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As the secession crisis in the Old Dominion approached its climax in May 1861, the Unionists of northwestern Virginia looked anxiously to the state of Ohio for "deliverance from tyranny." On May 26, 1861, only three days after Virginia formally seceded from the Union, Major General George B. McClellan, commander of the department of the Ohio, launched his invasion to preserve western Virginia for the Union. To his troops McClellan issued the first in a series of colorful, if exaggerated, manifestoes that helped to earn him the title, "The Young Napoleon of the West." NOTES ARE ON PAGES 193-194 |
84 OHIO HISTORY
"Soldiers!" he began,
You are ordered to cross the frontier,
and enter upon the soil of Virginia.
Your mission is to restore peace and
confidence, to protect the majesty of the
law, and to rescue our brethren from the
grasp of armed traitors. You are to
act in concert with [loyal] Virginia
troops, and to support their advance. ...
Preserve the strictest
discipline;--remember that each one of you holds in his
keeping, the honor of Ohio and the
Union. If you are called upon to overcome
armed opposition, I know that your
courage is equal to the task;--but remember,
that your only foes are the armed
traitors,--and show mercy even to them when
they are in your power, for many of them
are misguided. When, under your
protection, the loyal men of Western
Virginia have been enabled to organize
and arm, they can protect themselves,
and you can then return to your homes,
with the proud satisfaction of having
saved a gallant people from destruction.1
At 5 A.M. on the morning of May 27,
1861, the First (West) Virginia
Regiment accompanied by four companies
of the Second (West) Virginia
Volunteers proceeded southeast from Wheeling
along the line of the Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad toward a
Confederate encampment in the interior.
The Sixteenth Ohio, stationed at
Bellaire, across the river south of Wheeling,
was ordered to support the movement. To
the south, the Fourteenth and
Eighteenth Ohio regiments occupied
Parkersburg.2 Colonel Frederick W.
Lander, aide-de-camp to McClellan,
directed the invasion at Parkersburg,
while Colonel Benjamin F. Kelley,
commander of the First (West) Virginia
Volunteers, led the spearhead south from
Wheeling.3
On learning that Kelley had reached
Fairmont, some twenty miles from
his position at Grafton, Colonel George
A. Porterfield, the Confederate
commander, withdrew his troops to
Philippi, fifteen miles further south.4
Kelley continued his advance without
opposition.5 Meanwhile, the Fourteenth
Ohio moved east from Parkersburg. On
June 1 Lander joined the Fourteenth
near Clarksburg and ordered Colonel
James B. Steedman to prepare his
troops for a night march on June 2 against
Porterfield at Philippi. Lander,
accompanied by an advance guard, pushed
on to Grafton. There he found
Kelley, who had been joined by Indiana
troops under Brigadier General
Thomas A. Morris, planning an attack on
Porterfield also. A council of war
followed and the decision was made to
march on Philippi in two converging
columns--one wing directed by Kelley,
the other by Lander.6
At noon on June 2 Kelley's troops were
transported by rail to a point
eight miles east of Grafton and marched
south. Lander, reinforced by the
Eighteenth Ohio and the Sixth and Ninth
Indiana regiments, detrained at
Webster, a few miles west of Grafton. As
a result of a forced march on a
rainy, moonless night Kelley and Lander
arrived at Philippi almost simul-
taneously before dawn on the morning of
June 3.
WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861 85 The attack was scheduled to begin at 4 A.M. Unfortunately, neither Lander nor Kelley was able to get into position on time. Moreover, Kelley took the wrong fork of a road leading into Philippi. As a consequence, both Union columns approached Porterfield's encampment on the same side of town. By 4:30 A.M. Lander's guns were in position; but he had not yet com- municated with Kelley. On observing the Rebels breaking camp, Lander's batteries opened fire and the Ninth Indiana moved forward. As fate would have it, Kelley's arrival on the scene coincided with the beginning of Lander's bombardment. As a result, the (West) Virginia volunteers led the attack. The Confederates fled in confusion. Within minutes the "Philippi Races," the first land battle of the Civil War, was over. Had the attack proceeded |
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according to plan, Porterfield would not have escaped. As it was, his com- mand was shattered. The Confederates lost 750 stand of arms, and all of their ammunition, supplies, and equipment.7 Few casualties were suffered by either side; but federal troops took a number of prisoners, including Lieutenant Colonel William J. Willey.8 The encounter at Philippi, better described as a skirmish than a battle, nevertheless had profound implications so far as the future of western Virginia was concerned. On June 7 General Thomas S. Haymond, at Rich- mond, received an urgent telegram from the northwest. "Our troops at Philippi," it read, "have been attacked by a large force with artillery under McClelland [sic] and drew back to Beverly. We must have as large a number of troops as possible from Richmond without a moments [sic] delay or else abandon the Northwest."9 Shortly thereafter Brigadier General Robert S. Garnett took command |
86 OHIO
HISTORY
of Confederate troops in the northwest;
but never was Garnett in a position
to launch offensive operations against
the superior forces thrown into western
Virginia from Ohio. From his
headquarters at Laurel Hill, Garnett apprised
General Robert E. Lee, in command at
Richmond, of the difficulties he faced.
Arriving at Huttonsville on June 14,
Garnett reported:
I found there twenty-three companies of
infantry . . . in a miserable con-
dition as to arms, clothing, equipments,
instruction, and discipline. Twenty of
these companies were organized into two
regiments, the one under Lieutenant-
Colonel Jackson and the other under
Lieutenant-Colonel Heck. Though wholly
incapable, in my judgment, of rendering
anything like efficient service, I deemed
it of such importance to possess myself
of the two turnpike passes over the Rich
and Laurel Mountains, before they should
be seized by the enemy, that I left
Huttonsville on the evening of the 15th
with these two regiments and Captain
Rice's battery, and, by marching them a
greater portion of the night, reached
the two passes early in the afternoon of
the following day. . . .
I regard these two passes as the gates
to the northwestern country, and, had
they been occupied by the enemy, my
command would have been effectually
paralyzed or shut up in the Cheat River
Valley. I think it was a great mistake
on the part of the enemy not to have
remained here after driving Colonel
Porterfield's command over it. . . .
This force I consider more than
sufficient to hold these two passes, but not
sufficient to hold the railroad, if I
should get an opportunity of seizing it at
any particular point; for I must have an
adequate force in each of the passes
to secure them for our use.10
Lee had urged Garnett to destroy the
Cheat River bridge on the Baltimore
and Ohio. Even though Garnett recognized
the importance of this objective,
he advised Lee, "My moving force
(say three thousand) . . . will not be
sufficient, I fear, for this
operation."11 At no time did Garnett's army exceed
4,500 (including a Georgia regiment
which did not arrive until June 24),
while McClellan was to have nearly
20,000 men at his disposal in the
northwest alone. Garnett himself had a
rendezvous with death at Carrick's
Ford on July 13. In retrospect, the
feeble efforts made by the authorities at
Richmond to hold the northwest were
doomed from the beginning.
Porterfield had been ordered to Grafton
on May 4 by Lee to "select a
position for the troops called into the
service of the State, for the protection
and defense of that part of the
country." Using Grafton as a base of oper-
ations, Porterfield was directed to
occupy Parkersburg and Wheeling and
prevent the Baltimore and Ohio
"from being used to the injury of the
State."12 Obviously, Lee
expected an invasion from Ohio. Yet, his orders
to Porterfield were totally unrealistic
and therefore impossible to implement.
By far the largest number of troops to
be used in these operations were to
WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861 87
be raised in the northwest itself. On
May 3 Governor John Letcher had
ordered the militia of nineteen
northwestern counties to rendezvous at Park-
ersburg and Grafton.13 The
major difficulty in this plan was the fact that
twelve of those nineteen counties were
Union strongholds. Few militiamen
answered a Confederate "call to
the colors" from these areas; and the seven
secessionist counties listed in
Letcher's proclamation did not contain the
manpower necessary for carrying out
Lee's instructions.
Furthermore, adequate provision was not
made for supplying Porterfield
with arms, ammunition, and equipment.
On May 4 Lee informed Porterfield
that two hundred muskets had been sent
to Colonel Thomas J. "Stonewall"
Jackson at Harpers Ferry and would be
forwarded to Grafton.14 Ten days
later Lee shipped Porterfield another
six hundred muskets.15 If these sup-
plies arrived, they were not nearly
enough. On May 29 Porterfield reported
that during his retreat from Grafton to
Philippi, he was met by an unarmed
company of volunteers from Upshur
County which he was compelled "to
send home, for want of arms to supply
them with." Earlier he had been
forced to dismiss two cavalry
companies--one each from Barbour and
Pocahontas counties for the same
reason.16 As a result, Porterfield, with
only a thousand poorly equipped and
untrained militiamen under his com-
mand, was in no position to occupy
Parkersburg and Wheeling; nor could
he systematically destroy the railroad
bridges along the line of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad after the invasion
began. Unable to oppose Kelley at
Grafton, he withdrew to Philippi.
"As soon as I can organize my com-
mand," he wrote, "which I
hope to do soon, I will return to some more
eligible point in the neighborhood of
Grafton, which will enable me to
command both railroads."17 Porterfield
was "whistling in the dark." The
major flaw in his strategy under the
conditions he had to face was the fact
that he did not retreat far enough fast
enough.
Although George B. McClellan won glory
and the command of the army
of the Potomac for his military
exploits in northwestern Virginia, Governor
William Dennison of Ohio must be given
a full measure of recognition for
making the invasion of northwestern
Virginia possible. His efforts have not
been fully appreciated.
As early as January 1861 Dennison
warned Governor Letcher that the
"entire power and resources of the
State of Ohio" were to be offered to the
president of the United States to
coerce and subjugate seceding states.
Naturally enough, Letcher considered
this letter an implied threat against
Virginia.18 And indeed it
was! When the Virginia Convention of 1861
passed an ordinance of secession on
April 17, Dennison launched a vigorous
program to defend Ohio against
invasion.
88 OHIO HISTORY
One of the first important decisions
made by Dennison was his choice of
McClellan to command the Ohio
volunteers. The appointment, on April 23,
was received with general approbation
throughout the North.19 In addition to
McClellan, the appointment of Jacob
Dolson Cox and William S. Rosecrans
as brigadier generals proved to be
salutary. If not brilliant commanders,
these two were competent officers. In a
day when politics often determined
the appointment of officers to high
command their selection was no mean
achievement in itself.
On April 26 the Ohio legislature passed
an act conferring war powers on
Dennison. The Ohio governor acted
swiftly. On May 1 he advised R. W.
Taylor, auditor of the state of Ohio,
that he planned "to call into active
service nine regiments of Infantry and a
proper proportion of artillery and
cavalry." He requested that funds
be made available immediately for
expenses incurred.20 Dennison
then dispatched purchasing agents to Illinois
and New York City to acquire arms and
made arrangements to buy addi-
tional quantities in Europe. He also
took steps to give the military top
priority in the use of rail and telegraph
lines. As the national government
had to rely on state governments almost
exclusively in the early stages of
the war for troops, arms, ammunition,
and supplies, governors such as
Morton of Indiana and Dennison exercised
great influence on Lincoln and
the war department.
On April 27 the Ohio governor wrote to
Lincoln recommending that
McClellan be placed in charge of all
military forces west of the Alleghenies.21
A week later McClellan was chosen to
command the newly created depart-
ment of the Ohio, composed of the states
of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana.22
But Dennison was not satisfied. On May 7
he again contacted Washington,
urging that western Virginia be placed
under McClellan's jurisdiction also.
The next day this request was granted.23
Dennison's purpose was quite clear.
He immediately wrote McClellan at
Cincinnati, urging him to occupy Park-
ersburg.24 McClellan
hesitated. The information he received from the
"frontier" indicated
"that the moral effect of troops directly on the border
would not be very good--at least until
Western Virginia has decided for
herself what she will do."25 Dennison,
however, was not disposed to await
the outcome of the vote on the secession
ordinance on May 23. While he
did not attempt to interfere with
McClellan's conduct of military operations,
he continued to make strong suggestions.
On May 20 Dennison received word from
Wheeling informing him of
Confederate troop movements in the
vicinity of Grafton.26 Immediately the
Ohio governor wired Winfield Scott, the
federal general in chief, and Mc-
Clellan of these developments. Scott's
reply apparently was vague and
90 OHIO HISTORY
indecisive. Later that same day Dennison
sent a second dispatch to Mc-
Clellan and urged the immediate invasion
of western Virginia without
specific instructions from Washington.
It can never be said of Dennison
that he was not a man of action. In his
dispatch to McClellan he said:
Enclosed I send you [a] copy of my
telegram to Genl Scott and his reply
from which you will see he is not
disposed to share any of the responsibility
in taking care of Western Virginia. This
being so will it not be better for you
to take this part of your military
district under your immediate supervision
and provide whatever you may deem
necessary for its protection! Will not the
responsibility justify your asking for
an increase of the Ohio Contingent and
for all the arms and accompaniaments [sic]
that will be needed for its vigorous
discharge: It seems to me to so open the
way as to enable you to command all
the area and means necessary for the
prompt assured occupation of Western
Virginia and for carrying out your plan
of campaign in respect to that part
of the Union. Whatever aid I can render
is at your command.27
Scott's reasons for declining to issue
specific orders to McClellan re-
garding western Virginia are not clear.
Possibly he felt that direct action
before the ratification of the secession
ordinance by the Virginia electorate
would be premature. On April 27 Scott
had commented in a note to Lincoln
that "a march upon Richmond from
the Ohio would probably insure the
revolt of Western Virginia, which if
left alone will soon be five out of seven
for the Union."28 On the
other hand, Scott sent a strongly worded communi-
cation to McClellan on May 21 expressing
displeasure at McClellan's com-
plaint to the secretary of war that he
was without "instructions or authority."
Said Scott: "It is not conceived .
. . what instructions could have been needed
by you. Placed in command of a wide
Department . . . it surely was unnec-
essary to say that you were expected to
defend it against all enemies of the
U. States."29
If Scott's dispatch can be accepted at
face value, it might well be argued
that he expected McClellan to use his
own best judgment as to what action
was necessary within the boundaries of
his own department. Finally, on
May 24, four days after Dennison had
telegraphed Scott urging immediate
action, and only one day after the vote
on secession, Scott wired McClellan
in Cincinnati:
We have certain intelligence that at
least two companies of Virginia troops
have reached Grafton, evidently with the
purpose of overawing the friends of
the Union in Western Virginia. Can you
counteract the influence of that
detachment? Act promptly, and Major
Oakes, at Wheeling, may give you
valuable assistance.30
Certainly this telegram was not a
specific order instructing McClellan to
WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861 91
launch offensive operations in western
Virginia. But it is clear that Mc-
Clellan believed that Scott now expected
action. Following Philippi he wrote
Scott, "I trust, General, that my
action in the Grafton matter will show you
that I am not given to
procrastination."31
In the final analysis, it is plain that
McClellan's contention in later years
that he had acted entirely upon his own
authority and of his own volition,
"and without any advice, orders, or
instructions from Washington or else-
where," cannot be accepted at face
value.32 Such a view overlooked the
unqualified support McClellan received
from the influential Dennison.
Moreover, while Scott's telegram on May
24 may not have issued instructions
per se, it seems clear that McClellan
was expected to take such action as he
deemed necessary "to counteract the
influence of that detachment," located
one hundred miles from the Ohio River,
the exact size of which had not been
clearly determined. Conversely, Scott
appeared to be hedging throughout
as if he were attempting to avoid direct
responsibility if McClellan met
defeat or if an invasion proved to be
premature politically. Scott's fears
of possible political repercussions from
military intervention were as un-
founded as McClellan's later estimates
of Confederate military strength
were exaggerated.
McClellan arrived in Grafton on June 21
to take personal command of
operations against Garnett. He met with
unbridled enthusiasm all along his
route. Describing his reception, he
wrote to his wife:
At every station where we stopped crowds
had assembled to see the "young
general": gray-headed men and
women, mothers holding up their children to
take my hand, girls, boys, all sorts,
cheering and crying, God bless you! I
never went through such a scene in my
life.33
To his troops McClellan announced his
arrival in more dramatic style.
"Soldiers!" he wrote, "I
have heard that there was danger here. I have
come to place myself at your head and to
share it with you. I fear now but
one thing--that you will not find foemen
worthy of your steel."34 But Mc-
Clellan revealed a different attitude
when he wrote to Lieutenant Colonel
E. D. Townsend, the assistant adjutant
general, in Washington:
Assure the General [Winfield Scott] that
no prospect of a brilliant victory
shall induce me to depart from my
intention of gaining success by maneuvering
rather than by fighting. I will not
throw these raw men of mine into the teeth
of artillery and intrenchments if it is
possible to avoid it. Say to the General,
too, that I am trying to follow a lesson
long ago learned from him; i.e., not to
move until I know that everything is
ready, and then to move with the utmost
rapidity and energy.35
92 OHIO HISTORY
McClellan wrote this letter from
Buckhannon, "the important strategical
position in this region," from
which he would launch his attack against the
Confederate forces under Lieutenant
Colonel John Pegram at Rich Moun-
tain. Pegram had about 1,300 men, while
Garnett and the main body of
troops, composed of about 3,000 men, was
entrenched about twelve miles
north at Laurel Mountain. "I shall,
if possible," McClellan said to Town-
send, "turn the position to the
south, and thus occupy the Beverly road in
his [the enemy's] rear."36
McClellan planned his strategy with
precision. While concentrating about
8,000 men at Buckhannon for the main
attack on Pegram, he left 4,000 men
at Philippi under Brigadier General
Morris, whose major function lay in
"amusing the enemy" on Laurel.37
Moreover, McClellan had a large number
of troops concentrated at several other
points--including Weston, Clarks-
burg, Bulltown, and Grafton--which could
be called upon as exigencies
demanded. In addition, he ordered
Brigadier General Jacob D. Cox to the
Kanawha Valley with four full regiments
to dislodge Brigadier General
Henry A. Wise, who arrived in Charleston
on July 6. Wise's "Legion,"
composed of 2,700 raw militia troops,
was ordered to hold the Kanawha
region.38 Yet, McClellan
believed, and rightly so, that Garnett would
attempt to use Wise's command as a
diversionary force. If Wise could
threaten McClellan's rear, Garnett
reasoned, "the enemy would have to draw
from his force in my front to meet
him."39 Wise was eliminated as a poten-
tial threat, however, by Cox's
appearance on July 10 and by the swiftness
of McClellan's movements against Pegram.
Lee was not able to send
Garnett's urgent request on to Wise
until July 11, the same day that
Confederate hopes of holding the
northwest were destroyed by Pegram's
crushing defeat at Rich Mountain.40
Clearly perceiving that he would suffer
heavy losses if he stormed the
heavily entrenched western slope of
Rich, McClellan dispatched Rosecrans'
brigade of four regiments on a flanking
maneuver.41 Rosecrans was in luck.
A young Virginian by the name of David
Hart led Rosecrans to the summit
of Rich on Pegram's left flank by way of
an unguarded mountain trail. A
small force of three hundred
Confederates delayed the verdict for three
hours; but Pegram's doom was sealed.
Gathering the remnants of his com-
mand, a group of bewildered and
terror-stricken men, Pegram tried to make
his way "over the mountains, where
there was not the sign of a path, toward
General Garnett's camp."42 Convinced
of the futility of flight on learning
the next day that Garnett had abandoned
Laurel Mountain, there was
nothing left for Pegram "but the
sad determination of surrendering ourselves
prisoners of war to the enemy at
Beverly."43
|
As McClellan had hoped, Garnett found his position at Laurel untenable. As soon as the issue at Rich had been decided, McClellan "advanced . . . on Beverly and occupied it with the least possible delay--thus cutting off Garnett's retreat toward Huttonsville and forcing him to take the Leadsville and St. George road."44 With Morris in close pursuit, McClellan then wired Brigadier General C. W. Hill at Grafton to cut off his retreat.45 Garnett's capture seemed inevitable. As one Union officer expressed it, "Between 2,500 and 3,000 of a defeated army, in a disorganized condition, were in a position where escape did not come within the chances of war."46 Garnett himself was killed in a rear guard action at Carrick's Ford; but incredibly, |
94 OHIO HISTORY
the main body of his army escaped. Even
though it was twenty-five miles
from Carrick's Ford to the nearest pass
through the Alleghenies at Red
House, Garnett's command arrived at this
place two hours ahead of Union
troops and made good its escape. Two
major factors were responsible: a
delay in the transmission of McClellan's
telegram to Hill, and Hill's lack
of knowledge of the mountainous terrain,
which led him to conclude that
Garnett's line of retreat would be north
instead of east.47 Even so, Mc-
Clellan's victory was total.
The scene of action in western Virginia
then shifted to the Kanawha
Valley. Cox arrived at Point Pleasant on
July 10 and immediately began an
advance on Charleston.48 On
the afternoon of July 17 his advance guard of
1,200 men encountered 800 Confederates
from Wise's Legion at Scary
Creek, fifteen miles west of Charleston.
Although Cox was repulsed, the
battle at Scary was little more than a
delaying action.49 In light of Garnett's
crushing defeat in the northwest, Lee
ordered Wise to abandon the Kanawha
and withdraw towards Covington to
protect the Virginia Central Railroad.50
On learning that Cox had been checked at
Scary, McClellan planned to
take personal command of military
operations in the Kanawha Valley.51
But on July 22, the day after the
federal disaster at First Manassas, the
"Young Napoleon" was ordered
to Washington. In western Virginia he
was succeeded by the hero of Rich
Mountain, William S. Rosecrans. Cox,
however, continued his advance. On July
25 he entered Charleston; and
on July 29 he occupied Gauley Bridge,
the gateway to the Kanawha Valley
from the east.52 For all
practical purposes, the campaign in western
Virginia, if not over, had been won
beyond recall. Yet the northwest was
too great a prize to surrender without
an attempt being made to recover it.
In mid-August General Robert E. Lee,
accompanied by a force of 15,000
troops, arrived in the valley of
Virginia. Lee's first objective was to regain
the passes through the Alleghenies at
Laurel, Cheat, and Rich mountains.
Offensive operations in the northwest
would then be possible. On September
12 Lee launched an attack against the
federal troops at Cheat Mountain
near Huttonsville. But a combination of
factors, including mud, rain, sick-
ness, and bungling on the part of his
subordinates, conspired to make Lee's
debut as a field general a failure.53
The Confederates also made an
unsuccessful attempt to reconquer the
Kanawha Valley. Brigadier General John
Floyd, secretary of war under
Buchanan and an ex-governor of Virginia,
had raised a force of about 1,200
men in the southwest to protect the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.
Soon after Wise evacuated the Kanawha
region, Floyd was elevated to the
command of the army of the Kanawha. Wise
and his legion were ordered
WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861 95
to support Floyd. If any degree of
success were to be achieved, close coop-
eration between these two political
generals was imperative. Their personal
relations, however, were marked by
extreme bitterness. Henry Mason
Mathews, a representative in the
legislature from the region, wrote to Jeffer-
son Davis urging him to intervene.
"They are as inimical to each other as
men can be," he said, "and
from their course and actions I am fully satis-
fied that each of them would be highly
gratified to see the other annihi-
lated."54 Finally, on
September 21, a dispatch was sent to Wise relieving
him of command and ordering him back to
Richmond.55
Floyd did manage to win a skirmish at
Cross Lanes on August 26.56 And
he repulsed Rosecrans at the battle of
Carnifex Ferry on September 10. Yet,
in all probability, Floyd's army would
have been destroyed if Rosecrans
had pressed the issue.57 In
any event, neither Lee nor Floyd was in a
position to challenge federal supremacy
in northwestern Virginia. With the
exception of the brief reoccupation of
the Kanawha region by Major
General William W. Loring in September
of 1862, Union supremacy was
not challenged.58 Even
Loring's brief success came by default. Most federal
troops were withdrawn from western
Virginia when Lee moved north.
Union soldiers returned in force,
however, after the battles of South Moun-
tain and Antietam.59
The most obvious result of McClellan's
conquest of northwestern Virginia
was that it propelled the "Young
Napoleon" into the national limelight and
the command of the army of the Potomac.
Moreover, his mountain campaign
provided a psychological cushion for a
nation and an army that were shaken
by defeat at the first encounter at
Manassas. The strategic importance
of northwestern Virginia to the Union
cause, however, has not been appreci-
ated by most students of the Civil War.60
Northwestern Virginia served first of
all as a buffer zone for the states
of Ohio and Pennsylvania, a protective
covering for Pittsburgh and the
Ohio Valley. It also covered the western
flank of any Union army operating
in the Shenandoah Valley. In addition,
the line of the Baltimore and Ohio
ran through northwestern Virginia--a
railroad of great strategic importance
which provided the only connecting link
by rail between Washington and
the Middle West. The seizure of the
Baltimore and Ohio virtually intact
largely accounts for the rapidity with
which the northwest was conquered in
the first place. Finally, whether or not
Union occupation of northwestern
Virginia was a prime factor in
preserving Kentucky for the Union, the im-
portance of federal supremacy in both
areas in paving the way for the
occupation of eastern Tennessee can
hardly be exaggerated.61
It should be stressed also that
McClellan's invasion of northwestern Vir-
96 OHIO
HISTORY
ginia established the authority of the
Reorganized Government of Virginia
under Francis H. Pierpont, Union war
governor of the Old Dominion; and
it made a separate-state movement in
(West) Virginia possible. After
Garnett's defeat at Rich Mountain and
Wise's withdrawal from the Kanawha
Valley, northwestern Virginia no longer
was in danger of falling under the
control of a Confederate army of occupation.
But in view of the divided
loyalties of the inhabitants of western
Virginia and the persistence of
guerilla warfare in this region until
1865, it is clear that a liberal dose of
force was one of the prime ingredients
used by northwestern Unionists in
their magic formula for state-making.
In truth, West Virginia was a war-
born state.
THE AUTHOR: Richard O. Curry is a
visiting assistant professor of history
at the
University of Pittsburgh. His doctoral
dis-
sertation was a study of statehood
politics in
West Virginia.
|
As the secession crisis in the Old Dominion approached its climax in May 1861, the Unionists of northwestern Virginia looked anxiously to the state of Ohio for "deliverance from tyranny." On May 26, 1861, only three days after Virginia formally seceded from the Union, Major General George B. McClellan, commander of the department of the Ohio, launched his invasion to preserve western Virginia for the Union. To his troops McClellan issued the first in a series of colorful, if exaggerated, manifestoes that helped to earn him the title, "The Young Napoleon of the West." NOTES ARE ON PAGES 193-194 |