URBAN RIVALRY AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST 1820-1860 |
by HARRY N. SCHEIBER |
|
At the very beginning of settlement in the Old Northwest urban commu- nities developed in response to the commercial needs of the surrounding country.* And almost as soon as they appeared, there was "urban rivalry," that is, competition among them for advantages that would promote their growth and enhance their attractiveness to emigrants and investors.1 The earliest rivalries usually involved competition for advantages that govern- ment might bestow. Designation as the county seat or as the territorial or state capital marked the beginning of growth for many a rude village in the West, and the pursuit of these choice prizes was inevitably marked by keen political struggles. The presence of federal land offices, colleges and acad- emies, or government installations such as arsenals and prisons was for many towns the only factor that permitted them to outdistance less favored rivals with equivalent natural or geographic endowments.2 NOTES ARE ON PAGES 289-292 |
228 OHIO HISTORY
Sustained urban growth and economic
viability were in most cases depend-
ent upon more than initial advantages
that this sort of government patronage
could provide. Probably the most
important single requirement for urban
growth and commercial development was
adequate transportation. Without
reliable transport facilities connecting
a town with an expanding hinterland
and with outside markets, there were
oppressive limitations upon growth.
The struggle for internal improvements
therefore became the cause of the
most vigorous and persistent rivalries
among western urban communities--
rivalries marked by intense ambitions,
deeply rooted fear of failure, and
ingenious employment of the instruments
of political and economic leverage
at the disposal of urban leaders.3
The period of early urban growth in the
Old Northwest coincided with the
period of canal construction by the
states. How, then, did urban rivalries
influence state transport policy in the
canal era, 1820-45? How did con-
tinued rivalry affect the planning and
construction of western railroads when
private promotion supplanted state
enterprise, from the mid-forties to 1860?
Before dealing with these questions, it
must be noted that self-interested
urban activities and urban consciousness
cannot be strictly separated from
the more embracing force of which they
were manifestations, that is, from
"localism," a collective
consciousness and sense of common interests among
the people of a given locality. The
definition of common objectives and self-
interest might find expression at many
levels, and often urban aims and
objectives were merely an intense
reflection of regional aims.4 Towns fre-
quently spoke in state politics for the
trade areas with which they were asso-
ciated; yet within intrastate regions
(as within interstate sections) cities
might compete for hegemony. New
transport facilities and redirection of
trade--or even the prospect of such
change--might alter drastically the
regional identification of given urban
centers.
The interplay of regional and local
rivalries at the state level is illustrated
in the history of Ohio's improvements
policy. The movement for construction
of a canal between Lake Erie and the
Ohio River, which, it was hoped, would
open eastern markets to Ohio farmers and
merchants, began to gather strength
about 1820 in response to construction
of the Erie Canal in New York. In
1822 the Ohio legislature assigned to a
special commission the task of plan-
ning such a canal. The canal
commissioners soon recognized that their
problem was as much one of politics as
of engineering. As long as the
project remained a subject of discussion
in general terms, optimistic business
and political leaders throughout the
state gave it their support. But once the
project took precise form and the
commission recommended specific routes,
the virtue of vagueness was lost, and
the towns and regions that would be
230 OHIO HISTORY
bypassed united immediately in
opposition to the proposal. Spokesmen for
the disappointed communities evoked the
specter of oppressive taxation,
argued in principle against state
intervention in the economy, and denounced
the commissioners for alleged
corruption. Yet some of the same men had
earlier been among the most outspoken
advocates of a state canal project.5
In 1825 the Ohio canal commission
recommended, and the legislature
adopted, a canal program that
represented a fusion of several important
regional interests within the state. Two
canals were authorized, rather than
the single work originally contemplated.
One, the Miami Canal, satisfied
Cincinnati's mercantile community and
southwest Ohio; it was to run sixty-
seven miles from the Queen City north
through the Miami Valley to Dayton,
with the understanding that it would
later be extended northward to the
Maumee Valley and Lake Erie. The second
canal, the Ohio Canal, followed
a wide-sweeping reverse-S-shaped route
from the Ohio River to the lake,
passing first up the heavily settled
Scioto Valley, then arching eastward to
the headwaters of the Muskingum, there
turning northward again to its
terminus on the lake shore at
Cleveland.6
This canal program gave new focus to
urban and regional ambitions,
which adjusted quickly to take account
of inter-regional connections and
new trade relationships that the canals
would create. In the first place,
within regions through which the canals
passed, there was an intensified
struggle for positions on the projected
works. Everywhere along the canal
routes there was speculation in new
town-sites. A Tuscarawas County pro-
moter expressed the thoughts of hundreds
like himself when he wrote to one
of the canal commissioners: "I
expect a new town will spring up [along the
canal], which, from the great trade
which must center there, from the coun-
try between us and the Ohio, must be a
flourishing one. But where the spot
is, I want you to tell me."7
Sensitive to the potential threat to their own
interests, established market towns in
the interior petitioned for construction
of feeder canals that would connect them
with the main works. In many
instances the townspeople offered to pay
a portion of the cost. Several towns
organized private canal companies to
build feeder lines, not in expectation
of direct profits, but rather to protect
their commercial position.8
Events in the Scioto Valley, the
southern route of the Ohio Canal, indi-
cated the extremes to which localism
might run. Piketon and Chillicothe
had joined with other towns in the
valley to support the canal bill of 1825
in the legislature. But as soon as it
became necessary for the commission to
set the exact canal location, each town
advanced its own cause and all sense
of regional unity dissolved. The
Chillicothe interests were determined to
obtain a canal connection. They forced
through the legislature a resolution
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ordering the canal commission to build the canal through Chillicothe, even if it was necessary to build a dam or aqueduct across the river in order to bring the canal through the town. The canal commission complied, crossing the river to place the route through Chillicothe. To avoid further expenditure the commission decided not to re-cross the Scioto below Chillicothe. Piketon and other communities on the opposite bank downriver opposed this action bitterly, since it would prevent them from achieving a canal connection, but they were unsuccessful in their protests.9 Ironically, the state's accommo- dation of Chillicothe quieted the clamor there for only a few months. Once actual construction had begun, neighborhoods within the town vied with one another in what may be termed "neighborhood rivalry," various factions demanding that a particular street or section of town be designated as the canal route. Passions ran high for several months, and the mayor finally had to hold a referendum on "the naked and abstract question" of the canal route.10 |
232 OHIO HISTORY
State officials systematically
exploited such local rivalries. Where the
canal might be located on either side
of a river, the Ohio commissioners
solicited donations of land or cash
from townspeople and landowners on
opposite sides of the stream,
indicating that the more generous communities
would be favored when the canal was
located. This practice often stimulated
unreasonable expectations and resulted
in bitter disillusionment.1
Once the initial canal undertaking was
approved, the "disappointed" com-
munities--those entirely outside the
region of the canals--did not give up
their quest for improved
transportation. On the contrary, they proposed a
multitude of new projects, many of them
reflecting an effort by ambitious
towns to overcome the lead of
commercial rivals that had obtained places
on the canals. "Shall narrow views
and sectional feelings withhold our
assistance from a work of such evident
public utility?" the promoters of
one new project asked the general
assembly. "Shall we, palsied by untimely
fears, stop mid-way in the career of
public improvement, to calculate the
cost, before our fellow citizens in
other parts of the State participate in their
advantages?"12
Such new improvements schemes disrupted
older regional alliances and
introduced new forces into state
politics. Sandusky's railroad project is a
case in point. Only a few years after
their town had lost to Cleveland in the
struggle for designation as the
lake-shore terminus of the Ohio Canal, a
group of Sandusky promoters requested
state aid for the Mad River and
Lake Erie Railroad. The Mad River
Railroad was planned in 1831 to run
from Sandusky southwest to Dayton,
which was then head of navigation on
the Miami Canal, and ultimately to
Cincinnati. When the first canal pro-
gram had been debated in the
legislature, six years earlier, the Miami Canal
proposal had been supported by the
western counties located north of Dayton
--but only because of the understanding
that the canal would be extended
northward as soon as finances
permitted. Having enjoyed the benefits of its
position as head of navigation on the
Miami Canal, Dayton now shifted its
allegiance, and the town's
representatives decided to support state aid for
the Mad River Railroad instead of for
extension of the canal."13 This move
threatened to strand the area to the
north, and the towns in that region (espe-
cially Piqua) resented what they
regarded as Dayton's treachery. "The Canal
must be extended," Piqua's newspaper editor declared,
despite "the selfish
policy of those, who at a former period
made such professions of friendship
to us; but who, since their views
have been accomplished, forget their
obligations."14
The projects that blossomed forth in
every part of the state also came into
conflict with one another in the effort
to secure the patronage of the legis-
URBAN RIVALRY 233
lature, which at this time commanded
only limited funds. If logrolling was
an important feature of the legislative
process, so too was the log jam. The
Ohio General Assembly was virtually
stalemated for several years in the
early 1830's because of conflicting
demands for internal improvements.15
The jam began to break when extension of
the Miami Canal and construction
of the Wabash and Erie Canal were authorized--but
only because the federal
government had provided land-grant aid
for these projects. Finally, the
pressure of local ambitions became too
great to resist further. In 1836-37
the legislature approved a comprehensive
system of new canals and state
aid to railroad and turnpike companies,
a program that within five years
would bring Ohio to the verge of default
on its enlarged debt. Every region
had to be satisfied, it seemed; every
little community able to advance half
the cost was to receive state assistance
in the construction of turnpikes or
railways.16
With adoption of the enlarged
improvements program, urban and regional
ambitions adjusted rapidly to the new
transportation developments. Many of
the patterns of localism and rivalries
witnessed a decade earlier now reap-
peared. In the Muskingum Valley, where a
project to improve the river for
steamboat traffic was undertaken,
Zanesville and Dresden fought over which
town should be the head of navigation,
just as Dayton and Piqua had strug-
gled for headship on the Miami Canal.
Meanwhile, Marietta, situated at
the mouth of the Muskingum, protested
that the size of the locks was too
limited. The vision of every town in the
valley appeared to be one of infinite
optimism and boundless growth. "We
look forward," a petition of Marietta
merchants declared glowingly,
and [we] see our situation placed on the
thoroughfare, between the Atlantic & the
Medeterranean [sic] of the North,
the Mississippi & the St. Lawrence. We look
forward to the arrival of the Ohio &
Chesapeake Canal and the Baltimore &
Ohio Rail Road. . . . We look &
expect to see the Ohio made slackwater by Locks
& dams, from Marietta to Pittsburgh
. . . & Lastly we expect to see the Locks,
on the Muskingum Improvement, increased.
. . . We wish to convince you, that
the discriminating principle, attending
the small locks, is derogatory to social
Commerce, & has been discarded by
all civilized nations. 17
In the Maumee Valley, then sparsely
settled, the people of several small
towns--Toledo, Maumee, Perrysburg, and
Manhattan--and the absentee
proprietors of the towns (including
several of the most prominent Ohio
political leaders), all had favored
construction of the Wabash and Erie
Canal, a project designed to continue
Indiana's Wabash and Erie Canal
from the state line through the Maumee
Valley to the lake. But once the Ohio
234 OHIO HISTORY
legislature had decided to undertake the
project, these villages competed
bitterly with one another for
designation as the terminus.18 Among the instru-
ments of rivalry employed were court
injunctions, petitions to the legisla-
ture and to congress, and pressure on
the United States General Land Office
to limit the extent of the federal land
grant by designating one of the com-
peting towns as head of lake navigation.
State officials finally decided to
satisfy all the major competing points
by extending the canal to the mouth of
the river, with terminal locks and
basins at Manhattan, Toledo, and Maumee.
To equalize the conditions of rivalry
the state agreed also to open all the
terminal locks simultaneously.19 Thus
even after a major improvement had
been authorized, the competition of
rival communities could serve to increase
the costs of construction.
Roughly the same patterns of localism
characterized the evolution of
public transport policy in the other
states of the Old Northwest. During the
early promotional phase of internal
improvements, when state officials or
private pressure groups were agitating
for projects in general terms, there
tended to be divisions between the
great trade regions of each state. In
Indiana, for example, the southern
river counties viewed with suspicion the
proposal for the Wabash and Erie Canal,
and they coalesced to press for
roads and railways from the interior to
the Ohio River.20 In Illinois, too,
the region tributary to the Mississippi
River and southern markets adamantly
opposed state aid exclusively for the
proposed canal to Chicago. The towns
on the eastern lake shore in Wisconsin
(still a territory) all sought canal
or railroad connections with the
interior; but they were prevented from
realizing their objectives because of
opposition in the northern region, which
demanded priority for the Fox and
Wisconsin river improvement project,
and in the western river towns.21
Once specific projects had been
formulated, broad regional divisions
gave way under pressure for more
localized objectives. "Most of the members
[of the legislature] vote for nothing
which does not pass through their own
county," the Indiana state
engineer complained in 1835. Indiana's Michigan
Road, supported in a general way by all
the Ohio River counties, became an
object of sharp urban rivalry when
designation of the southern terminus
had to be made. Similarly, the program
that the state's engineers submitted
to the legislature in 1835 was not
rendered acceptable until it had been
expanded elaborately, "to buy
votes," a year later.22 In Michigan all the
lake shore towns demanded connections
with the interior, yet no policy
could command adequate support until
one embracing the objectives of
every competing town had been
formulated. And so Indiana, Illinois, and
Michigan all adopted comprehensive
state programs that overextended their
URBAN RIVALRY 235
resources. In both Illinois and Indiana
the political strength of localism
was further manifested in provisions of
the law requiring simultaneous starts
on all projects; in addition, each of
the states' settled regions was granted
representation on the boards of public
works.23 Once construction had begun,
moreover, scores of proposals were put
forward in each state for branch
lines, feeder canals, and turnpike and
railroad connections designed to
satisfy the needs of towns outside the
immediate areas of the main im-
provements.4
Still another feature of urban and
regional rivalry as it affected state
policy concerned canal tolls. Toll
schedules were commonly established
by state authorities on a protectionist
basis. The states maintained two toll
lists--one for "domestic," or
in-state, manufactures and a higher schedule of
tolls for "foreign," or
out-of-state, commodities. In Ohio, for example,
manufacturers of glassware, iron, salt,
crockery, and other products were
the beneficiaries of protectionist
tolls.25 As long as canals remained the sole
means of cheap transport to the
interior, manufacturers located inland from
Lake Erie or the Ohio River enjoyed a
form of tariff protection from out-
of-state competition. Merchants at the
terminal cities on the lake and the
Ohio River condemned the protectionist
policy as one which imposed arti-
ficial restrictions upon the canal
commerce that was their economic lifeblood.
The conflict between terminal cities and
inland towns was expressed in the
1840's in a debate over wheat and flour
tolls. The millers of the interior
demanded tolls on unprocessed grain that
were proportionally higher than
tolls on flour. This, they argued, would
encourage Ohio's milling industry
and reduce the flow of Ohio grain to New
York State mills. Merchants and
millers at terminal cities opposed such
action; they favored equivalent tolls
on grain and flour (or even
discrimination against flour) as a means of
fostering the milling industry of their
cities or the export of increasing quan-
tities of grain.26
Similarly, merchants at Cleveland, then
gateway for import of salt from
the East, fought discrimination in salt
tolls that protected Ohio producers in
the central portion of the state. Thus
within the state there was a conflict
between mercantile and manufacturing
interests, comparable to the division
in national politics over tariff policy.
The issue of canal tolls cut across
party lines, and special regional
alignments were fostered by this important
question. State officials were forced to
mediate such conflicts, with no reso-
lution possible that could fully satisfy
all contending interests.27
In the period of canal construction,
urban and regional ambitions were
directed largely toward manipulation and
control of state policy. The panic
of 1837 and the post-1839 depression
marked the end of the era of state
236 OHIO HISTORY
canals in the Old Northwest. As the
depression came to an end in the mid-
forties a new internal-improvements
movement gathered momentum, with a
new set of conditions shaping the
character of the movement. In the first
place, there had been a revulsion
against further large-scale construction
by state government, the result of
scandals in management of the public
works, intolerable indebtedness, and
default on their debt by several states
in the depression period.28 In
the second place, the advantages of the railroad
over the canal had been demonstrated.
Construction of railways to meet
local needs was a task that many
communities believed they could undertake
independently of state aid, particularly
if municipal, township, or county
governments extended assistance to
private companies.29 This enthusiasm for
railroads was heightened by another
force: the infusion of eastern capital
into western railroad construction and
reorganization after 1845-46. Foreign
investors, too (particularly the
English), showed renewed interest after 1852
in purchasing railroad bonds or
local-government securities issued for rail-
road aid.30 Moreover, in the canal
states the railroad promised to liberate
urban centers and regions that had
formerly been at the mercy of geographic
conditions. Limitations of terrain that
had characterized canal planning
were no longer relevant, a change that
urban leadership was quick to com-
prehend. The new railroad technology
reopened the critical question of which
city would dominate trade in each region
of the Old Northwest. As Chicago,
Milwaukee, and St. Louis battled for
control of the Mississippi Valley trade
in the most spectacular western urban
rivalry, so too in every area of the
West towns competed for positions on the
new railroads and for hegemony
in local trade areas.31
Most of the projected western railroads
were designed at first to serve
primarily local needs and objectives.
This fact explains the enthusiasm with
which communities, small and large,
supported private railroad companies
with public aid.32 Among the
arguments of railroad promoters seeking local
subscriptions and public assistance were
many that had become familiar in
the canal era. Multiple market outlets
were a major objective of many com-
munities, and numerous railroad schemes
were designed to free towns from
"monopoly" conditions, under
which they were tributary to a single market;
in the same way, the state canal
programs had been designed to open alter-
nate markets to western producers
formerly dependent upon the New Orleans
outlet. Established metropolitan
centers, such as Cleveland and Cincinnati,
extended municipal aid to railroads in
an effort to multiply and extend their
transport radii or to obtain all-rail
connections with the East. Some railroad
promoters even advertised their projects
as potential links in transcontinental
systems that would carry the trade of
Asia and the Far West through a par-
URBAN RIVALRY 237
ticular town or village. And by the
early fifties there had emerged the well-
known competition among major cities for
designation as the eastern termi-
nus of a land-grant transcontinental
railway.33 Less pretentious communities
sought places on the new railroad lines
merely to survive, or else to over-
come advantages enjoyed by rival towns
on canals or rivers.34
Indicative of the emphasis upon local
objectives in railroad promotion
was the ambivalent western attitude
toward eastern influence. The western
railroad promoter was usually quite
willing to accept financial assistance
from established railroad companies, and
he eagerly solicited eastern invest-
ment in bonds or stock. But he generally
had to rely in the first instance
upon local resources, public and
private; and the prospect that outsiders
might control the enterprise could
hinder seriously his efforts to raise funds
locally. One Ohio railroad organizer,
for example, argued with his fellow
promoters in 1851 that it was
inadvisable to employ an engineer from the
East to locate the line. Local people
would, he said, suspect "that this
Eastern man would come here with Eastern
habits, feelings, associations and
interests, the effect of which must be, to give everything an
Eastern aspect."35
In the same vein, the president of the
New Albany and Salem Railroad in
Indiana wrote in 1852 that because most
of the stockholders lived along the
route, the company was protected from
"the prejudice that exists in the
public mind in many places against
[railroads], where they are looked
upon as monopolies owned and managed by
persons having no interests or
sympathies in common with them."36
Yet two of the strongest arguments
employed by western railroad promoters
to secure local support were that
their roads might one day merge with
others to form a large integrated
system or that they might bring an
eastern main line to the sponsoring
communities.37
Western railroad entrepreneurs
skillfully induced and exploited local
rivalries, as state canal authorities
had once done, by soliciting subscriptions
or donations from communities on
alternative routes. One may trace the
routes of many early western railroads
by naming the towns and counties
(seldom on a straight line!) that
extended public aid. Similarly, the major
eastern trunk lines--notably the
Pennsylvania and the Baltimore and Ohio--
gave financial support to several
parallel-running western railroads, thereby
stimulating competition among rival
communities on all the routes thus
aided.38
Private financing and public aid at the
local level were critical determi-
nants of the pace and character of
western railroad expansion. Urban rivalry
continued to find expression, however,
in the arena of the state legislatures.
Debate over charters often involved
bitter conflict over routes; and in some
238 OHIO HISTORY |
|
The Lancaster Gazette Thursday Morning, April 10, 1851 Railroad Vote-Omeint. The following is the official vote of Fairfield county, for and aginst a county subscription of $250,000 to the capital stock of the Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad company. It is a gratifying result and will have without doubt a most favorable influence upon the prosperity of the county: Townships For. AGAINST Hocking ...... 803 ..... 26 Berne ...... 378 ..... 36 Auburn ...... 83 ..... 4 Rushcreek ...... 170 ..... 26 Richland ...... 189 ..... 42 Pleasant ...... 247 ..... 71 Walnut ...... 92 ..... 231 Liberty ...... 44 ..... 463 Violet ...... 10 ..... 327 Bloom ...... 68 ..... 288 Amanda ...... 228 ..... 20 Clearcreek ...... 130 ..... 101 Madison ...... 186 ..... 28 Greenfield ...... 188 ..... 71 Total ...... 2316 ..... 1784 Majority for subscription 1032 An editorial from the Lancaster (Ohio) Gazette approving of the favorable vote on a large county subscription to rail- road stock. The townships which voted overwhelmingly against it were farthest removed from the route of the railroad. cases railroad interests would block altogether the chartering of rival com- panies.39 Opposition to local aid was scattered, and not until 1851 in Ohio and long afterward in other western states was it effective. Urban leaders did occa- sionally divide over the question of priority in allocation of funds among several companies competing for a town's patronage. A few opponents of aid took an ideological position, condemning public assistance of any kind. There were also some instances of urban-rural conflict, with farming areas opposing county aid to railroads which, they averred, would merely enhance the wealth of already affluent market towns. The farm-mortgage railroad subscriptions notorious in Wisconsin-and to a lesser extent in Illinois- testify eloquently, however, to the fact that rural opposition to railroads was by no means universal. Finally, there were some instances of rivalry involv- ing towns within counties, with several vying for connections on the route of a railroad seeking county aid.40 The results of generous public and private support of western railroads were highly uneven. Whether or not their railroad stock paid dividends, |
URBAN RIVALRY 239
many communities were amply rewarded by
commercial advantages con-
ferred by the new transport lines.41
But precisely because the objectives
of western railway promotion had been
defined within a context of local am-
bitions, the reaction was severe when
these ambitions were frustrated.
Throughout the Old Northwest the people
resisted payment on bonds and
subscriptions that aided railroads never
built or which once built had fallen
victim to bankrupt reorganization.
Sometimes there was violence, as in
Athens, Ohio, where townspeople tore up
the tracks of the Marietta and
Cincinnati Railroad, which had bypassed
the town even though its citizens
had voted for county aid to the company.42 In the
1850's there appeared
anti-railroad sentiment that presaged
the Granger movement, a sentiment
stimulated by resentment against
emergent eastern dominance over railroads
built initially with local aid; the outsiders
often imposed rates unfavorable
to the western communities that had
helped build the roads.43
Whether or not the objectives of
westerners who supported early railroads
were later frustrated, the debates over
transportation heightened urban
community consciousness and sharpened
local pride in many western towns.
The issues concerning internal
improvements that dominated town politics
over many years constantly forced
farmers and urban residents alike to re-
examine their local interests, needs,
and hopes in a period of rapid change
in the West.
What occurred in the Old Northwest in
the period 1820-60 also charac-
terized development of the national
transportation system in the pre-Civil
War years: localism and regionalism were
so strong that they rendered
impossible any comprehensive, rational
planning of a system of internal
improvements.44 A glance at
the transport map of the West in 1860 reveals
the gross absurdities of parallel lines
and over-dense construction in many
areas. The highly rational response of
western leaders to their communities'
transport needs had led to a highly
irrational result. But the western
transport network included many lines of
communication, built mainly
with the resources of state and local government,
that were vital in the
development of a national economy. And
the growth of this transport net-
work had been influenced significantly
by the effects of urban and regional
rivalry.
THE AUTHOR: Harry N. Scheiber is an
assistant professor of history at
Dartmouth Col-
lege. He is now completing a book-length
study
of internal improvements and economic
change
in Ohio during the period covered in
this
article.
URBAN RIVALRY AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST 1820-1860 |
by HARRY N. SCHEIBER |
|
At the very beginning of settlement in the Old Northwest urban commu- nities developed in response to the commercial needs of the surrounding country.* And almost as soon as they appeared, there was "urban rivalry," that is, competition among them for advantages that would promote their growth and enhance their attractiveness to emigrants and investors.1 The earliest rivalries usually involved competition for advantages that govern- ment might bestow. Designation as the county seat or as the territorial or state capital marked the beginning of growth for many a rude village in the West, and the pursuit of these choice prizes was inevitably marked by keen political struggles. The presence of federal land offices, colleges and acad- emies, or government installations such as arsenals and prisons was for many towns the only factor that permitted them to outdistance less favored rivals with equivalent natural or geographic endowments.2 NOTES ARE ON PAGES 289-292 |