Ohio History Journal

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BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS

 

The Taft Story. By William S. White. (New York, Harper & Brothers,

1954. [x]+282p.; illustrations and index. $3.50.)

Within certain limits, William S. White, a very able New York Times

Washington correspondent, has produced a useful study of the late Senator

Taft. It should be added quickly, however, that the limits are indeed

limited. The book does not pretend to be a biography; in fact, it is without

documentation, woefully out of balance, and loosely put together. Still

there emerges a valuable portrait of "Mr. Republican," and one which

cannot help but contribute to our understanding of that sometimes mis-

understood man.

On the debit side the most striking omissions relate to Taft's ancestry,

nativity, adolescence, and early maturity. Only 52 of the book's 282 pages

have anything to do with background, and even there the data is so scattered

as to be something less than clear. After this brief introduction, one is

quickly propelled into 1945, and the remaining 230 pages deal with the

last eight years. Mr. White went to Washington in 1945, and his sole

sources are personal conversations with and observations of Senator Taft

after that time. In essence then this is a case study of Taft under eight

years of Truman and six months of Eisenhower.

As a case study what does it reveal? Several controlling factors at once

deserve comment. Taft, in the author's view, seldom understood that which

he did not experience. For example, his isolationism and his insistence on

cutting military expenditures, is explained by the fact that he never was in

the army. Then again, Taft never experienced anything resembling economic

insecurity. This, says Mr. White, is why he looked askance at "socialistic

nonsense," which was supposed to help those who had experienced economic

insecurity.

Another factor which conditioned Taft's outlook was the Bull Moose

defection in 1912. The lesson learned here was that unless party regularity

was maintained the party would be destroyed. This was at the bottom of

the senator's differences with Thomas E. Dewey. Taft felt that Dewey

represented a "me too-ism," which was so close to "Eastern internationalism"

and "New Deal socialism" as to sap the party's vitality. It left the rank

and file Republican with no chance to vote for honest to goodness "Old

Guard" Republicanism. When Taft negotiated the "Morningside Surrender"

with Dewey's man Eisenhower, the latter acceded to Taft's demands for a

program based on this traditional Republican philosophy. On that basis

419