friendly relations with
Germany. Upon Britain's rejection
of Wilson's modus vivendi, the
German admiralty extended the
ubmarine warfare against the great
passenger liners, and an
entirely new issue was raised.
The great debate over the right of
American citizens to travel
nmolested on passenger vessels of belligerent
nationality raged far
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Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
and wide in this country during the
late spring and early summer of
1915. When Wilson, in the second Lusitania
note, refused to
suggest that the issue be deferred for
arbitration, Bryan resigned
as secretary of state to assume
leadership of the extreme anti-war
elements of the South and Middle West.
Middlewestern reaction
to these events was almost
instantaneous. It was as if midwesterners
awoke for the first time to a
realization that war with Germany
was a possibility.
It was obvious from the great anti-war
meetings, from resolutions
adopted by hundreds of different
groups, and from the success of
Bryan's peace campaign that a large
number, perhaps a majority,
of midwesterners and southerners opposed
going to war over the
issue that Wilson had raised with the
German government. The
overwhelming and spontaneous popular
revulsion against war
over the submarine issue might have had
an immediate effect on
the administration's policies if Wilson
had been determined to
force the issue with Germany at this
time. For example, Senator
Martin and Representative Flood, both
from Virginia and both
powerful Democratic leaders in
congress, at the height of the
Lusitania crisis warned the president that he probably could not
obtain a congressional majority for a
war resolution. Members of
the cabinet advised him that
three-fourths of the people of the
South and West were for peace. Writing
in his private diary soon
after the United States entered the
war, Secretary of State Lansing
recalled that at the time of the Lusitania
crisis the president could
not have carried the country into war.
While this point is significant and
correct, it should not be
assumed that midwestern and southern
resistance to war paralyzec
Wilson's arm and prevented him from
adopting a strong policy
The evidence is conclusive that Wilson
did not want to adopt sucl
a strong policy and did not intend to
do so unless the submarine
campaign became so frightful as to
arouse a sweeping popula
demand for war. All during the great
crisis he kept on talking ii
terms that the isolationists could
heartily approve. We know nov
that the Germans did not have enough
submarines in 1915 to make ai
all-out underseas campaign worthwhile.
When they seemingl
The Middle West and the Coming of
World War 1 113
capitulated to Wilson's demand for a
cessation of their ruthless
warfare against unarmed, peaceful
Allied passenger ships, the
issue was momentarily settled.
Wilson's apparent triumph provoked an
outpouring of joy and
relief from midwesterners and most
other Americans. The president
was hailed as the victor in a struggle
of humane idealism against
the philosophy of brute force. But when
Wilson undertook to
press home one of the significant
lessons of the submarine con-
troversy, namely, the powerlessness of
the United States to protect
its interests against assaults upon
them, he set off a new public
debate over the nation's foreign
policy.
Actually, the advocates of preparedness
had already got their
campaign in high gear long before
Wilson gave his endorsement
to it. The effect of Wilson's coming
out for preparedness in the
fall of 1915 was merely to stimulate
the energies of the anti-
preparedness forces in the Middle West
and South, since they had
heretofore counted Wilson on their
side.
Public opinion on such important issues
is of course extremely
difficult to measure. None the less,
the evidence of midwestern
opposition to the administration's
preparedness program is so
overwhelming that one can only conclude
that at least the vocal
majority of midwesterners were ranged
against Wilson in this
fight. This was true also of the South.
Wilson recognized the
extent of midwestern hostility to
preparedness and endeavored to
counteract it by a spectacular speaking
tour through the region in
late January and early February 1916.
It is highly doubtful that
he won many converts. Certainly his
appeals had slight effect on
the midwestern representatives in
congress. And this was true in
spite of the fact that the large city
newspapers and many of the
business leaders supported defensive
preparedness as strongly as
their eastern counterparts.
In the struggle over preparedness
practically all the progressive
elements who had hitherto supported
Wilson on domestic questions
deserted him. The result was virtual
defeat of the administration
by what now amounted to a strong
southern-western coalition in
congress. The administration had
proposed an army bill which
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Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
would have soon created a reserve force
of a million potential
soldiers under national control--the
so-called continental army plan.
The consequences of the carrying
through of such a program for
American foreign policy were not lost
upon the anti-preparedness
leaders, who were of course also the
leaders of progressive,
isolationistic, anti-war sentiment. The
continental army plan was
decisively rejected, and Wilson
surrendered in such a way as to
provoke the resignation of his
secretary of war, Lindley M. Garrison.
As for the administration's naval
program, different circumstances
prevailed. A few of the
anti-preparedness leaders like Claude
Kitchin, Warren Worth Bailey, and Bryan
opposed on principle
the administration's plans for an
immense expansion of the navy,
but most of the anti-preparedness
coalition did not. A great army
might be used offensively in Europe or
Mexico, they argued, while
a powerful navy could never be used
except in the defense of
American interests at home or on the
seas. The movement for a
larger navy, moreover, had the support
of all the anti-Japanese
and anti-British elements among the
population. A great navy
could never be used against German land
power, but it might
prove decisive in the event of a
show-down with the British over
the blockade.
Up to this time, that is, late 1915 and
early 1916, midwestern
and southern opposition to strong
foreign and preparedness policies
had succeeded in emasculating the
administration's plan to create a
dependable army reserve and had
operated to remind Wilson that
warlike threats against Germany, if
ever he should want to make
them, would draw sharp opposition from
the people and their
spokesmen in congress. This opposition
was soon aroused over the
armed ship issue. But it was aroused
only because of the secret,
bungling, and contradictory diplomacy
of the president, Secretary
Lansing, and Colonel House.
The question of the right of Americans
to travel on belligerent
armed merchant ships had been
studiously avoided by Wilson in
negotiations with Germany during the
summer and fall of 1915.
At the beginning of the war the state
department had countenanced
The Middle West and the Coming of
World War I 115
the defensive arming of merchant ships,
but the question was at
that time academic. During the latter
part of 1915 and early in
January 1916, however, the American
government and people
obtained conclusive evidence that the
Allies were arming some
merchant ships and ordering them to
take offensive action against
submarines. Confronted with this
evidence, Lansing, with the full
approval of Wilson, began a diplomatic
campaign to force the
Allies to disarm their merchant ships.
In return, the German
government would be asked to continue
to observe the rules of
cruiser warfare in its submarine
operations. Lansing's modus vivendi
was embodied in a circular to the
Allied governments dated
January 18, 1916.
The German officials of course
gleefully approved Lansing's
proposal, and knowing full well that
the Allies would never agree
to the obliteration of their merchant
fleets, announced on February
8 and 10, 1916, that submarine
commanders would hereafter be
instructed to sink armed merchantmen on
sight. Wilson and
Lansing immediately reversed themselves
and a few days later
announced that they would hold the
German government strictly
accountable for American lives lost as
a result of the new sub-
marine order.
Midwestern reaction to Wilson's
baffling shift in policy was
immediate and hostile. There at once
arose a demand that was
nationwide, but strongest in the
Midwest, that congress intervene
to prohibit Americans from traveling on
armed merchant ships.
The evidence strongly suggests that
neither the people of the
Middle West and the South, nor their
representatives in congress,
were willing to go to war in defense of
an obsolete legality.
Resolutions introduced in the two
houses earlier by Representative
McLemore of Texas and Senator Gore of
Oklahoma were at once
resurrected as an answer to the
administration.
It was evident that a situation was
developing in congress that
might soon get out of control. On
February 21 Senators Stone and
Kern and Representative Flood informed
Wilson of the growing
revolt. Four days later Speaker Clark
and Representatives Kitchin
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Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
and Flood called on Wilson--the much
misunderstood "sunrise
conference"--and warned him that
sentiment in the house was
overwhelmingly in favor of the McLemore
resolution.
The spectacular manner in which Wilson
met this challenge to
his leadership in foreign affairs is
well known. But it is usually
not remembered that the
administration's strategy prevented an
open expression of congressional
opinion on the armed ship issue.
The McLemore and Gore resolutions were
tabled, it is true, but
only because Wilson and Postmaster
General Burleson put enormous
pressure on the southern Democrats. The
patronage stick was not
so threatening to midwestern
congressmen. A majority of them,
including the solid delegations from
Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin, voted to repudiate the
president's foreign policy
at a critical juncture.
The armed ship controversy was a dismal
affair and a grim
reminder to Wilson that the Middle
West, at least, and probably
the South also, was still inflexible in
its opposition to any measures
that might conceivably lead to war. It
was a tragic affair, also,
because congressional leaders began to
suspect that Wilson was
maneuvering to involve the country in
the European conflict. There
was a purpose behind Wilson's strange
reversal on the armed ship
question, but that purpose was not
intervention. It was mediation
and peace. At the very time that
Lansing was preparing his modus
vivendi of January 18, 1916, Colonel House was in London
endeavoring to persuade the British
cabinet to cooperate in a plan
to end the war on the basis of a
reasonable peace settlement. The
issuance of Lansing's memorandum nearly
wrecked these negotia-
tions. Wilson abandoned the modus
vivendi at House's urging,
therefore, in order to undo the damage
that it had done. It is no
coincidence that the so-called
gentlemen's agreement was initialed
by Grey and House on February 22, at
the very moment when
Wilson was standing firm against the
congressional majority.
The existence of the gentlemen's
agreement was of course not
publicly known, nor were the reasons
for Wilson's stand in the
armed ship controversy even faintly
comprehended. And ignorance
of his purposes only added to the
misunderstanding of congressmen
The Middle West and the Coming of
World War I 117
and their constituents. A short time
later, when Wilson was certain
he would succeed in compelling the
belligerents to come to the
peace table soon, he pressed the German
government hard in the
Sussex case and won a reaffirmation of the Arabic and Persia
pledges. Thus the president thought he
had rehabilitated himself
in the respect of the British leaders
and was in a position from
which he could dictate the peace
settlement. The Sussex crisis of
course brought the country to the verge
of breaking diplomatic
relations with Germany, and it is
doubtful that Wilson had any
substantial support from the Middle
West for his diplomacy.
Yet he was now playing for stakes no
less than the peace of the
world, and he pursued his course
relentlessly.
The six weeks following the ending of
the Sussex crisis were
weeks of confusion and uncertainty
among political leaders and
the people. Theodore Roosevelt, the
leading American inter-
ventionist, had called for strong
action and denounced the presi-
dent's weak policy. When Elihu Root and
Henry Cabot Lodge
took up Roosevelt's theme in important
political speeches in
February and March, it seemed certain
that the Republicans would
make this their chief point of attack
in the coming presidential
campaign. At least, it appeared so to
the newspapers and to Re-
publican leaders like former President
Taft, who was sure his
party was headed straight for defeat if
it became avowedly a war
party.
The startling political developments
after the Sussex incident,
however, soon resolved all doubts as to
public sentiment on the
issue of war or peace. It was as if the
people of the Middle West
sensed that they had narrowly averted
intervention, and during
May and the first weeks of June there
occurred such striking
evidences of the section's overwhelming
passion for peace as the
country had not heretofore witnessed.
This virtual peace obsession
had its most significant impact on the
two major parties.
Roosevelt was now campaigning for the
Republican nomination
on what amounted to an interventionist
platform. Root and Lodge
had given him tacit endorsement in
their speeches opening the
Republican campaign. But it was soon
evident that the people of
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Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
the country, and above all of the
Middle West, were not in a
heroic mood. The defeat of Robert
Bacon, an avowed interventionist,
for the Republican senatorial
nomination in New York by a man
who had the support of the
German-Americans and the peace
element, indicated that interventionism
could not command a
majority even among eastern
Republicans. More significant, however,
was Henry Ford's sweeping success in
the Republican presidential
primaries in Michigan and Nebraska.
Ford, an outstanding pacifist,
was not even a candidate and tried to
take his name off the
Michigan and Nebraska ballots. The
peace Republicans in those
states were obviously using Ford's
candidacy as a warning to their
national leaders. Finally, the
nomination of Charles Evans Hughes
by the party in June brought a
resolution of all doubts as to the
sentiments of the Republican rank and
file. Hughes had been put
forward as a candidate by the peace
forces and the German-
Americans, and his nomination signified
repudiation of the war
element.
The answer of the Democratic voters to
the question of peace or
war was given even more decisively by
their representatives in the
national convention that met in St.
Louis on June 14. Smarting
under the Republican charges of
weakness and vacillation, Wilson
and his managers had planned to make
the convention one gigantic
demonstration of Democratic patriotism,
with Americanism the
chief battle-cry of the campaign. These
plans went completely
awry, however, when former Governor
Martin H. Glynn's keynote
speech sounded the peace note and the
convention got entirely out
of control and became one long and loud
demonstration for peace,
almost at any price. Not Wilson, but
Bryan, who had been cast
out of the party councils and was not
even a delegate, became the
real hero of the occasion.
As it turned out, developments abroad
facilitated Wilson's easy
adjustment to this new situation. By
this time Grey had definitely
refused to carry through on the
gentlemen's agreement, and the
British government had begun instead to
intensify its economic
warfare. As a consequence, Wilson's
opinion had turned sharply
against the British, so much so that he
was well on the way toward
The Middle West and the Coming of
World War I 119
becoming genuinely neutral. This
significant configuration of cir-
cumstances, in addition to the manifest
demand of the South and
Middle West for a pacific, neutral
foreign policy, eased Wilson's
shift from his former position as
pro-Allied mediator to his new
position as champion of peace and
neutrality.
The campaign that followed witnessed
the fulfillment of all the
hopes and dreams of the peace forces.
Much to the delight of the
Democrats, Hughes was caught in the
middle of two opposing
fires within his own party. Roosevelt
and the Republican inter-
ventionists kept up their steady
barrage against Wilson's allegedly
spineless foreign policy, and Hughes
could not silence them without
alienating an important minority in his
own ranks.
In contrast, the Democrats were
disturbed by no such division.
Wilson made the issue of war or peace
the leading issue of his own
campaign and warned the country that a
vote for Hughes was a
vote for war. His managers highlighted
the peace theme in all
campaign literature and advertisements.
The leading Democratic
peace advocates, led by Bryan, were
turned loose in full force
on the Middle and Far West and given
carte blanche to commit
their party to a policy of
non-intervention. No one missed the
significance of these developments,
least of all Count von Bernstorff,
who described them to his government
with satisfaction and delight.
Even after taking into account the
complexity of the campaign
issues and the importance of domestic
questions, the conclusion is
inevitable that Wilson's victory in
November was an emphatic
mandate for peace from the people of
the Middle West, the South,
and the Far West. This, in any event,
was Wilson's own evaluation
of the returns. Soon after the election
he told Colonel House that
the American people did not want to go
to war to protect the
right of Americans to travel on
belligerent merchant ships. Yet
Wilson now knew that both Germany and
Great Britain would
soon further intensify their maritime
warfare and that it might
prove impossible for the United States
to avoid decisive action
against one side or the other. In order
to avert the probability of
American participation, during the next
two and a half months he
radically shifted his foreign policy.
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Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
That change involved nothing less than
bringing the war to an
end through diplomatic cooperation with
the German government.
The perils of such a course were
evident and were pointed out by
Lansing and House. What if Germany
agreed to accept a reasonable
peace settlement and the Allies
refused? Would not the United
States then be drawn into a sympathetic
alliance with Germany,
with the consequent danger of a rupture
with Britain, House and
Lansing both asked. Wilson agreed but
declared that he was
willing to accept such consequences. It
is evident that he thought
the Germans were ready to accept or
offer reasonable terms, that
the Allies were not, and that he could
force the Allies to come
to the peace table.
Wilson's peace campaign of December
1916 and January 1917
was an implementing of the peace
longings of the sections that
had returned him to power and as such
evoked overwhelming
approval in the Middle West. Based as
it was upon Wilson's
assumption that the German government
would cooperate with
his plans for a "peace without
victory," a peace of reasonableness,
it was hopelessly romantic. Wilson did
not know it, but the men
then running the German government had
not the slightest desire
for a reasonable settlement. They
coveted nothing less than destruc-
tion of the British maritime system and
absolute dominion in
Europe, both in the East and the West.
Germany's ambitions were finally
revealed to Wilson on January
31, 1917, concurrently with the
announcement of an unrestricted
submarine campaign against all
commerce. Wilson had been
tricked, deceived, and betrayed. He had
no alternative but to sever
diplomatic relations with the German
Empire. As a responsible
leader, he had no alternative but to
inform the American people
of the consequences to them of the
success of the German drive
for dominion over Europe. Instead of
doing this, however, he
justified the break in diplomatic
relations solely on legal grounds
and expressed the fervent hope that the
German government
really did not mean what it had said.
The people of the country
overwhelmingly approved the dis-
missal of Bernstorff. But at least a
large majority of southerners
The Middle West and the Coming of
World War 1 121
and midwesterners believed that the
nation's security was in no
manner threatened by the submarine
campaign, and they wanted
desperately to avoid participation in a
war in which their vital
interests were not involved. During
February and March 1917
there was a full-fledged public debate
over the question of war
or peace, and from this debate there
emerged what might be called
the anti-war element's alternative to
full-scale participation. It
was the proposal, first made by
Professor Carlton Hayes of Columbia
University, that the United States
pursue a policy of armed
neutrality and avoid doggedly any
intervention in European affairs.
Hayes's proposal evoked approval in all
sections, but in the Middle
West it was seized upon as the one
solution of a painful dilemma.
When the president asked congress for
authority to arm and defend
American merchant ships, congressional
approval was overwhelming.
Forty-seven percent of the midwestern
members of the house and
Sixty-four percent of the farwestern
members voted to deny pro-
section to ships carrying munitions, it
is true; but when this amend-
nent failed, only thirteen votes were
cast against the arming of
merchant ships. It should be added,
also, that there was virtually
no opposition in the senate to the armed ship bill. The so-called
filibuster, which was not a filibuster
at all, was directed against a
Provision of the bill endowing the
president with extraordinary
war powers, not against the principle
of armed neutrality.
The denouement of the story, in its
major aspects, is so well
known that there is no need to repeat
it here. Wilson soon
abandoned armed neutrality, which for a
short time he, too, had
accepted as a substitute for war,
although the reasons he gave for
zing so were hardly comprehensible. The
Middle West con-
tinued to hope for peace. Even at this
critical moment the president
failed to tell the people the facts of
international life or to justify
the necessity for war on a basis that
had any real significance. His
war message was a call for a great
crusade for democracy that
inevitably turned bitter in the end and
made disillusioned cynics
at of the crusaders. The people of the
great Mississippi Valley
had no alternative but to concur in the
decision for war. The
situation was out of their control.
THE MIDDLE WEST AND THE COMING
OF WORLD WAR I*
by ARTHUR S. LINK
Associate Professor of History,
Northwestern University
It is difficult to avoid elaborating
the obvious in describing the
general attitude of the leaders and
people of the Middle West
toward the European War, from its
outbreak until the intervention
of the United States in 1917. Nourished
as they had been upon a
tradition of the uniqueness of American
democratic virtue and
upon the concept of the degeneracy of
Europe, midwesterners were
certain that the war was the natural
consequence of imperialism,
militarism, commercial greed, and
dynastic feuds. The sentiments
of revulsion evoked by these
traditional beliefs were heightened,
moreover, by the admonitions of a
generation of progressives and
social gospel preachers, who had
convinced a significant part of the
thoughtful population that wars were
inherently evil in principle
and were made, in practice, by
munitions-makers, international
bankers, and scheming diplomats.
Before February or March of 1917 the
people of the Middle West
saw no reason why they should alter
these basic attitudes. For the
most part, they continued to live in a
happy and apathetic fool's
paradise, serene in the conviction that
their country had no vital
stake in the outcome of the struggle in
Europe. On the whole, this
was also the general attitude of the
entire country--of editors,
politicians, preachers, and public
leaders of every stripe. It was
an attitude shared and voiced on many
occasions by President
Wilson, who gave little evidence before
April 1917 of perceiving
the significance of the war for the
vital interests of the United
States.
There were a few spokesmen who realized
how important was
America's stake in the war, but they
did not reside in the Middle
*This and the following article by
Jeannette P. Nichols were originally given as
papers in a joint session on "The
Middle West and the Coming of the Two World
Wars" at the forty-fifth annual
meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Asso-
ciation held at Chicago, April 17-19, 1952.
109